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Security hole in `script'
-------------------------
The BSD `script' utility included in the `bsdutils' package is not
installed setuid root, and was not written to be. Sometimes the tty
`script' allocates is already owned by the appropriate user, in which
case there will be no problem. In other cases, `script' will not be
able to set the ownership or mode of the pty/tty pair it allocates,
and so it cannot prevent other processes reading or writing to the tty.
The result of this is a security hole: during such a `script' session,
other users can read keystrokes from your tty, or write to your terminal,
without any warning or explicit authorisation. This means that any
password(s) or other sensitive data you enter during such a `script'
session are not secure against snooping, even if they are (properly)
not echoed to the screen.
To protect against this, `script' tries to detect whether the tty
allocated for it by the C library's openpty() function is secure
against snooping. If it detects that there is a problem, `script'
issues a warning. If you see this warning, you should not enter any
sensitive data during the script session, and you should not trust the
output displayed, or that recorded in the `typescript' file, to be free
from tampering.
This bug is due to a long-standing design flaw in UNIX, and is to be cured
shortly by the introduction of the UNIX98-style pty system supported
by GLIBC 2.1 and Linux 2.2. The UNIX98-style pty system makes use of
kernel support to create slave devices on the fly, with the correct
ownership and permissions already in place. This allows unprivileged
user programs to allocate pty/tty pairs securely, and eliminates the
race conditions currently present in pty allocation.
When `script' is used on a system with UNIX98-style pty support in
the kernel and in libc, `script' will detect that its tty is secure,
and will not display the warning.
Charles Briscoe-Smith <cpbs@debian.org> Wed, 9 Dec 1998 13:32:49 +0000
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