diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 6527 |
1 files changed, 3203 insertions, 3324 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index fadca74..b8f91bc 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source @@ -162,11 +162,11 @@ #include <openssl/hmac.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -#include <openssl/dh.h> +# include <openssl/dh.h> #endif #include <openssl/bn.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> +# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> #endif #include <openssl/md5.h> @@ -174,3502 +174,3381 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) - { - if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) - return(SSLv3_server_method()); - else - return(NULL); - } +{ + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) + return (SSLv3_server_method()); + else + return (NULL); +} IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, - ssl3_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl3_get_server_method) + ssl3_accept, + ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) - { - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && - (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) - { - if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) - { - /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, - we do so if There is no srp login name */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - } - else - { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); - } - } - return ret; - } +{ + int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; + + *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && + (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { + if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { + /* + * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp + * login name + */ + ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + } else { + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); + } + } + return ret; +} #endif int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) - { - BUF_MEM *buf; - unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0; - - RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); - ERR_clear_error(); - clear_sys_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb=s->ctx->info_callback; - - /* init things to blank */ - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); - - if (s->cert == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); - return(-1); - } - +{ + BUF_MEM *buf; + unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int ret = -1; + int new_state, state, skip = 0; + + RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* init things to blank */ + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) + SSL_clear(s); + + if (s->cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); + return (-1); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we - * already got and don't await it anymore, because - * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) - { - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } + /* + * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and + * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during + * handshakes anyway. + */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + } #endif - for (;;) - { - state=s->state; - - switch (s->state) - { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate=1; - /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ - - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - - s->server=1; - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); - - if ((s->version>>8) != 3) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) - { - if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) - { - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->init_buf=buf; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - s->init_num=0; - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - - if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) - { - /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that - * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) - */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } - else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - /* Server attempting to renegotiate with - * client that doesn't support secure - * renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - else - { - /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, - * we will just send a HelloRequest */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: - - s->shutdown=0; - ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num=0; - - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - - s->shutdown=0; - if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) - { - ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - } + for (;;) { + state = s->state; + + switch (s->state) { + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: + s->renegotiate = 1; + /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ + + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: + + s->server = 1; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + + if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) { + if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + BUF_MEM_free(buf); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + s->init_buf = buf; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + s->init_num = 0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* + * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. + */ + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + + if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { + /* + * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the + * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) + */ + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* + * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't + * support secure renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } else { + /* + * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a + * HelloRequest + */ + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: + + s->shutdown = 0; + ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num = 0; + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: + s->state = SSL_ST_OK; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: + + s->shutdown = 0; + if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { + ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - { - int al; - if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) - { - /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ - s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - goto end; - } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) - { - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - /* This is not really an error but the only means to - for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - } -#endif - - s->renegotiate = 2; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + { + int al; + if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { + /* + * callback indicates firther work to be done + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + goto end; + } + if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + /* + * This is not really an error but the only means to for + * a client to detect whether srp is supported. + */ + if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + } +#endif + + s->renegotiate = 2; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: + ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->hit) - { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } + if (s->hit) { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + } #else - if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + if (s->hit) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ - /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ + /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ + if (! + (s->s3->tmp. + new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | + SSL_aSRP)) +&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - else - { - skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } else { + skip = 1; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } #else - } - else - skip=1; + } else + skip = 1; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* - * clear this, it may get reset by - * send_server_key_exchange - */ - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; - - - /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or - * RSA but we have a sign only certificate - * - * PSK: may send PSK identity hints - * - * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange - * message only if the cipher suite is either - * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the - * server certificate contains the server's - * public key for key exchange. - */ - if (0 - /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity - * hint if provided */ + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* + * clear this, it may get reset by + * send_server_key_exchange + */ + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; + + /* + * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a + * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For + * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if + * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, + * the server certificate contains the server's public key for + * key exchange. + */ + if (0 + /* + * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if + * provided + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ - || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) + /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ + || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif - || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) - || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) - || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL - || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - ) - ) - ) - ) - { - ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - } - else - skip=1; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: - if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || - /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, - * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ - ((s->session->peer != NULL) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || - /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites - * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts - * and in RFC 2246): */ - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && - /* ... except when the application insists on verification - * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || - /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || - /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) - /* With normal PSK Certificates and - * Certificate Requests are omitted */ - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - /* no cert request */ - skip=1; - s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - } - else - { - s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; - ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH)) + || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) + || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) + && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys + [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * + 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) + ) + ) + ) + ) { + ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + } else + skip = 1; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: + if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || + /* + * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert + * during re-negotiation: + */ + ((s->session->peer != NULL) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || + /* + * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see + * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in + * RFC 2246): + */ + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && + /* + * ... except when the application insists on + * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts + * this for SSL 3) + */ + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || + /* + * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites + */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || + /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) + /* + * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests + * are omitted + */ + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + /* no cert request */ + skip = 1; + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; + ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif - s->init_num=0; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - - /* This code originally checked to see if - * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO - * and then flushed. This caused problems - * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed - * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue - * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING - * still exist. So instead we just flush - * unconditionally. - */ - - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; - - s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: - /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ - ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (ret == 2) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; - else { - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) - { - ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - } - s->init_num=0; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (ret == 2) - { - /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when - * the client sends its ECDH pub key in - * a certificate, the CertificateVerify - * message is not sent. - * Also for GOST ciphersuites when - * the client uses its key from the certificate - * for key exchange. - */ + s->init_num = 0; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: + + /* + * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending + * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as + * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely + * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of + * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush + * unconditionally. + */ + + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: + /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ + ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 2) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; + else { + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + } + s->init_num = 0; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 2) { + /* + * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH + * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is + * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses + * its key from the certificate for key exchange. + */ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif - s->init_num = 0; - } - else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num=0; - if (!s->session->peer) - break; - /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer - * at this point and digest cached records. - */ - if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - } - else - { - int offset=0; - int dgst_num; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num=0; - - /* We need to get hashes here so if there is - * a client cert, it can be verified - * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify - * should be generalized. But it is next step - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - return -1; - for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) - if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) - { - int dgst_size; - - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); - dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); - if (dgst_size < 0) - { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - offset+=dgst_size; - } - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - /* - * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be - * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need - * to set this here because we don't know if we're - * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* we should decide if we expected this one */ - ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num = 0; + if (!s->session->peer) + break; + /* + * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and + * digest cached records. + */ + if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + } else { + int offset = 0; + int dgst_num; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + /* + * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, + * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for + * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next + * step + */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + return -1; + for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) + if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { + int dgst_size; + + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + EVP_MD_CTX_type + (s-> + s3->handshake_dgst + [dgst_num]), + &(s->s3-> + tmp.cert_verify_md + [offset])); + dgst_size = + EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); + if (dgst_size < 0) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + offset += dgst_size; + } + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: + /* + * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be + * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need + * to set this here because we don't know if we're + * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. + */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* we should decide if we expected this one */ + ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif - s->init_num=0; - break; + s->init_num = 0; + break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: - /* - * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. - * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through - * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was - * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. - * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is - * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until - * the client's Finished message is read. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->init_num = 0; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - break; + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: + /* + * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. + * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through + * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was + * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make + * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. + * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is + * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until + * the client's Finished message is read. + */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + + ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->init_num = 0; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + break; #endif - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - /* - * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. - * In a full handshake, we end up here through - * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was - * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. - * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is - * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until - * the client's Finished message is read. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL_ST_OK; + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: + /* + * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. + * In a full handshake, we end up here through + * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was + * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make + * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. + * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is + * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until + * the client's Finished message is read. + */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + if (s->hit) + s->state = SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif - else - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num=0; - break; + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; #endif - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: - - s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) - { ret= -1; goto end; } - - ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); - - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num=0; - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) - { - ret= -1; - goto end; - } - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: - ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, - SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, - s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, - s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (s->hit) - { + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: + + s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, + SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); + + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: + ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, + SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, + s->method-> + ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, + s->method-> + ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; + if (s->hit) { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - { - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - } - else - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; + } else + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; #endif - } - else - s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num=0; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf=NULL; - - /* remove buffering on output */ - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - - s->init_num=0; - - if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ - { - s->renegotiate=0; - s->new_session=0; - - ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; - /* s->server=1; */ - s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; - - if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); - } - - ret = 1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - - default: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret= -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) - { - if (s->debug) - { - if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - - if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) - { - new_state=s->state; - s->state=state; - cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); - s->state=new_state; - } - } - skip=0; - } -end: - /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ - - s->in_handshake--; - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); - return(ret); - } + } else + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL_ST_OK: + /* clean a few things up */ + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + + /* remove buffering on output */ + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + + s->init_num = 0; + + if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a + * HelloRequest */ + s->renegotiate = 0; + s->new_session = 0; + + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + /* s->server=1; */ + s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + + default: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + } + + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { + if (s->debug) { + if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) + goto end; + } + + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { + new_state = s->state; + s->state = state; + cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); + s->state = new_state; + } + } + skip = 0; + } + end: + /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ + + s->in_handshake--; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); + return (ret); +} int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) - { - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num=4; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } +{ + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 4; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) - { - int ok; - long n; - - /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, - * so permit appropriate message length */ - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) - { - /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per - * negotiation. */ - if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); - return -1; - } - /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, - * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ +{ + int ok; + long n; + + /* + * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, + * so permit appropriate message length + */ + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + /* + * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per + * negotiation. + */ + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); + return -1; + } + /* + * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, + * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) - { - DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); - s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; - } + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); + s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) - { - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); - s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; - } + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; + } #endif - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; - return 2; - } - return 1; + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; + return 2; + } + return 1; } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - { - int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; - unsigned int cookie_len; - long n; - unsigned long id; - unsigned char *p,*d,*q; - SSL_CIPHER *c; +{ + int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; + unsigned int cookie_len; + long n; + unsigned long id; + unsigned char *p, *d, *q; + SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; #endif - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; - - /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. - * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, - * This down switching should be handled by a different method. - * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with - * TLSv1. - */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A - ) - { - s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; - } - s->first_packet=1; - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, - SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - s->first_packet=0; - d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header - * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ - s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; - p+=2; - - if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || - (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && - !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) - { - /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ - s->version = s->client_version; - } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - - /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't - * contain one, just return since we do not want to - * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) - { - unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; - - session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); - - if (cookie_length == 0) - return 1; - } - - /* load the client random */ - memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* get the session-id */ - j= *(p++); - - s->hit=0; - /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. - * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests - * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather - * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security - * won't even compile against older library versions). - * - * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request - * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, - * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - * setting will be ignored. - */ - if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) - goto err; - } - else - { - i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); - /* - * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated - * version. - * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption - * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but - * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. - * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and - * will abort the handshake with an error. - */ - if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) - { /* previous session */ - s->hit=1; - } - else if (i == -1) - goto err; - else /* i == 0 */ - { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) - goto err; - } - } - - p+=j; - - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - /* cookie stuff */ - cookie_len = *(p++); - - /* - * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the - * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it - * does not cause an overflow. - */ - if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) - { - /* too much data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && - cookie_len > 0) - { - memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); - - if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) - { - if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, - cookie_len) == 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - /* else cookie verification succeeded */ - } - else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, - s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - ret = 2; - } - - p += cookie_len; - } - - n2s(p,i); - if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) - { - /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; - } - if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) - { - /* not enough data */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) - == NULL)) - { - goto err; - } - p+=i; - - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) - { - j=0; - id=s->session->cipher->id; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; + + /* + * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are + * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down + * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we + * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. + */ + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; + } + s->first_packet = 1; + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + s->first_packet = 0; + d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /* + * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may + * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) + */ + s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; + p += 2; + + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && + !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { + /* + * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version + * number + */ + s->version = s->client_version; + } + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just + * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check + * cookie length... + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { + unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); + + if (cookie_length == 0) + return 1; + } + + /* load the client random */ + memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* get the session-id */ + j = *(p++); + + s->hit = 0; + /* + * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in + * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally + * ignore resumption requests with flag + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather + * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this + * for security won't even compile against older library versions). + * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to + * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains + * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. + */ + if ((s->new_session + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + goto err; + } else { + i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); + /* + * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated + * version. + * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption + * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but + * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. + * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and + * will abort the handshake with an error. + */ + if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous + * session */ + s->hit = 1; + } else if (i == -1) + goto err; + else { /* i == 0 */ + + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + goto err; + } + } + + p += j; + + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + /* cookie stuff */ + cookie_len = *(p++); + + /* + * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the + * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it + * does not cause an overflow. + */ + if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { + /* too much data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { + memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); + + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, + cookie_len) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + /* else cookie verification succeeded */ + } + /* default verification */ + else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + ret = 2; + } + + p += cookie_len; + } + + n2s(p, i); + if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { + /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); + goto f_err; + } + if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) + == NULL)) { + goto err; + } + p += i; + + /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ + if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { + j = 0; + id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); + fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", + sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) - { - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", - i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), - SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); + fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", + i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); #endif - if (c->id == id) - { - j=1; - break; - } - } -/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade - * attack: CVE-2010-4180. - */ + if (c->id == id) { + j = 1; + break; + } + } + /* + * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: + * CVE-2010-4180. + */ #if 0 - if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) - { - /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may - * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to - * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server - * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not - * enabled, though. */ - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); - if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) - { - s->session->cipher = c; - j = 1; - } - } + if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) + && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { + /* + * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used + * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead + * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't + * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the + * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. + */ + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { + s->session->cipher = c; + j = 1; + } + } #endif - if (j == 0) - { - /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher - * list if we are asked to reuse it */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* compression */ - i= *(p++); - if ((p+i) > (d+n)) - { - /* not enough data */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - q=p; - for (j=0; j<i; j++) - { - if (p[j] == 0) break; - } - - p+=i; - if (j >= i) - { - /* no compress */ - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; - } - + if (j == 0) { + /* + * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked + * to reuse it + */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } + } + + /* compression */ + i = *(p++); + if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + q = p; + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (p[j] == 0) + break; + } + + p += i; + if (j >= i) { + /* no compress */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); + goto f_err; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) - { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) - { - /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } - } - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this - * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate - * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow - * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ - { - unsigned char *pos; - pos=s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) - { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; - - s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, - ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) - { - s->hit=1; - s->session->ciphers=ciphers; - s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; - - ciphers=NULL; - - /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ - pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - if (pref_cipher == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - - s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; - - if (s->cipher_list) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); - - if (s->cipher_list_by_id) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); - - s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); - s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); - } - } + /* TLS extensions */ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + } + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake + * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before + * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket + * processing to use it in key derivation. + */ + { + unsigned char *pos; + pos = s->s3->server_random; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + + s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, + &pref_cipher, + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->hit = 1; + s->session->ciphers = ciphers; + s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; + + ciphers = NULL; + + /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ + pref_cipher = + pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, + s-> + session->ciphers, + SSL_get_ciphers + (s)); + if (pref_cipher == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; + + if (s->cipher_list) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); + + if (s->cipher_list_by_id) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); + + s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); + } + } #endif - /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other - * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression - * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ - s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; + /* + * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other + * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression + * algorithms from the client, starting at q. + */ + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) - { - int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; - /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ - /* Can't disable compression */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } - /* Look for resumed compression method */ - for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) - { - comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); - if (comp_id == comp->id) - { - s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; - break; - } - } - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ - for (m = 0; m < i; m++) - { - if (q[m] == comp_id) - break; - } - if (m >= i) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); - goto f_err; - } - } - else if (s->hit) - comp = NULL; - else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) - { /* See if we have a match */ - int m,nn,o,v,done=0; - - nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - for (m=0; m<nn; m++) - { - comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); - v=comp->id; - for (o=0; o<i; o++) - { - if (v == q[o]) - { - done=1; - break; - } - } - if (done) break; - } - if (done) - s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; - else - comp=NULL; - } + /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; + /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ + /* Can't disable compression */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed compression method */ + for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); + if (comp_id == comp->id) { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; + break; + } + } + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ + for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { + if (q[m] == comp_id) + break; + } + if (m >= i) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } + } else if (s->hit) + comp = NULL; + else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { + /* See if we have a match */ + int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; + + nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); + v = comp->id; + for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { + if (v == q[o]) { + done = 1; + break; + } + } + if (done) + break; + } + if (done) + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; + else + comp = NULL; + } #else - /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session - * using compression. - */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } + /* + * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } #endif - /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must - * pick a cipher */ + /* + * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher + */ - if (!s->hit) - { + if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - s->session->compress_meth=0; + s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else - s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; + s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif - if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers=ciphers; - if (ciphers == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); - goto f_err; - } - ciphers=NULL; - c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - - if (c == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; - } - else - { - /* Session-id reuse */ + if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); + s->session->ciphers = ciphers; + if (ciphers == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); + goto f_err; + } + ciphers = NULL; + c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (c == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + } else { + /* Session-id reuse */ #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; - SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; - - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) - { - sk=s->session->ciphers; - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) - { - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); - if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) - nc=c; - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) - ec=c; - } - if (nc != NULL) - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; - else if (ec != NULL) - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; - else - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; - } - else + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; + SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; + + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { + sk = s->session->ciphers; + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) + nc = c; + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) + ec = c; + } + if (nc != NULL) + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; + else if (ec != NULL) + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; + else + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; + } else #endif - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; - } - - if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) - { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* we now have the following setup. - * client_random - * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers - * compression - basically ignored right now - * ssl version is set - sslv3 - * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. - * s->hit - session reuse flag - * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. - */ - - /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) - { - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - } - - if (ret < 0) ret=1; - if (0) - { -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - } -err: - if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return(ret); - } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; + } + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION + || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + /*- + * we now have the following setup. + * client_random + * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers + * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers + * compression - basically ignored right now + * ssl version is set - sslv3 + * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. + * s->hit - session reuse flag + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. + */ + + /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + } + + if (ret < 0) + ret = 1; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + } + err: + if (ciphers != NULL) + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); + return (ret); +} int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i,sl; - unsigned long l; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) - { - buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; +{ + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i, sl; + unsigned long l; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { + buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - p=s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) - return -1; + p = s->s3->server_random; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) + return -1; #endif - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d=p= &(buf[4]); - - *(p++)=s->version>>8; - *(p++)=s->version&0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* There are several cases for the session ID to send - * back in the server hello: - * - For session reuse from the session cache, - * we send back the old session ID. - * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) - * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" - * (which doesn't actually identify the session). - * - If it is a new session, we send back the new - * session ID. - * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, - * we send back a 0-length session ID. - * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, - * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed - * to send back. - */ - if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) - && !s->hit) - s->session->session_id_length=0; - - sl=s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - *(p++)=sl; - memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); - p+=sl; - - /* put the cipher */ - i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); - p+=i; - - /* put the compression method */ + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d = p = &(buf[4]); + + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + + /* Random stuff */ + memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /*- + * There are several cases for the session ID to send + * back in the server hello: + * - For session reuse from the session cache, + * we send back the old session ID. + * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) + * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" + * (which doesn't actually identify the session). + * - If it is a new session, we send back the new + * session ID. + * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, + * we send back a 0-length session ID. + * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ + if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) + && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + sl = s->session->session_id_length; + if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + *(p++) = sl; + memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); + p += sl; + + /* put the cipher */ + i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); + p += i; + + /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++)=0; + *(p++) = 0; #else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - *(p++)=0; - else - *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + *(p++) = 0; + else + *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - return -1; - } - if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } + if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } + if ((p = + ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, + buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == + NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } #endif - /* do the header */ - l=(p-d); - d=buf; - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; - l2n3(l,d); - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num=p-buf; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } + /* do the header */ + l = (p - d); + d = buf; + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; + l2n3(l, d); + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = p - buf; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) - { - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* do the header */ - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num=4; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } +{ + unsigned char *p; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 4; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; - int j,num; - RSA *rsa; - unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - unsigned int u; + unsigned char *q; + int j, num; + RSA *rsa; + unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; + DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encodedlen = 0; - int curve_id = 0; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encodedlen = 0; + int curve_id = 0; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - unsigned char *p,*d; - int al,i; - unsigned long type; - int n; - CERT *cert; - BIGNUM *r[4]; - int nr[4],kn; - BUF_MEM *buf; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) - { - type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - cert=s->cert; - - buf=s->init_buf; - - r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; - n=0; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + unsigned char *p, *d; + int al, i; + unsigned long type; + int n; + CERT *cert; + BIGNUM *r[4]; + int nr[4], kn; + BUF_MEM *buf; + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { + type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + cert = s->cert; + + buf = s->init_buf; + + r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; + n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (type & SSL_kRSA) - { - rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; - if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) - { - rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); - if(rsa == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - RSA_up_ref(rsa); - cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; - } - if (rsa == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - r[0]=rsa->n; - r[1]=rsa->e; - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; - } - else + if (type & SSL_kRSA) { + rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; + if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { + rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> + tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> + tmp.new_cipher)); + if (rsa == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + RSA_up_ref(rsa); + cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; + } + if (rsa == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + r[0] = rsa->n; + r[1] = rsa->e; + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (type & SSL_kEDH) - { - dhp=cert->dh_tmp; - if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) - dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); - if (dhp == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; - if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || - dhp->priv_key == NULL || - (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) - { - if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - else - { - dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); - dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); - if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || - (dh->priv_key == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - r[0]=dh->p; - r[1]=dh->g; - r[2]=dh->pub_key; - } - else + if (type & SSL_kEDH) { + dhp = cert->dh_tmp; + if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) + dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> + tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> + tmp.new_cipher)); + if (dhp == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; + if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || + dhp->priv_key == NULL || + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { + if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); + dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); + if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + r[0] = dh->p; + r[1] = dh->g; + r[2] = dh->pub_key; + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (type & SSL_kEECDH) - { - const EC_GROUP *group; - - ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; - if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) - { - ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); - } - if (ecdhp == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ - if (ecdhp == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; - if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) - { - if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); - goto err; - } - - /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH - * keys over named (not generic) curves. For - * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. - */ - if ((curve_id = - tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) - == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key. - * First check the size of encoding and - * allocate memory accordingly. - */ - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); - - if (encodedlen == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; - - /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not - * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. - * In this situation, we need four additional bytes - * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams - * structure. - */ - n = 4 + encodedlen; - - /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message - * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs - */ - r[0]=NULL; - r[1]=NULL; - r[2]=NULL; - r[3]=NULL; - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ + if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { + const EC_GROUP *group; + + ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; + if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { + ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> + tmp.new_cipher), + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> + s3->tmp.new_cipher)); + } + if (ecdhp == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ + if (ecdhp == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; + if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { + if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + + /* + * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named + * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is + * non-zero. + */ + if ((curve_id = + tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) + == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and + * allocate memory accordingly. + */ + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); + + if (encodedlen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + bn_ctx = NULL; + + /* + * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in + * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four + * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams + * structure. + */ + n = 4 + encodedlen; + + /* + * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we + * can set these to NULLs + */ + r[0] = NULL; + r[1] = NULL; + r[2] = NULL; + r[3] = NULL; + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_kPSK) - { - /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ - n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - } - else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + if (type & SSL_kPSK) { + /* + * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint + */ + n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (type & SSL_kSRP) - { - if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); - goto err; - } - r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; - r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; - r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; - r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; - } - else + if (type & SSL_kSRP) { + if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || + (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); + goto err; + } + r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; + r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; + r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; + r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; + } else #endif - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) - { - nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); + { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { + nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - n+=1+nr[i]; - else + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) + n += 1 + nr[i]; + else #endif - n+=2+nr[i]; - } - - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) - { - if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) - == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - } - else - { - pkey=NULL; - kn=0; - } - - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); - goto err; - } - d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - p= &(d[4]); - - for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) - { + n += 2 + nr[i]; + } + + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) + == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + } else { + pkey = NULL; + kn = 0; + } + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); + goto err; + } + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p = &(d[4]); + + for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - { - *p = nr[i]; - p++; - } - else + if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { + *p = nr[i]; + p++; + } else #endif - s2n(nr[i],p); - BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); - p+=nr[i]; - } + s2n(nr[i], p); + BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); + p += nr[i]; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (type & SSL_kEECDH) - { - /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. - * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: - * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] - * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by - * the actual encoded point itself - */ - *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; - p += 1; - *p = 0; - p += 1; - *p = curve_id; - p += 1; - *p = encodedlen; - p += 1; - memcpy((unsigned char*)p, - (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, - encodedlen); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - encodedPoint = NULL; - p += encodedlen; - } + if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { + /* + * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In + * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte + * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded + * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself + */ + *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; + p += 1; + *p = 0; + p += 1; + *p = curve_id; + p += 1; + *p = encodedlen; + p += 1; + memcpy((unsigned char *)p, + (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + encodedPoint = NULL; + p += encodedlen; + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_kPSK) - { - /* copy PSK identity hint */ - s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); - strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); - p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - } + if (type & SSL_kPSK) { + /* copy PSK identity hint */ + s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); + strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); + p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + } #endif - /* not anonymous */ - if (pkey != NULL) - { - /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) - * and p points to the space at the end. */ + /* not anonymous */ + if (pkey != NULL) { + /* + * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p + * points to the space at the end. + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA - && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - q=md_buf; - j=0; - for (num=2; num > 0; num--) - { - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, - EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) - ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, - (unsigned int *)&i); - q+=i; - j+=i; - } - if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, - &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); - goto err; - } - s2n(u,p); - n+=u+2; - } - else + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA + && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { + q = md_buf; + j = 0; + for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) + ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); + q += i; + j += i; + } + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); + goto err; + } + s2n(u, p); + n += u + 2; + } else #endif - if (md) - { - /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature - * algorithm */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) - { - /* Should never happen */ - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - p+=2; - } + if (md) { + /* + * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { + /* Should never happen */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + p += 2; + } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", - EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); - if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); - goto err; - } - s2n(i,p); - n+=i+2; - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - n+= 2; - } - else - { - /* Is this error check actually needed? */ - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - l2n3(n,d); - - /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send - * it off */ - s->init_num=n+4; - s->init_off=0; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); -err: + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto err; + } + s2n(i, p); + n += i + 2; + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + n += 2; + } else { + /* Is this error check actually needed? */ + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + l2n3(n, d); + + /* + * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off + */ + s->init_num = n + 4; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + if (encodedPoint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return(-1); - } + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return (-1); +} int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) - { - unsigned char *p,*d; - int i,j,nl,off,n; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) - { - buf=s->init_buf; - - d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); - - /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ - p++; - n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); - d[0]=n; - p+=n; - n++; - - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); - s2n(nl, p); - p += nl + 2; - n += nl + 2; - } - - off=n; - p+=2; - n+=2; - - sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); - nl=0; - if (sk != NULL) - { - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) - { - name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); - j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) - { - s2n(j,p); - i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); - n+=2+j; - nl+=2+j; - } - else - { - d=p; - i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); - j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; - n+=j; - nl+=j; - } - } - } - /* else no CA names */ - p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); - s2n(nl,p); - - d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; - *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - l2n3(n,d); - - /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send - * it off */ - - s->init_num=n+4; - s->init_off=0; +{ + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i, j, nl, off, n; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; + X509_NAME *name; + BUF_MEM *buf; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { + buf = s->init_buf; + + d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); + + /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ + p++; + n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); + d[0] = n; + p += n; + n++; + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); + s2n(nl, p); + p += nl + 2; + n += nl + 2; + } + + off = n; + p += 2; + n += 2; + + sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + nl = 0; + if (sk != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { + name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); + j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { + s2n(j, p); + i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); + n += 2 + j; + nl += 2 + j; + } else { + d = p; + i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); + j -= 2; + s2n(j, d); + j += 2; + n += j; + nl += j; + } + } + } + /* else no CA names */ + p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); + s2n(nl, p); + + d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + l2n3(n, d); + + /* + * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off + */ + + s->init_num = n + 4; + s->init_off = 0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; - - /* do the header */ - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - *(p++)=0; - s->init_num += 4; + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + goto err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + *(p++) = 0; + s->init_num += 4; #endif - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; - } + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; + } - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -err: - return(-1); - } + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + err: + return (-1); +} int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) - { - int i,al,ok; - long n; - unsigned long alg_k; - unsigned char *p; +{ + int i, al, ok; + long n; + unsigned long alg_k; + unsigned char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa=NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - BIGNUM *pub=NULL; - DH *dh_srvr; + BIGNUM *pub = NULL; + DH *dh_srvr; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + KSSL_ERR kssl_err; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; - EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; + EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - 2048, /* ??? */ - &ok); + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); - if (!ok) return((int)n); - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - { - unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - int decrypt_len; - unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; - size_t j; - - /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ - if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) - { - if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) - rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; - /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should - * be sent already */ - if (rsa == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); - goto f_err; - - } - } - else - { - pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; - if ( (pkey == NULL) || - (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || - (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto f_err; - } - rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; - } - - /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - n2s(p,i); - if (n != i+2) - { - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - else - p-=2; - } - else - n=i; - } - - /* - * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure - * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire - * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The - * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the - * bound is sufficient to be safe. - */ - if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because - * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see - * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of - * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the - * case that the decrypt fails. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - - /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) - goto err; - decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - ERR_clear_error(); - - /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. - * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ - decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); - - /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct - * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. - * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack - * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version - * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks - * are done in constant time and are treated like any other - * decryption error. */ - version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); - version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); - - /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as - * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks - * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for - * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the - * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not - * support the requested protocol version. If - * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) - { - unsigned char workaround_good; - workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); - workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); - version_good |= workaround_good; - } - - /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good - * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ - decrypt_good &= version_good; - - /* - * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using - * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not - * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees - * it is still sufficiently large to read from. - */ - for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) - { - p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], - rand_premaster_secret[j]); - } - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, - p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); - } - else + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + int decrypt_len; + unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; + size_t j; + + /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { + if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) + rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; + /* + * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already + */ + if (rsa == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); + goto f_err; + + } + } else { + pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; + if ((pkey == NULL) || + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); + goto f_err; + } + rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; + } + + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + n2s(p, i); + if (n != i + 2) { + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto f_err; + } else + p -= 2; + } else + n = i; + } + + /* + * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure + * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire + * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The + * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the + * bound is sufficient to be safe. + */ + if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of + * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, + * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and + * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt + * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 + */ + + /* + * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. + */ + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + goto err; + decrypt_len = + RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* + * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will + * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. + */ + decrypt_good = + constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); + + /* + * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then + * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The + * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number + * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in + * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. + */ + version_good = + constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); + version_good &= + constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); + + /* + * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). + * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol + * version instead if the server does not support the requested + * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such + * clients. + */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { + unsigned char workaround_good; + workaround_good = + constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); + workaround_good &= + constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); + version_good |= workaround_good; + } + + /* + * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to + * remain non-zero (0xff). + */ + decrypt_good &= version_good; + + /* + * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using + * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not + * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees + * it is still sufficiently large to read from. + */ + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { + p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], + rand_premaster_secret[j]); + } + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + p, + sizeof + (rand_premaster_secret)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) - { - n2s(p,i); - if (n != i+2) - { - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto err; - } - else - { - p-=2; - i=(int)n; - } - } - - if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); - goto f_err; - } - else - { - if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - else - dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; - } - - pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); - if (pub == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); - - if (i <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); - BN_clear_free(pub); - goto err; - } - - DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); - s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; - - BN_clear_free(pub); - pub=NULL; - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,p,i); - OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); - } - else + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + n2s(p, i); + if (n != i + 2) { + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto err; + } else { + p -= 2; + i = (int)n; + } + } + + if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); + goto f_err; + } else { + if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else + dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; + } + + pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); + if (pub == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); + + if (i <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + BN_clear_free(pub); + goto err; + } + + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); + s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; + + BN_clear_free(pub); + pub = NULL; + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + p, i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) - { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - krb5_data enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator; - krb5_data enc_pms; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl; - krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; - krb5_ticket_times ttimes; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - - if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); - - n2s(p,i); - enc_ticket.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; - p+=enc_ticket.length; - - n2s(p,i); - authenticator.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - authenticator.data = (char *)p; - p+=authenticator.length; - - n2s(p,i); - enc_pms.length = i; - enc_pms.data = (char *)p; - p+=enc_pms.length; - - /* Note that the length is checked again below, - ** after decryption - */ - if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + - enc_pms.length + 6)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, - &kssl_err)) != 0) - { -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, - ** but will return authtime == 0. - */ - if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, - &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) - { -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); - goto err; - } - -#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ - - if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, - (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - outl += padl; - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) - { - /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the - * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the - * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). - * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of - * the protocol version. - * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. - * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) - */ - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, pms, outl); - - if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) - { - size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); - if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) - { - s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; - memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); - } - } - - - /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, - ** but it caused problems for apache. - ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); - ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; - */ - } - else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { + krb5_error_code krb5rc; + krb5_data enc_ticket; + krb5_data authenticator; + krb5_data enc_pms; + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + int padl, outl; + krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; + krb5_ticket_times ttimes; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); + + if (!kssl_ctx) + kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); + + n2s(p, i); + enc_ticket.length = i; + + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; + p += enc_ticket.length; + + n2s(p, i); + authenticator.length = i; + + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + authenticator.data = (char *)p; + p += authenticator.length; + + n2s(p, i); + enc_pms.length = i; + enc_pms.data = (char *)p; + p += enc_pms.length; + + /* + * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption + */ + if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + + enc_pms.length + 6)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, + &kssl_err)) != 0) { +# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); + if (kssl_err.text) + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); +# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will + * return authtime == 0. + */ + if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, + &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { +# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); + if (kssl_err.text) + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); +# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); + goto err; + } +# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); +# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); + if (enc == NULL) + goto err; + + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ + + if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, + (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + outl += padl; + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) + && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { + /* + * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as + * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, + * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH + * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random + * bytes instead of the protocol version. If + * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. + * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos + * cipher) + */ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + pms, outl); + + if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { + size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); + if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { + s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; + memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, + len); + } + } + + /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, + * but it caused problems for apache. + * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); + * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; + */ + } else +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - int ret = 1; - int field_size = 0; - const EC_KEY *tkey; - const EC_GROUP *group; - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - - /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ - if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Let's get server private key and group information */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) - { - /* use the certificate */ - tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; - } - else - { - /* use the ephermeral values we saved when - * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. - */ - tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; - } - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || - !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Let's get client's public key */ - if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (n == 0L) - { - /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ - - if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) - == NULL) || - (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) - { - /* XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates - * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is - * never executed. When that support is - * added, we ought to ensure the key - * received in the certificate is - * authorized for key agreement. - * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that - * the two ECDH shares are for the same - * group. - */ - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ - } - else - { - /* Get client's public key from encoded point - * in the ClientKeyExchange message. - */ - if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get encoded point length */ - i = *p; - p += 1; - if (n != 1 + i) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, - clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer - * currently, so set it to the start - */ - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - } - - /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); - if (field_size <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); - if (i <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); - EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); - s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; - - /* Compute the master secret */ - s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ - generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); - return (ret); - } - else + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + int ret = 1; + int field_size = 0; + const EC_KEY *tkey; + const EC_GROUP *group; + const BIGNUM *priv_key; + + /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ + if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Let's get server private key and group information */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + /* use the certificate */ + tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; + } else { + /* + * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the + * ServerKeyExchange msg. + */ + tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; + } + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || + !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Let's get client's public key */ + if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (n == 0L) { + /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ + + if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) + == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { + /* + * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication + * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the + * code is never executed. When that support is added, we + * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is + * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly + * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. + */ + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> + pkey.ec)) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ + } else { + /* + * Get client's public key from encoded point in the + * ClientKeyExchange message. + */ + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get encoded point length */ + i = *p; + p += 1; + if (n != 1 + i) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* + * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it + * to the start + */ + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + } + + /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); + if (field_size <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, + NULL); + if (i <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; + + /* Compute the master secret */ + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + p, i); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); + return (ret); + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) - { - unsigned char *t = NULL; - unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; - unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; - int psk_err = 1; - char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; - - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - - n2s(p,i); - if (n != i+2) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto psk_err; - } - if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto psk_err; - } - if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); - goto psk_err; - } - - /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity - * string for the callback */ - memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); - memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); - psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, - psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); - - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } - else if (psk_len == 0) - { - /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - goto psk_err; - } - - /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ - pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; - t = psk_or_pre_ms; - memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); - s2n(psk_len, t); - memset(t, 0, psk_len); - t+=psk_len; - s2n(psk_len, t); - - if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && - s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); - psk_err = 0; - psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_err != 0) - goto f_err; - } - else + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + unsigned char *t = NULL; + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; + int psk_err = 1; + char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; + + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + + n2s(p, i); + if (n != i + 2) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto psk_err; + } + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto psk_err; + } + if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + goto psk_err; + } + + /* + * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback + */ + memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); + memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); + psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, + psk_or_pre_ms, + sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); + + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } else if (psk_len == 0) { + /* + * PSK related to the given identity not found + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + goto psk_err; + } + + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ + pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; + t = psk_or_pre_ms; + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); + s2n(psk_len, t); + memset(t, 0, psk_len); + t += psk_len; + s2n(psk_len, t); + + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && + s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + psk_or_pre_ms, + pre_ms_len); + psk_err = 0; + psk_err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_err != 0) + goto f_err; + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) - { - int param_len; - - n2s(p,i); - param_len=i+2; - if (param_len > n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 - || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) - { - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - p+=i; - } - else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ - if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) - { - int ret = 0; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; - size_t outlen=32, inlen; - unsigned long alg_a; - int Ttag, Tclass; - long Tlen; - - /* Get our certificate private key*/ - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; - - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); - EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe - * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from - * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use - * a client certificate for authorization only. */ - client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (client_pub_pkey) - { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* Decrypt session key */ - if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || - Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || - Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - start = p; - inlen = Tlen; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) - - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - /* Generate master secret */ - s->session->master_key_length= - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) - ret = 2; - else - ret = 1; - gerr: - EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - if (ret) - return ret; - else - goto err; - } - else - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - return(1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + int param_len; + + n2s(p, i); + param_len = i + 2; + if (param_len > n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 + || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session->master_key_length = + SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key)) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + p += i; + } else +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + int ret = 0; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; + size_t outlen = 32, inlen; + unsigned long alg_a; + int Ttag, Tclass; + long Tlen; + + /* Get our certificate private key */ + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); + EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); + /* + * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe + * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from + * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a + * client certificate for authorization only. + */ + client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (client_pub_pkey) { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) + ERR_clear_error(); + } + /* Decrypt session key */ + if (ASN1_get_object + ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, + n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE + || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto gerr; + } + start = p; + inlen = Tlen; + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt + (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto gerr; + } + /* Generate master secret */ + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + premaster_secret, 32); + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl + (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + ret = 2; + else + ret = 1; + gerr: + EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + if (ret) + return ret; + else + goto err; + } else { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) -err: + err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); - EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); - if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); + if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif - return(-1); - } + return (-1); +} int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) - { - EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; - unsigned char *p; - int al,ok,ret=0; - long n; - int type=0,i,j; - X509 *peer; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, - -1, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) - { - peer=s->session->peer; - pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); - type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); - } - else - { - peer=NULL; - pkey=NULL; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) - { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - if (peer != NULL) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - ret=1; - goto end; - } - - if (peer == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - - /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ - /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare - * signature without length field */ - if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || - pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) - { - i=64; - } - else - { - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); - /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ - if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); - if (md == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + int al, ok, ret = 0; + long n; + int type = 0, i, j; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, + -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) { + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); + type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); + } else { + peer = NULL; + pkey = NULL; + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + if (peer != NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if (peer == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto f_err; + } + + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* + * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without + * length field + */ + if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || + pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { + i = 64; + } else { + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); + /* Should never happen */ + if (sigalg == -1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ + if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); + if (md == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG -fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - p += 2; - n -= 2; - } - n2s(p,i); - n-=2; - if (i > n) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + p += 2; + n -= 2; + } + n2s(p, i); + n -= 2; + if (i > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + long hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", - EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) - { - i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, - pkey->pkey.rsa); - if (i < 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto f_err; - } - if (i == 0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else + if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, + pkey->pkey.rsa); + if (i < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + goto f_err; + } + if (i == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) - { - j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, - &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); - if (j <= 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { + j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); + if (j <= 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - { - j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, - &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); - if (j <= 0) - { - /* bad signature */ - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); + if (j <= 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else #endif - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) - { unsigned char signature[64]; - int idx; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); - EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); - if (i!=64) { - fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); - } - for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { - signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; - } - j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - if (j<=0) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - else - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - goto f_err; - } - - - ret=1; - if (0) - { -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - } -end: - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) - { - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - } - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return(ret); - } + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 + || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { + unsigned char signature[64]; + int idx; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); + if (i != 64) { + fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); + } + for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { + signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; + } + j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, + 32); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + if (j <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + goto f_err; + } + + ret = 1; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + } + end: + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return (ret); +} int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) - { - int i,ok,al,ret= -1; - X509 *x=NULL; - unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; - const unsigned char *p,*q; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, - -1, - s->max_cert_list, - &ok); - - if (!ok) return((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) - { - if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ - if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - return(1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) - { - al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - n2l3(p,llen); - if (llen+3 != n) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) - { - n2l3(p,l); - if ((l+nc+3) > llen) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - q=p; - x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); - if (x == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (p != (q+l)) - { - al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x=NULL; - nc+=l+3; - } - - if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) - { - /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - { - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ - else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - { - al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - else - { - i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); - if (i <= 0) - { - al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ - X509_free(s->session->peer); - s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL - * when we arrive here. */ - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - { - s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) - sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); - s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; - /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the - * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ - - sk=NULL; - - ret=1; - if (0) - { -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - } -err: - if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); - if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); - return(ret); - } +{ + int i, ok, al, ret = -1; + X509 *x = NULL; + unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; + const unsigned char *p, *q; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto f_err; + } + /* + * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list + */ + if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return (1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + n2l3(p, llen); + if (llen + 3 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { + n2l3(p, l); + if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + q = p; + x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); + if (x == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (p != (q + l)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x = NULL; + nc += l + 3; + } + + if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { + /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ + else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto f_err; + } + /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } else { + i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); + if (i <= 0) { + al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ + X509_free(s->session->peer); + s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + + /* + * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we + * arrive here. + */ + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); + s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; + /* + * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own + * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c + */ + + sk = NULL; + + ret = 1; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + } + err: + if (x != NULL) + X509_free(x); + if (sk != NULL) + sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); + return (ret); +} int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) - { - unsigned long l; - X509 *x; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) - { - x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); - if (x == NULL) - { - /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return(0); - } - } - - l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); - if (!l) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return(0); - } - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; - s->init_num=(int)l; - s->init_off=0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } +{ + unsigned long l; + X509 *x; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { + x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); + if (x == NULL) { + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return (0); + } + } + + l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); + if (!l) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return (0); + } + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; + s->init_num = (int)l; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) - { - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) - { - unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; - const unsigned char *const_p; - int len, slen_full, slen; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned int hlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char key_name[16]; - - /* get session encoding length */ - slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); - /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is - * too long - */ - if (slen_full > 0xFF00) - return -1; - senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); - if (!senc) - return -1; - p = senc; - i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); - - /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ - const_p = senc; - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); - if (sess == NULL) - { - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; - } - sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ - - slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); - if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ - { - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; - } - p = senc; - i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); - SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - - /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length - * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session - * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, - 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + - EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - return -1; - - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - /* do the header */ - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; - /* Skip message length for now */ - p += 3; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present - * it does all the work otherwise use generated values - * from parent ctx. - */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) - { - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, - &hctx, 1) < 0) - { - OPENSSL_free(senc); - return -1; - } - } - else - { - RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); - } - - /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): - * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), - * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long - * as their sessions. */ - l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, 16); - p += 16; - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); - p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - /* Encrypt session data */ - EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); - p += len; - EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); - p += len; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - - HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; - l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ - p += 4; - s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ - - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num= len; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - s->init_off=0; - OPENSSL_free(senc); - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } +{ + unsigned char *senc = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { + unsigned char *p, *macstart; + const unsigned char *const_p; + int len, slen_full, slen; + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned int hlen; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char key_name[16]; + + /* get session encoding length */ + slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); + /* + * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too + * long + */ + if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) + return -1; + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); + if (!senc) + return -1; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + + p = senc; + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) + goto err; + + /* + * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up + */ + const_p = senc; + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); + if (sess == NULL) + goto err; + sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ + + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); + if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + goto err; + } + p = senc; + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + goto err; + } + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + + /*- + * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, + 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) + goto err; + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + /* do the header */ + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + /* Skip message length for now */ + p += 3; + /* + * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does + * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. + */ + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, + &hctx, 1) < 0) + goto err; + } else { + if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) + goto err; + if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) + goto err; + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) + goto err; + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + } + + /* + * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified + * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for + * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. + */ + l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); + + /* Skip ticket length for now */ + p += 2; + /* Output key name */ + macstart = p; + memcpy(p, key_name, 16); + p += 16; + /* output IV */ + memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); + p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + /* Encrypt session data */ + if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) + goto err; + p += len; + if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) + goto err; + p += len; + + if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) + goto err; + if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) + goto err; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + + p += hlen; + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ + /* Total length */ + len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; + l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ + p += 4; + s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ + + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = len; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; + s->init_off = 0; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + err: + if (senc) + OPENSSL_free(senc); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return -1; +} int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) - { - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) - { - unsigned char *p; - /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + - * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) - * + (ocsp response) - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) - return -1; - - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* do the header */ - *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; - /* message length */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); - /* status type */ - *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; - /* length of OCSP response */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); - /* actual response */ - memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; - s->init_off = 0; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); - } +{ + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { + unsigned char *p; + /*- + * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) + * + (ocsp response) + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) + return -1; + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + /* message length */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); + /* status type */ + *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; + /* length of OCSP response */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); + /* actual response */ + memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ + return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); +} # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It - * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ +/* + * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. + * It sets the next_proto member in s if found + */ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) - { - int ok; - int proto_len, padding_len; - long n; - const unsigned char *p; - - /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the - * extension in their ClientHello */ - if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); - return -1; - } - - n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, - SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, - 514, /* See the payload format below */ - &ok); - - if (!ok) - return((int)n); - - /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received - * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset - * by ssl3_get_finished). */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); - return -1; - } - - if (n < 2) - return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ - - p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - /* The payload looks like: - * uint8 proto_len; - * uint8 proto[proto_len]; - * uint8 padding_len; - * uint8 padding[padding_len]; - */ - proto_len = p[0]; - if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) - return 0; - padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; - if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) - return 0; - - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; - - return 1; - } +{ + int ok; + int proto_len, padding_len; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the + * extension in their ClientHello + */ + if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, + SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); + return -1; + } + + /* See the payload format below */ + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, + SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, + SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + /* + * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in + * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by + * ssl3_get_finished). + */ + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return -1; + } + + if (n < 2) + return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + /*- + * The payload looks like: + * uint8 proto_len; + * uint8 proto[proto_len]; + * uint8 padding_len; + * uint8 padding[padding_len]; + */ + proto_len = p[0]; + if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) + return 0; + padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; + if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) + return 0; + + s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); + if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); + s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; + + return 1; +} # endif #endif |