Merge branch 'upstream' into tizen_basetizen_5.5.m2_releasesubmit/tizen_base/20191001.092458submit/tizen_5.5_base_mobile_hotfix/20201023.171501submit/tizen_5.5_base/20191030.000001accepted/tizen/base/20191008.101335accepted/tizen/5.5/base/mobile/hotfix/20201023.085356accepted/tizen/5.5/base/20191030.083643tizen_5.5_tvtizen_5.5_base_mobile_hotfixaccepted/tizen_5.5_base_mobile_hotfix

Change-Id: I052187c6bd9cc55d587fd63c000608ead364e629

38 files changed, 763 insertions, 175 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 8cfdec6..114ea24 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,48 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2s and 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019]
+
+   *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+      used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+      or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+      `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+      This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+      especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+      By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+      serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+      internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+      [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+  *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+     this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+     NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+     does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+     (CVE-2019-1547)
+     [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+     An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+     second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+     recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+     encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+     decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+     used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+     As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+     key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+     certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+     The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+  *) Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
+
+     '/usr/local/ssl' is an unsafe prefix for location to install OpenSSL
+     binaries and run-time config file.
+     (CVE-2019-1552)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
 
   *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index 54c3f44..e4ca515 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare
 # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
 # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
 # -Wextended-offsetof
-my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token  -Wno-extended-offsetof";
+my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token  -Wno-extended-offsetof";
 
 # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
 # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initiali
 # -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
 # -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
 # -Wextended-offsetof
-my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
+my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
 
 # Warn that "make depend" should be run?
 my $warn_make_depend = 0;
diff --git a/INSTALL.DJGPP b/INSTALL.DJGPP
index 1047ec9..ecbf493 100644
--- a/INSTALL.DJGPP
+++ b/INSTALL.DJGPP
@@ -33,8 +33,18 @@
  running in a DOS box under Windows. If so, just close the BASH
  shell, go back to Windows, and restart BASH. Then run "make" again.
 
- RUN-TIME CAVEAT LECTOR
- --------------
+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
+ ### Entropy
 
  Quoting FAQ:
 
diff --git a/INSTALL.W32 b/INSTALL.W32
index bd10187..b97a3d0 100644
--- a/INSTALL.W32
+++ b/INSTALL.W32
@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@
  get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
  it goes wrong.
 
+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
  Visual C++
  ----------
 
@@ -104,7 +115,7 @@
  ---------------------
 
  * Configure for building with Borland Builder:
-   > perl Configure BC-32
+   > perl Configure BC-32 --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
 
  * Create the appropriate makefile
    > ms\do_nasm
@@ -196,7 +207,7 @@
 
  * Compile OpenSSL:
 
-   $ ./config
+   $ ./config --prefix=c:/some/openssl/dir
    [...]
    $ make
    [...]
@@ -206,7 +217,11 @@
    and openssl.exe application in apps directory.
 
    It is also possible to cross-compile it on Linux by configuring
-   with './Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- mingw ...'.
+   like this:
+
+   $ ./Configure --cross-compile-prefix=i386-mingw32- \
+     --prefix=c:/some/openssl/dir mingw ...
+
    'make test' is naturally not applicable then.
 
    libcrypto.a and libssl.a are the static libraries. To use the DLLs,
@@ -240,6 +255,9 @@
 	$ copy /b out32dll\libeay32.dll c:\openssl\bin
 	$ copy /b out32dll\openssl.exe  c:\openssl\bin
 
+      ("c:\openssl" should be whatever you specified to --prefix when
+      configuring the build)
+
       Of course, you can choose another device than c:.  C: is used here
       because that's usually the first (and often only) harddisk device.
       Note: in the modssl INSTALL.Win32, p: is used rather than c:.
diff --git a/INSTALL.W64 b/INSTALL.W64
index 9fa7a19..3f5bf80 100644
--- a/INSTALL.W64
+++ b/INSTALL.W64
@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@
    Neither of these is actually big deal and hardly encountered
    in real-life applications.
 
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
  Compiling procedure
  -------------------
 
@@ -43,7 +51,7 @@
 
  To build for Win64/x64:
 
- > perl Configure VC-WIN64A
+ > perl Configure VC-WIN64A --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
  > ms\do_win64a
  > nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak
  > cd out32dll
@@ -51,7 +59,7 @@
 
  To build for Win64/IA64:
 
- > perl Configure VC-WIN64I
+ > perl Configure VC-WIN64I --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
  > ms\do_win64i
  > nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak
  > cd out32dll
diff --git a/INSTALL.WCE b/INSTALL.WCE
index d78c61a..490685d 100644
--- a/INSTALL.WCE
+++ b/INSTALL.WCE
@@ -35,6 +35,17 @@
  redirects IO to active sync link, while PortSDK - to NT-like console
  driver on the handheld itself.
 
+ CAVEAT LECTOR
+ -------------
+
+ ### Default install and config paths
+
+ ./Configure defaults to '/usr/local/ssl' as installation top.  This is
+ suitable for Unix, but not for Windows, where this usually is a world
+ writable directory and therefore accessible for change by untrusted users.
+ It is therefore recommended to set your own --prefix or --openssldir to
+ some location that is not world writeable (see the example above)
+
  Building
  --------
 
@@ -61,7 +72,7 @@
 
  Next you should run Configure:
 
- > perl Configure VC-CE
+ > perl Configure VC-CE --prefix=c:\some\openssl\dir
 
  Next you need to build the Makefiles:
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 1f018f5..5f80ba8 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2s
+VERSION=1.0.2t
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 4d4e9df..a9705fe 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2s and OpenSSL 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019]
+
+      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
+        (CVE-2019-1563)
+      o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+        used even when parsing explicit parameters
+      o Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction
+        (CVE-2019-1547)
+      o Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
+        (CVE-2019-1552)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2r and OpenSSL 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
+
+      o None
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2q and OpenSSL 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
 
       o 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)
diff --git a/README b/README
index 4288325..dc20742 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2s 28 May 2019
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2t 10 Sep 2019
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/crypto/arm_arch.h b/crypto/arm_arch.h
index 9d6e588..de592de 100644
--- a/crypto/arm_arch.h
+++ b/crypto/arm_arch.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
 #  endif
 # endif
 
-# if !__ASSEMBLER__
+# ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
 extern unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P;
 # endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c
index 356fa15..6283e37 100644
--- a/crypto/armcap.c
+++ b/crypto/armcap.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <crypto.h>
 
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "arm_arch.h"
 
 unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/Makefile b/crypto/bn/Makefile
index 9fc4447..7a3bf5d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h
-bn_lib.o: bn_lib.c
+bn_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+bn_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_lcl.h bn_lib.c
 bn_mod.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 bn_mod.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 2a84698..d4419a3 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include "bn_lcl.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
 
 const char BN_version[] = "Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
@@ -187,13 +188,57 @@ int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG l)
     return bits;
 }
 
+/*
+ * This function still leaks `a->dmax`: it's caller's responsibility to
+ * expand the input `a` in advance to a public length.
+ */
+static inline
+int bn_num_bits_consttime(const BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    int j, ret;
+    unsigned int mask, past_i;
+    int i = a->top - 1;
+    bn_check_top(a);
+
+    for (j = 0, past_i = 0, ret = 0; j < a->dmax; j++) {
+        mask = constant_time_eq_int(i, j); /* 0xff..ff if i==j, 0x0 otherwise */
+
+        ret += BN_BITS2 & (~mask & ~past_i);
+        ret += BN_num_bits_word(a->d[j]) & mask;
+
+        past_i |= mask; /* past_i will become 0xff..ff after i==j */
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if BN_is_zero(a) => i is -1 and ret contains garbage, so we mask the
+     * final result.
+     */
+    mask = ~(constant_time_eq_int(i, ((int)-1)));
+
+    return ret & mask;
+}
+
 int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
 {
     int i = a->top - 1;
     bn_check_top(a);
 
+    if (a->flags & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) {
+        /*
+         * We assume that BIGNUMs flagged as CONSTTIME have also been expanded
+         * so that a->dmax is not leaking secret information.
+         *
+         * In other words, it's the caller's responsibility to ensure `a` has
+         * been preallocated in advance to a public length if we hit this
+         * branch.
+         *
+         */
+        return bn_num_bits_consttime(a);
+    }
+
     if (BN_is_zero(a))
         return 0;
+
     return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
 }
 
@@ -613,8 +658,11 @@ BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
     return (ret);
 }
 
+typedef enum {big, little} endianess_t;
+
 /* ignore negative */
-static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+static
+int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen, endianess_t endianess)
 {
     int n;
     size_t i, lasti, j, atop, mask;
@@ -646,10 +694,17 @@ static int bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
 
     lasti = atop - 1;
     atop = a->top * BN_BYTES;
-    for (i = 0, j = 0, to += tolen; j < (size_t)tolen; j++) {
+    if (endianess == big)
+        to += tolen; /* start from the end of the buffer */
+    for (i = 0, j = 0; j < (size_t)tolen; j++) {
+        unsigned char val;
         l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
         mask = 0 - ((j - atop) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1));
-        *--to = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & mask);
+        val = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES)) & mask);
+        if (endianess == big)
+            *--to = val;
+        else
+            *to++ = val;
         i += (i - lasti) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1); /* stay on last limb */
     }
 
@@ -660,21 +715,66 @@ int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
 {
     if (tolen < 0)
         return -1;
-    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen);
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen, big);
 }
 
 int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to)
 {
-    int n, i;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, -1, big);
+}
+
+BIGNUM *bn_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret)
+{
+    unsigned int i, m;
+    unsigned int n;
     BN_ULONG l;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
 
-    bn_check_top(a);
-    n = i = BN_num_bytes(a);
-    while (i--) {
-        l = a->d[i / BN_BYTES];
-        *(to++) = (unsigned char)(l >> (8 * (i % BN_BYTES))) & 0xff;
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        ret = bn = BN_new();
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    bn_check_top(ret);
+    s += len;
+    /* Skip trailing zeroes. */
+    for ( ; len > 0 && s[-1] == 0; s--, len--)
+        continue;
+    n = len;
+    if (n == 0) {
+        ret->top = 0;
+        return ret;
+    }
+    i = ((n - 1) / BN_BYTES) + 1;
+    m = ((n - 1) % (BN_BYTES));
+    if (bn_wexpand(ret, (int)i) == NULL) {
+        BN_free(bn);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    ret->top = i;
+    ret->neg = 0;
+    l = 0;
+    while (n--) {
+        s--;
+        l = (l << 8L) | *s;
+        if (m-- == 0) {
+            ret->d[--i] = l;
+            l = 0;
+            m = BN_BYTES - 1;
+        }
     }
-    return (n);
+    /*
+     * need to call this due to clear byte at top if avoiding having the top
+     * bit set (-ve number)
+     */
+    bn_correct_top(ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen)
+{
+    if (tolen < 0)
+        return -1;
+    return bn2binpad(a, to, tolen, little);
 }
 
 int BN_ucmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
diff --git a/crypto/bn_int.h b/crypto/bn_int.h
index a552cc2..6791154 100644
--- a/crypto/bn_int.h
+++ b/crypto/bn_int.h
@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ int bn_mul_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int bn_sqr_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
 
 int bn_bn2binpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
+
+BIGNUM *bn_lebin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
+int bn_bn2lebinpad(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to, int tolen);
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
index 93c06cb..e46348f 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
     unsigned char *ek = NULL;
     size_t eklen;
     int ret = 0;
+    size_t fixlen = 0;
     CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
     ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
 
@@ -430,6 +431,19 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
         return 0;
     }
 
+    if (cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert
+            && !cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug) {
+        X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+        const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm);
+
+        if (ciph == NULL) {
+            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        fixlen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph);
+    }
+
     ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
     if (!ktri->pctx)
         return 0;
@@ -460,7 +474,9 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen,
                          ktri->encryptedKey->data,
-                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) {
+                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0
+            || eklen == 0
+            || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
         CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h b/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
index 20f2c25..9ec13f5 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st {
     size_t keylen;
     /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
     int debug;
+    /* Set to 1 if we have no cert and need extra safety measures for MMA */
+    int havenocert;
 };
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st {
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
index 07e3472..f2d81bd 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
         cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
     else
         cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+    if (!cert)
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 1;
+    else
+        cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert = 0;
     if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
         return 1;
     if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
diff --git a/crypto/constant_time_locl.h b/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
index a5734f2..f322e78 100644
--- a/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
  * (Google).
  * ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -185,11 +185,29 @@ static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
     return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Returns the value unmodified, but avoids optimizations.
+ * The barriers prevent the compiler from narrowing down the
+ * possible value range of the mask and ~mask in the select
+ * statements, which avoids the recognition of the select
+ * and turning it into a conditional load or branch.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int value_barrier(unsigned int a)
+{
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__)
+    unsigned int r;
+    __asm__("" : "=r"(r) : "0"(a));
+#else
+    volatile unsigned int r = a;
+#endif
+    return r;
+}
+
 static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
                                                 unsigned int a,
                                                 unsigned int b)
 {
-    return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+    return (value_barrier(mask) & a) | (value_barrier(~mask) & b);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
diff --git a/crypto/cryptlib.h b/crypto/cryptlib.h
index cdbddf1..2f9eced 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.h
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.h
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ extern int OPENSSL_NONPIC_relocated;
 
 char *ossl_safe_getenv(const char *);
 
+unsigned long OPENSSL_rdtsc(void);
+
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/ec/Makefile b/crypto/ec/Makefile
index 6628390..e9d65e3 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ec_curve.c ec_lcl.h
+ec_curve.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../bn_int.h ec_curve.c ec_lcl.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 ec_cvt.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h
index 81e6faf..0127036 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * \author Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -1073,6 +1073,7 @@ int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off);
  * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
+
 void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 
 /* Error codes for the EC functions. */
@@ -1270,13 +1271,14 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 # define EC_R_SLOT_FULL                                   108
 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR                         113
 # define EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER                             128
+# define EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR                            152
 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP                               129
 # define EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER                               114
 # define EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD                           131
 # define EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS                      145
 # define EC_R_WRONG_ORDER                                 130
 
-#ifdef  __cplusplus
+# ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
-#endif
+# endif
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index b0cd3e1..865130f 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -695,10 +695,12 @@ ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group,
 static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 {
     int ok = 0, tmp;
-    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
+    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL, *dup = NULL;
     BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
     EC_POINT *point = NULL;
     long field_bits;
+    int curve_name = NID_undef;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
     if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType ||
         !params->fieldID->p.ptr) {
@@ -914,13 +916,75 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * Check if the explicit parameters group just created matches one of the
+     * built-in curves.
+     *
+     * We create a copy of the group just built, so that we can remove optional
+     * fields for the lookup: we do this to avoid the possibility that one of
+     * the optional parameters is used to force the library into using a less
+     * performant and less secure EC_METHOD instead of the specialized one.
+     * In any case, `seed` is not really used in any computation, while a
+     * cofactor different from the one in the built-in table is just
+     * mathematically wrong anyway and should not be used.
+     */
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((dup = EC_GROUP_dup(ret)) == NULL
+            || EC_GROUP_set_seed(dup, NULL, 0) != 1
+            || !EC_GROUP_set_generator(dup, point, a, NULL)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid_from_params(dup, ctx)) != NID_undef) {
+        /*
+         * The input explicit parameters successfully matched one of the
+         * built-in curves: often for built-in curves we have specialized
+         * methods with better performance and hardening.
+         *
+         * In this case we replace the `EC_GROUP` created through explicit
+         * parameters with one created from a named group.
+         */
+        EC_GROUP *named_group = NULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+        /*
+         * NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 and NID_secp224r1 are both aliases for
+         * the same curve, we prefer the SECP nid when matching explicit
+         * parameters as that is associated with a specialized EC_METHOD.
+         */
+        if (curve_name == NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12)
+            curve_name = NID_secp224r1;
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) */
+
+        if ((named_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_name)) == NULL) {
+            ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        EC_GROUP_free(ret);
+        ret = named_group;
+
+        /*
+         * Set the flag so that EC_GROUPs created from explicit parameters are
+         * serialized using explicit parameters by default.
+         *
+         * 0x0 = OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE
+         */
+        EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
+    }
+
     ok = 1;
 
- err:if (!ok) {
+ err:
+    if (!ok) {
         if (ret)
-            EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
+            EC_GROUP_free(ret);
         ret = NULL;
     }
+    if (dup)
+        EC_GROUP_free(dup);
 
     if (p)
         BN_free(p);
@@ -930,6 +994,8 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
         BN_free(b);
     if (point)
         EC_POINT_free(point);
+    if (ctx)
+        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     return (ret);
 }
 
@@ -990,7 +1056,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
     }
 
     if (a && *a)
-        EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
+        EC_GROUP_free(*a);
     if (a)
         *a = group;
 
@@ -1040,7 +1106,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
 
     if (priv_key->parameters) {
         if (ret->group)
-            EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret->group);
+            EC_GROUP_free(ret->group);
         ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters);
     }
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
index 6dbe9d8..a6c5083 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2010 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 
+#include "bn_int.h"
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
@@ -3246,3 +3248,115 @@ int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
     }
     return NID_undef;
 }
+
+#define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
+/*
+ * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
+ * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
+ * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
+ *
+ * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
+ *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
+ */
+int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
+    size_t i, seed_len;
+    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
+    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
+    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
+    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+    const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
+    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
+    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
+    if (meth == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
+    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
+    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
+    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
+    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
+    cofactor = &group->cofactor;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+    /*
+     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
+     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
+     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
+     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
+     */
+    param_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
+    len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+    if (len > param_len)
+        param_len = len;
+
+    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
+    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
+    if (param_bytes == NULL)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Create the bignums */
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
+        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto end;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
+     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
+     */
+    /* Get p, a & b */
+    if (!(ec_group_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
+        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
+        /* Get x & y */
+        && ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
+        /* Get order */
+        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
+        goto end;
+
+   /*
+     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
+     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
+     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
+        if (bn_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
+        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
+
+        data = curve.data;
+        /* Get the raw order byte data */
+        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
+        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
+
+        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
+        if (data->field_type == field_type
+            && param_len == data->param_len
+            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
+            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
+            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
+                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
+            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
+            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
+                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
+                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
+            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
+            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
+                             == 0) {
+            ret = curve.nid;
+            goto end;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
+    ret = NID_undef;
+end:
+    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 6fe5baa..2205411 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/ec/ec_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_SLOT_FULL), "slot full"},
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR), "undefined generator"},
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNDEFINED_ORDER), "undefined order"},
+    {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR), "unknown cofactor"},
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP), "unknown group"},
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER), "unknown order"},
     {ERR_REASON(EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD), "unsupported field"},
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index 8665a4c..14afa3c 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -565,3 +565,18 @@ EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gf2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
                                        const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
 EC_GROUP *FIPS_ec_group_new_by_curve_name(int nid);
 #endif
+
+int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * The next 2 functions are just internal wrappers around the omonimous
+ * functions with either the `_GFp` or the `_GF2m` suffix.
+ *
+ * They are meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of these 2 functions.
+ */
+int ec_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                       BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                    BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index cd2c420..e3f2e82 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -294,6 +294,67 @@ int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth)
     return meth->field_type;
 }
 
+/*-
+ * Try computing cofactor from the generator order (n) and field cardinality (q).
+ * This works for all curves of cryptographic interest.
+ *
+ * Hasse thm: q + 1 - 2*sqrt(q) <= n*h <= q + 1 + 2*sqrt(q)
+ * h_min = (q + 1 - 2*sqrt(q))/n
+ * h_max = (q + 1 + 2*sqrt(q))/n
+ * h_max - h_min = 4*sqrt(q)/n
+ * So if n > 4*sqrt(q) holds, there is only one possible value for h:
+ * h = \lfloor (h_min + h_max)/2 \rceil = \lfloor (q + 1)/n \rceil
+ *
+ * Otherwise, zero cofactor and return success.
+ */
+static int ec_guess_cofactor(EC_GROUP *group) {
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+
+    /*-
+     * If the cofactor is too large, we cannot guess it.
+     * The RHS of below is a strict overestimate of lg(4 * sqrt(q))
+     */
+    if (BN_num_bits(&group->order) <= (BN_num_bits(&group->field) + 1) / 2 + 3) {
+        /* default to 0 */
+        BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
+        /* return success */
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    if ((q = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* set q = 2**m for binary fields; q = p otherwise */
+    if (group->meth->field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        BN_zero(q);
+        if (!BN_set_bit(q, BN_num_bits(&group->field) - 1))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        if (!BN_copy(q, &group->field))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* compute h = \lfloor (q + 1)/n \rceil = \lfloor (q + 1 + n/2)/n \rfloor */
+    if (!BN_rshift1(&group->cofactor, &group->order) /* n/2 */
+        || !BN_add(&group->cofactor, &group->cofactor, q) /* q + n/2 */
+        /* q + 1 + n/2 */
+        || !BN_add(&group->cofactor, &group->cofactor, BN_value_one())
+        /* (q + 1 + n/2)/n */
+        || !BN_div(&group->cofactor, NULL, &group->cofactor, &group->order, ctx))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
 int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
                            const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor)
 {
@@ -302,6 +363,33 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
         return 0;
     }
 
+    /* require group->field >= 1 */
+    if (BN_is_zero(&group->field) || BN_is_negative(&group->field)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * - require order >= 1
+     * - enforce upper bound due to Hasse thm: order can be no more than one bit
+     *   longer than field cardinality
+     */
+    if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order) || BN_is_negative(order)
+        || BN_num_bits(order) > BN_num_bits(&group->field) + 1) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Unfortunately the cofactor is an optional field in many standards.
+     * Internally, the lib uses 0 cofactor as a marker for "unknown cofactor".
+     * So accept cofactor == NULL or cofactor >= 0.
+     */
+    if (cofactor != NULL && BN_is_negative(cofactor)) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_SET_GENERATOR, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (group->generator == NULL) {
         group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group);
         if (group->generator == NULL)
@@ -310,17 +398,17 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
     if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator))
         return 0;
 
-    if (order != NULL) {
-        if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order))
-            return 0;
-    } else
-        BN_zero(&group->order);
+    if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order))
+        return 0;
 
-    if (cofactor != NULL) {
+    /* Either take the provided positive cofactor, or try to compute it */
+    if (cofactor != NULL && !BN_is_zero(cofactor)) {
         if (!BN_copy(&group->cofactor, cofactor))
             return 0;
-    } else
+    } else if (!ec_guess_cofactor(group)) {
         BN_zero(&group->cofactor);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     /*-
      * Access to the `mont_data` field of an EC_GROUP struct should always be
@@ -1169,3 +1257,60 @@ int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *group)
         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * This is just a wrapper around the public functions
+ *  - EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m
+ *  - EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp
+ *
+ * It is meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of it.
+ */
+int ec_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                       BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int field_nid;
+
+    field_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        return EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+    } else
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC2M) */
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        return EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx);
+    } else {
+        /* this should never happen */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is just a wrapper around the public functions
+ *   - EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m
+ *   - EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp
+ *
+ * It is meant to facilitate backporting of code from newer branches, where
+ * the public API includes a "field agnostic" version of it.
+ */
+int ec_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
+                                    BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int field_nid;
+
+    field_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
+        return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    } else
+#endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC2M) */
+    if (field_nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+        return EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    } else {
+        /* this should never happen */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index 121f587..76eaa70 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */
 
 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
   /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -334,34 +335,21 @@ static void felem_to_bin28(u8 out[28], const felem in)
     }
 }
 
-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* From OpenSSL BIGNUM to internal representation */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
     felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;
 
-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
     bin28_to_felem(out, b_out);
     return 1;
 }
@@ -369,10 +357,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* From internal representation to OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    felem_to_bin28(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    felem_to_bin28(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************/
@@ -1426,8 +1413,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
     felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
     felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
     felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;
     int have_pre_comp = 0;
     size_t num_points = num;
     felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
@@ -1509,14 +1495,12 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
         memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
         memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
         for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                 /* the generator */
-            {
                 p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                 p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                 /* the i^th point */
-            {
                 p = points[i];
                 p_scalar = scalars[i];
             }
@@ -1532,10 +1516,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                         goto err;
                     }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                 /* precompute multiples */
                 if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                     (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -1578,20 +1568,21 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                 ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
             }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
         /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   g_secret,
                   mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
         /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
     /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
     felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
     felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index 378f0ba..5576d31 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */
 
 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
   /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -144,34 +145,21 @@ static void smallfelem_to_bin32(u8 out[32], const smallfelem in)
     *((u64 *)&out[24]) = in[3];
 }
 
-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
     felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;
 
-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
     bin32_to_felem(out, b_out);
     return 1;
 }
@@ -179,10 +167,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *smallfelem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const smallfelem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    smallfelem_to_bin32(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -2014,8 +2001,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
     felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
     smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
     smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    unsigned i;
+    int num_bytes;
     int have_pre_comp = 0;
     size_t num_points = num;
     smallfelem x_in, y_in, z_in;
@@ -2097,17 +2084,15 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
         memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
         memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem));
         for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                 /*
                  * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
                  * generator
                  */
-            {
                 p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                 p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                 /* the i^th point */
-            {
                 p = points[i];
                 p_scalar = scalars[i];
             }
@@ -2123,10 +2108,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                         goto err;
                     }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                 /* precompute multiples */
                 if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                     (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -2171,20 +2162,21 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                 ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
             }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
         /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   g_secret,
                   mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
         /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   NULL, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
     /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
     felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
     felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index 1a42068..007cffa 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 # include <string.h>
 # include <openssl/err.h>
 # include "ec_lcl.h"
+# include "bn_int.h" /* bn_bn2lebinpad, bn_lebin2bn */
 
 # if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3 || (__GNUC__ == 3 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 1))
   /* even with gcc, the typedef won't work for 32-bit platforms */
@@ -168,34 +169,21 @@ static void felem_to_bin66(u8 out[66], const felem in)
     (*((limb *) & out[58])) = in[8];
 }
 
-/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn */
-static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len)
-{
-    unsigned i;
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-        out[i] = in[len - 1 - i];
-}
-
 /* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem */
 static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in;
     felem_bytearray b_out;
-    unsigned num_bytes;
+    int num_bytes;
 
-    /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */
-    memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out));
-    num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn);
-    if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) {
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(bn, b_out, sizeof(b_out));
+    if (num_bytes < 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes);
     bin66_to_felem(out, b_out);
     return 1;
 }
@@ -203,10 +191,9 @@ static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn)
 /* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM */
 static BIGNUM *felem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const felem in)
 {
-    felem_bytearray b_in, b_out;
-    felem_to_bin66(b_in, in);
-    flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out));
-    return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
+    felem_bytearray b_out;
+    felem_to_bin66(b_out, in);
+    return bn_lebin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out);
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -1826,8 +1813,8 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
     felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL;
     felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL;
     felem *tmp_felems = NULL;
-    felem_bytearray tmp;
-    unsigned i, num_bytes;
+    unsigned i;
+    int num_bytes;
     int have_pre_comp = 0;
     size_t num_points = num;
     felem x_in, y_in, z_in, x_out, y_out, z_out;
@@ -1909,17 +1896,15 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
         memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray));
         memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem));
         for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) {
-            if (i == num)
+            if (i == num) {
                 /*
                  * we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the
                  * generator
                  */
-            {
                 p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
                 p_scalar = scalar;
-            } else
+            } else {
                 /* the i^th point */
-            {
                 p = points[i];
                 p_scalar = scalars[i];
             }
@@ -1935,10 +1920,16 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                         goto err;
                     }
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-                } else
-                    num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp);
-                flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes);
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                } else {
+                    num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(p_scalar,
+                                               secrets[i], sizeof(secrets[i]));
+                }
+                if (num_bytes < 0) {
+                    ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                    goto err;
+                }
                 /* precompute multiples */
                 if ((!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X)) ||
                     (!BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y)) ||
@@ -1981,21 +1972,22 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
                 ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
                 goto err;
             }
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp);
-        } else
-            num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp);
-        flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes);
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(tmp_scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        } else {
+            num_bytes = bn_bn2lebinpad(scalar, g_secret, sizeof(g_secret));
+        }
         /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   g_secret,
                   mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp,
                   (const felem(*)[3])g_pre_comp);
-    } else
+    } else {
         /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */
         batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out,
                   (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, num_points,
                   NULL, mixed, (const felem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, NULL);
+    }
     /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */
     felem_contract(x_in, x_out);
     felem_contract(y_in, y_out);
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 8b47569..488e2bc 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000213fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000214fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s-fips  28 May 2019"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2t-fips  10 Sep 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s  28 May 2019"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2t  10 Sep 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index f376f59..9ea21e3 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY *b2i_dss(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
     } else {
         if (!read_lebn(&p, 20, &dsa->priv_key))
             goto memerr;
+        /* Set constant time flag before public key calculation */
+        BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
         /* Calculate public key */
         if (!(dsa->pub_key = BN_new()))
             goto memerr;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 6a46368..63bc882 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
 }
 
 static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
-                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               size_t fixlen)
 {
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
     unsigned char *ek = NULL;
@@ -224,7 +225,9 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
     }
 
     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
-                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
+                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0
+            || eklen == 0
+            || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
         ret = 0;
         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto err;
@@ -571,13 +574,14 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
             for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
                 ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
 
-                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey,
+                        EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher)) < 0)
                     goto err;
                 ERR_clear_error();
             }
         } else {
             /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
-            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
+            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey, 0) < 0)
                 goto err;
             ERR_clear_error();
         }
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 475dfc5..fb62c35 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
         return 0;
     }
 
+    /* Set consant-time flag on private parameters */
+    BN_set_flags(key->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(key->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_set_flags(key->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     i = BN_new();
     j = BN_new();
     k = BN_new();
@@ -141,6 +145,10 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
     }
 
     if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL) {
+        /* Set consant-time flag on CRT parameters */
+        BN_set_flags(key->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(key->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+        BN_set_flags(key->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
         /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
         if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
             ret = -1;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 2d82f8f..a7b90e6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
     STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
     int i;
     ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
         X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
         CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
index d4d024c..a594b07 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -205,15 +205,18 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_print(BIO *out, GENERAL_NAME *gen)
         break;
 
     case GEN_EMAIL:
-        BIO_printf(out, "email:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "email:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
         break;
 
     case GEN_DNS:
-        BIO_printf(out, "DNS:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "DNS:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
         break;
 
     case GEN_URI:
-        BIO_printf(out, "URI:%s", gen->d.ia5->data);
+        BIO_printf(out, "URI:");
+        ASN1_STRING_print(out, gen->d.ia5);
         break;
 
     case GEN_DIRNAME:
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 7e94a22..475ddcf 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2s
+Version: 1.0.2t
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/packaging/openssl.spec b/packaging/openssl.spec
index 074e044..41eadc4 100644
--- a/packaging/openssl.spec
+++ b/packaging/openssl.spec
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 Summary:   Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name:      openssl
-Version:   1.0.2s
+Version:   1.0.2t
 Release:   0
 License:   OpenSSL and Apache-2.0 and BSD-3-Clause
 Group:     Security/Crypto Libraries
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index 2e52214..3a72e46 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -4432,3 +4432,4 @@ EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup               4786	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt               4787	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy                  4788	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ossl_safe_getenv                        4789	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+OPENSSL_rdtsc                           4790	EXIST::FUNCTION: