diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'agent')
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/ChangeLog-2011 | 2617 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/Makefile.am | 110 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/Makefile.in | 1164 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/agent.h | 373 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/cache.c | 340 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/call-pinentry.c | 1178 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/call-scd.c | 1167 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/command-ssh.c | 3089 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/command.c | 2073 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/divert-scd.c | 451 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/findkey.c | 952 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/genkey.c | 484 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/gpg-agent.c | 2291 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/learncard.c | 472 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/minip12.c | 2360 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/minip12.h | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/pkdecrypt.c | 151 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/pksign.c | 261 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/preset-passphrase.c | 270 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/protect-tool.c | 1271 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/protect.c | 1321 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/t-protect.c | 310 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/trans.c | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/trustlist.c | 763 |
24 files changed, 23545 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/agent/ChangeLog-2011 b/agent/ChangeLog-2011 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f543f27 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/ChangeLog-2011 @@ -0,0 +1,2617 @@ +2011-12-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + NB: ChangeLog files are no longer manually maintained. Starting + on December 1st, 2011 we put change information only in the GIT + commit log, and generate a top-level ChangeLog file from logs at + "make dist". See doc/HACKING for details. + +2011-08-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_keyinfo, do_one_keyinfo): Support options --data + and --ssh-fpr. + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_identity_register): Display the ssh + fingerprint in the prompt. + (add_control_entry): Add arg FMTFPR and use it as comment in + sshcontrol. + (confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol): New. + (data_sign): Ask for confirmaton if requested. + (search_control_file): Add new arg R_CONFIRM and enhance parser. + * findkey.c (agent_raw_key_from_file): New. + (modify_description): Add format letter %F. + + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Simplify comment extraction by + using gcry_sexp_nth_string. + +2011-08-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_pattern): Use gpg_strerror. + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_receive_mpint_list): Remove set but unused + var ELEMS_PUBLIC_N. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Remove set but unused var MAY_COREDUMP. + +2011-07-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_receive_key): Do not init comment to an empty + static string; in the error case it would be freed. + +2011-04-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: Include estream.h + (main): s/pth_kill/es_pth_kill/. + +2010-11-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (opt): Add field SIGUSR2_ENABLED. + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Set that flag. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Enable events depending on this flag. + +2010-09-30 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (unprotect): Do not put the passphrase into the cache + if it has been changed. + +2010-09-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main, reread_configuration): Always test whether + the default configuration file has been created in the meantime. + Fixes bug#1285. + +2010-08-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin, agent_get_passphrase): Fix + setting of confidential flag. + + * call-scd.c (agent_card_scd): Pass assuan comment lines to the + caller. + (ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS): Provide replacement if needed. + +2010-05-12 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * preset-passphrase.c (forget_passphrase): Actually implement + this. Fixes bug#1198. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_tick): Do not print die message with option -q. + +2010-05-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (opt): Add field USE_STANDARD_SOCKET. + * gpg-agent.c (use_standard_socket): Remove. Use new option instead. + + * command.c (cmd_killagent, cmd_reloadagent): Provide command also + for non-W32 platforms. + (cmd_getinfo): New subcommands std_session_env and std_startup_env. + +2010-05-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Add command --use-standard-socket-p. + +2010-05-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (check_own_socket_thread): Do not release SOCKNAME + too early. + +2010-03-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (unlock_scd): Send a BYE under certain conditions. + +2010-02-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Remove a translation prefix. + +2010-02-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (agent_unprotect): Initialize CLEARTEXT. + + * command.c (register_commands): Unconditionally use + assuan_register_post_cmd_notify. + (start_command_handler): Undocumented use assuan_set_io_monitor. + +2010-02-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Always free OPTSTR. Send + default-xxx strings. + +2010-02-11 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + From trunk 2009-09-23, 2009-11-02, 2009-11-04, 2009-11-05, 2009-11-25, + 2009-12-08: + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_CFLAGS, gpg_agent_LDADD): Use libassuan + instead of libassuan-pth. + * gpg-agent.c: Invoke ASSUAN_SYSTEM_PTH_IMPL. + (main): Update to new API. Call assuan_set_system_hooks and + assuan_sock_init. Fix invocation of assuan_socket_connect. + Call assuan_set_assuan_log_stream here. + (parse_rereadable_options): Don't set global assuan log + file (there ain't one anymore). + (check_own_socket_pid_cb): Return gpg_error_t instead of int. + (check_own_socket_thread, check_for_running_agent): Create assuan + context before connecting to server. Update use of + assuan_socket_connect. + * command.c: Include "scdaemon.h" before <assuan.h> because of + GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT check. + (write_and_clear_outbuf): Use gpg_error_t instead of + assuan_error_t. + (cmd_geteventcounter, cmd_istrusted, cmd_listtrusted) + (cmd_marktrusted, cmd_havekey, cmd_sigkey, cmd_setkeydesc) + (cmd_sethash, cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey, cmd_readkey) + (cmd_keyinfo, cmd_get_passphrase, cmd_clear_passphrase) + (cmd_get_confirmation, cmd_learn, cmd_passwd) + (cmd_preset_passphrase, cmd_scd, cmd_getval, cmd_putval) + (cmd_updatestartuptty, cmd_killagent, cmd_reloadagent) + (cmd_getinfo, option_handler): Return gpg_error_t instead of int. + (post_cmd_notify): Change type of ERR to gpg_error_t from int. + (io_monitor): Add hook argument. Use symbols for constants. + (register_commands): Change return type of HANDLER to gpg_error_t. + Use assuan_handler_t type. Add NULL arg to assuan_register_command. + Add help arg to assuan_register_command. Convert all command + comments to help strings. + (start_command_handler): Allocate assuan context before starting + server. Change assuan_init_socket_server_ext into + assuan_init_socket_server. Use assuan_fd_t and assuan_fdopen on fds. + Do not call assuan_set_log_stream anymore. + (reset_notify): Take LINE arg and return error. + * call-pinentry.c: Include "scdaemon.h" before <assuan.h> because + of GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT check. + (unlock_pinentry): Call assuan_release instead of + assuan_disconnect. + (getinfo_pid_cb, getpin_cb): Return gpg_error_t instead of int. + (start_pinentry): Allocate assuan context before connecting to + server. Call assuan_pipe_connect, notassuan_pipe_connect_ext. + Convert posix fd to assuan fd. + * call-scd.c (membuf_data_cb, learn_status_cb, get_serialno_cb) + (membuf_data_cb, inq_needpin, card_getattr_cb, pass_status_thru) + (pass_data_thru): Change return type to gpg_error_t. + (start_scd): Allocate assuan context before connecting to server. + Update use of assuan_socket_connect and assuan_pipe_connect. + Convert posix fd to assuan fd. + +2010-01-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (do_encryption): Encode the s2kcount and do not use a + static value of 96. + +2009-12-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_getinfo): Add sub-command "s2k_count". + +2009-12-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (agent_unprotect): Decode the S2K count here and take + care of the new unencoded values. Add a lower limit sanity check. + (hash_passphrase): Do not decode here. + (get_standard_s2k_count, calibrate_s2k_count): New. + (calibrate_get_time, calibrate_elapsed_time): New. + (do_encryption): Use get_standard_s2k_count. + +2009-12-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (set_debug): Allow for numerical debug leveles. Print + active debug flags. + +2009-12-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (read_trustfiles): Store the pointer returned from + shrinking the memory and not the orginal one. Fixes bug#1163. + Reported by TAKAHASHI Tamotsu. Also return correct error after + memory failure. + +2009-09-04 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.com> + + * command.c (start_command_handler): Add comment about gap in + implementation (in dead code), for future reference. + +2009-08-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): I18n a prompt string. + +2009-07-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h: Include session-env.h. + (opt): Replace most of the startup_xxx fields by a session_env_t. + (struct server_control_s): Likewise. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Rewrite setting of the startup fields. + (handle_connections, main): Allocate SESSION_ENV. + (agent_init_default_ctrl, agent_deinit_default_ctrl): Change + accordingly. + * command.c (option_handler): Ditto. + (cmd_updatestartuptty): Change accordingly. Protect old values + from out of core failures. + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Ditto. + (start_command_handler_ssh): Replace strdup by xtrystrdup. + * call-pinentry.c (atfork_cb): Pass new envrinmnet variables. + (start_pinentry): Use session_env stuff. + * protect-tool.c (main): Adjust call to gnupg_prepare_get_passphrase. + +2009-06-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * genkey.c (agent_protect_and_store): Return RC and not 0. + * protect.c (do_encryption): Fix ignored error code from malloc. + Reported by Fabian Keil. + +2009-06-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_get_confirmation): Add arg WITH_CANCEL. + Change all callers. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use WITH_CANCEL + +2009-06-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * learncard.c (send_cert_back): Ignore certain error codes. + +2009-06-05 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Fix last change by appending + a ".key". + +2009-06-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c: Include estream.h. + (store_private_key): Replace stdio streams by estream functions + for a portable use of the "x" mode. + * trustlist.c: Include estream.h. + (agent_marktrusted): Replace stdio stream by estream functions. + + * protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Use bin2hex. + +2009-06-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Run pth_kill after fork. Fixes bug#1066. + +2009-05-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (JNLIB_NEED_AFLOCAL): Define. + (create_server_socket): Use SUN_LEN macro. + +2009-05-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + Fix bug #1053. + + * agent.h (lookup_ttl_t): New. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Add arg LOOKUP_TTL. + (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. + * pksign.c (agent_pksign_do): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (ttl_from_sshcontrol): New. + (data_sign): Pass new function to agent_pksign_do. + (search_control_file): Add new arg R_TTL. + +2009-05-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Add option --qualitybar. + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin): Factor some code out to ... + (setup_qualitybar): .. new. + (agent_get_passphrase): Add arg WITH_QUALITYBAR and implement it. + +2009-04-14 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_get_confirmation): Try SETNOTOK command + with pinentry. + +2009-04-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (pe_opt): New. + (opts): Add option --agent-program. Use ARGPARSE macros. + (get_new_passphrase): Remove. + (get_passphrase): Use gpg-agent directly. Remove arg OPT_CHECK and + change all callers. + * Makefile.am (gpg_protect_tool_LDADD): Replace pwquery_libs by + LIBASSUAN_LIBS. + (gpg_protect_tool_CFLAGS): New. + + * command.c (percent_plus_unescape): Remove. + (cmd_putval): Use percent_plus_unescape_inplace. + * call-scd.c (unescape_status_string): Remove. + (card_getattr_cb): Use percent_plus_unescape. + * protect-tool.c (main): Use percent_plus_unescape from common/. + (percent_plus_unescape, percent_plus_unescape_string): Remove. + +2009-03-27 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * learncard.c (agent_handle_learn): Add new certtype 111. + +2009-03-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (MAX_DIGEST_LEN): Change to 64. + * command.c (cmd_sethash): Allow digest length of 48 and 64. + (cmd_sethash): Allow more hash algos. + + * trustlist.c (reformat_name): New. + (agent_marktrusted): Use a reformatted name. Reload the table + before the update and always reload it at the end. + (agent_istrusted): Check early for the disabled flag. + +2009-03-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Return a specific error message + if the key is not available. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Print a started message to show the real pid. + +2009-03-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * learncard.c (struct kpinfo_cp_parm_s): Add field CTRL. + (struct certinfo_cb_parm_s): Ditto. + (agent_handle_learn): Set CTRL field. + (kpinfo_cb, certinfo_cb): Send progress status. + + * agent.h (agent_write_status): Flag with GNUPG_GCC_A_SENTINEL. + +2009-03-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (struct trustitem_s): Add field DISABLED. + (read_one_trustfile): Parse the '!' flag. + (agent_istrusted, agent_listtrusted): Check flag. + (agent_istrusted): Add arg R_DISABLED. Change all callers. + (agent_marktrusted): Do not ask if flagged as disabled. Reverse + the order of the questions. Store the disabled flag. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Save signal mask and open fds. Restore mask + and close all fds prior to the exec. Fixes bug#1013. + +2009-03-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Break repeat loop on error. + Show error message. + (cmd_getinfo): Add subcommand "cmd_has_option". + (command_has_option): New. + +2009-03-17 Daiki Ueno <ueno@unixuser.org> + + * command.c (option_value): New function. + (cmd_get_passphrase): Accept new option --repeat, which makes + gpg-agent to ask passphrase several times. + +2009-03-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_keyinfo): New command. + (register_commands): Register it. + (agent_write_status): Make sure not to print LR or CR. + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Factor shadow info parsing out to ... + * protect.c (parse_shadow_info): New. + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Use make_canon_sexp. + (agent_write_private_key, unprotect, read_key_file) + (agent_key_available): Use bin2hex. + (agent_key_info_from_file): New. + (read_key_file): Log no error message for ENOENT. + +2009-03-05 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Support flag 'P'. Change max_digits + from 8 to 16. Append a message about keypads. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Change max digits to 16. + +2009-03-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_getinfo): Add subcommand "scd_running". + + * call-scd.c (agent_scd_check_running): New. + + * gpg-agent.c: Add missing option strings for "--batch" and + "--homedir". Reported by Petr Uzel. + + * protect-tool.c (import_p12_file): Take care of canceled + passphrase entry. Fixes bug#1003. + (export_p12_file): Ditto. + +2008-12-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Set action of all pth event + handled signals to SIG_IGN. Use a different pth_sigmask strategy. + +2008-12-10 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Implement option --no-ask. + +2008-12-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Call i18n_init before init_common_subsystems. + * preset-passphrase.c (main): Ditto. + * protect-tool.c (main): Ditto. + + * command.c (cmd_preset_passphrase): Allow an arbitrary string for + the cache id. + +2008-12-08 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Sync the ticker to the next + full second. This is bug#871. + +2008-12-05 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (decrypt_block): Fix const modified of CHARSETS. + * learncard.c (sinfo_cb_parm_s): Remove superflous semicolon. + Reported by Stoyan Angelov. + +2008-11-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (make_libversion): New. + (my_strusage): Print libgcrypt version + +2008-11-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (membuf_data_cb): Change return type to + assuan_error_t to avoid warnings with newer libassuan versions. + +2008-11-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_killagent): Stop the agent immediately. + (start_command_handler): Take care of GPG_ERR_EOF. + +2008-10-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Move USE_STANDARD_SOCKET to the outer scope. + (create_socket_name): Remove arg USE_STANDARD_SOCKET. Change all + callers. + (create_server_socket): Remove IS_STANDARD_NAME and replace it by + USE_STANDARD_SOCKET. Change all callers. + (check_own_socket_running): New. + (check_own_socket, check_own_socket_thread): New. + (handle_tick): Check server socket once a minute. + (handle_connections): Remove the extra pth_wait in the shutdown + case. + +2008-10-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_geteventcounter): Mark unused arg. + (cmd_listtrusted, cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey): Ditto. + (cmd_updatestartuptty, post_cmd_notify): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (add_control_entry) + (ssh_handler_request_identities, ssh_handler_remove_identity) + (ssh_handler_remove_all_identities, ssh_handler_lock) + (ssh_handler_unlock): Ditto. + * call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p, popup_message_thread) + (agent_popup_message_stop): Ditto. + * findkey.c (agent_public_key_from_file): Ditto. + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_pattern): Ditto. + * call-scd.c (atfork_cb): Ditto. + * protect-tool.c (import_p12_cert_cb): Ditto. + * t-protect.c (main): Ditto. + +2008-10-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd) [W32]: Use snprintf again because we now + always use the estream variant. + +2008-10-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Enable assuan loggging if requested. + (agent_scd_check_aliveness) [W32]: Fix use of GetExitCodeProcess. + +2008-10-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (get_agent_scd_notify_event): Need to use a manual + reset event. + +2008-09-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (GCRY_MD_USER): Rename to GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER. + (GCRY_MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1): Rename to MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1 and + change all users. + +2008-09-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Support a Reset Code style PINs.. + +2008-09-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (parse_keygrip): Use hex2bin. + (cmd_preset_passphrase): Decode the passphrase. Reported by Kiss + Gabor. Fixes #679 again. + * preset-passphrase.c (make_hexstring): Remove. + (preset_passphrase): Use bin2hex. + +2008-05-27 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (insert_colons): Fix stupidly wrong allocation size + computation. + +2008-05-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Re-initialize default assuan log stream if a + log file is used. + + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use xtryasprintf and xfree. + + * gpg-agent.c (main, agent_deinit_default_ctrl): Always use xfree + because our asprintf is mapped to an xmalloc style function in + util.h. Replace xstrdup by xtrystrdup. + * w32main.c (build_argv): Ditto. + * preset-passphrase.c (preset_passphrase): Ditto. + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Ditto. + * command.c (option_handler): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (ssh_handler_request_identities): Ditto. + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Ditto. + + * gpg-agent.c (start_connection_thread) + (start_connection_thread_ssh): Use pth_thread_id for useful output + under W32. + (pth_thread_id) [!PTH_HAVE_PTH_THREAD_ID]: New. + +2008-03-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (agent_inq_pinentry_launched): New prototype. + + * call-pinentry.c: Include sys/types.h and signal.h. + +2008-02-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (agent_inq_pinentry_launched): New. + (option_handler): Add option allow-pinentry-notify. + * call-pinentry.c (getinfo_pid_cb): New. + (start_pinentry): Ask for the PID and notify the client. + +2008-01-15 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Start pinentry in detached + mode. + +2007-12-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin): Use gnupg_get_help_string. + +2007-12-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): s/standard_socket/use_standard_socket/ for + clarity. + (create_server_socket): New arg IS_SSH to avoid testing with + assuan commands. + +2007-11-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (get_agent_scd_notify_event): New. + (handle_signal): Factor SIGUSR2 code out to: + (agent_sigusr2_action): .. New. + (agent_sighup_action): Print info message here and not in + handle_signal. + (handle_connections) [PTH_EVENT_HANDLE]: Call agent_sigusr2_action. + + * call-scd.c (agent_scd_check_aliveness) [W32]: Implemented. + (start_scd) [W32]: Send event-signal option. + +2007-11-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin): Set the tooltip for the quality + bar. + +2007-11-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (struct server_control_s): Add XAUTHORITY and + PINENTRY_USER_DATA. + * gpg-agent.c: New option --xauthority. + (main, agent_init_default_ctrl) + (agent_deinit_default_ctrl): Implemented + * command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Ditto. + * call-pinentry.c (atfork_cb): Set the environment. + (start_pinentry): Pass CTRL as arg to atfork_cb. + +2007-11-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd) [W32]: Take care of fflush peculiarities. + +2007-11-07 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h: Remove errors.h. + +2007-10-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_constraints): Changed the wording of + the warning messages. + +2007-10-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (get_passphrase): Use new utf8 switch fucntions. + +2007-10-15 Daiki Ueno <ueno@unixuser.org> (wk) + + * command-ssh.c (reenter_compare_cb): New function; imported from + genkey.c. + (ssh_identity_register): Ask initial passphrase twice. + +2007-10-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_getinfo): Add "pid" subcommand. + +2007-10-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (struct server_control_s): Remove unused CONNECTION_FD. + + * gpg-agent.c: Remove w32-afunix.h. Include mkdtemp.h. + (socket_nonce, socket_nonce_ssh): New. + (create_server_socket): Use assuan socket wrappers. Remove W32 + specific stuff. Save the server nonce. + (check_nonce): New. + (start_connection_thread, start_connection_thread_ssh): Call it. + (handle_connections): Change args to gnupg_fd_t. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Change LISTEN_FD to gnupg_fd_t. + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Ditto. + +2007-09-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (struct pin_entry_info_s): Add element WITH_QUALITYBAR. + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_constraints): New arg SILENT. + Changed all callers. + (agent_protect_and_store, agent_genkey): Enable qualitybar. + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin): Send that option. + (unescape_passphrase_string): New. + (inq_quality): New. + (estimate_passphrase_quality): New. + +2007-09-14 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_popup_message_stop): Implement kill for + Windows. + +2007-08-28 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Add option --faked-system-time. + + * protect-tool.c (read_and_unprotect): Print the protected-at date. + + * agent.h (struct server_control_s): Add member IN_PASSWD. + * command.c (cmd_passwd): Set it. + * findkey.c (try_unprotect_cb): Use it. + + * protect.c (do_encryption): Replace asprintf by xtryasprint. + (agent_protect): Create the protected-at item. + (agent_unprotect): Add optional arg PROTECTED_AT. + (merge_lists): Add args CUTOFF and CUTLEN. + (agent_unprotect): Use them. + * findkey.c (try_unprotect_cb): Add code to test for expired keys. + (unprotect): Allow changing the passphrase. + +2007-08-27 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: Add options --min-passphrase-nonalpha, + --check-passphrase-pattern and --enforce-passphrase-constraints. + (MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA): Init nonalpha option to 1. + (main): Declare options for gpgconf. + * agent.h (struct): Add members MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA, + ENFORCE_PASSPHRASE_CONSTRAINTS and CHECK_PASSPHRASE_PATTERN. + * genkey.c (nonalpha_charcount): New. + (check_passphrase_pattern): New. + (check_passphrase_constraints): Implement. Factor some code out... + (take_this_one_anyway, take_this_one_anyway2): .. New. + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_show_message): New. + (agent_askpin): We better reset the pin buffer before asking. + + * trustlist.c (insert_colons): New. + (agent_marktrusted): Pretty print the fpr. + +2007-08-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (O_BINARY): Make sure it is defined. + (agent_write_private_key): Use O_BINARY + + * protect-tool.c (import_p12_file): Add hack to allow importing of + gnupg 2.0.4 generated files. + +2007-08-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (read_one_trustfile): Add flag "cm". + (agent_istrusted): Ditto. + +2007-08-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: Include gc-opt-flags.h and remove their definition + here. + +2007-07-13 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_constraints): Require a confirmation + for an empty passphrase. + (agent_genkey, agent_protect_and_store): No need to repeat an + empty passphrase. + +2007-07-05 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (struct inq_needpin_s): New. + (inq_needpin): Pass unknown inquiries up. + +2007-07-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (TIMERTICK_INTERVAL): New. + (fixed_gcry_pth_init, main): Kludge to fix Pth initialization. + +2007-07-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Do not use FD_SETSIZE for + select but compute the correct number. + +2007-07-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_reloadagent) [W32]: New. + (register_commands) [W32]: New command RELOADAGENT. + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_SOURCES): Remove w32main.c and w32main.h. + (gpg_agent_res_ldflags): Remove icon file as we don't have a + proper icon yet. + * gpg-agent.c (main): do not include w32main.h. Remove all calls + to w32main.c. + (agent_sighup_action): New. + (handle_signal): Use it. + +2007-06-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (create_directories) [W32]: Made it work. + +2007-06-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (ctrl_t): Remove. It is now declared in ../common/util.h. + + * gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New arg SILENT. Changed + all callers. + (create_server_socket): If the standard socket is in use check + whether a agent is running and avoid starting another one. + +2007-06-18 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Percent escape pathname in --gpgconf-list + output. + +2007-06-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * w32main.c (build_argv): New. + (WinMain): Use it. + + * command.c (cmd_killagent) [W32]: New. + (cmd_getinfo): New. + * gpg-agent.c (get_agent_ssh_socket_name): New. + (no_force_standard_socket) New. + (create_server_socket): Use it. + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_res_ldflags): Pass windows option to ld. + +2007-06-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (main): Setup default socket name for + simple-pwquery. + (MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New. Use map_spwq_error for spqw related + error codes. + * preset-passphrase.c (main): Setup default socket name for + simple-pwquery. + (map_spwq_error): Remove. + (MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New. + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Use gnupg_module_name. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto. + +2007-06-12 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * taskbar.c: New. + + * trustlist.c (read_one_trustfile): Replace GNUPG_SYSCONFDIR by a + function call. + (read_trustfiles): Ditto. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Replace some calls by init_common_subsystems. + * preset-passphrase.c (main): Ditto. + * protect-tool.c (main): Ditto. + +2007-06-11 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am (common_libs): Use libcommonstd macro. + (commonpth_libs): Use libcommonpth macro. + + * protect-tool.c (main) [W32]: Call pth_init. + + * preset-passphrase.c (main) [W32]: Replace the explicit Winsocket + init by a call to pth_init. + + * trustlist.c (initialize_module_trustlist): New. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Call it. + + * call-pinentry.c (initialize_module_query): Rename to + initialize_module_call_pinentry. + + * minip12.c: Remove iconv.h. Add utf8conf.h. Changed all iconv + calss to use these jnlib wrappers. + +2007-06-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (enum): Rename CONTEXT to ASNCONTEXT as winnt.h + defines such a symbol to access the process context. + + * call-pinentry.c (dump_mutex_state) [W32]: Handle the W32Pth case. + * call-scd.c (dump_mutex_state): Ditto. + + * protect-tool.c (i18n_init): Remove. + * preset-passphrase.c (i18n_init): Remove. + * gpg-agent.c (i18n_init): Remove. + +2007-05-19 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * protect-tool.c (get_passphrase): Free ORIG_CODESET on error. + +2007-05-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (make_shadow_info): Replace sprintf by smklen. + +2007-04-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (my_gcry_logger, my_gcry_outofcore_handler): Removed. + (main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper. + * protect-tool.c (my_gcry_logger): Removed. + (main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper. + +2007-04-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (read_trustfiles): Take a missing trustlist as an + empty one. + +2007-03-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c: New option --p12-charset. + * minip12.c (p12_build): Implement it. + +2007-03-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c: Include iconv.h. + (decrypt_block): New. + (parse_bag_encrypted_data, parse_bag_data): Use it here. + (bag_data_p, bag_decrypted_data_p): New helpers. + +2007-03-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main) <gpgconf>: Add entries for all ttl options. + +2007-02-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Fix for OS X to allow loading + of the bundle. Tested by Benjamin Donnachie. + +2007-02-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --pinentry-touch-file. + (get_agent_socket_name): New. + * agent.h (opt): Add pinentry_touch_file. + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Send new option to the + pinentry. + +2007-01-31 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> (wk) + + * command-ssh.c (stream_read_string): Initialize LENGTH to zero. + (start_command_handler_ssh): Use es_fgetc/es_ungetc to check if + EOF has been reached before trying to process another request. + +2007-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): + + * Makefile.am (t_common_ldadd): Add LIBICONV. + +2007-01-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_constraints): Get ngettext call right + and use UTF-8 aware strlen. + + * protect-tool.c (get_passphrase): New arg OPT_CHECK. + (get_new_passphrase): Enable OPT_CHECK on the first call. + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Implement option --check. + +2007-01-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN): New + (parse_rereadable_options): New option --min-passphrase-len. + * genkey.c (check_passphrase_constraints): New. + (agent_genkey, agent_protect_and_store): Call new function. Fix + memory leak. + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_askpin): Allow translation of the displayed + error message. + (agent_popup_message_start): Remove arg CANCEL_BTN. + (popup_message_thread): Use --one-button option. + + * command.c (cmd_passwd): Now that we don't distinguish between + assuan and regular error codes we can jump to the end on error. + +2006-12-07 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> + + * Makefile.am: Link to iconv for jnlib dependency. + +2006-11-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_popup_message_stop): Use SIGKILL. + * call-scd.c (inq_needpin): Implement POPUPKEYPADPROMPT and + DISMISSKEYPADPROMPT. + +2006-11-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (make_shadow_info): Cast printf arg to unsigned int. + * minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data): Ditto. + (parse_bag_data, p12_parse): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (ssh_identity_register): Changed buffer_n to + size_t. + + * agent.h (struct server_control_s): New field thread_startup. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Moved CTRL init code to .. + * gpg-agent.c (start_connection_thread): .. here. + (agent_deinit_default_ctrl): New. + (agent_init_default_ctrl): Made static. + (handle_connections): Allocate CTRL and pass it pth_spawn. + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Moved CTRL init code + to .. + * gpg-agent.c (start_connection_thread_ssh): .. here. + +2006-11-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (bump_key_eventcounter): New. + (bump_card_eventcounter): New. + (cmd_geteventcounter): New command. + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Call bump_card_eventcounter. + * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): Call bump_key_eventcounter. + * trustlist.c (agent_reload_trustlist): Ditto. + + * command.c (post_cmd_notify, io_monitor): New. + (register_commands, start_command_handler): Register them. + +2006-11-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): In detached mode connect standard + descriptors to /dev/null. + + * trustlist.c (read_trustfiles): Make sure not to pass a zero size + to realloc as the C standards says that this behaves like free. + +2006-11-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (my_strusage): Fixed typo. + +2006-10-23 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): New command --gpgconf-test. + + * minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data, parse_bag_data): Allow for + a salt of 20 bytes. + +2006-10-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am (t_common_ldadd): Use GPG_ERROR_LIBS instead -o just -l + +2006-10-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (unprotect): Use it to avoid unnecessary calls to + agent_askpin. + * call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p): New. + +2006-10-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_LDADD): Link to libcommonpth. + (gpg_agent_CFLAGS): New. This allows to only link this with Pth. + +2006-10-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_get_confirmation): Map Cancel code here too. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Return Cancel instead of + Not_Confirmed for the first question. + +2006-10-12 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (get_passphrase): Fix if !HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET. + +2006-10-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Use PTH version of libassuan. + (gpg_agent_LDADD): Ditto. + + * divert-scd.c (divert_pksign): Use PKAUTH for the TLS algo. + +2006-10-05 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (has_option_name): New. + (cmd_sethash): New --hash option. + * pksign.c (do_encode_raw_pkcs1): New. + (agent_pksign_do): Use it here for the TLS algo. + * agent.h (GCRY_MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1): New. + * divert-scd.c (pksign): Add case for tls-md5sha1. + + * divert-scd.c (encode_md_for_card): Check that the algo is valid. + +2006-10-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-pinentry.c (agent_get_passphrase): Changed to return the + unencoded passphrase. + (agent_askpin, agent_get_passphrase, agent_get_confirmation): Need + to map the cancel error. + * command.c (send_back_passphrase): New. + (cmd_get_passphrase): Use it here. Also implement --data option. + (skip_options): New. + +2006-09-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * learncard.c (agent_handle_learn): Send back the keypair + information. + +2006-09-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (read_one_trustfile): Allow extra flags. + (struct trustitem_s): Replaced KEYFLAGS by a FLAGS struct. + Changed all code to use this. + (agent_istrusted): New arg CTRL. Changed all callers. Send back + flags. + * command.c (agent_write_status): New. + +2006-09-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am: Changes to allow parallel make runs. + +2006-09-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c: Entirely rewritten. + (agent_trustlist_housekeeping): Removed and removed all calls. + +2006-09-14 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + Replaced all call gpg_error_from_errno(errno) by + gpg_error_from_syserror(). + + * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Replaced pipe_connect2 by + pipe_connect_ext. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Replaced + init_connected_socket_server by init_socket_server_ext. + +2006-09-13 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * preset-passphrase.c (main) [W32]: Check for WSAStartup error. + +2006-09-08 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c: Add signal.h as we are referencing SIGUSR2. + +2006-09-06 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Add $(GPG_ERR_CFLAGS). + (gpg_agent_LDADD): Replace -lgpg-error with $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS). + +2006-09-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * query.c: Renamed to .. + * call-pinentry.c: .. this. + + * agent.h (out_of_core): Removed. + (CTRL): Removed and changed everywhere to ctrl_t. + + Replaced all Assuan error codes by libgpg-error codes. Removed + all map_to_assuan_status and map_assuan_err. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Call assuan_set_assuan_err_source to have Assuan + switch to gpg-error codes. + * command.c (set_error): Adjusted. + +2006-09-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (percent_plus_unescape): New. + (cmd_get_val, cmd_putval): New. + +2006-08-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (stream_read_mpi): Sanity check for early + detecting of too large keys. + * gpg-agent.c (my_gcry_outofcore_handler): New. + (main): Register it. + (main): No allocate 32k secure memory (was 16k). + +2006-07-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * preset-passphrase.c (make_hexstring): For consistency use + xtrymalloc and changed caller to use xfree. Fixed function + comment. + +2006-07-29 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * preset-passphrase.c (preset_passphrase): Do not strip off last + character of passphrase. + (make_hexstring): New function. + * command.c (cmd_preset_passphrase): Use parse_hexstring to syntax + check passphrase argument. Truncate passphrase at delimiter. + +2006-07-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (build_key_bag): New args SHA1HASH and + KEYIDSTR. Append bag Attributes if these args are given. + (build_cert_sequence): ditto. + (p12_build): Calculate certificate hash and pass to build + functions. + +2006-07-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (oid_pkcs_12_keyBag): New. + (parse_bag_encrypted_data): New arg R_RESULT. Support keybags and + return the key object. + (p12_parse): Take new arg into account. Free RESULT on error. + +2006-06-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Print info for SIGUSR2 only in + verbose mode. + +2006-06-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (make_cstring): Use memcpy instead of strncpy. + (ssh_receive_mpint_list, sexp_key_extract, data_sign): Use + xtrycalloc instead of xtrymalloc followed by memset. + +2006-06-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (create_final): New arg PW. Add code to calculate the + MAC. + +2006-06-09 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_LDADD): Add $(NETLIBS). + (gpg_protect_tool_LDADD): Likewise. + (gpg_preset_passphrase_LDADD): Likewise. + +2006-04-09 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_request_process): Removed FIXME mentioning a + possible DoS attack. + +2006-04-01 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_identity_register): Make KEY_GRIP_RAW be 20 + instead of 21 bytes long; do not fill KEY_GRIP_RAW[20] with NUL + byte - KEY_GRIP_RAW is a raw binary string anyway. + +2006-02-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (struct scd_local_s): New field next_local. + (scd_local_list): New. + (start_scd): Put new local into list. + (agent_reset_scd): Remove it from the list. + (agent_scd_check_aliveness): Here is the actual reason why we need + all this stuff. + (agent_reset_scd): Send the new command RESTART instead of RESET. + +2005-12-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (cram_octet_string): New + (p12_parse): Use it for NDEFed bags. + (parse_bag_data): Ditto. + (string_to_key, set_key_iv, crypt_block): New arg SALTLEN. + (p12_build): Use old value 8 for new arg. + (parse_bag_encrypted_data, parse_bag_data): Allow for salts of 8 + to 16 bytes. Add new arg R_CONSUMED. + +2005-11-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (p12_parse): Fixed for case that the key object comes + prior to the certificate. + +2005-10-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Hack to use it for a keypad message. + + * call-scd.c (inq_needpin): Reworked to support the new KEYPADINFO. + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Keep track of the owner. + (popup_message_thread, agent_popup_message_start) + (agent_popup_message_stop, agent_reset_query): New. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Make sure a popup window gets + closed. + +2005-10-08 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * Makefile.am (gpg_protect_tool_LDADD): Add ../gl/libgnu.a. + (gpg_preset_passphrase_LDADD, t_common_ldadd): Likewise. + (gpg_agent_LDADD): Add ../gl/libgnu.a after ../common/libcommon.a. + +2005-09-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (build_key_sequence, build_cert_sequence): Fixed + padding. + +2005-09-15 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * t-protect.c (test_agent_protect): Implemented. + (main): Disable use of secure memory. + +2005-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (p12_build): Oops, array needs to be larger for the + certificate. + (build_cert_bag): Fixed yesterdays change. + + * command-ssh.c (card_key_available): Let the card handler decide + whether the card is supported here. Also get a short serial + number to return from the card handler. + +2005-09-08 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (build_cert_bag): Use a non constructed object. + i.e. 0x80 and not 0xa0. + +2005-08-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Use a default file name for --write-env-file. + +2005-07-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (agent_public_key_from_file): Fixed array assignment. + This was the cause for random segvs. + +2005-06-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (data_sign): Removed empty statement. + +2005-06-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (create_final): Cast size_t to ulong for printf. + (build_key_bag, build_cert_bag, build_cert_sequence): Ditto. + +2005-06-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c (make_advanced): Makde RESULT a plain char. + * call-scd.c (unescape_status_string): Need to cast unsigned char* + for strcpy. + (agent_card_pksign): Made arg R_BUF an unsigned char**. + * divert-scd.c (divert_pksign): Made SIGVAL unsigned char*. + (encode_md_for_card): Initialize R_VAL and R_LEN. + * genkey.c (store_key): Made BUF unsigned. + * protect.c (do_encryption): Ditto. + (do_encryption): Made arg PROTBEGIN unsigned. Initialize RESULT + and RESULTLEN even on error. + (merge_lists): Need to cast unsigned char * for strcpy. Initialize + RESULTand RESULTLEN even on error. + (agent_unprotect): Likewise for strtoul. + (make_shadow_info): Made P and INFO plain char. + (agent_shadow_key): Made P plain char. + +2005-06-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * query.c (agent_get_passphrase): Made HEXSTRING a char*. + * command-ssh.c (ssh_key_grip): Made arg BUFFER unsigned. + (ssh_key_grip): Simplified. + (data_sign): Initialize variables with the definition. + (ssh_convert_key_to_blob): Make sure that BLOB and BLOB_SIZE + are set to NULL on error. Cool, gcc-4 detects uninitialized stuff + beyond function boundaries; well it can't know that we do error + proper error handling so that this was not a real error. + (file_to_buffer): Likewise for BUFFER and BUFFER_N. + (data_sign): Likewise for SIG and SIG_N. + (stream_read_byte): Set B to a value even on error. + * command.c (cmd_genkey): Changed VALUE to char. + (cmd_readkey): Cast arg for gcry_sexp_sprint. + * agent.h (struct server_control_s): Made KEYGRIP unsigned. + +2005-06-13 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Reset the SCD. + +2005-06-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (create_socket_name): New option --max-cache-ttl-ssh. + * cache.c (housekeeping): Use it. + (agent_put_cache): Use a switch to get the default ttl so that it + is easier to add more cases. + +2005-06-06 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --default-cache-ttl-ssh. + * agent.h (cache_mode_t): New. + * pksign.c (agent_pksign_do): New arg CACHE_MODE to replace the + ARG IGNORE_CACHE. Changed all callers. + (agent_pksign): Ditto. + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. Canged all callers. + (unprotect): Ditto. + * command-ssh.c (data_sign): Use CACHE_MODE_SSH. + * cache.c (agent_get_cache): New arg CACHE_MODE. + (agent_put_cache): Ditto. Store it in the cache. + + * query.c (agent_query_dump_state, dump_mutex_state): New. + (unlock_pinentry): Reset the global context before releasing the + mutex. + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Dump query.c info on SIGUSR1. + + * call-scd.c (agent_scd_check_aliveness): Always do a waitpid and + add a timeout to the locking. + +2005-06-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): New. + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --write-env-file. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Make sure that the signals we + are handling are not blocked.Block signals while creating new + threads. + +2005-06-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (agent_scd_dump_state, dump_mutex_state): New. + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Print it on SIGUSR1. + (handle_connections): Include the file descriptor into the + threadnames. + +2005-06-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: Include setenv.h. + +2005-05-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (out_of_core): s/__inline__/inine. Noted by Ray Link. + +2005-05-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Do not unset the DISPLAY when we are + continuing as child. + +2005-05-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (inq_needpin): Skip leading spaces in of PIN + description. + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Enhanced to cope with description + flags. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Add arg PROMPT_TEXT. Changed all + callers. + +2005-05-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Don't test for an alive scdaemon here. + (agent_scd_check_aliveness): New. + * gpg-agent.c (handle_tick): Test for an alive scdaemon. + (handle_signal): Print thread info on SIGUSR1. + +2005-05-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect-tool.c: New option --canonical. + (show_file): Implement it. + + * keyformat.txt: Define the created-at attribute for keys. + +2005-05-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Removed the card reset kludge. + +2005-05-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (unlock_scd): Add new arg CTRL. Changed all callers. + (start_scd): Reoworked to allow for additional connections. + * agent.h (ctrl_t): Add local data for the SCdaemon. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Release SERVER_LOCAL. + + * gpg-agent.c (create_server_socket): Use xmalloc. + (main): Removed option --disable-pth a dummy. Removed non-pth + code path. + (cleanup_sh): Removed. Not needed anymore. + +2005-05-05 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_key_to_buffer): Rename to ... + (ssh_key_to_protected_buffer): ... this; change callers. + Improved documentation. + Use ssh_key_grip(), where gcry_pk_get_keygrip() has been used + before. + (ssh_handler_sign_request): Removed unusued variable P. + +2005-04-20 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_handler_request_identities): Removed + debugging code (sleep call), which was commited unintenionally. + +2005-04-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data): Fix the unpadding hack. + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --disable-scdaemon. + (handle_connections): Add time event to drive ... + (handle_tick): New function. + (main): Record the parent PID. Fixed segv when using ssh and a + command. + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Take care of this option. + +2005-04-03 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_request_spec): New member: secret_input. + (REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE): New argument: secret_input. + (request_specs): Add secret_input flag. + (request_spec_lookup): New function ... + (ssh_request_process): ... use it here; depending on secret_input + flag allocate secure or non-secure memory. + +2005-03-02 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (sexp_key_extract): Removed FIXME, since + xtrymallos does set errno correctly by now. + (sexp_extract_identifier): Remove const attribute from identifier. + (ssh_handler_request_identities): Remove const attribute from + key_type; removes ugly casts and FIXME. + (sexp_key_extract): Remove const attribute from comment. + (ssh_send_key_public): Remove const attribute from + key_type/comment; removes ugly cast. + (data_sign): Remove const attribute from identifier; removes ugly + cast. + (key_secret_to_public): Remove const attribute from comment; + removes ugly cast. + (ssh_handler_sign_request): Remove const attribute from p. + (sexp_key_extract): Use make_cstring(). + (ssh_key_extract_comment): Likewise. + (ssh_key_to_buffer): Use secure memory for memory area to hold the + key S-Expression. + Added more comments. + +2005-02-25 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (modify_description): Keep invalid % escapes, so that + %0A may pass through. + + * agent.h (server_control_s): New field USE_AUTH_CALL. + * call-scd.c (agent_card_pksign): Make use of it. + * command-ssh.c (data_sign): Set the flag. + (ssh_send_key_public): New arg OVERRIDE_COMMENT. + (card_key_available): Add new arg CARDSN. + (ssh_handler_request_identities): Use the card s/n as comment. + (sexp_key_extract): Use GCRYMPI_FMT_STD. + (data_sign): Ditto. + + * learncard.c (make_shadow_info): Moved to .. + * protect.c (make_shadow_info): .. here. Return NULL on malloc + failure. Made global. + * agent.h: Add prototype. + +2005-02-24 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * call-scd.c (unescape_status_string): New. Actual a copy of + ../g10/call-agent.c + (card_getattr_cb, agent_card_getattr): New. + + * command-ssh.c (card_key_available): New. + (ssh_handler_request_identities): First see whether a card key is + available. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Need to check for events if + select returns with -1. + +2005-02-23 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (get_passphrase): Removed. + (ssh_identity_register): Partly rewritten. + (open_control_file, search_control_file, add_control_entry): New. + (ssh_handler_request_identities): Return only files listed in our + control file. + + * findkey.c (unprotect): Check for allocation error. + + * agent.h (opt): Add fields to record the startup terminal + settings. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Record them and do not force keep display + with --enable-ssh-support. + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Use them here. + + * gpg-agent.c: Renamed option --ssh-support to + --enable-ssh-support. + + * command.c (cmd_readkey): New. + (register_commands): Register new command "READKEY". + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_request_process): Improved logging. + + * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): Always use plain open. + Don't depend on an umask for permissions. + (agent_key_from_file): Factored file reading code out to .. + (read_key_file): .. new function. + (agent_public_key_from_file): New. + +2005-02-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (stream_read_string): Removed call to abort on + memory error because the CVS version of libgcrypt makes sure + that ERRNO gets always set on error even with a faulty user + supplied function. + +2005-02-19 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_receive_mpint_list): Slightly rewritten, do + not use elems_secret member of key_spec. + (ssh_key_type_spec): Removed member: elems_secret. + (ssh_key_types): Removed elems_secret data. + (ssh_sexp_construct): Renamed to ... + (sexp_key_construct): ... this; changed callers. + (ssh_sexp_extract): Renamed to ... + (sexp_key_extract): ... this; changed callers. + (ssh_sexp_extract_key_type): Renamed to ... + (sexp_extract_identifier): ... this; changed callers; use + make_cstring(). + Added more comments. + +2005-02-18 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_sexp_construct): Rewritten generation of sexp + template, clarified. + (ssh_sexp_extract): Support shadowed-private-key-sexp; treat + protected-private key and shadowed-private-key as public keys. + (key_secret_to_public): Rewritten: simply use ssh_sexp_extract() + and ssh_sexp_construct(). + +2005-02-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * findkey.c (modify_description): Don't increment OUT_LEN during + the second pass. + +2005-02-14 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (es_read_byte): Renamed to ... + (stream_es_read_byte): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_byte): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_byte): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_uint32): Renamed to ... + (stream_read_uint32): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_uint32): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_uint32): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_data): Renamed to ... + (stream_read_data): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_data): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_data): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_string): Renamed to ... + (stream_read_string): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_cstring): Renamed to ... + (stream_read_cstring): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_string): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_string): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_cstring): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_cstring): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_mpi): Renamed to ... + (stream_read_mpi): ... this; changed callers. + (es_write_mpi): Renamed to ... + (stream_write_mpi): ... this; changed callers. + (es_copy): Renamed to ... + (stream_copy): ... this; changed callers. + (es_read_file): Renamed to ... + (file_to_buffer): ... this; changed callers. + (ssh_identity_register): Removed variable description_length; + changed code to use asprintf for description. + (stream_write_uint32): Do not filter out the last byte of shift + expression. + (uint32_construct): New macro ... + (stream_read_uint32): ... use it; removed unnecessary cast. + +2005-02-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * agent.h (agent_exit): Add JNLIB_GCC_A_NR to indicate that this + function won't return. + + * gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): Initialize pid to a + default value if not needed. + + * command-ssh.c: Removed stdint.h. s/byte_t/unsigned char/, + s/uint32/u32/ becuase that is what we have always used in GnuPG. + (ssh_request_specs): Moved to top of file. + (ssh_key_types): Ditto. + (make_cstring): Ditto. + (data_sign): Don't use a variable for the passphrase prompt, make + it translatable. + (ssh_request_process): + + + * findkey.c (modify_description): Renamed arguments for clarity, + polished documentation. Make comment a C-string. Fixed case of + DESCRIPTION being just "%". + (agent_key_from_file): Make sure comment string to a C-string. + + * gpg-agent.c (create_socket_name): Cleanup the implemntation, use + DIMof, agent_exit, removed superflous args and return the + allocated string as value. Documented. Changed callers. + (create_server_socket): Cleanups similar to above. Changed callers. + (cleanup_do): Renamed to .. + (remove_socket): .. this. Changed caller. + (handle_connections): The signals are to be handled in the select + and not in the accept. Test all FDs after returning from a + select. Remove the event tests from the accept calls. The select + already assured that the accept won't block. + +2005-01-29 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_handler_request_identities) + (ssh_handler_sign_request, ssh_handler_add_identity) + (ssh_handler_remove_identity, ssh_handler_remove_all_identities) + (ssh_handler_lock, ssh_handler_unlock): Changed to return an error + code instead of a boolean. + (ssh_request_process): Changed to return a boolean instead of an + error; adjust caller. + (ssh_request_handle_t): Adjusted type. + (ssh_request_spec): New member: identifier. + (REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE): New macro; use it for initialization of + request_specs[]. + (ssh_request_process): In debugging mode, log identifier of + handler to execute. + (start_command_handler_ssh): Moved most of the stream handling + code ... + (ssh_request_process): ... here. + +2005-01-28 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_handler_add_identity): Pass ctrl to + ssh_identity_register(). + (ssh_identity_register): New argument: ctrl; pass ctrl to + get_passphrase(). + (get_passphrase): Pass ctrl instead of NULL to agent_askpin(). + (start_command_handler_ssh): Use agent_init_default_ctrl(); + deallocate structure members, which might be dynamically + allocated. + (lifetime_default): Removed variable. + (ssh_handler_add_identity): Fix ttl handling; renamed variable + `death' to `ttl'. + (ssh_identity_register): Fix key grip handling. + +2005-01-26 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * command-ssh.c (ssh_handler_sign_request): Confirm to agent + protocol in case of failure. + + * command-ssh.c: New file. + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_SOURCES): New source file: command-ssh.c. + + * findkey.c (modify_description): New function. + (agent_key_from_file): Support comment field in key s-expressions. + + * gpg-agent.c (enum cmd_and_opt_values): New item: oSSHSupport. + (opts) New entry for oSSHSupport. + New variable: socket_name_ssh. + (cleanup_do): New function based on cleanup(). + (cleanup): Use cleanup_do() for socket_name and socket_name_ssh. + (main): New switch case for oSSHSupport. + (main): Move socket name creation code to ... + (create_socket_name): ... this new function. + (main): Use create_socket_name() for creating socket names for + socket_name and for socket_name_ssh in case ssh support is + enabled. + Move socket creation code to ... + (create_server_socket): ... this new function. + (main): Use create_server_socket() for creating sockets. + In case standard_socket is set, do not only store a socket name in + socket_name, but also in socket_name_ssh. + Generate additional environment info strings for ssh support. + Pass additional ssh socket argument to handle_connections. + (start_connection_thread_ssh): New function. + (handle_connections): Use select to multiplex between gpg-agent + and ssh-agent protocol. + + * agent.h (struct opt): New member: ssh_support. + (start_command_handler_ssh): Add prototype. + +2005-01-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use "Cancel" for the first + confirmation and made the strings translatable. + + * cache.c (agent_put_cache): Fix the test for using the default + TTL. + +2004-12-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * preset-passphrase.c (preset_passphrase): Handle --passphrase. + + * Makefile.am (gpg_preset_passphrase_LDADD): Reorder libs so that + pwquery may use stuff from jnlib. Conditionally add -lwsock2 + (gpg_protect_tool_LDADD): Ditto. + + * preset-passphrase.c (main): Use default_homedir(). + (main) [W32]: Initialize sockets. + +2004-12-21 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * Makefile.am (libexec_PROGRAMS): Add gpg-preset-passphrase. + (gpg_preset_passphrase_SOURCES, gpg_preset_passphrase_LDADD): New + targets. + * agent.h (opt): New member allow_cache_passphrase. + * cache.c (housekeeping): Check if R->ttl is not negative. + (agent_put_cache): Allow ttl to be negative. + * command.c (parse_hexstring): Allow something to follow the + hexstring. + (cmd_cache_passphrase): New function. + (register_commands): Add it. + * gpg-agent.c: Handle --allow-preset-passphrase. + * preset-passphrase.c: New file. + +2004-12-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Use default_homedir(). + * protect-tool.c (main): Ditto. + +2004-12-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main) [W32]: Now that Mutexes work we can remove + the pth_init kludge. + (main): Add new options --[no-]use-standard-socket. + (check_for_running_agent): Check whether it is running on the + standard socket. + + * call-scd.c (init_membuf, put_membuf, get_membuf): Removed. We + now use the identical implementation from ../common/membuf.c. + + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Changed arg OUTFP to OUTBUF and use + membuf functions to return the value. + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Ditto. + * genkey.c (agent_genkey): Ditto. + * command.c (cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey): Replaced + assuan_get_data_fp() by a the membuf scheme. + (clear_outbuf, write_and_clear_outbuf): New. + +2004-12-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * query.c (initialize_module_query): New. + * call-scd.c (initialize_module_call_scd): New. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Call them. + +2004-12-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Remove special Pth initialize. + + * agent.h (map_assuan_err): Define in terms of + map_assuan_err_with_source. + +2004-12-17 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * query.c: Undo change from 2004-12-05. + +2004-12-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c [W32]: Various hacks to make it work. + + * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key) [W32]: Adjust open call. + + * call-scd.c (start_scd) [W32]: Don't check whether the daemon + didn't died. To hard to do under Windows. + (start_scd) [W32]: Disable sending of the event signal option. + + * protect-tool.c (read_file, export_p12_file) [W32]: Use setmode + to get stdout and stin into binary mode. + +2004-12-05 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Allow CTRL be NULL. + +2004-10-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c (parse_rereadable_options): Return "not handled" + when the log file has not beend hadled. This is will let the main + option processing continue. Fixed a bug introduced on 2004-09-4 + resulting in logging to stderr until a HUP has been given. + (main): Don't close the listen FD. + +2004-09-30 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * Makefile.am: Adjusted from gettext 1.14. + +2004-09-29 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data): Print error if a bad + passphrase has been given. + +2004-09-28 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com> + + * protect.c (agent_unprotect): Fixed wiping of CLEARTEXT. Thanks + to Moritz for pointing this out. + +2004-09-25 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * agent.h: Declare: agent_pksign_do. + (struct server_control_s): New member: raw_value. + + * pksign.c (do_encode_md): New argument: raw_value; support + generation of raw (non-pkcs1) data objects; adjust callers. + (agent_pksign_do): New function, based on code ripped + out from agent_pksign. + (agent_pksign): Use agent_pksign_do. + + * command.c (start_command_handler): Set ctrl.digest.raw_value. + +2004-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.de> + + * gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New. + (main): The default action is now to check for an already running + agent. + (parse_rereadable_options): Set logfile only on reread. + (main): Do not print the "is development version" note. + +2004-08-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.de> + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --max-cache-ttl. Suggested by Alexander + Belopolsky. + * cache.c (housekeeping): Use it here instead of the hardwired + default of 1 hour. + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Use a timeout for the pinentry lock. + +2004-08-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.de> + + * protect-tool.c (get_passphrase): Make sure that the default + prompts passed to gpg-agent are utf-8 encoded. Add new prompt values. + (import_p12_file, import_p12_file, export_p12_file): Changed calls + to get_passphrase so that better prompts are displayed. + (get_new_passphrase): New. + +2004-07-22 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.de> + + * trustlist.c (read_list): Allow colons in the fingerprint. + (headerblurb): Rephrased. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Increase the stack size ot 256k. + +2004-06-20 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com> + + * gpg-agent.c: Include <sys/stat.h> (build fix for BSD). + +2004-05-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Reload the trustlist on SIGHUP. + (start_connection_thread): Hack to simulate a ticker. + * trustlist.c (agent_trustlist_housekeeping) + (agent_reload_trustlist): New. Protected all global functions + here with a simple counter which is sufficient for Pth. + +2004-05-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c: Remove help texts for options lile --lc-ctype. + (main): New option --allow-mark-trusted. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use it here. + +2004-04-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c: New option --enable-status-msg. + (store_private_key): Print status messages for imported keys. + (read_and_unprotect): Ditto for bad passphrase. + + * gpg-agent.c (parse_rereadable_options): New arg REREAD. Allow + changing oLogFile. + (current_logfile): New. + +2004-04-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Do not register an event signal if we + are running as a pipe server. + +2004-04-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Send event-signal option. Always check + that the scdaemon is still running. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Do not use SIGUSR{1,2} anymore for + changing the verbosity. + +2004-04-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Tell the logging code that we are running + detached. + +2004-04-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Use new libgcrypt thread library register + scheme. + +2004-03-23 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): For now, always print the default config + file name for --gpgconf-list. + +2004-03-17 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main) <gpgconf>: Fixed default value quoting. + +2004-03-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (parse_rereadable_options): Use the new + DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL macro. + (main): Updated --gpgconf-list output. + +2004-02-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_passwd): Take acount of a key description. + + * genkey.c (reenter_compare_cb): Do not set the error text. + (agent_protect_and_store, agent_genkey): Force a re-enter after a + non-matching passphrase. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Add new arg INITIAL_ERRTEXT; changed + all callers. + +2004-02-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c: New options --have-cert and --prompt. + (export_p12_file): Read a certificate from STDIN and pass it to + p12_build. Detect a keygrip and construct the filename in that + case. Unprotcet a key if needed. Print error messages for key + formats we can't handle. + (release_passphrase): New. + (get_passphrase): New arg PROMPTNO. Return the allocated + string. Changed all callers. + + * minip12.c: Revamped the build part. + (p12_build): New args CERT and CERTLEN. + +2004-02-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (main): Setup the used character set. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Ditto. + + * gpg-agent.c (set_debug): New. New option --debug-level. + (main): New option --gpgconf-list. + +2004-02-17 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * pksign.c (do_encode_md): Cleaned up by using gcry_sexp_build. + + * Makefile.am (gpg_protect_tool_SOURCES): Removed + simple-pwquery.[ch], as we once moved it to ../common. + +2004-02-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_setkeydesc): New. + (register_commands): Add command SETKEYDESC. + (cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt): Use the key description. + (reset_notify): Reset the description. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Add arg DESC_TEXT. + (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Ditto. + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Ditto. Made CIPHERTEXT an + unsigned char*. + + * protect-tool.c (main): New options --no-fail-on-exist, --homedir. + (store_private_key): Use them here. + +2004-02-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (read_file, main): Allow reading from stdin. + + * Makefile.am: Include cmacros.am for common flags. + (libexec_PROGRAMS): Put gpg-protect-tool there. + +2004-02-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data): Finished implementation. + (p12_parse): Add callback args. + * protect-tool.c (import_p12_cert_cb): New. + (import_p12_file): Use it. + +2004-02-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * minip12.c (crypt_block): Add arg CIPHER_ALGO; changed all callers. + (set_key_iv): Add arg KEYBYTES; changed caller. + +2004-02-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Extra paranoid wipe. + * protect.c (agent_unprotect): Ditto. + (merge_lists): Ditto. Add arg RESULTLEN. + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Don't show the secret key even in + debug mode. + + * protect.c: Add DSA and Elgamal description. + +2004-01-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * agent.h (server_control_s): Add connection_fd field. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Init it here. + * gpg-agent.c (agent_init_default_ctrl): and here. + * call-scd.c: Add the CTRL arg to all functions calling start_scd + and pass it to start_scd. Changed all callers + (start_scd): Keep track of the current active connection. + (agent_reset_scd): New. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Call it here. + * learncard.c (agent_handle_learn): Add arg CTRL; changed caller. + (send_cert_back): Ditto. + +2004-01-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Check whether the trustlist is + writable. + +2004-01-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * sexp-parse.h: Moved to ../common. + +2004-01-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (atfork_cb): New. + (start_scd): Make sure secmem gets cleared. + * query.c (atfork_cb): New. + (start_pinentry): Make sure secmem gets cleared. + +2004-01-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Now return an error code so + that we have more detailed error messages in the upper layers. + This fixes the handling of pinentry's cancel button. + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Changed accordingly. + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Ditto. + * command.c (cmd_passwd): Ditto. + +2003-12-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Set the prefixes for assuan logging. + +2003-12-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect.c (do_encryption): Use gcry_create_nonce instad of the + obsolete WEAK_RANDOM. + +2003-11-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * sexp-parse.h (snext): Don't use atoi_1 and digitp macros, so + that this file is useful by other applications too. + +2003-10-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_get_confirmation): New command. + +2003-08-20 Timo Schulz <twoaday@freakmail.de> + + * pksign.c (do_encode_md): Allocate enough space. Cast md + byte to unsigned char to prevent sign extension. + +2003-08-14 Timo Schulz <twoaday@freakmail.de> + + * pksign.c (do_encode_md): Due to the fact pkcs#1 padding + is now in Libgcrypt, use the new interface. + +2003-07-31 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_LDADD): Added INTLLIBS. + (gpg_protect_tool_SOURCES): Added simple-pwquery.[ch] + +2003-07-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + Adjusted for gcry_mpi_print and gcry_mpi_scan API change. + +2003-07-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * simple-pwquery.c, simple-pwquery.h: Moved to ../common. + * Makefile.am (gpg_protect_tool_LDADD): Add simple-pwquery.o. + Removed it from xx_SOURCES. + +2003-07-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Kludge to allow use of Pth 1 + and 2. + +2003-06-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (learn_status_cb): Store the serialno in PARM. + +2003-06-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (agent_card_serialno): Don't do a RESET anymore. + +2003-06-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_scd): New. + * call-scd.c (agent_card_scd): New. + * divert-scd.c (divert_generic_cmd): New + + * call-scd.c (agent_card_learn): New callback args SINFO. + (learn_status_cb): Pass all other status lines to the sinfo + callback. + * learncard.c (release_sinfo, sinfo_cb): New. + (agent_handle_learn): Pass the new cb to the learn function and + pass the collected information back to the client's assuan + connection. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Moved pth_init before gcry_check_version. + +2003-06-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Adjusted for Pth 2.0 + + Adjusted for changes in the libgcrypt API. Some more fixes for the + libgpg-error stuff. + +2003-06-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + Renamed error codes from INVALID to INV and removed _ERROR suffixes. + +2003-06-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + Changed all error codes in all files to the new libgpg-error scheme. + + * agent.h: Include gpg-error.h and errno.h + * Makefile.am: Link with libgpg-error + + * query.c: assuan.h is now a system header. + * genkey.c (agent_genkey): Fixed silly use of xmalloc by + xtrymalloc. + +2003-04-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (register_commands): Adjusted for new Assuan semantics. + + * Makefile.am: Don't override LDFLAGS. + +2002-12-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c: New variable config_filename. + (parse_rereadable_options): New. + (main): Use it here. Add setting of default values, set + config_filename. + (reread_configuration): Filled with actual code. + +2002-12-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (read_key): Don't run make_canonical on a NULL + buffer. + + * command.c (parse_hexstring): New. + (cmd_sethash): Use it. + (parse_keygrip): New. + (cmd_havekey, cmd_sigkey): Use it. + (cmd_passwd): New. + * genkey.c (agent_protect_and_store): New. + (store_key): Add arg FORCE. + (agent_genkey): Pass false to this force of store_key. + +2002-11-13 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Switch all messages to utf-8. + + * simple-pwquery.c (agent_send_all_options): Use $GPG_TTY and + stdin with ttyname. + + * cache.c (new_data): Uiih - /sizeof d/sizeof *d/. + +2002-11-10 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (option_handler): Fix keep_tty check. + +2002-11-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Make sure we have a default ttyname. + * command.c (option_handler): Check opt.keep_tty here + * query.c (start_pinentry): but not anymore here. + +2002-11-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * agent.h (opt,server_control_s): Move display and lc_ variables + to the control struct so that they are per connection. + * gpg-agent.c (agent_init_default_ctrl): New. + (main): Assign those command line options to new default_* variables. + Reset DISPLAY in server mode so that tehre is no implicit default. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Initialize and deinitialize + the control values. + (option_handler): Work on the ctrl values and not on the opt. + * query.c (start_pinentry): New argument CTRL to set the display + connection specific. Changed all callers to pass this value. + (agent_askpin,agent_get_passphrase,agent_get_confirmation): Add + CTRL arg and pass it ot start_pinentry. + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Pass CTRL argument. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Add CTRL argument + * command.c (cmd_marktrusted): Pass CTRL argument + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Add CTRL arg. + (divert_pksign,divert_pkdecrypt): Ditto. Changed caller. + (getpin_cb): Use OPAQUE to pass the CTRL variable. Changed both + users. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Add CTRL arg. + (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. + + * query.c (unlock_pinentry): Disconnect the pinentry so that we + start a new one for each request. This is required to support + clients with different environments (e.g. X magic cookies). + +2002-09-05 Neal H. Walfield <neal@cs.uml.edu> + + * gpg-agent.c (main) [USE_GNU_PTH]: No need to call + assuan_set_io_func as assuan is smart. + +2002-09-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Flush cache on SIGHUP. + * cache.c (agent_flush_cache): New. + + * gpg-agent.c, agent.h: Add --keep-display and --keep-tty. + * query.c (start_pinentry): Implement them. The option passing + needs more thoughts. + +2002-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (create_private_keys_directory) + (create_directories): New. + (main): Try to create a home directory. + +2002-09-04 Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.de> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Use sigaction, not signal. + +2002-09-03 Neal H. Walfield <neal@g10code.de> + + * findkey.c: Include <fcntl.h>. + (agent_write_private_key): Prefer POSIX compatibity, open and + fdopen, over the simplicity of GNU extensions, fopen(file, "x"). + +2002-08-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * query.c (agent_askpin): Provide the default desc text depending + on the pininfo. Do the basic PIN verification only when + min_digits is set. + +2002-08-21 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * query.c (agent_askpin): Hack to show the right default prompt. + (agent_get_passphrase): Ditto. + + * trans.c: Removed and replaced all usages with standard _() + + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Pass a more descritive text to the + pinentry. + + * Makefile.am: Renamed the binary protect-tool to gpg-protect-tool. + * protect-tool.c: Removed the note about internal use only. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): New option --daemon so that the program is + not accidently started in the background. + +2002-08-16 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (learn_status_cb): Handle CERTINFO status. + (agent_card_learn): Add args for certinfo cb. + * learncard.c (release_certinfo,certinfo_cb): New. + (send_cert_back): New. With factored out code from .. + (agent_handle_learn): here. Return certinfo stuff. + +2002-07-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): New option --ignore-cache-for-signing. + * command.c (option_handler): New server option + use-cache-for-signing defaulting to true. + (cmd_pksign): handle global and per session option. + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file, unprotect): New arg + ignore_cache. Changed all callers. + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Likewise. + +2002-06-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Use GNUPG_DERAULT_PINENTRY. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Use GNUPG_DEFAULT_SCDAEMON. + +2002-06-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (export_p12_file): New. + (main): New command --p12-export. + * minip12.c (create_final,p12_build,compute_tag_length): New. + (store_tag_length): New. + +2002-06-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * minip12.c (crypt_block): Renamed from decrypt_block, add arg to + allow encryption. + + * Makefile.am (pkglib_PROGRAMS): Put protect-tool there. + + * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key,agent_key_from_file) + (agent_key_available): Use GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR constant. + * gpg-agent.c (main): Use GNUPG_DEFAULT_HOMEDIR constant. + + * protect-tool.c (store_private_key): New. + (import_p12_file): Store the new file if requested. + (main): New options --force and --store. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Set a global flag when running detached. + * query.c (start_pinentry): Pass the list of FD to keep in the + child when not running detached. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto. + +2002-06-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_istrusted, cmd_listtrusted, cmd_marktrusted) + (cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey, cmd_get_passphrase) + (cmd_learn): Print an error message for a failed operation. + + * simple-pwquery.c, simple-pwquery.h: New. + * protect-tool. (get_passphrase): New, used to get a passphrase + from the agent if none was given on the command line. + +2002-06-25 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (rsa_key_check): New. + (import_p12_file): New. + (main): New command --p12-import. + * minip12.c, minip12.h: New. + +2002-06-24 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (read_file): New. + (read_key): Factored most code out to read_file. + +2002-06-17 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * agent.h: Add a callback function to the pin_entry_info structure. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Use the callback to check for a correct + PIN. Removed the start_err_text argument because it is not + anymore needed; changed callers. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Replace our own check loop by a callback. + (try_unprotect_cb): New. + * genkey.c (reenter_compare_cb): New. + (agent_genkey): Use this callback here. Fixed setting of the pi2 + variable and a segv in case of an empty PIN. + + * divert-scd.c (getpin_cb): Removed some unused stuff and + explained what we still have to change. + +2002-06-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): New option --disable-pth. + +2002-06-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c: Add command --show-keygrip + (show_keygrip): New. + +2002-05-23 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c: Seirialized all scdaeom access when using Pth. + + * cache.c: Made the cache Pth-thread-safe. + (agent_unlock_cache_entry): New. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Unlock the returned cache value. + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Ditto. + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Register pth_read/write with Assuan. + +2002-05-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * query.c: Serialized all pinentry access when using Pth. + + * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal,start_connection_thread) + (handle_connections): New + (main): Use the new Pth stuff to allow concurrent connections. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Add new arg FD so that the + fucntion can also be used for an already connected socket. + * Makefile.am: Link with Pth. + +2002-05-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * cache.c (housekeeping, agent_put_cache): Use our time() wrapper. + +2002-04-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * cache.c (agent_put_cache): Reinitialize the creation time and + the ttl when reusing a slot. + + * call-scd.c (start_scd): Print debug messages only with debug + flags set. + * query.c (start_pinentry): Ditto. + +2002-04-25 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * agent.h (agent_get_confirmation): Replace paramter prompt with + two parameters ok and cancel. + * query.c (agent_get_confirmation): Likewise. Implement this. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Fix invocation of + agent_get_confirmation. + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Likewise. + +2002-04-24 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * agent.h (struct opt): Add members display, ttyname, ttytype, + lc_ctype, and lc_messages. + * gpg-agent.c (enum cmd_and_opt_values): Add oDisplay, oTTYname, + oTTYtype, oLCctype, and LCmessages. + (main): Handle these options. + * command.c (option_handler): New function. + (register_commands): Register option handler. + * query.c (start_pinentry): Pass the various display and tty + options to the pinentry. + +2002-04-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect-tool.c (show_file): New. Used as default action. + +2002-03-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * divert-scd.c (encode_md_for_card): Don't do the pkcs-1 padding, + the scdaemon should take care of it. + (ask_for_card): Hack to not display the trailing zero. + +2002-03-11 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * learncard.c (kpinfo_cb): Remove the content restrictions from + the keyID. + +2002-03-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * learncard.c: New. + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): The serial number is binary so + convert it to hex here. + * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): New. + * genkey.c (store_key): And use it here. + + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Changed the way the diversion is done. + * divert-scd.c (divert_pkdecrypt): Changed interface and + implemented it. + +2002-03-05 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * call-scd.c (inq_needpin): New. + (agent_card_pksign): Add getpin_cb args. + (agent_card_pkdecrypt): New. + +2002-03-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Changed how the diversion is done. + * divert-scd.c (divert_pksign): Changed interface and implemented it. + (encode_md_for_card): New. + * call-scd.c (agent_card_pksign): New. + +2002-02-28 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Detect whether a Smartcard is to be + used and divert the operation in this case. + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Likewise + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Add optional arg shadow_info + and have it return information about a shadowed key. + * protect.c (agent_get_shadow_info): New. + + * protect.c (snext,sskip,smatch): Moved to + * sexp-parse.h: New file. + * divert-scd.c: New. + +2002-02-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect.c (agent_shadow_key): New. + + * command.c (cmd_learn): New command LEARN. + * gpg-agent.c: New option --scdaemon-program. + * call-scd.c (start_scd): New. Based on query.c + * query.c: Add 2 more arguments to all uses of assuan_transact. + +2002-02-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * findkey.c (unprotect): Show an error message for a bad passphrase. + + * command.c (cmd_marktrusted): Implemented. + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): New. + (open_list): Add APPEND arg. + + * query.c (agent_get_confirmation): New. + +2002-02-06 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * cache.c (housekeeping): Fixed linking in the remove case. + +2002-02-01 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c: New option --default-cache-ttl. + * cache.c (agent_put_cache): Use it. + + * cache.c: Add a few debug outputs. + + * protect.c (agent_private_key_type): New. + * agent.h: Add PRIVATE_KEY_ enums. + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Use it to decide whether we + have to unprotect a key. + (unprotect): Cache the passphrase. + + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file,agent_key_available): The key + files do now require a ".key" suffix to make a script's life + easier. + * genkey.c (store_key): Ditto. + +2002-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * genkey.c (store_key): Protect the key. + (agent_genkey): Ask for the passphrase. + * findkey.c (unprotect): Actually unprotect the key. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Add an optional start_err_text. + +2002-01-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * protect.c: New. + (hash_passphrase): Based on the GnuPG 1.0.6 version. + * protect-tool.c: New + +2002-01-29 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * findkey.c (agent_key_available): New. + * command.c (cmd_havekey): New. + (register_commands): And register new command. + +2002-01-20 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Remove the plus signs. + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Send no-grab option to pinentry + * gpg-agent.c (main): Move variable grab as no_grab to agent.h. + +2002-01-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): Disable core dumps. + + * cache.c: New. + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Use the cache. + (cmd_clear_passphrase): Ditto. + + * gpg-agent.c: Removed unused cruft and implement the socket + based server. + (my_strusage): Take bug report address from configure.ac. + * command.c (start_command_handler): Add an argument to start as + regular server. + (start_command_handler): Enable Assuan logging. + +2002-01-15 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * trustlist.c: New. + * command.c (cmd_istrusted, cmd_listtrusted, cmd_marktrusted): New. + +2002-01-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * genkey.c: Store the secret part and return the public part. + +2002-01-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): New. + (cmd_clear_passphrase): New. + * query.c (agent_get_passphrase): New. + +2002-01-02 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * genkey.c: New. + * command.c (cmd_genkey): New. + + * command.c (rc_to_assuan_status): Removed and changed all callers + to use map_to_assuan_status. + +2001-12-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * keyformat.txt: New. + +2001-12-19 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * query.c (start_pinentry): Add new argument to assuan_pipe_connect. + +2001-12-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * Makefile.am: Use LIBGCRYPT macros + +2001-12-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): New option --batch. New option --debug-wait + n, so that it is possible to attach gdb when used in server mode. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Don't ask in batch mode. + + * command.c: Removed the conversion macros as they are now in + ../common/util.h. + +2001-12-14 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de> + + * query.c (LINELENGTH): Removed. + (agent_askpin): Use ASSUAN_LINELENGTH, not LINELENGTH. + +2001-11-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c: Removed all GUI code, removed code for old + protocol. New code to use the Assuan protocol as a server and + also to communicate with a new ask-passphrase utility. + +2000-11-22 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> + + * gpg-agent.c (main): csh support by Dan Winship, new options --sh + and --csh and set default by consulting $SHELL. + +Mon Aug 21 17:59:17 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de> + + * gpg-agent.c (passphrase_dialog): Cleanup the window and added the + user supplied text to the window. + (main): Fixed segv in gtk_init when used without a command to start. + + * gpg-agent.c: --flush option. + (req_flush): New. + (req_clear_passphrase): Implemented. + +Fri Aug 18 14:27:14 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de> + + * gpg-agent.c: New. + * Makefile.am: New. + + + Copyright 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, + 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + + This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives + unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without + modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + + This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the + implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. diff --git a/agent/Makefile.am b/agent/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc8a22a --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +# Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is part of GnuPG. +# +# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + +## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in + +bin_PROGRAMS = gpg-agent +libexec_PROGRAMS = gpg-protect-tool gpg-preset-passphrase +noinst_PROGRAMS = $(TESTS) + +# EXTRA_DIST = gpg-agent.ico gpg-agent-resource.rc +EXTRA_DIST = ChangeLog-2011 + +AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/gl -I$(top_srcdir)/common -I$(top_srcdir)/intl + +include $(top_srcdir)/am/cmacros.am + +AM_CFLAGS = $(LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS) $(GPG_ERROR_CFLAGS) + +gpg_agent_SOURCES = \ + gpg-agent.c agent.h \ + command.c command-ssh.c \ + call-pinentry.c \ + cache.c \ + trans.c \ + findkey.c \ + pksign.c \ + pkdecrypt.c \ + genkey.c \ + protect.c \ + trustlist.c \ + divert-scd.c \ + call-scd.c \ + learncard.c + +common_libs = $(libcommon) ../jnlib/libjnlib.a ../gl/libgnu.a +commonpth_libs = $(libcommonpth) ../jnlib/libjnlib.a ../gl/libgnu.a +pwquery_libs = ../common/libsimple-pwquery.a + +#if HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +#.rc.o: +# $(WINDRES) `echo $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) | \ +# sed -e 's/-I/--include-dir /g;s/-D/--define /g'` -i $< -o $@ +# +#gpg_agent_res_ldflags = -Wl,gpg-agent-resource.o -Wl,--subsystem,windows +#gpg_agent_res_deps = gpg-agent-resource.o +#else +gpg_agent_res_ldflags = +gpg_agent_res_deps = +#endif + + +gpg_agent_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(LIBASSUAN_CFLAGS) $(PTH_CFLAGS) +gpg_agent_LDADD = $(commonpth_libs) \ + $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(LIBASSUAN_LIBS) $(PTH_LIBS) \ + $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(NETLIBS) $(LIBICONV) +gpg_agent_LDFLAGS = $(gpg_agent_res_ldflags) +gpg_agent_DEPENDENCIES = $(gpg_agent_res_deps) + +gpg_protect_tool_SOURCES = \ + protect-tool.c \ + protect.c \ + minip12.c minip12.h + +gpg_protect_tool_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(LIBASSUAN_CFLAGS) +gpg_protect_tool_LDADD = $(common_libs) $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(LIBASSUAN_LIBS) \ + $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(NETLIBS) $(LIBICONV) + +gpg_preset_passphrase_SOURCES = \ + preset-passphrase.c + +# Needs $(NETLIBS) for libsimple-pwquery.la. +gpg_preset_passphrase_LDADD = \ + $(pwquery_libs) $(common_libs) \ + $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(NETLIBS) $(LIBICONV) + + +# Make sure that all libs are build before we use them. This is +# important for things like make -j2. +$(PROGRAMS): $(common_libs) $(commonpth_libs) $(pwquery_libs) + + + +# +# Module tests +# +TESTS = t-protect + +t_common_ldadd = $(common_libs) \ + $(LIBGCRYPT_LIBS) $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(LIBICONV) + +t_protect_SOURCES = t-protect.c protect.c +t_protect_LDADD = $(t_common_ldadd) + + + + diff --git a/agent/Makefile.in b/agent/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8aa48f --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@ +# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.11.1 from Makefile.am. +# @configure_input@ + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, +# 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, +# Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +@SET_MAKE@ + +# Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is part of GnuPG. +# +# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + +# cmacros.am - C macro definitions +# Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is part of GnuPG. +# +# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + +VPATH = @srcdir@ +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibexecdir = $(libexecdir)/@PACKAGE@ +am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd +install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644 +install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c +install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c +INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA) +transform = $(program_transform_name) +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +build_triplet = @build@ +host_triplet = @host@ +bin_PROGRAMS = gpg-agent$(EXEEXT) +libexec_PROGRAMS = gpg-protect-tool$(EXEEXT) \ + gpg-preset-passphrase$(EXEEXT) +noinst_PROGRAMS = $(am__EXEEXT_1) +DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in \ + $(top_srcdir)/am/cmacros.am +@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@am__append_1 = -DGNUPG_BINDIR="\"$(bindir)\"" \ +@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@ -DGNUPG_LIBEXECDIR="\"$(libexecdir)\"" \ +@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@ -DGNUPG_LIBDIR="\"$(libdir)/@PACKAGE@\"" \ +@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@ -DGNUPG_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)/@PACKAGE@\"" \ +@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@ -DGNUPG_SYSCONFDIR="\"$(sysconfdir)/@PACKAGE@\"" + + +# If a specific protect tool program has been defined, pass its name +# to cc. 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+INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM@ +INTLLIBS = @INTLLIBS@ +INTL_MACOSX_LIBS = @INTL_MACOSX_LIBS@ +KSBA_CFLAGS = @KSBA_CFLAGS@ +KSBA_CONFIG = @KSBA_CONFIG@ +KSBA_LIBS = @KSBA_LIBS@ +LDAPLIBS = @LDAPLIBS@ +LDAP_CPPFLAGS = @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBASSUAN_CFLAGS = @LIBASSUAN_CFLAGS@ +LIBASSUAN_CONFIG = @LIBASSUAN_CONFIG@ +LIBASSUAN_LIBS = @LIBASSUAN_LIBS@ +LIBCURL = @LIBCURL@ +LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS = @LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS@ +LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS = @LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS@ +LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG = @LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG@ +LIBGCRYPT_LIBS = @LIBGCRYPT_LIBS@ +LIBGNU_LIBDEPS = @LIBGNU_LIBDEPS@ +LIBGNU_LTLIBDEPS = @LIBGNU_LTLIBDEPS@ +LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@ +LIBINTL = @LIBINTL@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBREADLINE = @LIBREADLINE@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +LIBUSB_LIBS = @LIBUSB_LIBS@ +LIBUTIL_LIBS = @LIBUTIL_LIBS@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBICONV = @LTLIBICONV@ +LTLIBINTL = @LTLIBINTL@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAINT = @MAINT@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MKDIR_P = @MKDIR_P@ +MSGFMT = @MSGFMT@ +MSGFMT_015 = @MSGFMT_015@ 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This is +# important for things like make -j2. +$(PROGRAMS): $(common_libs) $(commonpth_libs) $(pwquery_libs) + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/agent/agent.h b/agent/agent.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15cf8bf --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/agent.h @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/* agent.h - Global definitions for the agent + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#ifndef AGENT_H +#define AGENT_H + +#ifdef GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT +#error GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT already defined +#endif +#define GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT GPG_ERR_SOURCE_GPGAGENT +#include <gpg-error.h> +#define map_assuan_err(a) \ + map_assuan_err_with_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT, (a)) +#include <errno.h> + +#include <gcrypt.h> +#include "../common/util.h" +#include "../common/membuf.h" +#include "../common/sysutils.h" /* (gnupg_fd_t) */ +#include "../common/session-env.h" + +/* To convey some special hash algorithms we use algorithm numbers + reserved for application use. */ +#ifndef GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER +#define GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER 1024 +#endif +#define MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1 (GCRY_MODULE_ID_USER+1) + +/* Maximum length of a digest. */ +#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN 64 + +/* A large struct name "opt" to keep global flags */ +struct +{ + unsigned int debug; /* Debug flags (DBG_foo_VALUE) */ + int verbose; /* Verbosity level */ + int quiet; /* Be as quiet as possible */ + int dry_run; /* Don't change any persistent data */ + int batch; /* Batch mode */ + const char *homedir; /* Configuration directory name */ + + /* Environment setting gathered at program start or changed using the + Assuan command UPDATESTARTUPTTY. */ + session_env_t startup_env; + char *startup_lc_ctype; + char *startup_lc_messages; + + /* True if we are listening on the standard socket. */ + int use_standard_socket; + + /* True if we handle sigusr2. */ + int sigusr2_enabled; + + const char *pinentry_program; /* Filename of the program to start as + pinentry. */ + const char *scdaemon_program; /* Filename of the program to handle + smartcard tasks. */ + int disable_scdaemon; /* Never use the SCdaemon. */ + int no_grab; /* Don't let the pinentry grab the keyboard */ + + /* The name of the file pinentry shall tocuh before exiting. If + this is not set the filoe name of the standard socket is used. */ + const char *pinentry_touch_file; + + /* The default and maximum TTL of cache entries. */ + unsigned long def_cache_ttl; /* Default. */ + unsigned long def_cache_ttl_ssh; /* for SSH. */ + unsigned long max_cache_ttl; /* Default. */ + unsigned long max_cache_ttl_ssh; /* for SSH. */ + + /* Flag disallowing bypassing of the warning. */ + int enforce_passphrase_constraints; + /* The require minmum length of a passphrase. */ + unsigned int min_passphrase_len; + /* The minimum number of non-alpha characters in a passphrase. */ + unsigned int min_passphrase_nonalpha; + /* File name with a patternfile or NULL if not enabled. */ + const char *check_passphrase_pattern; + /* If not 0 the user is asked to change his passphrase after these + number of days. */ + unsigned int max_passphrase_days; + /* If set, a passphrase history will be written and checked at each + passphrase change. */ + int enable_passhrase_history; + + int running_detached; /* We are running detached from the tty. */ + + int ignore_cache_for_signing; + int allow_mark_trusted; + int allow_preset_passphrase; + int keep_tty; /* Don't switch the TTY (for pinentry) on request */ + int keep_display; /* Don't switch the DISPLAY (for pinentry) on request */ + int ssh_support; /* Enable ssh-agent emulation. */ +} opt; + + +#define DBG_COMMAND_VALUE 1 /* debug commands i/o */ +#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */ +#define DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE 4 /* debug low level crypto */ +#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE 32 /* debug memory allocation stuff */ +#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE 64 /* debug the caching */ +#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128 /* show memory statistics */ +#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512 /* debug hashing operations */ +#define DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE 1024 + +#define DBG_COMMAND (opt.debug & DBG_COMMAND_VALUE) +#define DBG_CRYPTO (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE) +#define DBG_MEMORY (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE) +#define DBG_CACHE (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE) +#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE) +#define DBG_ASSUAN (opt.debug & DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE) + +struct server_local_s; +struct scd_local_s; + +/* Collection of data per session (aka connection). */ +struct server_control_s +{ + /* Private data used to fire up the connection thread. We use this + structure do avoid an extra allocation for just a few bytes. */ + struct { + gnupg_fd_t fd; + } thread_startup; + + /* Private data of the server (command.c). */ + struct server_local_s *server_local; + + /* Private data of the SCdaemon (call-scd.c). */ + struct scd_local_s *scd_local; + + session_env_t session_env; + char *lc_ctype; + char *lc_messages; + + struct { + int algo; + unsigned char value[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; + int valuelen; + int raw_value: 1; + } digest; + unsigned char keygrip[20]; + int have_keygrip; + + int use_auth_call; /* Hack to send the PKAUTH command instead of the + PKSIGN command to the scdaemon. */ + int in_passwd; /* Hack to inhibit enforced passphrase change + during an explicit passwd command. */ +}; + + +struct pin_entry_info_s +{ + int min_digits; /* min. number of digits required or 0 for freeform entry */ + int max_digits; /* max. number of allowed digits allowed*/ + int max_tries; + int failed_tries; + int with_qualitybar; /* Set if the quality bar should be displayed. */ + int (*check_cb)(struct pin_entry_info_s *); /* CB used to check the PIN */ + void *check_cb_arg; /* optional argument which might be of use in the CB */ + const char *cb_errtext; /* used by the cb to displaye a specific error */ + size_t max_length; /* allocated length of the buffer */ + char pin[1]; +}; + + +enum + { + PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN = 0, + PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR = 1, + PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED = 2, + PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED = 3 + }; + + +/* Values for the cache_mode arguments. */ +typedef enum + { + CACHE_MODE_IGNORE = 0, /* Special mode to bypass the cache. */ + CACHE_MODE_ANY, /* Any mode except ignore matches. */ + CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, /* Normal cache (gpg-agent). */ + CACHE_MODE_USER, /* GET_PASSPHRASE related cache. */ + CACHE_MODE_SSH /* SSH related cache. */ + } +cache_mode_t; + + +/* The type of a function to lookup a TTL by a keygrip. */ +typedef int (*lookup_ttl_t)(const char *hexgrip); + + +/*-- gpg-agent.c --*/ +void agent_exit (int rc) JNLIB_GCC_A_NR; /* Also implemented in other tools */ +const char *get_agent_socket_name (void); +const char *get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void); +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +void *get_agent_scd_notify_event (void); +#endif +void agent_sighup_action (void); + +/*-- command.c --*/ +gpg_error_t agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid); +gpg_error_t agent_write_status (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, ...) + GNUPG_GCC_A_SENTINEL(0); +void bump_key_eventcounter (void); +void bump_card_eventcounter (void); +void start_command_handler (ctrl_t, gnupg_fd_t, gnupg_fd_t); + +/*-- command-ssh.c --*/ +void start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl_t, gnupg_fd_t); + +/*-- findkey.c --*/ +int agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, + const void *buffer, size_t length, int force); +gpg_error_t agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *desc_text, + const unsigned char *grip, + unsigned char **shadow_info, + cache_mode_t cache_mode, + lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl, + gcry_sexp_t *result); +gpg_error_t agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, + gcry_sexp_t *result); +gpg_error_t agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *grip, + gcry_sexp_t *result); +int agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip); +gpg_error_t agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, + int *r_keytype, + unsigned char **r_shadow_info); + +/*-- call-pinentry.c --*/ +void initialize_module_call_pinentry (void); +void agent_query_dump_state (void); +void agent_reset_query (ctrl_t ctrl); +int pinentry_active_p (ctrl_t ctrl, int waitseconds); +int agent_askpin (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *desc_text, const char *prompt_text, + const char *inital_errtext, + struct pin_entry_info_s *pininfo); +int agent_get_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, char **retpass, + const char *desc, const char *prompt, + const char *errtext, int with_qualitybar); +int agent_get_confirmation (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *ok, + const char *notokay, int with_cancel); +int agent_show_message (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *ok_btn); +int agent_popup_message_start (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *desc, const char *ok_btn); +void agent_popup_message_stop (ctrl_t ctrl); + + +/*-- cache.c --*/ +void agent_flush_cache (void); +int agent_put_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode, + const char *data, int ttl); +const char *agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode, + void **cache_id); +void agent_unlock_cache_entry (void **cache_id); + + +/*-- pksign.c --*/ +int agent_pksign_do (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + gcry_sexp_t *signature_sexp, + cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl); +int agent_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + membuf_t *outbuf, cache_mode_t cache_mode); + +/*-- pkdecrypt.c --*/ +int agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen, + membuf_t *outbuf); + +/*-- genkey.c --*/ +int check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *pw, int silent); +int agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyparam, size_t keyparmlen, membuf_t *outbuf); +int agent_protect_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_skey); + +/*-- protect.c --*/ +unsigned long get_standard_s2k_count (void); +int agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen); +int agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, + gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen); +int agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey); +unsigned char *make_shadow_info (const char *serialno, const char *idstring); +int agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, + unsigned char **result); +int agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, + unsigned char const **shadow_info); +gpg_error_t parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, + char **r_hexsn, char **r_idstr); + + +/*-- trustlist.c --*/ +void initialize_module_trustlist (void); +gpg_error_t agent_istrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, int *r_disabled); +gpg_error_t agent_listtrusted (void *assuan_context); +gpg_error_t agent_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, + const char *fpr, int flag); +void agent_reload_trustlist (void); + + +/*-- divert-scd.c --*/ +int divert_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int algo, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, unsigned char **r_sig); +int divert_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *cipher, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, + char **r_buf, size_t *r_len); +int divert_generic_cmd (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *cmdline, void *assuan_context); + + +/*-- call-scd.c --*/ +void initialize_module_call_scd (void); +void agent_scd_dump_state (void); +int agent_scd_check_running (void); +void agent_scd_check_aliveness (void); +int agent_reset_scd (ctrl_t ctrl); +int agent_card_learn (ctrl_t ctrl, + void (*kpinfo_cb)(void*, const char *), + void *kpinfo_cb_arg, + void (*certinfo_cb)(void*, const char *), + void *certinfo_cb_arg, + void (*sinfo_cb)(void*, const char *, + size_t, const char *), + void *sinfo_cb_arg); +int agent_card_serialno (ctrl_t ctrl, char **r_serialno); +int agent_card_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyid, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, + const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen); +int agent_card_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyid, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*,size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, + const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen, + char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen); +int agent_card_readcert (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *id, char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen); +int agent_card_readkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *id, unsigned char **r_buf); +gpg_error_t agent_card_getattr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, char **result); +int agent_card_scd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cmdline, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, void *assuan_context); + + +/*-- learncard.c --*/ +int agent_handle_learn (ctrl_t ctrl, void *assuan_context); + + +#endif /*AGENT_H*/ diff --git a/agent/cache.c b/agent/cache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10f9ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +/* cache.c - keep a cache of passphrases + * Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include "agent.h" + +struct secret_data_s { + int totallen; /* this includes the padding */ + int datalen; /* actual data length */ + char data[1]; +}; + +typedef struct cache_item_s *ITEM; +struct cache_item_s { + ITEM next; + time_t created; + time_t accessed; + int ttl; /* max. lifetime given in seconds, -1 one means infinite */ + int lockcount; + struct secret_data_s *pw; + cache_mode_t cache_mode; + char key[1]; +}; + + +static ITEM thecache; + + +static void +release_data (struct secret_data_s *data) +{ + xfree (data); +} + +static struct secret_data_s * +new_data (const void *data, size_t length) +{ + struct secret_data_s *d; + int total; + + /* we pad the data to 32 bytes so that it get more complicated + finding something out by watching allocation patterns. This is + usally not possible but we better assume nothing about our + secure storage provider*/ + total = length + 32 - (length % 32); + + d = gcry_malloc_secure (sizeof *d + total - 1); + if (d) + { + d->totallen = total; + d->datalen = length; + memcpy (d->data, data, length); + } + return d; +} + + + +/* check whether there are items to expire */ +static void +housekeeping (void) +{ + ITEM r, rprev; + time_t current = gnupg_get_time (); + + /* First expire the actual data */ + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (!r->lockcount && r->pw + && r->ttl >= 0 && r->accessed + r->ttl < current) + { + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug (" expired `%s' (%ds after last access)\n", + r->key, r->ttl); + release_data (r->pw); + r->pw = NULL; + r->accessed = current; + } + } + + /* Second, make sure that we also remove them based on the created stamp so + that the user has to enter it from time to time. */ + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + unsigned long maxttl; + + switch (r->cache_mode) + { + case CACHE_MODE_SSH: maxttl = opt.max_cache_ttl_ssh; break; + default: maxttl = opt.max_cache_ttl; break; + } + if (!r->lockcount && r->pw && r->created + maxttl < current) + { + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug (" expired `%s' (%lus after creation)\n", + r->key, opt.max_cache_ttl); + release_data (r->pw); + r->pw = NULL; + r->accessed = current; + } + } + + /* Third, make sure that we don't have too many items in the list. + Expire old and unused entries after 30 minutes */ + for (rprev=NULL, r=thecache; r; ) + { + if (!r->pw && r->ttl >= 0 && r->accessed + 60*30 < current) + { + if (r->lockcount) + { + log_error ("can't remove unused cache entry `%s' due to" + " lockcount=%d\n", + r->key, r->lockcount); + r->accessed += 60*10; /* next error message in 10 minutes */ + rprev = r; + r = r->next; + } + else + { + ITEM r2 = r->next; + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug (" removed `%s' (slot not used for 30m)\n", r->key); + xfree (r); + if (!rprev) + thecache = r2; + else + rprev->next = r2; + r = r2; + } + } + else + { + rprev = r; + r = r->next; + } + } +} + + +void +agent_flush_cache (void) +{ + ITEM r; + + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("agent_flush_cache\n"); + + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (!r->lockcount && r->pw) + { + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug (" flushing `%s'\n", r->key); + release_data (r->pw); + r->pw = NULL; + r->accessed = 0; + } + else if (r->lockcount && r->pw) + { + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug (" marked `%s' for flushing\n", r->key); + r->accessed = 0; + r->ttl = 0; + } + } +} + + + +/* Store DATA of length DATALEN in the cache under KEY and mark it + with a maximum lifetime of TTL seconds. If there is already data + under this key, it will be replaced. Using a DATA of NULL deletes + the entry. A TTL of 0 is replaced by the default TTL and a TTL of + -1 set infinite timeout. CACHE_MODE is stored with the cache entry + and used to select different timeouts. */ +int +agent_put_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode, + const char *data, int ttl) +{ + ITEM r; + + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("agent_put_cache `%s' requested ttl=%d mode=%d\n", + key, ttl, cache_mode); + housekeeping (); + + if (!ttl) + { + switch(cache_mode) + { + case CACHE_MODE_SSH: ttl = opt.def_cache_ttl_ssh; break; + default: ttl = opt.def_cache_ttl; break; + } + } + if (!ttl || cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_IGNORE) + return 0; + + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (!r->lockcount && !strcmp (r->key, key)) + break; + } + if (r) + { /* replace */ + if (r->pw) + { + release_data (r->pw); + r->pw = NULL; + } + if (data) + { + r->created = r->accessed = gnupg_get_time (); + r->ttl = ttl; + r->cache_mode = cache_mode; + r->pw = new_data (data, strlen (data)+1); + if (!r->pw) + log_error ("out of core while allocating new cache item\n"); + } + } + else if (data) + { /* simply insert */ + r = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (key)); + if (!r) + log_error ("out of core while allocating new cache control\n"); + else + { + strcpy (r->key, key); + r->created = r->accessed = gnupg_get_time (); + r->ttl = ttl; + r->cache_mode = cache_mode; + r->pw = new_data (data, strlen (data)+1); + if (!r->pw) + { + log_error ("out of core while allocating new cache item\n"); + xfree (r); + } + else + { + r->next = thecache; + thecache = r; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + + +/* Try to find an item in the cache. Note that we currently don't + make use of CACHE_MODE. */ +const char * +agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode, void **cache_id) +{ + ITEM r; + + if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_IGNORE) + return NULL; + + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("agent_get_cache `%s'...\n", key); + housekeeping (); + + /* first try to find one with no locks - this is an updated cache + entry: We might have entries with a lockcount and without a + lockcount. */ + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (!r->lockcount && r->pw && !strcmp (r->key, key)) + { + /* put_cache does only put strings into the cache, so we + don't need the lengths */ + r->accessed = gnupg_get_time (); + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("... hit\n"); + r->lockcount++; + *cache_id = r; + return r->pw->data; + } + } + /* again, but this time get even one with a lockcount set */ + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (r->pw && !strcmp (r->key, key)) + { + r->accessed = gnupg_get_time (); + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("... hit (locked)\n"); + r->lockcount++; + *cache_id = r; + return r->pw->data; + } + } + if (DBG_CACHE) + log_debug ("... miss\n"); + + *cache_id = NULL; + return NULL; +} + + +void +agent_unlock_cache_entry (void **cache_id) +{ + ITEM r; + + for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next) + { + if (r == *cache_id) + { + if (!r->lockcount) + log_error ("trying to unlock non-locked cache entry `%s'\n", + r->key); + else + r->lockcount--; + return; + } + } +} diff --git a/agent/call-pinentry.c b/agent/call-pinentry.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad1bd03 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/call-pinentry.c @@ -0,0 +1,1178 @@ +/* call-pinentry.c - Spawn the pinentry to query stuff from the user + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2008, + * 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +# include <sys/wait.h> +# include <sys/types.h> +# include <signal.h> +#endif +#include <pth.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> +#include "setenv.h" +#include "i18n.h" + +#ifdef _POSIX_OPEN_MAX +#define MAX_OPEN_FDS _POSIX_OPEN_MAX +#else +#define MAX_OPEN_FDS 20 +#endif + + +/* Because access to the pinentry must be serialized (it is and shall + be a global mutual dialog) we should better timeout further + requests after some time. 2 minutes seem to be a reasonable + time. */ +#define LOCK_TIMEOUT (1*60) + +/* The assuan context of the current pinentry. */ +static assuan_context_t entry_ctx; + +/* The control variable of the connection owning the current pinentry. + This is only valid if ENTRY_CTX is not NULL. Note, that we care + only about the value of the pointer and that it should never be + dereferenced. */ +static ctrl_t entry_owner; + +/* A mutex used to serialize access to the pinentry. */ +static pth_mutex_t entry_lock; + +/* The thread ID of the popup working thread. */ +static pth_t popup_tid; + +/* A flag used in communication between the popup working thread and + its stop function. */ +static int popup_finished; + + + +/* Data to be passed to our callbacks, */ +struct entry_parm_s +{ + int lines; + size_t size; + unsigned char *buffer; +}; + + + + +/* This function must be called once to initialize this module. This + has to be done before a second thread is spawned. We can't do the + static initialization because Pth emulation code might not be able + to do a static init; in particular, it is not possible for W32. */ +void +initialize_module_call_pinentry (void) +{ + static int initialized; + + if (!initialized) + { + if (pth_mutex_init (&entry_lock)) + initialized = 1; + } +} + + + +static void +dump_mutex_state (pth_mutex_t *m) +{ +#ifdef _W32_PTH_H + (void)m; + log_printf ("unknown under W32"); +#else + if (!(m->mx_state & PTH_MUTEX_INITIALIZED)) + log_printf ("not_initialized"); + else if (!(m->mx_state & PTH_MUTEX_LOCKED)) + log_printf ("not_locked"); + else + log_printf ("locked tid=0x%lx count=%lu", (long)m->mx_owner, m->mx_count); +#endif +} + + +/* This function may be called to print infromation pertaining to the + current state of this module to the log. */ +void +agent_query_dump_state (void) +{ + log_info ("agent_query_dump_state: entry_lock="); + dump_mutex_state (&entry_lock); + log_printf ("\n"); + log_info ("agent_query_dump_state: entry_ctx=%p pid=%ld popup_tid=%p\n", + entry_ctx, (long)assuan_get_pid (entry_ctx), popup_tid); +} + +/* Called to make sure that a popup window owned by the current + connection gets closed. */ +void +agent_reset_query (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + if (entry_ctx && popup_tid && entry_owner == ctrl) + { + agent_popup_message_stop (ctrl); + } +} + + +/* Unlock the pinentry so that another thread can start one and + disconnect that pinentry - we do this after the unlock so that a + stalled pinentry does not block other threads. Fixme: We should + have a timeout in Assuan for the disconnect operation. */ +static int +unlock_pinentry (int rc) +{ + assuan_context_t ctx = entry_ctx; + + entry_ctx = NULL; + if (!pth_mutex_release (&entry_lock)) + { + log_error ("failed to release the entry lock\n"); + if (!rc) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + } + assuan_release (ctx); + return rc; +} + + +/* To make sure we leave no secrets in our image after forking of the + pinentry, we use this callback. */ +static void +atfork_cb (void *opaque, int where) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = opaque; + + if (!where) + { + int iterator = 0; + const char *name, *assname, *value; + + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM); + + while ((name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, &assname))) + { + /* For all new envvars (!ASSNAME) and the two medium old + ones which do have an assuan name but are conveyed using + environment variables, update the environment of the + forked process. */ + if (!assname + || !strcmp (name, "XAUTHORITY") + || !strcmp (name, "PINENTRY_USER_DATA")) + { + value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, name); + if (value) + setenv (name, value, 1); + } + } + } +} + + +static gpg_error_t +getinfo_pid_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + unsigned long *pid = opaque; + char pidbuf[50]; + + /* There is only the pid in the server's response. */ + if (length >= sizeof pidbuf) + length = sizeof pidbuf -1; + if (length) + { + strncpy (pidbuf, buffer, length); + pidbuf[length] = 0; + *pid = strtoul (pidbuf, NULL, 10); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Fork off the pin entry if this has not already been done. Note, + that this function must always be used to aquire the lock for the + pinentry - we will serialize _all_ pinentry calls. + */ +static int +start_pinentry (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + int rc; + const char *pgmname; + assuan_context_t ctx; + const char *argv[5]; + int no_close_list[3]; + int i; + pth_event_t evt; + const char *tmpstr; + unsigned long pinentry_pid; + const char *value; + + evt = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_TIME, pth_timeout (LOCK_TIMEOUT, 0)); + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&entry_lock, 0, evt)) + { + if (pth_event_occurred (evt)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT); + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + log_error (_("failed to acquire the pinentry lock: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + + entry_owner = ctrl; + + if (entry_ctx) + return 0; + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("starting a new PIN Entry\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + fflush (stdout); + fflush (stderr); +#endif + if (fflush (NULL)) + { +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); +#endif + log_error ("error flushing pending output: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + /* At least Windows XP fails here with EBADF. According to docs + and Wine an fflush(NULL) is the same as _flushall. However + the Wime implementaion does not flush stdin,stdout and stderr + - see above. Lets try to ignore the error. */ +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + return unlock_pinentry (tmperr); +#endif + } + + if (!opt.pinentry_program || !*opt.pinentry_program) + opt.pinentry_program = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_PINENTRY); + pgmname = opt.pinentry_program; + if ( !(pgmname = strrchr (opt.pinentry_program, '/'))) + pgmname = opt.pinentry_program; + else + pgmname++; + + /* OS X needs the entire file name in argv[0], so that it can locate + the resource bundle. For other systems we stick to the usual + convention of supplying only the name of the program. */ +#ifdef __APPLE__ + argv[0] = opt.pinentry_program; +#else /*!__APPLE__*/ + argv[0] = pgmname; +#endif /*__APPLE__*/ + + if (!opt.keep_display + && (value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, "DISPLAY"))) + { + argv[1] = "--display"; + argv[2] = value; + argv[3] = NULL; + } + else + argv[1] = NULL; + + i=0; + if (!opt.running_detached) + { + if (log_get_fd () != -1) + no_close_list[i++] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (log_get_fd ()); + no_close_list[i++] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (fileno (stderr)); + } + no_close_list[i] = -1; + + rc = assuan_new (&ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + + /* Connect to the pinentry and perform initial handshaking. Note + that atfork is used to change the environment for pinentry. We + start the server in detached mode to suppress the console window + under Windows. */ + rc = assuan_pipe_connect (ctx, opt.pinentry_program, argv, + no_close_list, atfork_cb, ctrl, + ASSUAN_PIPE_CONNECT_DETACHED); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't connect to the PIN entry module: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + assuan_release (ctx); + return unlock_pinentry (gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PIN_ENTRY)); + } + entry_ctx = ctx; + + if (DBG_ASSUAN) + log_debug ("connection to PIN entry established\n"); + + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, + opt.no_grab? "OPTION no-grab":"OPTION grab", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, "GPG_TTY"); + if (value) + { + char *optstr; + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION ttyname=%s", value) < 0 ) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, "TERM"); + if (value) + { + char *optstr; + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION ttytype=%s", value) < 0 ) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + if (ctrl->lc_ctype) + { + char *optstr; + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION lc-ctype=%s", ctrl->lc_ctype) < 0 ) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + if (ctrl->lc_messages) + { + char *optstr; + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION lc-messages=%s", ctrl->lc_messages) < 0 ) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + { + /* Provide a few default strings for use by the pinentries. This + may help a pinentry to avoid implementing localization code. */ + static struct { const char *key, *value; } tbl[] = { + /* TRANSLATORS: These are labels for buttons etc used in + Pinentries. An underscore indicates that the next letter + should be used as an accelerator. Double the underscore for + a literal one. The actual to be translated text starts after + the second vertical bar. */ + { "ok", N_("|pinentry-label|_OK") }, + { "cancel", N_("|pinentry-label|_Cancel") }, + { "prompt", N_("|pinentry-label|PIN:") }, + { NULL, NULL} + }; + char *optstr; + int idx; + const char *s, *s2; + + for (idx=0; tbl[idx].key; idx++) + { + s = _(tbl[idx].value); + if (*s == '|' && (s2=strchr (s+1,'|'))) + s = s2+1; + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION default-%s=%s", tbl[idx].key, s) < 0 ) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + } + } + + + /* Tell the pinentry the name of a file it shall touch after having + messed with the tty. This is optional and only supported by + newer pinentries and thus we do no error checking. */ + tmpstr = opt.pinentry_touch_file; + if (tmpstr && !strcmp (tmpstr, "/dev/null")) + tmpstr = NULL; + else if (!tmpstr) + tmpstr = get_agent_socket_name (); + if (tmpstr) + { + char *optstr; + + if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION touch-file=%s", tmpstr ) < 0 ) + ; + else + { + assuan_transact (entry_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + xfree (optstr); + } + } + + + /* Now ask the Pinentry for its PID. If the Pinentry is new enough + it will send the pid back and we will use an inquire to notify + our client. The client may answer the inquiry either with END or + with CAN to cancel the pinentry. */ + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "GETINFO pid", + getinfo_pid_cb, &pinentry_pid, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + log_info ("You may want to update to a newer pinentry\n"); + rc = 0; + } + else if (!rc && (pid_t)pinentry_pid == (pid_t)(-1)) + log_error ("pinentry did not return a PID\n"); + else + { + rc = agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl, pinentry_pid); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED) + return unlock_pinentry (gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED)); + rc = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Returns True is the pinentry is currently active. If WAITSECONDS is + greater than zero the function will wait for this many seconds + before returning. */ +int +pinentry_active_p (ctrl_t ctrl, int waitseconds) +{ + (void)ctrl; + + if (waitseconds > 0) + { + pth_event_t evt; + int rc; + + evt = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_TIME, pth_timeout (waitseconds, 0)); + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&entry_lock, 0, evt)) + { + if (pth_event_occurred (evt)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIMEOUT); + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + return rc; + } + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + } + else + { + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&entry_lock, 1, NULL)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_LOCKED); + } + + if (!pth_mutex_release (&entry_lock)) + log_error ("failed to release the entry lock at %d\n", __LINE__); + return 0; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +getpin_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + struct entry_parm_s *parm = opaque; + + if (!buffer) + return 0; + + /* we expect the pin to fit on one line */ + if (parm->lines || length >= parm->size) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_TOO_MUCH_DATA); + + /* fixme: we should make sure that the assuan buffer is allocated in + secure memory or read the response byte by byte */ + memcpy (parm->buffer, buffer, length); + parm->buffer[length] = 0; + parm->lines++; + return 0; +} + + +static int +all_digitsp( const char *s) +{ + for (; *s && *s >= '0' && *s <= '9'; s++) + ; + return !*s; +} + + +/* Return a new malloced string by unescaping the string S. Escaping + is percent escaping and '+'/space mapping. A binary Nul will + silently be replaced by a 0xFF. Function returns NULL to indicate + an out of memory status. PArsing stops at the end of the string or + a white space character. */ +static char * +unescape_passphrase_string (const unsigned char *s) +{ + char *buffer, *d; + + buffer = d = xtrymalloc_secure (strlen ((const char*)s)+1); + if (!buffer) + return NULL; + while (*s && !spacep (s)) + { + if (*s == '%' && s[1] && s[2]) + { + s++; + *d = xtoi_2 (s); + if (!*d) + *d = '\xff'; + d++; + s += 2; + } + else if (*s == '+') + { + *d++ = ' '; + s++; + } + else + *d++ = *s++; + } + *d = 0; + return buffer; +} + + +/* Estimate the quality of the passphrase PW and return a value in the + range 0..100. */ +static int +estimate_passphrase_quality (const char *pw) +{ + int goodlength = opt.min_passphrase_len + opt.min_passphrase_len/3; + int length; + const char *s; + + if (goodlength < 1) + return 0; + + for (length = 0, s = pw; *s; s++) + if (!spacep (s)) + length ++; + + if (length > goodlength) + return 100; + return ((length*10) / goodlength)*10; +} + + +/* Handle the QUALITY inquiry. */ +static gpg_error_t +inq_quality (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + assuan_context_t ctx = opaque; + char *pin; + int rc; + int percent; + char numbuf[20]; + + if (!strncmp (line, "QUALITY", 7) && (line[7] == ' ' || !line[7])) + { + line += 7; + while (*line == ' ') + line++; + + pin = unescape_passphrase_string (line); + if (!pin) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + percent = estimate_passphrase_quality (pin); + if (check_passphrase_constraints (NULL, pin, 1)) + percent = -percent; + snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%d", percent); + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf)); + xfree (pin); + } + } + else + { + log_error ("unsupported inquiry `%s' from pinentry\n", line); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE); + } + + return rc; +} + + +/* Helper for agent_askpin and agent_get_passphrase. */ +static int +setup_qualitybar (void) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + char *tmpstr, *tmpstr2; + const char *tooltip; + + /* TRANSLATORS: This string is displayed by Pinentry as the label + for the quality bar. */ + tmpstr = try_percent_escape (_("Quality:"), "\t\r\n\f\v"); + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETQUALITYBAR %s", tmpstr? tmpstr:""); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + xfree (tmpstr); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc == 103 /*(Old assuan error code)*/ + || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) + ; /* Ignore Unknown Command from old Pinentry versions. */ + else if (rc) + return rc; + + tmpstr2 = gnupg_get_help_string ("pinentry.qualitybar.tooltip", 0); + if (tmpstr2) + tooltip = tmpstr2; + else + { + /* TRANSLATORS: This string is a tooltip, shown by pinentry when + hovering over the quality bar. Please use an appropriate + string to describe what this is about. The length of the + tooltip is limited to about 900 characters. If you do not + translate this entry, a default english text (see source) + will be used. */ + tooltip = _("pinentry.qualitybar.tooltip"); + if (!strcmp ("pinentry.qualitybar.tooltip", tooltip)) + tooltip = ("The quality of the text entered above.\n" + "Please ask your administrator for " + "details about the criteria."); + } + tmpstr = try_percent_escape (tooltip, "\t\r\n\f\v"); + xfree (tmpstr2); + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETQUALITYBAR_TT %s", tmpstr? tmpstr:""); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + xfree (tmpstr); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc == 103 /*(Old assuan error code)*/ + || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) + ; /* Ignore Unknown Command from old pinentry versions. */ + else if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Call the Entry and ask for the PIN. We do check for a valid PIN + number here and repeat it as long as we have invalid formed + numbers. */ +int +agent_askpin (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *desc_text, const char *prompt_text, + const char *initial_errtext, + struct pin_entry_info_s *pininfo) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + struct entry_parm_s parm; + const char *errtext = NULL; + int is_pin = 0; + int saveflag; + + if (opt.batch) + return 0; /* fixme: we should return BAD PIN */ + + if (!pininfo || pininfo->max_length < 1) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + if (!desc_text && pininfo->min_digits) + desc_text = _("Please enter your PIN, so that the secret key " + "can be unlocked for this session"); + else if (!desc_text) + desc_text = _("Please enter your passphrase, so that the secret key " + "can be unlocked for this session"); + + if (prompt_text) + is_pin = !!strstr (prompt_text, "PIN"); + else + is_pin = desc_text && strstr (desc_text, "PIN"); + + rc = start_pinentry (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETDESC %s", desc_text); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETPROMPT %s", + prompt_text? prompt_text : is_pin? "PIN:" : "Passphrase:"); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + /* If a passphrase quality indicator has been requested and a + minimum passphrase length has not been disabled, send the command + to the pinentry. */ + if (pininfo->with_qualitybar && opt.min_passphrase_len ) + { + rc = setup_qualitybar (); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + if (initial_errtext) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETERROR %s", initial_errtext); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + for (;pininfo->failed_tries < pininfo->max_tries; pininfo->failed_tries++) + { + memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm); + parm.size = pininfo->max_length; + *pininfo->pin = 0; /* Reset the PIN. */ + parm.buffer = (unsigned char*)pininfo->pin; + + if (errtext) + { + /* TRANLATORS: The string is appended to an error message in + the pinentry. The %s is the actual error message, the + two %d give the current and maximum number of tries. */ + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, _("SETERROR %s (try %d of %d)"), + errtext, pininfo->failed_tries+1, pininfo->max_tries); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + errtext = NULL; + } + + saveflag = assuan_get_flag (entry_ctx, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL); + assuan_begin_confidential (entry_ctx); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "GETPIN", getpin_cb, &parm, + inq_quality, entry_ctx, NULL, NULL); + assuan_set_flag (entry_ctx, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL, saveflag); + /* Most pinentries out in the wild return the old Assuan error code + for canceled which gets translated to an assuan Cancel error and + not to the code for a user cancel. Fix this here. */ + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) + && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_TOO_MUCH_DATA) + errtext = is_pin? _("PIN too long") + : _("Passphrase too long"); + else if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + if (!errtext && pininfo->min_digits) + { + /* do some basic checks on the entered PIN. */ + if (!all_digitsp (pininfo->pin)) + errtext = _("Invalid characters in PIN"); + else if (pininfo->max_digits + && strlen (pininfo->pin) > pininfo->max_digits) + errtext = _("PIN too long"); + else if (strlen (pininfo->pin) < pininfo->min_digits) + errtext = _("PIN too short"); + } + + if (!errtext && pininfo->check_cb) + { + /* More checks by utilizing the optional callback. */ + pininfo->cb_errtext = NULL; + rc = pininfo->check_cb (pininfo); + if (rc == -1 && pininfo->cb_errtext) + errtext = pininfo->cb_errtext; + else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE + || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN) + errtext = (is_pin? _("Bad PIN") + : _("Bad Passphrase")); + else if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + if (!errtext) + return unlock_pinentry (0); /* okay, got a PIN or passphrase */ + } + + return unlock_pinentry (gpg_error (pininfo->min_digits? GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN + : GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE)); +} + + + +/* Ask for the passphrase using the supplied arguments. The returned + passphrase needs to be freed by the caller. */ +int +agent_get_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, + char **retpass, const char *desc, const char *prompt, + const char *errtext, int with_qualitybar) +{ + + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + struct entry_parm_s parm; + int saveflag; + + *retpass = NULL; + if (opt.batch) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); + + rc = start_pinentry (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!prompt) + prompt = desc && strstr (desc, "PIN")? "PIN": _("Passphrase"); + + + if (desc) + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETDESC %s", desc); + else + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "RESET"); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETPROMPT %s", prompt); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + if (with_qualitybar && opt.min_passphrase_len) + { + rc = setup_qualitybar (); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + if (errtext) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETERROR %s", errtext); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm); + parm.size = ASSUAN_LINELENGTH/2 - 5; + parm.buffer = gcry_malloc_secure (parm.size+10); + if (!parm.buffer) + return unlock_pinentry (out_of_core ()); + + saveflag = assuan_get_flag (entry_ctx, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL); + assuan_begin_confidential (entry_ctx); + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "GETPIN", getpin_cb, &parm, + inq_quality, entry_ctx, NULL, NULL); + assuan_set_flag (entry_ctx, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL, saveflag); + /* Most pinentries out in the wild return the old Assuan error code + for canceled which gets translated to an assuan Cancel error and + not to the code for a user cancel. Fix this here. */ + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + if (rc) + xfree (parm.buffer); + else + *retpass = parm.buffer; + return unlock_pinentry (rc); +} + + + +/* Pop up the PIN-entry, display the text and the prompt and ask the + user to confirm this. We return 0 for success, ie. the user + confirmed it, GPG_ERR_NOT_CONFIRMED for what the text says or an + other error. If WITH_CANCEL it true an extra cancel button is + displayed to allow the user to easily return a GPG_ERR_CANCELED. + if the Pinentry does not support this, the user can still cancel by + closing the Pinentry window. */ +int +agent_get_confirmation (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *desc, const char *ok, + const char *notok, int with_cancel) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + + rc = start_pinentry (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (desc) + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETDESC %s", desc); + else + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "RESET"); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + /* Most pinentries out in the wild return the old Assuan error code + for canceled which gets translated to an assuan Cancel error and + not to the code for a user cancel. Fix this here. */ + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + if (ok) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETOK %s", ok); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, + line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + if (notok) + { + /* Try to use the newer NOTOK feature if a cancel button is + requested. If no cancel button is requested we keep on using + the standard cancel. */ + if (with_cancel) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETNOTOK %s", notok); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, + line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + else + rc = GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD; + + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETCANCEL %s", notok); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "CONFIRM", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + + return unlock_pinentry (rc); +} + + + +/* Pop up the PINentry, display the text DESC and a button with the + text OK_BTN (which may be NULL to use the default of "OK") and waut + for the user to hit this button. The return value is not + relevant. */ +int +agent_show_message (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *ok_btn) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + + rc = start_pinentry (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (desc) + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETDESC %s", desc); + else + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "RESET"); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + /* Most pinentries out in the wild return the old Assuan error code + for canceled which gets translated to an assuan Cancel error and + not to the code for a user cancel. Fix this here. */ + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + if (ok_btn) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETOK %s", ok_btn); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "CONFIRM --one-button", NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc && gpg_err_source (rc) && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ASS_CANCELED) + rc = gpg_err_make (gpg_err_source (rc), GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + + return unlock_pinentry (rc); +} + + +/* The thread running the popup message. */ +static void * +popup_message_thread (void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + /* We use the --one-button hack instead of the MESSAGE command to + allow the use of old Pinentries. Those old Pinentries will then + show an additional Cancel button but that is mostly a visual + annoyance. */ + assuan_transact (entry_ctx, "CONFIRM --one-button", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + popup_finished = 1; + return NULL; +} + + +/* Pop up a message window similar to the confirm one but keep it open + until agent_popup_message_stop has been called. It is crucial for + the caller to make sure that the stop function gets called as soon + as the message is not anymore required because the message is + system modal and all other attempts to use the pinentry will fail + (after a timeout). */ +int +agent_popup_message_start (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *ok_btn) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + pth_attr_t tattr; + + rc = start_pinentry (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (desc) + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETDESC %s", desc); + else + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "RESET"); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + + if (ok_btn) + { + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SETOK %s", ok_btn); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (entry_ctx, line, NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + + tattr = pth_attr_new(); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_JOINABLE, 1); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_STACK_SIZE, 256*1024); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_NAME, "popup-message"); + + popup_finished = 0; + popup_tid = pth_spawn (tattr, popup_message_thread, NULL); + if (!popup_tid) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("error spawning popup message handler: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + pth_attr_destroy (tattr); + return unlock_pinentry (rc); + } + pth_attr_destroy (tattr); + + return 0; +} + +/* Close a popup window. */ +void +agent_popup_message_stop (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + int rc; + pid_t pid; + + (void)ctrl; + + if (!popup_tid || !entry_ctx) + { + log_debug ("agent_popup_message_stop called with no active popup\n"); + return; + } + + pid = assuan_get_pid (entry_ctx); + if (pid == (pid_t)(-1)) + ; /* No pid available can't send a kill. */ + else if (popup_finished) + ; /* Already finished and ready for joining. */ +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + /* Older versions of assuan set PID to 0 on Windows to indicate an + invalid value. */ + else if (pid != (pid_t) INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE + && pid != 0) + { + HANDLE process = (HANDLE) pid; + + /* Arbitrary error code. */ + TerminateProcess (process, 1); + } +#else + else if (pid && ((rc=waitpid (pid, NULL, WNOHANG))==-1 || (rc == pid)) ) + { /* The daemon already died. No need to send a kill. However + because we already waited for the process, we need to tell + assuan that it should not wait again (done by + unlock_pinentry). */ + if (rc == pid) + assuan_set_flag (entry_ctx, ASSUAN_NO_WAITPID, 1); + } + else if (pid > 0) + kill (pid, SIGKILL); /* Need to use SIGKILL due to bad + interaction of SIGINT with Pth. */ +#endif + + /* Now wait for the thread to terminate. */ + rc = pth_join (popup_tid, NULL); + if (!rc) + log_debug ("agent_popup_message_stop: pth_join failed: %s\n", + strerror (errno)); + popup_tid = NULL; + entry_owner = NULL; + + /* Now we can close the connection. */ + unlock_pinentry (0); +} + + diff --git a/agent/call-scd.c b/agent/call-scd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a43377 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/call-scd.c @@ -0,0 +1,1167 @@ +/* call-scd.c - fork of the scdaemon to do SC operations + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +#include <sys/wait.h> +#endif +#include <pth.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> + +#ifdef _POSIX_OPEN_MAX +#define MAX_OPEN_FDS _POSIX_OPEN_MAX +#else +#define MAX_OPEN_FDS 20 +#endif + +/* This Assuan flag is only available since libassuan 2.0.2. Because + comments lines are comments anyway we can use a replacement which + might not do anything. assuan_{g,s}et_flag don't return an error + thus there won't be any ABI problem. */ +#ifndef ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS +#define ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS 4 +#endif + + +/* Definition of module local data of the CTRL structure. */ +struct scd_local_s +{ + /* We keep a list of all allocated context with a an achnor at + SCD_LOCAL_LIST (see below). */ + struct scd_local_s *next_local; + + /* We need to get back to the ctrl object actually referencing this + structure. This is really an awkward way of enumerint the lcoal + contects. A much cleaner way would be to keep a global list of + ctrl objects to enumerate them. */ + ctrl_t ctrl_backlink; + + assuan_context_t ctx; /* NULL or session context for the SCdaemon + used with this connection. */ + int locked; /* This flag is used to assert proper use of + start_scd and unlock_scd. */ + +}; + + +/* Callback parameter for learn card */ +struct learn_parm_s +{ + void (*kpinfo_cb)(void*, const char *); + void *kpinfo_cb_arg; + void (*certinfo_cb)(void*, const char *); + void *certinfo_cb_arg; + void (*sinfo_cb)(void*, const char *, size_t, const char *); + void *sinfo_cb_arg; +}; + +struct inq_needpin_s +{ + assuan_context_t ctx; + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t); + void *getpin_cb_arg; + assuan_context_t passthru; /* If not NULL, pass unknown inquiries + up to the caller. */ +}; + + +/* To keep track of all active SCD contexts, we keep a linked list + anchored at this variable. */ +static struct scd_local_s *scd_local_list; + +/* A Mutex used inside the start_scd function. */ +static pth_mutex_t start_scd_lock; + +/* A malloced string with the name of the socket to be used for + additional connections. May be NULL if not provided by + SCdaemon. */ +static char *socket_name; + +/* The context of the primary connection. This is also used as a flag + to indicate whether the scdaemon has been started. */ +static assuan_context_t primary_scd_ctx; + +/* To allow reuse of the primary connection, the following flag is set + to true if the primary context has been reset and is not in use by + any connection. */ +static int primary_scd_ctx_reusable; + + + +/* Local prototypes. */ +static gpg_error_t membuf_data_cb (void *opaque, + const void *buffer, size_t length); + + + + +/* This function must be called once to initialize this module. This + has to be done before a second thread is spawned. We can't do the + static initialization because Pth emulation code might not be able + to do a static init; in particular, it is not possible for W32. */ +void +initialize_module_call_scd (void) +{ + static int initialized; + + if (!initialized) + { + if (!pth_mutex_init (&start_scd_lock)) + log_fatal ("error initializing mutex: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + initialized = 1; + } +} + + +static void +dump_mutex_state (pth_mutex_t *m) +{ +#ifdef _W32_PTH_H + (void)m; + log_printf ("unknown under W32"); +#else + if (!(m->mx_state & PTH_MUTEX_INITIALIZED)) + log_printf ("not_initialized"); + else if (!(m->mx_state & PTH_MUTEX_LOCKED)) + log_printf ("not_locked"); + else + log_printf ("locked tid=0x%lx count=%lu", (long)m->mx_owner, m->mx_count); +#endif +} + + +/* This function may be called to print infromation pertaining to the + current state of this module to the log. */ +void +agent_scd_dump_state (void) +{ + log_info ("agent_scd_dump_state: scd_lock="); + dump_mutex_state (&start_scd_lock); + log_printf ("\n"); + log_info ("agent_scd_dump_state: primary_scd_ctx=%p pid=%ld reusable=%d\n", + primary_scd_ctx, + (long)assuan_get_pid (primary_scd_ctx), + primary_scd_ctx_reusable); + if (socket_name) + log_info ("agent_scd_dump_state: socket=`%s'\n", socket_name); +} + + +/* The unlock_scd function shall be called after having accessed the + SCD. It is currently not very useful but gives an opportunity to + keep track of connections currently calling SCD. Note that the + "lock" operation is done by the start_scd() function which must be + called and error checked before any SCD operation. CTRL is the + usual connection context and RC the error code to be passed trhough + the function. */ +static int +unlock_scd (ctrl_t ctrl, int rc) +{ + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_OPERATIONAL + && gpg_err_source (rc) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_SCD) + { + /* If the SCdaemon returned this error, it detected a major + problem, like no reader connected. To finish this we need to + stop the connection. This simulates an explicit killing of + the SCdaemon. */ + assuan_transact (primary_scd_ctx, "BYE", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + + if (ctrl->scd_local->locked != 1) + { + log_error ("unlock_scd: invalid lock count (%d)\n", + ctrl->scd_local->locked); + if (!rc) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + } + ctrl->scd_local->locked = 0; + return rc; +} + +/* To make sure we leave no secrets in our image after forking of the + scdaemon, we use this callback. */ +static void +atfork_cb (void *opaque, int where) +{ + (void)opaque; + + if (!where) + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM); +} + + +/* Fork off the SCdaemon if this has not already been done. Lock the + daemon and make sure that a proper context has been setup in CTRL. + This function might also lock the daemon, which means that the + caller must call unlock_scd after this fucntion has returned + success and the actual Assuan transaction been done. */ +static int +start_scd (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + const char *pgmname; + assuan_context_t ctx = NULL; + const char *argv[3]; + int no_close_list[3]; + int i; + int rc; + + if (opt.disable_scdaemon) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + /* If this is the first call for this session, setup the local data + structure. */ + if (!ctrl->scd_local) + { + ctrl->scd_local = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl->scd_local); + if (!ctrl->scd_local) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + ctrl->scd_local->ctrl_backlink = ctrl; + ctrl->scd_local->next_local = scd_local_list; + scd_local_list = ctrl->scd_local; + } + + + /* Assert that the lock count is as expected. */ + if (ctrl->scd_local->locked) + { + log_error ("start_scd: invalid lock count (%d)\n", + ctrl->scd_local->locked); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + } + ctrl->scd_local->locked++; + + if (ctrl->scd_local->ctx) + return 0; /* Okay, the context is fine. We used to test for an + alive context here and do an disconnect. Now that we + have a ticker function to check for it, it is easier + not to check here but to let the connection run on an + error instead. */ + + + /* We need to protect the following code. */ + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&start_scd_lock, 0, NULL)) + { + log_error ("failed to acquire the start_scd lock: %s\n", + strerror (errno)); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + } + + /* Check whether the pipe server has already been started and in + this case either reuse a lingering pipe connection or establish a + new socket based one. */ + if (primary_scd_ctx && primary_scd_ctx_reusable) + { + ctx = primary_scd_ctx; + primary_scd_ctx_reusable = 0; + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("new connection to SCdaemon established (reusing)\n"); + goto leave; + } + + rc = assuan_new (&ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + err = rc; + goto leave; + } + + if (socket_name) + { + rc = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, socket_name, 0, 0); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't connect to socket `%s': %s\n", + socket_name, gpg_strerror (rc)); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SCDAEMON); + goto leave; + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("new connection to SCdaemon established\n"); + goto leave; + } + + if (primary_scd_ctx) + { + log_info ("SCdaemon is running but won't accept further connections\n"); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SCDAEMON); + goto leave; + } + + /* Nope, it has not been started. Fire it up now. */ + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("no running SCdaemon - starting it\n"); + + if (fflush (NULL)) + { +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); +#endif + log_error ("error flushing pending output: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + /* At least Windows XP fails here with EBADF. According to docs + and Wine an fflush(NULL) is the same as _flushall. However + the Wime implementaion does not flush stdin,stdout and stderr + - see above. Lets try to ignore the error. */ +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + goto leave; +#endif + } + + if (!opt.scdaemon_program || !*opt.scdaemon_program) + opt.scdaemon_program = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_SCDAEMON); + if ( !(pgmname = strrchr (opt.scdaemon_program, '/'))) + pgmname = opt.scdaemon_program; + else + pgmname++; + + argv[0] = pgmname; + argv[1] = "--multi-server"; + argv[2] = NULL; + + i=0; + if (!opt.running_detached) + { + if (log_get_fd () != -1) + no_close_list[i++] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (log_get_fd ()); + no_close_list[i++] = assuan_fd_from_posix_fd (fileno (stderr)); + } + no_close_list[i] = -1; + + /* Connect to the pinentry and perform initial handshaking. Use + detached flag (128) so that under W32 SCDAEMON does not show up a + new window. */ + rc = assuan_pipe_connect (ctx, opt.scdaemon_program, argv, + no_close_list, atfork_cb, NULL, 128); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't connect to the SCdaemon: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SCDAEMON); + goto leave; + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_debug ("first connection to SCdaemon established\n"); + + if (DBG_ASSUAN) + assuan_set_log_stream (ctx, log_get_stream ()); + + /* Get the name of the additional socket opened by scdaemon. */ + { + membuf_t data; + unsigned char *databuf; + size_t datalen; + + xfree (socket_name); + socket_name = NULL; + init_membuf (&data, 256); + assuan_transact (ctx, "GETINFO socket_name", + membuf_data_cb, &data, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + databuf = get_membuf (&data, &datalen); + if (databuf && datalen) + { + socket_name = xtrymalloc (datalen + 1); + if (!socket_name) + log_error ("warning: can't store socket name: %s\n", + strerror (errno)); + else + { + memcpy (socket_name, databuf, datalen); + socket_name[datalen] = 0; + if (DBG_ASSUAN) + log_debug ("additional connections at `%s'\n", socket_name); + } + } + xfree (databuf); + } + + /* Tell the scdaemon we want him to send us an event signal. */ + if (opt.sigusr2_enabled) + { + char buf[100]; + +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "OPTION event-signal=%lx", + (unsigned long)get_agent_scd_notify_event ()); +#else + snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "OPTION event-signal=%d", SIGUSR2); +#endif + assuan_transact (ctx, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + + primary_scd_ctx = ctx; + primary_scd_ctx_reusable = 0; + + leave: + if (err) + { + unlock_scd (ctrl, err); + if (ctx) + assuan_release (ctx); + } + else + { + ctrl->scd_local->ctx = ctx; + } + if (!pth_mutex_release (&start_scd_lock)) + log_error ("failed to release the start_scd lock: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + return err; +} + + +/* Check whether the SCdaemon is active. This is a fast check without + any locking and might give a wrong result if another thread is about + to start the daemon or the daemon is about to be stopped.. */ +int +agent_scd_check_running (void) +{ + return !!primary_scd_ctx; +} + + +/* Check whether the Scdaemon is still alive and clean it up if not. */ +void +agent_scd_check_aliveness (void) +{ + pth_event_t evt; + pid_t pid; +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + DWORD rc; +#else + int rc; +#endif + + if (!primary_scd_ctx) + return; /* No scdaemon running. */ + + /* This is not a critical function so we use a short timeout while + acquiring the lock. */ + evt = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_TIME, pth_timeout (1, 0)); + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&start_scd_lock, 0, evt)) + { + if (pth_event_occurred (evt)) + { + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info ("failed to acquire the start_scd lock while" + " doing an aliveness check: %s\n", "timeout"); + } + else + log_error ("failed to acquire the start_scd lock while" + " doing an aliveness check: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + return; + } + pth_event_free (evt, PTH_FREE_THIS); + + if (primary_scd_ctx) + { + pid = assuan_get_pid (primary_scd_ctx); +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + /* If we have a PID we disconnect if either GetExitProcessCode + fails or if ir returns the exit code of the scdaemon. 259 is + the error code for STILL_ALIVE. */ + if (pid != (pid_t)(void*)(-1) && pid + && (!GetExitCodeProcess ((HANDLE)pid, &rc) || rc != 259)) +#else + if (pid != (pid_t)(-1) && pid + && ((rc=waitpid (pid, NULL, WNOHANG))==-1 || (rc == pid)) ) +#endif + { + /* Okay, scdaemon died. Disconnect the primary connection + now but take care that it won't do another wait. Also + cleanup all other connections and release their + resources. The next use will start a new daemon then. + Due to the use of the START_SCD_LOCAL we are sure that + none of these context are actually in use. */ + struct scd_local_s *sl; + + assuan_set_flag (primary_scd_ctx, ASSUAN_NO_WAITPID, 1); + assuan_release (primary_scd_ctx); + + for (sl=scd_local_list; sl; sl = sl->next_local) + { + if (sl->ctx) + { + if (sl->ctx != primary_scd_ctx) + assuan_release (sl->ctx); + sl->ctx = NULL; + } + } + + primary_scd_ctx = NULL; + primary_scd_ctx_reusable = 0; + + xfree (socket_name); + socket_name = NULL; + } + } + + if (!pth_mutex_release (&start_scd_lock)) + log_error ("failed to release the start_scd lock while" + " doing the aliveness check: %s\n", strerror (errno)); +} + + + +/* Reset the SCD if it has been used. Actually it is not a reset but + a cleanup of resources used by the current connection. */ +int +agent_reset_scd (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + if (ctrl->scd_local) + { + if (ctrl->scd_local->ctx) + { + /* We can't disconnect the primary context because libassuan + does a waitpid on it and thus the system would hang. + Instead we send a reset and keep that connection for + reuse. */ + if (ctrl->scd_local->ctx == primary_scd_ctx) + { + /* Send a RESTART to the SCD. This is required for the + primary connection as a kind of virtual EOF; we don't + have another way to tell it that the next command + should be viewed as if a new connection has been + made. For the non-primary connections this is not + needed as we simply close the socket. We don't check + for an error here because the RESTART may fail for + example if the scdaemon has already been terminated. + Anyway, we need to set the reusable flag to make sure + that the aliveness check can clean it up. */ + assuan_transact (primary_scd_ctx, "RESTART", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + primary_scd_ctx_reusable = 1; + } + else + assuan_release (ctrl->scd_local->ctx); + ctrl->scd_local->ctx = NULL; + } + + /* Remove the local context from our list and release it. */ + if (!scd_local_list) + BUG (); + else if (scd_local_list == ctrl->scd_local) + scd_local_list = ctrl->scd_local->next_local; + else + { + struct scd_local_s *sl; + + for (sl=scd_local_list; sl->next_local; sl = sl->next_local) + if (sl->next_local == ctrl->scd_local) + break; + if (!sl->next_local) + BUG (); + sl->next_local = ctrl->scd_local->next_local; + } + xfree (ctrl->scd_local); + ctrl->scd_local = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + + + +static gpg_error_t +learn_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + struct learn_parm_s *parm = opaque; + const char *keyword = line; + int keywordlen; + + for (keywordlen=0; *line && !spacep (line); line++, keywordlen++) + ; + while (spacep (line)) + line++; + if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "CERTINFO", keywordlen)) + { + parm->certinfo_cb (parm->certinfo_cb_arg, line); + } + else if (keywordlen == 11 && !memcmp (keyword, "KEYPAIRINFO", keywordlen)) + { + parm->kpinfo_cb (parm->kpinfo_cb_arg, line); + } + else if (keywordlen && *line) + { + parm->sinfo_cb (parm->sinfo_cb_arg, keyword, keywordlen, line); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Perform the LEARN command and return a list of all private keys + stored on the card. */ +int +agent_card_learn (ctrl_t ctrl, + void (*kpinfo_cb)(void*, const char *), + void *kpinfo_cb_arg, + void (*certinfo_cb)(void*, const char *), + void *certinfo_cb_arg, + void (*sinfo_cb)(void*, const char *, size_t, const char *), + void *sinfo_cb_arg) +{ + int rc; + struct learn_parm_s parm; + + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm); + parm.kpinfo_cb = kpinfo_cb; + parm.kpinfo_cb_arg = kpinfo_cb_arg; + parm.certinfo_cb = certinfo_cb; + parm.certinfo_cb_arg = certinfo_cb_arg; + parm.sinfo_cb = sinfo_cb; + parm.sinfo_cb_arg = sinfo_cb_arg; + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, "LEARN --force", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + learn_status_cb, &parm); + if (rc) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + + +static gpg_error_t +get_serialno_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + char **serialno = opaque; + const char *keyword = line; + const char *s; + int keywordlen, n; + + for (keywordlen=0; *line && !spacep (line); line++, keywordlen++) + ; + while (spacep (line)) + line++; + + if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "SERIALNO", keywordlen)) + { + if (*serialno) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFLICT); /* Unexpected status line. */ + for (n=0,s=line; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++) + ; + if (!n || (n&1)|| !(spacep (s) || !*s) ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER); + *serialno = xtrymalloc (n+1); + if (!*serialno) + return out_of_core (); + memcpy (*serialno, line, n); + (*serialno)[n] = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Return the serial number of the card or an appropriate error. The + serial number is returned as a hexstring. */ +int +agent_card_serialno (ctrl_t ctrl, char **r_serialno) +{ + int rc; + char *serialno = NULL; + + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, "SERIALNO", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + get_serialno_cb, &serialno); + if (rc) + { + xfree (serialno); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + *r_serialno = serialno; + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + + + +static gpg_error_t +membuf_data_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + membuf_t *data = opaque; + + if (buffer) + put_membuf (data, buffer, length); + return 0; +} + +/* Handle the NEEDPIN inquiry. */ +static gpg_error_t +inq_needpin (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + struct inq_needpin_s *parm = opaque; + char *pin; + size_t pinlen; + int rc; + + if (!strncmp (line, "NEEDPIN", 7) && (line[7] == ' ' || !line[7])) + { + line += 7; + while (*line == ' ') + line++; + + pinlen = 90; + pin = gcry_malloc_secure (pinlen); + if (!pin) + return out_of_core (); + + rc = parm->getpin_cb (parm->getpin_cb_arg, line, pin, pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, pin, pinlen); + xfree (pin); + } + else if (!strncmp (line, "POPUPKEYPADPROMPT", 17) + && (line[17] == ' ' || !line[17])) + { + line += 17; + while (*line == ' ') + line++; + + rc = parm->getpin_cb (parm->getpin_cb_arg, line, NULL, 1); + } + else if (!strncmp (line, "DISMISSKEYPADPROMPT", 19) + && (line[19] == ' ' || !line[19])) + { + rc = parm->getpin_cb (parm->getpin_cb_arg, "", NULL, 0); + } + else if (parm->passthru) + { + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + int rest; + int needrest = !strncmp (line, "KEYDATA", 8); + + /* Pass the inquiry up to our caller. We limit the maximum + amount to an arbitrary value. As we know that the KEYDATA + enquiry is pretty sensitive we disable logging then */ + if ((rest = (needrest + && !assuan_get_flag (parm->passthru, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL)))) + assuan_begin_confidential (parm->passthru); + rc = assuan_inquire (parm->passthru, line, &value, &valuelen, 8096); + if (rest) + assuan_end_confidential (parm->passthru); + if (!rc) + { + if ((rest = (needrest + && !assuan_get_flag (parm->ctx, ASSUAN_CONFIDENTIAL)))) + assuan_begin_confidential (parm->ctx); + rc = assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, value, valuelen); + if (rest) + assuan_end_confidential (parm->ctx); + xfree (value); + } + else + log_error ("error forwarding inquiry `%s': %s\n", + line, gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + else + { + log_error ("unsupported inquiry `%s'\n", line); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_INQUIRE); + } + + return rc; +} + + + +/* Create a signature using the current card */ +int +agent_card_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyid, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, + const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen) +{ + int rc, i; + char *p, line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + membuf_t data; + struct inq_needpin_s inqparm; + size_t len; + unsigned char *sigbuf; + size_t sigbuflen; + + *r_buf = NULL; + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (indatalen*2 + 50 > DIM(line)) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL)); + + sprintf (line, "SETDATA "); + p = line + strlen (line); + for (i=0; i < indatalen ; i++, p += 2 ) + sprintf (p, "%02X", indata[i]); + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + + init_membuf (&data, 1024); + inqparm.ctx = ctrl->scd_local->ctx; + inqparm.getpin_cb = getpin_cb; + inqparm.getpin_cb_arg = getpin_cb_arg; + inqparm.passthru = 0; + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, + ctrl->use_auth_call? "PKAUTH %s":"PKSIGN %s", keyid); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + membuf_data_cb, &data, + inq_needpin, &inqparm, + NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len)); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + sigbuf = get_membuf (&data, &sigbuflen); + + /* Create an S-expression from it which is formatted like this: + "(7:sig-val(3:rsa(1:sSIGBUFLEN:SIGBUF)))" */ + *r_buflen = 21 + 11 + sigbuflen + 4; + p = xtrymalloc (*r_buflen); + *r_buf = (unsigned char*)p; + if (!p) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, out_of_core ()); + p = stpcpy (p, "(7:sig-val(3:rsa(1:s" ); + sprintf (p, "%u:", (unsigned int)sigbuflen); + p += strlen (p); + memcpy (p, sigbuf, sigbuflen); + p += sigbuflen; + strcpy (p, ")))"); + xfree (sigbuf); + + assert (gcry_sexp_canon_len (*r_buf, *r_buflen, NULL, NULL)); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + +/* Decipher INDATA using the current card. Note that the returned value is */ +int +agent_card_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyid, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, + const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen, + char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen) +{ + int rc, i; + char *p, line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + membuf_t data; + struct inq_needpin_s inqparm; + size_t len; + + *r_buf = NULL; + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* FIXME: use secure memory where appropriate */ + if (indatalen*2 + 50 > DIM(line)) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL)); + + sprintf (line, "SETDATA "); + p = line + strlen (line); + for (i=0; i < indatalen ; i++, p += 2 ) + sprintf (p, "%02X", indata[i]); + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + + init_membuf (&data, 1024); + inqparm.ctx = ctrl->scd_local->ctx; + inqparm.getpin_cb = getpin_cb; + inqparm.getpin_cb_arg = getpin_cb_arg; + inqparm.passthru = 0; + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "PKDECRYPT %s", keyid); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + membuf_data_cb, &data, + inq_needpin, &inqparm, + NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len)); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + *r_buf = get_membuf (&data, r_buflen); + if (!*r_buf) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM)); + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + + +/* Read a certificate with ID into R_BUF and R_BUFLEN. */ +int +agent_card_readcert (ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *id, char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + membuf_t data; + size_t len; + + *r_buf = NULL; + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + init_membuf (&data, 1024); + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "READCERT %s", id); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + membuf_data_cb, &data, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len)); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + *r_buf = get_membuf (&data, r_buflen); + if (!*r_buf) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM)); + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + + +/* Read a key with ID and return it in an allocate buffer pointed to + by r_BUF as a valid S-expression. */ +int +agent_card_readkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *id, unsigned char **r_buf) +{ + int rc; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + membuf_t data; + size_t len, buflen; + + *r_buf = NULL; + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + init_membuf (&data, 1024); + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "READKEY %s", id); + line[DIM(line)-1] = 0; + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + membuf_data_cb, &data, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + { + xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len)); + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + *r_buf = get_membuf (&data, &buflen); + if (!*r_buf) + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM)); + + if (!gcry_sexp_canon_len (*r_buf, buflen, NULL, NULL)) + { + xfree (*r_buf); *r_buf = NULL; + return unlock_scd (ctrl, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE)); + } + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + + +/* Type used with the card_getattr_cb. */ +struct card_getattr_parm_s { + const char *keyword; /* Keyword to look for. */ + size_t keywordlen; /* strlen of KEYWORD. */ + char *data; /* Malloced and unescaped data. */ + int error; /* ERRNO value or 0 on success. */ +}; + +/* Callback function for agent_card_getattr. */ +static gpg_error_t +card_getattr_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + struct card_getattr_parm_s *parm = opaque; + const char *keyword = line; + int keywordlen; + + if (parm->data) + return 0; /* We want only the first occurrence. */ + + for (keywordlen=0; *line && !spacep (line); line++, keywordlen++) + ; + while (spacep (line)) + line++; + + if (keywordlen == parm->keywordlen + && !memcmp (keyword, parm->keyword, keywordlen)) + { + parm->data = percent_plus_unescape ((const unsigned char*)line, 0xff); + if (!parm->data) + parm->error = errno; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Call the agent to retrieve a single line data object. On success + the object is malloced and stored at RESULT; it is guaranteed that + NULL is never stored in this case. On error an error code is + returned and NULL stored at RESULT. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_card_getattr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, char **result) +{ + int err; + struct card_getattr_parm_s parm; + char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH]; + + *result = NULL; + + if (!*name) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm); + parm.keyword = name; + parm.keywordlen = strlen (name); + + /* We assume that NAME does not need escaping. */ + if (8 + strlen (name) > DIM(line)-1) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); + stpcpy (stpcpy (line, "GETATTR "), name); + + err = start_scd (ctrl); + if (err) + return err; + + err = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, line, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + card_getattr_cb, &parm); + if (!err && parm.error) + err = gpg_error_from_errno (parm.error); + + if (!err && !parm.data) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); + + if (!err) + *result = parm.data; + else + xfree (parm.data); + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, err); +} + + + + +static gpg_error_t +pass_status_thru (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + assuan_context_t ctx = opaque; + char keyword[200]; + int i; + + for (i=0; *line && !spacep (line) && i < DIM(keyword)-1; line++, i++) + keyword[i] = *line; + keyword[i] = 0; + /* truncate any remaining keyword stuff. */ + for (; *line && !spacep (line); line++) + ; + while (spacep (line)) + line++; + + assuan_write_status (ctx, keyword, line); + return 0; +} + +static gpg_error_t +pass_data_thru (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + assuan_context_t ctx = opaque; + + assuan_send_data (ctx, buffer, length); + return 0; +} + + +/* Send the line CMDLINE with command for the SCDdaemon to it and send + all status messages back. This command is used as a general quoting + mechanism to pass everything verbatim to SCDAEMON. The PIN + inquiry is handled inside gpg-agent. */ +int +agent_card_scd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cmdline, + int (*getpin_cb)(void *, const char *, char*, size_t), + void *getpin_cb_arg, void *assuan_context) +{ + int rc; + struct inq_needpin_s inqparm; + int saveflag; + + rc = start_scd (ctrl); + if (rc) + return rc; + + inqparm.ctx = ctrl->scd_local->ctx; + inqparm.getpin_cb = getpin_cb; + inqparm.getpin_cb_arg = getpin_cb_arg; + inqparm.passthru = assuan_context; + saveflag = assuan_get_flag (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS); + assuan_set_flag (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS, 1); + rc = assuan_transact (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, cmdline, + pass_data_thru, assuan_context, + inq_needpin, &inqparm, + pass_status_thru, assuan_context); + assuan_set_flag (ctrl->scd_local->ctx, ASSUAN_CONVEY_COMMENTS, saveflag); + if (rc) + { + return unlock_scd (ctrl, rc); + } + + return unlock_scd (ctrl, 0); +} + + diff --git a/agent/command-ssh.c b/agent/command-ssh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f96ef5 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/command-ssh.c @@ -0,0 +1,3089 @@ +/* command-ssh.c - gpg-agent's ssh-agent emulation layer + * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +/* Only v2 of the ssh-agent protocol is implemented. */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <dirent.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include "agent.h" + +#include "estream.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "../common/ssh-utils.h" + + + + +/* Request types. */ +#define SSH_REQUEST_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 +#define SSH_REQUEST_SIGN_REQUEST 13 +#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_IDENTITY 17 +#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 +#define SSH_REQUEST_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 +#define SSH_REQUEST_LOCK 22 +#define SSH_REQUEST_UNLOCK 23 +#define SSH_REQUEST_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 + +/* Options. */ +#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 +#define SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 + +/* Response types. */ +#define SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS 6 +#define SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE 5 +#define SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 +#define SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 + +/* Other constants. */ +#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING 20 +#define SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS 2 +#define SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 (1 << 0) + + +/* The blurb we put into the header of a newly created control file. */ +static const char sshcontrolblurb[] = +"# List of allowed ssh keys. Only keys present in this file are used\n" +"# in the SSH protocol. The ssh-add tool may add new entries to this\n" +"# file to enable them; you may also add them manually. Comment\n" +"# lines, like this one, as well as empty lines are ignored. Lines do\n" +"# have a certain length limit but this is not serious limitation as\n" +"# the format of the entries is fixed and checked by gpg-agent. A\n" +"# non-comment line starts with optional white spaces, followed by the\n" +"# keygrip of the key given as 40 hex digits, optionally followed by a\n" +"# the caching TTL in seconds and another optional field for arbitrary\n" +"# flags. Prepend the keygrip with an '!' mark to disable it.\n" +"\n"; + + + +/* Macros. */ + +/* Return a new uint32 with b0 being the most significant byte and b3 + being the least significant byte. */ +#define uint32_construct(b0, b1, b2, b3) \ + ((b0 << 24) | (b1 << 16) | (b2 << 8) | b3) + + + + +/* + * Basic types. + */ + +/* Type for a request handler. */ +typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_request_handler_t) (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); + +/* Type, which is used for associating request handlers with the + appropriate request IDs. */ +typedef struct ssh_request_spec +{ + unsigned char type; + ssh_request_handler_t handler; + const char *identifier; + unsigned int secret_input; +} ssh_request_spec_t; + +/* Type for "key modifier functions", which are necessary since + OpenSSH and GnuPG treat key material slightly different. A key + modifier is called right after a new key identity has been received + in order to "sanitize" the material. */ +typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_key_modifier_t) (const char *elems, + gcry_mpi_t *mpis); + +/* The encoding of a generated signature is dependent on the + algorithm; therefore algorithm specific signature encoding + functions are necessary. */ +typedef gpg_error_t (*ssh_signature_encoder_t) (estream_t signature_blob, + gcry_mpi_t *mpis); + +/* Type, which is used for boundling all the algorithm specific + information together in a single object. */ +typedef struct ssh_key_type_spec +{ + /* Algorithm identifier as used by OpenSSH. */ + const char *ssh_identifier; + + /* Algorithm identifier as used by GnuPG. */ + const char *identifier; + + /* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one of the + agent protocol. */ + const char *elems_key_secret; + + /* List of MPI names for public keys; order matches the one of the + agent protocol. */ + const char *elems_key_public; + + /* List of MPI names for signature data. */ + const char *elems_signature; + + /* List of MPI names for secret keys; order matches the one, which + is required by gpg-agent's key access layer. */ + const char *elems_sexp_order; + + /* Key modifier function. Key modifier functions are necessary in + order to fix any inconsistencies between the representation of + keys on the SSH and on the GnuPG side. */ + ssh_key_modifier_t key_modifier; + + /* Signature encoder function. Signature encoder functions are + necessary since the encoding of signatures depends on the used + algorithm. */ + ssh_signature_encoder_t signature_encoder; + + /* Misc flags. */ + unsigned int flags; +} ssh_key_type_spec_t; + + +/* Prototypes. */ +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); +static gpg_error_t ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, + estream_t response); + +static gpg_error_t ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis); +static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (estream_t signature_blob, + gcry_mpi_t *mpis); +static gpg_error_t ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (estream_t signature_blob, + gcry_mpi_t *mpis); + + + +/* Global variables. */ + + +/* Associating request types with the corresponding request + handlers. */ + +static ssh_request_spec_t request_specs[] = + { +#define REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE(id, name, secret_input) \ + { SSH_REQUEST_##id, ssh_handler_##name, #name, secret_input } + + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REQUEST_IDENTITIES, request_identities, 1), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (SIGN_REQUEST, sign_request, 0), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_IDENTITY, add_identity, 1), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED, add_identity, 1), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_IDENTITY, remove_identity, 0), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES, remove_all_identities, 0), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (LOCK, lock, 0), + REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE (UNLOCK, unlock, 0) +#undef REQUEST_SPEC_DEFINE + }; + + +/* Table holding key type specifications. */ +static ssh_key_type_spec_t ssh_key_types[] = + { + { + "ssh-rsa", "rsa", "nedupq", "en", "s", "nedpqu", + ssh_key_modifier_rsa, ssh_signature_encoder_rsa, + SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2 + }, + { + "ssh-dss", "dsa", "pqgyx", "pqgy", "rs", "pqgyx", + NULL, ssh_signature_encoder_dsa, + 0 + }, + }; + + + + + +/* + General utility functions. + */ + +/* A secure realloc, i.e. it makes sure to allocate secure memory if A + is NULL. This is required because the standard gcry_realloc does + not know whether to allocate secure or normal if NULL is passed as + existing buffer. */ +static void * +realloc_secure (void *a, size_t n) +{ + void *p; + + if (a) + p = gcry_realloc (a, n); + else + p = gcry_malloc_secure (n); + + return p; +} + + +/* Create and return a new C-string from DATA/DATA_N (i.e.: add + NUL-termination); return NULL on OOM. */ +static char * +make_cstring (const char *data, size_t data_n) +{ + char *s; + + s = xtrymalloc (data_n + 1); + if (s) + { + memcpy (s, data, data_n); + s[data_n] = 0; + } + + return s; +} + + + + +/* + Primitive I/O functions. + */ + + +/* Read a byte from STREAM, store it in B. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char *b) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + ret = es_fgetc (stream); + if (ret == EOF) + { + if (es_ferror (stream)) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + *b = 0; + } + else + { + *b = ret & 0xFF; + err = 0; + } + + return err; +} + +/* Write the byte contained in B to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_byte (estream_t stream, unsigned char b) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + ret = es_fputc (b, stream); + if (ret == EOF) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = 0; + + return err; +} + +/* Read a uint32 from STREAM, store it in UINT32. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 *uint32) +{ + unsigned char buffer[4]; + size_t bytes_read; + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + ret = es_read (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read); + if (ret) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + if (bytes_read != sizeof (buffer)) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + else + { + u32 n; + + n = uint32_construct (buffer[0], buffer[1], buffer[2], buffer[3]); + *uint32 = n; + err = 0; + } + } + + return err; +} + +/* Write the uint32 contained in UINT32 to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_uint32 (estream_t stream, u32 uint32) +{ + unsigned char buffer[4]; + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + buffer[0] = uint32 >> 24; + buffer[1] = uint32 >> 16; + buffer[2] = uint32 >> 8; + buffer[3] = uint32 >> 0; + + ret = es_write (stream, buffer, sizeof (buffer), NULL); + if (ret) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = 0; + + return err; +} + +/* Read SIZE bytes from STREAM into BUFFER. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_data (estream_t stream, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + size_t bytes_read; + int ret; + + ret = es_read (stream, buffer, size, &bytes_read); + if (ret) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + if (bytes_read != size) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + else + err = 0; + } + + return err; +} + +/* Write SIZE bytes from BUFFER to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_data (estream_t stream, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t size) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + ret = es_write (stream, buffer, size, NULL); + if (ret) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = 0; + + return err; +} + +/* Read a binary string from STREAM into STRING, store size of string + in STRING_SIZE; depending on SECURE use secure memory for + string. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_string (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, + unsigned char **string, u32 *string_size) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + u32 length = 0; + + /* Read string length. */ + err = stream_read_uint32 (stream, &length); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Allocate space. */ + if (secure) + buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (length + 1); + else + buffer = xtrymalloc (length + 1); + if (! buffer) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + /* Read data. */ + err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer, length); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Finalize string object. */ + buffer[length] = 0; + *string = buffer; + if (string_size) + *string_size = length; + + out: + + if (err) + xfree (buffer); + + return err; +} + +/* Read a C-string from STREAM, store copy in STRING. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_cstring (estream_t stream, char **string) +{ + unsigned char *buffer; + gpg_error_t err; + + err = stream_read_string (stream, 0, &buffer, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + + *string = (char *) buffer; + + out: + + return err; +} + + +/* Write a binary string from STRING of size STRING_N to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_string (estream_t stream, + const unsigned char *string, u32 string_n) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + err = stream_write_uint32 (stream, string_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_data (stream, string, string_n); + + out: + + return err; +} + +/* Write a C-string from STRING to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_cstring (estream_t stream, const char *string) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + err = stream_write_string (stream, + (const unsigned char *) string, strlen (string)); + + return err; +} + +/* Read an MPI from STREAM, store it in MPINT. Depending on SECURE + use secure memory. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_read_mpi (estream_t stream, unsigned int secure, gcry_mpi_t *mpint) +{ + unsigned char *mpi_data; + u32 mpi_data_size; + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_mpi_t mpi; + + mpi_data = NULL; + + err = stream_read_string (stream, secure, &mpi_data, &mpi_data_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* To avoid excessive use of secure memory we check that an MPI is + not too large. */ + if (mpi_data_size > 520) + { + log_error (_("ssh keys greater than %d bits are not supported\n"), 4096); + err = GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE; + goto out; + } + + err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, mpi_data, mpi_data_size, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + + *mpint = mpi; + + out: + + xfree (mpi_data); + + return err; +} + +/* Write the MPI contained in MPINT to STREAM. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_write_mpi (estream_t stream, gcry_mpi_t mpint) +{ + unsigned char *mpi_buffer; + size_t mpi_buffer_n; + gpg_error_t err; + + mpi_buffer = NULL; + + err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &mpi_buffer, &mpi_buffer_n, mpint); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_string (stream, mpi_buffer, mpi_buffer_n); + + out: + + xfree (mpi_buffer); + + return err; +} + +/* Copy data from SRC to DST until EOF is reached. */ +static gpg_error_t +stream_copy (estream_t dst, estream_t src) +{ + char buffer[BUFSIZ]; + size_t bytes_read; + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + err = 0; + while (1) + { + ret = es_read (src, buffer, sizeof (buffer), &bytes_read); + if (ret || (! bytes_read)) + { + if (ret) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + break; + } + ret = es_write (dst, buffer, bytes_read, NULL); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + break; + } + } + + return err; +} + + +/* Read the content of the file specified by FILENAME into a newly + create buffer, which is to be stored in BUFFER; store length of + buffer in BUFFER_N. */ +static gpg_error_t +file_to_buffer (const char *filename, unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buffer_n) +{ + unsigned char *buffer_new; + struct stat statbuf; + estream_t stream; + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + + *buffer = NULL; + *buffer_n = 0; + + buffer_new = NULL; + err = 0; + + stream = es_fopen (filename, "r"); + if (! stream) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + ret = fstat (es_fileno (stream), &statbuf); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + buffer_new = xtrymalloc (statbuf.st_size); + if (! buffer_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = stream_read_data (stream, buffer_new, statbuf.st_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + *buffer = buffer_new; + *buffer_n = statbuf.st_size; + + out: + + if (stream) + es_fclose (stream); + + if (err) + xfree (buffer_new); + + return err; +} + + + + +/* Open the ssh control file and create it if not available. With + APPEND passed as true the file will be opened in append mode, + otherwise in read only mode. On success a file pointer is stored + at the address of R_FP. */ +static gpg_error_t +open_control_file (FILE **r_fp, int append) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + char *fname; + FILE *fp; + + /* Note: As soon as we start to use non blocking functions here + (i.e. where Pth might switch threads) we need to employ a + mutex. */ + *r_fp = NULL; + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "sshcontrol", NULL); + /* FIXME: With "a+" we are not able to check whether this will will + be created and thus the blurb needs to be written first. */ + fp = fopen (fname, append? "a+":"r"); + if (!fp && errno == ENOENT) + { + /* Fixme: "x" is a GNU extension. We might want to use the es_ + functions here. */ + fp = fopen (fname, "wx"); + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + log_error (_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (fname); + return err; + } + fputs (sshcontrolblurb, fp); + fclose (fp); + fp = fopen (fname, append? "a+":"r"); + } + + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + log_error (_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (fname); + return err; + } + + *r_fp = fp; + + return 0; +} + + +/* Search the file at stream FP from the beginning until a matching + HEXGRIP is found; return success in this case and store true at + DISABLED if the found key has been disabled. If R_TTL is not NULL + a specified TTL for that key is stored there. If R_CONFIRM is not + NULL it is set to 1 if the key has the confirm flag set. */ +static gpg_error_t +search_control_file (FILE *fp, const char *hexgrip, + int *r_disabled, int *r_ttl, int *r_confirm) +{ + int c, i, n; + char *p, *pend, line[256]; + long ttl; + int lnr = 0; + const char fname[] = "sshcontrol"; + + assert (strlen (hexgrip) == 40 ); + + if (r_confirm) + *r_confirm = 0; + + fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET); + clearerr (fp); + *r_disabled = 0; + next_line: + do + { + if (!fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp) ) + { + if (feof (fp)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); + return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + } + lnr++; + + if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n') + { + /* Eat until end of line */ + while ( (c=getc (fp)) != EOF && c != '\n') + ; + return gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG + : GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE); + } + + /* Allow for empty lines and spaces */ + for (p=line; spacep (p); p++) + ; + } + while (!*p || *p == '\n' || *p == '#'); + + *r_disabled = 0; + if (*p == '!') + { + *r_disabled = 1; + for (p++; spacep (p); p++) + ; + } + + for (i=0; hexdigitp (p) && i < 40; p++, i++) + if (hexgrip[i] != (*p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p)) + goto next_line; + if (i != 40 || !(spacep (p) || *p == '\n')) + { + log_error ("invalid formatted line in `%s', line %d\n", fname, lnr); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); + } + + ttl = strtol (p, &pend, 10); + p = pend; + if (!(spacep (p) || *p == '\n') || ttl < -1) + { + log_error ("invalid TTL value in `%s', line %d; assuming 0\n", + fname, lnr); + ttl = 0; + } + if (r_ttl) + *r_ttl = ttl; + + /* Now check for key-value pairs of the form NAME[=VALUE]. */ + while (*p) + { + for (; spacep (p) && *p != '\n'; p++) + ; + if (!*p || *p == '\n') + break; + n = strcspn (p, "= \t\n"); + if (p[n] == '=') + { + log_error ("assigning a value to a flag is not yet supported; " + "in `%s', line %d; flag ignored\n", fname, lnr); + p++; + } + else if (n == 7 && !memcmp (p, "confirm", 7)) + { + if (r_confirm) + *r_confirm = 1; + } + else + log_error ("invalid flag `%.*s' in `%s', line %d; ignored\n", + n, p, fname, lnr); + p += n; + } + + return 0; /* Okay: found it. */ +} + + + +/* Add an entry to the control file to mark the key with the keygrip + HEXGRIP as usable for SSH; i.e. it will be returned when ssh asks + for it. FMTFPR is the fingerprint string. This function is in + general used to add a key received through the ssh-add function. + We can assume that the user wants to allow ssh using this key. */ +static gpg_error_t +add_control_entry (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *hexgrip, const char *fmtfpr, + int ttl, int confirm) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + FILE *fp; + int disabled; + + (void)ctrl; + + err = open_control_file (&fp, 1); + if (err) + return err; + + err = search_control_file (fp, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, NULL); + if (err && gpg_err_code(err) == GPG_ERR_EOF) + { + struct tm *tp; + time_t atime = time (NULL); + + /* Not yet in the file - add it. Because the file has been + opened in append mode, we simply need to write to it. */ + tp = localtime (&atime); + fprintf (fp, ("# Key added on: %04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n" + "# Fingerprint: %s\n" + "%s %d%s\n"), + 1900+tp->tm_year, tp->tm_mon+1, tp->tm_mday, + tp->tm_hour, tp->tm_min, tp->tm_sec, + fmtfpr, hexgrip, ttl, confirm? " confirm":""); + + } + fclose (fp); + return 0; +} + + +/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the TTL. */ +static int +ttl_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip) +{ + FILE *fp; + int disabled, ttl; + + if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40) + return 0; /* Wrong input: Use global default. */ + + if (open_control_file (&fp, 0)) + return 0; /* Error: Use the global default TTL. */ + + if (search_control_file (fp, hexgrip, &disabled, &ttl, NULL) + || disabled) + ttl = 0; /* Use the global default if not found or disabled. */ + + fclose (fp); + + return ttl; +} + + +/* Scan the sshcontrol file and return the confirm flag. */ +static int +confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (const char *hexgrip) +{ + FILE *fp; + int disabled, confirm; + + if (!hexgrip || strlen (hexgrip) != 40) + return 1; /* Wrong input: Better ask for confirmation. */ + + if (open_control_file (&fp, 0)) + return 1; /* Error: Better ask for confirmation. */ + + if (search_control_file (fp, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, &confirm) + || disabled) + confirm = 0; /* If not found or disabled, there is no reason to + ask for confirmation. */ + + fclose (fp); + + return confirm; +} + + + + + +/* + + MPI lists. + + */ + +/* Free the list of MPIs MPI_LIST. */ +static void +mpint_list_free (gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list) +{ + if (mpi_list) + { + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; mpi_list[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_list[i]); + xfree (mpi_list); + } +} + +/* Receive key material MPIs from STREAM according to KEY_SPEC; + depending on SECRET expect a public key or secret key. The newly + allocated list of MPIs is stored in MPI_LIST. Returns usual error + code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_receive_mpint_list (estream_t stream, int secret, + ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec, gcry_mpi_t **mpi_list) +{ + const char *elems_public; + unsigned int elems_n; + const char *elems; + int elem_is_secret; + gcry_mpi_t *mpis; + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned int i; + + mpis = NULL; + err = 0; + + if (secret) + elems = key_spec.elems_key_secret; + else + elems = key_spec.elems_key_public; + elems_n = strlen (elems); + + elems_public = key_spec.elems_key_public; + + mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis ); + if (!mpis) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + elem_is_secret = 0; + for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++) + { + if (secret) + elem_is_secret = ! strchr (elems_public, elems[i]); + err = stream_read_mpi (stream, elem_is_secret, &mpis[i]); + if (err) + break; + } + if (err) + goto out; + + *mpi_list = mpis; + + out: + + if (err) + mpint_list_free (mpis); + + return err; +} + + + +/* Key modifier function for RSA. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_key_modifier_rsa (const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *mpis) +{ + gcry_mpi_t p; + gcry_mpi_t q; + gcry_mpi_t u; + + if (strcmp (elems, "nedupq")) + /* Modifying only necessary for secret keys. */ + goto out; + + u = mpis[3]; + p = mpis[4]; + q = mpis[5]; + + if (gcry_mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0) + { + /* P shall be smaller then Q! Swap primes. iqmp becomes u. */ + gcry_mpi_t tmp; + + tmp = mpis[4]; + mpis[4] = mpis[5]; + mpis[5] = tmp; + } + else + /* U needs to be recomputed. */ + gcry_mpi_invm (u, p, q); + + out: + + return 0; +} + +/* Signature encoder function for RSA. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_signature_encoder_rsa (estream_t signature_blob, gcry_mpi_t *mpis) +{ + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_n; + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_mpi_t s; + + s = mpis[0]; + + err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, s); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, data, data_n); + xfree (data); + + out: + + return err; +} + + +/* Signature encoder function for DSA. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_signature_encoder_dsa (estream_t signature_blob, gcry_mpi_t *mpis) +{ + unsigned char buffer[SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_ELEMS]; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_n; + gpg_error_t err; + int i; + + data = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) + { + err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &data, &data_n, mpis[i]); + if (err) + break; + + if (data_n > SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */ + break; + } + + memset (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING), 0, + SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n); + memcpy (buffer + (i * SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING) + + (SSH_DSA_SIGNATURE_PADDING - data_n), data, data_n); + + xfree (data); + data = NULL; + } + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_string (signature_blob, buffer, sizeof (buffer)); + + out: + + xfree (data); + + return err; +} + +/* + S-Expressions. + */ + + +/* This function constructs a new S-Expression for the key identified + by the KEY_SPEC, SECRET, MPIS and COMMENT, which is to be stored in + *SEXP. Returns usual error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +sexp_key_construct (gcry_sexp_t *sexp, + ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec, int secret, + gcry_mpi_t *mpis, const char *comment) +{ + const char *key_identifier[] = { "public-key", "private-key" }; + gcry_sexp_t sexp_new; + char *sexp_template; + size_t sexp_template_n; + gpg_error_t err; + const char *elems; + size_t elems_n; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + void **arg_list; + + err = 0; + sexp_new = NULL; + arg_list = NULL; + if (secret) + elems = key_spec.elems_sexp_order; + else + elems = key_spec.elems_key_public; + elems_n = strlen (elems); + + /* + Calculate size for sexp_template_n: + + "(%s(%s<mpis>)(comment%s))" -> 20 + sizeof (<mpis>). + + mpi: (X%m) -> 5. + + */ + sexp_template_n = 20 + (elems_n * 5); + sexp_template = xtrymalloc (sexp_template_n); + if (! sexp_template) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + /* Key identifier, algorithm identifier, mpis, comment. */ + arg_list = xtrymalloc (sizeof (*arg_list) * (2 + elems_n + 1)); + if (! arg_list) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + i = 0; + arg_list[i++] = &key_identifier[secret]; + arg_list[i++] = &key_spec.identifier; + + *sexp_template = 0; + sexp_template_n = 0; + sexp_template_n = sprintf (sexp_template + sexp_template_n, "(%%s(%%s"); + for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++) + { + sexp_template_n += sprintf (sexp_template + sexp_template_n, "(%c%%m)", + elems[i]); + if (secret) + { + for (j = 0; j < elems_n; j++) + if (key_spec.elems_key_secret[j] == elems[i]) + break; + } + else + j = i; + arg_list[i + 2] = &mpis[j]; + } + sexp_template_n += sprintf (sexp_template + sexp_template_n, + ")(comment%%s))"); + + arg_list[i + 2] = &comment; + + err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&sexp_new, NULL, sexp_template, arg_list); + if (err) + goto out; + + *sexp = sexp_new; + + out: + + xfree (arg_list); + xfree (sexp_template); + + return err; +} + +/* This functions breaks up the key contained in the S-Expression SEXP + according to KEY_SPEC. The MPIs are bundled in a newly create + list, which is to be stored in MPIS; a newly allocated string + holding the comment will be stored in COMMENT; SECRET will be + filled with a boolean flag specifying what kind of key it is. + Returns usual error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +sexp_key_extract (gcry_sexp_t sexp, + ssh_key_type_spec_t key_spec, int *secret, + gcry_mpi_t **mpis, char **comment) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_sexp_t value_list; + gcry_sexp_t value_pair; + gcry_sexp_t comment_list; + unsigned int i; + char *comment_new; + const char *data; + size_t data_n; + int is_secret; + size_t elems_n; + const char *elems; + gcry_mpi_t *mpis_new; + gcry_mpi_t mpi; + + err = 0; + value_list = NULL; + value_pair = NULL; + comment_list = NULL; + comment_new = NULL; + mpis_new = NULL; + + data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (sexp, 0, &data_n); + if (! data) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + if ((data_n == 10 && !strncmp (data, "public-key", 10)) + || (data_n == 21 && !strncmp (data, "protected-private-key", 21)) + || (data_n == 20 && !strncmp (data, "shadowed-private-key", 20))) + { + is_secret = 0; + elems = key_spec.elems_key_public; + } + else if (data_n == 11 && !strncmp (data, "private-key", 11)) + { + is_secret = 1; + elems = key_spec.elems_key_secret; + } + else + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + elems_n = strlen (elems); + mpis_new = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis_new ); + if (!mpis_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + value_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, key_spec.identifier, 0); + if (! value_list) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++) + { + value_pair = gcry_sexp_find_token (value_list, elems + i, 1); + if (! value_pair) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + break; + } + + /* Note that we need to use STD format; i.e. prepend a 0x00 to + indicate a positive number if the high bit is set. */ + mpi = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (value_pair, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD); + if (! mpi) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + break; + } + mpis_new[i] = mpi; + gcry_sexp_release (value_pair); + value_pair = NULL; + } + if (err) + goto out; + + /* We do not require a comment sublist to be present here. */ + data = NULL; + data_n = 0; + + comment_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, "comment", 0); + if (comment_list) + data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (comment_list, 1, &data_n); + if (! data) + { + data = "(none)"; + data_n = 6; + } + + comment_new = make_cstring (data, data_n); + if (! comment_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + if (secret) + *secret = is_secret; + *mpis = mpis_new; + *comment = comment_new; + + out: + + gcry_sexp_release (value_list); + gcry_sexp_release (value_pair); + gcry_sexp_release (comment_list); + + if (err) + { + xfree (comment_new); + mpint_list_free (mpis_new); + } + + return err; +} + +/* Extract the car from SEXP, and create a newly created C-string + which is to be stored in IDENTIFIER. */ +static gpg_error_t +sexp_extract_identifier (gcry_sexp_t sexp, char **identifier) +{ + char *identifier_new; + gcry_sexp_t sublist; + const char *data; + size_t data_n; + gpg_error_t err; + + identifier_new = NULL; + err = 0; + + sublist = gcry_sexp_nth (sexp, 1); + if (! sublist) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (sublist, 0, &data_n); + if (! data) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + identifier_new = make_cstring (data, data_n); + if (! identifier_new) + { + err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno); + goto out; + } + + *identifier = identifier_new; + + out: + + gcry_sexp_release (sublist); + + return err; +} + + + +/* + + Key I/O. + +*/ + +/* Search for a key specification entry. If SSH_NAME is not NULL, + search for an entry whose "ssh_name" is equal to SSH_NAME; + otherwise, search for an entry whose "name" is equal to NAME. + Store found entry in SPEC on success, return error otherwise. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_key_type_lookup (const char *ssh_name, const char *name, + ssh_key_type_spec_t *spec) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < DIM (ssh_key_types); i++) + if ((ssh_name && (! strcmp (ssh_name, ssh_key_types[i].ssh_identifier))) + || (name && (! strcmp (name, ssh_key_types[i].identifier)))) + break; + + if (i == DIM (ssh_key_types)) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + else + { + *spec = ssh_key_types[i]; + err = 0; + } + + return err; +} + +/* Receive a key from STREAM, according to the key specification given + as KEY_SPEC. Depending on SECRET, receive a secret or a public + key. If READ_COMMENT is true, receive a comment string as well. + Constructs a new S-Expression from received data and stores it in + KEY_NEW. Returns zero on success or an error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_receive_key (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t *key_new, int secret, + int read_comment, ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + char *key_type = NULL; + char *comment = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t key = NULL; + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec; + gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list = NULL; + const char *elems; + + + err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &key_type); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_key_type_lookup (key_type, NULL, &spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_receive_mpint_list (stream, secret, spec, &mpi_list); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (read_comment) + { + err = stream_read_cstring (stream, &comment); + if (err) + goto out; + } + + if (secret) + elems = spec.elems_key_secret; + else + elems = spec.elems_key_public; + + if (spec.key_modifier) + { + err = (*spec.key_modifier) (elems, mpi_list); + if (err) + goto out; + } + + err = sexp_key_construct (&key, spec, secret, mpi_list, comment? comment:""); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (key_spec) + *key_spec = spec; + *key_new = key; + + out: + + mpint_list_free (mpi_list); + xfree (key_type); + xfree (comment); + + return err; +} + +/* Converts a key of type TYPE, whose key material is given in MPIS, + into a newly created binary blob, which is to be stored in + BLOB/BLOB_SIZE. Returns zero on success or an error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_convert_key_to_blob (unsigned char **blob, size_t *blob_size, + const char *type, gcry_mpi_t *mpis) +{ + unsigned char *blob_new; + long int blob_size_new; + estream_t stream; + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned int i; + + *blob = NULL; + *blob_size = 0; + + blob_new = NULL; + stream = NULL; + err = 0; + + stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, NULL, NULL, "r+"); + if (! stream) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = stream_write_cstring (stream, type); + if (err) + goto out; + + for (i = 0; mpis[i] && (! err); i++) + err = stream_write_mpi (stream, mpis[i]); + if (err) + goto out; + + blob_size_new = es_ftell (stream); + if (blob_size_new == -1) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = es_fseek (stream, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (err) + goto out; + + blob_new = xtrymalloc (blob_size_new); + if (! blob_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = stream_read_data (stream, blob_new, blob_size_new); + if (err) + goto out; + + *blob = blob_new; + *blob_size = blob_size_new; + + out: + + if (stream) + es_fclose (stream); + if (err) + xfree (blob_new); + + return err; +} + + +/* Write the public key KEY_PUBLIC to STREAM in SSH key format. If + OVERRIDE_COMMENT is not NULL, it will be used instead of the + comment stored in the key. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_send_key_public (estream_t stream, gcry_sexp_t key_public, + const char *override_comment) +{ + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec; + gcry_mpi_t *mpi_list; + char *key_type; + char *comment; + unsigned char *blob; + size_t blob_n; + gpg_error_t err; + + key_type = NULL; + mpi_list = NULL; + comment = NULL; + blob = NULL; + + err = sexp_extract_identifier (key_public, &key_type); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_key_type_lookup (NULL, key_type, &spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = sexp_key_extract (key_public, spec, NULL, &mpi_list, &comment); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_convert_key_to_blob (&blob, &blob_n, + spec.ssh_identifier, mpi_list); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_string (stream, blob, blob_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_cstring (stream, + override_comment? override_comment : comment); + + out: + + mpint_list_free (mpi_list); + xfree (key_type); + xfree (comment); + xfree (blob); + + return err; +} + +/* Read a public key out of BLOB/BLOB_SIZE according to the key + specification given as KEY_SPEC, storing the new key in KEY_PUBLIC. + Returns zero on success or an error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (unsigned char *blob, size_t blob_size, + gcry_sexp_t *key_public, + ssh_key_type_spec_t *key_spec) +{ + estream_t blob_stream; + gpg_error_t err; + + err = 0; + + blob_stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, NULL, NULL, "r+"); + if (! blob_stream) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = stream_write_data (blob_stream, blob, blob_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = es_fseek (blob_stream, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_receive_key (blob_stream, key_public, 0, 0, key_spec); + + out: + + if (blob_stream) + es_fclose (blob_stream); + + return err; +} + + + +/* This function calculates the key grip for the key contained in the + S-Expression KEY and writes it to BUFFER, which must be large + enough to hold it. Returns usual error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_key_grip (gcry_sexp_t key, unsigned char *buffer) +{ + if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (key, buffer)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + + return 0; +} + + +/* Converts the secret key KEY_SECRET into a public key, storing it in + KEY_PUBLIC. SPEC is the according key specification. Returns zero + on success or an error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +key_secret_to_public (gcry_sexp_t *key_public, + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec, gcry_sexp_t key_secret) +{ + char *comment; + gcry_mpi_t *mpis; + gpg_error_t err; + int is_secret; + + comment = NULL; + mpis = NULL; + + err = sexp_key_extract (key_secret, spec, &is_secret, &mpis, &comment); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = sexp_key_construct (key_public, spec, 0, mpis, comment); + + out: + + mpint_list_free (mpis); + xfree (comment); + + return err; +} + + +/* Check whether a smartcard is available and whether it has a usable + key. Store a copy of that key at R_PK and return 0. If no key is + available store NULL at R_PK and return an error code. If CARDSN + is not NULL, a string with the serial number of the card will be + a malloced and stored there. */ +static gpg_error_t +card_key_available (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t *r_pk, char **cardsn) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + char *authkeyid; + char *serialno = NULL; + unsigned char *pkbuf; + size_t pkbuflen; + gcry_sexp_t s_pk; + unsigned char grip[20]; + + *r_pk = NULL; + if (cardsn) + *cardsn = NULL; + + /* First see whether a card is available and whether the application + is supported. */ + err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$AUTHKEYID", &authkeyid); + if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CARD_REMOVED ) + { + /* Ask for the serial number to reset the card. */ + err = agent_card_serialno (ctrl, &serialno); + if (err) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("error getting serial number of card: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + return err; + } + log_info (_("detected card with S/N: %s\n"), serialno); + err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$AUTHKEYID", &authkeyid); + } + if (err) + { + log_error (_("error getting default authentication keyID of card: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (serialno); + return err; + } + + /* Get the S/N if we don't have it yet. Use the fast getattr method. */ + if (!serialno && (err = agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "SERIALNO", &serialno)) ) + { + log_error (_("error getting serial number of card: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + + /* Read the public key. */ + err = agent_card_readkey (ctrl, authkeyid, &pkbuf); + if (err) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("no suitable card key found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + + pkbuflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pkbuf, 0, NULL, NULL); + err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_pk, NULL, (char*)pkbuf, pkbuflen); + if (err) + { + log_error ("failed to build S-Exp from received card key: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (pkbuf); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + + err = ssh_key_grip (s_pk, grip); + if (err) + { + log_debug ("error computing keygrip from received card key: %s\n", + gcry_strerror (err)); + xfree (pkbuf); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pk); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + + if ( agent_key_available (grip) ) + { + /* (Shadow)-key is not available in our key storage. */ + unsigned char *shadow_info; + unsigned char *tmp; + + shadow_info = make_shadow_info (serialno, authkeyid); + if (!shadow_info) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (pkbuf); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pk); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + err = agent_shadow_key (pkbuf, shadow_info, &tmp); + xfree (shadow_info); + if (err) + { + log_error (_("shadowing the key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (pkbuf); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pk); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + xfree (pkbuf); + pkbuf = tmp; + pkbuflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pkbuf, 0, NULL, NULL); + assert (pkbuflen); + + err = agent_write_private_key (grip, pkbuf, pkbuflen, 0); + if (err) + { + log_error (_("error writing key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (pkbuf); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pk); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + } + + if (cardsn) + { + char *dispsn; + + /* If the card handler is able to return a short serialnumber, + use that one, else use the complete serialno. */ + if (!agent_card_getattr (ctrl, "$DISPSERIALNO", &dispsn)) + { + *cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", dispsn); + xfree (dispsn); + } + else + *cardsn = xtryasprintf ("cardno:%s", serialno); + if (!*cardsn) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (pkbuf); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pk); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + return err; + } + } + + xfree (pkbuf); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (authkeyid); + *r_pk = s_pk; + return 0; +} + + + + +/* + + Request handler. Each handler is provided with a CTRL context, a + REQUEST object and a RESPONSE object. The actual request is to be + read from REQUEST, the response needs to be written to RESPONSE. + +*/ + + +/* Handler for the "request_identities" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_request_identities (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + char *key_type; + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec; + struct dirent *dir_entry; + char *key_directory; + size_t key_directory_n; + char *key_path; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buffer_n; + u32 key_counter; + estream_t key_blobs; + gcry_sexp_t key_secret; + gcry_sexp_t key_public; + DIR *dir; + gpg_error_t err; + int ret; + FILE *ctrl_fp = NULL; + char *cardsn; + gpg_error_t ret_err; + + (void)request; + + /* Prepare buffer stream. */ + + key_directory = NULL; + key_secret = NULL; + key_public = NULL; + key_type = NULL; + key_path = NULL; + key_counter = 0; + buffer = NULL; + dir = NULL; + err = 0; + + key_blobs = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, NULL, NULL, "r+"); + if (! key_blobs) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + /* Open key directory. */ + key_directory = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL); + if (! key_directory) + { + err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno); + goto out; + } + key_directory_n = strlen (key_directory); + + key_path = xtrymalloc (key_directory_n + 46); + if (! key_path) + { + err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno); + goto out; + } + + sprintf (key_path, "%s/", key_directory); + sprintf (key_path + key_directory_n + 41, ".key"); + + dir = opendir (key_directory); + if (! dir) + { + err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno); + goto out; + } + + + + /* First check whether a key is currently available in the card + reader - this should be allowed even without being listed in + sshcontrol. */ + + if (!card_key_available (ctrl, &key_public, &cardsn)) + { + err = ssh_send_key_public (key_blobs, key_public, cardsn); + gcry_sexp_release (key_public); + key_public = NULL; + xfree (cardsn); + if (err) + goto out; + + key_counter++; + } + + + /* Then look at all the registered an allowed keys. */ + + + /* Fixme: We should better iterate over the control file and check + whether the key file is there. This is better in resepct to + performance if tehre are a lot of key sin our key storage. */ + /* FIXME: make sure that buffer gets deallocated properly. */ + err = open_control_file (&ctrl_fp, 0); + if (err) + goto out; + + while ( (dir_entry = readdir (dir)) ) + { + if ((strlen (dir_entry->d_name) == 44) + && (! strncmp (dir_entry->d_name + 40, ".key", 4))) + { + char hexgrip[41]; + int disabled; + + /* We do only want to return keys listed in our control + file. */ + strncpy (hexgrip, dir_entry->d_name, 40); + hexgrip[40] = 0; + if ( strlen (hexgrip) != 40 ) + continue; + if (search_control_file (ctrl_fp, hexgrip, &disabled, NULL, NULL) + || disabled) + continue; + + strncpy (key_path + key_directory_n + 1, dir_entry->d_name, 40); + + /* Read file content. */ + err = file_to_buffer (key_path, &buffer, &buffer_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&key_secret, NULL, (char*)buffer, buffer_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + xfree (buffer); + buffer = NULL; + + err = sexp_extract_identifier (key_secret, &key_type); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_key_type_lookup (NULL, key_type, &spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + xfree (key_type); + key_type = NULL; + + err = key_secret_to_public (&key_public, spec, key_secret); + if (err) + goto out; + + gcry_sexp_release (key_secret); + key_secret = NULL; + + err = ssh_send_key_public (key_blobs, key_public, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + + gcry_sexp_release (key_public); + key_public = NULL; + + key_counter++; + } + } + + ret = es_fseek (key_blobs, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + out: + + /* Send response. */ + + gcry_sexp_release (key_secret); + gcry_sexp_release (key_public); + + if (! err) + { + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + ret_err = stream_write_uint32 (response, key_counter); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + ret_err = stream_copy (response, key_blobs); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + } + else + { + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + goto leave; + }; + + leave: + + if (key_blobs) + es_fclose (key_blobs); + if (dir) + closedir (dir); + + if (ctrl_fp) + fclose (ctrl_fp); + + xfree (key_directory); + xfree (key_path); + xfree (buffer); + xfree (key_type); + + return ret_err; +} + + +/* This function hashes the data contained in DATA of size DATA_N + according to the message digest algorithm specified by MD_ALGORITHM + and writes the message digest to HASH, which needs to large enough + for the digest. */ +static gpg_error_t +data_hash (unsigned char *data, size_t data_n, + int md_algorithm, unsigned char *hash) +{ + gcry_md_hash_buffer (md_algorithm, hash, data, data_n); + + return 0; +} + +/* This function signs the data contained in CTRL, stores the created + signature in newly allocated memory in SIG and it's size in SIG_N; + SIG_ENCODER is the signature encoder to use. */ +static gpg_error_t +data_sign (ctrl_t ctrl, ssh_signature_encoder_t sig_encoder, + unsigned char **sig, size_t *sig_n) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_sexp_t signature_sexp = NULL; + estream_t stream = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t valuelist = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t sublist = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t sig_value = NULL; + unsigned char *sig_blob = NULL; + size_t sig_blob_n = 0; + char *identifier = NULL; + const char *identifier_raw; + size_t identifier_n; + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec; + int ret; + unsigned int i; + const char *elems; + size_t elems_n; + gcry_mpi_t *mpis = NULL; + char hexgrip[40+1]; + + *sig = NULL; + *sig_n = 0; + + /* Quick check to see whether we have a valid keygrip and convert it + to hex. */ + if (!ctrl->have_keygrip) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); + goto out; + } + bin2hex (ctrl->keygrip, 20, hexgrip); + + /* Ask for confirmation if needed. */ + if (confirm_flag_from_sshcontrol (hexgrip)) + { + gcry_sexp_t key; + char *fpr, *prompt; + char *comment = NULL; + + err = agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip, &key); + if (err) + goto out; + err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &fpr); + if (!err) + { + gcry_sexp_t tmpsxp = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0); + if (tmpsxp) + comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (tmpsxp, 1); + gcry_sexp_release (tmpsxp); + } + gcry_sexp_release (key); + if (err) + goto out; + prompt = xtryasprintf (_("An ssh process requested the use of key%%0A" + " %s%%0A" + " (%s)%%0A" + "Do you want to allow this?"), + fpr, comment? comment:""); + xfree (fpr); + gcry_free (comment); + err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, prompt, _("Allow"), _("Deny"), 0); + xfree (prompt); + if (err) + goto out; + } + + /* Create signature. */ + ctrl->use_auth_call = 1; + err = agent_pksign_do (ctrl, + _("Please enter the passphrase " + "for the ssh key%%0A %F%%0A (%c)"), + &signature_sexp, + CACHE_MODE_SSH, ttl_from_sshcontrol); + ctrl->use_auth_call = 0; + if (err) + goto out; + + valuelist = gcry_sexp_nth (signature_sexp, 1); + if (! valuelist) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + stream = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, NULL, NULL, "r+"); + if (! stream) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + identifier_raw = gcry_sexp_nth_data (valuelist, 0, &identifier_n); + if (! identifier_raw) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + identifier = make_cstring (identifier_raw, identifier_n); + if (! identifier) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = ssh_key_type_lookup (NULL, identifier, &spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = stream_write_cstring (stream, spec.ssh_identifier); + if (err) + goto out; + + elems = spec.elems_signature; + elems_n = strlen (elems); + + mpis = xtrycalloc (elems_n + 1, sizeof *mpis); + if (!mpis) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < elems_n; i++) + { + sublist = gcry_sexp_find_token (valuelist, spec.elems_signature + i, 1); + if (! sublist) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + break; + } + + sig_value = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (sublist, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); + if (! sig_value) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); /* FIXME? */ + break; + } + gcry_sexp_release (sublist); + sublist = NULL; + + mpis[i] = sig_value; + } + if (err) + goto out; + + err = (*sig_encoder) (stream, mpis); + if (err) + goto out; + + sig_blob_n = es_ftell (stream); + if (sig_blob_n == -1) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + sig_blob = xtrymalloc (sig_blob_n); + if (! sig_blob) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + ret = es_fseek (stream, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + err = stream_read_data (stream, sig_blob, sig_blob_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + *sig = sig_blob; + *sig_n = sig_blob_n; + + out: + + if (err) + xfree (sig_blob); + + if (stream) + es_fclose (stream); + gcry_sexp_release (valuelist); + gcry_sexp_release (signature_sexp); + gcry_sexp_release (sublist); + mpint_list_free (mpis); + xfree (identifier); + + return err; +} + +/* Handler for the "sign_request" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_sign_request (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + gcry_sexp_t key; + ssh_key_type_spec_t spec; + unsigned char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; + unsigned int hash_n; + unsigned char key_grip[20]; + unsigned char *key_blob; + u32 key_blob_size; + unsigned char *data; + unsigned char *sig; + size_t sig_n; + u32 data_size; + u32 flags; + gpg_error_t err; + gpg_error_t ret_err; + + key_blob = NULL; + data = NULL; + sig = NULL; + key = NULL; + + /* Receive key. */ + + err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, &spec); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Receive data to sign. */ + err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &data, &data_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* FIXME? */ + err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &flags); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Hash data. */ + hash_n = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (GCRY_MD_SHA1); + if (! hash_n) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + goto out; + } + err = data_hash (data, data_size, GCRY_MD_SHA1, hash); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Calculate key grip. */ + err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Sign data. */ + + ctrl->digest.algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1; + memcpy (ctrl->digest.value, hash, hash_n); + ctrl->digest.valuelen = hash_n; + ctrl->digest.raw_value = ! (spec.flags & SPEC_FLAG_USE_PKCS1V2); + ctrl->have_keygrip = 1; + memcpy (ctrl->keygrip, key_grip, 20); + + err = data_sign (ctrl, spec.signature_encoder, &sig, &sig_n); + + out: + + /* Done. */ + + if (! err) + { + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SIGN_RESPONSE); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + ret_err = stream_write_string (response, sig, sig_n); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + } + else + { + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + if (ret_err) + goto leave; + } + + leave: + + gcry_sexp_release (key); + xfree (key_blob); + xfree (data); + xfree (sig); + + return ret_err; +} + +/* This function extracts the comment contained in the key + S-Expression KEY and stores a copy in COMMENT. Returns usual error + code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_key_extract_comment (gcry_sexp_t key, char **comment) +{ + gcry_sexp_t comment_list; + char *comment_new; + const char *data; + size_t data_n; + gpg_error_t err; + + comment_list = gcry_sexp_find_token (key, "comment", 0); + if (! comment_list) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + data = gcry_sexp_nth_data (comment_list, 1, &data_n); + if (! data) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto out; + } + + comment_new = make_cstring (data, data_n); + if (! comment_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + *comment = comment_new; + err = 0; + + out: + + gcry_sexp_release (comment_list); + + return err; +} + +/* This function converts the key contained in the S-Expression KEY + into a buffer, which is protected by the passphrase PASSPHRASE. + Returns usual error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (gcry_sexp_t key, const char *passphrase, + unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buffer_n) +{ + unsigned char *buffer_new; + unsigned int buffer_new_n; + gpg_error_t err; + + err = 0; + buffer_new_n = gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + buffer_new = xtrymalloc_secure (buffer_new_n); + if (! buffer_new) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + gcry_sexp_sprint (key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buffer_new, buffer_new_n); + /* FIXME: guarantee? */ + + err = agent_protect (buffer_new, passphrase, buffer, buffer_n); + + out: + + xfree (buffer_new); + + return err; +} + + + +/* Callback function to compare the first entered PIN with the one + currently being entered. */ +static int +reenter_compare_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi) +{ + const char *pin1 = pi->check_cb_arg; + + if (!strcmp (pin1, pi->pin)) + return 0; /* okay */ + return -1; +} + +/* Store the ssh KEY into our local key storage and protect it after + asking for a passphrase. Cache that passphrase. TTL is the + maximum caching time for that key. If the key already exists in + our key storage, don't do anything. When entering a new key also + add an entry to the sshcontrol file. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_identity_register (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t key, int ttl, int confirm) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char key_grip_raw[20]; + char key_grip[41]; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t buffer_n; + char *description = NULL; + const char *description2 = _("Please re-enter this passphrase"); + char *comment = NULL; + char *key_fpr = NULL; + const char *initial_errtext = NULL; + unsigned int i; + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi = NULL, *pi2; + + err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip_raw); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Check whether the key is already in our key storage. Don't do + anything then. */ + if ( !agent_key_available (key_grip_raw) ) + goto out; /* Yes, key is available. */ + + err = ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &key_fpr); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_key_extract_comment (key, &comment); + if (err) + goto out; + + if ( asprintf (&description, + _("Please enter a passphrase to protect" + " the received secret key%%0A" + " %s%%0A" + " %s%%0A" + "within gpg-agent's key storage"), + key_fpr, comment ? comment : "") < 0) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (2, sizeof (*pi) + 100 + 1); + if (!pi) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + pi2 = pi + (sizeof *pi + 100 + 1); + pi->max_length = 100; + pi->max_tries = 1; + pi2->max_length = 100; + pi2->max_tries = 1; + pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb; + pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin; + + next_try: + err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description, NULL, initial_errtext, pi); + initial_errtext = NULL; + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Unless the passphrase is empty, ask to confirm it. */ + if (pi->pin && *pi->pin) + { + err = agent_askpin (ctrl, description2, NULL, NULL, pi2); + if (err == -1) + { /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not + hit cancel. */ + initial_errtext = _("does not match - try again"); + goto next_try; + } + } + + err = ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (key, pi->pin, &buffer, &buffer_n); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Store this key to our key storage. */ + err = agent_write_private_key (key_grip_raw, buffer, buffer_n, 0); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* Cache this passphrase. */ + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) + sprintf (key_grip + 2 * i, "%02X", key_grip_raw[i]); + + err = agent_put_cache (key_grip, CACHE_MODE_SSH, pi->pin, ttl); + if (err) + goto out; + + /* And add an entry to the sshcontrol file. */ + err = add_control_entry (ctrl, key_grip, key_fpr, ttl, confirm); + + + out: + if (pi && pi->max_length) + wipememory (pi->pin, pi->max_length); + xfree (pi); + xfree (buffer); + xfree (comment); + xfree (key_fpr); + xfree (description); + + return err; +} + + +/* This function removes the key contained in the S-Expression KEY + from the local key storage, in case it exists there. Returns usual + error code. FIXME: this function is a stub. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_identity_drop (gcry_sexp_t key) +{ + unsigned char key_grip[21] = { 0 }; + gpg_error_t err; + + err = ssh_key_grip (key, key_grip); + if (err) + goto out; + + key_grip[sizeof (key_grip) - 1] = 0; + + /* FIXME: What to do here - forgetting the passphrase or deleting + the key from key cache? */ + + out: + + return err; +} + +/* Handler for the "add_identity" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_add_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + gpg_error_t ret_err; + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_sexp_t key; + unsigned char b; + int confirm; + int ttl; + + confirm = 0; + key = NULL; + ttl = 0; + + /* FIXME? */ + err = ssh_receive_key (request, &key, 1, 1, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + + while (1) + { + err = stream_read_byte (request, &b); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF) + { + err = 0; + break; + } + + switch (b) + { + case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: + { + u32 n = 0; + + err = stream_read_uint32 (request, &n); + if (! err) + ttl = n; + break; + } + + case SSH_OPT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: + { + confirm = 1; + break; + } + + default: + /* FIXME: log/bad? */ + break; + } + } + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_identity_register (ctrl, key, ttl, confirm); + + out: + + gcry_sexp_release (key); + + if (! err) + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS); + else + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + + return ret_err; +} + +/* Handler for the "remove_identity" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_remove_identity (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + unsigned char *key_blob; + u32 key_blob_size; + gcry_sexp_t key; + gpg_error_t ret_err; + gpg_error_t err; + + (void)ctrl; + + /* Receive key. */ + + key_blob = NULL; + key = NULL; + + err = stream_read_string (request, 0, &key_blob, &key_blob_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_read_key_public_from_blob (key_blob, key_blob_size, &key, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = ssh_identity_drop (key); + + out: + + xfree (key_blob); + gcry_sexp_release (key); + + if (! err) + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS); + else + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + + return ret_err; +} + +/* FIXME: stub function. Actually useful? */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_identities_remove_all (void) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + err = 0; + + /* FIXME: shall we remove _all_ cache entries or only those + registered through the ssh emulation? */ + + return err; +} + +/* Handler for the "remove_all_identities" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_remove_all_identities (ctrl_t ctrl, + estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + gpg_error_t ret_err; + gpg_error_t err; + + (void)ctrl; + (void)request; + + err = ssh_identities_remove_all (); + + if (! err) + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS); + else + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + + return ret_err; +} + +/* Lock agent? FIXME: stub function. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_lock (void) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + /* FIXME */ + log_error ("ssh-agent's lock command is not implemented\n"); + err = 0; + + return err; +} + +/* Unock agent? FIXME: stub function. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_unlock (void) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + log_error ("ssh-agent's unlock command is not implemented\n"); + err = 0; + + return err; +} + +/* Handler for the "lock" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_lock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + gpg_error_t ret_err; + gpg_error_t err; + + (void)ctrl; + (void)request; + + err = ssh_lock (); + + if (! err) + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS); + else + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + + return ret_err; +} + +/* Handler for the "unlock" command. */ +static gpg_error_t +ssh_handler_unlock (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t request, estream_t response) +{ + gpg_error_t ret_err; + gpg_error_t err; + + (void)ctrl; + (void)request; + + err = ssh_unlock (); + + if (! err) + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_SUCCESS); + else + ret_err = stream_write_byte (response, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + + return ret_err; +} + + + +/* Return the request specification for the request identified by TYPE + or NULL in case the requested request specification could not be + found. */ +static ssh_request_spec_t * +request_spec_lookup (int type) +{ + ssh_request_spec_t *spec; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < DIM (request_specs); i++) + if (request_specs[i].type == type) + break; + if (i == DIM (request_specs)) + { + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("ssh request %u is not supported\n", type); + spec = NULL; + } + else + spec = request_specs + i; + + return spec; +} + +/* Process a single request. The request is read from and the + response is written to STREAM_SOCK. Uses CTRL as context. Returns + zero in case of success, non zero in case of failure. */ +static int +ssh_request_process (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream_sock) +{ + ssh_request_spec_t *spec; + estream_t response; + estream_t request; + unsigned char request_type; + gpg_error_t err; + int send_err; + int ret; + unsigned char *request_data; + u32 request_data_size; + u32 response_size; + + request_data = NULL; + response = NULL; + request = NULL; + send_err = 0; + + /* Create memory streams for request/response data. The entire + request will be stored in secure memory, since it might contain + secret key material. The response does not have to be stored in + secure memory, since we never give out secret keys. + + Note: we only have little secure memory, but there is NO + possibility of DoS here; only trusted clients are allowed to + connect to the agent. What could happen is that the agent + returns out-of-secure-memory errors on requests in case the + agent's owner floods his own agent with many large messages. + -moritz */ + + /* Retrieve request. */ + err = stream_read_string (stream_sock, 1, &request_data, &request_data_size); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info ("received ssh request of length %u\n", + (unsigned int)request_data_size); + + if (! request_data_size) + { + send_err = 1; + goto out; + /* Broken request; FIXME. */ + } + + request_type = request_data[0]; + spec = request_spec_lookup (request_type); + if (! spec) + { + send_err = 1; + goto out; + /* Unknown request; FIXME. */ + } + + if (spec->secret_input) + request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, realloc_secure, gcry_free, "r+"); + else + request = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, gcry_realloc, gcry_free, "r+"); + if (! request) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + ret = es_setvbuf (request, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + err = stream_write_data (request, request_data + 1, request_data_size - 1); + if (err) + goto out; + es_rewind (request); + + response = es_mopen (NULL, 0, 0, 1, NULL, NULL, "r+"); + if (! response) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto out; + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) started\n", + spec->identifier, spec->type); + + err = (*spec->handler) (ctrl, request, response); + + if (opt.verbose) + { + if (err) + log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) failed: %s\n", + spec->identifier, spec->type, gpg_strerror (err)); + else + log_info ("ssh request handler for %s (%u) ready\n", + spec->identifier, spec->type); + } + + if (err) + { + send_err = 1; + goto out; + } + + response_size = es_ftell (response); + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info ("sending ssh response of length %u\n", + (unsigned int)response_size); + + err = es_fseek (response, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (err) + { + send_err = 1; + goto out; + } + + err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, response_size); + if (err) + { + send_err = 1; + goto out; + } + + err = stream_copy (stream_sock, response); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = es_fflush (stream_sock); + if (err) + goto out; + + out: + + if (err && es_feof (stream_sock)) + log_error ("error occured while processing request: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + + if (send_err) + { + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info ("sending ssh error response\n"); + err = stream_write_uint32 (stream_sock, 1); + if (err) + goto leave; + err = stream_write_byte (stream_sock, SSH_RESPONSE_FAILURE); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + leave: + + if (request) + es_fclose (request); + if (response) + es_fclose (response); + xfree (request_data); /* FIXME? */ + + return !!err; +} + +/* Start serving client on SOCK_CLIENT. */ +void +start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t sock_client) +{ + estream_t stream_sock = NULL; + gpg_error_t err = 0; + int ret; + + /* Because the ssh protocol does not send us information about the + the current TTY setting, we resort here to use those from startup + or those explictly set. */ + { + static const char *names[] = + {"GPG_TTY", "DISPLAY", "TERM", "XAUTHORITY", "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL}; + int idx; + const char *value; + + for (idx=0; !err && names[idx]; idx++) + if (!session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, names[idx]) + && (value = session_env_getenv (opt.startup_env, names[idx]))) + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, names[idx], value); + + if (!err && !ctrl->lc_ctype && opt.startup_lc_ctype) + if (!(ctrl->lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (opt.startup_lc_ctype))) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + if (!err && !ctrl->lc_messages && opt.startup_lc_messages) + if (!(ctrl->lc_messages = xtrystrdup (opt.startup_lc_messages))) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + if (err) + { + log_error ("error setting default session environment: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto out; + } + } + + + /* Create stream from socket. */ + stream_sock = es_fdopen (FD2INT(sock_client), "r+"); + if (!stream_sock) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("failed to create stream from socket: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto out; + } + /* We have to disable the estream buffering, because the estream + core doesn't know about secure memory. */ + ret = es_setvbuf (stream_sock, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + if (ret) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("failed to disable buffering " + "on socket stream: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + goto out; + } + + /* Main processing loop. */ + while ( !ssh_request_process (ctrl, stream_sock) ) + { + /* Check wether we have reached EOF before trying to read + another request. */ + int c; + + c = es_fgetc (stream_sock); + if (c == EOF) + break; + es_ungetc (c, stream_sock); + } + + /* Reset the SCD in case it has been used. */ + agent_reset_scd (ctrl); + + + out: + if (stream_sock) + es_fclose (stream_sock); +} diff --git a/agent/command.c b/agent/command.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97cf507 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/command.c @@ -0,0 +1,2073 @@ +/* command.c - gpg-agent command handler + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, + * 2006, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +/* FIXME: we should not use the default assuan buffering but setup + some buffering in secure mempory to protect session keys etc. */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <dirent.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> +#include "i18n.h" +#include "../common/ssh-utils.h" + +/* maximum allowed size of the inquired ciphertext */ +#define MAXLEN_CIPHERTEXT 4096 +/* maximum allowed size of the key parameters */ +#define MAXLEN_KEYPARAM 1024 + +#define set_error(e,t) assuan_set_error (ctx, gpg_error (e), (t)) + + +#if MAX_DIGEST_LEN < 20 +#error MAX_DIGEST_LEN shorter than keygrip +#endif + +/* Data used to associate an Assuan context with local server data */ +struct server_local_s +{ + assuan_context_t assuan_ctx; + int message_fd; + int use_cache_for_signing; + char *keydesc; /* Allocated description for the next key + operation. */ + int pause_io_logging; /* Used to suppress I/O logging during a command */ + int stopme; /* If set to true the agent will be terminated after + the end of this session. */ + int allow_pinentry_notify; /* Set if pinentry notifications should + be done. */ +}; + + +/* An entry for the getval/putval commands. */ +struct putval_item_s +{ + struct putval_item_s *next; + size_t off; /* Offset to the value into DATA. */ + size_t len; /* Length of the value. */ + char d[1]; /* Key | Nul | value. */ +}; + + +/* A list of key value pairs fpr the getval/putval commands. */ +static struct putval_item_s *putval_list; + + + +/* To help polling clients, we keep track of the number of certain + events. This structure keeps those counters. The counters are + integers and there should be no problem if they are overflowing as + callers need to check only whether a counter changed. The actual + values are not meaningful. */ +struct +{ + /* Incremented if any of the other counters below changed. */ + unsigned int any; + + /* Incremented if a key is added or removed from the internal privat + key database. */ + unsigned int key; + + /* Incremented if a change of the card readers stati has been + detected. */ + unsigned int card; + +} eventcounter; + + + +/* Local prototypes. */ +static int command_has_option (const char *cmd, const char *cmdopt); + + + + +/* Release the memory buffer MB but first wipe out the used memory. */ +static void +clear_outbuf (membuf_t *mb) +{ + void *p; + size_t n; + + p = get_membuf (mb, &n); + if (p) + { + memset (p, 0, n); + xfree (p); + } +} + + +/* Write the content of memory buffer MB as assuan data to CTX and + wipe the buffer out afterwards. */ +static gpg_error_t +write_and_clear_outbuf (assuan_context_t ctx, membuf_t *mb) +{ + gpg_error_t ae; + void *p; + size_t n; + + p = get_membuf (mb, &n); + if (!p) + return out_of_core (); + ae = assuan_send_data (ctx, p, n); + memset (p, 0, n); + xfree (p); + return ae; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +reset_notify (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + + (void) line; + + memset (ctrl->keygrip, 0, 20); + ctrl->have_keygrip = 0; + ctrl->digest.valuelen = 0; + + xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc); + ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL; + return 0; +} + + +/* Check whether the option NAME appears in LINE */ +static int +has_option (const char *line, const char *name) +{ + const char *s; + int n = strlen (name); + + s = strstr (line, name); + return (s && (s == line || spacep (s-1)) && (!s[n] || spacep (s+n))); +} + +/* Same as has_option but does only test for the name of the option + and ignores an argument, i.e. with NAME being "--hash" it would + return true for "--hash" as well as for "--hash=foo". */ +static int +has_option_name (const char *line, const char *name) +{ + const char *s; + int n = strlen (name); + + s = strstr (line, name); + return (s && (s == line || spacep (s-1)) + && (!s[n] || spacep (s+n) || s[n] == '=')); +} + +/* Return a pointer to the argument of the option with NAME. If such + an option is not given, it returns NULL. */ +static char * +option_value (const char *line, const char *name) +{ + char *s; + int n = strlen (name); + + s = strstr (line, name); + if (s && (s == line || spacep (s-1)) + && s[n] && (spacep (s+n) || s[n] == '=')) + { + s += n + 1; + s += strspn (s, " "); + if (*s && !spacep(s)) + return s; + } + return NULL; +} + + +/* Skip over options. It is assumed that leading spaces have been + removed (this is the case for lines passed to a handler from + assuan). Blanks after the options are also removed. */ +static char * +skip_options (char *line) +{ + while ( *line == '-' && line[1] == '-' ) + { + while (*line && !spacep (line)) + line++; + while (spacep (line)) + line++; + } + return line; +} + + +/* Replace all '+' by a blank. */ +static void +plus_to_blank (char *s) +{ + for (; *s; s++) + { + if (*s == '+') + *s = ' '; + } +} + + +/* Parse a hex string. Return an Assuan error code or 0 on success and the + length of the parsed string in LEN. */ +static int +parse_hexstring (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *string, size_t *len) +{ + const char *p; + size_t n; + + /* parse the hash value */ + for (p=string, n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++) + ; + if (*p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && *p) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hexstring"); + if ((n&1)) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "odd number of digits"); + *len = n; + return 0; +} + +/* Parse the keygrip in STRING into the provided buffer BUF. BUF must + provide space for 20 bytes. BUF is not changed if the function + returns an error. */ +static int +parse_keygrip (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *string, unsigned char *buf) +{ + int rc; + size_t n = 0; + + rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, string, &n); + if (rc) + return rc; + n /= 2; + if (n != 20) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of keygrip"); + + if (hex2bin (string, buf, 20) < 0) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_BUG, "hex2bin"); + + return 0; +} + + +/* Write an assuan status line. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_write_status (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, ...) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + va_list arg_ptr; + const char *text; + assuan_context_t ctx = ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx; + char buf[950], *p; + size_t n; + + va_start (arg_ptr, keyword); + + p = buf; + n = 0; + while ( (text = va_arg (arg_ptr, const char *)) ) + { + if (n) + { + *p++ = ' '; + n++; + } + for ( ; *text && n < DIM (buf)-3; n++, text++) + { + if (*text == '\n') + { + *p++ = '\\'; + *p++ = 'n'; + } + else if (*text == '\r') + { + *p++ = '\\'; + *p++ = 'r'; + } + else + *p++ = *text; + } + } + *p = 0; + err = assuan_write_status (ctx, keyword, buf); + + va_end (arg_ptr); + return err; +} + + +/* Helper to notify the client about a launched Pinentry. Because + that might disturb some older clients, this is only done if enabled + via an option. Returns an gpg error code. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid) +{ + char line[100]; + + if (!ctrl || !ctrl->server_local + || !ctrl->server_local->allow_pinentry_notify) + return 0; + snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "PINENTRY_LAUNCHED %lu", pid); + return assuan_inquire (ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx, line, NULL, NULL, 0); +} + + + +static const char hlp_geteventcounter[] = + "GETEVENTCOUNTER\n" + "\n" + "Return a a status line named EVENTCOUNTER with the current values\n" + "of all event counters. The values are decimal numbers in the range\n" + "0 to UINT_MAX and wrapping around to 0. The actual values should\n" + "not be relied upon, they shall only be used to detect a change.\n" + "\n" + "The currently defined counters are:\n" + "\n" + "ANY - Incremented with any change of any of the other counters.\n" + "KEY - Incremented for added or removed private keys.\n" + "CARD - Incremented for changes of the card readers stati."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_geteventcounter (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + char any_counter[25]; + char key_counter[25]; + char card_counter[25]; + + (void)line; + + snprintf (any_counter, sizeof any_counter, "%u", eventcounter.any); + snprintf (key_counter, sizeof key_counter, "%u", eventcounter.key); + snprintf (card_counter, sizeof card_counter, "%u", eventcounter.card); + + return agent_write_status (ctrl, "EVENTCOUNTER", + any_counter, + key_counter, + card_counter, + NULL); +} + + +/* This function should be called once for all key removals or + additions. This function is assured not to do any context + switches. */ +void +bump_key_eventcounter (void) +{ + eventcounter.key++; + eventcounter.any++; +} + +/* This function should be called for all card reader status + changes. This function is assured not to do any context + switches. */ +void +bump_card_eventcounter (void) +{ + eventcounter.card++; + eventcounter.any++; +} + + + + +static const char hlp_istrusted[] = + "ISTRUSTED <hexstring_with_fingerprint>\n" + "\n" + "Return OK when we have an entry with this fingerprint in our\n" + "trustlist"; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_istrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc, n, i; + char *p; + char fpr[41]; + + /* Parse the fingerprint value. */ + for (p=line,n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++) + ; + if (*p || !(n == 40 || n == 32)) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid fingerprint"); + i = 0; + if (n==32) + { + strcpy (fpr, "00000000"); + i += 8; + } + for (p=line; i < 40; p++, i++) + fpr[i] = *p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p; + fpr[i] = 0; + rc = agent_istrusted (ctrl, fpr, NULL); + if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED) + return rc; + else if (rc == -1 || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED); + else + { + log_error ("command is_trusted failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } +} + + +static const char hlp_listtrusted[] = + "LISTTRUSTED\n" + "\n" + "List all entries from the trustlist."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_listtrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + + (void)line; + + rc = agent_listtrusted (ctx); + if (rc) + log_error ("command listtrusted failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_martrusted[] = + "MARKTRUSTED <hexstring_with_fingerprint> <flag> <display_name>\n" + "\n" + "Store a new key in into the trustlist."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_marktrusted (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc, n, i; + char *p; + char fpr[41]; + int flag; + + /* parse the fingerprint value */ + for (p=line,n=0; hexdigitp (p); p++, n++) + ; + if (!spacep (p) || !(n == 40 || n == 32)) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid fingerprint"); + i = 0; + if (n==32) + { + strcpy (fpr, "00000000"); + i += 8; + } + for (p=line; i < 40; p++, i++) + fpr[i] = *p >= 'a'? (*p & 0xdf): *p; + fpr[i] = 0; + + while (spacep (p)) + p++; + flag = *p++; + if ( (flag != 'S' && flag != 'P') || !spacep (p) ) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid flag - must be P or S"); + while (spacep (p)) + p++; + + rc = agent_marktrusted (ctrl, p, fpr, flag); + if (rc) + log_error ("command marktrusted failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + + +static const char hlp_havekey[] = + "HAVEKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n" + "\n" + "Return success when the secret key is available."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_havekey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char buf[20]; + + rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, buf); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (agent_key_available (buf)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); + + return 0; +} + + +static const char hlp_sigkey[] = + "SIGKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n" + "SETKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n" + "\n" + "Set the key used for a sign or decrypt operation."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_sigkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + + rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, ctrl->keygrip); + if (rc) + return rc; + ctrl->have_keygrip = 1; + return 0; +} + + +static const char hlp_setkeydesc[] = + "SETKEYDESC plus_percent_escaped_string\n" + "\n" + "Set a description to be used for the next PKSIGN or PKDECRYPT\n" + "operation if this operation requires the entry of a passphrase. If\n" + "this command is not used a default text will be used. Note, that\n" + "this description implictly selects the label used for the entry\n" + "box; if the string contains the string PIN (which in general will\n" + "not be translated), \"PIN\" is used, otherwise the translation of\n" + "\"passphrase\" is used. The description string should not contain\n" + "blanks unless they are percent or '+' escaped.\n" + "\n" + "The description is only valid for the next PKSIGN or PKDECRYPT\n" + "operation."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_setkeydesc (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + char *desc, *p; + + for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + desc = p; + p = strchr (desc, ' '); + if (p) + *p = 0; /* We ignore any garbage; we might late use it for other args. */ + + if (!desc || !*desc) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given"); + + /* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and should + leave the other escaping in place because the escaped string is + send verbatim to the pinentry which does the unescaping (but not + the + replacing) */ + plus_to_blank (desc); + + xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc); + ctrl->server_local->keydesc = xtrystrdup (desc); + if (!ctrl->server_local->keydesc) + return out_of_core (); + return 0; +} + + +static const char hlp_sethash[] = + "SETHASH --hash=<name>|<algonumber> <hexstring>\n" + "\n" + "The client can use this command to tell the server about the data\n" + "(which usually is a hash) to be signed."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_sethash (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + size_t n; + char *p; + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + unsigned char *buf; + char *endp; + int algo; + + /* Parse the alternative hash options which may be used instead of + the algo number. */ + if (has_option_name (line, "--hash")) + { + if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha1")) + algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha224")) + algo = GCRY_MD_SHA224; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha256")) + algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha384")) + algo = GCRY_MD_SHA384; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=sha512")) + algo = GCRY_MD_SHA512; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=rmd160")) + algo = GCRY_MD_RMD160; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=md5")) + algo = GCRY_MD_MD5; + else if (has_option (line, "--hash=tls-md5sha1")) + algo = MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1; + else + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hash algorithm"); + } + else + algo = 0; + + line = skip_options (line); + + if (!algo) + { + /* No hash option has been given: require an algo number instead */ + algo = (int)strtoul (line, &endp, 10); + for (line = endp; *line == ' ' || *line == '\t'; line++) + ; + if (!algo || gcry_md_test_algo (algo)) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, NULL); + } + ctrl->digest.algo = algo; + + /* Parse the hash value. */ + n = 0; + rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, line, &n); + if (rc) + return rc; + n /= 2; + if (algo == MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1 && n == 36) + ; + else if (n != 16 && n != 20 && n != 24 + && n != 28 && n != 32 && n != 48 && n != 64) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unsupported length of hash"); + + if (n > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "hash value to long"); + + buf = ctrl->digest.value; + ctrl->digest.valuelen = n; + for (p=line, n=0; n < ctrl->digest.valuelen; p += 2, n++) + buf[n] = xtoi_2 (p); + for (; n < ctrl->digest.valuelen; n++) + buf[n] = 0; + return 0; +} + + +static const char hlp_pksign[] = + "PKSIGN [options]\n" + "\n" + "Perform the actual sign operation. Neither input nor output are\n" + "sensitive to eavesdropping."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_pksign (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + cache_mode_t cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_NORMAL; + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + membuf_t outbuf; + + (void)line; + + if (opt.ignore_cache_for_signing) + cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_IGNORE; + else if (!ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing) + cache_mode = CACHE_MODE_IGNORE; + + init_membuf (&outbuf, 512); + + rc = agent_pksign (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->keydesc, + &outbuf, cache_mode); + if (rc) + clear_outbuf (&outbuf); + else + rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf); + if (rc) + log_error ("command pksign failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc); + ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL; + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_pkdecrypt[] = + "PKDECRYPT <options>\n" + "\n" + "Perform the actual decrypt operation. Input is not\n" + "sensitive to eavesdropping."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_pkdecrypt (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + membuf_t outbuf; + + (void)line; + + /* First inquire the data to decrypt */ + rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "CIPHERTEXT", + &value, &valuelen, MAXLEN_CIPHERTEXT); + if (rc) + return rc; + + init_membuf (&outbuf, 512); + + rc = agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->keydesc, + value, valuelen, &outbuf); + xfree (value); + if (rc) + clear_outbuf (&outbuf); + else + rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf); + if (rc) + log_error ("command pkdecrypt failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc); + ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL; + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_genkey[] = + "GENKEY\n" + "\n" + "Generate a new key, store the secret part and return the public\n" + "part. Here is an example transaction:\n" + "\n" + " C: GENKEY\n" + " S: INQUIRE KEYPARAM\n" + " C: D (genkey (rsa (nbits 1024)))\n" + " C: END\n" + " S: D (public-key\n" + " S: D (rsa (n 326487324683264) (e 10001)))\n" + " S: OK key created\n" + "\n"; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_genkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + membuf_t outbuf; + + (void)line; + + /* First inquire the parameters */ + rc = assuan_inquire (ctx, "KEYPARAM", &value, &valuelen, MAXLEN_KEYPARAM); + if (rc) + return rc; + + init_membuf (&outbuf, 512); + + rc = agent_genkey (ctrl, (char*)value, valuelen, &outbuf); + xfree (value); + if (rc) + clear_outbuf (&outbuf); + else + rc = write_and_clear_outbuf (ctx, &outbuf); + if (rc) + log_error ("command genkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + + +static const char hlp_readkey[] = + "READKEY <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n" + "\n" + "Return the public key for the given keygrip."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_readkey (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + unsigned char grip[20]; + gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL; + + rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip); + if (rc) + return rc; /* Return immediately as this is already an Assuan error code.*/ + + rc = agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &s_pkey); + if (!rc) + { + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = xtrymalloc (len); + if (!buf) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, buf, len); + xfree (buf); + } + gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); + } + + if (rc) + log_error ("command readkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + +static const char hlp_keyinfo[] = + "KEYINFO [--list] [--data] [--ssh-fpr] <keygrip>\n" + "\n" + "Return information about the key specified by the KEYGRIP. If the\n" + "key is not available GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND is returned. If the option\n" + "--list is given the keygrip is ignored and information about all\n" + "available keys are returned. The information is returned as a\n" + "status line unless --data was specified, with this format:\n" + "\n" + " KEYINFO <keygrip> <type> <serialno> <idstr> - - <fpr>\n" + "\n" + "KEYGRIP is the keygrip.\n" + "\n" + "TYPE is describes the type of the key:\n" + " 'D' - Regular key stored on disk,\n" + " 'T' - Key is stored on a smartcard (token).\n" + " '-' - Unknown type.\n" + "\n" + "SERIALNO is an ASCII string with the serial number of the\n" + " smartcard. If the serial number is not known a single\n" + " dash '-' is used instead.\n" + "\n" + "IDSTR is the IDSTR used to distinguish keys on a smartcard. If it\n" + " is not known a dash is used instead.\n" + "\n" + "FPR returns the formatted ssh-style fingerprint of the key. It is only\n" + " print if the option --ssh-fpr has been used. '-' is printed if the\n" + " fingerprint is not available.\n" + "\n" + "More information may be added in the future."; +static gpg_error_t +do_one_keyinfo (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, assuan_context_t ctx, + int data, int with_ssh_fpr) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + char hexgrip[40+1]; + char *fpr = NULL; + int keytype; + unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; + char *serialno = NULL; + char *idstr = NULL; + const char *keytypestr; + + err = agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl, grip, &keytype, &shadow_info); + if (err) + goto leave; + + /* Reformat the grip so that we use uppercase as good style. */ + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + + if (keytype == PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR + || keytype == PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED) + keytypestr = "D"; + else if (keytype == PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED) + keytypestr = "T"; + else + keytypestr = "-"; + + /* Compute the ssh fingerprint if requested. */ + if (with_ssh_fpr) + { + gcry_sexp_t key; + + if (!agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl, grip, &key)) + { + ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &fpr); + gcry_sexp_release (key); + } + } + + if (shadow_info) + { + err = parse_shadow_info (shadow_info, &serialno, &idstr); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + /* Note that we don't support the CACHED and PROTECTION values as + gnupg 2.1 does. We print '-' instead. However we support the + ssh fingerprint. */ + if (!data) + err = agent_write_status (ctrl, "KEYINFO", + hexgrip, + keytypestr, + serialno? serialno : "-", + idstr? idstr : "-", + "-", + "-", + fpr? fpr : "-", + NULL); + else + { + char *string; + + string = xtryasprintf ("%s %s %s %s - - %s\n", + hexgrip, keytypestr, + serialno? serialno : "-", + idstr? idstr : "-", + fpr? fpr : "-"); + if (!string) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + err = assuan_send_data (ctx, string, strlen(string)); + xfree (string); + } + + leave: + xfree (fpr); + xfree (shadow_info); + xfree (serialno); + xfree (idstr); + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +cmd_keyinfo (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int err; + unsigned char grip[20]; + DIR *dir = NULL; + int list_mode; + int opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr; + + list_mode = has_option (line, "--list"); + opt_data = has_option (line, "--data"); + opt_ssh_fpr = has_option (line, "--ssh-fpr"); + line = skip_options (line); + + if (list_mode) + { + char *dirname; + struct dirent *dir_entry; + char hexgrip[41]; + + dirname = make_filename_try (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL); + if (!dirname) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + dir = opendir (dirname); + if (!dir) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (dirname); + goto leave; + } + xfree (dirname); + + while ( (dir_entry = readdir (dir)) ) + { + if (strlen (dir_entry->d_name) != 44 + || strcmp (dir_entry->d_name + 40, ".key")) + continue; + strncpy (hexgrip, dir_entry->d_name, 40); + hexgrip[40] = 0; + + if ( hex2bin (hexgrip, grip, 20) < 0 ) + continue; /* Bad hex string. */ + + err = do_one_keyinfo (ctrl, grip, ctx, opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + err = 0; + } + else + { + err = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip); + if (err) + goto leave; + err = do_one_keyinfo (ctrl, grip, ctx, opt_data, opt_ssh_fpr); + } + + leave: + if (dir) + closedir (dir); + if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND) + log_error ("command keyinfo failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + return err; +} + + + +static int +send_back_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, int via_data, const char *pw) +{ + size_t n; + int rc; + + assuan_begin_confidential (ctx); + n = strlen (pw); + if (via_data) + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, pw, n); + else + { + char *p = xtrymalloc_secure (n*2+1); + if (!p) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + bin2hex (pw, n, p); + rc = assuan_set_okay_line (ctx, p); + xfree (p); + } + } + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_get_passphrase[] = + "GET_PASSPHRASE [--data] [--check] [--no-ask] [--repeat[=N]]\n" + " [--qualitybar] <cache_id>\n" + " [<error_message> <prompt> <description>]\n" + "\n" + "This function is usually used to ask for a passphrase to be used\n" + "for conventional encryption, but may also be used by programs which\n" + "need specal handling of passphrases. This command uses a syntax\n" + "which helps clients to use the agent with minimum effort. The\n" + "agent either returns with an error or with a OK followed by the hex\n" + "encoded passphrase. Note that the length of the strings is\n" + "implicitly limited by the maximum length of a command.\n" + "\n" + "If the option \"--data\" is used the passphrase is returned by usual\n" + "data lines and not on the okay line.\n" + "\n" + "If the option \"--check\" is used the passphrase constraints checks as\n" + "implemented by gpg-agent are applied. A check is not done if the\n" + "passphrase has been found in the cache.\n" + "\n" + "If the option \"--no-ask\" is used and the passphrase is not in the\n" + "cache the user will not be asked to enter a passphrase but the error\n" + "code GPG_ERR_NO_DATA is returned. \n" + "\n" + "If the option \"--qualitybar\" is used a visual indication of the\n" + "entered passphrase quality is shown. (Unless no minimum passphrase\n" + "length has been configured.)"; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_get_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + const char *pw; + char *response; + char *cacheid = NULL, *desc = NULL, *prompt = NULL, *errtext = NULL; + const char *desc2 = _("Please re-enter this passphrase"); + char *p; + void *cache_marker; + int opt_data, opt_check, opt_no_ask, opt_qualbar; + int opt_repeat = 0; + char *repeat_errtext = NULL; + + opt_data = has_option (line, "--data"); + opt_check = has_option (line, "--check"); + opt_no_ask = has_option (line, "--no-ask"); + if (has_option_name (line, "--repeat")) + { + p = option_value (line, "--repeat"); + if (p) + opt_repeat = atoi (p); + else + opt_repeat = 1; + } + opt_qualbar = has_option (line, "--qualitybar"); + line = skip_options (line); + + cacheid = line; + p = strchr (cacheid, ' '); + if (p) + { + *p++ = 0; + while (*p == ' ') + p++; + errtext = p; + p = strchr (errtext, ' '); + if (p) + { + *p++ = 0; + while (*p == ' ') + p++; + prompt = p; + p = strchr (prompt, ' '); + if (p) + { + *p++ = 0; + while (*p == ' ') + p++; + desc = p; + p = strchr (desc, ' '); + if (p) + *p = 0; /* Ignore trailing garbage. */ + } + } + } + if (!cacheid || !*cacheid || strlen (cacheid) > 50) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of cacheID"); + if (!desc) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given"); + + if (!strcmp (cacheid, "X")) + cacheid = NULL; + if (!strcmp (errtext, "X")) + errtext = NULL; + if (!strcmp (prompt, "X")) + prompt = NULL; + if (!strcmp (desc, "X")) + desc = NULL; + + pw = cacheid ? agent_get_cache (cacheid, CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, &cache_marker) + : NULL; + if (pw) + { + rc = send_back_passphrase (ctx, opt_data, pw); + agent_unlock_cache_entry (&cache_marker); + } + else if (opt_no_ask) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); + else + { + /* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and + should leave the other escaping in place because the escaped + string is send verbatim to the pinentry which does the + unescaping (but not the + replacing) */ + if (errtext) + plus_to_blank (errtext); + if (prompt) + plus_to_blank (prompt); + if (desc) + plus_to_blank (desc); + + next_try: + rc = agent_get_passphrase (ctrl, &response, desc, prompt, + repeat_errtext? repeat_errtext:errtext, + opt_qualbar); + xfree (repeat_errtext); + repeat_errtext = NULL; + if (!rc) + { + int i; + + if (opt_check && check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl, response, 0)) + { + xfree (response); + goto next_try; + } + for (i = 0; i < opt_repeat; i++) + { + char *response2; + + rc = agent_get_passphrase (ctrl, &response2, desc2, prompt, + errtext, 0); + if (rc) + break; + if (strcmp (response2, response)) + { + xfree (response2); + xfree (response); + repeat_errtext = try_percent_escape + (_("does not match - try again"), NULL); + if (!repeat_errtext) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + break; + } + goto next_try; + } + xfree (response2); + } + if (!rc) + { + if (cacheid) + agent_put_cache (cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER, response, 0); + rc = send_back_passphrase (ctx, opt_data, response); + } + xfree (response); + } + } + + if (rc) + log_error ("command get_passphrase failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_clear_passphrase[] = + "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE <cache_id>\n" + "\n" + "may be used to invalidate the cache entry for a passphrase. The\n" + "function returns with OK even when there is no cached passphrase."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_clear_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + char *cacheid = NULL; + char *p; + + /* parse the stuff */ + for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + cacheid = p; + p = strchr (cacheid, ' '); + if (p) + *p = 0; /* ignore garbage */ + if (!cacheid || !*cacheid || strlen (cacheid) > 50) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid length of cacheID"); + + agent_put_cache (cacheid, CACHE_MODE_USER, NULL, 0); + return 0; +} + + +static const char hlp_get_confirmation[] = + "GET_CONFIRMATION <description>\n" + "\n" + "This command may be used to ask for a simple confirmation.\n" + "DESCRIPTION is displayed along with a Okay and Cancel button. This\n" + "command uses a syntax which helps clients to use the agent with\n" + "minimum effort. The agent either returns with an error or with a\n" + "OK. Note, that the length of DESCRIPTION is implicitly limited by\n" + "the maximum length of a command. DESCRIPTION should not contain\n" + "any spaces, those must be encoded either percent escaped or simply\n" + "as '+'."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_get_confirmation (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + char *desc = NULL; + char *p; + + /* parse the stuff */ + for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + desc = p; + p = strchr (desc, ' '); + if (p) + *p = 0; /* We ignore any garbage -may be later used for other args. */ + + if (!desc || !*desc) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no description given"); + + if (!strcmp (desc, "X")) + desc = NULL; + + /* Note, that we only need to replace the + characters and should + leave the other escaping in place because the escaped string is + send verbatim to the pinentry which does the unescaping (but not + the + replacing) */ + if (desc) + plus_to_blank (desc); + + rc = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, NULL, NULL, 0); + if (rc) + log_error ("command get_confirmation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + +static const char hlp_learn[] = + "LEARN [--send]\n" + "\n" + "Learn something about the currently inserted smartcard. With\n" + "--send the new certificates are send back."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_learn (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + + rc = agent_handle_learn (ctrl, has_option (line, "--send")? ctx : NULL); + if (rc) + log_error ("command learn failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + +static const char hlp_passwd[] = + "PASSWD <hexstring_with_keygrip>\n" + "\n" + "Change the passphrase/PIN for the key identified by keygrip in LINE."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_passwd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + unsigned char grip[20]; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL; + unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; + + rc = parse_keygrip (ctx, line, grip); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + ctrl->in_passwd++; + rc = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, ctrl->server_local->keydesc, + grip, &shadow_info, CACHE_MODE_IGNORE, NULL, + &s_skey); + if (rc) + ; + else if (!s_skey) + { + log_error ("changing a smartcard PIN is not yet supported\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + } + else + rc = agent_protect_and_store (ctrl, s_skey); + ctrl->in_passwd--; + + xfree (ctrl->server_local->keydesc); + ctrl->server_local->keydesc = NULL; + + leave: + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + xfree (shadow_info); + if (rc) + log_error ("command passwd failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_preset_passphrase[] = + "PRESET_PASSPHRASE <string_or_keygrip> <timeout> <hexstring>\n" + "\n" + "Set the cached passphrase/PIN for the key identified by the keygrip\n" + "to passwd for the given time, where -1 means infinite and 0 means\n" + "the default (currently only a timeout of -1 is allowed, which means\n" + "to never expire it). If passwd is not provided, ask for it via the\n" + "pinentry module."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_preset_passphrase (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc; + char *grip_clear = NULL; + char *passphrase = NULL; + int ttl; + size_t len; + + if (!opt.allow_preset_passphrase) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "no --allow-preset-passphrase"); + + grip_clear = line; + while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t')) + line++; + if (!*line) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE); + *line = '\0'; + line++; + while (*line && (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t')) + line++; + + /* Currently, only infinite timeouts are allowed. */ + ttl = -1; + if (line[0] != '-' || line[1] != '1') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + line++; + line++; + while (!(*line != ' ' && *line != '\t')) + line++; + + /* Syntax check the hexstring. */ + len = 0; + rc = parse_hexstring (ctx, line, &len); + if (rc) + return rc; + line[len] = '\0'; + + /* If there is a passphrase, use it. Currently, a passphrase is + required. */ + if (*line) + { + /* Do in-place conversion. */ + passphrase = line; + if (!hex2str (passphrase, passphrase, strlen (passphrase)+1, NULL)) + rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "invalid hexstring"); + } + else + rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "passphrase is required"); + + if (!rc) + rc = agent_put_cache (grip_clear, CACHE_MODE_ANY, passphrase, ttl); + + if (rc) + log_error ("command preset_passphrase failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + + return rc; +} + + + +static const char hlp_scd[] = + "SCD <commands to pass to the scdaemon>\n" + " \n" + "This is a general quote command to redirect everything to the\n" + "SCdaemon."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_scd (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc; + + rc = divert_generic_cmd (ctrl, line, ctx); + + return rc; +} + + + +static const char hlp_getval[] = + "GETVAL <key>\n" + "\n" + "Return the value for KEY from the special environment as created by\n" + "PUTVAL."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_getval (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *key = NULL; + char *p; + struct putval_item_s *vl; + + for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + key = p; + p = strchr (key, ' '); + if (p) + { + *p++ = 0; + for (; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + if (*p) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "too many arguments"); + } + if (!key || !*key) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no key given"); + + + for (vl=putval_list; vl; vl = vl->next) + if ( !strcmp (vl->d, key) ) + break; + + if (vl) /* Got an entry. */ + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, vl->d+vl->off, vl->len); + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); + + if (rc) + log_error ("command getval failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + +static const char hlp_putval[] = + "PUTVAL <key> [<percent_escaped_value>]\n" + "\n" + "The gpg-agent maintains a kind of environment which may be used to\n" + "store key/value pairs in it, so that they can be retrieved later.\n" + "This may be used by helper daemons to daemonize themself on\n" + "invocation and register them with gpg-agent. Callers of the\n" + "daemon's service may now first try connect to get the information\n" + "for that service from gpg-agent through the GETVAL command and then\n" + "try to connect to that daemon. Only if that fails they may start\n" + "an own instance of the service daemon. \n" + "\n" + "KEY is an an arbitrary symbol with the same syntax rules as keys\n" + "for shell environment variables. PERCENT_ESCAPED_VALUE is the\n" + "corresponsing value; they should be similar to the values of\n" + "envronment variables but gpg-agent does not enforce any\n" + "restrictions. If that value is not given any value under that KEY\n" + "is removed from this special environment."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_putval (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *key = NULL; + char *value = NULL; + size_t valuelen = 0; + char *p; + struct putval_item_s *vl, *vlprev; + + for (p=line; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + key = p; + p = strchr (key, ' '); + if (p) + { + *p++ = 0; + for (; *p == ' '; p++) + ; + if (*p) + { + value = p; + p = strchr (value, ' '); + if (p) + *p = 0; + valuelen = percent_plus_unescape_inplace (value, 0); + } + } + if (!key || !*key) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "no key given"); + + + for (vl=putval_list,vlprev=NULL; vl; vlprev=vl, vl = vl->next) + if ( !strcmp (vl->d, key) ) + break; + + if (vl) /* Delete old entry. */ + { + if (vlprev) + vlprev->next = vl->next; + else + putval_list = vl->next; + xfree (vl); + } + + if (valuelen) /* Add entry. */ + { + vl = xtrymalloc (sizeof *vl + strlen (key) + valuelen); + if (!vl) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + vl->len = valuelen; + vl->off = strlen (key) + 1; + strcpy (vl->d, key); + memcpy (vl->d + vl->off, value, valuelen); + vl->next = putval_list; + putval_list = vl; + } + } + + if (rc) + log_error ("command putval failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; +} + + + + +static const char hlp_updatestartuptty[] = + "UPDATESTARTUPTTY\n" + "\n" + "Set startup TTY and X11 DISPLAY variables to the values of this\n" + "session. This command is useful to pull future pinentries to\n" + "another screen. It is only required because there is no way in the\n" + "ssh-agent protocol to convey this information."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_updatestartuptty (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + static const char *names[] = + { "GPG_TTY", "DISPLAY", "TERM", "XAUTHORITY", "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL }; + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + gpg_error_t err = 0; + session_env_t se; + int idx; + char *lc_ctype = NULL; + char *lc_messages = NULL; + + (void)line; + + se = session_env_new (); + if (!se) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + for (idx=0; !err && names[idx]; idx++) + { + const char *value = session_env_getenv (ctrl->session_env, names[idx]); + if (value) + err = session_env_setenv (se, names[idx], value); + } + + if (!err && ctrl->lc_ctype) + if (!(lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (ctrl->lc_ctype))) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + if (!err && ctrl->lc_messages) + if (!(lc_messages = xtrystrdup (ctrl->lc_messages))) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + if (err) + { + session_env_release (se); + xfree (lc_ctype); + xfree (lc_messages); + } + else + { + session_env_release (opt.startup_env); + opt.startup_env = se; + xfree (opt.startup_lc_ctype); + opt.startup_lc_ctype = lc_ctype; + xfree (opt.startup_lc_messages); + opt.startup_lc_messages = lc_messages; + } + + return err; +} + + + +static const char hlp_killagent[] = + "KILLAGENT\n" + "\n" + "If the agent has been started using a standard socket\n" + "we allow a client to stop the agent."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_killagent (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + + (void)line; + + if (!opt.use_standard_socket) + return set_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "no --use-standard-socket"); + + ctrl->server_local->stopme = 1; + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF); +} + + +static const char hlp_reloadagent[] = + "RELOADAGENT\n" + "\n" + "This command is an alternative to SIGHUP\n" + "to reload the configuration."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_reloadagent (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + (void)ctx; + (void)line; + + agent_sighup_action (); + return 0; +} + + + +static const char hlp_getinfo[] = + "GETINFO <what>\n" + "\n" + "Multipurpose function to return a variety of information.\n" + "Supported values for WHAT are:\n" + "\n" + " version - Return the version of the program.\n" + " pid - Return the process id of the server.\n" + " socket_name - Return the name of the socket.\n" + " ssh_socket_name - Return the name of the ssh socket.\n" + " scd_running - Return OK if the SCdaemon is already running.\n" + " std_session_env - List the standard session environment.\n" + " std_startup_env - List the standard startup environment.\n" + " cmd_has_option\n" + " - Returns OK if the command CMD implements the option OPT."; +static gpg_error_t +cmd_getinfo (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + int rc = 0; + + if (!strcmp (line, "version")) + { + const char *s = VERSION; + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s)); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "pid")) + { + char numbuf[50]; + + snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", (unsigned long)getpid ()); + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf)); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "socket_name")) + { + const char *s = get_agent_socket_name (); + + if (s) + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s)); + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "ssh_socket_name")) + { + const char *s = get_agent_ssh_socket_name (); + + if (s) + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, s, strlen (s)); + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "scd_running")) + { + rc = agent_scd_check_running ()? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "s2k_count")) + { + char numbuf[50]; + + snprintf (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, "%lu", get_standard_s2k_count ()); + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, numbuf, strlen (numbuf)); + } + else if (!strcmp (line, "std_session_env") + || !strcmp (line, "std_startup_env")) + { + int iterator; + const char *name, *value; + char *string; + + iterator = 0; + while ((name = session_env_list_stdenvnames (&iterator, NULL))) + { + value = session_env_getenv_or_default + (line[5] == 't'? opt.startup_env:ctrl->session_env, name, NULL); + if (value) + { + string = xtryasprintf ("%s=%s", name, value); + if (!string) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, string, strlen (string)+1); + if (!rc) + rc = assuan_send_data (ctx, NULL, 0); + } + if (rc) + break; + } + } + } + else if (!strncmp (line, "cmd_has_option", 14) + && (line[14] == ' ' || line[14] == '\t' || !line[14])) + { + char *cmd, *cmdopt; + line += 14; + while (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t') + line++; + if (!*line) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE); + else + { + cmd = line; + while (*line && (*line != ' ' && *line != '\t')) + line++; + if (!*line) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE); + else + { + *line++ = 0; + while (*line == ' ' || *line == '\t') + line++; + if (!*line) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE); + else + { + cmdopt = line; + if (!command_has_option (cmd, cmdopt)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + } + } + } + else + rc = set_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER, "unknown value for WHAT"); + return rc; +} + + + +static gpg_error_t +option_handler (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *key, const char *value) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + gpg_error_t err = 0; + + if (!strcmp (key, "putenv")) + { + /* Change the session's environment to be used for the + Pinentry. Valid values are: + <NAME> Delete envvar NAME + <KEY>= Set envvar NAME to the empty string + <KEY>=<VALUE> Set envvar NAME to VALUE + */ + err = session_env_putenv (ctrl->session_env, value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "display")) + { + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "DISPLAY", value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "ttyname")) + { + if (!opt.keep_tty) + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "GPG_TTY", value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "ttytype")) + { + if (!opt.keep_tty) + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "TERM", value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "lc-ctype")) + { + if (ctrl->lc_ctype) + xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype); + ctrl->lc_ctype = xtrystrdup (value); + if (!ctrl->lc_ctype) + return out_of_core (); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "lc-messages")) + { + if (ctrl->lc_messages) + xfree (ctrl->lc_messages); + ctrl->lc_messages = xtrystrdup (value); + if (!ctrl->lc_messages) + return out_of_core (); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "xauthority")) + { + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "XAUTHORITY", value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "pinentry-user-data")) + { + err = session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", value); + } + else if (!strcmp (key, "use-cache-for-signing")) + ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = *value? atoi (value) : 0; + else if (!strcmp (key, "allow-pinentry-notify")) + ctrl->server_local->allow_pinentry_notify = 1; + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPTION); + + return err; +} + + + + +/* Called by libassuan after all commands. ERR is the error from the + last assuan operation and not the one returned from the command. */ +static void +post_cmd_notify (assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + + (void)err; + + /* Switch off any I/O monitor controlled logging pausing. */ + ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging = 0; +} + + +/* This function is called by libassuan for all I/O. We use it here + to disable logging for the GETEVENTCOUNTER commands. This is so + that the debug output won't get cluttered by this primitive + command. */ +static unsigned int +io_monitor (assuan_context_t ctx, void *hook, int direction, + const char *line, size_t linelen) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = assuan_get_pointer (ctx); + + (void) hook; + + /* Note that we only check for the uppercase name. This allows to + see the logging for debugging if using a non-upercase command + name. */ + if (ctx && direction == ASSUAN_IO_FROM_PEER + && linelen >= 15 + && !strncmp (line, "GETEVENTCOUNTER", 15) + && (linelen == 15 || spacep (line+15))) + { + ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging = 1; + } + + return ctrl->server_local->pause_io_logging? ASSUAN_IO_MONITOR_NOLOG : 0; +} + + +/* Return true if the command CMD implements the option OPT. */ +static int +command_has_option (const char *cmd, const char *cmdopt) +{ + if (!strcmp (cmd, "GET_PASSPHRASE")) + { + if (!strcmp (cmdopt, "repeat")) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Tell the assuan library about our commands */ +static int +register_commands (assuan_context_t ctx) +{ + static struct { + const char *name; + assuan_handler_t handler; + const char * const help; + } table[] = { + { "GETEVENTCOUNTER",cmd_geteventcounter, hlp_geteventcounter }, + { "ISTRUSTED", cmd_istrusted, hlp_istrusted }, + { "HAVEKEY", cmd_havekey, hlp_havekey }, + { "KEYINFO", cmd_keyinfo, hlp_keyinfo }, + { "SIGKEY", cmd_sigkey, hlp_sigkey }, + { "SETKEY", cmd_sigkey, hlp_sigkey }, + { "SETKEYDESC", cmd_setkeydesc,hlp_setkeydesc }, + { "SETHASH", cmd_sethash, hlp_sethash }, + { "PKSIGN", cmd_pksign, hlp_pksign }, + { "PKDECRYPT", cmd_pkdecrypt, hlp_pkdecrypt }, + { "GENKEY", cmd_genkey, hlp_genkey }, + { "READKEY", cmd_readkey, hlp_readkey }, + { "GET_PASSPHRASE", cmd_get_passphrase, hlp_get_passphrase }, + { "PRESET_PASSPHRASE", cmd_preset_passphrase, hlp_preset_passphrase }, + { "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE", cmd_clear_passphrase, hlp_clear_passphrase }, + { "GET_CONFIRMATION", cmd_get_confirmation, hlp_get_confirmation }, + { "LISTTRUSTED", cmd_listtrusted, hlp_listtrusted }, + { "MARKTRUSTED", cmd_marktrusted, hlp_martrusted }, + { "LEARN", cmd_learn, hlp_learn }, + { "PASSWD", cmd_passwd, hlp_passwd }, + { "INPUT", NULL }, + { "OUTPUT", NULL }, + { "SCD", cmd_scd, hlp_scd }, + { "GETVAL", cmd_getval, hlp_getval }, + { "PUTVAL", cmd_putval, hlp_putval }, + { "UPDATESTARTUPTTY", cmd_updatestartuptty, hlp_updatestartuptty }, + { "KILLAGENT", cmd_killagent, hlp_killagent }, + { "RELOADAGENT", cmd_reloadagent,hlp_reloadagent }, + { "GETINFO", cmd_getinfo, hlp_getinfo }, + { NULL } + }; + int i, rc; + + for (i=0; table[i].name; i++) + { + rc = assuan_register_command (ctx, table[i].name, table[i].handler, + table[i].help); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + assuan_register_post_cmd_notify (ctx, post_cmd_notify); + assuan_register_reset_notify (ctx, reset_notify); + assuan_register_option_handler (ctx, option_handler); + return 0; +} + + +/* Startup the server. If LISTEN_FD and FD is given as -1, this is a + simple piper server, otherwise it is a regular server. CTRL is the + control structure for this connection; it has only the basic + intialization. */ +void +start_command_handler (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t listen_fd, gnupg_fd_t fd) +{ + int rc; + assuan_context_t ctx = NULL; + + rc = assuan_new (&ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + agent_exit (2); + } + + if (listen_fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD && fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD) + { + assuan_fd_t filedes[2]; + + filedes[0] = assuan_fdopen (0); + filedes[1] = assuan_fdopen (1); + rc = assuan_init_pipe_server (ctx, filedes); + } + else if (listen_fd != GNUPG_INVALID_FD) + { + rc = assuan_init_socket_server (ctx, listen_fd, 0); + /* FIXME: Need to call assuan_sock_set_nonce for Windows. But + this branch is currently not used. */ + } + else + { + rc = assuan_init_socket_server (ctx, fd, ASSUAN_SOCKET_SERVER_ACCEPTED); + } + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to initialize the server: %s\n", + gpg_strerror(rc)); + agent_exit (2); + } + rc = register_commands (ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to register commands with Assuan: %s\n", + gpg_strerror(rc)); + agent_exit (2); + } + + assuan_set_pointer (ctx, ctrl); + ctrl->server_local = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl->server_local); + ctrl->server_local->assuan_ctx = ctx; + ctrl->server_local->message_fd = -1; + ctrl->server_local->use_cache_for_signing = 1; + ctrl->digest.raw_value = 0; + + assuan_set_io_monitor (ctx, io_monitor, NULL); + + for (;;) + { + rc = assuan_accept (ctx); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF || rc == -1) + { + break; + } + else if (rc) + { + log_info ("Assuan accept problem: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + break; + } + + rc = assuan_process (ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_info ("Assuan processing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + continue; + } + } + + /* Reset the SCD if needed. */ + agent_reset_scd (ctrl); + + /* Reset the pinentry (in case of popup messages). */ + agent_reset_query (ctrl); + + /* Cleanup. */ + assuan_release (ctx); + if (ctrl->server_local->stopme) + agent_exit (0); + xfree (ctrl->server_local); + ctrl->server_local = NULL; +} + diff --git a/agent/divert-scd.c b/agent/divert-scd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf07d07 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/divert-scd.c @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ +/* divert-scd.c - divert operations to the scdaemon + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "sexp-parse.h" + + +static int +ask_for_card (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *shadow_info, char **r_kid) +{ + int rc, i; + char *serialno; + int no_card = 0; + char *desc; + char *want_sn, *want_kid; + int want_sn_displen; + + *r_kid = NULL; + + rc = parse_shadow_info (shadow_info, &want_sn, &want_kid); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* We assume that a 20 byte serial number is a standard one which + has the property to have a zero in the last nibble (Due to BCD + representation). We don't display this '0' because it may + confuse the user. */ + want_sn_displen = strlen (want_sn); + if (want_sn_displen == 20 && want_sn[19] == '0') + want_sn_displen--; + + for (;;) + { + rc = agent_card_serialno (ctrl, &serialno); + if (!rc) + { + log_debug ("detected card with S/N %s\n", serialno); + i = strcmp (serialno, want_sn); + xfree (serialno); + serialno = NULL; + if (!i) + { + xfree (want_sn); + *r_kid = want_kid; + return 0; /* yes, we have the correct card */ + } + } + else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CARD_NOT_PRESENT) + { + log_debug ("no card present\n"); + rc = 0; + no_card = 1; + } + else + { + log_error ("error accessing card: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + + if (!rc) + { + if (asprintf (&desc, + "%s:%%0A%%0A" + " \"%.*s\"", + no_card + ? _("Please insert the card with serial number") + : _("Please remove the current card and " + "insert the one with serial number"), + want_sn_displen, want_sn) < 0) + { + rc = out_of_core (); + } + else + { + rc = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, NULL, NULL, 0); + xfree (desc); + } + } + if (rc) + { + xfree (want_sn); + xfree (want_kid); + return rc; + } + } +} + + +/* Put the DIGEST into an DER encoded container and return it in R_VAL. */ +static int +encode_md_for_card (const unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int algo, + unsigned char **r_val, size_t *r_len) +{ + unsigned char *frame; + unsigned char asn[100]; + size_t asnlen; + + *r_val = NULL; + *r_len = 0; + + asnlen = DIM(asn); + if (!algo || gcry_md_test_algo (algo)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO); + if (gcry_md_algo_info (algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ASNOID, asn, &asnlen)) + { + log_error ("no object identifier for algo %d\n", algo); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + } + + frame = xtrymalloc (asnlen + digestlen); + if (!frame) + return out_of_core (); + memcpy (frame, asn, asnlen); + memcpy (frame+asnlen, digest, digestlen); + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_printhex ("encoded hash:", frame, asnlen+digestlen); + + *r_val = frame; + *r_len = asnlen+digestlen; + return 0; +} + + +/* Callback used to ask for the PIN which should be set into BUF. The + buf has been allocated by the caller and is of size MAXBUF which + includes the terminating null. The function should return an UTF-8 + string with the passphrase, the buffer may optionally be padded + with arbitrary characters. + + INFO gets displayed as part of a generic string. However if the + first character of INFO is a vertical bar all up to the next + verical bar are considered flags and only everything after the + second vertical bar gets displayed as the full prompt. + + Flags: + + 'N' = New PIN, this requests a second prompt to repeat the + PIN. If the PIN is not correctly repeated it starts from + all over. + 'A' = The PIN is an Admin PIN, SO-PIN or alike. + 'P' = The PIN is a PUK (Personal Unblocking Key). + 'R' = The PIN is a Reset Code. + + Example: + + "|AN|Please enter the new security officer's PIN" + + The text "Please ..." will get displayed and the flags 'A' and 'N' + are considered. + */ +static int +getpin_cb (void *opaque, const char *info, char *buf, size_t maxbuf) +{ + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi; + int rc; + ctrl_t ctrl = opaque; + const char *ends, *s; + int any_flags = 0; + int newpin = 0; + int resetcode = 0; + int is_puk = 0; + const char *again_text = NULL; + const char *prompt = "PIN"; + + if (buf && maxbuf < 2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Parse the flags. */ + if (info && *info =='|' && (ends=strchr (info+1, '|'))) + { + for (s=info+1; s < ends; s++) + { + if (*s == 'A') + prompt = _("Admin PIN"); + else if (*s == 'P') + { + /* TRANSLATORS: A PUK is the Personal Unblocking Code + used to unblock a PIN. */ + prompt = _("PUK"); + is_puk = 1; + } + else if (*s == 'N') + newpin = 1; + else if (*s == 'R') + { + prompt = _("Reset Code"); + resetcode = 1; + } + } + info = ends+1; + any_flags = 1; + } + else if (info && *info == '|') + log_debug ("pin_cb called without proper PIN info hack\n"); + + /* If BUF has been passed as NULL, we are in keypad mode: The + callback opens the popup and immediatley returns. */ + if (!buf) + { + if (maxbuf == 0) /* Close the pinentry. */ + { + agent_popup_message_stop (ctrl); + rc = 0; + } + else if (maxbuf == 1) /* Open the pinentry. */ + { + if (info) + { + char *desc; + + if ( asprintf (&desc, + _("%s%%0A%%0AUse the reader's keypad for input."), + info) < 0 ) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + rc = agent_popup_message_start (ctrl, desc, NULL); + xfree (desc); + } + } + else + rc = agent_popup_message_start (ctrl, NULL, NULL); + } + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + return rc; + } + + /* FIXME: keep PI and TRIES in OPAQUE. Frankly this is a whole + mess because we should call the card's verify function from the + pinentry check pin CB. */ + again: + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + maxbuf + 10); + if (!pi) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + pi->max_length = maxbuf-1; + pi->min_digits = 0; /* we want a real passphrase */ + pi->max_digits = 16; + pi->max_tries = 3; + + if (any_flags) + { + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, info, prompt, again_text, pi); + again_text = NULL; + if (!rc && newpin) + { + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi2; + pi2 = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + maxbuf + 10); + if (!pi2) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + pi2->max_length = maxbuf-1; + pi2->min_digits = 0; + pi2->max_digits = 16; + pi2->max_tries = 1; + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, + (resetcode? + _("Repeat this Reset Code"): + is_puk? + _("Repeat this PUK"): + _("Repeat this PIN")), + prompt, NULL, pi2); + if (!rc && strcmp (pi->pin, pi2->pin)) + { + again_text = (resetcode? + N_("Reset Code not correctly repeated; try again"): + is_puk? + N_("PUK not correctly repeated; try again"): + N_("PIN not correctly repeated; try again")); + xfree (pi2); + xfree (pi); + goto again; + } + xfree (pi2); + } + } + else + { + char *desc; + if ( asprintf (&desc, + _("Please enter the PIN%s%s%s to unlock the card"), + info? " (`":"", + info? info:"", + info? "')":"") < 0) + desc = NULL; + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, desc?desc:info, prompt, NULL, pi); + xfree (desc); + } + + if (!rc) + { + strncpy (buf, pi->pin, maxbuf-1); + buf[maxbuf-1] = 0; + } + xfree (pi); + return rc; +} + + + + +int +divert_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *digest, size_t digestlen, int algo, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, unsigned char **r_sig) +{ + int rc; + char *kid; + size_t siglen; + unsigned char *sigval = NULL; + + rc = ask_for_card (ctrl, shadow_info, &kid); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (algo == MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1) + { + int save = ctrl->use_auth_call; + ctrl->use_auth_call = 1; + rc = agent_card_pksign (ctrl, kid, getpin_cb, ctrl, + digest, digestlen, &sigval, &siglen); + ctrl->use_auth_call = save; + } + else + { + unsigned char *data; + size_t ndata; + + rc = encode_md_for_card (digest, digestlen, algo, &data, &ndata); + if (!rc) + { + rc = agent_card_pksign (ctrl, kid, getpin_cb, ctrl, + data, ndata, &sigval, &siglen); + xfree (data); + } + } + + if (!rc) + *r_sig = sigval; + + xfree (kid); + + return rc; +} + + +/* Decrypt the the value given asn an S-expression in CIPHER using the + key identified by SHADOW_INFO and return the plaintext in an + allocated buffer in R_BUF. */ +int +divert_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *cipher, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, + char **r_buf, size_t *r_len) +{ + int rc; + char *kid; + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + const unsigned char *ciphertext; + size_t ciphertextlen; + char *plaintext; + size_t plaintextlen; + + s = cipher; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "enc-val")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "rsa")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "a")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + ciphertext = s; + ciphertextlen = n; + + rc = ask_for_card (ctrl, shadow_info, &kid); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = agent_card_pkdecrypt (ctrl, kid, getpin_cb, ctrl, + ciphertext, ciphertextlen, + &plaintext, &plaintextlen); + if (!rc) + { + *r_buf = plaintext; + *r_len = plaintextlen; + } + xfree (kid); + return rc; +} + + +int +divert_generic_cmd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cmdline, void *assuan_context) +{ + return agent_card_scd (ctrl, cmdline, getpin_cb, ctrl, assuan_context); +} + + + + + diff --git a/agent/findkey.c b/agent/findkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..800db88 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/findkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,952 @@ +/* findkey.c - Locate the secret key + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, + * 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <pth.h> /* (we use pth_sleep) */ + +#include "agent.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "../common/ssh-utils.h" + +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + +/* Helper to pass data to the check callback of the unprotect function. */ +struct try_unprotect_arg_s +{ + ctrl_t ctrl; + const unsigned char *protected_key; + unsigned char *unprotected_key; + int change_required; /* Set by the callback to indicate that the + user should chnage the passphrase. */ +}; + + +/* Write an S-expression formatted key to our key storage. With FORCE + passed as true an existing key with the given GRIP will get + overwritten. */ +int +agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, + const void *buffer, size_t length, int force) +{ + char *fname; + FILE *fp; + char hexgrip[40+4+1]; + int fd; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key"); + + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL); + + if (!force && !access (fname, F_OK)) + { + log_error ("secret key file `%s' already exists\n", fname); + xfree (fname); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + + /* In FORCE mode we would like to create FNAME but only if it does + not already exist. We cannot make this guarantee just using + POSIX (GNU provides the "x" opentype for fopen, however, this is + not portable). Thus, we use the more flexible open function and + then use fdopen to obtain a stream. */ + fd = open (fname, force? (O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_BINARY) + : (O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_BINARY), + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + | S_IRGRP +#endif + ); + if (fd < 0) + fp = NULL; + else + { + fp = fdopen (fd, "wb"); + if (!fp) + { + int save_e = errno; + close (fd); + errno = save_e; + } + } + + if (!fp) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + log_error ("can't create `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + xfree (fname); + return tmperr; + } + + if (fwrite (buffer, length, 1, fp) != 1) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + log_error ("error writing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + fclose (fp); + remove (fname); + xfree (fname); + return tmperr; + } + if ( fclose (fp) ) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + log_error ("error closing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + remove (fname); + xfree (fname); + return tmperr; + } + bump_key_eventcounter (); + xfree (fname); + return 0; +} + + +/* Callback function to try the unprotection from the passpharse query + code. */ +static int +try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi) +{ + struct try_unprotect_arg_s *arg = pi->check_cb_arg; + size_t dummy; + gpg_error_t err; + gnupg_isotime_t now, protected_at, tmptime; + char *desc = NULL; + + assert (!arg->unprotected_key); + + arg->change_required = 0; + err = agent_unprotect (arg->protected_key, pi->pin, protected_at, + &arg->unprotected_key, &dummy); + if (err) + return err; + if (!opt.max_passphrase_days || arg->ctrl->in_passwd) + return 0; /* No regular passphrase change required. */ + + if (!*protected_at) + { + /* No protection date known - must force passphrase change. */ + desc = xtrystrdup (_("Note: This passphrase has never been changed.%0A" + "Please change it now.")); + if (!desc) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + else + { + gnupg_get_isotime (now); + gnupg_copy_time (tmptime, protected_at); + err = add_days_to_isotime (tmptime, opt.max_passphrase_days); + if (err) + return err; + if (strcmp (now, tmptime) > 0 ) + { + /* Passphrase "expired". */ + desc = xtryasprintf + (_("This passphrase has not been changed%%0A" + "since %.4s-%.2s-%.2s. Please change it now."), + protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6); + if (!desc) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + } + + if (desc) + { + /* Change required. */ + if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints) + { + err = agent_get_confirmation (arg->ctrl, desc, + _("Change passphrase"), NULL, 0); + if (!err) + arg->change_required = 1; + } + else + { + err = agent_get_confirmation (arg->ctrl, desc, + _("Change passphrase"), + _("I'll change it later"), 0); + if (!err) + arg->change_required = 1; + else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED) + err = 0; + } + xfree (desc); + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Modify a Key description, replacing certain special format + characters. List of currently supported replacements: + + %% - Replaced by a single % + %c - Replaced by the content of COMMENT. + %F - Replaced by an ssh style fingerprint computed from KEY. + + The functions returns 0 on success or an error code. On success a + newly allocated string is stored at the address of RESULT. + */ +static gpg_error_t +modify_description (const char *in, const char *comment, const gcry_sexp_t key, + char **result) +{ + size_t comment_length; + size_t in_len; + size_t out_len; + char *out; + size_t i; + int special, pass; + char *ssh_fpr = NULL; + + comment_length = strlen (comment); + in_len = strlen (in); + + /* First pass calculates the length, second pass does the actual + copying. */ + out = NULL; + out_len = 0; + for (pass=0; pass < 2; pass++) + { + special = 0; + for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) + { + if (special) + { + special = 0; + switch (in[i]) + { + case '%': + if (out) + *out++ = '%'; + else + out_len++; + break; + + case 'c': /* Comment. */ + if (out) + { + memcpy (out, comment, comment_length); + out += comment_length; + } + else + out_len += comment_length; + break; + + case 'F': /* SSH style fingerprint. */ + if (!ssh_fpr && key) + ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, &ssh_fpr); + if (ssh_fpr) + { + if (out) + out = stpcpy (out, ssh_fpr); + else + out_len += strlen (ssh_fpr); + } + break; + + default: /* Invalid special sequences are kept as they are. */ + if (out) + { + *out++ = '%'; + *out++ = in[i]; + } + else + out_len+=2; + break; + } + } + else if (in[i] == '%') + special = 1; + else + { + if (out) + *out++ = in[i]; + else + out_len++; + } + } + + if (!pass) + { + *result = out = xtrymalloc (out_len + 1); + if (!out) + { + xfree (ssh_fpr); + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + } + } + + *out = 0; + assert (*result + out_len == out); + xfree (ssh_fpr); + return 0; +} + + + +/* Unprotect the canconical encoded S-expression key in KEYBUF. GRIP + should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the + caching mechanism. DESC_TEXT may be set to override the default + description used for the pinentry. If LOOKUP_TTL is given this + function is used to lookup the default ttl. */ +static int +unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip, + cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl) +{ + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi; + struct try_unprotect_arg_s arg; + int rc; + unsigned char *result; + size_t resultlen; + char hexgrip[40+1]; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + + /* First try to get it from the cache - if there is none or we can't + unprotect it, we fall back to ask the user */ + if (cache_mode != CACHE_MODE_IGNORE) + { + void *cache_marker; + const char *pw; + + retry: + pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode, &cache_marker); + if (pw) + { + rc = agent_unprotect (*keybuf, pw, NULL, &result, &resultlen); + agent_unlock_cache_entry (&cache_marker); + if (!rc) + { + xfree (*keybuf); + *keybuf = result; + return 0; + } + rc = 0; + } + + /* If the pinentry is currently in use, we wait up to 60 seconds + for it to close and check the cache again. This solves a common + situation where several requests for unprotecting a key have + been made but the user is still entering the passphrase for + the first request. Because all requests to agent_askpin are + serialized they would then pop up one after the other to + request the passphrase - despite that the user has already + entered it and is then available in the cache. This + implementation is not race free but in the worst case the + user has to enter the passphrase only once more. */ + if (pinentry_active_p (ctrl, 0)) + { + /* Active - wait */ + if (!pinentry_active_p (ctrl, 60)) + { + /* We need to give the other thread a chance to actually put + it into the cache. */ + pth_sleep (1); + goto retry; + } + /* Timeout - better call pinentry now the plain way. */ + } + } + + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + 100); + if (!pi) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + pi->max_length = 100; + pi->min_digits = 0; /* we want a real passphrase */ + pi->max_digits = 16; + pi->max_tries = 3; + pi->check_cb = try_unprotect_cb; + arg.ctrl = ctrl; + arg.protected_key = *keybuf; + arg.unprotected_key = NULL; + arg.change_required = 0; + pi->check_cb_arg = &arg; + + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, desc_text, NULL, NULL, pi); + if (!rc) + { + assert (arg.unprotected_key); + if (arg.change_required) + { + size_t canlen, erroff; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey; + + assert (arg.unprotected_key); + canlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (arg.unprotected_key, 0, NULL, NULL); + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, + (char*)arg.unprotected_key, canlen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n", + (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc)); + wipememory (arg.unprotected_key, canlen); + xfree (arg.unprotected_key); + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + rc = agent_protect_and_store (ctrl, s_skey); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("changing the passphrase failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + wipememory (arg.unprotected_key, canlen); + xfree (arg.unprotected_key); + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + } + else + agent_put_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode, pi->pin, + lookup_ttl? lookup_ttl (hexgrip) : 0); + xfree (*keybuf); + *keybuf = arg.unprotected_key; + } + xfree (pi); + return rc; +} + + +/* Read the key identified by GRIP from the private key directory and + return it as an gcrypt S-expression object in RESULT. On failure + returns an error code and stores NULL at RESULT. */ +static gpg_error_t +read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip, gcry_sexp_t *result) +{ + int rc; + char *fname; + FILE *fp; + struct stat st; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buflen, erroff; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey; + char hexgrip[40+4+1]; + + *result = NULL; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key"); + + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL); + fp = fopen (fname, "rb"); + if (!fp) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_ENOENT) + log_error ("can't open `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + xfree (fname); + return rc; + } + + if (fstat (fileno(fp), &st)) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("can't stat `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + xfree (fname); + fclose (fp); + return rc; + } + + buflen = st.st_size; + buf = xtrymalloc (buflen+1); + if (!buf || fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("error reading `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + xfree (fname); + fclose (fp); + xfree (buf); + return rc; + } + + /* Convert the file into a gcrypt S-expression object. */ + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, (char*)buf, buflen); + xfree (fname); + fclose (fp); + xfree (buf); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n", + (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + *result = s_skey; + return 0; +} + + +/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp in RESULT after locating it using + the GRIP. Stores NULL at RESULT if the operation shall be diverted + to a token; in this case an allocated S-expression with the + shadow_info part from the file is stored at SHADOW_INFO. + CACHE_MODE defines now the cache shall be used. DESC_TEXT may be + set to present a custom description for the pinentry. LOOKUP_TTL + is an optional function to convey a TTL to the cache manager; we do + not simply pass the TTL value because the value is only needed if an + unprotect action was needed and looking up the TTL may have some + overhead (e.g. scanning the sshcontrol file). */ +gpg_error_t +agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info, + cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl, + gcry_sexp_t *result) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len, buflen, erroff; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey; + int got_shadow_info = 0; + + *result = NULL; + if (shadow_info) + *shadow_info = NULL; + + rc = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* For use with the protection functions we also need the key as an + canonical encoded S-expression in a buffer. Create this buffer + now. */ + rc = make_canon_sexp (s_skey, &buf, &len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + switch (agent_private_key_type (buf)) + { + case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR: + break; /* no unprotection needed */ + case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED: + { + char *desc_text_final; + char *comment = NULL; + + /* Note, that we will take the comment as a C string for + display purposes; i.e. all stuff beyond a Nul character is + ignored. */ + { + gcry_sexp_t comment_sexp; + + comment_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "comment", 0); + if (comment_sexp) + comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (comment_sexp, 1); + gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp); + } + + desc_text_final = NULL; + if (desc_text) + rc = modify_description (desc_text, comment? comment:"", s_skey, + &desc_text_final); + gcry_free (comment); + + if (!rc) + { + rc = unprotect (ctrl, desc_text_final, &buf, grip, + cache_mode, lookup_ttl); + if (rc) + log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + + xfree (desc_text_final); + } + break; + case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED: + if (shadow_info) + { + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + + rc = agent_get_shadow_info (buf, &s); + if (!rc) + { + n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (s, 0, NULL,NULL); + assert (n); + *shadow_info = xtrymalloc (n); + if (!*shadow_info) + rc = out_of_core (); + else + { + memcpy (*shadow_info, s, n); + rc = 0; + got_shadow_info = 1; + } + } + if (rc) + log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + else + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY); + break; + default: + log_error ("invalid private key format\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + break; + } + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + s_skey = NULL; + if (rc || got_shadow_info) + { + xfree (buf); + return rc; + } + + buflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (buf, 0, NULL, NULL); + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, (char*)buf, buflen); + wipememory (buf, buflen); + xfree (buf); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n", + (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + + *result = s_skey; + return 0; +} + + +/* Return the key for the keygrip GRIP. The result is stored at + RESULT. This function extracts the key from the private key + database and returns it as an S-expression object as it is. On + failure an error code is returned and NULL stored at RESULT. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, + gcry_sexp_t *result) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey; + + (void)ctrl; + + *result = NULL; + + err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey); + if (!err) + *result = s_skey; + return err; +} + + +/* Return the public key for the keygrip GRIP. The result is stored + at RESULT. This function extracts the public key from the private + key database. On failure an error code is returned and NULL stored + at RESULT. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, + const unsigned char *grip, + gcry_sexp_t *result) +{ + int i, idx, rc; + gcry_sexp_t s_skey; + const char *algoname; + gcry_sexp_t uri_sexp, comment_sexp; + const char *uri, *comment; + size_t uri_length, comment_length; + char *format, *p; + void *args[4+2+2+1]; /* Size is max. # of elements + 2 for uri + 2 + for comment + end-of-list. */ + int argidx; + gcry_sexp_t list, l2; + const char *name; + const char *s; + size_t n; + const char *elems; + gcry_mpi_t *array; + + (void)ctrl; + + *result = NULL; + + rc = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "shadowed-private-key", 0 ); + if (!list) + list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "protected-private-key", 0 ); + if (!list) + list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "private-key", 0 ); + if (!list) + { + log_error ("invalid private key format\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + } + + l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + list = l2; + name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 0, &n); + if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "rsa", 3)) + { + algoname = "rsa"; + elems = "ne"; + } + else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "dsa", 3)) + { + algoname = "dsa"; + elems = "pqgy"; + } + else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "elg", 3)) + { + algoname = "elg"; + elems = "pgy"; + } + else + { + log_error ("unknown private key algorithm\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + } + + /* Allocate an array for the parameters and copy them out of the + secret key. FIXME: We should have a generic copy function. */ + array = xtrycalloc (strlen(elems) + 1, sizeof *array); + if (!array) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + return rc; + } + + for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ ) + { + l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1); + if (!l2) + { + /* Required parameter not found. */ + for (i=0; i<idx; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + } + array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); + gcry_sexp_release (l2); + if (!array[idx]) + { + /* Required parameter is invalid. */ + for (i=0; i<idx; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + } + } + gcry_sexp_release (list); + list = NULL; + + uri = NULL; + uri_length = 0; + uri_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "uri", 0); + if (uri_sexp) + uri = gcry_sexp_nth_data (uri_sexp, 1, &uri_length); + + comment = NULL; + comment_length = 0; + comment_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "comment", 0); + if (comment_sexp) + comment = gcry_sexp_nth_data (comment_sexp, 1, &comment_length); + + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + s_skey = NULL; + + + /* FIXME: The following thing is pretty ugly code; we should + investigate how to make it cleaner. Probably code to handle + canonical S-expressions in a memory buffer is better suioted for + such a task. After all that is what we do in protect.c. Neeed + to find common patterns and write a straightformward API to use + them. */ + assert (sizeof (size_t) <= sizeof (void*)); + + format = xtrymalloc (15+7*strlen (elems)+10+15+1+1); + if (!format) + { + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + for (i=0; array[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (uri_sexp); + gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp); + return rc; + } + + argidx = 0; + p = stpcpy (stpcpy (format, "(public-key("), algoname); + for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ ) + { + *p++ = '('; + *p++ = *s; + p = stpcpy (p, " %m)"); + assert (argidx < DIM (args)); + args[argidx++] = &array[idx]; + } + *p++ = ')'; + if (uri) + { + p = stpcpy (p, "(uri %b)"); + assert (argidx+1 < DIM (args)); + args[argidx++] = (void *)uri_length; + args[argidx++] = (void *)uri; + } + if (comment) + { + p = stpcpy (p, "(comment %b)"); + assert (argidx+1 < DIM (args)); + args[argidx++] = (void *)comment_length; + args[argidx++] = (void*)comment; + } + *p++ = ')'; + *p = 0; + assert (argidx < DIM (args)); + args[argidx] = NULL; + + rc = gcry_sexp_build_array (&list, NULL, format, args); + xfree (format); + for (i=0; array[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (uri_sexp); + gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp); + + if (!rc) + *result = list; + return rc; +} + + + +/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp after locating it using the grip. + Returns NULL if key is not available. 0 = key is available */ +int +agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip) +{ + int result; + char *fname; + char hexgrip[40+4+1]; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key"); + + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL); + result = !access (fname, R_OK)? 0 : -1; + xfree (fname); + return result; +} + + + +/* Return the information about the secret key specified by the binary + keygrip GRIP. If the key is a shadowed one the shadow information + will be stored at the address R_SHADOW_INFO as an allocated + S-expression. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip, + int *r_keytype, unsigned char **r_shadow_info) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + int keytype; + + (void)ctrl; + + if (r_keytype) + *r_keytype = PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN; + if (r_shadow_info) + *r_shadow_info = NULL; + + { + gcry_sexp_t sexp; + + err = read_key_file (grip, &sexp); + if (err) + { + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + else + return err; + } + err = make_canon_sexp (sexp, &buf, &len); + gcry_sexp_release (sexp); + if (err) + return err; + } + + keytype = agent_private_key_type (buf); + switch (keytype) + { + case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR: + break; + case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED: + /* If we ever require it we could retrieve the comment fields + from such a key. */ + break; + case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED: + if (r_shadow_info) + { + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + + err = agent_get_shadow_info (buf, &s); + if (!err) + { + n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (s, 0, NULL, NULL); + assert (n); + *r_shadow_info = xtrymalloc (n); + if (!*r_shadow_info) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + memcpy (*r_shadow_info, s, n); + } + } + break; + default: + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + break; + } + + if (!err && r_keytype) + *r_keytype = keytype; + + xfree (buf); + return err; +} diff --git a/agent/genkey.c b/agent/genkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..176e77d --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/genkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* genkey.c - Generate a keypair + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "exechelp.h" +#include "sysutils.h" + +static int +store_key (gcry_sexp_t private, const char *passphrase, int force) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + unsigned char grip[20]; + + if ( !gcry_pk_get_keygrip (private, grip) ) + { + log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n"); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (private, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = gcry_malloc_secure (len); + if (!buf) + return out_of_core (); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (private, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + + if (passphrase) + { + unsigned char *p; + + rc = agent_protect (buf, passphrase, &p, &len); + if (rc) + { + xfree (buf); + return rc; + } + xfree (buf); + buf = p; + } + + rc = agent_write_private_key (grip, buf, len, force); + xfree (buf); + return rc; +} + + +/* Count the number of non-alpha characters in S. Control characters + and non-ascii characters are not considered. */ +static size_t +nonalpha_count (const char *s) +{ + size_t n; + + for (n=0; *s; s++) + if (isascii (*s) && ( isdigit (*s) || ispunct (*s) )) + n++; + + return n; +} + + +/* Check PW against a list of pattern. Return 0 if PW does not match + these pattern. */ +static int +check_passphrase_pattern (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *pw) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + const char *pgmname = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_CHECK_PATTERN); + FILE *infp; + const char *argv[10]; + pid_t pid; + int result, i; + + (void)ctrl; + + infp = gnupg_tmpfile (); + if (!infp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error creating temporary file: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + return 1; /* Error - assume password should not be used. */ + } + + if (fwrite (pw, strlen (pw), 1, infp) != 1) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error writing to temporary file: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + fclose (infp); + return 1; /* Error - assume password should not be used. */ + } + rewind (infp); + + i = 0; + argv[i++] = "--null"; + argv[i++] = "--", + argv[i++] = opt.check_passphrase_pattern, + argv[i] = NULL; + assert (i < sizeof argv); + + if (gnupg_spawn_process_fd (pgmname, argv, fileno (infp), -1, -1, &pid)) + result = 1; /* Execute error - assume password should no be used. */ + else if (gnupg_wait_process (pgmname, pid, NULL)) + result = 1; /* Helper returned an error - probably a match. */ + else + result = 0; /* Success; i.e. no match. */ + + /* Overwrite our temporary file. */ + rewind (infp); + for (i=((strlen (pw)+99)/100)*100; i > 0; i--) + putc ('\xff', infp); + fflush (infp); + fclose (infp); + return result; +} + + +static int +take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *anyway_btn) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints) + { + err = agent_show_message (ctrl, desc, _("Enter new passphrase")); + if (!err) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + } + else + err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, + anyway_btn, _("Enter new passphrase"), 0); + return err; +} + + +static int +take_this_one_anyway (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc) +{ + return take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl, desc, _("Take this one anyway")); +} + + +/* Check whether the passphrase PW is suitable. Returns 0 if the + passphrase is suitable and true if it is not and the user should be + asked to provide a different one. If SILENT is set, no message are + displayed. */ +int +check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *pw, int silent) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned int minlen = opt.min_passphrase_len; + unsigned int minnonalpha = opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha; + + if (!pw) + pw = ""; + + if (utf8_charcount (pw) < minlen ) + { + char *desc; + + if (silent) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + + desc = xtryasprintf + ( ngettext ("Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase.%%0A" + "A passphrase should be at least %u character long.", + "Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase.%%0A" + "A passphrase should be at least %u characters long.", + minlen), minlen ); + if (!desc) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + err = take_this_one_anyway (ctrl, desc); + xfree (desc); + if (err) + return err; + } + + if (nonalpha_count (pw) < minnonalpha ) + { + char *desc; + + if (silent) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + + desc = xtryasprintf + ( ngettext ("Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase.%%0A" + "A passphrase should contain at least %u digit or%%0A" + "special character.", + "Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase.%%0A" + "A passphrase should contain at least %u digits or%%0A" + "special characters.", + minnonalpha), minnonalpha ); + if (!desc) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + err = take_this_one_anyway (ctrl, desc); + xfree (desc); + if (err) + return err; + } + + /* If configured check the passphrase against a list of know words + and pattern. The actual test is done by an external program. + The warning message is generic to give the user no hint on how to + circumvent this list. */ + if (*pw && opt.check_passphrase_pattern && + check_passphrase_pattern (ctrl, pw)) + { + const char *desc = + /* */ _("Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase.%%0A" + "A passphrase may not be a known term or match%%0A" + "certain pattern."); + + if (silent) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + + err = take_this_one_anyway (ctrl, desc); + if (err) + return err; + } + + /* The final check is to warn about an empty passphrase. */ + if (!*pw) + { + const char *desc = (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints? + _("You have not entered a passphrase!%0A" + "An empty passphrase is not allowed.") : + _("You have not entered a passphrase - " + "this is in general a bad idea!%0A" + "Please confirm that you do not want to " + "have any protection on your key.")); + + if (silent) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + + err = take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl, desc, + _("Yes, protection is not needed")); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Callback function to compare the first entered PIN with the one + currently being entered. */ +static int +reenter_compare_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi) +{ + const char *pin1 = pi->check_cb_arg; + + if (!strcmp (pin1, pi->pin)) + return 0; /* okay */ + return -1; +} + + + +/* Generate a new keypair according to the parameters given in + KEYPARAM */ +int +agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyparam, size_t keyparamlen, + membuf_t *outbuf) +{ + gcry_sexp_t s_keyparam, s_key, s_private, s_public; + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi, *pi2; + int rc; + size_t len; + char *buf; + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_keyparam, NULL, keyparam, keyparamlen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to convert keyparam: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + + /* Get the passphrase now, cause key generation may take a while. */ + { + const char *text1 = _("Please enter the passphrase to%0A" + "to protect your new key"); + const char *text2 = _("Please re-enter this passphrase"); + const char *initial_errtext = NULL; + + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (2, sizeof (*pi) + 100); + pi2 = pi + (sizeof *pi + 100); + pi->max_length = 100; + pi->max_tries = 3; + pi->with_qualitybar = 1; + pi2->max_length = 100; + pi2->max_tries = 3; + pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb; + pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin; + + next_try: + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, text1, NULL, initial_errtext, pi); + initial_errtext = NULL; + if (!rc) + { + if (check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl, pi->pin, 0)) + { + pi->failed_tries = 0; + pi2->failed_tries = 0; + goto next_try; + } + if (pi->pin && *pi->pin) + { + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, text2, NULL, NULL, pi2); + if (rc == -1) + { /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not + hit cancel. */ + initial_errtext = _("does not match - try again"); + goto next_try; + } + } + } + if (rc) + { + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + + if (!*pi->pin) + { + xfree (pi); + pi = NULL; /* User does not want a passphrase. */ + } + } + + rc = gcry_pk_genkey (&s_key, s_keyparam ); + gcry_sexp_release (s_keyparam); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + + /* break out the parts */ + s_private = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "private-key", 0); + if (!s_private) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: invalid return value\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + xfree (pi); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + s_public = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "public-key", 0); + if (!s_public) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: invalid return value\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + xfree (pi); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); s_key = NULL; + + /* store the secret key */ + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_debug ("storing private key\n"); + rc = store_key (s_private, pi? pi->pin:NULL, 0); + xfree (pi); pi = NULL; + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + if (rc) + { + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + return rc; + } + + /* return the public key */ + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_debug ("returning public key\n"); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_public, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = xtrymalloc (len); + if (!buf) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core (); + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + return tmperr; + } + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_public, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + xfree (buf); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Apply a new passpahrse to the key S_SKEY and store it. */ +int +agent_protect_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_skey) +{ + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi, *pi2; + int rc; + + { + const char *text1 = _("Please enter the new passphrase"); + const char *text2 = _("Please re-enter this passphrase"); + const char *initial_errtext = NULL; + + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (2, sizeof (*pi) + 100); + pi2 = pi + (sizeof *pi + 100); + pi->max_length = 100; + pi->max_tries = 3; + pi->with_qualitybar = 1; + pi2->max_length = 100; + pi2->max_tries = 3; + pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb; + pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin; + + next_try: + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, text1, NULL, initial_errtext, pi); + initial_errtext = NULL; + if (!rc) + { + if (check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl, pi->pin, 0)) + { + pi->failed_tries = 0; + pi2->failed_tries = 0; + goto next_try; + } + /* Unless the passphrase is empty, ask to confirm it. */ + if (pi->pin && *pi->pin) + { + rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, text2, NULL, NULL, pi2); + if (rc == -1) + { /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not + hit cancel. */ + initial_errtext = _("does not match - try again"); + goto next_try; + } + } + } + if (rc) + { + xfree (pi); + return rc; + } + + if (!*pi->pin) + { + xfree (pi); + pi = NULL; /* User does not want a passphrase. */ + } + } + + rc = store_key (s_skey, pi? pi->pin:NULL, 1); + xfree (pi); + return rc; +} diff --git a/agent/gpg-agent.c b/agent/gpg-agent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b00d899 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/gpg-agent.c @@ -0,0 +1,2291 @@ +/* gpg-agent.c - The GnuPG Agent + * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, + * 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +# include <sys/socket.h> +# include <sys/un.h> +#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ +#include <unistd.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <pth.h> + +#define JNLIB_NEED_LOG_LOGV +#define JNLIB_NEED_AFLOCAL +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> /* Malloc hooks and socket wrappers. */ + +#include "i18n.h" +#include "mkdtemp.h" /* Gnulib replacement. */ +#include "sysutils.h" +#include "setenv.h" +#include "gc-opt-flags.h" +#include "exechelp.h" +#include "../common/estream.h" + +enum cmd_and_opt_values +{ aNull = 0, + oCsh = 'c', + oQuiet = 'q', + oSh = 's', + oVerbose = 'v', + + oNoVerbose = 500, + aGPGConfList, + aGPGConfTest, + aUseStandardSocketP, + oOptions, + oDebug, + oDebugAll, + oDebugLevel, + oDebugWait, + oNoGreeting, + oNoOptions, + oHomedir, + oNoDetach, + oNoGrab, + oLogFile, + oServer, + oDaemon, + oBatch, + + oPinentryProgram, + oPinentryTouchFile, + oDisplay, + oTTYname, + oTTYtype, + oLCctype, + oLCmessages, + oXauthority, + oScdaemonProgram, + oDefCacheTTL, + oDefCacheTTLSSH, + oMaxCacheTTL, + oMaxCacheTTLSSH, + oEnforcePassphraseConstraints, + oMinPassphraseLen, + oMinPassphraseNonalpha, + oCheckPassphrasePattern, + oMaxPassphraseDays, + oEnablePassphraseHistory, + oUseStandardSocket, + oNoUseStandardSocket, + oFakedSystemTime, + + oIgnoreCacheForSigning, + oAllowMarkTrusted, + oAllowPresetPassphrase, + oKeepTTY, + oKeepDISPLAY, + oSSHSupport, + oDisableScdaemon, + oWriteEnvFile +}; + + + +static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = { + + { aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", 256, "@" }, + { aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", 256, "@" }, + { aUseStandardSocketP, "use-standard-socket-p", 256, "@" }, + + { 301, NULL, 0, N_("@Options:\n ") }, + + { oServer, "server", 0, N_("run in server mode (foreground)") }, + { oDaemon, "daemon", 0, N_("run in daemon mode (background)") }, + { oVerbose, "verbose", 0, N_("verbose") }, + { oQuiet, "quiet", 0, N_("be somewhat more quiet") }, + { oSh, "sh", 0, N_("sh-style command output") }, + { oCsh, "csh", 0, N_("csh-style command output") }, + { oOptions, "options" , 2, N_("|FILE|read options from FILE")}, + { oDebug, "debug" ,4|16, "@"}, + { oDebugAll, "debug-all" ,0, "@"}, + { oDebugLevel, "debug-level" ,2, "@"}, + { oDebugWait,"debug-wait",1, "@"}, + { oNoDetach, "no-detach" ,0, N_("do not detach from the console")}, + { oNoGrab, "no-grab" ,0, N_("do not grab keyboard and mouse")}, + { oLogFile, "log-file" ,2, N_("use a log file for the server")}, + { oUseStandardSocket, "use-standard-socket", 0, + N_("use a standard location for the socket")}, + { oNoUseStandardSocket, "no-use-standard-socket", 0, "@"}, + { oPinentryProgram, "pinentry-program", 2 , + N_("|PGM|use PGM as the PIN-Entry program") }, + { oPinentryTouchFile, "pinentry-touch-file", 2 , "@" }, + { oScdaemonProgram, "scdaemon-program", 2 , + N_("|PGM|use PGM as the SCdaemon program") }, + { oDisableScdaemon, "disable-scdaemon", 0, N_("do not use the SCdaemon") }, + { oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", 2, "@" }, /* (epoch time) */ + + { oBatch, "batch", 0, "@" }, + { oHomedir, "homedir", 2, "@"}, + + { oDisplay, "display", 2, "@" }, + { oTTYname, "ttyname", 2, "@" }, + { oTTYtype, "ttytype", 2, "@" }, + { oLCctype, "lc-ctype", 2, "@" }, + { oLCmessages, "lc-messages", 2, "@" }, + { oXauthority, "xauthority", 2, "@" }, + { oKeepTTY, "keep-tty", 0, N_("ignore requests to change the TTY")}, + { oKeepDISPLAY, "keep-display", + 0, N_("ignore requests to change the X display")}, + + { oDefCacheTTL, "default-cache-ttl", 4, + N_("|N|expire cached PINs after N seconds")}, + { oDefCacheTTLSSH, "default-cache-ttl-ssh", 4, "@" }, + { oMaxCacheTTL, "max-cache-ttl", 4, "@" }, + { oMaxCacheTTLSSH, "max-cache-ttl-ssh", 4, "@" }, + + { oEnforcePassphraseConstraints, "enforce-passphrase-constraints", 0, "@"}, + { oMinPassphraseLen, "min-passphrase-len", 4, "@" }, + { oMinPassphraseNonalpha, "min-passphrase-nonalpha", 4, "@" }, + { oCheckPassphrasePattern, "check-passphrase-pattern", 2, "@" }, + { oMaxPassphraseDays, "max-passphrase-days", 4, "@" }, + { oEnablePassphraseHistory, "enable-passphrase-history", 0, "@" }, + + { oIgnoreCacheForSigning, "ignore-cache-for-signing", 0, + N_("do not use the PIN cache when signing")}, + { oAllowMarkTrusted, "allow-mark-trusted", 0, + N_("allow clients to mark keys as \"trusted\"")}, + { oAllowPresetPassphrase, "allow-preset-passphrase", 0, + N_("allow presetting passphrase")}, + { oSSHSupport, "enable-ssh-support", 0, N_("enable ssh-agent emulation") }, + { oWriteEnvFile, "write-env-file", 2|8, + N_("|FILE|write environment settings also to FILE")}, + {0} +}; + + +#define DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL (10*60) /* 10 minutes */ +#define DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH (30*60) /* 30 minutes */ +#define MAX_CACHE_TTL (120*60) /* 2 hours */ +#define MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH (120*60) /* 2 hours */ +#define MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN (8) +#define MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA (1) +#define MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS (0) + +/* The timer tick used for housekeeping stuff. For Windows we use a + longer period as the SetWaitableTimer seems to signal earlier than + the 2 seconds. */ +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +#define TIMERTICK_INTERVAL (4) +#else +#define TIMERTICK_INTERVAL (2) /* Seconds. */ +#endif + + +/* The list of open file descriptors at startup. Note that this list + has been allocated using the standard malloc. */ +static int *startup_fd_list; + +/* The signal mask at startup and a flag telling whether it is valid. */ +#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK +static sigset_t startup_signal_mask; +static int startup_signal_mask_valid; +#endif + +/* Flag to indicate that a shutdown was requested. */ +static int shutdown_pending; + +/* Counter for the currently running own socket checks. */ +static int check_own_socket_running; + +/* It is possible that we are currently running under setuid permissions */ +static int maybe_setuid = 1; + +/* Name of the communication socket used for native gpg-agent requests. */ +static char *socket_name; + +/* Name of the communication socket used for ssh-agent-emulation. */ +static char *socket_name_ssh; + +/* We need to keep track of the server's nonces (these are dummies for + POSIX systems). */ +static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce; +static assuan_sock_nonce_t socket_nonce_ssh; + + +/* Default values for options passed to the pinentry. */ +static char *default_display; +static char *default_ttyname; +static char *default_ttytype; +static char *default_lc_ctype; +static char *default_lc_messages; +static char *default_xauthority; + +/* Name of a config file, which will be reread on a HUP if it is not NULL. */ +static char *config_filename; + +/* Helper to implement --debug-level */ +static const char *debug_level; + +/* Keep track of the current log file so that we can avoid updating + the log file after a SIGHUP if it didn't changed. Malloced. */ +static char *current_logfile; + +/* The handle_tick() function may test whether a parent is still + running. We record the PID of the parent here or -1 if it should be + watched. */ +static pid_t parent_pid = (pid_t)(-1); + + +/* + Local prototypes. + */ + +static char *create_socket_name (char *standard_name, char *template); +static gnupg_fd_t create_server_socket (char *name, int is_ssh, + assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce); +static void create_directories (void); + +static void agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl); +static void agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl); + +static void handle_connections (gnupg_fd_t listen_fd, + gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_ssh); +static void check_own_socket (void); +static int check_for_running_agent (int silent, int mode); + +/* Pth wrapper function definitions. */ +ASSUAN_SYSTEM_PTH_IMPL; + +GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTH_IMPL; +static int fixed_gcry_pth_init (void) +{ + return pth_self ()? 0 : (pth_init () == FALSE) ? errno : 0; +} + + +#ifndef PTH_HAVE_PTH_THREAD_ID +static unsigned long pth_thread_id (void) +{ + return (unsigned long)pth_self (); +} +#endif + + + +/* + Functions. + */ + +static char * +make_libversion (const char *libname, const char *(*getfnc)(const char*)) +{ + const char *s; + char *result; + + if (maybe_setuid) + { + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 0, 0); /* Drop setuid. */ + maybe_setuid = 0; + } + s = getfnc (NULL); + result = xmalloc (strlen (libname) + 1 + strlen (s) + 1); + strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (result, libname), " "), s); + return result; +} + + +static const char * +my_strusage (int level) +{ + static char *ver_gcry; + const char *p; + + switch (level) + { + case 11: p = "gpg-agent (GnuPG)"; + break; + case 13: p = VERSION; break; + case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break; + /* TRANSLATORS: @EMAIL@ will get replaced by the actual bug + reporting address. This is so that we can change the + reporting address without breaking the translations. */ + case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break; + + case 20: + if (!ver_gcry) + ver_gcry = make_libversion ("libgcrypt", gcry_check_version); + p = ver_gcry; + break; + + case 1: + case 40: p = _("Usage: gpg-agent [options] (-h for help)"); + break; + case 41: p = _("Syntax: gpg-agent [options] [command [args]]\n" + "Secret key management for GnuPG\n"); + break; + + default: p = NULL; + } + return p; +} + + + +/* Setup the debugging. With the global variable DEBUG_LEVEL set to NULL + only the active debug flags are propagated to the subsystems. With + DEBUG_LEVEL set, a specific set of debug flags is set; thus overriding + all flags already set. Note that we don't fail here, because it is + important to keep gpg-agent running even after re-reading the + options due to a SIGHUP. */ +static void +set_debug (void) +{ + int numok = (debug_level && digitp (debug_level)); + int numlvl = numok? atoi (debug_level) : 0; + + if (!debug_level) + ; + else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "none") || (numok && numlvl < 1)) + opt.debug = 0; + else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "basic") || (numok && numlvl <= 2)) + opt.debug = DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE; + else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "advanced") || (numok && numlvl <= 5)) + opt.debug = DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE|DBG_COMMAND_VALUE; + else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "expert") || (numok && numlvl <= 8)) + opt.debug = (DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE|DBG_COMMAND_VALUE + |DBG_CACHE_VALUE); + else if (!strcmp (debug_level, "guru") || numok) + { + opt.debug = ~0; + /* Unless the "guru" string has been used we don't want to allow + hashing debugging. The rationale is that people tend to + select the highest debug value and would then clutter their + disk with debug files which may reveal confidential data. */ + if (numok) + opt.debug &= ~(DBG_HASHING_VALUE); + } + else + { + log_error (_("invalid debug-level `%s' given\n"), debug_level); + opt.debug = 0; /* Reset debugging, so that prior debug + statements won't have an undesired effect. */ + } + + if (opt.debug && !opt.verbose) + opt.verbose = 1; + if (opt.debug && opt.quiet) + opt.quiet = 0; + + if (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE) + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 2); + if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE ) + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_VERBOSITY, (int)opt.verbose); + + if (opt.debug) + log_info ("enabled debug flags:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (opt.debug & DBG_COMMAND_VALUE)? " command":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE )? " mpi":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )? " crypto":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE )? " memory":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE )? " cache":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE)? " memstat":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)? " hashing":"", + (opt.debug & DBG_ASSUAN_VALUE )? " assuan":""); +} + + +/* Helper for cleanup to remove one socket with NAME. */ +static void +remove_socket (char *name) +{ + if (name && *name) + { + char *p; + + remove (name); + p = strrchr (name, '/'); + if (p) + { + *p = 0; + rmdir (name); + *p = '/'; + } + *name = 0; + } +} + +static void +cleanup (void) +{ + remove_socket (socket_name); + remove_socket (socket_name_ssh); +} + + + +/* Handle options which are allowed to be reset after program start. + Return true when the current option in PARGS could be handled and + false if not. As a special feature, passing a value of NULL for + PARGS, resets the options to the default. REREAD should be set + true if it is not the initial option parsing. */ +static int +parse_rereadable_options (ARGPARSE_ARGS *pargs, int reread) +{ + if (!pargs) + { /* reset mode */ + opt.quiet = 0; + opt.verbose = 0; + opt.debug = 0; + opt.no_grab = 0; + opt.pinentry_program = NULL; + opt.pinentry_touch_file = NULL; + opt.scdaemon_program = NULL; + opt.def_cache_ttl = DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL; + opt.def_cache_ttl_ssh = DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH; + opt.max_cache_ttl = MAX_CACHE_TTL; + opt.max_cache_ttl_ssh = MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH; + opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints = 0; + opt.min_passphrase_len = MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN; + opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha = MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA; + opt.check_passphrase_pattern = NULL; + opt.max_passphrase_days = MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS; + opt.enable_passhrase_history = 0; + opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 0; + opt.allow_mark_trusted = 0; + opt.disable_scdaemon = 0; + return 1; + } + + switch (pargs->r_opt) + { + case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break; + case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break; + + case oDebug: opt.debug |= pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break; + case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs->r.ret_str; break; + + case oLogFile: + if (!reread) + return 0; /* not handeld */ + if (!current_logfile || !pargs->r.ret_str + || strcmp (current_logfile, pargs->r.ret_str)) + { + log_set_file (pargs->r.ret_str); + if (DBG_ASSUAN) + assuan_set_assuan_log_stream (log_get_stream ()); + xfree (current_logfile); + current_logfile = xtrystrdup (pargs->r.ret_str); + } + break; + + case oNoGrab: opt.no_grab = 1; break; + + case oPinentryProgram: opt.pinentry_program = pargs->r.ret_str; break; + case oPinentryTouchFile: opt.pinentry_touch_file = pargs->r.ret_str; break; + case oScdaemonProgram: opt.scdaemon_program = pargs->r.ret_str; break; + case oDisableScdaemon: opt.disable_scdaemon = 1; break; + + case oDefCacheTTL: opt.def_cache_ttl = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + case oDefCacheTTLSSH: opt.def_cache_ttl_ssh = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + case oMaxCacheTTL: opt.max_cache_ttl = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + case oMaxCacheTTLSSH: opt.max_cache_ttl_ssh = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + + case oEnforcePassphraseConstraints: + opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints=1; + break; + case oMinPassphraseLen: opt.min_passphrase_len = pargs->r.ret_ulong; break; + case oMinPassphraseNonalpha: + opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha = pargs->r.ret_ulong; + break; + case oCheckPassphrasePattern: + opt.check_passphrase_pattern = pargs->r.ret_str; + break; + case oMaxPassphraseDays: + opt.max_passphrase_days = pargs->r.ret_ulong; + break; + case oEnablePassphraseHistory: + opt.enable_passhrase_history = 1; + break; + + case oIgnoreCacheForSigning: opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 1; break; + + case oAllowMarkTrusted: opt.allow_mark_trusted = 1; break; + + case oAllowPresetPassphrase: opt.allow_preset_passphrase = 1; break; + + default: + return 0; /* not handled */ + } + + return 1; /* handled */ +} + + +/* The main entry point. */ +int +main (int argc, char **argv ) +{ + ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs; + int orig_argc; + char **orig_argv; + FILE *configfp = NULL; + char *configname = NULL; + const char *shell; + unsigned configlineno; + int parse_debug = 0; + int default_config =1; + int greeting = 0; + int nogreeting = 0; + int pipe_server = 0; + int is_daemon = 0; + int nodetach = 0; + int csh_style = 0; + char *logfile = NULL; + int debug_wait = 0; + int gpgconf_list = 0; + gpg_error_t err; + const char *env_file_name = NULL; + struct assuan_malloc_hooks malloc_hooks; + + /* Before we do anything else we save the list of currently open + file descriptors and the signal mask. This info is required to + do the exec call properly. */ + startup_fd_list = get_all_open_fds (); +#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK + if (!sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, NULL, &startup_signal_mask)) + startup_signal_mask_valid = 1; +#endif /*HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/ + + /* Set program name etc. */ + set_strusage (my_strusage); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN); + /* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL + when adding any stuff between here and the call to INIT_SECMEM() + somewhere after the option parsing */ + log_set_prefix ("gpg-agent", JNLIB_LOG_WITH_PREFIX|JNLIB_LOG_WITH_PID); + + /* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */ + i18n_init (); + init_common_subsystems (); + + + /* Libgcrypt requires us to register the threading model first. + Note that this will also do the pth_init. */ + gcry_threads_pth.init = fixed_gcry_pth_init; + err = gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_THREAD_CBS, &gcry_threads_pth); + if (err) + { + log_fatal ("can't register GNU Pth with Libgcrypt: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + } + + + /* Check that the libraries are suitable. Do it here because + the option parsing may need services of the library. */ + if (!gcry_check_version (NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION) ) + { + log_fatal( _("%s is too old (need %s, have %s)\n"), "libgcrypt", + NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, gcry_check_version (NULL) ); + } + + malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc; + malloc_hooks.realloc = gcry_realloc; + malloc_hooks.free = gcry_free; + assuan_set_malloc_hooks (&malloc_hooks); + assuan_set_assuan_log_prefix (log_get_prefix (NULL)); + assuan_set_gpg_err_source (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT); + assuan_set_system_hooks (ASSUAN_SYSTEM_PTH); + assuan_sock_init (); + + setup_libgcrypt_logging (); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL); + + disable_core_dumps (); + + /* Set default options. */ + parse_rereadable_options (NULL, 0); /* Reset them to default values. */ +#ifdef USE_STANDARD_SOCKET + opt.use_standard_socket = 1; /* Under Windows we always use a standard + socket. */ +#endif + + shell = getenv ("SHELL"); + if (shell && strlen (shell) >= 3 && !strcmp (shell+strlen (shell)-3, "csh") ) + csh_style = 1; + + opt.homedir = default_homedir (); + + /* Record some of the original environment strings. */ + { + const char *s; + int idx; + static const char *names[] = + { "DISPLAY", "TERM", "XAUTHORITY", "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL }; + + err = 0; + opt.startup_env = session_env_new (); + if (!opt.startup_env) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + for (idx=0; !err && names[idx]; idx++) + { + s = getenv (names[idx]); + if (s) + err = session_env_setenv (opt.startup_env, names[idx], s); + } + if (!err) + { + s = ttyname (0); + if (s) + err = session_env_setenv (opt.startup_env, "GPG_TTY", s); + } + if (err) + log_fatal ("error recording startup environment: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + + /* Fixme: Better use the locale function here. */ + opt.startup_lc_ctype = getenv ("LC_CTYPE"); + if (opt.startup_lc_ctype) + opt.startup_lc_ctype = xstrdup (opt.startup_lc_ctype); + opt.startup_lc_messages = getenv ("LC_MESSAGES"); + if (opt.startup_lc_messages) + opt.startup_lc_messages = xstrdup (opt.startup_lc_messages); + } + + /* Check whether we have a config file on the commandline */ + orig_argc = argc; + orig_argv = argv; + pargs.argc = &argc; + pargs.argv = &argv; + pargs.flags= 1|(1<<6); /* do not remove the args, ignore version */ + while (arg_parse( &pargs, opts)) + { + if (pargs.r_opt == oDebug || pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll) + parse_debug++; + else if (pargs.r_opt == oOptions) + { /* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but + read the option file when it is encountered at the + commandline */ + default_config = 0; + } + else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions) + default_config = 0; /* --no-options */ + else if (pargs.r_opt == oHomedir) + opt.homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; + } + + /* Initialize the secure memory. */ + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 32768, 0); + maybe_setuid = 0; + + /* + Now we are now working under our real uid + */ + + if (default_config) + configname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "gpg-agent.conf", NULL ); + + argc = orig_argc; + argv = orig_argv; + pargs.argc = &argc; + pargs.argv = &argv; + pargs.flags= 1; /* do not remove the args */ + next_pass: + if (configname) + { + configlineno = 0; + configfp = fopen (configname, "r"); + if (!configfp) + { + if (default_config) + { + if( parse_debug ) + log_info (_("NOTE: no default option file `%s'\n"), + configname ); + /* Save the default conf file name so that + reread_configuration is able to test whether the + config file has been created in the meantime. */ + xfree (config_filename); + config_filename = configname; + configname = NULL; + } + else + { + log_error (_("option file `%s': %s\n"), + configname, strerror(errno) ); + exit(2); + } + xfree (configname); + configname = NULL; + } + if (parse_debug && configname ) + log_info (_("reading options from `%s'\n"), configname ); + default_config = 0; + } + + while (optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno, &pargs, opts) ) + { + if (parse_rereadable_options (&pargs, 0)) + continue; /* Already handled */ + switch (pargs.r_opt) + { + case aGPGConfList: gpgconf_list = 1; break; + case aGPGConfTest: gpgconf_list = 2; break; + case aUseStandardSocketP: gpgconf_list = 3; break; + case oBatch: opt.batch=1; break; + + case oDebugWait: debug_wait = pargs.r.ret_int; break; + + case oOptions: + /* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */ + if (!configfp) + { + xfree(configname); + configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); + goto next_pass; + } + break; + case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break; + case oNoVerbose: opt.verbose = 0; break; + case oNoOptions: break; /* no-options */ + case oHomedir: opt.homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + case oNoDetach: nodetach = 1; break; + case oLogFile: logfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + case oCsh: csh_style = 1; break; + case oSh: csh_style = 0; break; + case oServer: pipe_server = 1; break; + case oDaemon: is_daemon = 1; break; + + case oDisplay: default_display = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break; + case oTTYname: default_ttyname = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break; + case oTTYtype: default_ttytype = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break; + case oLCctype: default_lc_ctype = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); break; + case oLCmessages: default_lc_messages = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); + case oXauthority: default_xauthority = xstrdup (pargs.r.ret_str); + break; + + case oUseStandardSocket: opt.use_standard_socket = 1; break; + case oNoUseStandardSocket: opt.use_standard_socket = 0; break; + + case oFakedSystemTime: + { + time_t faked_time = isotime2epoch (pargs.r.ret_str); + if (faked_time == (time_t)(-1)) + faked_time = (time_t)strtoul (pargs.r.ret_str, NULL, 10); + gnupg_set_time (faked_time, 0); + } + break; + + case oKeepTTY: opt.keep_tty = 1; break; + case oKeepDISPLAY: opt.keep_display = 1; break; + + case oSSHSupport: opt.ssh_support = 1; break; + case oWriteEnvFile: + if (pargs.r_type) + env_file_name = pargs.r.ret_str; + else + env_file_name = make_filename ("~/.gpg-agent-info", NULL); + break; + + default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break; + } + } + if (configfp) + { + fclose( configfp ); + configfp = NULL; + /* Keep a copy of the name so that it can be read on SIGHUP. */ + if (config_filename != configname) + { + xfree (config_filename); + config_filename = configname; + } + configname = NULL; + goto next_pass; + } + + xfree (configname); + configname = NULL; + if (log_get_errorcount(0)) + exit(2); + if (nogreeting ) + greeting = 0; + + if (greeting) + { + fprintf (stderr, "%s %s; %s\n", + strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) ); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) ); + } +#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION + /* We don't want to print it here because gpg-agent is useful of its + own and quite matured. */ + /*log_info ("NOTE: this is a development version!\n");*/ +#endif + + set_debug (); + + if (atexit (cleanup)) + { + log_error ("atexit failed\n"); + cleanup (); + exit (1); + } + + initialize_module_call_pinentry (); + initialize_module_call_scd (); + initialize_module_trustlist (); + + /* Try to create missing directories. */ + create_directories (); + + if (debug_wait && pipe_server) + { + log_debug ("waiting for debugger - my pid is %u .....\n", + (unsigned int)getpid()); + gnupg_sleep (debug_wait); + log_debug ("... okay\n"); + } + + if (gpgconf_list == 3) + agent_exit (!opt.use_standard_socket); + if (gpgconf_list == 2) + agent_exit (0); + if (gpgconf_list) + { + char *filename; + char *filename_esc; + + /* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format. */ + filename = make_filename (opt.homedir, "gpg-agent.conf", NULL ); + filename_esc = percent_escape (filename, NULL); + + printf ("gpgconf-gpg-agent.conf:%lu:\"%s\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, filename_esc); + xfree (filename); + xfree (filename_esc); + + printf ("verbose:%lu:\n" + "quiet:%lu:\n" + "debug-level:%lu:\"none:\n" + "log-file:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME ); + printf ("default-cache-ttl:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL ); + printf ("default-cache-ttl-ssh:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SSH ); + printf ("max-cache-ttl:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MAX_CACHE_TTL ); + printf ("max-cache-ttl-ssh:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MAX_CACHE_TTL_SSH ); + printf ("enforce-passphrase-constraints:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("min-passphrase-len:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN ); + printf ("min-passphrase-nonalpha:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, + MIN_PASSPHRASE_NONALPHA); + printf ("check-passphrase-pattern:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("max-passphrase-days:%lu:%d:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME, + MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS); + printf ("enable-passphrase-history:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("no-grab:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("ignore-cache-for-signing:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("allow-mark-trusted:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + printf ("disable-scdaemon:%lu:\n", + GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE|GC_OPT_FLAG_RUNTIME); + + agent_exit (0); + } + + /* If this has been called without any options, we merely check + whether an agent is already running. We do this here so that we + don't clobber a logfile but print it directly to stderr. */ + if (!pipe_server && !is_daemon) + { + log_set_prefix (NULL, JNLIB_LOG_WITH_PREFIX); + check_for_running_agent (0, 0); + agent_exit (0); + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_NLS + /* gpg-agent usually does not output any messages because it runs in + the background. For log files it is acceptable to have messages + always encoded in utf-8. We switch here to utf-8, so that + commands like --help still give native messages. It is far + easier to switch only once instead of for every message and it + actually helps when more then one thread is active (avoids an + extra copy step). */ + bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE_GT, "UTF-8"); +#endif + + /* Now start with logging to a file if this is desired. */ + if (logfile) + { + log_set_file (logfile); + log_set_prefix (NULL, (JNLIB_LOG_WITH_PREFIX + |JNLIB_LOG_WITH_TIME + |JNLIB_LOG_WITH_PID)); + current_logfile = xstrdup (logfile); + } + if (DBG_ASSUAN) + assuan_set_assuan_log_stream (log_get_stream ()); + + /* Make sure that we have a default ttyname. */ + if (!default_ttyname && ttyname (1)) + default_ttyname = xstrdup (ttyname (1)); + if (!default_ttytype && getenv ("TERM")) + default_ttytype = xstrdup (getenv ("TERM")); + + + if (pipe_server) + { + /* This is the simple pipe based server */ + ctrl_t ctrl; + + ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl); + if (!ctrl) + { + log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + agent_exit (1); + } + ctrl->session_env = session_env_new (); + if (!ctrl->session_env) + { + log_error ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + xfree (ctrl); + agent_exit (1); + } + agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl); + start_command_handler (ctrl, GNUPG_INVALID_FD, GNUPG_INVALID_FD); + agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl); + xfree (ctrl); + } + else if (!is_daemon) + ; /* NOTREACHED */ + else + { /* Regular server mode */ + gnupg_fd_t fd; + gnupg_fd_t fd_ssh; + pid_t pid; + + /* Remove the DISPLAY variable so that a pinentry does not + default to a specific display. There is still a default + display when gpg-agent was started using --display or a + client requested this using an OPTION command. Note, that we + don't do this when running in reverse daemon mode (i.e. when + exec the program given as arguments). */ +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + if (!opt.keep_display && !argc) + unsetenv ("DISPLAY"); +#endif + + + /* Create the sockets. */ + socket_name = create_socket_name + ("S.gpg-agent", "/tmp/gpg-XXXXXX/S.gpg-agent"); + if (opt.ssh_support) + socket_name_ssh = create_socket_name + ("S.gpg-agent.ssh", "/tmp/gpg-XXXXXX/S.gpg-agent.ssh"); + + fd = create_server_socket (socket_name, 0, &socket_nonce); + if (opt.ssh_support) + fd_ssh = create_server_socket (socket_name_ssh, 1, &socket_nonce_ssh); + else + fd_ssh = GNUPG_INVALID_FD; + + /* If we are going to exec a program in the parent, we record + the PID, so that the child may check whether the program is + still alive. */ + if (argc) + parent_pid = getpid (); + + fflush (NULL); +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + pid = getpid (); + printf ("set GPG_AGENT_INFO=%s;%lu;1\n", socket_name, (ulong)pid); +#else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ + pid = fork (); + if (pid == (pid_t)-1) + { + log_fatal ("fork failed: %s\n", strerror (errno) ); + exit (1); + } + else if (pid) + { /* We are the parent */ + char *infostr, *infostr_ssh_sock, *infostr_ssh_pid; + + /* Close the socket FD. */ + close (fd); + + /* Note that we used a standard fork so that Pth runs in + both the parent and the child. The pth_fork would + terminate Pth in the child but that is not the way we + want it. Thus we use a plain fork and terminate Pth here + in the parent. The pth_kill may or may not work reliable + but it should not harm to call it. Because Pth fiddles + with the signal mask the signal mask might not be correct + right now and thus we restore it. That is not strictly + necessary but some programs falsely assume a cleared + signal mask. es_pth_kill is a wrapper around pth_kill to + take care not to use any Pth functions in the estream + code after Pth has been killed. */ + if ( !es_pth_kill () ) + log_error ("pth_kill failed in forked process\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK + if (startup_signal_mask_valid) + { + if (sigprocmask (SIG_SETMASK, &startup_signal_mask, NULL)) + log_error ("error restoring signal mask: %s\n", + strerror (errno)); + } + else + log_info ("no saved signal mask\n"); +#endif /*HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/ + + /* Create the info string: <name>:<pid>:<protocol_version> */ + if (asprintf (&infostr, "GPG_AGENT_INFO=%s:%lu:1", + socket_name, (ulong)pid ) < 0) + { + log_error ("out of core\n"); + kill (pid, SIGTERM); + exit (1); + } + if (opt.ssh_support) + { + if (asprintf (&infostr_ssh_sock, "SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%s", + socket_name_ssh) < 0) + { + log_error ("out of core\n"); + kill (pid, SIGTERM); + exit (1); + } + if (asprintf (&infostr_ssh_pid, "SSH_AGENT_PID=%u", + pid) < 0) + { + log_error ("out of core\n"); + kill (pid, SIGTERM); + exit (1); + } + } + + *socket_name = 0; /* Don't let cleanup() remove the socket - + the child should do this from now on */ + if (opt.ssh_support) + *socket_name_ssh = 0; + + if (env_file_name) + { + FILE *fp; + + fp = fopen (env_file_name, "w"); + if (!fp) + log_error (_("error creating `%s': %s\n"), + env_file_name, strerror (errno)); + else + { + fputs (infostr, fp); + putc ('\n', fp); + if (opt.ssh_support) + { + fputs (infostr_ssh_sock, fp); + putc ('\n', fp); + fputs (infostr_ssh_pid, fp); + putc ('\n', fp); + } + fclose (fp); + } + } + + + if (argc) + { /* Run the program given on the commandline. */ + if (putenv (infostr)) + { + log_error ("failed to set environment: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + kill (pid, SIGTERM ); + exit (1); + } + if (opt.ssh_support && putenv (infostr_ssh_sock)) + { + log_error ("failed to set environment: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + kill (pid, SIGTERM ); + exit (1); + } + if (opt.ssh_support && putenv (infostr_ssh_pid)) + { + log_error ("failed to set environment: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + kill (pid, SIGTERM ); + exit (1); + } + + /* Close all the file descriptors except the standard + ones and those open at startup. We explicitly don't + close 0,1,2 in case something went wrong collecting + them at startup. */ + close_all_fds (3, startup_fd_list); + + /* Run the command. */ + execvp (argv[0], argv); + log_error ("failed to run the command: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + kill (pid, SIGTERM); + exit (1); + } + else + { + /* Print the environment string, so that the caller can use + shell's eval to set it */ + if (csh_style) + { + *strchr (infostr, '=') = ' '; + printf ("setenv %s;\n", infostr); + if (opt.ssh_support) + { + *strchr (infostr_ssh_sock, '=') = ' '; + printf ("setenv %s;\n", infostr_ssh_sock); + *strchr (infostr_ssh_pid, '=') = ' '; + printf ("setenv %s;\n", infostr_ssh_pid); + } + } + else + { + printf ( "%s; export GPG_AGENT_INFO;\n", infostr); + if (opt.ssh_support) + { + printf ("%s; export SSH_AUTH_SOCK;\n", infostr_ssh_sock); + printf ("%s; export SSH_AGENT_PID;\n", infostr_ssh_pid); + } + } + xfree (infostr); + if (opt.ssh_support) + { + xfree (infostr_ssh_sock); + xfree (infostr_ssh_pid); + } + exit (0); + } + /*NOTREACHED*/ + } /* End parent */ + + /* + This is the child + */ + + /* Detach from tty and put process into a new session */ + if (!nodetach ) + { + int i; + unsigned int oldflags; + + /* Close stdin, stdout and stderr unless it is the log stream */ + for (i=0; i <= 2; i++) + { + if (!log_test_fd (i) && i != fd ) + { + if ( ! close (i) + && open ("/dev/null", i? O_WRONLY : O_RDONLY) == -1) + { + log_error ("failed to open `%s': %s\n", + "/dev/null", strerror (errno)); + cleanup (); + exit (1); + } + } + } + if (setsid() == -1) + { + log_error ("setsid() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) ); + cleanup (); + exit (1); + } + + log_get_prefix (&oldflags); + log_set_prefix (NULL, oldflags | JNLIB_LOG_RUN_DETACHED); + opt.running_detached = 1; + } + + if (chdir("/")) + { + log_error ("chdir to / failed: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + exit (1); + } + + { + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; + sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sigaction (SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL); + } +#endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ + + log_info ("%s %s started\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) ); + handle_connections (fd, opt.ssh_support ? fd_ssh : GNUPG_INVALID_FD); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + } + + return 0; +} + + +void +agent_exit (int rc) +{ + /*FIXME: update_random_seed_file();*/ +#if 1 + /* at this time a bit annoying */ + if (opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE) + { + gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_MEMORY_STATS ); + gcry_control( GCRYCTL_DUMP_RANDOM_STATS ); + } + if (opt.debug) + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DUMP_SECMEM_STATS ); +#endif + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM ); + rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0; + exit (rc); +} + + +static void +agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + /* Note we ignore malloc errors because we can't do much about it + and the request will fail anyway shortly after this + initialization. */ + session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "DISPLAY", default_display); + session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "GPG_TTY", default_ttyname); + session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "TERM", default_ttytype); + session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "XAUTHORITY", default_xauthority); + session_env_setenv (ctrl->session_env, "PINENTRY_USER_DATA", NULL); + + if (ctrl->lc_ctype) + xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype); + ctrl->lc_ctype = default_lc_ctype? xtrystrdup (default_lc_ctype) : NULL; + + if (ctrl->lc_messages) + xfree (ctrl->lc_messages); + ctrl->lc_messages = default_lc_messages? xtrystrdup (default_lc_messages) + /**/ : NULL; + +} + + +static void +agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl_t ctrl) +{ + session_env_release (ctrl->session_env); + + if (ctrl->lc_ctype) + xfree (ctrl->lc_ctype); + if (ctrl->lc_messages) + xfree (ctrl->lc_messages); +} + + +/* Reread parts of the configuration. Note, that this function is + obviously not thread-safe and should only be called from the PTH + signal handler. + + Fixme: Due to the way the argument parsing works, we create a + memory leak here for all string type arguments. There is currently + no clean way to tell whether the memory for the argument has been + allocated or points into the process' original arguments. Unless + we have a mechanism to tell this, we need to live on with this. */ +static void +reread_configuration (void) +{ + ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs; + FILE *fp; + unsigned int configlineno = 0; + int dummy; + + if (!config_filename) + return; /* No config file. */ + + fp = fopen (config_filename, "r"); + if (!fp) + { + log_info (_("option file `%s': %s\n"), + config_filename, strerror(errno) ); + return; + } + + parse_rereadable_options (NULL, 1); /* Start from the default values. */ + + memset (&pargs, 0, sizeof pargs); + dummy = 0; + pargs.argc = &dummy; + pargs.flags = 1; /* do not remove the args */ + while (optfile_parse (fp, config_filename, &configlineno, &pargs, opts) ) + { + if (pargs.r_opt < -1) + pargs.err = 1; /* Print a warning. */ + else /* Try to parse this option - ignore unchangeable ones. */ + parse_rereadable_options (&pargs, 1); + } + fclose (fp); + set_debug (); +} + + +/* Return the file name of the socket we are using for native + requests. */ +const char * +get_agent_socket_name (void) +{ + const char *s = socket_name; + + return (s && *s)? s : NULL; +} + +/* Return the file name of the socket we are using for SSH + requests. */ +const char * +get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void) +{ + const char *s = socket_name_ssh; + + return (s && *s)? s : NULL; +} + + +/* Under W32, this function returns the handle of the scdaemon + notification event. Calling it the first time creates that + event. */ +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +void * +get_agent_scd_notify_event (void) +{ + static HANDLE the_event; + + if (!the_event) + { + HANDLE h, h2; + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa = { sizeof (SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), NULL, TRUE}; + + /* We need to use manual reset evet object due to the way our + w32-pth wait function works: If we would use an automatic + reset event we are not able to figure out which handle has + been signaled because at the time we single out the signaled + handles using WFSO the event has already been reset due to + the WFMO. */ + h = CreateEvent (&sa, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + if (!h) + log_error ("can't create scd notify event: %s\n", w32_strerror (-1) ); + else if (!DuplicateHandle (GetCurrentProcess(), h, + GetCurrentProcess(), &h2, + EVENT_MODIFY_STATE|SYNCHRONIZE, TRUE, 0)) + { + log_error ("setting syncronize for scd notify event failed: %s\n", + w32_strerror (-1) ); + CloseHandle (h); + } + else + { + CloseHandle (h); + the_event = h2; + } + } + + log_debug ("returning notify handle %p\n", the_event); + return the_event; +} +#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ + + + +/* Create a name for the socket. With USE_STANDARD_SOCKET given as + true using STANDARD_NAME in the home directory or if given as + false from the mkdir type name TEMPLATE. In the latter case a + unique name in a unique new directory will be created. In both + cases check for valid characters as well as against a maximum + allowed length for a unix domain socket is done. The function + terminates the process in case of an error. Returns: Pointer to an + allocated string with the absolute name of the socket used. */ +static char * +create_socket_name (char *standard_name, char *template) +{ + char *name, *p; + + if (opt.use_standard_socket) + name = make_filename (opt.homedir, standard_name, NULL); + else + { + name = xstrdup (template); + p = strrchr (name, '/'); + if (!p) + BUG (); + *p = 0; + if (!mkdtemp (name)) + { + log_error (_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"), + name, strerror (errno)); + agent_exit (2); + } + *p = '/'; + } + + if (strchr (name, PATHSEP_C)) + { + log_error (("`%s' are not allowed in the socket name\n"), PATHSEP_S); + agent_exit (2); + } + if (strlen (name) + 1 >= DIMof (struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) ) + { + log_error (_("name of socket too long\n")); + agent_exit (2); + } + return name; +} + + + +/* Create a Unix domain socket with NAME. Returns the file descriptor + or terminates the process in case of an error. Not that this + function needs to be used for the regular socket first and only + then for the ssh socket. */ +static gnupg_fd_t +create_server_socket (char *name, int is_ssh, assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce) +{ + struct sockaddr_un *serv_addr; + socklen_t len; + gnupg_fd_t fd; + int rc; + + fd = assuan_sock_new (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd == ASSUAN_INVALID_FD) + { + log_error (_("can't create socket: %s\n"), strerror (errno)); + agent_exit (2); + } + + serv_addr = xmalloc (sizeof (*serv_addr)); + memset (serv_addr, 0, sizeof *serv_addr); + serv_addr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + if (strlen (name) + 1 >= sizeof (serv_addr->sun_path)) + { + log_error (_("socket name `%s' is too long\n"), name); + agent_exit (2); + } + strcpy (serv_addr->sun_path, name); + len = SUN_LEN (serv_addr); + rc = assuan_sock_bind (fd, (struct sockaddr*) serv_addr, len); + if (opt.use_standard_socket && rc == -1 && errno == EADDRINUSE) + { + /* Check whether a gpg-agent is already running on the standard + socket. We do this test only if this is not the ssh socket. + For ssh we assume that a test for gpg-agent has already been + done and reuse the requested ssh socket. Testing the + ssh-socket is not possible because at this point, though we + know the new Assuan socket, the Assuan server and thus the + ssh-agent server is not yet operational. This would lead to + a hang. */ + if (!is_ssh && !check_for_running_agent (1, 1)) + { + log_error (_("a gpg-agent is already running - " + "not starting a new one\n")); + *name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */ + assuan_sock_close (fd); + agent_exit (2); + } + remove (name); + rc = assuan_sock_bind (fd, (struct sockaddr*) serv_addr, len); + } + if (rc != -1 + && (rc=assuan_sock_get_nonce ((struct sockaddr*)serv_addr, len, nonce))) + log_error (_("error getting nonce for the socket\n")); + if (rc == -1) + { + /* We use gpg_strerror here because it allows us to get strings + for some W32 socket error codes. */ + log_error (_("error binding socket to `%s': %s\n"), + serv_addr->sun_path, + gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_errno (errno))); + + assuan_sock_close (fd); + if (opt.use_standard_socket) + *name = 0; /* Inhibit removal of the socket by cleanup(). */ + agent_exit (2); + } + + if (listen (FD2INT(fd), 5 ) == -1) + { + log_error (_("listen() failed: %s\n"), strerror (errno)); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + agent_exit (2); + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("listening on socket `%s'\n"), serv_addr->sun_path); + + return fd; +} + + +/* Check that the directory for storing the private keys exists and + create it if not. This function won't fail as it is only a + convenience function and not strictly necessary. */ +static void +create_private_keys_directory (const char *home) +{ + char *fname; + struct stat statbuf; + + fname = make_filename (home, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, NULL); + if (stat (fname, &statbuf) && errno == ENOENT) + { +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /*FIXME: Setup proper permissions. */ + if (!CreateDirectory (fname, NULL)) + log_error (_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"), + fname, w32_strerror (-1) ); +#else + if (mkdir (fname, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR )) + log_error (_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"), + fname, strerror (errno) ); +#endif + else if (!opt.quiet) + log_info (_("directory `%s' created\n"), fname); + } + xfree (fname); +} + +/* Create the directory only if the supplied directory name is the + same as the default one. This way we avoid to create arbitrary + directories when a non-default home directory is used. To cope + with HOME, we compare only the suffix if we see that the default + homedir does start with a tilde. We don't stop here in case of + problems because other functions will throw an error anyway.*/ +static void +create_directories (void) +{ + struct stat statbuf; + const char *defhome = standard_homedir (); + char *home; + + home = make_filename (opt.homedir, NULL); + if ( stat (home, &statbuf) ) + { + if (errno == ENOENT) + { + if ( +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + ( !compare_filenames (home, defhome) ) +#else + (*defhome == '~' + && (strlen (home) >= strlen (defhome+1) + && !strcmp (home + strlen(home) + - strlen (defhome+1), defhome+1))) + || (*defhome != '~' && !strcmp (home, defhome) ) +#endif + ) + { +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + if (!CreateDirectory (home, NULL)) + log_error (_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"), + home, w32_strerror (-1) ); +#else + if (mkdir (home, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR )) + log_error (_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"), + home, strerror (errno) ); +#endif + else + { + if (!opt.quiet) + log_info (_("directory `%s' created\n"), home); + create_private_keys_directory (home); + } + } + } + else + log_error (_("stat() failed for `%s': %s\n"), home, strerror (errno)); + } + else if ( !S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) + { + log_error (_("can't use `%s' as home directory\n"), home); + } + else /* exists and is a directory. */ + { + create_private_keys_directory (home); + } + xfree (home); +} + + + +/* This is the worker for the ticker. It is called every few seconds + and may only do fast operations. */ +static void +handle_tick (void) +{ + static time_t last_minute; + + if (!last_minute) + last_minute = time (NULL); + + /* Check whether the scdaemon has died and cleanup in this case. */ + agent_scd_check_aliveness (); + + /* If we are running as a child of another process, check whether + the parent is still alive and shutdown if not. */ +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + if (parent_pid != (pid_t)(-1)) + { + if (kill (parent_pid, 0)) + { + shutdown_pending = 2; + if (!opt.quiet) + { + log_info ("parent process died - shutting down\n"); + log_info ("%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) ); + } + cleanup (); + agent_exit (0); + } + } +#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ + + /* Code to be run every minute. */ + if (last_minute + 60 <= time (NULL)) + { + check_own_socket (); + last_minute = time (NULL); + } + +} + + +/* A global function which allows us to call the reload stuff from + other places too. This is only used when build for W32. */ +void +agent_sighup_action (void) +{ + log_info ("SIGHUP received - " + "re-reading configuration and flushing cache\n"); + agent_flush_cache (); + reread_configuration (); + agent_reload_trustlist (); +} + + +static void +agent_sigusr2_action (void) +{ + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("SIGUSR2 received - updating card event counter\n"); + /* Nothing to check right now. We only increment a counter. */ + bump_card_eventcounter (); +} + + +static void +handle_signal (int signo) +{ + switch (signo) + { +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + case SIGHUP: + agent_sighup_action (); + break; + + case SIGUSR1: + log_info ("SIGUSR1 received - printing internal information:\n"); + pth_ctrl (PTH_CTRL_DUMPSTATE, log_get_stream ()); + agent_query_dump_state (); + agent_scd_dump_state (); + break; + + case SIGUSR2: + agent_sigusr2_action (); + break; + + case SIGTERM: + if (!shutdown_pending) + log_info ("SIGTERM received - shutting down ...\n"); + else + log_info ("SIGTERM received - still %ld running threads\n", + pth_ctrl( PTH_CTRL_GETTHREADS )); + shutdown_pending++; + if (shutdown_pending > 2) + { + log_info ("shutdown forced\n"); + log_info ("%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13) ); + cleanup (); + agent_exit (0); + } + break; + + case SIGINT: + log_info ("SIGINT received - immediate shutdown\n"); + log_info( "%s %s stopped\n", strusage(11), strusage(13)); + cleanup (); + agent_exit (0); + break; +#endif + default: + log_info ("signal %d received - no action defined\n", signo); + } +} + + +/* Check the nonce on a new connection. This is a NOP unless we we + are using our Unix domain socket emulation under Windows. */ +static int +check_nonce (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_sock_nonce_t *nonce) +{ + if (assuan_sock_check_nonce (ctrl->thread_startup.fd, nonce)) + { + log_info (_("error reading nonce on fd %d: %s\n"), + FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd), strerror (errno)); + assuan_sock_close (ctrl->thread_startup.fd); + xfree (ctrl); + return -1; + } + else + return 0; +} + + +/* This is the standard connection thread's main function. */ +static void * +start_connection_thread (void *arg) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = arg; + + if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce)) + return NULL; + + agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl); + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("handler 0x%lx for fd %d started\n"), + pth_thread_id (), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd)); + + start_command_handler (ctrl, GNUPG_INVALID_FD, ctrl->thread_startup.fd); + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("handler 0x%lx for fd %d terminated\n"), + pth_thread_id (), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd)); + + agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl); + xfree (ctrl); + return NULL; +} + + +/* This is the ssh connection thread's main function. */ +static void * +start_connection_thread_ssh (void *arg) +{ + ctrl_t ctrl = arg; + + if (check_nonce (ctrl, &socket_nonce_ssh)) + return NULL; + + agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl); + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("ssh handler 0x%lx for fd %d started\n"), + pth_thread_id (), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd)); + + start_command_handler_ssh (ctrl, ctrl->thread_startup.fd); + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("ssh handler 0x%lx for fd %d terminated\n"), + pth_thread_id (), FD2INT(ctrl->thread_startup.fd)); + + agent_deinit_default_ctrl (ctrl); + xfree (ctrl); + return NULL; +} + + +/* Connection handler loop. Wait for connection requests and spawn a + thread after accepting a connection. */ +static void +handle_connections (gnupg_fd_t listen_fd, gnupg_fd_t listen_fd_ssh) +{ + pth_attr_t tattr; + pth_event_t ev, time_ev; + sigset_t sigs; + int signo; + struct sockaddr_un paddr; + socklen_t plen; + fd_set fdset, read_fdset; + int ret; + gnupg_fd_t fd; + int nfd; + + tattr = pth_attr_new(); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_JOINABLE, 0); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_STACK_SIZE, 256*1024); + +#ifndef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM /* fixme */ + /* Make sure that the signals we are going to handle are not blocked + and create an event object for them. We also set the default + action to ignore because we use an Pth event to get notified + about signals. This avoids that the default action is taken in + case soemthing goes wrong within Pth. The problem might also be + a Pth bug. */ + sigemptyset (&sigs ); + { + static const int mysigs[] = { SIGHUP, SIGUSR1, SIGUSR2, SIGINT, SIGTERM }; + struct sigaction sa; + int i; + + for (i=0; i < DIM (mysigs); i++) + { + sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sigaction (mysigs[i], &sa, NULL); + + sigaddset (&sigs, mysigs[i]); + } + } + + pth_sigmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &sigs, NULL); + ev = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_SIGS, &sigs, &signo); +#else +# ifdef PTH_EVENT_HANDLE + sigs = 0; + ev = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_HANDLE, get_agent_scd_notify_event ()); + signo = 0; +# else + /* Use a dummy event. */ + sigs = 0; + ev = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_SIGS, &sigs, &signo); +# endif +#endif + time_ev = NULL; + + /* Set a flag to tell call-scd.c that it may enable event + notifications. */ + opt.sigusr2_enabled = 1; + + FD_ZERO (&fdset); + FD_SET (FD2INT (listen_fd), &fdset); + nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd); + if (listen_fd_ssh != GNUPG_INVALID_FD) + { + FD_SET ( FD2INT(listen_fd_ssh), &fdset); + if (FD2INT (listen_fd_ssh) > nfd) + nfd = FD2INT (listen_fd_ssh); + } + + for (;;) + { + /* Make sure that our signals are not blocked. */ + pth_sigmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &sigs, NULL); + + /* Shutdown test. */ + if (shutdown_pending) + { + if (pth_ctrl (PTH_CTRL_GETTHREADS) == 1) + break; /* ready */ + + /* Do not accept new connections but keep on running the + loop to cope with the timer events. */ + FD_ZERO (&fdset); + } + + /* Create a timeout event if needed. To help with power saving + we syncronize the ticks to the next full second. */ + if (!time_ev) + { + pth_time_t nexttick; + + nexttick = pth_timeout (TIMERTICK_INTERVAL, 0); + if (nexttick.tv_usec > 10) /* Use a 10 usec threshhold. */ + { + nexttick.tv_sec++; + nexttick.tv_usec = 0; + } + time_ev = pth_event (PTH_EVENT_TIME, nexttick); + } + + /* POSIX says that fd_set should be implemented as a structure, + thus a simple assignment is fine to copy the entire set. */ + read_fdset = fdset; + + if (time_ev) + pth_event_concat (ev, time_ev, NULL); + ret = pth_select_ev (nfd+1, &read_fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL, ev); + if (time_ev) + pth_event_isolate (time_ev); + + if (ret == -1) + { + if (pth_event_occurred (ev) + || (time_ev && pth_event_occurred (time_ev))) + { + if (pth_event_occurred (ev)) + { +#if defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) && defined(PTH_EVENT_HANDLE) + agent_sigusr2_action (); +#else + handle_signal (signo); +#endif + } + if (time_ev && pth_event_occurred (time_ev)) + { + pth_event_free (time_ev, PTH_FREE_ALL); + time_ev = NULL; + handle_tick (); + } + continue; + } + log_error (_("pth_select failed: %s - waiting 1s\n"), + strerror (errno)); + pth_sleep (1); + continue; + } + + if (pth_event_occurred (ev)) + { +#if defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) && defined(PTH_EVENT_HANDLE) + agent_sigusr2_action (); +#else + handle_signal (signo); +#endif + } + + if (time_ev && pth_event_occurred (time_ev)) + { + pth_event_free (time_ev, PTH_FREE_ALL); + time_ev = NULL; + handle_tick (); + } + + + /* We now might create new threads and because we don't want any + signals (as we are handling them here) to be delivered to a + new thread. Thus we need to block those signals. */ + pth_sigmask (SIG_BLOCK, &sigs, NULL); + + if (!shutdown_pending && FD_ISSET (FD2INT (listen_fd), &read_fdset)) + { + ctrl_t ctrl; + + plen = sizeof paddr; + fd = INT2FD (pth_accept (FD2INT(listen_fd), + (struct sockaddr *)&paddr, &plen)); + if (fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD) + { + log_error ("accept failed: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + } + else if ( !(ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl)) ) + { + log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + } + else if ( !(ctrl->session_env = session_env_new ()) ) + { + log_error ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + xfree (ctrl); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + } + else + { + char threadname[50]; + + snprintf (threadname, sizeof threadname-1, + "conn fd=%d (gpg)", FD2INT(fd)); + threadname[sizeof threadname -1] = 0; + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_NAME, threadname); + ctrl->thread_startup.fd = fd; + if (!pth_spawn (tattr, start_connection_thread, ctrl)) + { + log_error ("error spawning connection handler: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + xfree (ctrl); + } + } + fd = GNUPG_INVALID_FD; + } + + if (!shutdown_pending && listen_fd_ssh != GNUPG_INVALID_FD + && FD_ISSET ( FD2INT (listen_fd_ssh), &read_fdset)) + { + ctrl_t ctrl; + + plen = sizeof paddr; + fd = INT2FD(pth_accept (FD2INT(listen_fd_ssh), + (struct sockaddr *)&paddr, &plen)); + if (fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD) + { + log_error ("accept failed for ssh: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + } + else if ( !(ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl)) ) + { + log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + } + else if ( !(ctrl->session_env = session_env_new ()) ) + { + log_error ("error allocating session environment block: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + xfree (ctrl); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + } + else + { + char threadname[50]; + + agent_init_default_ctrl (ctrl); + snprintf (threadname, sizeof threadname-1, + "conn fd=%d (ssh)", FD2INT(fd)); + threadname[sizeof threadname -1] = 0; + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_NAME, threadname); + ctrl->thread_startup.fd = fd; + if (!pth_spawn (tattr, start_connection_thread_ssh, ctrl) ) + { + log_error ("error spawning ssh connection handler: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + assuan_sock_close (fd); + xfree (ctrl); + } + } + fd = GNUPG_INVALID_FD; + } + } + + pth_event_free (ev, PTH_FREE_ALL); + if (time_ev) + pth_event_free (time_ev, PTH_FREE_ALL); + cleanup (); + log_info (_("%s %s stopped\n"), strusage(11), strusage(13)); +} + + + +/* Helper for check_own_socket. */ +static gpg_error_t +check_own_socket_pid_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + membuf_t *mb = opaque; + put_membuf (mb, buffer, length); + return 0; +} + + +/* The thread running the actual check. We need to run this in a + separate thread so that check_own_thread can be called from the + timer tick. */ +static void * +check_own_socket_thread (void *arg) +{ + int rc; + char *sockname = arg; + assuan_context_t ctx = NULL; + membuf_t mb; + char *buffer; + + check_own_socket_running++; + + rc = assuan_new (&ctx); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't allocate assuan context: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + rc = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, sockname, (pid_t)(-1), 0); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't connect my own socket: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + init_membuf (&mb, 100); + rc = assuan_transact (ctx, "GETINFO pid", check_own_socket_pid_cb, &mb, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + put_membuf (&mb, "", 1); + buffer = get_membuf (&mb, NULL); + if (rc || !buffer) + { + log_error ("sending command \"%s\" to my own socket failed: %s\n", + "GETINFO pid", gpg_strerror (rc)); + rc = 1; + } + else if ( (pid_t)strtoul (buffer, NULL, 10) != getpid ()) + { + log_error ("socket is now serviced by another server\n"); + rc = 1; + } + else if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_error ("socket is still served by this server\n"); + + xfree (buffer); + + leave: + xfree (sockname); + if (ctx) + assuan_release (ctx); + if (rc) + { + /* We may not remove the socket as it is now in use by another + server. Setting the name to empty does this. */ + if (socket_name) + *socket_name = 0; + if (socket_name_ssh) + *socket_name_ssh = 0; + shutdown_pending = 2; + log_info ("this process is useless - shutting down\n"); + } + check_own_socket_running--; + return NULL; +} + + +/* Check whether we are still listening on our own socket. In case + another gpg-agent process started after us has taken ownership of + our socket, we woul linger around without any real taks. Thus we + better check once in a while whether we are really needed. */ +static void +check_own_socket (void) +{ + char *sockname; + pth_attr_t tattr; + + if (!opt.use_standard_socket) + return; /* This check makes only sense in standard socket mode. */ + + if (check_own_socket_running || shutdown_pending) + return; /* Still running or already shutting down. */ + + sockname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "S.gpg-agent", NULL); + if (!sockname) + return; /* Out of memory. */ + + tattr = pth_attr_new(); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_JOINABLE, 0); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_STACK_SIZE, 256*1024); + pth_attr_set (tattr, PTH_ATTR_NAME, "check-own-socket"); + + if (!pth_spawn (tattr, check_own_socket_thread, sockname)) + log_error ("error spawning check_own_socket_thread: %s\n", + strerror (errno) ); + pth_attr_destroy (tattr); +} + + + +/* Figure out whether an agent is available and running. Prints an + error if not. If SILENT is true, no messages are printed. Usually + started with MODE 0. Returns 0 if the agent is running. */ +static int +check_for_running_agent (int silent, int mode) +{ + int rc; + char *infostr, *p; + assuan_context_t ctx = NULL; + int prot, pid; + + if (!mode) + { + infostr = getenv ("GPG_AGENT_INFO"); + if (!infostr || !*infostr) + { + if (!check_for_running_agent (silent, 1)) + return 0; /* Okay, its running on the standard socket. */ + if (!silent) + log_error (_("no gpg-agent running in this session\n")); + return -1; + } + + infostr = xstrdup (infostr); + if ( !(p = strchr (infostr, PATHSEP_C)) || p == infostr) + { + xfree (infostr); + if (!check_for_running_agent (silent, 1)) + return 0; /* Okay, its running on the standard socket. */ + if (!silent) + log_error (_("malformed GPG_AGENT_INFO environment variable\n")); + return -1; + } + + *p++ = 0; + pid = atoi (p); + while (*p && *p != PATHSEP_C) + p++; + prot = *p? atoi (p+1) : 0; + if (prot != 1) + { + xfree (infostr); + if (!silent) + log_error (_("gpg-agent protocol version %d is not supported\n"), + prot); + if (!check_for_running_agent (silent, 1)) + return 0; /* Okay, its running on the standard socket. */ + return -1; + } + } + else /* MODE != 0 */ + { + infostr = make_filename (opt.homedir, "S.gpg-agent", NULL); + pid = (pid_t)(-1); + } + + rc = assuan_new (&ctx); + if (! rc) + rc = assuan_socket_connect (ctx, infostr, pid, 0); + xfree (infostr); + if (rc) + { + if (!mode && !check_for_running_agent (silent, 1)) + return 0; /* Okay, its running on the standard socket. */ + + if (!mode && !silent) + log_error ("can't connect to the agent: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + + if (ctx) + assuan_release (ctx); + return -1; + } + + if (!opt.quiet && !silent) + log_info ("gpg-agent running and available\n"); + + assuan_release (ctx); + return 0; +} diff --git a/agent/learncard.c b/agent/learncard.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77f2bb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/learncard.c @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ +/* learncard.c - Handle the LEARN command + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> + +/* Structures used by the callback mechanism to convey information + pertaining to key pairs. */ +struct keypair_info_s +{ + struct keypair_info_s *next; + int no_cert; + char *id; /* points into grip */ + char hexgrip[1]; /* The keygrip (i.e. a hash over the public key + parameters) formatted as a hex string. + Allocated somewhat large to also act as + memeory for the above ID field. */ +}; +typedef struct keypair_info_s *KEYPAIR_INFO; + +struct kpinfo_cb_parm_s +{ + ctrl_t ctrl; + int error; + KEYPAIR_INFO info; +}; + + +/* Structures used by the callback mechanism to convey information + pertaining to certificates. */ +struct certinfo_s { + struct certinfo_s *next; + int type; + int done; + char id[1]; +}; +typedef struct certinfo_s *CERTINFO; + +struct certinfo_cb_parm_s +{ + ctrl_t ctrl; + int error; + CERTINFO info; +}; + + +/* Structures used by the callback mechanism to convey assuan status + lines. */ +struct sinfo_s { + struct sinfo_s *next; + char *data; /* Points into keyword. */ + char keyword[1]; +}; +typedef struct sinfo_s *SINFO; + +struct sinfo_cb_parm_s { + int error; + SINFO info; +}; + + +/* Destructor for key information objects. */ +static void +release_keypair_info (KEYPAIR_INFO info) +{ + while (info) + { + KEYPAIR_INFO tmp = info->next; + xfree (info); + info = tmp; + } +} + +/* Destructor for certificate information objects. */ +static void +release_certinfo (CERTINFO info) +{ + while (info) + { + CERTINFO tmp = info->next; + xfree (info); + info = tmp; + } +} + +/* Destructor for status information objects. */ +static void +release_sinfo (SINFO info) +{ + while (info) + { + SINFO tmp = info->next; + xfree (info); + info = tmp; + } +} + + + +/* This callback is used by agent_card_learn and passed the content of + all KEYPAIRINFO lines. It merely stores this data away */ +static void +kpinfo_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + struct kpinfo_cb_parm_s *parm = opaque; + KEYPAIR_INFO item; + char *p; + + if (parm->error) + return; /* no need to gather data after an error coccured */ + + if ((parm->error = agent_write_status (parm->ctrl, "PROGRESS", + "learncard", "k", "0", "0", NULL))) + return; + + item = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *item + strlen (line)); + if (!item) + { + parm->error = out_of_core (); + return; + } + strcpy (item->hexgrip, line); + for (p = item->hexgrip; hexdigitp (p); p++) + ; + if (p == item->hexgrip && *p == 'X' && spacep (p+1)) + { + item->no_cert = 1; + p++; + } + else if ((p - item->hexgrip) != 40 || !spacep (p)) + { /* not a 20 byte hex keygrip or not followed by a space */ + parm->error = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_RESPONSE); + xfree (item); + return; + } + *p++ = 0; + while (spacep (p)) + p++; + item->id = p; + while (*p && !spacep (p)) + p++; + if (p == item->id) + { /* invalid ID string */ + parm->error = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_RESPONSE); + xfree (item); + return; + } + *p = 0; /* ignore trailing stuff */ + + /* store it */ + item->next = parm->info; + parm->info = item; +} + + +/* This callback is used by agent_card_learn and passed the content of + all CERTINFO lines. It merely stores this data away */ +static void +certinfo_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) +{ + struct certinfo_cb_parm_s *parm = opaque; + CERTINFO item; + int type; + char *p, *pend; + + if (parm->error) + return; /* no need to gather data after an error coccured */ + + if ((parm->error = agent_write_status (parm->ctrl, "PROGRESS", + "learncard", "c", "0", "0", NULL))) + return; + + type = strtol (line, &p, 10); + while (spacep (p)) + p++; + for (pend = p; *pend && !spacep (pend); pend++) + ; + if (p == pend || !*p) + { + parm->error = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_RESPONSE); + return; + } + *pend = 0; /* ignore trailing stuff */ + + item = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *item + strlen (p)); + if (!item) + { + parm->error = out_of_core (); + return; + } + item->type = type; + strcpy (item->id, p); + /* store it */ + item->next = parm->info; + parm->info = item; +} + + +/* This callback is used by agent_card_learn and passed the content of + all SINFO lines. It merely stores this data away */ +static void +sinfo_cb (void *opaque, const char *keyword, size_t keywordlen, + const char *data) +{ + struct sinfo_cb_parm_s *sparm = opaque; + SINFO item; + + if (sparm->error) + return; /* no need to gather data after an error coccured */ + + item = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *item + keywordlen + 1 + strlen (data)); + if (!item) + { + sparm->error = out_of_core (); + return; + } + memcpy (item->keyword, keyword, keywordlen); + item->data = item->keyword + keywordlen; + *item->data = 0; + item->data++; + strcpy (item->data, data); + /* store it */ + item->next = sparm->info; + sparm->info = item; +} + + + +static int +send_cert_back (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *id, void *assuan_context) +{ + int rc; + char *derbuf; + size_t derbuflen; + + rc = agent_card_readcert (ctrl, id, &derbuf, &derbuflen); + if (rc) + { + const char *action; + + switch (gpg_err_code (rc)) + { + case GPG_ERR_INV_ID: + case GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND: + action = " - ignored"; + break; + default: + action = ""; + break; + } + if (opt.verbose || !*action) + log_info ("error reading certificate `%s': %s%s\n", + id? id:"?", gpg_strerror (rc), action); + + return *action? 0 : rc; + } + + rc = assuan_send_data (assuan_context, derbuf, derbuflen); + xfree (derbuf); + if (!rc) + rc = assuan_send_data (assuan_context, NULL, 0); + if (!rc) + rc = assuan_write_line (assuan_context, "END"); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("sending certificate failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Perform the learn operation. If ASSUAN_CONTEXT is not NULL all new + certificates are send back via Assuan. */ +int +agent_handle_learn (ctrl_t ctrl, void *assuan_context) +{ + int rc; + + struct kpinfo_cb_parm_s parm; + struct certinfo_cb_parm_s cparm; + struct sinfo_cb_parm_s sparm; + char *serialno = NULL; + KEYPAIR_INFO item; + SINFO sitem; + unsigned char grip[20]; + char *p; + int i; + static int certtype_list[] = { + 111, /* Root CA */ + 101, /* trusted */ + 102, /* useful */ + 100, /* regular */ + /* We don't include 110 here because gpgsm can't handle that + special root CA format. */ + -1 /* end of list */ + }; + + + memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm); + memset (&cparm, 0, sizeof cparm); + memset (&sparm, 0, sizeof sparm); + parm.ctrl = ctrl; + cparm.ctrl = ctrl; + + /* Check whether a card is present and get the serial number */ + rc = agent_card_serialno (ctrl, &serialno); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + /* Now gather all the available info. */ + rc = agent_card_learn (ctrl, kpinfo_cb, &parm, certinfo_cb, &cparm, + sinfo_cb, &sparm); + if (!rc && (parm.error || cparm.error || sparm.error)) + rc = parm.error? parm.error : cparm.error? cparm.error : sparm.error; + if (rc) + { + log_debug ("agent_card_learn failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + log_info ("card has S/N: %s\n", serialno); + + /* Pass on all the collected status information. */ + if (assuan_context) + { + for (sitem = sparm.info; sitem; sitem = sitem->next) + { + assuan_write_status (assuan_context, sitem->keyword, sitem->data); + } + } + + /* Write out the certificates in a standard order. */ + for (i=0; certtype_list[i] != -1; i++) + { + CERTINFO citem; + for (citem = cparm.info; citem; citem = citem->next) + { + if (certtype_list[i] != citem->type) + continue; + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (" id: %s (type=%d)\n", + citem->id, citem->type); + + if (assuan_context) + { + rc = send_cert_back (ctrl, citem->id, assuan_context); + if (rc) + goto leave; + citem->done = 1; + } + } + } + + for (item = parm.info; item; item = item->next) + { + unsigned char *pubkey, *shdkey; + size_t n; + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (" id: %s (grip=%s)\n", item->id, item->hexgrip); + + if (item->no_cert) + continue; /* No public key yet available. */ + + if (assuan_context) + { + agent_write_status (ctrl, "KEYPAIRINFO", + item->hexgrip, item->id, NULL); + } + + for (p=item->hexgrip, i=0; i < 20; p += 2, i++) + grip[i] = xtoi_2 (p); + + if (!agent_key_available (grip)) + continue; /* The key is already available. */ + + /* Unknown key - store it. */ + rc = agent_card_readkey (ctrl, item->id, &pubkey); + if (rc) + { + log_debug ("agent_card_readkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + { + unsigned char *shadow_info = make_shadow_info (serialno, item->id); + if (!shadow_info) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); + xfree (pubkey); + goto leave; + } + rc = agent_shadow_key (pubkey, shadow_info, &shdkey); + xfree (shadow_info); + } + xfree (pubkey); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("shadowing the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (shdkey, 0, NULL, NULL); + assert (n); + + rc = agent_write_private_key (grip, shdkey, n, 0); + xfree (shdkey); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("error writing key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("stored\n"); + + if (assuan_context) + { + CERTINFO citem; + + /* only send the certificate if we have not done so before */ + for (citem = cparm.info; citem; citem = citem->next) + { + if (!strcmp (citem->id, item->id)) + break; + } + if (!citem) + { + rc = send_cert_back (ctrl, item->id, assuan_context); + if (rc) + goto leave; + } + } + } + + + leave: + xfree (serialno); + release_keypair_info (parm.info); + release_certinfo (cparm.info); + release_sinfo (sparm.info); + return rc; +} + + diff --git a/agent/minip12.c b/agent/minip12.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2471717 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/minip12.c @@ -0,0 +1,2360 @@ +/* minip12.c - A minimal pkcs-12 implementation. + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include <config.h> +#endif +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <gcrypt.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#ifdef TEST +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#endif + +#include "../jnlib/logging.h" +#include "../jnlib/utf8conv.h" +#include "minip12.h" + +#ifndef DIM +#define DIM(v) (sizeof(v)/sizeof((v)[0])) +#endif + + +enum +{ + UNIVERSAL = 0, + APPLICATION = 1, + ASNCONTEXT = 2, + PRIVATE = 3 +}; + + +enum +{ + TAG_NONE = 0, + TAG_BOOLEAN = 1, + TAG_INTEGER = 2, + TAG_BIT_STRING = 3, + TAG_OCTET_STRING = 4, + TAG_NULL = 5, + TAG_OBJECT_ID = 6, + TAG_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR = 7, + TAG_EXTERNAL = 8, + TAG_REAL = 9, + TAG_ENUMERATED = 10, + TAG_EMBEDDED_PDV = 11, + TAG_UTF8_STRING = 12, + TAG_REALTIVE_OID = 13, + TAG_SEQUENCE = 16, + TAG_SET = 17, + TAG_NUMERIC_STRING = 18, + TAG_PRINTABLE_STRING = 19, + TAG_TELETEX_STRING = 20, + TAG_VIDEOTEX_STRING = 21, + TAG_IA5_STRING = 22, + TAG_UTC_TIME = 23, + TAG_GENERALIZED_TIME = 24, + TAG_GRAPHIC_STRING = 25, + TAG_VISIBLE_STRING = 26, + TAG_GENERAL_STRING = 27, + TAG_UNIVERSAL_STRING = 28, + TAG_CHARACTER_STRING = 29, + TAG_BMP_STRING = 30 +}; + + +static unsigned char const oid_data[9] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01 }; +static unsigned char const oid_encryptedData[9] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06 }; +static unsigned char const oid_pkcs_12_keyBag[11] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x01 }; +static unsigned char const oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag[11] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x02 }; +static unsigned char const oid_pkcs_12_CertBag[11] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x03 }; +static unsigned char const oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag[11] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x04 }; + +static unsigned char const oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC[10] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x03 }; +static unsigned char const oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC[10] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x06 }; +static unsigned char const oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12[10] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01 }; + + +static unsigned char const oid_rsaEncryption[9] = { + 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; + + +static unsigned char const data_3desiter2048[30] = { + 0x30, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, + 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0E, + 0x04, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x00 }; +#define DATA_3DESITER2048_SALT_OFF 18 + +static unsigned char const data_rc2iter2048[30] = { + 0x30, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, + 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x06, 0x30, 0x0E, + 0x04, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x00 }; +#define DATA_RC2ITER2048_SALT_OFF 18 + +static unsigned char const data_mactemplate[51] = { + 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, + 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, + 0x14, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x04, 0x08, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x02, 0x08, 0x00 }; +#define DATA_MACTEMPLATE_MAC_OFF 17 +#define DATA_MACTEMPLATE_SALT_OFF 39 + +static unsigned char const data_attrtemplate[106] = { + 0x31, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x55, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, + 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x14, 0x31, + 0x48, 0x1e, 0x46, 0x00, 0x47, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x00, + 0x75, 0x00, 0x50, 0x00, 0x47, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, + 0x65, 0x00, 0x78, 0x00, 0x70, 0x00, 0x6f, 0x00, + 0x72, 0x00, 0x74, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x64, 0x00, + 0x20, 0x00, 0x63, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x72, 0x00, + 0x74, 0x00, 0x69, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, 0x69, 0x00, + 0x63, 0x00, 0x61, 0x00, 0x74, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, + 0x20, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, + 0x66, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, 0x66, 0x00, + 0x66, 0x30, 0x23, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, + 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x15, 0x31, 0x16, + 0x04, 0x14 }; /* Need to append SHA-1 digest. */ +#define DATA_ATTRTEMPLATE_KEYID_OFF 73 + +struct buffer_s +{ + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t length; +}; + + +struct tag_info +{ + int class; + int is_constructed; + unsigned long tag; + unsigned long length; /* length part of the TLV */ + int nhdr; + int ndef; /* It is an indefinite length */ +}; + + +/* Parse the buffer at the address BUFFER which is of SIZE and return + the tag and the length part from the TLV triplet. Update BUFFER + and SIZE on success. Checks that the encoded length does not + exhaust the length of the provided buffer. */ +static int +parse_tag (unsigned char const **buffer, size_t *size, struct tag_info *ti) +{ + int c; + unsigned long tag; + const unsigned char *buf = *buffer; + size_t length = *size; + + ti->length = 0; + ti->ndef = 0; + ti->nhdr = 0; + + /* Get the tag */ + if (!length) + return -1; /* premature eof */ + c = *buf++; length--; + ti->nhdr++; + + ti->class = (c & 0xc0) >> 6; + ti->is_constructed = !!(c & 0x20); + tag = c & 0x1f; + + if (tag == 0x1f) + { + tag = 0; + do + { + tag <<= 7; + if (!length) + return -1; /* premature eof */ + c = *buf++; length--; + ti->nhdr++; + tag |= c & 0x7f; + } + while (c & 0x80); + } + ti->tag = tag; + + /* Get the length */ + if (!length) + return -1; /* prematureeof */ + c = *buf++; length--; + ti->nhdr++; + + if ( !(c & 0x80) ) + ti->length = c; + else if (c == 0x80) + ti->ndef = 1; + else if (c == 0xff) + return -1; /* forbidden length value */ + else + { + unsigned long len = 0; + int count = c & 0x7f; + + for (; count; count--) + { + len <<= 8; + if (!length) + return -1; /* premature_eof */ + c = *buf++; length--; + ti->nhdr++; + len |= c & 0xff; + } + ti->length = len; + } + + if (ti->class == UNIVERSAL && !ti->tag) + ti->length = 0; + + if (ti->length > length) + return -1; /* data larger than buffer. */ + + *buffer = buf; + *size = length; + return 0; +} + + +/* Given an ASN.1 chunk of a structure like: + + 24 NDEF: OCTET STRING -- This is not passed to us + 04 1: OCTET STRING -- INPUT point s to here + : 30 + 04 1: OCTET STRING + : 80 + [...] + 04 2: OCTET STRING + : 00 00 + : } -- This denotes a Null tag and are the last + -- two bytes in INPUT. + + Create a new buffer with the content of that octet string. INPUT + is the orginal buffer with a length as stored at LENGTH. Returns + NULL on error or a new malloced buffer with the length of this new + buffer stored at LENGTH and the number of bytes parsed from input + are added to the value stored at INPUT_CONSUMED. INPUT_CONSUMED is + allowed to be passed as NULL if the caller is not interested in + this value. */ +static unsigned char * +cram_octet_string (const unsigned char *input, size_t *length, + size_t *input_consumed) +{ + const unsigned char *s = input; + size_t n = *length; + unsigned char *output, *d; + struct tag_info ti; + + /* Allocate output buf. We know that it won't be longer than the + input buffer. */ + d = output = gcry_malloc (n); + if (!output) + goto bailout; + + for (;;) + { + if (parse_tag (&s, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class == UNIVERSAL && ti.tag == TAG_OCTET_STRING + && !ti.ndef && !ti.is_constructed) + { + memcpy (d, s, ti.length); + s += ti.length; + d += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + else if (ti.class == UNIVERSAL && !ti.tag && !ti.is_constructed) + break; /* Ready */ + else + goto bailout; + } + + + *length = d - output; + if (input_consumed) + *input_consumed += s - input; + return output; + + bailout: + if (input_consumed) + *input_consumed += s - input; + gcry_free (output); + return NULL; +} + + + +static int +string_to_key (int id, char *salt, size_t saltlen, int iter, const char *pw, + int req_keylen, unsigned char *keybuf) +{ + int rc, i, j; + gcry_md_hd_t md; + gcry_mpi_t num_b1 = NULL; + int pwlen; + unsigned char hash[20], buf_b[64], buf_i[128], *p; + size_t cur_keylen; + size_t n; + + cur_keylen = 0; + pwlen = strlen (pw); + if (pwlen > 63/2) + { + log_error ("password too long\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (saltlen < 8) + { + log_error ("salt too short\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* Store salt and password in BUF_I */ + p = buf_i; + for(i=0; i < 64; i++) + *p++ = salt [i%saltlen]; + for(i=j=0; i < 64; i += 2) + { + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = pw[j]; + if (++j > pwlen) /* Note, that we include the trailing zero */ + j = 0; + } + + for (;;) + { + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_md_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + for(i=0; i < 64; i++) + gcry_md_putc (md, id); + gcry_md_write (md, buf_i, 128); + memcpy (hash, gcry_md_read (md, 0), 20); + gcry_md_close (md); + for (i=1; i < iter; i++) + gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hash, hash, 20); + + for (i=0; i < 20 && cur_keylen < req_keylen; i++) + keybuf[cur_keylen++] = hash[i]; + if (cur_keylen == req_keylen) + { + gcry_mpi_release (num_b1); + return 0; /* ready */ + } + + /* need more bytes. */ + for(i=0; i < 64; i++) + buf_b[i] = hash[i % 20]; + rc = gcry_mpi_scan (&num_b1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf_b, 64, &n); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_mpi_scan failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return -1; + } + gcry_mpi_add_ui (num_b1, num_b1, 1); + for (i=0; i < 128; i += 64) + { + gcry_mpi_t num_ij; + + rc = gcry_mpi_scan (&num_ij, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf_i + i, 64, &n); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_mpi_scan failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return -1; + } + gcry_mpi_add (num_ij, num_ij, num_b1); + gcry_mpi_clear_highbit (num_ij, 64*8); + rc = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf_i + i, 64, &n, num_ij); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_mpi_print failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return -1; + } + gcry_mpi_release (num_ij); + } + } +} + + +static int +set_key_iv (gcry_cipher_hd_t chd, char *salt, size_t saltlen, int iter, + const char *pw, int keybytes) +{ + unsigned char keybuf[24]; + int rc; + + assert (keybytes == 5 || keybytes == 24); + if (string_to_key (1, salt, saltlen, iter, pw, keybytes, keybuf)) + return -1; + rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (chd, keybuf, keybytes); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_cipher_setkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return -1; + } + + if (string_to_key (2, salt, saltlen, iter, pw, 8, keybuf)) + return -1; + rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (chd, keybuf, 8); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("gcry_cipher_setiv failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + + +static void +crypt_block (unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, char *salt, size_t saltlen, + int iter, const char *pw, int cipher_algo, int encrypt) +{ + gcry_cipher_hd_t chd; + int rc; + + rc = gcry_cipher_open (&chd, cipher_algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, 0); + if (rc) + { + log_error ( "gcry_cipher_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror(rc)); + wipememory (buffer, length); + return; + } + if (set_key_iv (chd, salt, saltlen, iter, pw, + cipher_algo == GCRY_CIPHER_RFC2268_40? 5:24)) + { + wipememory (buffer, length); + goto leave; + } + + rc = encrypt? gcry_cipher_encrypt (chd, buffer, length, NULL, 0) + : gcry_cipher_decrypt (chd, buffer, length, NULL, 0); + + if (rc) + { + wipememory (buffer, length); + log_error ( "en/de-crytion failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + leave: + gcry_cipher_close (chd); +} + + +/* Decrypt a block of data and try several encodings of the key. + CIPHERTEXT is the encrypted data of size LENGTH bytes; PLAINTEXT is + a buffer of the same size to receive the decryption result. SALT, + SALTLEN, ITER and PW are the information required for decryption + and CIPHER_ALGO is the algorithm id to use. CHECK_FNC is a + function called with the plaintext and used to check whether the + decryption succeeded; i.e. that a correct passphrase has been + given. That function shall return true if the decryption has likely + succeeded. */ +static void +decrypt_block (const void *ciphertext, unsigned char *plaintext, size_t length, + char *salt, size_t saltlen, + int iter, const char *pw, int cipher_algo, + int (*check_fnc) (const void *, size_t)) +{ + static const char * const charsets[] = { + "", /* No conversion - use the UTF-8 passphrase direct. */ + "ISO-8859-1", + "ISO-8859-15", + "ISO-8859-2", + "ISO-8859-3", + "ISO-8859-4", + "ISO-8859-5", + "ISO-8859-6", + "ISO-8859-7", + "ISO-8859-8", + "ISO-8859-9", + "KOI8-R", + "IBM437", + "IBM850", + "EUC-JP", + "BIG5", + NULL + }; + int charsetidx = 0; + char *convertedpw = NULL; /* Malloced and converted password or NULL. */ + size_t convertedpwsize = 0; /* Allocated length. */ + + for (charsetidx=0; charsets[charsetidx]; charsetidx++) + { + if (*charsets[charsetidx]) + { + jnlib_iconv_t cd; + const char *inptr; + char *outptr; + size_t inbytes, outbytes; + + if (!convertedpw) + { + /* We assume one byte encodings. Thus we can allocate + the buffer of the same size as the original + passphrase; the result will actually be shorter + then. */ + convertedpwsize = strlen (pw) + 1; + convertedpw = gcry_malloc_secure (convertedpwsize); + if (!convertedpw) + { + log_info ("out of secure memory while" + " converting passphrase\n"); + break; /* Give up. */ + } + } + + cd = jnlib_iconv_open (charsets[charsetidx], "utf-8"); + if (cd == (jnlib_iconv_t)(-1)) + continue; + + inptr = pw; + inbytes = strlen (pw); + outptr = convertedpw; + outbytes = convertedpwsize - 1; + if ( jnlib_iconv (cd, (const char **)&inptr, &inbytes, + &outptr, &outbytes) == (size_t)-1) + { + jnlib_iconv_close (cd); + continue; + } + *outptr = 0; + jnlib_iconv_close (cd); + log_info ("decryption failed; trying charset `%s'\n", + charsets[charsetidx]); + } + memcpy (plaintext, ciphertext, length); + crypt_block (plaintext, length, salt, saltlen, iter, + convertedpw? convertedpw:pw, cipher_algo, 0); + if (check_fnc (plaintext, length)) + break; /* Decryption succeeded. */ + } + gcry_free (convertedpw); +} + + +/* Return true if the decryption of an bag_encrypted_data object has + likely succeeded. */ +static int +bag_decrypted_data_p (const void *plaintext, size_t length) +{ + struct tag_info ti; + const unsigned char *p = plaintext; + size_t n = length; + + /* { */ + /* # warning debug code is enabled */ + /* FILE *fp = fopen ("tmp-rc2-plain.der", "wb"); */ + /* if (!fp || fwrite (p, n, 1, fp) != 1) */ + /* exit (2); */ + /* fclose (fp); */ + /* } */ + + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + return 0; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + return 0; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* Note: If R_RESULT is passed as NULL, a key object as already be + processed and thus we need to skip it here. */ +static int +parse_bag_encrypted_data (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, + int startoffset, size_t *r_consumed, const char *pw, + void (*certcb)(void*, const unsigned char*, size_t), + void *certcbarg, gcry_mpi_t **r_result) +{ + struct tag_info ti; + const unsigned char *p = buffer; + const unsigned char *p_start = buffer; + size_t n = length; + const char *where; + char salt[20]; + size_t saltlen; + unsigned int iter; + unsigned char *plain = NULL; + int bad_pass = 0; + unsigned char *cram_buffer = NULL; + size_t consumed = 0; /* Number of bytes consumed from the orginal buffer. */ + int is_3des = 0; + gcry_mpi_t *result = NULL; + int result_count; + + if (r_result) + *r_result = NULL; + where = "start"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + where = "bag.encryptedData.version"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER || ti.length != 1 || *p != 0) + goto bailout; + p++; n--; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + where = "bag.encryptedData.data"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID || ti.length != DIM(oid_data) + || memcmp (p, oid_data, DIM(oid_data))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM(oid_data); + n -= DIM(oid_data); + + where = "bag.encryptedData.keyinfo"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (!ti.class && ti.tag == TAG_OBJECT_ID + && ti.length == DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC) + && !memcmp (p, oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC, + DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC))) + { + p += DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC); + n -= DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2_CBC); + } + else if (!ti.class && ti.tag == TAG_OBJECT_ID + && ti.length == DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC) + && !memcmp (p, oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC, + DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC))) + { + p += DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC); + n -= DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC); + is_3des = 1; + } + else + goto bailout; + + where = "rc2or3des-params"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING + || ti.length < 8 || ti.length > 20 ) + goto bailout; + saltlen = ti.length; + memcpy (salt, p, saltlen); + p += saltlen; + n -= saltlen; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER || !ti.length ) + goto bailout; + for (iter=0; ti.length; ti.length--) + { + iter <<= 8; + iter |= (*p++) & 0xff; + n--; + } + + where = "rc2or3des-ciphertext"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + + consumed = p - p_start; + if (ti.class == ASNCONTEXT && ti.tag == 0 && ti.is_constructed && ti.ndef) + { + /* Mozilla exported certs now come with single byte chunks of + octect strings. (Mozilla Firefox 1.0.4). Arghh. */ + where = "cram-rc2or3des-ciphertext"; + cram_buffer = cram_octet_string ( p, &n, &consumed); + if (!cram_buffer) + goto bailout; + p = p_start = cram_buffer; + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + r_consumed = NULL; /* Ugly hack to not update that value any further. */ + ti.length = n; + } + else if (ti.class == ASNCONTEXT && ti.tag == 0 && ti.length ) + ; + else + goto bailout; + + log_info ("%lu bytes of %s encrypted text\n",ti.length,is_3des?"3DES":"RC2"); + + plain = gcry_malloc_secure (ti.length); + if (!plain) + { + log_error ("error allocating decryption buffer\n"); + goto bailout; + } + decrypt_block (p, plain, ti.length, salt, saltlen, iter, pw, + is_3des? GCRY_CIPHER_3DES : GCRY_CIPHER_RFC2268_40, + bag_decrypted_data_p); + n = ti.length; + startoffset = 0; + p_start = p = plain; + + where = "outer.outer.seq"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + { + bad_pass = 1; + goto bailout; + } + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + { + bad_pass = 1; + goto bailout; + } + + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + { + bad_pass = 1; + goto bailout; + } + + /* Loop over all certificates inside the bag. */ + while (n) + { + int iscrlbag = 0; + int iskeybag = 0; + + where = "certbag.nextcert"; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + where = "certbag.objectidentifier"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID) + goto bailout; + if ( ti.length == DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CertBag) + && !memcmp (p, oid_pkcs_12_CertBag, DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CertBag))) + { + p += DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CertBag); + n -= DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CertBag); + } + else if ( ti.length == DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag) + && !memcmp (p, oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag, DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag))) + { + p += DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag); + n -= DIM(oid_pkcs_12_CrlBag); + iscrlbag = 1; + } + else if ( ti.length == DIM(oid_pkcs_12_keyBag) + && !memcmp (p, oid_pkcs_12_keyBag, DIM(oid_pkcs_12_keyBag))) + { + /* The TrustedMIME plugin for MS Outlook started to create + files with just one outer 3DES encrypted container and + inside the certificates as well as the key. */ + p += DIM(oid_pkcs_12_keyBag); + n -= DIM(oid_pkcs_12_keyBag); + iskeybag = 1; + } + else + goto bailout; + + where = "certbag.before.certheader"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (iscrlbag) + { + log_info ("skipping unsupported crlBag\n"); + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + else if (iskeybag && (result || !r_result)) + { + log_info ("one keyBag already processed; skipping this one\n"); + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + else if (iskeybag) + { + int len; + + log_info ("processing simple keyBag\n"); + + /* Fixme: This code is duplicated from parse_bag_data. */ + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER + || ti.length != 1 || *p) + goto bailout; + p++; n--; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + len = ti.length; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (len < ti.nhdr) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.nhdr; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID + || ti.length != DIM(oid_rsaEncryption) + || memcmp (p, oid_rsaEncryption, + DIM(oid_rsaEncryption))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM (oid_rsaEncryption); + n -= DIM (oid_rsaEncryption); + if (len < ti.length) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.length; + if (n < len) + goto bailout; + p += len; + n -= len; + if ( parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) + || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING) + goto bailout; + if ( parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) + || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + len = ti.length; + + result = gcry_calloc (10, sizeof *result); + if (!result) + { + log_error ( "error allocating result array\n"); + goto bailout; + } + result_count = 0; + + where = "reading.keybag.key-parameters"; + for (result_count = 0; len && result_count < 9;) + { + if ( parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) + || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER) + goto bailout; + if (len < ti.nhdr) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.nhdr; + if (len < ti.length) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.length; + if (!result_count && ti.length == 1 && !*p) + ; /* ignore the very first one if it is a 0 */ + else + { + int rc; + + rc = gcry_mpi_scan (result+result_count, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, p, + ti.length, NULL); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("error parsing key parameter: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto bailout; + } + result_count++; + } + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + if (len) + goto bailout; + } + else + { + log_info ("processing certBag\n"); + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID + || ti.length != DIM(oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12) + || memcmp (p, oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12, + DIM(oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM(oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12); + n -= DIM(oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12); + + where = "certbag.before.octetstring"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING || ti.ndef) + goto bailout; + + /* Return the certificate. */ + if (certcb) + certcb (certcbarg, p, ti.length); + + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + + /* Ugly hack to cope with the padding: Forget about the rest if + that is less or equal to the cipher's block length. We can + reasonable assume that all valid data will be longer than + just one block. */ + if (n <= 8) + n = 0; + + /* Skip the optional SET with the pkcs12 cert attributes. */ + if (n) + { + where = "bag.attributes"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (!ti.class && ti.tag == TAG_SEQUENCE) + ; /* No attributes. */ + else if (!ti.class && ti.tag == TAG_SET && !ti.ndef) + { /* The optional SET. */ + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + if (n <= 8) + n = 0; + if (n && parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + } + else + goto bailout; + } + } + + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + gcry_free (plain); + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + if (r_result) + *r_result = result; + return 0; + + bailout: + if (result) + { + int i; + + for (i=0; result[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (result[i]); + gcry_free (result); + } + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + gcry_free (plain); + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + log_error ("encryptedData error at \"%s\", offset %u\n", + where, (unsigned int)((p - p_start)+startoffset)); + if (bad_pass) + { + /* Note, that the following string might be used by other programs + to check for a bad passphrase; it should therefore not be + translated or changed. */ + log_error ("possibly bad passphrase given\n"); + } + return -1; +} + + +/* Return true if the decryption of a bag_data object has likely + succeeded. */ +static int +bag_data_p (const void *plaintext, size_t length) +{ + struct tag_info ti; + const unsigned char *p = plaintext; + size_t n = length; + +/* { */ +/* # warning debug code is enabled */ +/* FILE *fp = fopen ("tmp-3des-plain-key.der", "wb"); */ +/* if (!fp || fwrite (p, n, 1, fp) != 1) */ +/* exit (2); */ +/* fclose (fp); */ +/* } */ + + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + return 0; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER + || ti.length != 1 || *p) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + + +static gcry_mpi_t * +parse_bag_data (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, int startoffset, + size_t *r_consumed, const char *pw) +{ + int rc; + struct tag_info ti; + const unsigned char *p = buffer; + const unsigned char *p_start = buffer; + size_t n = length; + const char *where; + char salt[20]; + size_t saltlen; + unsigned int iter; + int len; + unsigned char *plain = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t *result = NULL; + int result_count, i; + unsigned char *cram_buffer = NULL; + size_t consumed = 0; /* Number of bytes consumed from the orginal buffer. */ + + where = "start"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING) + goto bailout; + + consumed = p - p_start; + if (ti.is_constructed && ti.ndef) + { + /* Mozilla exported certs now come with single byte chunks of + octect strings. (Mozilla Firefox 1.0.4). Arghh. */ + where = "cram-data.outersegs"; + cram_buffer = cram_octet_string ( p, &n, &consumed); + if (!cram_buffer) + goto bailout; + p = p_start = cram_buffer; + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + r_consumed = NULL; /* Ugly hack to not update that value any further. */ + } + + + where = "data.outerseqs"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + where = "data.objectidentifier"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID + || ti.length != DIM(oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag) + || memcmp (p, oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag, + DIM(oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM(oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag); + n -= DIM(oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag); + + where = "shrouded,outerseqs"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID + || ti.length != DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC) + || memcmp (p, oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC, + DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC); + n -= DIM(oid_pbeWithSHAAnd3_KeyTripleDES_CBC); + + where = "3des-params"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING + || ti.length < 8 || ti.length > 20) + goto bailout; + saltlen = ti.length; + memcpy (salt, p, saltlen); + p += saltlen; + n -= saltlen; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER || !ti.length ) + goto bailout; + for (iter=0; ti.length; ti.length--) + { + iter <<= 8; + iter |= (*p++) & 0xff; + n--; + } + + where = "3des-ciphertext"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING || !ti.length ) + goto bailout; + + log_info ("%lu bytes of 3DES encrypted text\n", ti.length); + + plain = gcry_malloc_secure (ti.length); + if (!plain) + { + log_error ("error allocating decryption buffer\n"); + goto bailout; + } + consumed += p - p_start + ti.length; + decrypt_block (p, plain, ti.length, salt, saltlen, iter, pw, + GCRY_CIPHER_3DES, + bag_data_p); + n = ti.length; + startoffset = 0; + p_start = p = plain; + + where = "decrypted-text"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER + || ti.length != 1 || *p) + goto bailout; + p++; n--; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + len = ti.length; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (len < ti.nhdr) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.nhdr; + if (ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID + || ti.length != DIM(oid_rsaEncryption) + || memcmp (p, oid_rsaEncryption, + DIM(oid_rsaEncryption))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM (oid_rsaEncryption); + n -= DIM (oid_rsaEncryption); + if (len < ti.length) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.length; + if (n < len) + goto bailout; + p += len; + n -= len; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + len = ti.length; + + result = gcry_calloc (10, sizeof *result); + if (!result) + { + log_error ( "error allocating result array\n"); + goto bailout; + } + result_count = 0; + + where = "reading.key-parameters"; + for (result_count=0; len && result_count < 9;) + { + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti) || ti.class || ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER) + goto bailout; + if (len < ti.nhdr) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.nhdr; + if (len < ti.length) + goto bailout; + len -= ti.length; + if (!result_count && ti.length == 1 && !*p) + ; /* ignore the very first one if it is a 0 */ + else + { + rc = gcry_mpi_scan (result+result_count, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, p, + ti.length, NULL); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("error parsing key parameter: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto bailout; + } + result_count++; + } + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + if (len) + goto bailout; + + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + return result; + + bailout: + gcry_free (plain); + if (result) + { + for (i=0; result[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (result[i]); + gcry_free (result); + } + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + log_error ( "data error at \"%s\", offset %u\n", + where, (unsigned int)((p - buffer) + startoffset)); + if (r_consumed) + *r_consumed = consumed; + return NULL; +} + + +/* Parse a PKCS12 object and return an array of MPI representing the + secret key parameters. This is a very limited implementation in + that it is only able to look for 3DES encoded encryptedData and + tries to extract the first private key object it finds. In case of + an error NULL is returned. CERTCB and CERRTCBARG are used to pass + X.509 certificates back to the caller. */ +gcry_mpi_t * +p12_parse (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, const char *pw, + void (*certcb)(void*, const unsigned char*, size_t), + void *certcbarg) +{ + struct tag_info ti; + const unsigned char *p = buffer; + const unsigned char *p_start = buffer; + size_t n = length; + const char *where; + int bagseqlength, len; + int bagseqndef, lenndef; + gcry_mpi_t *result = NULL; + unsigned char *cram_buffer = NULL; + + where = "pfx"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + where = "pfxVersion"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_INTEGER || ti.length != 1 || *p != 3) + goto bailout; + p++; n--; + + where = "authSave"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.tag != TAG_OBJECT_ID || ti.length != DIM(oid_data) + || memcmp (p, oid_data, DIM(oid_data))) + goto bailout; + p += DIM(oid_data); + n -= DIM(oid_data); + + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != ASNCONTEXT || ti.tag) + goto bailout; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != UNIVERSAL || ti.tag != TAG_OCTET_STRING) + goto bailout; + + if (ti.is_constructed && ti.ndef) + { + /* Mozilla exported certs now come with single byte chunks of + octect strings. (Mozilla Firefox 1.0.4). Arghh. */ + where = "cram-bags"; + cram_buffer = cram_octet_string ( p, &n, NULL); + if (!cram_buffer) + goto bailout; + p = p_start = cram_buffer; + } + + where = "bags"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (ti.class != UNIVERSAL || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + bagseqndef = ti.ndef; + bagseqlength = ti.length; + while (bagseqlength || bagseqndef) + { +/* log_debug ( "at offset %u\n", (p - p_start)); */ + where = "bag-sequence"; + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (bagseqndef && ti.class == UNIVERSAL && !ti.tag && !ti.is_constructed) + break; /* Ready */ + if (ti.class != UNIVERSAL || ti.tag != TAG_SEQUENCE) + goto bailout; + + if (!bagseqndef) + { + if (bagseqlength < ti.nhdr) + goto bailout; + bagseqlength -= ti.nhdr; + if (bagseqlength < ti.length) + goto bailout; + bagseqlength -= ti.length; + } + lenndef = ti.ndef; + len = ti.length; + + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (lenndef) + len = ti.nhdr; + else + len -= ti.nhdr; + + if (ti.tag == TAG_OBJECT_ID && ti.length == DIM(oid_encryptedData) + && !memcmp (p, oid_encryptedData, DIM(oid_encryptedData))) + { + size_t consumed = 0; + + p += DIM(oid_encryptedData); + n -= DIM(oid_encryptedData); + if (!lenndef) + len -= DIM(oid_encryptedData); + where = "bag.encryptedData"; + if (parse_bag_encrypted_data (p, n, (p - p_start), &consumed, pw, + certcb, certcbarg, + result? NULL : &result)) + goto bailout; + if (lenndef) + len += consumed; + } + else if (ti.tag == TAG_OBJECT_ID && ti.length == DIM(oid_data) + && !memcmp (p, oid_data, DIM(oid_data))) + { + if (result) + { + log_info ("already got an key object, skipping this one\n"); + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + else + { + size_t consumed = 0; + + p += DIM(oid_data); + n -= DIM(oid_data); + if (!lenndef) + len -= DIM(oid_data); + result = parse_bag_data (p, n, (p - p_start), &consumed, pw); + if (!result) + goto bailout; + if (lenndef) + len += consumed; + } + } + else + { + log_info ("unknown bag type - skipped\n"); + p += ti.length; + n -= ti.length; + } + + if (len < 0 || len > n) + goto bailout; + p += len; + n -= len; + if (lenndef) + { + /* Need to skip the Null Tag. */ + if (parse_tag (&p, &n, &ti)) + goto bailout; + if (!(ti.class == UNIVERSAL && !ti.tag && !ti.is_constructed)) + goto bailout; + } + } + + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + return result; + bailout: + log_error ("error at \"%s\", offset %u\n", + where, (unsigned int)(p - p_start)); + if (result) + { + int i; + + for (i=0; result[i]; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (result[i]); + gcry_free (result); + } + gcry_free (cram_buffer); + return NULL; +} + + + +static size_t +compute_tag_length (size_t n) +{ + int needed = 0; + + if (n < 128) + needed += 2; /* tag and one length byte */ + else if (n < 256) + needed += 3; /* tag, number of length bytes, 1 length byte */ + else if (n < 65536) + needed += 4; /* tag, number of length bytes, 2 length bytes */ + else + { + log_error ("object too larger to encode\n"); + return 0; + } + return needed; +} + +static unsigned char * +store_tag_length (unsigned char *p, int tag, size_t n) +{ + if (tag == TAG_SEQUENCE) + tag |= 0x20; /* constructed */ + + *p++ = tag; + if (n < 128) + *p++ = n; + else if (n < 256) + { + *p++ = 0x81; + *p++ = n; + } + else if (n < 65536) + { + *p++ = 0x82; + *p++ = n >> 8; + *p++ = n; + } + + return p; +} + + +/* Create the final PKCS-12 object from the sequences contained in + SEQLIST. PW is the password. That array is terminated with an NULL + object. */ +static unsigned char * +create_final (struct buffer_s *sequences, const char *pw, size_t *r_length) +{ + int i; + size_t needed = 0; + size_t len[8], n; + unsigned char *macstart; + size_t maclen; + unsigned char *result, *p; + size_t resultlen; + char salt[8]; + unsigned char keybuf[20]; + gcry_md_hd_t md; + int rc; + int with_mac = 1; + + + /* 9 steps to create the pkcs#12 Krampf. */ + + /* 8. The MAC. */ + /* We add this at step 0. */ + + /* 7. All the buffers. */ + for (i=0; sequences[i].buffer; i++) + needed += sequences[i].length; + + /* 6. This goes into a sequences. */ + len[6] = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + needed += n; + + /* 5. Encapsulate all in an octet string. */ + len[5] = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + needed += n; + + /* 4. And tag it with [0]. */ + len[4] = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + needed += n; + + /* 3. Prepend an data OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_data); + + /* 2. Put all into a sequences. */ + len[2] = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + needed += n; + + /* 1. Prepend the version integer 3. */ + needed += 3; + + /* 0. And the final outer sequence. */ + if (with_mac) + needed += DIM (data_mactemplate); + len[0] = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + needed += n; + + /* Allocate a buffer. */ + result = gcry_malloc (needed); + if (!result) + { + log_error ("error allocating buffer\n"); + return NULL; + } + p = result; + + /* 0. Store the very outer sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[0]); + + /* 1. Store the version integer 3. */ + *p++ = TAG_INTEGER; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = 3; + + /* 2. Store another sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[2]); + + /* 3. Store the data OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_data)); + memcpy (p, oid_data, DIM (oid_data)); + p += DIM (oid_data); + + /* 4. Next comes a context tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[4]); + + /* 5. And an octet string. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OCTET_STRING, len[5]); + + /* 6. And the inner sequence. */ + macstart = p; + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[6]); + + /* 7. Append all the buffers. */ + for (i=0; sequences[i].buffer; i++) + { + memcpy (p, sequences[i].buffer, sequences[i].length); + p += sequences[i].length; + } + + if (with_mac) + { + /* Intermezzo to compute the MAC. */ + maclen = p - macstart; + gcry_randomize (salt, 8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + if (string_to_key (3, salt, 8, 2048, pw, 20, keybuf)) + { + gcry_free (result); + return NULL; + } + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("gcry_md_open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + gcry_free (result); + return NULL; + } + rc = gcry_md_setkey (md, keybuf, 20); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("gcry_md_setkey failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + gcry_md_close (md); + gcry_free (result); + return NULL; + } + gcry_md_write (md, macstart, maclen); + + /* 8. Append the MAC template and fix it up. */ + memcpy (p, data_mactemplate, DIM (data_mactemplate)); + memcpy (p + DATA_MACTEMPLATE_SALT_OFF, salt, 8); + memcpy (p + DATA_MACTEMPLATE_MAC_OFF, gcry_md_read (md, 0), 20); + p += DIM (data_mactemplate); + gcry_md_close (md); + } + + /* Ready. */ + resultlen = p - result; + if (needed != resultlen) + log_debug ("length mismatch: %lu, %lu\n", + (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long)resultlen); + + *r_length = resultlen; + return result; +} + + +/* Build a DER encoded SEQUENCE with the key: + + SEQUENCE { + INTEGER 0 + SEQUENCE { + OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) + NULL + } + OCTET STRING, encapsulates { + SEQUENCE { + INTEGER 0 + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + INTEGER + } + } + } +*/ + +static unsigned char * +build_key_sequence (gcry_mpi_t *kparms, size_t *r_length) +{ + int rc, i; + size_t needed, n; + unsigned char *plain, *p; + size_t plainlen; + size_t outseqlen, oidseqlen, octstrlen, inseqlen; + + needed = 3; /* The version(?) integer of value 0. */ + for (i=0; kparms[i]; i++) + { + n = 0; + rc = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, NULL, 0, &n, kparms[i]); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("error formatting parameter: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return NULL; + } + needed += n; + n = compute_tag_length (n); + if (!n) + return NULL; + needed += n; + } + if (i != 8) + { + log_error ("invalid parameters for p12_build\n"); + return NULL; + } + /* Now this all goes into a sequence. */ + inseqlen = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + if (!n) + return NULL; + needed += n; + /* Encapsulate all into an octet string. */ + octstrlen = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + if (!n) + return NULL; + needed += n; + /* Prepend the object identifier sequence. */ + oidseqlen = 2 + DIM (oid_rsaEncryption) + 2; + needed += 2 + oidseqlen; + /* The version number. */ + needed += 3; + /* And finally put the whole thing into a sequence. */ + outseqlen = needed; + n = compute_tag_length (needed); + if (!n) + return NULL; + needed += n; + + /* allocate 8 extra bytes for padding */ + plain = gcry_malloc_secure (needed+8); + if (!plain) + { + log_error ("error allocating encryption buffer\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* And now fill the plaintext buffer. */ + p = plain; + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, outseqlen); + /* Store version. */ + *p++ = TAG_INTEGER; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = 0; + /* Store object identifier sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, oidseqlen); + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_rsaEncryption)); + memcpy (p, oid_rsaEncryption, DIM (oid_rsaEncryption)); + p += DIM (oid_rsaEncryption); + *p++ = TAG_NULL; + *p++ = 0; + /* Start with the octet string. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OCTET_STRING, octstrlen); + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, inseqlen); + /* Store the key parameters. */ + *p++ = TAG_INTEGER; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = 0; + for (i=0; kparms[i]; i++) + { + n = 0; + rc = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, NULL, 0, &n, kparms[i]); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("oops: error formatting parameter: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + gcry_free (plain); + return NULL; + } + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_INTEGER, n); + + n = plain + needed - p; + rc = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, p, n, &n, kparms[i]); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("oops: error storing parameter: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + gcry_free (plain); + return NULL; + } + p += n; + } + + plainlen = p - plain; + assert (needed == plainlen); + /* Append some pad characters; we already allocated extra space. */ + n = 8 - plainlen % 8; + for (i=0; i < n; i++, plainlen++) + *p++ = n; + + *r_length = plainlen; + return plain; +} + + + +static unsigned char * +build_key_bag (unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen, char *salt, + const unsigned char *sha1hash, const char *keyidstr, + size_t *r_length) +{ + size_t len[11], needed; + unsigned char *p, *keybag; + size_t keybaglen; + + /* Walk 11 steps down to collect the info: */ + + /* 10. The data goes into an octet string. */ + needed = compute_tag_length (buflen); + needed += buflen; + + /* 9. Prepend the algorithm identifier. */ + needed += DIM (data_3desiter2048); + + /* 8. Put a sequence around. */ + len[8] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 7. Prepend a [0] tag. */ + len[7] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 6b. The attributes which are appended at the end. */ + if (sha1hash) + needed += DIM (data_attrtemplate) + 20; + + /* 6. Prepend the shroudedKeyBag OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag); + + /* 5+4. Put all into two sequences. */ + len[5] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length ( needed); + len[4] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 3. This all goes into an octet string. */ + len[3] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 2. Prepend another [0] tag. */ + len[2] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 1. Prepend the data OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_data); + + /* 0. Prepend another sequence. */ + len[0] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* Now that we have all length information, allocate a buffer. */ + p = keybag = gcry_malloc (needed); + if (!keybag) + { + log_error ("error allocating buffer\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* Walk 11 steps up to store the data. */ + + /* 0. Store the first sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[0]); + + /* 1. Store the data OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_data)); + memcpy (p, oid_data, DIM (oid_data)); + p += DIM (oid_data); + + /* 2. Store a [0] tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[2]); + + /* 3. And an octet string. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OCTET_STRING, len[3]); + + /* 4+5. Two sequences. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[4]); + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[5]); + + /* 6. Store the shroudedKeyBag OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, + DIM (oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag)); + memcpy (p, oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag, + DIM (oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag)); + p += DIM (oid_pkcs_12_pkcs_8ShroudedKeyBag); + + /* 7. Store a [0] tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[7]); + + /* 8. Store a sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[8]); + + /* 9. Now for the pre-encoded algorithm identifier and the salt. */ + memcpy (p, data_3desiter2048, DIM (data_3desiter2048)); + memcpy (p + DATA_3DESITER2048_SALT_OFF, salt, 8); + p += DIM (data_3desiter2048); + + /* 10. And the octet string with the encrypted data. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OCTET_STRING, buflen); + memcpy (p, buffer, buflen); + p += buflen; + + /* Append the attributes whose length we calculated at step 2b. */ + if (sha1hash) + { + int i; + + memcpy (p, data_attrtemplate, DIM (data_attrtemplate)); + for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + p[DATA_ATTRTEMPLATE_KEYID_OFF+2*i+1] = keyidstr[i]; + p += DIM (data_attrtemplate); + memcpy (p, sha1hash, 20); + p += 20; + } + + + keybaglen = p - keybag; + if (needed != keybaglen) + log_debug ("length mismatch: %lu, %lu\n", + (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long)keybaglen); + + *r_length = keybaglen; + return keybag; +} + + +static unsigned char * +build_cert_bag (unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen, char *salt, + size_t *r_length) +{ + size_t len[9], needed; + unsigned char *p, *certbag; + size_t certbaglen; + + /* Walk 9 steps down to collect the info: */ + + /* 8. The data goes into an octet string. */ + needed = compute_tag_length (buflen); + needed += buflen; + + /* 7. The algorithm identifier. */ + needed += DIM (data_rc2iter2048); + + /* 6. The data OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_data); + + /* 5. A sequence. */ + len[5] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length ( needed); + + /* 4. An integer. */ + needed += 3; + + /* 3. A sequence. */ + len[3] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 2. A [0] tag. */ + len[2] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 1. The encryptedData OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_encryptedData); + + /* 0. The first sequence. */ + len[0] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* Now that we have all length information, allocate a buffer. */ + p = certbag = gcry_malloc (needed); + if (!certbag) + { + log_error ("error allocating buffer\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* Walk 9 steps up to store the data. */ + + /* 0. Store the first sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[0]); + + /* 1. Store the encryptedData OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_encryptedData)); + memcpy (p, oid_encryptedData, DIM (oid_encryptedData)); + p += DIM (oid_encryptedData); + + /* 2. Store a [0] tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[2]); + + /* 3. Store a sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[3]); + + /* 4. Store the integer 0. */ + *p++ = TAG_INTEGER; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = 0; + + /* 5. Store a sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[5]); + + /* 6. Store the data OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_data)); + memcpy (p, oid_data, DIM (oid_data)); + p += DIM (oid_data); + + /* 7. Now for the pre-encoded algorithm identifier and the salt. */ + memcpy (p, data_rc2iter2048, DIM (data_rc2iter2048)); + memcpy (p + DATA_RC2ITER2048_SALT_OFF, salt, 8); + p += DIM (data_rc2iter2048); + + /* 8. And finally the [0] tag with the encrypted data. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0x80, buflen); + memcpy (p, buffer, buflen); + p += buflen; + certbaglen = p - certbag; + + if (needed != certbaglen) + log_debug ("length mismatch: %lu, %lu\n", + (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long)certbaglen); + + *r_length = certbaglen; + return certbag; +} + + +static unsigned char * +build_cert_sequence (unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *sha1hash, const char *keyidstr, + size_t *r_length) +{ + size_t len[8], needed, n; + unsigned char *p, *certseq; + size_t certseqlen; + int i; + + assert (strlen (keyidstr) == 8); + + /* Walk 8 steps down to collect the info: */ + + /* 7. The data goes into an octet string. */ + needed = compute_tag_length (buflen); + needed += buflen; + + /* 6. A [0] tag. */ + len[6] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 5. An OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12); + + /* 4. A sequence. */ + len[4] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 3. A [0] tag. */ + len[3] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 2b. The attributes which are appended at the end. */ + if (sha1hash) + needed += DIM (data_attrtemplate) + 20; + + /* 2. An OID. */ + needed += 2 + DIM (oid_pkcs_12_CertBag); + + /* 1. A sequence. */ + len[1] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* 0. The first sequence. */ + len[0] = needed; + needed += compute_tag_length (needed); + + /* Now that we have all length information, allocate a buffer. */ + p = certseq = gcry_malloc (needed + 8 /*(for padding)*/); + if (!certseq) + { + log_error ("error allocating buffer\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* Walk 8 steps up to store the data. */ + + /* 0. Store the first sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[0]); + + /* 1. Store the second sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[1]); + + /* 2. Store the pkcs12-cert-bag OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, DIM (oid_pkcs_12_CertBag)); + memcpy (p, oid_pkcs_12_CertBag, DIM (oid_pkcs_12_CertBag)); + p += DIM (oid_pkcs_12_CertBag); + + /* 3. Store a [0] tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[3]); + + /* 4. Store a sequence. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_SEQUENCE, len[4]); + + /* 5. Store the x509Certificate OID. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OBJECT_ID, + DIM (oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12)); + memcpy (p, oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12, + DIM (oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12)); + p += DIM (oid_x509Certificate_for_pkcs_12); + + /* 6. Store a [0] tag. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, 0xa0, len[6]); + + /* 7. And the octet string with the actual certificate. */ + p = store_tag_length (p, TAG_OCTET_STRING, buflen); + memcpy (p, buffer, buflen); + p += buflen; + + /* Append the attributes whose length we calculated at step 2b. */ + if (sha1hash) + { + memcpy (p, data_attrtemplate, DIM (data_attrtemplate)); + for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + p[DATA_ATTRTEMPLATE_KEYID_OFF+2*i+1] = keyidstr[i]; + p += DIM (data_attrtemplate); + memcpy (p, sha1hash, 20); + p += 20; + } + + certseqlen = p - certseq; + if (needed != certseqlen) + log_debug ("length mismatch: %lu, %lu\n", + (unsigned long)needed, (unsigned long)certseqlen); + + /* Append some pad characters; we already allocated extra space. */ + n = 8 - certseqlen % 8; + for (i=0; i < n; i++, certseqlen++) + *p++ = n; + + *r_length = certseqlen; + return certseq; +} + + +/* Expect the RSA key parameters in KPARMS and a password in PW. + Create a PKCS structure from it and return it as well as the length + in R_LENGTH; return NULL in case of an error. If CHARSET is not + NULL, re-encode PW to that character set. */ +unsigned char * +p12_build (gcry_mpi_t *kparms, unsigned char *cert, size_t certlen, + const char *pw, const char *charset, size_t *r_length) +{ + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + size_t n, buflen; + char salt[8]; + struct buffer_s seqlist[3]; + int seqlistidx = 0; + unsigned char sha1hash[20]; + char keyidstr[8+1]; + char *pwbuf = NULL; + size_t pwbufsize = 0; + + n = buflen = 0; /* (avoid compiler warning). */ + memset (sha1hash, 0, 20); + *keyidstr = 0; + + if (charset && pw && *pw) + { + jnlib_iconv_t cd; + const char *inptr; + char *outptr; + size_t inbytes, outbytes; + + /* We assume that the converted passphrase is at max 2 times + longer than its utf-8 encoding. */ + pwbufsize = strlen (pw)*2 + 1; + pwbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (pwbufsize); + if (!pwbuf) + { + log_error ("out of secure memory while converting passphrase\n"); + goto failure; + } + + cd = jnlib_iconv_open (charset, "utf-8"); + if (cd == (jnlib_iconv_t)(-1)) + { + log_error ("can't convert passphrase to" + " requested charset `%s': %s\n", + charset, strerror (errno)); + gcry_free (pwbuf); + goto failure; + } + + inptr = pw; + inbytes = strlen (pw); + outptr = pwbuf; + outbytes = pwbufsize - 1; + if ( jnlib_iconv (cd, (const char **)&inptr, &inbytes, + &outptr, &outbytes) == (size_t)-1) + { + log_error ("error converting passphrase to" + " requested charset `%s': %s\n", + charset, strerror (errno)); + gcry_free (pwbuf); + jnlib_iconv_close (cd); + goto failure; + } + *outptr = 0; + jnlib_iconv_close (cd); + pw = pwbuf; + } + + + if (cert && certlen) + { + /* Calculate the hash value we need for the bag attributes. */ + gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, sha1hash, cert, certlen); + sprintf (keyidstr, "%02x%02x%02x%02x", + sha1hash[16], sha1hash[17], sha1hash[18], sha1hash[19]); + + /* Encode the certificate. */ + buffer = build_cert_sequence (cert, certlen, sha1hash, keyidstr, + &buflen); + if (!buffer) + goto failure; + + /* Encrypt it. */ + gcry_randomize (salt, 8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + crypt_block (buffer, buflen, salt, 8, 2048, pw, + GCRY_CIPHER_RFC2268_40, 1); + + /* Encode the encrypted stuff into a bag. */ + seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer = build_cert_bag (buffer, buflen, salt, &n); + seqlist[seqlistidx].length = n; + gcry_free (buffer); + buffer = NULL; + if (!seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer) + goto failure; + seqlistidx++; + } + + + if (kparms) + { + /* Encode the key. */ + buffer = build_key_sequence (kparms, &buflen); + if (!buffer) + goto failure; + + /* Encrypt it. */ + gcry_randomize (salt, 8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + crypt_block (buffer, buflen, salt, 8, 2048, pw, GCRY_CIPHER_3DES, 1); + + /* Encode the encrypted stuff into a bag. */ + if (cert && certlen) + seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer = build_key_bag (buffer, buflen, salt, + sha1hash, keyidstr, &n); + else + seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer = build_key_bag (buffer, buflen, salt, + NULL, NULL, &n); + seqlist[seqlistidx].length = n; + gcry_free (buffer); + buffer = NULL; + if (!seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer) + goto failure; + seqlistidx++; + } + + seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer = NULL; + seqlist[seqlistidx].length = 0; + + buffer = create_final (seqlist, pw, &buflen); + + failure: + if (pwbuf) + { + wipememory (pwbuf, pwbufsize); + gcry_free (pwbuf); + } + for ( ; seqlistidx; seqlistidx--) + gcry_free (seqlist[seqlistidx].buffer); + + *r_length = buffer? buflen : 0; + return buffer; +} + + +#ifdef TEST + +static void +cert_cb (void *opaque, const unsigned char *cert, size_t certlen) +{ + printf ("got a certificate of %u bytes length\n", certlen); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *fp; + struct stat st; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buflen; + gcry_mpi_t *result; + + if (argc != 3) + { + fprintf (stderr, "usage: testp12 file passphrase\n"); + return 1; + } + + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, NULL); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, NULL); + + fp = fopen (argv[1], "rb"); + if (!fp) + { + fprintf (stderr, "can't open `%s': %s\n", argv[1], strerror (errno)); + return 1; + } + + if (fstat (fileno(fp), &st)) + { + fprintf (stderr, "can't stat `%s': %s\n", argv[1], strerror (errno)); + return 1; + } + + buflen = st.st_size; + buf = gcry_malloc (buflen+1); + if (!buf || fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1) + { + fprintf (stderr, "error reading `%s': %s\n", argv[1], strerror (errno)); + return 1; + } + fclose (fp); + + result = p12_parse (buf, buflen, argv[2], cert_cb, NULL); + if (result) + { + int i, rc; + unsigned char *tmpbuf; + + for (i=0; result[i]; i++) + { + rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, &tmpbuf, + NULL, result[i]); + if (rc) + printf ("%d: [error printing number: %s]\n", + i, gpg_strerror (rc)); + else + { + printf ("%d: %s\n", i, tmpbuf); + gcry_free (tmpbuf); + } + } + } + + return 0; + +} + +/* +Local Variables: +compile-command: "gcc -Wall -O0 -g -DTEST=1 -o minip12 minip12.c ../jnlib/libjnlib.a -L /usr/local/lib -lgcrypt -lgpg-error" +End: +*/ +#endif /* TEST */ diff --git a/agent/minip12.h b/agent/minip12.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..998f82f --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/minip12.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* minip12.h - Global definitions for the minimal pkcs-12 implementation. + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#ifndef MINIP12_H +#define MINIP12_H + +#include <gcrypt.h> + +gcry_mpi_t *p12_parse (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, + const char *pw, + void (*certcb)(void*, const unsigned char*, size_t), + void *certcbarg); + +unsigned char *p12_build (gcry_mpi_t *kparms, + unsigned char *cert, size_t certlen, + const char *pw, const char *charset, + size_t *r_length); + + +#endif /*MINIP12_H*/ diff --git a/agent/pkdecrypt.c b/agent/pkdecrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e1c47d --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/pkdecrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* pkdecrypt.c - public key decryption (well, acually using a secret key) + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#include "agent.h" + + +/* DECRYPT the stuff in ciphertext which is expected to be a S-Exp. + Try to get the key from CTRL and write the decoded stuff back to + OUTFP. */ +int +agent_pkdecrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + const unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertextlen, + membuf_t *outbuf) +{ + gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL, s_cipher = NULL, s_plain = NULL; + unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; + int rc; + char *buf = NULL; + size_t len; + + if (!ctrl->have_keygrip) + { + log_error ("speculative decryption not yet supported\n"); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_cipher, NULL, (char*)ciphertext, ciphertextlen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to convert ciphertext: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + goto leave; + } + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + { + log_printhex ("keygrip:", ctrl->keygrip, 20); + log_printhex ("cipher: ", ciphertext, ciphertextlen); + } + rc = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, desc_text, + ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info, + CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey); + if (rc) + { + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); + else + log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n"); + goto leave; + } + + if (!s_skey) + { /* divert operation to the smartcard */ + + if (!gcry_sexp_canon_len (ciphertext, ciphertextlen, NULL, NULL)) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + goto leave; + } + + rc = divert_pkdecrypt (ctrl, ciphertext, shadow_info, &buf, &len ); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("smartcard decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + { + char tmpbuf[60]; + + sprintf (tmpbuf, "(5:value%u:", (unsigned int)len); + put_membuf (outbuf, tmpbuf, strlen (tmpbuf)); + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2); + } + } + else + { /* No smartcard, but a private key */ +/* if (DBG_CRYPTO ) */ +/* { */ +/* log_debug ("skey: "); */ +/* gcry_sexp_dump (s_skey); */ +/* } */ + + rc = gcry_pk_decrypt (&s_plain, s_cipher, s_skey); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("decryption failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + { + log_debug ("plain: "); + gcry_sexp_dump (s_plain); + } + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = xmalloc (len); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_plain, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + if (*buf == '(') + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + else + { + /* Old style libgcrypt: This is only an S-expression + part. Turn it into a complete S-expression. */ + put_membuf (outbuf, "(5:value", 8); + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2); + } + } + + + leave: + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + gcry_sexp_release (s_plain); + gcry_sexp_release (s_cipher); + xfree (buf); + xfree (shadow_info); + return rc; +} + + diff --git a/agent/pksign.c b/agent/pksign.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25cadb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/pksign.c @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +/* pksign.c - public key signing (well, actually using a secret key) + * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#include "agent.h" + + +static int +do_encode_md (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int algo, gcry_sexp_t * r_hash, + int raw_value) +{ + gcry_sexp_t hash; + int rc; + + if (!raw_value) + { + const char *s; + char tmp[16+1]; + int i; + + s = gcry_md_algo_name (algo); + if (s && strlen (s) < 16) + { + for (i=0; i < strlen (s); i++) + tmp[i] = tolower (s[i]); + tmp[i] = '\0'; + } + + rc = gcry_sexp_build (&hash, NULL, + "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", + tmp, (int)mdlen, md); + } + else + { + gcry_mpi_t mpi; + + rc = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, md, mdlen, NULL); + if (! rc) + { + rc = gcry_sexp_build (&hash, NULL, + "(data (flags raw) (value %m))", + mpi); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi); + } + + } + + *r_hash = hash; + return rc; +} + + +/* Special version of do_encode_md to take care of pkcs#1 padding. + For TLS-MD5SHA1 we need to do the padding ourself as Libgrypt does + not know about this special scheme. Fixme: We should have a + pkcs1-only-padding flag for Libgcrypt. */ +static int +do_encode_raw_pkcs1 (const byte *md, size_t mdlen, unsigned int nbits, + gcry_sexp_t *r_hash) +{ + int rc; + gcry_sexp_t hash; + unsigned char *frame; + size_t i, n, nframe; + + nframe = (nbits+7) / 8; + if ( !mdlen || mdlen + 8 + 4 > nframe ) + { + /* Can't encode this hash into a frame of size NFRAME. */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); + } + + frame = xtrymalloc (nframe); + if (!frame) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + /* Assemble the pkcs#1 block type 1. */ + n = 0; + frame[n++] = 0; + frame[n++] = 1; /* Block type. */ + i = nframe - mdlen - 3 ; + assert (i >= 8); /* At least 8 bytes of padding. */ + memset (frame+n, 0xff, i ); + n += i; + frame[n++] = 0; + memcpy (frame+n, md, mdlen ); + n += mdlen; + assert (n == nframe); + + /* Create the S-expression. */ + rc = gcry_sexp_build (&hash, NULL, + "(data (flags raw) (value %b))", + (int)nframe, frame); + xfree (frame); + + *r_hash = hash; + return rc; +} + + + +/* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and return + the signature S-expression. LOOKUP is an optional function to + provide a way for lower layers to ask for the caching TTL. */ +int +agent_pksign_do (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + gcry_sexp_t *signature_sexp, + cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl) +{ + gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL, s_sig = NULL; + unsigned char *shadow_info = NULL; + unsigned int rc = 0; /* FIXME: gpg-error? */ + + if (! ctrl->have_keygrip) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY); + + rc = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, desc_text, ctrl->keygrip, + &shadow_info, cache_mode, lookup_ttl, + &s_skey); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to read the secret key\n"); + goto leave; + } + + if (!s_skey) + { + /* Divert operation to the smartcard */ + + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + + rc = divert_pksign (ctrl, + ctrl->digest.value, + ctrl->digest.valuelen, + ctrl->digest.algo, + shadow_info, &buf); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("smartcard signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (buf, 0, NULL, NULL); + assert (len); + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_sig, NULL, (char*)buf, len); + xfree (buf); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to convert sigbuf returned by divert_pksign " + "into S-Exp: %s", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + } + else + { + /* No smartcard, but a private key */ + + gcry_sexp_t s_hash = NULL; + + /* Put the hash into a sexp */ + if (ctrl->digest.algo == MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1) + rc = do_encode_raw_pkcs1 (ctrl->digest.value, + ctrl->digest.valuelen, + gcry_pk_get_nbits (s_skey), + &s_hash); + else + rc = do_encode_md (ctrl->digest.value, + ctrl->digest.valuelen, + ctrl->digest.algo, + &s_hash, + ctrl->digest.raw_value); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + { + log_debug ("skey: "); + gcry_sexp_dump (s_skey); + } + + /* sign */ + rc = gcry_pk_sign (&s_sig, s_hash, s_skey); + gcry_sexp_release (s_hash); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("signing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + { + log_debug ("result: "); + gcry_sexp_dump (s_sig); + } + } + + leave: + + *signature_sexp = s_sig; + + gcry_sexp_release (s_skey); + xfree (shadow_info); + + return rc; +} + +/* SIGN whatever information we have accumulated in CTRL and write it + back to OUTFP. */ +int +agent_pksign (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text, + membuf_t *outbuf, cache_mode_t cache_mode) +{ + gcry_sexp_t s_sig = NULL; + char *buf = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int rc = 0; + + rc = agent_pksign_do (ctrl, desc_text, &s_sig, cache_mode, NULL); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_sig, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = xmalloc (len); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_sig, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + + leave: + gcry_sexp_release (s_sig); + xfree (buf); + + return rc; +} diff --git a/agent/preset-passphrase.c b/agent/preset-passphrase.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72de91b --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/preset-passphrase.c @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +/* preset-passphrase.c - A tool to preset a passphrase. + * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H +#include <locale.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET +#include <langinfo.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM +#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +#include <windows.h> /* To initialize the sockets. fixme */ +#endif + +#define JNLIB_NEED_LOG_LOGV +#include "agent.h" +#include "minip12.h" +#include "simple-pwquery.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "sysutils.h" + + +enum cmd_and_opt_values +{ aNull = 0, + oVerbose = 'v', + oPassphrase = 'P', + + oPreset = 'c', + oForget = 'f', + + oNoVerbose = 500, + + oHomedir, + +aTest }; + + +static const char *opt_homedir; +static const char *opt_passphrase; + +static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = { + + { 301, NULL, 0, N_("@Options:\n ") }, + + { oVerbose, "verbose", 0, "verbose" }, + { oPassphrase, "passphrase", 2, "|STRING|use passphrase STRING" }, + { oPreset, "preset", 256, "preset passphrase"}, + { oForget, "forget", 256, "forget passphrase"}, + + { oHomedir, "homedir", 2, "@" }, + {0} +}; + + +static const char * +my_strusage (int level) +{ + const char *p; + switch (level) + { + case 11: p = "gpg-preset-passphrase (GnuPG)"; + break; + case 13: p = VERSION; break; + case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break; + case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break; + + case 1: + case 40: + p = _("Usage: gpg-preset-passphrase [options] KEYGRIP (-h for help)\n"); + break; + case 41: + p = _("Syntax: gpg-preset-passphrase [options] KEYGRIP\n" + "Password cache maintenance\n"); + break; + + default: p = NULL; + } + return p; +} + + + + +/* Include the implementation of map_spwq_error. */ +MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL + + +static void +preset_passphrase (const char *keygrip) +{ + int rc; + char *line; + /* FIXME: Use secure memory. */ + char passphrase[500]; + char *passphrase_esc; + + if (!opt_passphrase) + { + rc = read (0, passphrase, sizeof (passphrase) - 1); + if (rc < 0) + { + log_error ("reading passphrase failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ())); + return; + } + passphrase[rc] = '\0'; + line = strchr (passphrase, '\n'); + if (line) + { + if (line > passphrase && line[-1] == '\r') + line--; + *line = '\0'; + } + + /* FIXME: How to handle empty passwords? */ + } + + { + const char *s = opt_passphrase ? opt_passphrase : passphrase; + passphrase_esc = bin2hex (s, strlen (s), NULL); + } + if (!passphrase_esc) + { + log_error ("can not escape string: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ())); + return; + } + + rc = asprintf (&line, "PRESET_PASSPHRASE %s -1 %s\n", keygrip, + passphrase_esc); + wipememory (passphrase_esc, strlen (passphrase_esc)); + xfree (passphrase_esc); + + if (rc < 0) + { + log_error ("caching passphrase failed: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ())); + return; + } + if (!opt_passphrase) + wipememory (passphrase, sizeof (passphrase)); + + rc = map_spwq_error (simple_query (line)); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("caching passphrase failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + + wipememory (line, strlen (line)); + xfree (line); +} + + +static void +forget_passphrase (const char *keygrip) +{ + int rc; + char *line; + + rc = asprintf (&line, "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE %s\n", keygrip); + if (rc < 0) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + rc = map_spwq_error (simple_query (line)); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("clearing passphrase failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + + xfree (line); +} + + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs; + int cmd = 0; + const char *keygrip = NULL; + + set_strusage (my_strusage); + log_set_prefix ("gpg-preset-passphrase", 1); + + /* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */ + i18n_init (); + init_common_subsystems (); + + opt_homedir = default_homedir (); + + pargs.argc = &argc; + pargs.argv = &argv; + pargs.flags= 1; /* (do not remove the args) */ + while (arg_parse (&pargs, opts) ) + { + switch (pargs.r_opt) + { + case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break; + case oHomedir: opt_homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + + case oPreset: cmd = oPreset; break; + case oForget: cmd = oForget; break; + case oPassphrase: opt_passphrase = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + + default : pargs.err = 2; break; + } + } + if (log_get_errorcount(0)) + exit(2); + + if (argc == 1) + keygrip = *argv; + else + usage (1); + + /* Tell simple-pwquery about the the standard socket name. */ + { + char *tmp = make_filename (opt_homedir, "S.gpg-agent", NULL); + simple_pw_set_socket (tmp); + xfree (tmp); + } + + if (cmd == oPreset) + preset_passphrase (keygrip); + else if (cmd == oForget) + forget_passphrase (keygrip); + else + log_error ("one of the options --preset or --forget must be given\n"); + + agent_exit (0); + return 8; /*NOTREACHED*/ +} + + +void +agent_exit (int rc) +{ + rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0; + exit (rc); +} diff --git a/agent/protect-tool.c b/agent/protect-tool.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc040f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/protect-tool.c @@ -0,0 +1,1271 @@ +/* protect-tool.c - A tool to test the secret key protection + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H +#include <locale.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET +#include <langinfo.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM +#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */ +#endif + +#define JNLIB_NEED_LOG_LOGV +#include "agent.h" +#include "minip12.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "get-passphrase.h" +#include "sysutils.h" +#include "estream.h" + + +enum cmd_and_opt_values +{ + aNull = 0, + oVerbose = 'v', + oArmor = 'a', + oPassphrase = 'P', + + oProtect = 'p', + oUnprotect = 'u', + + oNoVerbose = 500, + oShadow, + oShowShadowInfo, + oShowKeygrip, + oS2Kcalibration, + oCanonical, + + oP12Import, + oP12Export, + oP12Charset, + oStore, + oForce, + oHaveCert, + oNoFailOnExist, + oHomedir, + oPrompt, + oStatusMsg, + + oAgentProgram +}; + + +struct rsa_secret_key_s +{ + gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */ + gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */ + gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */ + gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */ + gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */ + gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */ +}; + + +static const char *opt_homedir; +static int opt_armor; +static int opt_canonical; +static int opt_store; +static int opt_force; +static int opt_no_fail_on_exist; +static int opt_have_cert; +static const char *opt_passphrase; +static char *opt_prompt; +static int opt_status_msg; +static const char *opt_p12_charset; +static const char *opt_agent_program; + +static char *get_passphrase (int promptno); +static void release_passphrase (char *pw); +static int store_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, + const void *buffer, size_t length, int force); + + +static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = { + ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")), + + ARGPARSE_c (oProtect, "protect", "protect a private key"), + ARGPARSE_c (oUnprotect, "unprotect", "unprotect a private key"), + ARGPARSE_c (oShadow, "shadow", "create a shadow entry for a public key"), + ARGPARSE_c (oShowShadowInfo, "show-shadow-info", "return the shadow info"), + ARGPARSE_c (oShowKeygrip, "show-keygrip", "show the \"keygrip\""), + ARGPARSE_c (oP12Import, "p12-import", + "import a pkcs#12 encoded private key"), + ARGPARSE_c (oP12Export, "p12-export", + "export a private key pkcs#12 encoded"), + + ARGPARSE_c (oS2Kcalibration, "s2k-calibration", "@"), + + ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")), + + ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", "verbose"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", "write output in advanced format"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oCanonical, "canonical", "write output in canonical format"), + + ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "|STRING|use passphrase STRING"), + ARGPARSE_s_s (oP12Charset,"p12-charset", + "|NAME|set charset for a new PKCS#12 passphrase to NAME"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oHaveCert, "have-cert", + "certificate to export provided on STDIN"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oStore, "store", + "store the created key in the appropriate place"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oForce, "force", + "force overwriting"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoFailOnExist, "no-fail-on-exist", "@"), + ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"), + ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrompt, "prompt", + "|ESCSTRING|use ESCSTRING as prompt in pinentry"), + ARGPARSE_s_n (oStatusMsg, "enable-status-msg", "@"), + + ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"), + + ARGPARSE_end () +}; + +static const char * +my_strusage (int level) +{ + const char *p; + switch (level) + { + case 11: p = "gpg-protect-tool (GnuPG)"; + break; + case 13: p = VERSION; break; + case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break; + case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break; + + case 1: + case 40: p = _("Usage: gpg-protect-tool [options] (-h for help)\n"); + break; + case 41: p = _("Syntax: gpg-protect-tool [options] [args]\n" + "Secret key maintenance tool\n"); + break; + + default: p = NULL; + } + return p; +} + + +/* static void */ +/* print_mpi (const char *text, gcry_mpi_t a) */ +/* { */ +/* char *buf; */ +/* void *bufaddr = &buf; */ +/* int rc; */ + +/* rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, bufaddr, NULL, a); */ +/* if (rc) */ +/* log_info ("%s: [error printing number: %s]\n", text, gpg_strerror (rc)); */ +/* else */ +/* { */ +/* log_info ("%s: %s\n", text, buf); */ +/* gcry_free (buf); */ +/* } */ +/* } */ + + + +static unsigned char * +make_canonical (const char *fname, const char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int rc; + size_t erroff, len; + gcry_sexp_t sexp; + unsigned char *result; + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, buf, buflen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("invalid S-Expression in `%s' (off=%u): %s\n", + fname, (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc)); + return NULL; + } + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + result = xmalloc (len); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, result, len); + assert (len); + gcry_sexp_release (sexp); + return result; +} + +static char * +make_advanced (const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int rc; + size_t erroff, len; + gcry_sexp_t sexp; + char *result; + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, (const char*)buf, buflen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("invalid canonical S-Expression (off=%u): %s\n", + (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc)); + return NULL; + } + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + result = xmalloc (len); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, result, len); + assert (len); + gcry_sexp_release (sexp); + return result; +} + + +static char * +read_file (const char *fname, size_t *r_length) +{ + FILE *fp; + char *buf; + size_t buflen; + + if (!strcmp (fname, "-")) + { + size_t nread, bufsize = 0; + + fp = stdin; +#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM + setmode ( fileno(fp) , O_BINARY ); +#endif + buf = NULL; + buflen = 0; +#define NCHUNK 8192 + do + { + bufsize += NCHUNK; + if (!buf) + buf = xmalloc (bufsize); + else + buf = xrealloc (buf, bufsize); + + nread = fread (buf+buflen, 1, NCHUNK, fp); + if (nread < NCHUNK && ferror (fp)) + { + log_error ("error reading `[stdin]': %s\n", strerror (errno)); + xfree (buf); + return NULL; + } + buflen += nread; + } + while (nread == NCHUNK); +#undef NCHUNK + + } + else + { + struct stat st; + + fp = fopen (fname, "rb"); + if (!fp) + { + log_error ("can't open `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + return NULL; + } + + if (fstat (fileno(fp), &st)) + { + log_error ("can't stat `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + fclose (fp); + return NULL; + } + + buflen = st.st_size; + buf = xmalloc (buflen+1); + if (fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1) + { + log_error ("error reading `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + fclose (fp); + xfree (buf); + return NULL; + } + fclose (fp); + } + + *r_length = buflen; + return buf; +} + + +static unsigned char * +read_key (const char *fname) +{ + char *buf; + size_t buflen; + unsigned char *key; + + buf = read_file (fname, &buflen); + if (!buf) + return NULL; + key = make_canonical (fname, buf, buflen); + xfree (buf); + return key; +} + + + +static void +read_and_protect (const char *fname) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *key; + unsigned char *result; + size_t resultlen; + char *pw; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + pw = get_passphrase (1); + rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen); + release_passphrase (pw); + xfree (key); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("protecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + + if (opt_armor) + { + char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen); + xfree (result); + if (!p) + return; + result = (unsigned char*)p; + resultlen = strlen (p); + } + + fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout); + xfree (result); +} + + +static void +read_and_unprotect (const char *fname) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *key; + unsigned char *result; + size_t resultlen; + char *pw; + gnupg_isotime_t protected_at; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + rc = agent_unprotect (key, (pw=get_passphrase (1)), + protected_at, &result, &resultlen); + release_passphrase (pw); + xfree (key); + if (rc) + { + if (opt_status_msg) + log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] bad-passphrase\n"); + log_error ("unprotecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("key protection done at %.4s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%s\n", + protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6, + protected_at+9, protected_at+11, protected_at+13); + + + if (opt_armor) + { + char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen); + xfree (result); + if (!p) + return; + result = (unsigned char*)p; + resultlen = strlen (p); + } + + fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout); + xfree (result); +} + + + +static void +read_and_shadow (const char *fname) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *key; + unsigned char *result; + size_t resultlen; + unsigned char dummy_info[] = "(8:313233342:43)"; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + rc = agent_shadow_key (key, dummy_info, &result); + xfree (key); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("shadowing the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + resultlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (result, 0, NULL,NULL); + assert (resultlen); + + if (opt_armor) + { + char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen); + xfree (result); + if (!p) + return; + result = (unsigned char*)p; + resultlen = strlen (p); + } + + fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout); + xfree (result); +} + +static void +show_shadow_info (const char *fname) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *key; + const unsigned char *info; + size_t infolen; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + rc = agent_get_shadow_info (key, &info); + xfree (key); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + infolen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (info, 0, NULL,NULL); + assert (infolen); + + if (opt_armor) + { + char *p = make_advanced (info, infolen); + if (!p) + return; + fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout); + xfree (p); + } + else + fwrite (info, infolen, 1, stdout); +} + + +static void +show_file (const char *fname) +{ + unsigned char *key; + size_t keylen; + char *p; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + keylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, 0, NULL,NULL); + assert (keylen); + + if (opt_canonical) + { + fwrite (key, keylen, 1, stdout); + } + else + { + p = make_advanced (key, keylen); + if (p) + { + fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout); + xfree (p); + } + } + xfree (key); +} + +static void +show_keygrip (const char *fname) +{ + unsigned char *key; + gcry_sexp_t private; + unsigned char grip[20]; + int i; + + key = read_key (fname); + if (!key) + return; + + if (gcry_sexp_new (&private, key, 0, 0)) + { + log_error ("gcry_sexp_new failed\n"); + return; + } + xfree (key); + + if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (private, grip)) + { + log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n"); + return; + } + gcry_sexp_release (private); + + for (i=0; i < 20; i++) + printf ("%02X", grip[i]); + putchar ('\n'); +} + + +static int +rsa_key_check (struct rsa_secret_key_s *skey) +{ + int err = 0; + gcry_mpi_t t = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t t1 = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t t2 = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t phi = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + + /* check that n == p * q */ + gcry_mpi_mul (t, skey->p, skey->q); + if (gcry_mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) ) + { + log_error ("RSA oops: n != p * q\n"); + err++; + } + + /* check that p is less than q */ + if (gcry_mpi_cmp (skey->p, skey->q) > 0) + { + gcry_mpi_t tmp; + + log_info ("swapping secret primes\n"); + tmp = gcry_mpi_copy (skey->p); + gcry_mpi_set (skey->p, skey->q); + gcry_mpi_set (skey->q, tmp); + gcry_mpi_release (tmp); + /* and must recompute u of course */ + gcry_mpi_invm (skey->u, skey->p, skey->q); + } + + /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */ + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->p, 1 ); + gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0); + if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) + { + log_error ("RSA oops: e divides p-1\n"); + err++; + } + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->q, 1); + gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0); + if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0)) + { + log_info ( "RSA oops: e divides q-1\n" ); + err++; + } + + /* check that d is correct. */ + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t1, skey->p, 1); + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t2, skey->q, 1); + gcry_mpi_mul (phi, t1, t2); + gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, phi); + if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d)) + { /* no: try universal exponent. */ + gcry_mpi_gcd (t, t1, t2); + gcry_mpi_div (t, NULL, phi, t, 0); + gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, t); + if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d)) + { + log_error ("RSA oops: bad secret exponent\n"); + err++; + } + } + + /* check for correctness of u */ + gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->p, skey->q); + if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->u)) + { + log_info ( "RSA oops: bad u parameter\n"); + err++; + } + + if (err) + log_info ("RSA secret key check failed\n"); + + gcry_mpi_release (t); + gcry_mpi_release (t1); + gcry_mpi_release (t2); + gcry_mpi_release (phi); + + return err? -1:0; +} + + +/* A callback used by p12_parse to return a certificate. */ +static void +import_p12_cert_cb (void *opaque, const unsigned char *cert, size_t certlen) +{ + struct b64state state; + gpg_error_t err, err2; + + (void)opaque; + + err = b64enc_start (&state, stdout, "CERTIFICATE"); + if (!err) + err = b64enc_write (&state, cert, certlen); + err2 = b64enc_finish (&state); + if (!err) + err = err2; + if (err) + log_error ("error writing armored certificate: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); +} + +static void +import_p12_file (const char *fname) +{ + char *buf; + unsigned char *result; + size_t buflen, resultlen, buf_off; + int i; + int rc; + gcry_mpi_t *kparms; + struct rsa_secret_key_s sk; + gcry_sexp_t s_key; + unsigned char *key; + unsigned char grip[20]; + char *pw; + + /* fixme: we should release some stuff on error */ + + buf = read_file (fname, &buflen); + if (!buf) + return; + + /* GnuPG 2.0.4 accidently created binary P12 files with the string + "The passphrase is %s encoded.\n\n" prepended to the ASN.1 data. + We fix that here. */ + if (buflen > 29 && !memcmp (buf, "The passphrase is ", 18)) + { + for (buf_off=18; buf_off < buflen && buf[buf_off] != '\n'; buf_off++) + ; + buf_off++; + if (buf_off < buflen && buf[buf_off] == '\n') + buf_off++; + } + else + buf_off = 0; + + kparms = p12_parse ((unsigned char*)buf+buf_off, buflen-buf_off, + (pw=get_passphrase (2)), + import_p12_cert_cb, NULL); + release_passphrase (pw); + xfree (buf); + if (!kparms) + { + log_error ("error parsing or decrypting the PKCS-12 file\n"); + return; + } + for (i=0; kparms[i]; i++) + ; + if (i != 8) + { + log_error ("invalid structure of private key\n"); + return; + } + + +/* print_mpi (" n", kparms[0]); */ +/* print_mpi (" e", kparms[1]); */ +/* print_mpi (" d", kparms[2]); */ +/* print_mpi (" p", kparms[3]); */ +/* print_mpi (" q", kparms[4]); */ +/* print_mpi ("dmp1", kparms[5]); */ +/* print_mpi ("dmq1", kparms[6]); */ +/* print_mpi (" u", kparms[7]); */ + + sk.n = kparms[0]; + sk.e = kparms[1]; + sk.d = kparms[2]; + sk.q = kparms[3]; + sk.p = kparms[4]; + sk.u = kparms[7]; + if (rsa_key_check (&sk)) + return; +/* print_mpi (" n", sk.n); */ +/* print_mpi (" e", sk.e); */ +/* print_mpi (" d", sk.d); */ +/* print_mpi (" p", sk.p); */ +/* print_mpi (" q", sk.q); */ +/* print_mpi (" u", sk.u); */ + + /* Create an S-expresion from the parameters. */ + rc = gcry_sexp_build (&s_key, NULL, + "(private-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)(d%m)(p%m)(q%m)(u%m)))", + sk.n, sk.e, sk.d, sk.p, sk.q, sk.u, NULL); + for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (kparms[i]); + gcry_free (kparms); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to created S-expression from key: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + + /* Compute the keygrip. */ + if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_key, grip)) + { + log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n"); + return; + } + log_info ("keygrip: "); + for (i=0; i < 20; i++) + log_printf ("%02X", grip[i]); + log_printf ("\n"); + + /* Convert to canonical encoding. */ + buflen = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (buflen); + key = gcry_xmalloc_secure (buflen); + buflen = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, key, buflen); + assert (buflen); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + + pw = get_passphrase (4); + rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen); + release_passphrase (pw); + xfree (key); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("protecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return; + } + + if (opt_armor) + { + char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen); + xfree (result); + if (!p) + return; + result = (unsigned char*)p; + resultlen = strlen (p); + } + + if (opt_store) + store_private_key (grip, result, resultlen, opt_force); + else + fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout); + + xfree (result); +} + + + +static gcry_mpi_t * +sexp_to_kparms (gcry_sexp_t sexp) +{ + gcry_sexp_t list, l2; + const char *name; + const char *s; + size_t n; + int i, idx; + const char *elems; + gcry_mpi_t *array; + + list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, "private-key", 0 ); + if(!list) + return NULL; + l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + list = l2; + name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 0, &n); + if(!name || n != 3 || memcmp (name, "rsa", 3)) + { + gcry_sexp_release (list); + return NULL; + } + + /* Parameter names used with RSA. */ + elems = "nedpqu"; + array = xcalloc (strlen(elems) + 1, sizeof *array); + for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ ) + { + l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1); + if (!l2) + { + for (i=0; i<idx; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + return NULL; /* required parameter not found */ + } + array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); + gcry_sexp_release (l2); + if (!array[idx]) + { + for (i=0; i<idx; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); + xfree (array); + gcry_sexp_release (list); + return NULL; /* required parameter is invalid */ + } + } + + gcry_sexp_release (list); + return array; +} + + +/* Check whether STRING is a KEYGRIP, i.e has the correct length and + does only consist of uppercase hex characters. */ +static int +is_keygrip (const char *string) +{ + int i; + + for(i=0; string[i] && i < 41; i++) + if (!strchr("01234567890ABCDEF", string[i])) + return 0; + return i == 40; +} + + +static void +export_p12_file (const char *fname) +{ + int rc; + gcry_mpi_t kparms[9], *kp; + unsigned char *key; + size_t keylen; + gcry_sexp_t private; + struct rsa_secret_key_s sk; + int i; + unsigned char *cert = NULL; + size_t certlen = 0; + int keytype; + size_t keylen_for_wipe = 0; + char *pw; + + if ( is_keygrip (fname) ) + { + char hexgrip[40+4+1]; + char *p; + + assert (strlen(fname) == 40); + strcpy (stpcpy (hexgrip, fname), ".key"); + + p = make_filename (opt_homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL); + key = read_key (p); + xfree (p); + } + else + key = read_key (fname); + + if (!key) + return; + + keytype = agent_private_key_type (key); + if (keytype == PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED) + { + unsigned char *tmpkey; + size_t tmplen; + + rc = agent_unprotect (key, (pw=get_passphrase (1)), + NULL, &tmpkey, &tmplen); + release_passphrase (pw); + if (rc) + { + if (opt_status_msg && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE ) + log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] bad-passphrase\n"); + log_error ("unprotecting key `%s' failed: %s\n", + fname, gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (key); + return; + } + xfree (key); + key = tmpkey; + keylen_for_wipe = tmplen; + + keytype = agent_private_key_type (key); + } + + if (keytype == PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED) + { + log_error ("`%s' is a shadowed private key - can't export it\n", fname); + wipememory (key, keylen_for_wipe); + xfree (key); + return; + } + else if (keytype != PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR) + { + log_error ("\%s' is not a private key\n", fname); + wipememory (key, keylen_for_wipe); + xfree (key); + return; + } + + + if (opt_have_cert) + { + cert = (unsigned char*)read_file ("-", &certlen); + if (!cert) + { + wipememory (key, keylen_for_wipe); + xfree (key); + return; + } + } + + + if (gcry_sexp_new (&private, key, 0, 0)) + { + log_error ("gcry_sexp_new failed\n"); + wipememory (key, keylen_for_wipe); + xfree (key); + xfree (cert); + return; + } + wipememory (key, keylen_for_wipe); + xfree (key); + + kp = sexp_to_kparms (private); + gcry_sexp_release (private); + if (!kp) + { + log_error ("error converting key parameters\n"); + xfree (cert); + return; + } + sk.n = kp[0]; + sk.e = kp[1]; + sk.d = kp[2]; + sk.p = kp[3]; + sk.q = kp[4]; + sk.u = kp[5]; + xfree (kp); + + + kparms[0] = sk.n; + kparms[1] = sk.e; + kparms[2] = sk.d; + kparms[3] = sk.q; + kparms[4] = sk.p; + kparms[5] = gcry_mpi_snew (0); /* compute d mod (p-1) */ + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (kparms[5], kparms[3], 1); + gcry_mpi_mod (kparms[5], sk.d, kparms[5]); + kparms[6] = gcry_mpi_snew (0); /* compute d mod (q-1) */ + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (kparms[6], kparms[4], 1); + gcry_mpi_mod (kparms[6], sk.d, kparms[6]); + kparms[7] = sk.u; + kparms[8] = NULL; + + pw = get_passphrase (3); + key = p12_build (kparms, cert, certlen, pw, opt_p12_charset, &keylen); + release_passphrase (pw); + xfree (cert); + for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + gcry_mpi_release (kparms[i]); + if (!key) + return; + +#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM + setmode ( fileno (stdout) , O_BINARY ); +#endif + fwrite (key, keylen, 1, stdout); + xfree (key); +} + + + +int +main (int argc, char **argv ) +{ + ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs; + int cmd = 0; + const char *fname; + + set_strusage (my_strusage); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN); + log_set_prefix ("gpg-protect-tool", 1); + + /* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */ + i18n_init (); + init_common_subsystems (); + + if (!gcry_check_version (NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION) ) + { + log_fatal( _("%s is too old (need %s, have %s)\n"), "libgcrypt", + NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, gcry_check_version (NULL) ); + } + + setup_libgcrypt_logging (); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0); + + + opt_homedir = default_homedir (); + + + pargs.argc = &argc; + pargs.argv = &argv; + pargs.flags= 1; /* (do not remove the args) */ + while (arg_parse (&pargs, opts) ) + { + switch (pargs.r_opt) + { + case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break; + case oArmor: opt_armor=1; break; + case oCanonical: opt_canonical=1; break; + case oHomedir: opt_homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + + case oAgentProgram: opt_agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + + case oProtect: cmd = oProtect; break; + case oUnprotect: cmd = oUnprotect; break; + case oShadow: cmd = oShadow; break; + case oShowShadowInfo: cmd = oShowShadowInfo; break; + case oShowKeygrip: cmd = oShowKeygrip; break; + case oP12Import: cmd = oP12Import; break; + case oP12Export: cmd = oP12Export; break; + case oP12Charset: opt_p12_charset = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + + case oS2Kcalibration: cmd = oS2Kcalibration; break; + + case oPassphrase: opt_passphrase = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + case oStore: opt_store = 1; break; + case oForce: opt_force = 1; break; + case oNoFailOnExist: opt_no_fail_on_exist = 1; break; + case oHaveCert: opt_have_cert = 1; break; + case oPrompt: opt_prompt = pargs.r.ret_str; break; + case oStatusMsg: opt_status_msg = 1; break; + + default: pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break; + } + } + if (log_get_errorcount (0)) + exit (2); + + fname = "-"; + if (argc == 1) + fname = *argv; + else if (argc > 1) + usage (1); + + /* Set the information which can't be taken from envvars. */ + gnupg_prepare_get_passphrase (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT, + opt.verbose, + opt_homedir, + opt_agent_program, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (opt_prompt) + opt_prompt = percent_plus_unescape (opt_prompt, 0); + + if (cmd == oProtect) + read_and_protect (fname); + else if (cmd == oUnprotect) + read_and_unprotect (fname); + else if (cmd == oShadow) + read_and_shadow (fname); + else if (cmd == oShowShadowInfo) + show_shadow_info (fname); + else if (cmd == oShowKeygrip) + show_keygrip (fname); + else if (cmd == oP12Import) + import_p12_file (fname); + else if (cmd == oP12Export) + export_p12_file (fname); + else if (cmd == oS2Kcalibration) + { + if (!opt.verbose) + opt.verbose++; /* We need to see something. */ + get_standard_s2k_count (); + } + else + show_file (fname); + + agent_exit (0); + return 8; /*NOTREACHED*/ +} + +void +agent_exit (int rc) +{ + rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0; + exit (rc); +} + + +/* Return the passphrase string and ask the agent if it has not been + set from the command line PROMPTNO select the prompt to display: + 0 = default + 1 = taken from the option --prompt + 2 = for unprotecting a pkcs#12 object + 3 = for protecting a new pkcs#12 object + 4 = for protecting an imported pkcs#12 in our system +*/ +static char * +get_passphrase (int promptno) +{ + char *pw; + int err; + const char *desc; + char *orig_codeset; + int repeat = 0; + + if (opt_passphrase) + return xstrdup (opt_passphrase); + + orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 (); + + if (promptno == 1 && opt_prompt) + { + desc = opt_prompt; + } + else if (promptno == 2) + { + desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to unprotect the " + "PKCS#12 object."); + } + else if (promptno == 3) + { + desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the " + "new PKCS#12 object."); + repeat = 1; + } + else if (promptno == 4) + { + desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the " + "imported object within the GnuPG system."); + repeat = 1; + } + else + desc = _("Please enter the passphrase or the PIN\n" + "needed to complete this operation."); + + i18n_switchback (orig_codeset); + + err = gnupg_get_passphrase (NULL, NULL, _("Passphrase:"), desc, + repeat, repeat, 1, &pw); + if (err) + { + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED) + log_info (_("cancelled\n")); + else + log_error (_("error while asking for the passphrase: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + agent_exit (0); + } + assert (pw); + + return pw; +} + + +static void +release_passphrase (char *pw) +{ + if (pw) + { + wipememory (pw, strlen (pw)); + xfree (pw); + } +} + +static int +store_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, + const void *buffer, size_t length, int force) +{ + char *fname; + estream_t fp; + char hexgrip[40+4+1]; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip); + strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key"); + + fname = make_filename (opt_homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL); + if (force) + fp = es_fopen (fname, "wb"); + else + { + if (!access (fname, F_OK)) + { + if (opt_status_msg) + log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] secretkey-exists\n"); + if (opt_no_fail_on_exist) + log_info ("secret key file `%s' already exists\n", fname); + else + log_error ("secret key file `%s' already exists\n", fname); + xfree (fname); + return opt_no_fail_on_exist? 0 : -1; + } + /* FWIW: Under Windows Vista the standard fopen in the msvcrt + fails if the "x" GNU extension is used. */ + fp = es_fopen (fname, "wbx"); + } + + if (!fp) + { + log_error ("can't create `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + xfree (fname); + return -1; + } + + if (es_fwrite (buffer, length, 1, fp) != 1) + { + log_error ("error writing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + es_fclose (fp); + remove (fname); + xfree (fname); + return -1; + } + if (es_fclose (fp)) + { + log_error ("error closing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno)); + remove (fname); + xfree (fname); + return -1; + } + log_info ("secret key stored as `%s'\n", fname); + + if (opt_status_msg) + log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] secretkey-stored\n"); + + xfree (fname); + return 0; +} diff --git a/agent/protect.c b/agent/protect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6c9641 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/protect.c @@ -0,0 +1,1321 @@ +/* protect.c - Un/Protect a secret key + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, + * 2003, 2007, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM +# include <windows.h> +#else +# include <sys/times.h> +#endif + +#include "agent.h" + +#include "sexp-parse.h" + +#define PROT_CIPHER GCRY_CIPHER_AES +#define PROT_CIPHER_STRING "aes" +#define PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN (128/8) + + +/* A table containing the information needed to create a protected + private key */ +static struct { + const char *algo; + const char *parmlist; + int prot_from, prot_to; +} protect_info[] = { + { "rsa", "nedpqu", 2, 5 }, + { "dsa", "pqgyx", 4, 4 }, + { "elg", "pgyx", 3, 3 }, + { NULL } +}; + + +/* A helper object for time measurement. */ +struct calibrate_time_s +{ +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + FILETIME creation_time, exit_time, kernel_time, user_time; +#else + clock_t ticks; +#endif +}; + + +static int +hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, + int s2kmode, + const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/* Get the process time and store it in DATA. */ +static void +calibrate_get_time (struct calibrate_time_s *data) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + GetProcessTimes (GetCurrentProcess (), + &data->creation_time, &data->exit_time, + &data->kernel_time, &data->user_time); +#else + struct tms tmp; + + times (&tmp); + data->ticks = tmp.tms_utime; +#endif +} + + +static unsigned long +calibrate_elapsed_time (struct calibrate_time_s *starttime) +{ + struct calibrate_time_s stoptime; + + calibrate_get_time (&stoptime); +#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM + { + unsigned long long t1, t2; + + t1 = (((unsigned long long)starttime->kernel_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + + starttime->kernel_time.dwLowDateTime); + t1 += (((unsigned long long)starttime->user_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + + starttime->user_time.dwLowDateTime); + t2 = (((unsigned long long)stoptime.kernel_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + + stoptime.kernel_time.dwLowDateTime); + t2 += (((unsigned long long)stoptime.user_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + + stoptime.user_time.dwLowDateTime); + return (unsigned long)((t2 - t1)/10000); + } +#else + return (unsigned long)((((double) (stoptime.ticks - starttime->ticks)) + /CLOCKS_PER_SEC)*10000000); +#endif +} + + +/* Run a test hashing for COUNT and return the time required in + milliseconds. */ +static unsigned long +calibrate_s2k_count_one (unsigned long count) +{ + int rc; + char keybuf[PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN]; + struct calibrate_time_s starttime; + + calibrate_get_time (&starttime); + rc = hash_passphrase ("123456789abcdef0", GCRY_MD_SHA1, + 3, "saltsalt", count, keybuf, sizeof keybuf); + if (rc) + BUG (); + return calibrate_elapsed_time (&starttime); +} + + +/* Measure the time we need to do the hash operations and deduce an + S2K count which requires about 100ms of time. */ +static unsigned long +calibrate_s2k_count (void) +{ + unsigned long count; + unsigned long ms; + + for (count = 65536; count; count *= 2) + { + ms = calibrate_s2k_count_one (count); + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info ("S2K calibration: %lu -> %lums\n", count, ms); + if (ms > 100) + break; + } + + count = (unsigned long)(((double)count / ms) * 100); + count /= 1024; + count *= 1024; + if (count < 65536) + count = 65536; + + if (opt.verbose) + { + ms = calibrate_s2k_count_one (count); + log_info ("S2K calibration: %lu iterations for %lums\n", count, ms); + } + + return count; +} + + + +/* Return the standard S2K count. */ +unsigned long +get_standard_s2k_count (void) +{ + static unsigned long count; + + if (!count) + count = calibrate_s2k_count (); + + /* Enforce a lower limit. */ + return count < 65536 ? 65536 : count; +} + + + + +/* Calculate the MIC for a private key S-Exp. SHA1HASH should point to + a 20 byte buffer. This function is suitable for any algorithms. */ +static int +calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) +{ + const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end; + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + + s = plainkey; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + hash_begin = s; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ + + while (*s == '(') + { + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; + if ( *s != ')' ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + } + if (*s != ')') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + hash_end = s; + + gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, sha1hash, + hash_begin, hash_end - hash_begin); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Encrypt the parameter block starting at PROTBEGIN with length + PROTLEN using the utf8 encoded key PASSPHRASE and return the entire + encrypted block in RESULT or return with an error code. SHA1HASH + is the 20 byte SHA-1 hash required for the integrity code. + + The parameter block is expected to be an incomplete S-Expression of + the form (example in advanced format): + + (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) + (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) + (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) + (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) + + the returned block is the S-Expression: + + (protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string) + +*/ +static int +do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, + const char *passphrase, const unsigned char *sha1hash, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) +{ + gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; + const char *modestr = "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc"; + int blklen, enclen, outlen; + unsigned char *iv = NULL; + int rc; + char *outbuf = NULL; + char *p; + int saltpos, ivpos, encpos; + + *resultlen = 0; + *result = NULL; + + rc = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, PROT_CIPHER, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, + GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + + /* We need to work on a copy of the data because this makes it + easier to add the trailer and the padding and more important we + have to prefix the text with 2 parenthesis, so we have to + allocate enough space for: + + ((<parameter_list>)(4:hash4:sha120:<hashvalue>)) + padding + + We always append a full block of random bytes as padding but + encrypt only what is needed for a full blocksize. */ + blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (PROT_CIPHER); + outlen = 2 + protlen + 2 + 6 + 6 + 23 + 2 + blklen; + enclen = outlen/blklen * blklen; + outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (outlen); + if (!outbuf) + rc = out_of_core (); + if (!rc) + { + /* Allocate random bytes to be used as IV, padding and s2k salt. */ + iv = xtrymalloc (blklen*2+8); + if (!iv) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); + else + { + gcry_create_nonce (iv, blklen*2+8); + rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, blklen); + } + } + if (!rc) + { + unsigned char *key; + size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; + + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); + if (!key) + rc = out_of_core (); + else + { + rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1, + 3, iv+2*blklen, + get_standard_s2k_count (), key, keylen); + if (!rc) + rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen); + xfree (key); + } + } + if (!rc) + { + p = outbuf; + *p++ = '('; + *p++ = '('; + memcpy (p, protbegin, protlen); + p += protlen; + memcpy (p, ")(4:hash4:sha120:", 17); + p += 17; + memcpy (p, sha1hash, 20); + p += 20; + *p++ = ')'; + *p++ = ')'; + memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); + p += blklen; + assert ( p - outbuf == outlen); + rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, enclen, NULL, 0); + } + gcry_cipher_close (hd); + if (rc) + { + xfree (iv); + xfree (outbuf); + return rc; + } + + /* Now allocate the buffer we want to return. This is + + (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc + ((sha1 salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv) + encrypted_octet_string) + + in canoncical format of course. We use asprintf and %n modifier + and dummy values as placeholders. */ + { + char countbuf[35]; + + snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu", get_standard_s2k_count ()); + p = xtryasprintf + ("(9:protected%d:%s((4:sha18:%n_8bytes_%u:%s)%d:%n%*s)%d:%n%*s)", + (int)strlen (modestr), modestr, + &saltpos, + (unsigned int)strlen (countbuf), countbuf, + blklen, &ivpos, blklen, "", + enclen, &encpos, enclen, ""); + if (!p) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core (); + xfree (iv); + xfree (outbuf); + return tmperr; + } + } + *resultlen = strlen (p); + *result = (unsigned char*)p; + memcpy (p+saltpos, iv+2*blklen, 8); + memcpy (p+ivpos, iv, blklen); + memcpy (p+encpos, outbuf, enclen); + xfree (iv); + xfree (outbuf); + return 0; +} + + + +/* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in PLAINKEY. We assume + a valid S-Exp here. */ +int +agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) +{ + int rc; + const unsigned char *s; + const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end; + const unsigned char *prot_begin, *prot_end, *real_end; + size_t n; + int c, infidx, i; + unsigned char hashvalue[20]; + char timestamp_exp[35]; + unsigned char *protected; + size_t protectedlen; + int depth = 0; + unsigned char *p; + gcry_md_hd_t md; + + /* Create an S-expression with the procted-at timestamp. */ + memcpy (timestamp_exp, "(12:protected-at15:", 19); + gnupg_get_isotime (timestamp_exp+19); + timestamp_exp[19+15] = ')'; + + /* Parse original key. */ + s = plainkey; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + depth++; + hash_begin = s; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + + for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo + && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) + ; + if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + + prot_begin = prot_end = NULL; + for (i=0; (c=protect_info[infidx].parmlist[i]); i++) + { + if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_from) + prot_begin = s; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (n != 1 || c != *s) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s +=n; /* skip value */ + if (*s != ')') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth--; + if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_to) + prot_end = s; + s++; + } + if (*s != ')' || !prot_begin || !prot_end ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth--; + hash_end = s; + s++; + /* skip to the end of the S-exp */ + assert (depth == 1); + rc = sskip (&s, &depth); + if (rc) + return rc; + assert (!depth); + real_end = s-1; + + + /* Hash the stuff. Because the timestamp_exp won't get protected, + we can't simply hash a continuous buffer but need to use several + md_writes. */ + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0 ); + if (rc) + return rc; + gcry_md_write (md, hash_begin, hash_end - hash_begin); + gcry_md_write (md, timestamp_exp, 35); + gcry_md_write (md, ")", 1); + memcpy (hashvalue, gcry_md_read (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1), 20); + gcry_md_close (md); + + rc = do_encryption (prot_begin, prot_end - prot_begin + 1, + passphrase, hashvalue, + &protected, &protectedlen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Now create the protected version of the key. Note that the 10 + extra bytes are for for the inserted "protected-" string (the + beginning of the plaintext reads: "((11:private-key(" ). The 35 + term is the space for (12:protected-at15:<timestamp>). */ + *resultlen = (10 + + (prot_begin-plainkey) + + protectedlen + + 35 + + (real_end-prot_end)); + *result = p = xtrymalloc (*resultlen); + if (!p) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core (); + xfree (protected); + return tmperr; + } + memcpy (p, "(21:protected-", 14); + p += 14; + memcpy (p, plainkey+4, prot_begin - plainkey - 4); + p += prot_begin - plainkey - 4; + memcpy (p, protected, protectedlen); + p += protectedlen; + + memcpy (p, timestamp_exp, 35); + p += 35; + + memcpy (p, prot_end+1, real_end - prot_end); + p += real_end - prot_end; + assert ( p - *result == *resultlen); + xfree (protected); + + return 0; +} + + +/* Do the actual decryption and check the return list for consistency. */ +static int +do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, + const char *passphrase, + const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, + unsigned char **result) +{ + int rc = 0; + int blklen; + gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; + unsigned char *outbuf; + size_t reallen; + + blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (PROT_CIPHER); + if (protectedlen < 4 || (protectedlen%blklen)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + + rc = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, PROT_CIPHER, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, + GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (protectedlen); + if (!outbuf) + rc = out_of_core (); + if (!rc) + rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, ivlen); + if (!rc) + { + unsigned char *key; + size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; + + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); + if (!key) + rc = out_of_core (); + else + { + rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1, + 3, s2ksalt, s2kcount, key, keylen); + if (!rc) + rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen); + xfree (key); + } + } + if (!rc) + rc = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, outbuf, protectedlen, + protected, protectedlen); + gcry_cipher_close (hd); + if (rc) + { + xfree (outbuf); + return rc; + } + /* Do a quick check first. */ + if (*outbuf != '(' && outbuf[1] != '(') + { + xfree (outbuf); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); + } + /* Check that we have a consistent S-Exp. */ + reallen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (outbuf, protectedlen, NULL, NULL); + if (!reallen || (reallen + blklen < protectedlen) ) + { + xfree (outbuf); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); + } + *result = outbuf; + return 0; +} + + +/* Merge the parameter list contained in CLEARTEXT with the original + protect lists PROTECTEDKEY by replacing the list at REPLACEPOS. + Return the new list in RESULT and the MIC value in the 20 byte + buffer SHA1HASH. CUTOFF and CUTLEN will receive the offset and the + length of the resulting list which should go into the MIC + calculation but then be removed. */ +static int +merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, + size_t replacepos, + const unsigned char *cleartext, + unsigned char *sha1hash, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen, + size_t *cutoff, size_t *cutlen) +{ + size_t n, newlistlen; + unsigned char *newlist, *p; + const unsigned char *s; + const unsigned char *startpos, *endpos; + int i, rc; + + *result = NULL; + *resultlen = 0; + *cutoff = 0; + *cutlen = 0; + + if (replacepos < 26) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG); + + /* Estimate the required size of the resulting list. We have a large + safety margin of >20 bytes (MIC hash from CLEARTEXT and the + removed "protected-" */ + newlistlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (protectedkey, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (!newlistlen) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG); + n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (cleartext, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG); + newlistlen += n; + newlist = gcry_malloc_secure (newlistlen); + if (!newlist) + return out_of_core (); + + /* Copy the initial segment */ + strcpy ((char*)newlist, "(11:private-key"); + p = newlist + 15; + memcpy (p, protectedkey+15+10, replacepos-15-10); + p += replacepos-15-10; + + /* copy the cleartext */ + s = cleartext; + if (*s != '(' && s[1] != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG); /*we already checked this */ + s += 2; + startpos = s; + while ( *s == '(' ) + { + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + goto invalid_sexp; + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + goto invalid_sexp; + s += n; + if ( *s != ')' ) + goto invalid_sexp; + s++; + } + if ( *s != ')' ) + goto invalid_sexp; + endpos = s; + s++; + /* Intermezzo: Get the MIC */ + if (*s != '(') + goto invalid_sexp; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "hash")) + goto invalid_sexp; + n = snext (&s); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) + goto invalid_sexp; + n = snext (&s); + if (n != 20) + goto invalid_sexp; + memcpy (sha1hash, s, 20); + s += n; + if (*s != ')') + goto invalid_sexp; + /* End intermezzo */ + + /* append the parameter list */ + memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); + p += endpos - startpos; + + /* Skip over the protected list element in the original list. */ + s = protectedkey + replacepos; + assert (*s == '('); + s++; + i = 1; + rc = sskip (&s, &i); + if (rc) + goto failure; + /* Record the position of the optional protected-at expression. */ + if (*s == '(') + { + const unsigned char *save_s = s; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (smatch (&s, n, "protected-at")) + { + i = 1; + rc = sskip (&s, &i); + if (rc) + goto failure; + *cutlen = s - save_s; + } + s = save_s; + } + startpos = s; + i = 2; /* we are inside this level */ + rc = sskip (&s, &i); + if (rc) + goto failure; + assert (s[-1] == ')'); + endpos = s; /* one behind the end of the list */ + + /* Append the rest. */ + if (*cutlen) + *cutoff = p - newlist; + memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); + p += endpos - startpos; + + + /* ready */ + *result = newlist; + *resultlen = newlistlen; + return 0; + + failure: + wipememory (newlist, newlistlen); + xfree (newlist); + return rc; + + invalid_sexp: + wipememory (newlist, newlistlen); + xfree (newlist); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); +} + + + +/* Unprotect the key encoded in canonical format. We assume a valid + S-Exp here. If a protected-at item is available, its value will + be stored at protocted_at unless this is NULL. */ +int +agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, + gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) +{ + int rc; + const unsigned char *s; + const unsigned char *protect_list; + size_t n; + int infidx, i; + unsigned char sha1hash[20], sha1hash2[20]; + const unsigned char *s2ksalt; + unsigned long s2kcount; + const unsigned char *iv; + const unsigned char *prot_begin; + unsigned char *cleartext = NULL; /* Just to avoid gcc warning. */ + unsigned char *final; + size_t finallen; + size_t cutoff, cutlen; + + if (protected_at) + *protected_at = 0; + + s = protectedkey; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + + for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo + && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) + ; + if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + + + /* See wether we have a protected-at timestamp. */ + protect_list = s; /* Save for later. */ + if (protected_at) + { + while (*s == '(') + { + prot_begin = s; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (smatch (&s, n, "protected-at")) + { + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (n != 15) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + memcpy (protected_at, s, 15); + protected_at[15] = 0; + break; + } + s += n; + i = 1; + rc = sskip (&s, &i); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + } + + /* Now find the list with the protected information. Here is an + example for such a list: + (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc + ((sha1 <salt> <count>) <Initialization_Vector>) + <encrypted_data>) + */ + s = protect_list; + for (;;) + { + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + prot_begin = s; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (smatch (&s, n, "protected")) + break; + s += n; + i = 1; + rc = sskip (&s, &i); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + /* found */ + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); + if (*s != '(' || s[1] != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += 2; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); + n = snext (&s); + if (n != 8) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + s2ksalt = s; + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + /* We expect a list close as next, so we can simply use strtoul() + here. We might want to check that we only have digits - but this + is nothing we should worry about */ + if (s[n] != ')' ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + + /* Old versions of gpg-agent used the funny floating point number in + a byte encoding as specified by OpenPGP. However this is not + needed and thus we now store it as a plain unsigned integer. We + can easily distinguish the old format by looking at its value: + Less than 256 is an old-style encoded number; other values are + plain integers. In any case we check that they are at least + 65536 because we never used a lower value in the past and we + should have a lower limit. */ + s2kcount = strtoul ((const char*)s, NULL, 10); + if (!s2kcount) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + if (s2kcount < 256) + s2kcount = (16ul + (s2kcount & 15)) << ((s2kcount >> 4) + 6); + if (s2kcount < 65536) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + + s += n; + s++; /* skip list end */ + + n = snext (&s); + if (n != 16) /* Wrong blocksize for IV (we support only aes-128). */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + iv = s; + s += n; + if (*s != ')' ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + + rc = do_decryption (s, n, + passphrase, s2ksalt, s2kcount, + iv, 16, + &cleartext); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = merge_lists (protectedkey, prot_begin-protectedkey, cleartext, + sha1hash, &final, &finallen, &cutoff, &cutlen); + /* Albeit cleartext has been allocated in secure memory and thus + xfree will wipe it out, we do an extra wipe just in case + somethings goes badly wrong. */ + wipememory (cleartext, n); + xfree (cleartext); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = calculate_mic (final, sha1hash2); + if (!rc && memcmp (sha1hash, sha1hash2, 20)) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION); + if (rc) + { + wipememory (final, finallen); + xfree (final); + return rc; + } + /* Now remove tha part which is included in the MIC but should not + go into the final thing. */ + if (cutlen) + { + memmove (final+cutoff, final+cutoff+cutlen, finallen-cutoff-cutlen); + finallen -= cutlen; + } + + *result = final; + *resultlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (final, 0, NULL, NULL); + return 0; +} + +/* Check the type of the private key, this is one of the constants: + PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN if we can't figure out the type (this is the + value 0), PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR for an unprotected private key. + PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED for an protected private key or + PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED for a sub key where the secret parts are stored + elsewhere. */ +int +agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey) +{ + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + + s = privatekey; + if (*s != '(') + return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN; + if (smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key")) + return PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED; + if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key")) + return PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED; + if (smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) + return PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR; + return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN; +} + + + +/* Transform a passphrase into a suitable key of length KEYLEN and + store this key in the caller provided buffer KEY. The caller must + provide an HASHALGO, a valid S2KMODE (see rfc-2440) and depending on + that mode an S2KSALT of 8 random bytes and an S2KCOUNT. + + Returns an error code on failure. */ +static int +hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, + int s2kmode, + const unsigned char *s2ksalt, + unsigned long s2kcount, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int rc; + gcry_md_hd_t md; + int pass, i; + int used = 0; + int pwlen = strlen (passphrase); + + if ( (s2kmode != 0 && s2kmode != 1 && s2kmode != 3) + || !hashalgo || !keylen || !key || !passphrase) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + if ((s2kmode == 1 ||s2kmode == 3) && !s2ksalt) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, hashalgo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + for (pass=0; used < keylen; pass++) + { + if (pass) + { + gcry_md_reset (md); + for (i=0; i < pass; i++) /* preset the hash context */ + gcry_md_putc (md, 0); + } + + if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3) + { + int len2 = pwlen + 8; + unsigned long count = len2; + + if (s2kmode == 3) + { + count = s2kcount; + if (count < len2) + count = len2; + } + + while (count > len2) + { + gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8); + gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen); + count -= len2; + } + if (count < 8) + gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, count); + else + { + gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8); + count -= 8; + gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, count); + } + } + else + gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen); + + gcry_md_final (md); + i = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hashalgo); + if (i > keylen - used) + i = keylen - used; + memcpy (key+used, gcry_md_read (md, hashalgo), i); + used += i; + } + gcry_md_close(md); + return 0; +} + + + + +/* Create an canonical encoded S-expression with the shadow info from + a card's SERIALNO and the IDSTRING. */ +unsigned char * +make_shadow_info (const char *serialno, const char *idstring) +{ + const char *s; + char *info, *p; + char numbuf[20]; + size_t n; + + for (s=serialno, n=0; *s && s[1]; s += 2) + n++; + + info = p = xtrymalloc (1 + sizeof numbuf + n + + sizeof numbuf + strlen (idstring) + 1 + 1); + if (!info) + return NULL; + *p++ = '('; + p = stpcpy (p, smklen (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, n, NULL)); + for (s=serialno; *s && s[1]; s += 2) + *(unsigned char *)p++ = xtoi_2 (s); + p = stpcpy (p, smklen (numbuf, sizeof numbuf, strlen (idstring), NULL)); + p = stpcpy (p, idstring); + *p++ = ')'; + *p = 0; + return (unsigned char *)info; +} + + + +/* Create a shadow key from a public key. We use the shadow protocol + "ti-v1" and insert the S-expressionn SHADOW_INFO. The resulting + S-expression is returned in an allocated buffer RESULT will point + to. The input parameters are expected to be valid canonicalized + S-expressions */ +int +agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, + const unsigned char *shadow_info, + unsigned char **result) +{ + const unsigned char *s; + const unsigned char *point; + size_t n; + int depth = 0; + char *p; + size_t pubkey_len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pubkey, 0, NULL,NULL); + size_t shadow_info_len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (shadow_info, 0, NULL,NULL); + + if (!pubkey_len || !shadow_info_len) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + s = pubkey; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "public-key")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ + + while (*s != ')') + { + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s +=n; /* skip value */ + if (*s != ')') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth--; + s++; + } + point = s; /* insert right before the point */ + depth--; + s++; + assert (depth == 1); + + /* Calculate required length by taking in account: the "shadowed-" + prefix, the "shadowed", "t1-v1" as well as some parenthesis */ + n = 12 + pubkey_len + 1 + 3+8 + 2+5 + shadow_info_len + 1; + *result = xtrymalloc (n); + p = (char*)*result; + if (!p) + return out_of_core (); + p = stpcpy (p, "(20:shadowed-private-key"); + /* (10:public-key ...)*/ + memcpy (p, pubkey+14, point - (pubkey+14)); + p += point - (pubkey+14); + p = stpcpy (p, "(8:shadowed5:t1-v1"); + memcpy (p, shadow_info, shadow_info_len); + p += shadow_info_len; + *p++ = ')'; + memcpy (p, point, pubkey_len - (point - pubkey)); + p += pubkey_len - (point - pubkey); + + return 0; +} + +/* Parse a canonical encoded shadowed key and return a pointer to the + inner list with the shadow_info */ +int +agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, + unsigned char const **shadow_info) +{ + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + int depth = 0; + + s = shadowkey; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ + + for (;;) + { + if (*s == ')') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth++; + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed")) + break; + s += n; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s +=n; /* skip value */ + if (*s != ')') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + depth--; + s++; + } + /* Found the shadowed list, S points to the protocol */ + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (smatch (&s, n, "t1-v1")) + { + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + *shadow_info = s; + } + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; +} + + +/* Parse the canonical encoded SHADOW_INFO S-expression. On success + the hex encoded serial number is returned as a malloced strings at + R_HEXSN and the Id string as a malloced string at R_IDSTR. On + error an error code is returned and NULL is stored at the result + parameters addresses. If the serial number or the ID string is not + required, NULL may be passed for them. */ +gpg_error_t +parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, + char **r_hexsn, char **r_idstr) +{ + const unsigned char *s; + size_t n; + + if (r_hexsn) + *r_hexsn = NULL; + if (r_idstr) + *r_idstr = NULL; + + s = shadow_info; + if (*s != '(') + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + s++; + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + + if (r_hexsn) + { + *r_hexsn = bin2hex (s, n, NULL); + if (!*r_hexsn) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + s += n; + + n = snext (&s); + if (!n) + { + if (r_hexsn) + { + xfree (*r_hexsn); + *r_hexsn = NULL; + } + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + } + + if (r_idstr) + { + *r_idstr = xtrymalloc (n+1); + if (!*r_idstr) + { + if (r_hexsn) + { + xfree (*r_hexsn); + *r_hexsn = NULL; + } + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + memcpy (*r_idstr, s, n); + (*r_idstr)[n] = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/agent/t-protect.c b/agent/t-protect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e29caf --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/t-protect.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/* t-protect.c - Module tests for protect.c + * Copyright (C) 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include "agent.h" + + +#define pass() do { ; } while(0) +#define fail() do { fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d: test failed\n",\ + __FILE__,__LINE__); \ + exit (1); \ + } while(0) + + +static void +test_agent_protect (void) +{ + /* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in PLAINKEY. We assume + a valid S-Exp here. */ + + unsigned int i; + int ret; + struct key_spec + { + const char *string; + }; + /* Valid RSA key. */ + struct key_spec key_rsa_valid = + { + "\x28\x31\x31\x3A\x70\x72\x69\x76\x61\x74\x65\x2D\x6B\x65\x79\x28\x33\x3A\x72\x73" + "\x61\x28\x31\x3A\x6E\x31\x32\x39\x3A\x00\xB6\xB5\x09\x59\x6A\x9E\xCA\xBC\x93\x92" + "\x12\xF8\x91\xE6\x56\xA6\x26\xBA\x07\xDA\x85\x21\xA9\xCA\xD4\xC0\x8E\x64\x0C\x04" + "\x05\x2F\xBB\x87\xF4\x24\xEF\x1A\x02\x75\xA4\x8A\x92\x99\xAC\x9D\xB6\x9A\xBE\x3D" + "\x01\x24\xE6\xC7\x56\xB1\xF7\xDF\xB9\xB8\x42\xD6\x25\x1A\xEA\x6E\xE8\x53\x90\x49" + "\x5C\xAD\xA7\x3D\x67\x15\x37\xFC\xE5\x85\x0A\x93\x2F\x32\xBA\xB6\x0A\xB1\xAC\x1F" + "\x85\x2C\x1F\x83\xC6\x25\xE7\xA7\xD7\x0C\xDA\x9E\xF1\x6D\x5C\x8E\x47\x73\x9D\x77" + "\xDF\x59\x26\x1A\xBE\x84\x54\x80\x7F\xF4\x41\xE1\x43\xFB\xD3\x7F\x85\x45\x29\x28" + "\x31\x3A\x65\x33\x3A\x01\x00\x01\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x64\x31\x32\x38\x3A\x07\x7A\xD3" + "\xDE\x28\x42\x45\xF4\x80\x6A\x1B\x82\xB7\x9E\x61\x6F\xBD\xE8\x21\xC8\x2D\x69\x1A" + "\x65\x66\x5E\x57\xB5\xFA\xD3\xF3\x4E\x67\xF4\x01\xE7\xBD\x2E\x28\x69\x9E\x89\xD9" + "\xC4\x96\xCF\x82\x19\x45\xAE\x83\xAC\x7A\x12\x31\x17\x6A\x19\x6B\xA6\x02\x7E\x77" + "\xD8\x57\x89\x05\x5D\x50\x40\x4A\x7A\x2A\x95\xB1\x51\x2F\x91\xF1\x90\xBB\xAE\xF7" + "\x30\xED\x55\x0D\x22\x7D\x51\x2F\x89\xC0\xCD\xB3\x1A\xC0\x6F\xA9\xA1\x95\x03\xDD" + "\xF6\xB6\x6D\x0B\x42\xB9\x69\x1B\xFD\x61\x40\xEC\x17\x20\xFF\xC4\x8A\xE0\x0C\x34" + "\x79\x6D\xC8\x99\xE5\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x70\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xD5\x86\xC7\x8E\x5F\x1B" + "\x4B\xF2\xE7\xCD\x7A\x04\xCA\x09\x19\x11\x70\x6F\x19\x78\x8B\x93\xE4\x4E\xE2\x0A" + "\xAF\x46\x2E\x83\x63\xE9\x8A\x72\x25\x3E\xD8\x45\xCC\xBF\x24\x81\xBB\x35\x1E\x85" + "\x57\xC8\x5B\xCF\xFF\x0D\xAB\xDB\xFF\x8E\x26\xA7\x9A\x09\x38\x09\x6F\x27\x29\x28" + "\x31\x3A\x71\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xDB\x0C\xDF\x60\xF2\x6F\x2A\x29\x6C\x88\xD6\xBF\x9F" + "\x8E\x5B\xE4\x5C\x0D\xDD\x71\x3C\x96\xCC\x73\xEB\xCB\x48\xB0\x61\x74\x09\x43\xF2" + "\x1D\x2A\x93\xD6\xE4\x2A\x72\x11\xE7\xF0\x2A\x95\xDC\xED\x6C\x39\x0A\x67\xAD\x21" + "\xEC\xF7\x39\xAE\x8A\x0C\xA4\x6F\xF2\xEB\xB3\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x75\x36\x34\x3A\x33" + "\x14\x91\x95\xF1\x69\x12\xDB\x20\xA4\x8D\x02\x0D\xBC\x3B\x9E\x38\x81\xB3\x9D\x72" + "\x2B\xF7\x93\x78\xF6\x34\x0F\x43\x14\x8A\x6E\x9F\xC5\xF5\x3E\x28\x53\xB7\x38\x7B" + "\xA4\x44\x3B\xA5\x3A\x52\xFC\xA8\x17\x3D\xE6\xE8\x5B\x42\xF9\x78\x3D\x4A\x78\x17" + "\xD0\x68\x0B\x29\x29\x29\x00" + }; + /* This RSA key is missing the last closing brace. */ + struct key_spec key_rsa_bogus_0 = + { + "\x28\x31\x31\x3A\x70\x72\x69\x76\x61\x74\x65\x2D\x6B\x65\x79\x28\x33\x3A\x72\x73" + "\x61\x28\x31\x3A\x6E\x31\x32\x39\x3A\x00\xB6\xB5\x09\x59\x6A\x9E\xCA\xBC\x93\x92" + "\x12\xF8\x91\xE6\x56\xA6\x26\xBA\x07\xDA\x85\x21\xA9\xCA\xD4\xC0\x8E\x64\x0C\x04" + "\x05\x2F\xBB\x87\xF4\x24\xEF\x1A\x02\x75\xA4\x8A\x92\x99\xAC\x9D\xB6\x9A\xBE\x3D" + "\x01\x24\xE6\xC7\x56\xB1\xF7\xDF\xB9\xB8\x42\xD6\x25\x1A\xEA\x6E\xE8\x53\x90\x49" + "\x5C\xAD\xA7\x3D\x67\x15\x37\xFC\xE5\x85\x0A\x93\x2F\x32\xBA\xB6\x0A\xB1\xAC\x1F" + "\x85\x2C\x1F\x83\xC6\x25\xE7\xA7\xD7\x0C\xDA\x9E\xF1\x6D\x5C\x8E\x47\x73\x9D\x77" + "\xDF\x59\x26\x1A\xBE\x84\x54\x80\x7F\xF4\x41\xE1\x43\xFB\xD3\x7F\x85\x45\x29\x28" + "\x31\x3A\x65\x33\x3A\x01\x00\x01\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x64\x31\x32\x38\x3A\x07\x7A\xD3" + "\xDE\x28\x42\x45\xF4\x80\x6A\x1B\x82\xB7\x9E\x61\x6F\xBD\xE8\x21\xC8\x2D\x69\x1A" + "\x65\x66\x5E\x57\xB5\xFA\xD3\xF3\x4E\x67\xF4\x01\xE7\xBD\x2E\x28\x69\x9E\x89\xD9" + "\xC4\x96\xCF\x82\x19\x45\xAE\x83\xAC\x7A\x12\x31\x17\x6A\x19\x6B\xA6\x02\x7E\x77" + "\xD8\x57\x89\x05\x5D\x50\x40\x4A\x7A\x2A\x95\xB1\x51\x2F\x91\xF1\x90\xBB\xAE\xF7" + "\x30\xED\x55\x0D\x22\x7D\x51\x2F\x89\xC0\xCD\xB3\x1A\xC0\x6F\xA9\xA1\x95\x03\xDD" + "\xF6\xB6\x6D\x0B\x42\xB9\x69\x1B\xFD\x61\x40\xEC\x17\x20\xFF\xC4\x8A\xE0\x0C\x34" + "\x79\x6D\xC8\x99\xE5\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x70\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xD5\x86\xC7\x8E\x5F\x1B" + "\x4B\xF2\xE7\xCD\x7A\x04\xCA\x09\x19\x11\x70\x6F\x19\x78\x8B\x93\xE4\x4E\xE2\x0A" + "\xAF\x46\x2E\x83\x63\xE9\x8A\x72\x25\x3E\xD8\x45\xCC\xBF\x24\x81\xBB\x35\x1E\x85" + "\x57\xC8\x5B\xCF\xFF\x0D\xAB\xDB\xFF\x8E\x26\xA7\x9A\x09\x38\x09\x6F\x27\x29\x28" + "\x31\x3A\x71\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xDB\x0C\xDF\x60\xF2\x6F\x2A\x29\x6C\x88\xD6\xBF\x9F" + "\x8E\x5B\xE4\x5C\x0D\xDD\x71\x3C\x96\xCC\x73\xEB\xCB\x48\xB0\x61\x74\x09\x43\xF2" + "\x1D\x2A\x93\xD6\xE4\x2A\x72\x11\xE7\xF0\x2A\x95\xDC\xED\x6C\x39\x0A\x67\xAD\x21" + "\xEC\xF7\x39\xAE\x8A\x0C\xA4\x6F\xF2\xEB\xB3\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x75\x36\x34\x3A\x33" + "\x14\x91\x95\xF1\x69\x12\xDB\x20\xA4\x8D\x02\x0D\xBC\x3B\x9E\x38\x81\xB3\x9D\x72" + "\x2B\xF7\x93\x78\xF6\x34\x0F\x43\x14\x8A\x6E\x9F\xC5\xF5\x3E\x28\x53\xB7\x38\x7B" + "\xA4\x44\x3B\xA5\x3A\x52\xFC\xA8\x17\x3D\xE6\xE8\x5B\x42\xF9\x78\x3D\x4A\x78\x17" + "\xD0\x68\x0B\x29\x29\x00" + }; + /* This RSA key is the `e' value. */ + struct key_spec key_rsa_bogus_1 = + { + "\x28\x31\x31\x3A\x70\x72\x69\x76\x61\x74\x65\x2D\x6B\x65\x79\x28\x33\x3A\x72\x73" + "\x61\x28\x31\x3A\x6E\x31\x32\x39\x3A\x00\xA8\x80\xB6\x71\xF4\x95\x9F\x49\x84\xED" + "\xC1\x1D\x5F\xFF\xED\x14\x7B\x9C\x6A\x62\x0B\x7B\xE2\x3E\x41\x48\x49\x85\xF5\x64" + "\x50\x04\x9D\x30\xFC\x84\x1F\x01\xC3\xC3\x15\x03\x48\x6D\xFE\x59\x0B\xB0\xD0\x3E" + "\x68\x8A\x05\x7A\x62\xB0\xB9\x6E\xC5\xD2\xA8\xEE\x0C\x6B\xDE\x5E\x3D\x8E\xE8\x8F" + "\xB3\xAE\x86\x99\x7E\xDE\x2B\xC2\x4D\x60\x51\xDB\xB1\x2C\xD0\x38\xEC\x88\x62\x3E" + "\xA9\xDD\x11\x53\x04\x17\xE4\xF2\x07\x50\xDC\x44\xED\x14\xF5\x0B\xAB\x9C\xBC\x24" + "\xC6\xCB\xAD\x0F\x05\x25\x94\xE2\x73\xEB\x14\xD5\xEE\x5E\x18\xF0\x40\x31\x29\x28" + "\x31\x3A\x64\x31\x32\x38\x3A\x40\xD0\x55\x9D\x2A\xA7\xBC\xBF\xE2\x3E\x33\x98\x71" + "\x7B\x37\x3D\xB8\x38\x57\xA1\x43\xEA\x90\x81\x42\xCA\x23\xE1\xBF\x9C\xA8\xBC\xC5" + "\x9B\xF8\x9D\x77\x71\xCD\xD3\x85\x8B\x20\x3A\x92\xE9\xBC\x79\xF3\xF7\xF5\x6D\x15" + "\xA3\x58\x3F\xC2\xEB\xED\x72\xD4\xE0\xCF\xEC\xB3\xEC\xEB\x09\xEA\x1E\x72\x6A\xBA" + "\x95\x82\x2C\x7E\x30\x95\x66\x3F\xA8\x2D\x40\x0F\x7A\x12\x4E\xF0\x71\x0F\x97\xDB" + "\x81\xE4\x39\x6D\x24\x58\xFA\xAB\x3A\x36\x73\x63\x01\x77\x42\xC7\x9A\xEA\x87\xDA" + "\x93\x8F\x6C\x64\xAD\x9E\xF0\xCA\xA2\x89\xA4\x0E\xB3\x25\x73\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x70" + "\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xC3\xF7\x37\x3F\x9D\x93\xEC\xC7\x5E\x4C\xB5\x73\x29\x62\x35\x80" + "\xC6\x7C\x1B\x1E\x68\x5F\x92\x56\x77\x0A\xE2\x8E\x95\x74\x87\xA5\x2F\x83\x2D\xF7" + "\xA1\xC2\x78\x54\x18\x6E\xDE\x35\xF0\x9F\x7A\xCA\x80\x5C\x83\x5C\x44\xAD\x8B\xE7" + "\x5B\xE2\x63\x7D\x6A\xC7\x98\x97\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x71\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xDC\x1F\xB1" + "\xB3\xD8\x13\xE0\x09\x19\xFD\x1C\x58\xA1\x2B\x02\xB4\xC8\xF2\x1C\xE7\xF9\xC6\x3B" + "\x68\xB9\x72\x43\x86\xEF\xA9\x94\x68\x02\xEF\x7D\x77\xE0\x0A\xD1\xD7\x48\xFD\xCD" + "\x98\xDA\x13\x8A\x76\x48\xD4\x0F\x63\x28\xFA\x01\x1B\xF3\xC7\x15\xB8\x53\x22\x7E" + "\x77\x29\x28\x31\x3A\x75\x36\x35\x3A\x00\xB3\xBB\x4D\xEE\x5A\xAF\xD0\xF2\x56\x8A" + "\x10\x2D\x6F\x4B\x2D\x76\x49\x9B\xE9\xA8\x60\x5D\x9E\x7E\x50\x86\xF1\xA1\x0F\x28" + "\x9B\x7B\xE8\xDD\x1F\x87\x4E\x79\x7B\x50\x12\xA7\xB4\x8B\x52\x38\xEC\x7C\xBB\xB9" + "\x55\x87\x11\x1C\x74\xE7\x7F\xA0\xBA\xE3\x34\x5D\x61\xBF\x29\x29\x29\x00" + }; + + struct + { + const char *key; + const char *passphrase; + int no_result_expected; + int compare_results; + unsigned char *result_expected; + size_t resultlen_expected; + int ret_expected; + unsigned char *result; + size_t resultlen; + } specs[] = + { + /* Invalid S-Expressions */ + /* - non-NULL */ + { "", + "passphrase", 1, 0, NULL, 0, GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP, NULL, 0 }, + /* - NULL; disabled, this segfaults */ + //{ NULL, + // "passphrase", 1, NULL, 0, GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP, NULL, 0 }, + + /* Valid and invalid keys. */ + { key_rsa_valid.string, + "passphrase", 0, 0, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, 0 }, + { key_rsa_bogus_0.string, + "passphrase", 0, 0, NULL, 0, GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP, NULL, 0 }, + { key_rsa_bogus_1.string, + "passphrase", 0, 0, NULL, 0, GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP, NULL, 0 }, + + /* FIXME: add more test data. */ + }; + + for (i = 0; i < DIM (specs); i++) + { + ret = agent_protect ((const unsigned char*)specs[i].key, + specs[i].passphrase, + &specs[i].result, &specs[i].resultlen); + if (gpg_err_code (ret) != specs[i].ret_expected) + { + printf ("agent_protect() returned `%i/%s'; expected `%i/%s'\n", + ret, gpg_strerror (ret), + specs[i].ret_expected, gpg_strerror (specs[i].ret_expected)); + abort (); + } + + if (specs[i].no_result_expected) + { + assert (! specs[i].result); + assert (! specs[i].resultlen); + } + else + { + if (specs[i].compare_results) + { + assert (specs[i].resultlen == specs[i].resultlen_expected); + if (specs[i].result_expected) + assert (! memcmp (specs[i].result, specs[i].result_expected, + specs[i].resultlen)); + else + assert (! specs[i].result); + } + xfree (specs[i].result); + } + } +} + + +static void +test_agent_unprotect (void) +{ + /* Unprotect the key encoded in canonical format. We assume a valid + S-Exp here. */ +/* int */ +/* agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, */ +/* unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) */ +} + + +static void +test_agent_private_key_type (void) +{ +/* Check the type of the private key, this is one of the constants: + PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN if we can't figure out the type (this is the + value 0), PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR for an unprotected private key. + PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED for an protected private key or + PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED for a sub key where the secret parts are stored + elsewhere. */ +/* int */ +/* agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey) */ +} + + +static void +test_make_shadow_info (void) +{ +#if 0 + static struct + { + const char *snstr; + const char *idstr; + const char *expected; + } data[] = { + { "", "", NULL }, + + }; + int i; + unsigned char *result; + + for (i=0; i < DIM(data); i++) + { + result = make_shadow_info (data[i].snstr, data[i].idstr); + if (!result && !data[i].expected) + pass (); + else if (!result && data[i].expected) + fail (); + else if (!data[i].expected) + fail (); + /* fixme: Need to compare the result but also need to check + proper S-expression syntax. */ + } +#endif +} + + + +static void +test_agent_shadow_key (void) +{ +/* Create a shadow key from a public key. We use the shadow protocol + "ti-v1" and insert the S-expressionn SHADOW_INFO. The resulting + S-expression is returned in an allocated buffer RESULT will point + to. The input parameters are expected to be valid canonicalized + S-expressions */ +/* int */ +/* agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, */ +/* const unsigned char *shadow_info, */ +/* unsigned char **result) */ +} + + +static void +test_agent_get_shadow_info (void) +{ +/* Parse a canonical encoded shadowed key and return a pointer to the + inner list with the shadow_info */ +/* int */ +/* agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, */ +/* unsigned char const **shadow_info) */ +} + + + + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + (void)argc; + (void)argv; + + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM); + + test_agent_protect (); + test_agent_unprotect (); + test_agent_private_key_type (); + test_make_shadow_info (); + test_agent_shadow_key (); + test_agent_get_shadow_info (); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/agent/trans.c b/agent/trans.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e48889 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/trans.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* trans.c - translatable strings + * Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +/* To avoid any problems with the gettext implementation (there used + to be some vulnerabilities in the last years and the use of + external files is a minor security problem in itself), we use our + own simple translation stuff */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#include "agent.h" + +const char * +trans (const char *text) +{ + return text; +} diff --git a/agent/trustlist.c b/agent/trustlist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be5406b --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/trustlist.c @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/* trustlist.c - Maintain the list of trusted keys + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <pth.h> + +#include "agent.h" +#include <assuan.h> /* fixme: need a way to avoid assuan calls here */ +#include "i18n.h" +#include "estream.h" + + +/* A structure to store the information from the trust file. */ +struct trustitem_s +{ + struct + { + int disabled:1; /* This entry is disabled. */ + int for_pgp:1; /* Set by '*' or 'P' as first flag. */ + int for_smime:1; /* Set by '*' or 'S' as first flag. */ + int relax:1; /* Relax checking of root certificate + constraints. */ + int cm:1; /* Use chain model for validation. */ + } flags; + unsigned char fpr[20]; /* The binary fingerprint. */ +}; +typedef struct trustitem_s trustitem_t; + +/* Malloced table and its allocated size with all trust items. */ +static trustitem_t *trusttable; +static size_t trusttablesize; +/* A mutex used to protect the table. */ +static pth_mutex_t trusttable_lock; + + + +static const char headerblurb[] = +"# This is the list of trusted keys. Comment lines, like this one, as\n" +"# well as empty lines are ignored. Lines have a length limit but this\n" +"# is not a serious limitation as the format of the entries is fixed and\n" +"# checked by gpg-agent. A non-comment line starts with optional white\n" +"# space, followed by the SHA-1 fingerpint in hex, followed by a flag\n" +"# which may be one of 'P', 'S' or '*' and optionally followed by a list of\n" +"# other flags. The fingerprint may be prefixed with a '!' to mark the\n" +"# key as not trusted. You should give the gpg-agent a HUP or run the\n" +"# command \"gpgconf --reload gpg-agent\" after changing this file.\n" +"\n\n" +"# Include the default trust list\n" +"include-default\n" +"\n"; + + +/* This function must be called once to initialize this module. This + has to be done before a second thread is spawned. We can't do the + static initialization because Pth emulation code might not be able + to do a static init; in particular, it is not possible for W32. */ +void +initialize_module_trustlist (void) +{ + static int initialized; + + if (!initialized) + { + if (!pth_mutex_init (&trusttable_lock)) + log_fatal ("error initializing mutex: %s\n", strerror (errno)); + initialized = 1; + } +} + + + + +static void +lock_trusttable (void) +{ + if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&trusttable_lock, 0, NULL)) + log_fatal ("failed to acquire mutex in %s\n", __FILE__); +} + +static void +unlock_trusttable (void) +{ + if (!pth_mutex_release (&trusttable_lock)) + log_fatal ("failed to release mutex in %s\n", __FILE__); +} + + + +static gpg_error_t +read_one_trustfile (const char *fname, int allow_include, + trustitem_t **addr_of_table, + size_t *addr_of_tablesize, + int *addr_of_tableidx) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + FILE *fp; + int n, c; + char *p, line[256]; + trustitem_t *table, *ti; + int tableidx; + size_t tablesize; + int lnr = 0; + + table = *addr_of_table; + tablesize = *addr_of_tablesize; + tableidx = *addr_of_tableidx; + + fp = fopen (fname, "r"); + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error opening `%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + while (fgets (line, DIM(line)-1, fp)) + { + lnr++; + + if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n') + { + /* Eat until end of line. */ + while ( (c=getc (fp)) != EOF && c != '\n') + ; + err = gpg_error (*line? GPG_ERR_LINE_TOO_LONG + : GPG_ERR_INCOMPLETE_LINE); + log_error (_("file `%s', line %d: %s\n"), + fname, lnr, gpg_strerror (err)); + continue; + } + line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; /* Chop the LF. */ + + /* Allow for empty lines and spaces */ + for (p=line; spacep (p); p++) + ; + if (!*p || *p == '#') + continue; + + if (!strncmp (p, "include-default", 15) + && (!p[15] || spacep (p+15))) + { + char *etcname; + gpg_error_t err2; + + if (!allow_include) + { + log_error (_("statement \"%s\" ignored in `%s', line %d\n"), + "include-default", fname, lnr); + continue; + } + /* fixme: Should check for trailing garbage. */ + + etcname = make_filename (gnupg_sysconfdir (), "trustlist.txt", NULL); + if ( !strcmp (etcname, fname) ) /* Same file. */ + log_info (_("statement \"%s\" ignored in `%s', line %d\n"), + "include-default", fname, lnr); + else if ( access (etcname, F_OK) && errno == ENOENT ) + { + /* A non existent system trustlist is not an error. + Just print a note. */ + log_info (_("system trustlist `%s' not available\n"), etcname); + } + else + { + err2 = read_one_trustfile (etcname, 0, + &table, &tablesize, &tableidx); + if (err2) + err = err2; + } + xfree (etcname); + + continue; + } + + if (tableidx == tablesize) /* Need more space. */ + { + trustitem_t *tmp; + size_t tmplen; + + tmplen = tablesize + 20; + tmp = xtryrealloc (table, tmplen * sizeof *table); + if (!tmp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + table = tmp; + tablesize = tmplen; + } + + ti = table + tableidx; + + memset (&ti->flags, 0, sizeof ti->flags); + if (*p == '!') + { + ti->flags.disabled = 1; + p++; + while (spacep (p)) + p++; + } + + n = hexcolon2bin (p, ti->fpr, 20); + if (n < 0) + { + log_error (_("bad fingerprint in `%s', line %d\n"), fname, lnr); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); + continue; + } + p += n; + for (; spacep (p); p++) + ; + + /* Process the first flag which needs to be the first for + backward compatibility. */ + if (!*p || *p == '*' ) + { + ti->flags.for_smime = 1; + ti->flags.for_pgp = 1; + } + else if ( *p == 'P' || *p == 'p') + { + ti->flags.for_pgp = 1; + } + else if ( *p == 'S' || *p == 's') + { + ti->flags.for_smime = 1; + } + else + { + log_error (_("invalid keyflag in `%s', line %d\n"), fname, lnr); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); + continue; + } + p++; + if ( *p && !spacep (p) ) + { + log_error (_("invalid keyflag in `%s', line %d\n"), fname, lnr); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); + continue; + } + + /* Now check for more key-value pairs of the form NAME[=VALUE]. */ + while (*p) + { + for (; spacep (p); p++) + ; + if (!*p) + break; + n = strcspn (p, "= \t"); + if (p[n] == '=') + { + log_error ("assigning a value to a flag is not yet supported; " + "in `%s', line %d\n", fname, lnr); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); + p++; + } + else if (n == 5 && !memcmp (p, "relax", 5)) + ti->flags.relax = 1; + else if (n == 2 && !memcmp (p, "cm", 2)) + ti->flags.cm = 1; + else + log_error ("flag `%.*s' in `%s', line %d ignored\n", + n, p, fname, lnr); + p += n; + } + tableidx++; + } + if ( !err && !feof (fp) ) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error reading `%s', line %d: %s\n"), + fname, lnr, gpg_strerror (err)); + } + + leave: + if (fp) + fclose (fp); + *addr_of_table = table; + *addr_of_tablesize = tablesize; + *addr_of_tableidx = tableidx; + return err; +} + + +/* Read the trust files and update the global table on success. */ +static gpg_error_t +read_trustfiles (void) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + trustitem_t *table, *ti; + int tableidx; + size_t tablesize; + char *fname; + int allow_include = 1; + + tablesize = 20; + table = xtrycalloc (tablesize, sizeof *table); + if (!table) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + tableidx = 0; + + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "trustlist.txt", NULL); + if ( access (fname, F_OK) ) + { + if ( errno == ENOENT ) + ; /* Silently ignore a non-existing trustfile. */ + else + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error opening `%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + } + xfree (fname); + fname = make_filename (gnupg_sysconfdir (), "trustlist.txt", NULL); + allow_include = 0; + } + err = read_one_trustfile (fname, allow_include, + &table, &tablesize, &tableidx); + xfree (fname); + + if (err) + { + xfree (table); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT) + { + /* Take a missing trustlist as an empty one. */ + lock_trusttable (); + xfree (trusttable); + trusttable = NULL; + trusttablesize = 0; + unlock_trusttable (); + err = 0; + } + return err; + } + + /* Fixme: we should drop duplicates and sort the table. */ + ti = xtryrealloc (table, (tableidx?tableidx:1) * sizeof *table); + if (!ti) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (table); + return err; + } + + lock_trusttable (); + xfree (trusttable); + trusttable = ti; + trusttablesize = tableidx; + unlock_trusttable (); + return 0; +} + + + +/* Check whether the given fpr is in our trustdb. We expect FPR to be + an all uppercase hexstring of 40 characters. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_istrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, int *r_disabled) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + trustitem_t *ti; + size_t len; + unsigned char fprbin[20]; + + if (r_disabled) + *r_disabled = 0; + + if ( hexcolon2bin (fpr, fprbin, 20) < 0 ) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + if (!trusttable) + { + err = read_trustfiles (); + if (err) + { + log_error (_("error reading list of trusted root certificates\n")); + return err; + } + } + + if (trusttable) + { + for (ti=trusttable, len = trusttablesize; len; ti++, len--) + if (!memcmp (ti->fpr, fprbin, 20)) + { + if (ti->flags.disabled && r_disabled) + *r_disabled = 1; + + if (ti->flags.relax) + { + err = agent_write_status (ctrl, + "TRUSTLISTFLAG", "relax", + NULL); + if (err) + return err; + } + else if (ti->flags.cm) + { + err = agent_write_status (ctrl, + "TRUSTLISTFLAG", "cm", + NULL); + if (err) + return err; + } + return ti->flags.disabled? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED) : 0; + } + } + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED); +} + + +/* Write all trust entries to FP. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_listtrusted (void *assuan_context) +{ + trustitem_t *ti; + char key[51]; + gpg_error_t err; + size_t len; + + if (!trusttable) + { + err = read_trustfiles (); + if (err) + { + log_error (_("error reading list of trusted root certificates\n")); + return err; + } + } + + if (trusttable) + { + /* We need to lock the table because the scheduler may interrupt + assuan_send_data and an other thread may then re-read the table. */ + lock_trusttable (); + for (ti=trusttable, len = trusttablesize; len; ti++, len--) + { + if (ti->flags.disabled) + continue; + bin2hex (ti->fpr, 20, key); + key[40] = ' '; + key[41] = ((ti->flags.for_smime && ti->flags.for_pgp)? '*' + : ti->flags.for_smime? 'S': ti->flags.for_pgp? 'P':' '); + key[42] = '\n'; + assuan_send_data (assuan_context, key, 43); + assuan_send_data (assuan_context, NULL, 0); /* flush */ + } + unlock_trusttable (); + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Create a copy of string with colons inserted after each two bytes. + Caller needs to release the string. In case of a memory failure, + NULL is returned. */ +static char * +insert_colons (const char *string) +{ + char *buffer, *p; + size_t n = strlen (string); + size_t nnew = n + (n+1)/2; + + p = buffer = xtrymalloc ( nnew + 1 ); + if (!buffer) + return NULL; + while (*string) + { + *p++ = *string++; + if (*string) + { + *p++ = *string++; + if (*string) + *p++ = ':'; + } + } + *p = 0; + assert (strlen (buffer) <= nnew); + + return buffer; +} + + +/* To pretty print DNs in the Pinentry, we replace slashes by + REPLSTRING. The caller needs to free the returned string. NULL is + returned on error with ERRNO set. */ +static char * +reformat_name (const char *name, const char *replstring) +{ + const char *s; + char *newname; + char *d; + size_t count; + size_t replstringlen = strlen (replstring); + + /* If the name does not start with a slash it is not a preformatted + DN and thus we don't bother to reformat it. */ + if (*name != '/') + return xtrystrdup (name); + + /* Count the names. Note that a slash contained in a DN part is + expected to be C style escaped and thus the slashes we see here + are the actual part delimiters. */ + for (s=name+1, count=0; *s; s++) + if (*s == '/') + count++; + newname = xtrymalloc (strlen (name) + count*replstringlen + 1); + if (!newname) + return NULL; + for (s=name+1, d=newname; *s; s++) + if (*s == '/') + d = stpcpy (d, replstring); + else + *d++ = *s; + *d = 0; + return newname; +} + + +/* Insert the given fpr into our trustdb. We expect FPR to be an all + uppercase hexstring of 40 characters. FLAG is either 'P' or 'C'. + This function does first check whether that key has already been put + into the trustdb and returns success in this case. Before a FPR + actually gets inserted, the user is asked by means of the Pinentry + whether this is actual want he wants to do. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, const char *fpr, int flag) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + char *desc; + char *fname; + estream_t fp; + char *fprformatted; + char *nameformatted; + int is_disabled; + int yes_i_trust; + + /* Check whether we are at all allowed to modify the trustlist. + This is useful so that the trustlist may be a symlink to a global + trustlist with only admin priviliges to modify it. Of course + this is not a secure way of denying access, but it avoids the + usual clicking on an Okay button most users are used to. */ + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "trustlist.txt", NULL); + if ( access (fname, W_OK) && errno != ENOENT) + { + xfree (fname); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EPERM); + } + xfree (fname); + + if (!agent_istrusted (ctrl, fpr, &is_disabled)) + { + return 0; /* We already got this fingerprint. Silently return + success. */ + } + + /* This feature must explicitly been enabled. */ + if (!opt.allow_mark_trusted) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + if (is_disabled) + { + /* There is an disabled entry in the trustlist. Return an error + so that the user won't be asked again for that one. Changing + this flag with the integrated marktrusted feature is and will + not be made possible. */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED); + } + + + /* Insert a new one. */ + nameformatted = reformat_name (name, "%0A "); + if (!nameformatted) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + /* First a general question whether this is trusted. */ + desc = xtryasprintf ( + /* TRANSLATORS: This prompt is shown by the Pinentry + and has one special property: A "%%0A" is used by + Pinentry to insert a line break. The double + percent sign is actually needed because it is also + a printf format string. If you need to insert a + plain % sign, you need to encode it as "%%25". The + "%s" gets replaced by the name as stored in the + certificate. */ + _("Do you ultimately trust%%0A" + " \"%s\"%%0A" + "to correctly certify user certificates?"), + nameformatted); + if (!desc) + { + xfree (nameformatted); + return out_of_core (); + } + err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, _("Yes"), _("No"), 1); + xfree (desc); + if (!err) + yes_i_trust = 1; + else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_CONFIRMED) + yes_i_trust = 0; + else + { + xfree (nameformatted); + return err; + } + + + fprformatted = insert_colons (fpr); + if (!fprformatted) + { + xfree (nameformatted); + return out_of_core (); + } + + /* If the user trusts this certificate he has to verify the + fingerprint of course. */ + if (yes_i_trust) + { + desc = xtryasprintf + ( + /* TRANSLATORS: This prompt is shown by the Pinentry and has + one special property: A "%%0A" is used by Pinentry to + insert a line break. The double percent sign is actually + needed because it is also a printf format string. If you + need to insert a plain % sign, you need to encode it as + "%%25". The second "%s" gets replaced by a hexdecimal + fingerprint string whereas the first one receives the name + as stored in the certificate. */ + _("Please verify that the certificate identified as:%%0A" + " \"%s\"%%0A" + "has the fingerprint:%%0A" + " %s"), nameformatted, fprformatted); + if (!desc) + { + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return out_of_core (); + } + + /* TRANSLATORS: "Correct" is the label of a button and intended + to be hit if the fingerprint matches the one of the CA. The + other button is "the default "Cancel" of the Pinentry. */ + err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, _("Correct"), _("Wrong"), 1); + xfree (desc); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_CONFIRMED) + yes_i_trust = 0; + else if (err) + { + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return err; + } + } + + + /* Now check again to avoid duplicates. We take the lock to make + sure that nobody else plays with our file and force a reread. */ + lock_trusttable (); + agent_reload_trustlist (); + if (!agent_istrusted (ctrl, fpr, &is_disabled) || is_disabled) + { + unlock_trusttable (); + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return is_disabled? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED) : 0; + } + + fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "trustlist.txt", NULL); + if ( access (fname, F_OK) && errno == ENOENT) + { + fp = es_fopen (fname, "wx"); + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("can't create `%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (fname); + unlock_trusttable (); + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return err; + } + es_fputs (headerblurb, fp); + es_fclose (fp); + } + fp = es_fopen (fname, "a+"); + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("can't open `%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err)); + xfree (fname); + unlock_trusttable (); + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return err; + } + + /* Append the key. */ + es_fputs ("\n# ", fp); + xfree (nameformatted); + nameformatted = reformat_name (name, "\n# "); + if (!nameformatted || strchr (name, '\n')) + { + /* Note that there should never be a LF in NAME but we better + play safe and print a sanitized version in this case. */ + es_write_sanitized (fp, name, strlen (name), NULL, NULL); + } + else + es_fputs (nameformatted, fp); + es_fprintf (fp, "\n%s%s %c\n", yes_i_trust?"":"!", fprformatted, flag); + if (es_ferror (fp)) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + if (es_fclose (fp)) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + agent_reload_trustlist (); + xfree (fname); + unlock_trusttable (); + xfree (fprformatted); + xfree (nameformatted); + return err; +} + + +/* This function may be called to force reloading of the + trustlist. */ +void +agent_reload_trustlist (void) +{ + /* All we need to do is to delete the trusttable. At the next + access it will get re-read. */ + lock_trusttable (); + xfree (trusttable); + trusttable = NULL; + trusttablesize = 0; + unlock_trusttable (); + bump_key_eventcounter (); +} |