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authorhongjinghao <q1204531485@163.com>2023-06-05 18:17:06 +0100
committerKarol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>2023-10-05 22:07:47 +0200
commit5c4fb289437d1d80991ae74f689e34fcebb27b31 (patch)
treee93ab6f8e44171653efe77f7e2acdcd613a7b82a /doc
parent9aca6d45fb390318a8795e6c965f07143d051068 (diff)
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Normally, it's enough to rely on a message being given a serial number by the DBusConnection just before it is actually sent. However, in the rare case where the policy blocks the driver from sending a message (due to a deny rule or the outgoing message quota being full), we need to get a valid serial number sooner, so that we can copy it into the DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_REPLY_SERIAL field (which is mandatory) in the error message sent to monitors. Otherwise, the dbus-daemon will crash with an assertion failure if at least one Monitoring client is attached, because zero is not a valid serial number to copy. This fixes a denial-of-service vulnerability: if a privileged user is monitoring the well-known system bus using a Monitoring client like dbus-monitor or `busctl monitor`, then an unprivileged user can cause denial-of-service by triggering this crash. A mitigation for this vulnerability is to avoid attaching Monitoring clients to the system bus when they are not needed. If there are no Monitoring clients, then the vulnerable code is not reached. Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Resolves: dbus/dbus#457 (cherry picked from commit b159849e031000d1dbc1ab876b5fc78a3ce9b534) [ cherry picked to tizen branch, fixes CVE-2023-34969 ] Change-Id: Iee520329acc1d4a93d3a873a5fded056cb293d5b Signed-off-by: Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>
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