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authorTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2020-06-03 14:10:03 -0400
committerTom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>2020-06-03 14:10:03 -0400
commit1b6ae82a5abb4cbedb0d6cb262526173f4efa486 (patch)
tree916aadd700c3c98d3f6b6929ef1249e38043e319 /lib
parent0d8f35b58cc8458a5263b424896a386429ee49e5 (diff)
parenta4292eccfdc98b51d0200a6c912af237aeddd5c8 (diff)
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Merge tag 'efi-2020-07-rc4' of https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for UEFI sub-system for efi-2020-07-rc4 This patch series addresses the following issues: * allow compiling with clang * add missing function descriptions to the HTML documentation * simplify the validation of UEFI images * validate load options in the UEFI boot manager In a preparatory patch a structure definition is moved.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c48
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c10
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c35
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c1
-rw-r--r--lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c1
5 files changed, 62 insertions, 33 deletions
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
index b112f5d81e..e144b3e7f4 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c
@@ -36,24 +36,50 @@ static const struct efi_runtime_services *rs;
*
* @lo: pointer to target
* @data: serialized data
+ * @size: size of the load option, on return size of the optional data
+ * Return: status code
*/
-void efi_deserialize_load_option(struct efi_load_option *lo, u8 *data)
+efi_status_t efi_deserialize_load_option(struct efi_load_option *lo, u8 *data,
+ efi_uintn_t *size)
{
+ efi_uintn_t len;
+
+ len = sizeof(u32);
+ if (*size < len + 2 * sizeof(u16))
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
lo->attributes = get_unaligned_le32(data);
- data += sizeof(u32);
+ data += len;
+ *size -= len;
+ len = sizeof(u16);
lo->file_path_length = get_unaligned_le16(data);
- data += sizeof(u16);
+ data += len;
+ *size -= len;
- /* FIXME */
lo->label = (u16 *)data;
- data += (u16_strlen(lo->label) + 1) * sizeof(u16);
-
- /* FIXME */
+ len = u16_strnlen(lo->label, *size / sizeof(u16) - 1);
+ if (lo->label[len])
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ len = (len + 1) * sizeof(u16);
+ if (*size < len)
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ data += len;
+ *size -= len;
+
+ len = lo->file_path_length;
+ if (*size < len)
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
lo->file_path = (struct efi_device_path *)data;
- data += lo->file_path_length;
+ /*
+ * TODO: validate device path. There should be an end node within
+ * the indicated file_path_length.
+ */
+ data += len;
+ *size -= len;
lo->optional_data = data;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
@@ -168,7 +194,11 @@ static efi_status_t try_load_entry(u16 n, efi_handle_t *handle)
if (!load_option)
return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
- efi_deserialize_load_option(&lo, load_option);
+ ret = efi_deserialize_load_option(&lo, load_option, &size);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ log_warning("Invalid load option for %ls\n", varname);
+ goto error;
+ }
if (lo.attributes & LOAD_OPTION_ACTIVE) {
u32 attributes;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
index db34938196..1591ad8300 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static efi_handle_t current_image;
* restriction so we need to manually swap its and our view of that register on
* EFI callback entry/exit.
*/
-static volatile void *efi_gd, *app_gd;
+static volatile gd_t *efi_gd, *app_gd;
#endif
/* 1 if inside U-Boot code, 0 if inside EFI payload code */
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int __efi_entry_check(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
assert(efi_gd);
app_gd = gd;
- gd = efi_gd;
+ set_gd(efi_gd);
#endif
return ret;
}
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int __efi_exit_check(void)
{
int ret = --entry_count == 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM
- gd = app_gd;
+ set_gd(app_gd);
#endif
return ret;
}
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ void efi_restore_gd(void)
/* Only restore if we're already in EFI context */
if (!efi_gd)
return;
- gd = efi_gd;
+ set_gd(efi_gd);
#endif
}
@@ -2920,7 +2920,7 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_start_image(efi_handle_t image_handle,
* otherwise __efi_entry_check() will put the wrong value into
* app_gd.
*/
- gd = app_gd;
+ set_gd(app_gd);
#endif
/*
* To get ready to call EFI_EXIT below we have to execute the
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index 5dd601908d..478aaf50d3 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -212,14 +212,16 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
/**
- * cmp_pe_section - compare two sections
- * @arg1: Pointer to pointer to first section
- * @arg2: Pointer to pointer to second section
+ * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
+ * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header
+ * @arg2: pointer to pointer to second section header
*
- * Compare two sections in PE image.
+ * Compare the virtual addresses of two sections of an portable executable.
+ * The arguments are defined as const void * to allow usage with qsort().
*
- * Return: -1, 0, 1 respectively if arg1 < arg2, arg1 == arg2 or
- * arg1 > arg2
+ * Return: -1 if the virtual address of arg1 is less than that of arg2,
+ * 0 if the virtual addresses are equal, 1 if the virtual address
+ * of arg1 is greater than that of arg2.
*/
static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
{
@@ -237,7 +239,7 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
}
/**
- * efi_image_parse - parse a PE image
+ * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image
* @efi: Pointer to image
* @len: Size of @efi
* @regp: Pointer to a list of regions
@@ -404,7 +406,7 @@ err:
}
/**
- * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate - authenticate unsigned image with
+ * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with
* SHA256 hash
* @regs: List of regions to be verified
*
@@ -451,7 +453,7 @@ out:
}
/**
- * efi_image_authenticate - verify a signature of signed image
+ * efi_image_authenticate() - verify a signature of signed image
* @efi: Pointer to image
* @efi_size: Size of @efi
*
@@ -635,21 +637,18 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
goto err;
}
- /* assume sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32) <= sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64) */
- if (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32)) {
+ /*
+ * Check if the image section header fits into the file. Knowing that at
+ * least one section header follows we only need to check for the length
+ * of the 64bit header which is longer than the 32bit header.
+ */
+ if (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)) {
printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__);
ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
goto err;
}
nt = (void *) ((char *)efi + dos->e_lfanew);
- if ((nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) &&
- (efi_size < dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64))) {
- printf("%s: Invalid offset for Extended Header\n", __func__);
- ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
-
if (nt->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
printf("%s: Invalid NT Signature\n", __func__);
ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index adcb8c9cca..6685253856 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
index 0a43db5678..e097670e28 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ enum efi_secure_mode {
EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED,
};
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
static bool efi_secure_boot;
static int efi_secure_mode;
static u8 efi_vendor_keys;