diff options
author | Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> | 2014-09-16 03:24:05 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-11-14 08:59:55 -0800 |
commit | 44d1efb927e6dadb74b6620d1eed232708d75bac (patch) | |
tree | 6d9f72b99f821bee03884ee2ef5188ecddbe0643 /arch | |
parent | 449a72277a5dc2a12cd114af3be81a56ad10cbd1 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-44d1efb927e6dadb74b6620d1eed232708d75bac.tar.gz linux-stable-44d1efb927e6dadb74b6620d1eed232708d75bac.tar.bz2 linux-stable-44d1efb927e6dadb74b6620d1eed232708d75bac.zip |
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
commit 854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 upstream.
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 |
4 files changed, 42 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index cffcaee5425d..e9dc02968cf8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -984,6 +984,20 @@ static inline void kvm_inject_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 error_code) kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code); } +static inline u64 get_canonical(u64 la) +{ + return ((int64_t)la << 16) >> 16; +} + +static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + return get_canonical(la) != la; +#else + return false; +#endif +} + #define TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET 0x66 #define TSS_BASE_SIZE 0x68 #define TSS_IOPB_SIZE (65536 / 8) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 2de1bc09a8d4..ecb50a4c622d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -3213,7 +3213,7 @@ static int wrmsr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) msr.host_initiated = false; svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 2; - if (svm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) { + if (kvm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) { trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data); kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0); } else { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 75baf927be99..9bb89bd10e28 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -5172,7 +5172,7 @@ static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) msr.data = data; msr.index = ecx; msr.host_initiated = false; - if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) { + if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) { trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data); kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); return 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index dc1ee99cfc6d..51c2851ca243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -951,7 +951,6 @@ void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits); - /* * Writes msr value into into the appropriate "register". * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. @@ -959,8 +958,34 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_enable_efer_bits); */ int kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) { + switch (msr->index) { + case MSR_FS_BASE: + case MSR_GS_BASE: + case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: + case MSR_CSTAR: + case MSR_LSTAR: + if (is_noncanonical_address(msr->data)) + return 1; + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: + /* + * IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if + * non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on + * AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits, because it does + * not implement 64-bit SYSENTER). + * + * 64-bit code should hence be able to write a non-canonical + * value on AMD. Making the address canonical ensures that + * vmentry does not fail on Intel after writing a non-canonical + * value, and that something deterministic happens if the guest + * invokes 64-bit SYSENTER. + */ + msr->data = get_canonical(msr->data); + } return kvm_x86_ops->set_msr(vcpu, msr); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_msr); /* * Adapt set_msr() to msr_io()'s calling convention |