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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-05-03 13:45:58 -0500 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-05-04 12:52:47 -0400 |
commit | acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2 (patch) | |
tree | 8dd84537bf4b37809868b378a7a819437db625ae /net/nsh | |
parent | 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 (diff) | |
download | linux-rpi-acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2.tar.gz linux-rpi-acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2.tar.bz2 linux-rpi-acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2.zip |
net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'
Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/nsh')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions