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| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-06-29 13:28:07 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-06-30 21:24:18 +0900 |
| commit | ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0 (patch) | |
| tree | 4dd2099f5eabd75c7d66a217762edcffe8991df6 /drivers/atm | |
| parent | c7f653e0a8cf4e4a9951324f9b831cf88d813e48 (diff) | |
| download | linux-rpi-ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0.tar.gz linux-rpi-ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0.tar.bz2 linux-rpi-ced9e191501e52b95e1b57b8e0db00943869eed0.zip | |
atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1
pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/atm/zatm.c:1491 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index
zatm_dev->pool_info
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/atm')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/atm/zatm.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/atm/zatm.c b/drivers/atm/zatm.c index a8d2eb0ceb8d..2c288d1f42bb 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c +++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c @@ -1483,6 +1483,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd,void __user *arg) return -EFAULT; if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL) return -EINVAL; + pool = array_index_nospec(pool, + ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1); if (copy_from_user(&info, &((struct zatm_pool_req __user *) arg)->info, sizeof(info))) return -EFAULT; |