Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Tightened validation of key hashes for SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST. An
   invalid hash format causes a compilation error. Previously, they got
   included to the kernel binary but were silently ignored at run-time.

 - Allow root user to append new hashes to the blacklist keyring.

 - Trusted keys backed with Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
   Module (CAAM), which part of some of the new NXP's SoC's. Now there
   is total three hardware backends for trusted keys: TPM, ARM TEE and
   CAAM.

 - A scattered set of fixes and small improvements for the TPM driver.

* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
  doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source
  KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
  crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator
  crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material
  KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support
  tpm: Add field upgrade mode support for Infineon TPM2 modules
  tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()
  char: tpm: cr50_i2c: Suppress duplicated error message in .remove()
  tpm: cr50: Add new device/vendor ID 0x504a6666
  tpm: Remove read16/read32/write32 calls from tpm_tis_phy_ops
  tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
  tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
  certs: Explain the rationale to call panic()
  certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
  certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
  certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
  certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
  tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

36 files changed, 1056 insertions, 281 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9336d98fc670..a1a0eba0a2e5 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -6081,11 +6081,22 @@
 			sources:
 			- "tpm"
 			- "tee"
+			- "caam"
 			If not specified then it defaults to iterating through
 			the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the
 			first trust source as a backend which is initialized
 			successfully during iteration.
 
+	trusted.rng=	[KEYS]
+			Format: <string>
+			The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys.
+			Can be one of:
+			- "kernel"
+			- the same value as trusted.source: "tpm" or "tee"
+			- "default"
+			If not specified, "default" is used. In this case,
+			the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source.
+
 	tsc=		Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC.
 			Format: <string>
 			[x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index f614dad7de12..0bfb4c339748 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ safe.
          Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
          fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
 
+     (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)
+
+         When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
+         mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
+         randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
+         Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
+
   *  Execution isolation
 
      (1) TPM
@@ -46,6 +53,10 @@ safe.
          Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
          environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
 
+     (3) CAAM
+
+         Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
+
   * Optional binding to platform integrity state
 
      (1) TPM
@@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe.
          Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
          be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
 
+     (3) CAAM
+
+         Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
+         for platform integrity.
+
   *  Interfaces and APIs
 
      (1) TPM
@@ -74,10 +90,13 @@ safe.
          TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
          more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
 
+     (3) CAAM
+
+         Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
 
   *  Threat model
 
-     The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
+     The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
      purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.
 
 
@@ -87,22 +106,32 @@ Key Generation
 Trusted Keys
 ------------
 
-New keys are created from random numbers generated in the trust source. They
-are encrypted/decrypted using a child key in the storage key hierarchy.
-Encryption and decryption of the child key must be protected by a strong
-access control policy within the trust source.
+New keys are created from random numbers. They are encrypted/decrypted using
+a child key in the storage key hierarchy. Encryption and decryption of the
+child key must be protected by a strong access control policy within the
+trust source. The random number generator in use differs according to the
+selected trust source:
 
-  *  TPM (hardware device) based RNG
+  *  TPM: hardware device based RNG
 
-     Strength of random numbers may vary from one device manufacturer to
-     another.
+     Keys are generated within the TPM. Strength of random numbers may vary
+     from one device manufacturer to another.
 
-  *  TEE (OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone) based RNG
+  *  TEE: OP-TEE based on Arm TrustZone based RNG
 
      RNG is customizable as per platform needs. It can either be direct output
      from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
      which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
 
+  *  CAAM: Kernel RNG
+
+     The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
+     CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
+     is probed.
+
+Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
+command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.
+
 Encrypted Keys
 --------------
 
@@ -189,6 +218,19 @@ Usage::
 specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
 in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
 
+Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
+------------------------
+
+Usage::
+
+    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
+    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
+    keyctl print keyid
+
+"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
+CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
+Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+
 Encrypted Keys usage
 --------------------
 
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 413dc6a4db3c..3bf9805b10aa 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -4575,7 +4575,9 @@ L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
 F:	certs/
+F:	scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 F:	scripts/sign-file.c
+F:	tools/certs/
 
 CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER
 M:	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
@@ -10865,6 +10867,15 @@ S:	Supported
 F:	include/keys/trusted_tee.h
 F:	security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
 
+KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
+M:	Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
+R:	Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+L:	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
+S:	Maintained
+F:	include/keys/trusted_caam.h
+F:	security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
+
 KEYS/KEYRINGS
 M:	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 M:	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
diff --git a/certs/.gitignore b/certs/.gitignore
index 9e42fe3e02f5..56637aceaf81 100644
--- a/certs/.gitignore
+++ b/certs/.gitignore
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/blacklist_hashes_checked
 /extract-cert
 /x509_certificate_list
 /x509_revocation_list
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index 73d1350c223a..476755703cf8 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -104,8 +104,11 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
 	help
 	  If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
 	  form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... .  This will be included into a C
-	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
-	  be a string of hex digits.
+	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> must be a
+	  string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and
+	  finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128).
+	  Certificate hashes can be generated with
+	  tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
 
 config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
 	bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
@@ -124,4 +127,14 @@ config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS
 	  containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist
 	  keyring.
 
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys"
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
+	  they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
+	  keyring.  The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
+	  payload.  Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
+
 endmenu
diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
index d8443cfb1c40..1d26ae36af20 100644
--- a/certs/Makefile
+++ b/certs/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o c
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST) += revocation_certificates.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),)
+quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK   $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+      cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
+
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked
+
+CFLAGS_blacklist_hashes.o += -I$(srctree)
+
+targets += blacklist_hashes_checked
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE
+       $(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
 else
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
@@ -21,7 +33,7 @@ $(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
 $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS) $(obj)/extract-cert FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,extract_certs)
 
-targets += x509_certificate_list
+targets += x509_certificate_list blacklist_hashes_checked
 
 # If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been
 # supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index c9a435b15af4..25094ea73600 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -15,10 +15,24 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "blacklist.h"
 #include "common.h"
 
+/*
+ * According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(),
+ * the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits,
+ * which translates into 128 hex characters.
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_LEN	128
+
+#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \
+			    KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW)
+
+static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
+static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
+
 static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
@@ -32,41 +46,89 @@ extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;
  */
 static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 {
-	int n = 0;
-
-	if (*desc == ':')
-		return -EINVAL;
-	for (; *desc; desc++)
-		if (*desc == ':')
-			goto found_colon;
+	int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
+
+	/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
+	prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+	for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
+		if (*desc == ':') {
+			if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			if (bin_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (i >= prefix_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
+			tbs_step++;
+		if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
+			bin_step++;
+	}
 	return -EINVAL;
 
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
-	for (; *desc; desc++) {
+	for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
 		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		n++;
 	}
+	if (*desc)
+		/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */
+		return -ENOPKG;
 
-	if (n == 0 || n & 1)
+	/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */
+	if (i == 0 || i & 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description.  There will
- * be no payload.
- */
-static int blacklist_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
+		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	if (prep->datalen > 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	int err;
+#endif
+
+	/* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */
+	key->perm = BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not
+	 * signed but still trusted.
+	 */
+	if (key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN))
+		goto out;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	/*
+	 * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
+	 * trusted keyring.
+	 */
+	err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
+			strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
+			NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+#else
+	/*
+	 * It should not be possible to come here because the keyring doesn't
+	 * have KEY_USR_WRITE and the only other way to call this function is
+	 * for builtin hashes.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return -EPERM;
+#endif
+
+out:
+	return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
 }
 
-static void blacklist_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_update(struct key *key,
+		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
+	return -EPERM;
 }
 
 static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
@@ -77,17 +139,48 @@ static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
 	.name			= "blacklist",
 	.vet_description	= blacklist_vet_description,
-	.preparse		= blacklist_preparse,
-	.free_preparse		= blacklist_free_preparse,
-	.instantiate		= generic_key_instantiate,
+	.instantiate		= blacklist_key_instantiate,
+	.update			= blacklist_key_update,
 	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
 };
 
+static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	size_t type_len;
+	const char *type_prefix;
+	char *buffer, *p;
+
+	switch (hash_type) {
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
+		type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
+		break;
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
+		type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = bin_prefix;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
+	p += type_len;
+	*p++ = ':';
+	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
+	p += hash_len * 2;
+	*p = '\0';
+	return buffer;
+}
+
 /**
- * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
+ * mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
  * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
  */
-int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
+static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 
@@ -96,8 +189,7 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 				   hash,
 				   NULL,
 				   0,
-				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-				    KEY_USR_VIEW),
+				   BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM,
 				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
 				   KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
@@ -107,29 +199,36 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	const char *buffer;
+	int err;
+
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
+	err = mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(buffer);
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return err;
+}
+
 /**
  * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
  * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
  * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
- * @type: Type of hash
+ * @hash_type: Type of hash
  */
-int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
+int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	key_ref_t kref;
-	size_t type_len = strlen(type);
-	char *buffer, *p;
+	const char *buffer;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	*p++ = ':';
-	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
-	p += hash_len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
 	kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
 			      &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
 	if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
@@ -144,7 +243,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
 
 int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
 {
-	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, "bin") == -EKEYREJECTED)
+	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
+			-EKEYREJECTED)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -166,8 +266,10 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
 				   NULL,
 				   data,
 				   size,
-				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
-				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+				   KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH
+				   | KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN
+				   | KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
 		pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
@@ -194,30 +296,57 @@ int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
 }
 #endif
 
+static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
+		const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload,
+		struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+	if (type == &key_type_blacklist)
+		return 0;
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /*
  * Initialise the blacklist
+ *
+ * The blacklist_init() function is registered as an initcall via
+ * device_initcall().  As a result if the blacklist_init() function fails for
+ * any reason the kernel continues to execute.  While cleanly returning -ENODEV
+ * could be acceptable for some non-critical kernel parts, if the blacklist
+ * keyring fails to load it defeats the certificate/key based deny list for
+ * signed modules.  If a critical piece of security functionality that users
+ * expect to be present fails to initialize, panic()ing is likely the right
+ * thing to do.
  */
 static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 {
 	const char *const *bl;
+	struct key_restriction *restriction;
 
 	if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
 
+	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(*restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!restriction)
+		panic("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n");
+	restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist;
+
 	blacklist_keyring =
 		keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
 			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
-			      (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
-			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
-			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
-			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+			      KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
+			      KEY_POS_WRITE |
+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+			      | KEY_USR_WRITE
+#endif
+			      , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
 			      KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
-			      NULL, NULL);
+			      restriction, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
 
 	for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
-		if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
+		if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
 			pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 91a4ad50dea2..77ed4e93ad56 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_2;
 
-	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size,
+				  BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
 		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
 		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 4704fa553098..c1eb5d223839 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -400,7 +400,16 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,  u32 *value,
 	if (!rc) {
 		out = (struct tpm2_get_cap_out *)
 			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
-		*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		/*
+		 * To prevent failing boot up of some systems, Infineon TPM2.0
+		 * returns SUCCESS on TPM2_Startup in field upgrade mode. Also
+		 * the TPM2_Getcapability command returns a zero length list
+		 * in field upgrade mode.
+		 */
+		if (be32_to_cpu(out->property_cnt) > 0)
+			*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		else
+			rc = -ENODATA;
 	}
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 	return rc;
@@ -745,7 +754,11 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	rc = tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(chip);
 
 out:
-	if (rc == TPM2_RC_UPGRADE) {
+	/*
+	 * Infineon TPM in field upgrade mode will return no data for the number
+	 * of supported commands.
+	 */
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_UPGRADE || rc == -ENODATA) {
 		dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM in field upgrade mode, requires firmware upgrade\n");
 		chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_FIRMWARE_UPGRADE;
 		rc = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c
index 6e3235565a4d..5c233423c56f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static u8 ftpm_tee_tpm_op_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 static bool ftpm_tee_tpm_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return false;
 }
 
 static const struct tpm_class_ops ftpm_tee_tpm_ops = {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 3af4c07a9342..d3989b257f42 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 	if (!wait_event_timeout(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq,
 				ibmvtpm->rtce_buf != NULL,
 				HZ)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
 		dev_err(dev, "CRQ response timed out\n");
 		goto init_irq_cleanup;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index d3f2e5364c27..bcff6429e0b4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -153,50 +153,46 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device *dev)
 #endif
 
 static int tpm_tcg_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
-			      u8 *result)
+			      u8 *result, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	while (len--)
-		*result++ = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+	__le16 result_le16;
+	__le32 result_le32;
+
+	switch (io_mode) {
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_8:
+		while (len--)
+			*result++ = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_16:
+		result_le16 = cpu_to_le16(ioread16(phy->iobase + addr));
+		memcpy(result, &result_le16, sizeof(u16));
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_32:
+		result_le32 = cpu_to_le32(ioread32(phy->iobase + addr));
+		memcpy(result, &result_le32, sizeof(u32));
+		break;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int tpm_tcg_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
-			       const u8 *value)
+			       const u8 *value, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
 
-	while (len--)
-		iowrite8(*value++, phy->iobase + addr);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tcg_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	*result = ioread16(phy->iobase + addr);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tcg_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	*result = ioread32(phy->iobase + addr);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tcg_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	iowrite32(value, phy->iobase + addr);
+	switch (io_mode) {
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_8:
+		while (len--)
+			iowrite8(*value++, phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_16:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_32:
+		iowrite32(le32_to_cpu(*((__le32 *)value)), phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -204,9 +200,6 @@ static int tpm_tcg_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value)
 static const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm_tcg = {
 	.read_bytes = tpm_tcg_read_bytes,
 	.write_bytes = tpm_tcg_write_bytes,
-	.read16 = tpm_tcg_read16,
-	.read32 = tpm_tcg_read32,
-	.write32 = tpm_tcg_write32,
 };
 
 static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
index 3be24f221e32..6c203f36b8a1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
@@ -104,54 +104,88 @@ struct tpm_tis_data {
 	unsigned int timeout_max; /* usecs */
 };
 
+/*
+ * IO modes to indicate how many bytes should be read/written at once in the
+ * tpm_tis_phy_ops read_bytes/write_bytes calls. Use TPM_TIS_PHYS_8 to
+ * receive/transmit byte-wise, TPM_TIS_PHYS_16 for two bytes etc.
+ */
+enum tpm_tis_io_mode {
+	TPM_TIS_PHYS_8,
+	TPM_TIS_PHYS_16,
+	TPM_TIS_PHYS_32,
+};
+
 struct tpm_tis_phy_ops {
+	/* data is passed in little endian */
 	int (*read_bytes)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
-			  u8 *result);
+			  u8 *result, enum tpm_tis_io_mode mode);
 	int (*write_bytes)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
-			   const u8 *value);
-	int (*read16)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result);
-	int (*read32)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result);
-	int (*write32)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 src);
+			   const u8 *value, enum tpm_tis_io_mode mode);
 };
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				     u16 len, u8 *result)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, len, result);
+	return data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, len, result,
+					 TPM_TIS_PHYS_8);
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_read8(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u8 *result)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, 1, result);
+	return data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, 1, result, TPM_TIS_PHYS_8);
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				 u16 *result)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->read16(data, addr, result);
+	__le16 result_le;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u16),
+				       (u8 *)&result_le, TPM_TIS_PHYS_16);
+	if (!rc)
+		*result = le16_to_cpu(result_le);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				 u32 *result)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->read32(data, addr, result);
+	__le32 result_le;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
+				       (u8 *)&result_le, TPM_TIS_PHYS_32);
+	if (!rc)
+		*result = le32_to_cpu(result_le);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				      u16 len, const u8 *value)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, len, value);
+	return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, len, value,
+					  TPM_TIS_PHYS_8);
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_write8(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u8 value)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, 1, &value);
+	return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, 1, &value,
+					  TPM_TIS_PHYS_8);
 }
 
 static inline int tpm_tis_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 				  u32 value)
 {
-	return data->phy_ops->write32(data, addr, value);
+	__le32 value_le;
+	int rc;
+
+	value_le = cpu_to_le32(value);
+	rc =  data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
+					 (u8 *)&value_le, TPM_TIS_PHYS_32);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static inline bool is_bsw(void)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c
index f6c0affbb456..974479a1ec5a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_i2c_cr50.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_SHORT_MS	2		/* Short timeout during transactions */
 #define TPM_CR50_TIMEOUT_NOIRQ_MS	20		/* Timeout for TPM ready without IRQ */
 #define TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID		0x00281ae0L	/* Device and vendor ID reg value */
+#define TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID		0x504a6666L	/* Device and vendor ID reg value */
 #define TPM_CR50_I2C_MAX_RETRIES	3		/* Max retries due to I2C errors */
 #define TPM_CR50_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_LO	55		/* Min usecs between retries on I2C */
 #define TPM_CR50_I2C_RETRY_DELAY_HI	65		/* Max usecs between retries on I2C */
@@ -742,15 +743,15 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client)
 	}
 
 	vendor = le32_to_cpup((__le32 *)buf);
-	if (vendor != TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID) {
+	if (vendor != TPM_CR50_I2C_DID_VID && vendor != TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Vendor ID did not match! ID was %08x\n", vendor);
 		tpm_cr50_release_locality(chip, true);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
-	dev_info(dev, "cr50 TPM 2.0 (i2c 0x%02x irq %d id 0x%x)\n",
+	dev_info(dev, "%s TPM 2.0 (i2c 0x%02x irq %d id 0x%x)\n",
+		 vendor == TPM_TI50_I2C_DID_VID ? "ti50" : "cr50",
 		 client->addr, client->irq, vendor >> 16);
-
 	return tpm_chip_register(chip);
 }
 
@@ -768,8 +769,8 @@ static int tpm_cr50_i2c_remove(struct i2c_client *client)
 	struct device *dev = &client->dev;
 
 	if (!chip) {
-		dev_err(dev, "Could not get client data at remove\n");
-		return -ENODEV;
+		dev_crit(dev, "Could not get client data at remove, memory corruption ahead\n");
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h
index bba73979c368..d0f66f6f1931 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.h
@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ extern int tpm_tis_spi_init(struct spi_device *spi, struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy,
 extern int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
 				u8 *in, const u8 *out);
 
-extern int tpm_tis_spi_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result);
-extern int tpm_tis_spi_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result);
-extern int tpm_tis_spi_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI_CR50
 extern int cr50_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi);
 #else
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_cr50.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_cr50.c
index 7bf123d3c537..f4937280e940 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_cr50.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_cr50.c
@@ -222,13 +222,13 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_cr50_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 le
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_spi_cr50_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-				       u16 len, u8 *result)
+				       u16 len, u8 *result, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	return tpm_tis_spi_cr50_transfer(data, addr, len, result, NULL);
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_spi_cr50_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-					u16 len, const u8 *value)
+					u16 len, const u8 *value, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	return tpm_tis_spi_cr50_transfer(data, addr, len, NULL, value);
 }
@@ -236,9 +236,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_cr50_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
 static const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm_spi_cr50_phy_ops = {
 	.read_bytes = tpm_tis_spi_cr50_read_bytes,
 	.write_bytes = tpm_tis_spi_cr50_write_bytes,
-	.read16 = tpm_tis_spi_read16,
-	.read32 = tpm_tis_spi_read32,
-	.write32 = tpm_tis_spi_write32,
 };
 
 static void cr50_print_fw_version(struct tpm_tis_data *data)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
index 184396b3af50..a0963a3e92bd 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi_main.c
@@ -141,55 +141,17 @@ exit:
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_spi_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-				  u16 len, u8 *result)
+				  u16 len, u8 *result, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, result, NULL);
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_spi_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-				   u16 len, const u8 *value)
+				   u16 len, const u8 *value, enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, NULL, value);
 }
 
-int tpm_tis_spi_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result)
-{
-	__le16 result_le;
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u16),
-				       (u8 *)&result_le);
-	if (!rc)
-		*result = le16_to_cpu(result_le);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-int tpm_tis_spi_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result)
-{
-	__le32 result_le;
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
-				       (u8 *)&result_le);
-	if (!rc)
-		*result = le32_to_cpu(result_le);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-int tpm_tis_spi_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value)
-{
-	__le32 value_le;
-	int rc;
-
-	value_le = cpu_to_le32(value);
-	rc = data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
-					(u8 *)&value_le);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
 int tpm_tis_spi_init(struct spi_device *spi, struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy,
 		     int irq, const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops *phy_ops)
 {
@@ -205,9 +167,6 @@ int tpm_tis_spi_init(struct spi_device *spi, struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy,
 static const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm_spi_phy_ops = {
 	.read_bytes = tpm_tis_spi_read_bytes,
 	.write_bytes = tpm_tis_spi_write_bytes,
-	.read16 = tpm_tis_spi_read16,
-	.read32 = tpm_tis_spi_read32,
-	.write32 = tpm_tis_spi_write32,
 };
 
 static int tpm_tis_spi_probe(struct spi_device *dev)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c
index e47bdd272704..679196c61401 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer.c
@@ -35,72 +35,53 @@ static inline struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(struct tpm_tis_da
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_synquacer_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-					u16 len, u8 *result)
+					u16 len, u8 *result,
+					enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	while (len--)
-		*result++ = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+	switch (io_mode) {
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_8:
+		while (len--)
+			*result++ = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_16:
+		result[1] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 1);
+		result[0] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_32:
+		result[3] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 3);
+		result[2] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 2);
+		result[1] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 1);
+		result[0] = ioread8(phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int tpm_tis_synquacer_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
-					 u16 len, const u8 *value)
+					 u16 len, const u8 *value,
+					 enum tpm_tis_io_mode io_mode)
 {
 	struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	while (len--)
-		iowrite8(*value++, phy->iobase + addr);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tis_synquacer_read16_bw(struct tpm_tis_data *data,
-				       u32 addr, u16 *result)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	/*
-	 * Due to the limitation of SPI controller on SynQuacer,
-	 * 16/32 bits access must be done in byte-wise and descending order.
-	 */
-	*result = (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 1) << 8) |
-		  (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr));
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tis_synquacer_read32_bw(struct tpm_tis_data *data,
-				       u32 addr, u32 *result)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	/*
-	 * Due to the limitation of SPI controller on SynQuacer,
-	 * 16/32 bits access must be done in byte-wise and descending order.
-	 */
-	*result = (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 3) << 24) |
-		  (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 2) << 16) |
-		  (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr + 1) << 8) |
-		  (ioread8(phy->iobase + addr));
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm_tis_synquacer_write32_bw(struct tpm_tis_data *data,
-					u32 addr, u32 value)
-{
-	struct tpm_tis_synquacer_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
-
-	/*
-	 * Due to the limitation of SPI controller on SynQuacer,
-	 * 16/32 bits access must be done in byte-wise and descending order.
-	 */
-	iowrite8(value >> 24, phy->iobase + addr + 3);
-	iowrite8(value >> 16, phy->iobase + addr + 2);
-	iowrite8(value >> 8, phy->iobase + addr + 1);
-	iowrite8(value, phy->iobase + addr);
+	switch (io_mode) {
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_8:
+		while (len--)
+			iowrite8(*value++, phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_16:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case TPM_TIS_PHYS_32:
+		/*
+		 * Due to the limitation of SPI controller on SynQuacer,
+		 * 16/32 bits access must be done in byte-wise and descending order.
+		 */
+		iowrite8(value[3], phy->iobase + addr + 3);
+		iowrite8(value[2], phy->iobase + addr + 2);
+		iowrite8(value[1], phy->iobase + addr + 1);
+		iowrite8(value[0], phy->iobase + addr);
+		break;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -108,9 +89,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_synquacer_write32_bw(struct tpm_tis_data *data,
 static const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm_tcg_bw = {
 	.read_bytes	= tpm_tis_synquacer_read_bytes,
 	.write_bytes	= tpm_tis_synquacer_write_bytes,
-	.read16		= tpm_tis_synquacer_read16_bw,
-	.read32		= tpm_tis_synquacer_read32_bw,
-	.write32	= tpm_tis_synquacer_write32_bw,
 };
 
 static int tpm_tis_synquacer_init(struct device *dev,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
index 84ea7cba5ee5..ea9f8b1ae981 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API
 	  Selecting this will register the SEC4 hardware rng to
 	  the hw_random API for supplying the kernel entropy pool.
 
+config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+	bool
+
 endif # CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
 
 endif # CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
index 3570286eb9ce..25f7ae5a4642 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += caamalg_qi.o
 caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API) += caamhash.o
 caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API) += caamrng.o
 caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API) += caampkc.o pkc_desc.o
+caam_jr-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN) += blob_gen.o
 
 caam-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI) += qi.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_QI),)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6345c7269eb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/blob_gen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Pengutronix, Steffen Trumtrar <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "caam blob_gen: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "desc_constr.h"
+#include "desc.h"
+#include "error.h"
+#include "intern.h"
+#include "jr.h"
+#include "regs.h"
+
+#define CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX					\
+	/* Command to initialize & stating length of descriptor */	\
+	(CAAM_CMD_SZ +							\
+	/* Command to append the key-modifier + key-modifier data */	\
+	 CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH +			\
+	/* Command to include input key + pointer to the input key */	\
+	 CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX +				\
+	/* Command to include output key + pointer to the output key */	\
+	 CAAM_CMD_SZ + CAAM_PTR_SZ_MAX +				\
+	/* Command describing the operation to perform */		\
+	 CAAM_CMD_SZ)
+
+struct caam_blob_priv {
+	struct device jrdev;
+};
+
+struct caam_blob_job_result {
+	int err;
+	struct completion completion;
+};
+
+static void caam_blob_job_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void *context)
+{
+	struct caam_blob_job_result *res = context;
+	int ecode = 0;
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s %d: err 0x%x\n", __func__, __LINE__, err);
+
+	if (err)
+		ecode = caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err);
+
+	res->err = ecode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Upon completion, desc points to a buffer containing a CAAM job
+	 * descriptor which encapsulates data into an externally-storable
+	 * blob.
+	 */
+	complete(&res->completion);
+}
+
+int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
+		      struct caam_blob_info *info, bool encap)
+{
+	struct caam_blob_job_result testres;
+	struct device *jrdev = &priv->jrdev;
+	dma_addr_t dma_in, dma_out;
+	int op = OP_PCLID_BLOB;
+	size_t output_len;
+	u32 *desc;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (info->key_mod_len > CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (encap) {
+		op |= OP_TYPE_ENCAP_PROTOCOL;
+		output_len = info->input_len + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
+	} else {
+		op |= OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL;
+		output_len = info->input_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
+	}
+
+	desc = kzalloc(CAAM_BLOB_DESC_BYTES_MAX, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
+	if (!desc)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dma_in = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->input, info->input_len,
+				DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dma_in)) {
+		dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map input DMA buffer\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	dma_out = dma_map_single(jrdev, info->output, output_len,
+				 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(jrdev, dma_out)) {
+		dev_err(jrdev, "unable to map output DMA buffer\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_unmap_in;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A data blob is encrypted using a blob key (BK); a random number.
+	 * The BK is used as an AES-CCM key. The initial block (B0) and the
+	 * initial counter (Ctr0) are generated automatically and stored in
+	 * Class 1 Context DWords 0+1+2+3. The random BK is stored in the
+	 * Class 1 Key Register. Operation Mode is set to AES-CCM.
+	 */
+
+	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+	append_key_as_imm(desc, info->key_mod, info->key_mod_len,
+			  info->key_mod_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+	append_seq_in_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_in, info->input_len, 0);
+	append_seq_out_ptr_intlen(desc, dma_out, output_len, 0);
+	append_operation(desc, op);
+
+	print_hex_dump_debug("data@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+			     DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->input,
+			     info->input_len, false);
+	print_hex_dump_debug("jobdesc@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+			     DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, desc,
+			     desc_bytes(desc), false);
+
+	testres.err = 0;
+	init_completion(&testres.completion);
+
+	ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, desc, caam_blob_job_done, &testres);
+	if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+		wait_for_completion(&testres.completion);
+		ret = testres.err;
+		print_hex_dump_debug("output@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+				     DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, info->output,
+				     output_len, false);
+	}
+
+	if (ret == 0)
+		info->output_len = output_len;
+
+	dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_out, output_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+out_unmap_in:
+	dma_unmap_single(jrdev, dma_in, info->input_len, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+out_free:
+	kfree(desc);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_process_blob);
+
+struct caam_blob_priv *caam_blob_gen_init(void)
+{
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv;
+	struct device *jrdev;
+
+	/*
+	 * caam_blob_gen_init() may expectedly fail with -ENODEV, e.g. when
+	 * CAAM driver didn't probe or when SoC lacks BLOB support. An
+	 * error would be harsh in this case, so we stick to info level.
+	 */
+
+	jrdev = caam_jr_alloc();
+	if (IS_ERR(jrdev)) {
+		pr_info("job ring requested, but none currently available\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+	}
+
+	ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(jrdev->parent);
+	if (!ctrlpriv->blob_present) {
+		dev_info(jrdev, "no hardware blob generation support\n");
+		caam_jr_free(jrdev);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+	}
+
+	return container_of(jrdev, struct caam_blob_priv, jrdev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_blob_gen_init);
+
+void caam_blob_gen_exit(struct caam_blob_priv *priv)
+{
+	caam_jr_free(&priv->jrdev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_blob_gen_exit);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index ca0361b2dbb0..38c4d88a9d03 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -820,12 +820,25 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10)
+	comp_params = rd_reg32(&ctrl->perfmon.comp_parms_ls);
+	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some SoCs like the LS1028A (non-E) indicate CTPR_LS_BLOB support,
+	 * but fail when actually using it due to missing AES support, so
+	 * check both here.
+	 */
+	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
 		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&ctrl->perfmon.cha_id_ls) &
 			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
-	else
+		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
+			(rd_reg32(&ctrl->perfmon.cha_num_ls) & CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
+	} else {
 		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&ctrl->vreg.rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
 			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
+		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
+			(rd_reg32(&ctrl->vreg.aesa) & CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index 7d45b21bd55a..e92210e2ab76 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
 	 */
 	u8 total_jobrs;		/* Total Job Rings in device */
 	u8 qi_present;		/* Nonzero if QI present in device */
+	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
 	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
 	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
 	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
index 3738625c0250..66d6dad841bb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
@@ -320,7 +320,8 @@ struct version_regs {
 #define CHA_VER_VID_MASK	(0xffull << CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT)
 
 /* CHA Miscellaneous Information - AESA_MISC specific */
-#define CHA_VER_MISC_AES_GCM	BIT(1 + CHA_VER_MISC_SHIFT)
+#define CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK	GENMASK(7, 0)
+#define CHA_VER_MISC_AES_GCM		BIT(1 + CHA_VER_MISC_SHIFT)
 
 /* CHA Miscellaneous Information - PKHA_MISC specific */
 #define CHA_VER_MISC_PKHA_NO_CRYPT	BIT(7 + CHA_VER_MISC_SHIFT)
@@ -414,6 +415,7 @@ struct caam_perfmon {
 #define CTPR_MS_PG_SZ_MASK	0x10
 #define CTPR_MS_PG_SZ_SHIFT	4
 	u32 comp_parms_ms;	/* CTPR - Compile Parameters Register	*/
+#define CTPR_LS_BLOB           BIT(1)
 	u32 comp_parms_ls;	/* CTPR - Compile Parameters Register	*/
 	u64 rsvd1[2];
 
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 2419a735420f..91e080efb918 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
 
+enum blacklist_hash_type {
+	/* TBSCertificate hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
+	/* Raw data hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
 extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -54,13 +61,14 @@ static inline void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
 
 extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
+extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-			       const char *type);
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
 #else
 static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-				      const char *type)
+				      enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops {
 	/* Unseal a key. */
 	int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
 
-	/* Get a randomized key. */
+	/* Optional: Get a randomized key. */
 	int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
 
 	/* Exit key interface. */
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_caam.h b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..73fe2f32f65e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H
+#define __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H
+
+extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..937cac52f36d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/soc/fsl/caam-blob.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+#define __CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#define CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH		16
+#define CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD		(32 + 16)
+#define CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN		4096
+
+struct caam_blob_priv;
+
+/**
+ * struct caam_blob_info - information for CAAM blobbing
+ * @input:       pointer to input buffer (must be DMAable)
+ * @input_len:   length of @input buffer in bytes.
+ * @output:      pointer to output buffer (must be DMAable)
+ * @output_len:  length of @output buffer in bytes.
+ * @key_mod:     key modifier
+ * @key_mod_len: length of @key_mod in bytes.
+ *	         May not exceed %CAAM_BLOB_KEYMOD_LENGTH
+ */
+struct caam_blob_info {
+	void *input;
+	size_t input_len;
+
+	void *output;
+	size_t output_len;
+
+	const void *key_mod;
+	size_t key_mod_len;
+};
+
+/**
+ * caam_blob_gen_init - initialize blob generation
+ * Return: pointer to new &struct caam_blob_priv instance on success
+ * and ``ERR_PTR(-ENODEV)`` if CAAM has no hardware blobbing support
+ * or no job ring could be allocated.
+ */
+struct caam_blob_priv *caam_blob_gen_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * caam_blob_gen_exit - free blob generation resources
+ * @priv: instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init()
+ */
+void caam_blob_gen_exit(struct caam_blob_priv *priv);
+
+/**
+ * caam_process_blob - encapsulate or decapsulate blob
+ * @priv:   instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init()
+ * @info:   pointer to blobbing info describing key, blob and
+ *          key modifier buffers.
+ * @encap:  true for encapsulation, false for decapsulation
+ *
+ * Return: %0 and sets ``info->output_len`` on success and a negative
+ * error code otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_process_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
+		      struct caam_blob_info *info, bool encap);
+
+/**
+ * caam_encap_blob - encapsulate blob
+ * @priv:   instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init()
+ * @info:   pointer to blobbing info describing input key,
+ *          output blob and key modifier buffers.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 and sets ``info->output_len`` on success and
+ * a negative error code otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int caam_encap_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
+				  struct caam_blob_info *info)
+{
+	if (info->output_len < info->input_len + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return caam_process_blob(priv, info, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * caam_decap_blob - decapsulate blob
+ * @priv:   instance returned by caam_blob_gen_init()
+ * @info:   pointer to blobbing info describing output key,
+ *          input blob and key modifier buffers.
+ *
+ * Return: %0 and sets ``info->output_len`` on success and
+ * a negative error code otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int caam_decap_blob(struct caam_blob_priv *priv,
+				  struct caam_blob_info *info)
+{
+	if (info->input_len < CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD ||
+	    info->output_len < info->input_len - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return caam_process_blob(priv, info, false);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..107c1d3204d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/usr/bin/awk -f
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
+#
+# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of
+# hash strings.  Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a
+# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters
+# (up to 128).
+
+BEGIN {
+	RS = ","
+}
+{
+	if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) {
+		print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0;
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) {
+		print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) {
+		print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) > 128) {
+		print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) {
+		print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 1db4d3b4356d..a2464f3e66cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -17,34 +17,12 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
 static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
 
 /*
- * Blacklist a hash.
- */
-static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
-				       size_t len, const char *type,
-				       size_t type_len)
-{
-	char *hash, *p;
-
-	hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!hash)
-		return;
-	p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-	p += len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
-	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-	kfree(hash);
-}
-
-/*
  * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
  */
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 					   const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -53,7 +31,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
 					 const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 0e30b361e1c1..abb03a1b2a5c 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -70,23 +70,19 @@ config BIG_KEYS
 
 config TRUSTED_KEYS
 	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
-	select ASN1_ENCODER
-	select OID_REGISTRY
-	select ASN1
+	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
 	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
-	  generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
-	  if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.  Userspace will only ever
-	  see encrypted blobs.
+	  generated and sealed by a trust source selected at kernel boot-time.
+	  Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs.
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
 
+if TRUSTED_KEYS
+source "security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig"
+endif
+
 config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
 	depends on KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dbfdd8536468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
+	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select ASN1_ENCODER
+	select OID_REGISTRY
+	select ASN1
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key
+	  backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+	  which will be generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.
+	  The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other
+	  criteria match.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
+	bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
+	depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
+	  key backend.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+	bool "CAAM-based trusted keys"
+	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
+	  (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
+
+if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
+comment "No trust source selected!"
+endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
index feb8b6c3cc79..735aa0bc08ef 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
 trusted-y += trusted_core.o
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o
 
 $(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
-trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
 
-trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
+
+trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3415c520c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@pengutronix.de>
+ */
+
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
+
+static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
+
+#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
+
+static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
+
+static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input  = p->key,  .input_len   = p->key_len,
+		.output = p->blob, .output_len  = MAX_BLOB_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD, .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->blob_len = info.output_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct caam_blob_info info = {
+		.input   = p->blob,  .input_len  = p->blob_len,
+		.output  = p->key,   .output_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.key_mod = KEYMOD,  .key_mod_len = sizeof(KEYMOD) - 1,
+	};
+
+	ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, &info);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p->key_len = info.output_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int trusted_caam_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init();
+	if (IS_ERR(blobifier))
+		return PTR_ERR(blobifier);
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	if (ret)
+		caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_caam_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+	caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
+}
+
+struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = {
+	.migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
+	.init = trusted_caam_init,
+	.seal = trusted_caam_seal,
+	.unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
+	.exit = trusted_caam_exit,
+};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index 9b9d3ef79cbe..c6fc50d67214 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
+#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
 #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -16,23 +17,31 @@
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/static_call.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
+static char *trusted_rng = "default";
+module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
+
 static char *trusted_key_source;
 module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
 
 static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
 	{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
 #endif
-#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TEE)
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
 	{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
 #endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
+	{ "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
+#endif
 };
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
@@ -312,8 +321,14 @@ struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
 
+static int kernel_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+	return get_random_bytes_wait(key, key_len) ?: key_len;
+}
+
 static int __init init_trusted(void)
 {
+	int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
 	int i, ret = 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
@@ -322,6 +337,28 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 			    strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))
 			continue;
 
+		/*
+		 * We always support trusted.rng="kernel" and "default" as
+		 * well as trusted.rng=$trusted.source if the trust source
+		 * defines its own get_random callback.
+		 */
+		get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
+		if (trusted_rng && strcmp(trusted_rng, "default")) {
+			if (!strcmp(trusted_rng, "kernel")) {
+				get_random = kernel_get_random;
+			} else if (strcmp(trusted_rng, trusted_key_sources[i].name) ||
+				   !get_random) {
+				pr_warn("Unsupported RNG. Supported: kernel");
+				if (get_random)
+					pr_cont(", %s", trusted_key_sources[i].name);
+				pr_cont(", default\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!get_random)
+			get_random = kernel_get_random;
+
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
 				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
@@ -329,7 +366,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
 				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
-				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random);
+				   get_random);
 		static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
 				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
 		migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
diff --git a/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..c93df5387ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
+#
+# Compute and print the To Be Signed (TBS) hash of a certificate.  This is used
+# as description of keys in the blacklist keyring to identify certificates.
+# This output should be redirected, without newline, in a file (hash0.txt) and
+# signed to create a PKCS#7 file (hash0.p7s).  Both of these files can then be
+# loaded in the kernel with.
+#
+# Exemple on a workstation:
+# ./print-cert-tbs-hash.sh certificate-to-invalidate.pem > hash0.txt
+# openssl smime -sign -in hash0.txt -inkey builtin-private-key.pem \
+#               -signer builtin-certificate.pem -certfile certificate-chain.pem \
+#               -noattr -binary -outform DER -out hash0.p7s
+#
+# Exemple on a managed system:
+# keyctl padd blacklist "$(< hash0.txt)" %:.blacklist < hash0.p7s
+
+set -u -e -o pipefail
+
+CERT="${1:-}"
+BASENAME="$(basename -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")"
+
+if [ $# -ne 1 ] || [ ! -f "${CERT}" ]; then
+	echo "usage: ${BASENAME} <certificate>" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# Checks that it is indeed a certificate (PEM or DER encoded) and exclude the
+# optional PEM text header.
+if ! PEM="$(openssl x509 -inform DER -in "${CERT}" 2>/dev/null || openssl x509 -in "${CERT}")"; then
+	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse certificate" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# TBSCertificate starts at the second entry.
+# Cf. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3280#section-4.1
+#
+# Exemple of first lines printed by openssl asn1parse:
+#    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 763 cons: SEQUENCE
+#    4:d=1  hl=4 l= 483 cons: SEQUENCE
+#    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
+#   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :02
+#   13:d=2  hl=2 l=  20 prim: INTEGER           :3CEB2CB8818D968AC00EEFE195F0DF9665328B7B
+#   35:d=2  hl=2 l=  13 cons: SEQUENCE
+#   37:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT            :sha256WithRSAEncryption
+RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE='
+2s/^\s*\([0-9]\+\):d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*\([0-9]\+\)\s\+cons:\s*SEQUENCE\s*$/\1 \2/p;
+7s/^\s*[0-9]\+:d=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+hl=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+l=\s*[0-9]\+\s\+prim:\s*OBJECT\s*:\(.*\)$/\1/p;
+'
+
+RANGE_AND_DIGEST=($(echo "${PEM}" | \
+	openssl asn1parse -in - | \
+	sed -n -e "${RANGE_AND_DIGEST_RE}"))
+
+if [ "${#RANGE_AND_DIGEST[@]}" != 3 ]; then
+	echo "ERROR: Failed to parse TBSCertificate." >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+OFFSET="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[0]}"
+END="$(( OFFSET + RANGE_AND_DIGEST[1] ))"
+DIGEST="${RANGE_AND_DIGEST[2]}"
+
+# The signature hash algorithm is used by Linux to blacklist certificates.
+# Cf. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo()
+DIGEST_MATCH=""
+while read -r DIGEST_ITEM; do
+	if [ -z "${DIGEST_ITEM}" ]; then
+		break
+	fi
+	if echo "${DIGEST}" | grep -qiF "${DIGEST_ITEM}"; then
+		DIGEST_MATCH="${DIGEST_ITEM}"
+		break
+	fi
+done < <(openssl list -digest-commands | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -ur)
+
+if [ -z "${DIGEST_MATCH}" ]; then
+	echo "ERROR: Unknown digest algorithm: ${DIGEST}" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "${PEM}" | \
+	openssl x509 -in - -outform DER | \
+	dd "bs=1" "skip=${OFFSET}" "count=${END}" "status=none" | \
+	openssl dgst "-${DIGEST_MATCH}" - | \
+	awk '{printf "tbs:" $2}'