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| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2009-07-31 12:53:58 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-08-17 15:08:35 +1000 |
| commit | 9c0d90103c7e0eb6e638e5b649e9f6d8d9c1b4b3 (patch) | |
| tree | ba7c5fbed87e6ad6c395f4ca560e2e85d153a5dc /security | |
| parent | 894ef820b10d77e2d6d717342fc408bdd9825139 (diff) | |
| download | linux-exynos-9c0d90103c7e0eb6e638e5b649e9f6d8d9c1b4b3.tar.gz linux-exynos-9c0d90103c7e0eb6e638e5b649e9f6d8d9c1b4b3.tar.bz2 linux-exynos-9c0d90103c7e0eb6e638e5b649e9f6d8d9c1b4b3.zip | |
Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap
into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
checks are done.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 30 |
2 files changed, 30 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 21b6cead6a8e..88f752e8152c 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command, return 0; } -static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) -{ - if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) - return -EACCES; - return 0; -} - static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 48b7e0228fa3..6bcf6e81e547 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -984,3 +984,33 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) cap_sys_admin = 1; return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); } + +/* + * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr + * @file: unused + * @reqprot: unused + * @prot: unused + * @flags: unused + * @addr: address attempting to be mapped + * @addr_only: unused + * + * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need + * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the + * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed + * -EPERM if not. + */ +int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { + ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ + if (ret == 0) + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + } + return ret; +} |