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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2008-11-11 22:02:57 +1100
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-11-11 22:02:57 +1100
commit066746796bd2f0a1ba210c0dded3b6ee4032692a (patch)
tree868832ca0e199e4f173e23375cffb5fc3870402c /security
parenta2f2945a99057c7d44043465906c6bb63c3368a0 (diff)
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Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility
check when determining if a process has additional powers to override memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels. Use the new noaudit call instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c19
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 88a3ee33068..378dc53c08e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1979,16 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
- 0,
- NULL);
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2820,7 +2812,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
u32 size;
int error;
char *context = NULL;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
@@ -2835,13 +2826,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (!error)
- error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
- CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
- 0,
- NULL);
+ error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);