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author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2012-08-21 12:48:30 -0400 |
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committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2012-10-01 17:39:14 -0400 |
commit | 68eb35081e297b37db49d854cda144c6a3397699 (patch) | |
tree | b71fff7512d2ed12fec10bb15cc2aed2a6637f99 /fs/nfsd | |
parent | 6e67b5d1840b5788875ad561f2e76a1bf5facc86 (diff) | |
download | linux-3.10-68eb35081e297b37db49d854cda144c6a3397699.tar.gz linux-3.10-68eb35081e297b37db49d854cda144c6a3397699.tar.bz2 linux-3.10-68eb35081e297b37db49d854cda144c6a3397699.zip |
nfsd4: don't pin clientids to pseudoflavors
I added cr_flavor to the data compared in same_creds without any
justification, in d5497fc693a446ce9100fcf4117c3f795ddfd0d2 "nfsd4: move
rq_flavor into svc_cred".
Recent client changes then started making
mount -osec=krb5 server:/export /mnt/
echo "hello" >/mnt/TMP
umount /mnt/
mount -osec=krb5i server:/export /mnt/
echo "hello" >/mnt/TMP
to fail due to a clid_inuse on the second open.
Mounting sequentially like this with different flavors probably isn't
that common outside artificial tests. Also, the real bug here may be
that the server isn't just destroying the former clientid in this case
(because it isn't good enough at recognizing when the old state is
gone). But it prompted some discussion and a look back at the spec, and
I think the check was probably wrong. Fix and document.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 18 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 5122e1704cd..0f8d7e7922e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -1223,10 +1223,26 @@ static bool groups_equal(struct group_info *g1, struct group_info *g2) return true; } +/* + * RFC 3530 language requires clid_inuse be returned when the + * "principal" associated with a requests differs from that previously + * used. We use uid, gid's, and gss principal string as our best + * approximation. We also don't want to allow non-gss use of a client + * established using gss: in theory cr_principal should catch that + * change, but in practice cr_principal can be null even in the gss case + * since gssd doesn't always pass down a principal string. + */ +static bool is_gss_cred(struct svc_cred *cr) +{ + /* Is cr_flavor one of the gss "pseudoflavors"?: */ + return (cr->cr_flavor > RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR); +} + + static bool same_creds(struct svc_cred *cr1, struct svc_cred *cr2) { - if ((cr1->cr_flavor != cr2->cr_flavor) + if ((is_gss_cred(cr1) != is_gss_cred(cr2)) || (cr1->cr_uid != cr2->cr_uid) || (cr1->cr_gid != cr2->cr_gid) || !groups_equal(cr1->cr_group_info, cr2->cr_group_info)) |