81 files changed, 83317 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20d3ec1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,12964 @@
+2006-12-04  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* filter.h (armor_filter_context_t): New field REFCOUNT.
+	* armor.c (new_armor_context, release_armor_context) 
+	(push_armor_filter): New.
+	(armor_filter): Call releae_armor_context for IOBUFCTRL_FREE.
+	* import.c (import): Use the new function here instead of the
+	old hack using the iobuf_push_filter2. 
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Ditto.
+
+2006-12-03  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_clean): Made strings translatable.
+
+2006-12-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_clean): Show "already minimized" rather than
+	"already clean" when a minimized key is minimized again.  From
+	Dirk Traulsen.
+
+2006-12-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main), passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Add
+	--passphrase-repeat option to control how many times gpg will
+	re-prompt for a passphrase to ensure the user has typed it
+	correctly.  Defaults to 1.
+
+2006-11-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): Fixed buffer overflow occurring
+	if make_printable_string returns a longer string.  Fixes bug 728.
+
+2006-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (main): New command --gpgconf-list.
+
+2006-10-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Show the unpacked as well as
+	the packed s2k iteration count.
+
+	* main.h, options.h, gpg.c (encode_s2k_iterations, main),
+	passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Add --s2k-count option to specify
+	the number of s2k hash iterations.
+
+2006-10-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Write the 16-digit keyid rather
+	than whatever key selector the user used on the command line.
+
+2006-10-02  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data, mdc_decode_filter): Check the MDC
+	right here and don't let parse-packet handle the MDC.
+
+2006-08-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* skclist.c (is_insecure): Also test for uppercase version of the
+	insecure string.
+
+2006-07-31  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile) [USE_ONLY_8DOT3]: Search backwards for
+	the dot.  Fixes bug 654.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Use log_info instead of log_error to
+	allow a fallback without having gpg return an error code.  Fixes
+	bug #655.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): Invalidate the whole fd cache.
+	This is a workaround for problems in iobuf's stupid fd cache.
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Ditto.
+	* verify.c (verify_files): Ditto.
+
+2006-07-26  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_card_key_with_backup): Initialize sk_{un}protected.
+
+	* import.c (import): Initialize KEYBLOCK.
+
+	* pkclist.c (edit_ownertrust): Intialize trust to avoid gcc
+	warning.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_comment): Cap comments at 65k.
+	(parse_gpg_control): Skip too large control packets.
+
+2006-06-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs, algo_available):
+	Pass a union for preference hints rather than doing void * games.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Use it here.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): When signing with multiple DSA keys, one
+	being DSA1 and one being DSA2 and encrypting at the same time, if
+	the recipient preferences give a hash that can work with the DSA2
+	key, then allow the DSA1 key to be promoted rather than giving up
+	and using hash_for().
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): Automatically enable DSA2 mode when
+	handling a key that clearly isn't DSA1 (i.e. q!=160).
+
+2006-06-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* import.c (check_prefs_warning): Fix change for better
+	translatability.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_writekey): Fixed computation of memmove
+	length.  This led to garbled keys if E was larger than one byte.
+	Thanks to Achim Pietig for hinting at the garbled E.
+
+2006-06-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (reopen_std) [HAVE_W32_SYSTEM]: Do not use it.
+
+2006-06-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main), keygen.c (keygen_upd_std_prefs,
+	keygen_add_std_prefs, proc_parameter_file): Add
+	--default-keyserver-url to specify a keyserver URL at key
+	generation time, and "Keyserver:" keyword for doing the same
+	through a batch file.
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Accept a truncated hash even for DSA1 keys (be
+	liberal in what you accept, etc).
+
+2006-06-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Add a flag (from_sk) so we don't check
+	prefs on an autoconverted public key.  The check should only
+	happen on the sk side.  Noted by Dirk Traulsen.
+
+2006-06-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_card_key): Add optional argument to return a
+	pointer (not a copy) of the stub secret key for the secret key we
+	just generated on the card.
+	(generate_card_subkeypair): Use it here so that the signing key on
+	the card can use the card to generate the 0x19 backsig on the
+	primary key.  Noted by Janko Heilgeist and Jonas Oberg.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Cap the user ID size at 2048
+	bytes.  This prevents a memory allocation attack with a very large
+	user ID.  A very large packet length could even cause the
+	allocation (a u32) to wrap around to a small number.  Noted by
+	Evgeny Legerov on full-disclosure.
+
+2006-05-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_dsa): Allow generating DSA2 keys
+	(allow specifying sizes > 1024 when --enable-dsa2 is set).  The
+	size of q is set automatically based on the key size.
+	(ask_keysize, generate_keypair): Ask for DSA size when
+	--enable-dsa2 is set.
+
+2006-05-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Fix bug with a temporary directory on
+	Win32 that is over 256 bytes long.  Noted by Israel G. Lugo.
+
+2006-05-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (reopen_std): New function to reopen fd 0, 1, or 2 if we
+	are called with them closed.  This is to protect our
+	keyring/trustdb files from corruption if they get attached to one
+	of the standard fds.  Print a warning if possible that this has
+	happened, and fail completely if we cannot reopen (should never
+	happen).
+	(main): Call it here.
+
+2006-05-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_signature),
+	build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig), getkey.c
+	(fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey),
+	keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Fix meaning of key expiration
+	and sig expiration subpackets - zero means "never expire"
+	according to 2440, not "expire instantly".
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname), import.c (import_one): Fix key
+	selection problem when auto-key-locate returns a list of keys, not
+	all of which are usable (revoked, expired, etc).  Noted by Simon
+	Josefsson.
+
+2006-04-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (direct_uri_map): New.
+	(keyserver_spawn): Used here to add "_uri" to certain gpgkeys_xxx
+	helpers when the meaning is different if a path is provided
+	(i.e. ldap).
+	(keyserver_import_cert): Show warning if there is a CERT
+	fingerprint, but no --keyserver set.
+
+2006-04-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c: Fix build problem with platforms that stick libcurl
+	in a place not in the regular include search path.
+
+2006-04-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main): Add --enable-dsa2 and --disable-dsa2.
+	Defaults to disable.
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): If --enable-dsa2 is set, we're
+	allowed to truncate hashes to fit DSA keys.
+
+	* sign.c (match_dsa_hash): New.  Return the best match hash for a
+	given q size.
+	(do_sign, hash_for, sign_file): When signing with a DSA key, if it
+	has q==160, assume it is an old DSA key and don't allow truncation
+	unless --enable-dsa2 is also set.  q!=160 always allows truncation
+	since they must be DSA2 keys.
+	(make_keysig_packet): If the user doesn't specify a
+	--cert-digest-algo, use match_dsa_hash to pick the best hash for
+	key signatures.
+
+2006-04-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (print_mds), armor.c (armor_filter, parse_hash_header):
+	Add SHA-224.
+
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet), encode.c (encode_simple):
+	Factor common literal packet setup code from here, to...
+
+	* main.h, plaintext.c (setup_plaintext_name): Here. New. Make sure
+	the literal packet filename field is UTF-8 encoded.
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main): Make sure --set-filename is UTF-8
+	encoded and note when filenames are already UTF-8.
+
+2006-04-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_backsign): Give some more verbose errors when we
+	have no need to backsign.
+
+2006-04-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel, photoid.c (get_default_photo_command): Find an
+	image viewer at runtime.  Seems FC5 doesn't have xloadimage.
+
+2006-04-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Fix dupe-removal code.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_backsign): Allow backsigning even if the secret
+	subkey doesn't have a binding signature.
+
+	* armor.c (radix64_read): Don't report EOF when reading only a pad
+	(=) character.  The EOF actually starts after the pad.
+
+	* gpg.c (main): Make --export, --send-keys, --recv-keys,
+	--refresh-keys, and --fetch-keys follow their arguments from left
+	to right.  Suggested by Peter Palfrader.
+
+2006-04-08  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Print ring trust value only if not empty
+	and --with-colons has been given.
+
+2006-04-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (user_id_not_found_utf8): New.
+	(get_primary_uid, get_user_id): Use it.  Fixes Debian bug #205028
+	in the right way.
+
+2006-04-03  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* import.c (check_prefs_warning): Merged strings for better
+	translation.
+
+	* gpg.c (main) [__GLIBC__]: Default to libpcsclite.so.1.
+
+	* status.h, status.c (STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING): New.  Suggested by
+	Daiki Ueno.
+	* textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Issue new status code.
+	* sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Ditto.
+
+2006-03-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Fix missing auto_key_retrieve
+	unlock.  Fix strings to not start with a capital letter as per
+	convention.
+
+2006-03-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, seskey.c (encode_md_value): Modify to allow a q size
+	greater than 160 bits as per DSA2.  This will allow us to verify
+	and issue DSA2 signatures for some backwards compatibility once we
+	start generating DSA2 keys.	
+	* sign.c (do_sign), sig-check.c (do_check): Change all callers.
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Enforce the 160-bit check for new signatures
+	here since encode_md_value can handle non-160-bit digests now.
+	This will need to come out once the standard for DSA2 is firmed
+	up.
+
+2006-03-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* openfile.c (overwrite_filep): Fix small cpr issue.  Noted by
+	Daiki Ueno.
+
+2006-03-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Silently strip out duplicates
+	rather than causing an error.
+
+2006-03-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Changed warning URL to include faq.
+	* misc.c (idea_cipher_warn): Ditto.
+
+2006-03-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (get_pka_address): Fix bug introduced as part of
+	sig_to_notation conversion.  Noted by Peter Palfradrer.
+
+2006-03-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (agent_scd_pksign): Allow the use of ripemd-160 along
+	with scdaemon.
+
+2006-03-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_import_cert): Handle the IPGP CERT type
+	for both the fingerprint alone, and fingerprint+URL cases.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Minor cleanup.
+
+2006-03-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_pka): Use
+	the same API as the other auto-key-locate fetchers.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Use the fingerprint of the key
+	that we actually fetched.  This helps prevent problems where the
+	key that we fetched doesn't have the same name that we used to
+	fetch it.  In the case of CERT and PKA, this is an actual security
+	requirement as the URL might point to a key put in by an attacker.
+	By forcing the use of the fingerprint, we won't use the attacker's
+	key here.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn,
+	keyserver_work, keyserver_import_cert, keyserver_import_name,
+	keyserver_import_ldap): Pass fingerprint info through.
+
+	* main.h, import.c (import_one): Optionally return the fingerprint
+	of the key being imported.
+	(import_keys_internal, import_keys_stream, import): Change all
+	callers.
+
+2006-03-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Print the backsig warning when
+	there is no backsig present.  Give a URL for more information.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_backsign): Small tweak to work properly with
+	keys originally generated with older GnuPGs that included comments
+	in the secret keys.
+
+2006-03-10  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (get_manufacturer): Added Vendor 3
+
+2006-03-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (string_to_notation): Add ability to indicate a
+	notation to be deleted with a '-' prefix.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_set_notation): Use it here to allow deleting a
+	notation marked with '-'.  This works with either "-notation" or
+	"-notation=value".
+
+2006-03-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_set_notation): New function to set notations on
+	self-signatures.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it here.
+	(tty_print_notations): Helper.
+	(show_prefs): Show notations in "showpref".
+
+	* mainproc.c (get_pka_address)
+	* keylist.c (show_notation): Remove
+	duplicate code by using notation functions.
+
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (sig_to_notation)
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_notations): Provide printable text for
+	non-human-readable notation values.
+	
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (sig_to_notation)
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_notations): Tweak to handle non-human-readable
+	notation values.
+
+	* options.h, sign.c (mk_notation_policy_etc)
+	* gpg.c (add_notation_data): Use it here for the various notation
+	commands.
+
+	* packet.h, main.h, keygen.c (keygen_add_notations)
+	* build-packet.c (string_to_notation, sig_to_notation)
+	(free_notation): New "one stop shopping" functions to handle
+	notations and start removing some code duplication.
+
+2006-03-08  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Use log_error for standalone revocations.
+
+2006-03-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), gpg.c (main):
+	pka-lookups, not pka-lookup.
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main), keyedit.c [cmds], sig-check.c
+	(signature_check2): Rename "backsign" to "cross-certify" as a more
+	accurate name.
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main, parse_trust_model), pkclist.c
+	(check_signatures_trust), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print,
+	pka_uri_from_sig), trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Some tweaks to PKA so
+	that it is a verify-option now.
+
+2006-03-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_signature_packets): Return any_sig_seen to caller.
+	(check_sig_and_print): Option to partly allow the old behaviour.
+	* gpg.c: New option --allow-multisig-verification.
+
+2006-03-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Don't use MD5 for a RSA_S key as
+	that is not a PGP 2.x algorithm.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_compressed): "Uncompressed" is not a valid
+	compression algorithm.
+
+2006-03-06  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Made the composition test more
+	tight.  This is due to another bug report by Tavis Ormandy.
+	(add_onepass_sig): Simplified.
+
+2006-03-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Replace assert by explict error
+	conflict message.  Reported by Tavis Ormandy.
+
+2006-03-02  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (check_card_serialno): Don't ask in batch mode.
+
+2006-03-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Error if the user selects
+	"cert" or "pka" when those features are disabled.
+
+	* misc.c (has_invalid_email_chars): Fix some C syntax that broke
+	the compilers on SGI IRIX MIPS and Compaq/DEC OSF/1 Alpha.  Noted
+	by Nelson H. F. Beebe.
+
+2006-02-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Document auto-key-locate and give a pointer to
+	Simon Josefsson's page for CERT.
+
+2006-02-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (release_akl), gpg.c (main): Add
+	--no-auto-key-locate.
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main): Keep track of each keyserver registered
+	so we can match on them later.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (cmp_keyserver_spec,
+	keyserver_match), gpgv.c: New.  Find a keyserver that matches ours
+	and return its spec.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Use it here to get the
+	per-keyserver options from an earlier keyserver.
+
+2006-02-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Only change max_cert if
+	it is used.
+
+	* options.c, gpg.c (main), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): No
+	special treatment of include-revoked, include-subkeys, and
+	try-dns-srv.  These are keyserver features, and GPG shouldn't get
+	involved here.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri, add_canonical_option): Always
+	append options to the list, as ordering may be significant to the
+	user.
+
+	* gpg.c (add_notation_data): Fix reversed logic for isascii check
+	when adding notations.  Noted by Christian Biere.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (add_canonical_option): New.
+	(parse_keyserver_options): Moved from here.
+	(parse_keyserver_uri): Use it here so each keyserver can have some
+	private options in addition to the main keyserver-options
+	(e.g. per-keyserver auth).
+
+2006-02-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c
+	(keyserver_import_name), getkey.c (free_akl,
+	parse_auto_key_locate, get_pubkey_byname): The obvious next step:
+	allow arbitrary keyservers in the auto-key-locate list.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Remove
+	auto-cert-retrieve as it is no longer meaningful.  Add
+	max-cert-size to allow users to pick a max key size retrieved via
+	CERT.
+
+	* options.h, gpg.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print),
+	keyserver.c (keyserver_opts): Rename auto-pka-retrieve to
+	honor-pka-record to be consistent with honor-keyserver-url.
+
+	* options.h, keydb.h, g10.c (main), getkey.c
+	(parse_auto_key_locate): Parse a list of key access methods.
+	(get_pubkey_byname): Walk the list here to try and retrieve keys
+	we don't have locally.
+
+2006-02-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Fix minor security problem with
+	PKA when importing at -r time.  The URL in the PKA record may
+	point to a key put in by an attacker.  Fix is to use the
+	fingerprint from the PKA record as the recipient.  This ensures
+	that the PKA record is followed.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_pka): Return
+	the fingerprint we requested.
+
+	* gpgv.c: Stub keyserver_import_ldap.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_ldap):
+	Import using the PGP Universal trick of asking
+	ldap://keys.(maildomain) for the key.
+
+2006-02-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Include the scheme in the uri
+	even when we've assumed "hkp" when there was no scheme.
+
+2006-02-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* apdu.c (open_pcsc_reader): As a precaution set LIST to NULL
+	after free.
+
+2006-02-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures): Print warning also for NO_DATA.
+
+	* mainproc.c (struct mainproc_context): New field any_sig_seen.
+	(add_signature): Set it.
+	(proc_signature_packets): Test and return NO_DATA.
+
+2006-02-09  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (main) <oLockNever>: Disable random locking.
+
+2006-02-06  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h: Updated from GnuPG 1.9.  Changes:
+	* ccid-driver.h (CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_KEYPAD): New.
+	* ccid-driver.c (send_escape_cmd): New args RESULT, RESULTLEN and
+	RESULTMAX.  Changed all callers.
+	(ccid_transceive_escape): New.
+	* ccid-driver.c (special_transport): New
+	(ccid_open_reader, do_close_reader, ccid_shutdown_reader)
+	(bulk_out, bulk_in): Add support for CardMan 4040 reader.
+	* ccid-driver.c (scan_or_find_devices): Factored most code out to
+	(scan_or_find_usb_device): .. new.
+	(make_reader_id): Fixed vendor mask.
+
+2006-01-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): If there is a path present,
+	set the direct_uri flag so the right keyserver helper is run.
+
+2006-01-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Include the EXEEXT so we can find
+	keyserver helpers on systems that use extensions.
+
+	* misc.c (path_access) [HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS]: Do the right thing
+	with drive letter systems.
+
+2006-01-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, passphrase.c (next_to_last_passphrase): New.  "Touch" a
+	passphrase as if it was used (move from next_pw to last_pw).
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Use it here to handle the case
+	where a passphrase happens to be correct for a secret key, but yet
+	that key isn't the anonymous recipient (i.e. the secret key could
+	be decrypted, but not the session key).  This also handles the
+	case where a secret key is located on a card and a secret key with
+	no passphrase.  Note this does not fix bug 594 (anonymous
+	recipients on smartcard do not work) - it just prevents the
+	anonymous search from stopping when the card is encountered.
+
+2006-01-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): Fix problem when more than one
+	key in a refresh batch has a preferred keyserver set.  Noted by
+	Nicolas Rachinsky.
+
+2006-01-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), keyserver.c
+	(keyserver_import_pka), card-util.c (fetch_url): Always require a
+	scheme:// for keyserver URLs except when used as part of the
+	--keyserver command for backwards compatibility.
+
+	* sign.c (write_signature_packets): Lost a digest_algo line.
+
+	* sign.c (hash_for): Add code to detect if the sk lives on a smart
+	card.  If it does, only allow 160-bit hashes, a la DSA.  This
+	involves passing the *sk in, so change all callers.  This is
+	correct for today, given the current 160-bit q in DSA, and the
+	current SHA-1/RIPEMD160 support in the openpgp card.  It will
+	almost certainly need changing down the road.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_sign): Give user error if hash algorithm is
+	not supported by the card.
+
+2005-12-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_import_pka): New.  Moved from
+	getkey.c:get_pubkey_byname which was getting crowded.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_import_cert): Import a key found in DNS
+	via CERT records.  Can handle both the PGP (actual key) and IPGP
+	(URL) CERT types.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Call them both here.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Add
+	"auto-cert-retrieve" option with optional max size argument.
+
+	* gpgv.c: Stubs.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn,
+	keyserver_work, keygerver_getname): New keyserver_getname function
+	to fetch keys by name.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Call it here to enable locating
+	keys by full mailbox from a keyserver a la PKA.  Try PKA first,
+	though, as it is likely to be faster.
+
+2005-12-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c: New option --allow-pka-lookup.
+	(parse_trust_model): Add "+pka" variants.
+	(main): Make KEYSERVER_AUTO_PKA_RETRIEVE teh default.
+	* options.h (opt): New fields PKA_TRUST_INCREASE and
+	ALLOW_PKA_LOOKUP.
+	* status.h (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD, STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD): New.
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Increase trust due to valid
+	PKA only if that new option has been set.  Issue new status lines.
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Print info if this option is active.
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Honor allow-pka-lookup.
+	* mainproc.c (pka_uri_from_sig): Ditto.
+	
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Print no "ultimately trusted keys
+	found" only in non-quiet mode.
+
+2005-12-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): All primary keys can certify.
+
+2005-12-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (main): Restore convert-sk-to-pk as programs rely on it.
+
+	* keyid.c (usagestr_from_pk): Remove special PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT
+	flag.  It's no longer needed.
+
+2005-12-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (main): Don't default to import-options convert-sk-to-pk.
+	It causes confusing warning messages when importing a PGP-exported
+	key that contains a secret key without selfsigs followed by the
+	public key.
+
+2005-12-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_fetch): Switch on fast-import before we
+	--fetch-keys so we don't rebuild the trustdb after each fetch.
+
+2005-12-08  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c (main): Check for DBCS lead byte when converting the
+	homedir.  By Kazuyoshi Kakihara. Fixes PR561.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_fetch): Made strings translatable.
+
+2005-12-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (curl_cant_handle, keyserver_spawn)
+	(keyserver_fetch): Set a flag to indicate that we're doing a direct
+	URI fetch so we can differentiate between a keyserver operation
+	and a URI fetch for protocols like LDAP that can do either.
+
+2005-12-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Don't print "searching for key
+	00000000" when fetching a URI.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_fetch): New.  Fetch
+	an arbitrary URI using the keyserver helpers.
+
+	* gpg.c (main): Call it from here for --fetch-keys.
+
+2005-12-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Add NOTREACHED comment.
+
+2005-11-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (print_revokers): New.  Print the "rvk"
+	designated revoker record.  Moved from
+	keyedit.c:show_key_with_all_names_colon.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use it here ...
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): ... and here.
+
+2005-11-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_secret_key): Copy secret key into secure
+	memory since we may unprotect it.
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Add local
+	user support so users can use -u with --desig-revoke.  This
+	bypasses the interactive walk over the revocation keys.
+
+2005-11-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_clean): Simplify clean options to
+	just "clean", and add "minimize".
+
+	* import.c (parse_import_options): Make help text match the export
+	versions of the options.
+
+	* options.h, export.c (parse_export_options, do_export_stream):
+	Reduce clean options to two: clean and minimize.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clean_one_uid): New function that joins
+	uid and sig cleaning into one for a simple API outside trustdb.
+
+2005-11-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (parse_header_line): A fussy bit of 2440: header lines
+	are delimited with a colon-space pair.  Therefore a line such as
+	"Comment: " (with a trailing space) is actually legal, albeit not
+	particularly useful.
+
+2005-11-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clean_key): New function to handle key
+	cleaning from one convenient place.
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options,
+	clean_sigs_from_all_uids, import_one): Reduce clean options to
+	two: clean and minimize.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (setup_user_id): Remove.
+	(parse_user_id, parse_attribute): Just use xmalloc_clear instead.
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uid_from_key, clean_uids_from_key):
+	Significantly simpler implementation.
+
+2005-11-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_clean_sigs_from_uids): Add
+	"minimize" command.
+
+	* packet.h, keyedit.c (menu_clean_uids_from_key), trustdb.c
+	(clean_uids_from_key): Fix display bug where sigs cleaned for
+	other reasons caused a uid to appear as if it had been compacted.
+
+	* packet.h: Move some flags to a bitfield.  Change all callers.
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options,
+	clean_sigs_from_all_uids, import_one): Add import-minimal option.
+	Similar to export-minimal, except it works on the way in.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clean_sigs_from_uid): Add flag to remove
+	all non-selfsigs from key during cleaning.  Change all callers.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Use it here for export-minimal so
+	we don't need additional minimize code in the export path.
+
+2005-11-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Add a section for --encrypt-to.  This is Debian
+	bug 336211 by Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña.
+
+2005-11-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Include @LIBUSB_CPPFLAGS@ in our CPPFLAGS.
+	Strictly speaking this should be only in gpg_CPPFLAGS, but then we
+	have to compile everything twice for gpg and gpgv.
+
+	* apdu.c (open_pcsc_reader): Fix double free.
+
+	* gpg.c (main) [__APPLE__]: Default the PCSC driver to the OS X
+	location.  Suggested by Patty A. Hardy.
+
+2005-11-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_sigs_from_uid): Include sigs from unavailable
+	keys in the sigs that are cleaned.  Suggested by Dirk Traulsen and
+	many others.
+
+2005-11-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Do collapse_uids() before we do any
+	cleaning so keyserver mangled keys with doubled user IDs can be
+	properly cleaned - possibly sigs on the different user IDs cancel
+	each other out.
+
+	* import.c (parse_import_options), export.c
+	(parse_export_options): List "xxx-clean" before the longer options
+	so we don't end up with a partial match on the longer options.
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key): Return proper number of cleaned
+	user IDs.  Don't count user IDs as cleaned unless we actually
+	delete something.
+
+2005-10-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker), getkey.c (finish_lookup): Fix
+	problem with adding a cert-only designated revoker.  Code was
+	looking for a key with sign ability, and not cert ability.  Noted
+	by Timo Schulz.
+
+2005-10-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpg.c [__CYGWIN__]: Set default driver to winscard.dll.
+
+	* apdu.c, apdu.h: Updated from gnupg 1.9.  Changes are:
+	* apdu.c [__CYGWIN__]: Make cygwin environment similar to _WIN32.
+	Suggested by John P. Clizbe.
+	* apdu.h (SW_HOST_NO_KEYPAD): New.
+	* apdu.c (host_sw_string): Support new code. 
+	(reader_table_s): New field CHECK_KEYPAD.
+	(new_reader_slot, open_ct_reader, open_pcsc_reader) 
+	(open_ccid_reader, open_rapdu_reader): Initialize it.
+	(check_ccid_keypad): New.
+	(apdu_check_keypad): New.
+	(apdu_send_le): Factored all code out to ...
+	(send_le): .. new.  Takes an additional arg; changed all callers
+	of the orginal function to use this one with a NULL for the new
+	arg.
+	(apdu_send_simple_kp): New.
+	(ct_send_apdu, pcsc_send_apdu, my_rapdu_send_apdu) 
+	(send_apdu_ccid): New arg PININFO.
+	(send_apdu_ccid): Use the new arg.
+
+2005-10-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Default key and subkey usage
+	flags to algo capabilities if parameter file doesn't specify them.
+	Noted by Timo Schulz.
+
+2005-10-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Fixed prompt for repeated PIN.  Return
+	G10ERR_CANCELED and not just -1.
+	(status_sc_op_failure): New.  Use it where we issue that status.
+	(pin_cb): Append serial number to the need-pin status message.
+	(agent_scd_change_pin): Add arg SERIALNO.  Changed all callers.
+	(agent_scd_writekey): Ditto.
+	(agent_scd_setattr): Ditto.
+	(agent_scd_genkey): Ditto.
+	(agent_scd_checkpin): Pass serialno to the pin_cb.
+
+	* keygen.c (parse_expire_string): Allow setting the expire
+	interval using a "seconds=<n>" syntax.  This is useful for
+	debugging.
+
+2005-10-17  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Factored some code out to ...
+	(skip_subkey_p): .. new.
+	(subkey_in_list_p, release_subkey_list): New.
+	(new_subkey_list_item): New. 
+	(do_export_stream): Export exactly specified subkeys into one
+	keyblock.
+
+2005-10-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_backsign): New "backsign" command
+	to add 0x19 backsigs to old keys that don't have them.
+
+	* misc.c (parse_options): Fix build warning.
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (make_backsig): Make public.
+
+2005-10-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey), gpg.c (main),
+	sig-check.c (signature_check2): Add --require-backsigs and
+	--no-require-backsigs.  Currently defaults to
+	--no-require-backsigs.
+
+2005-10-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey), sig-check.c
+	(signature_check2), keygen.c (make_backsig): Did some backsig
+	interop testing with the PGP folks.  All is well, so I'm turning
+	generation of backsigs on for new keys.  Checking for backsigs on
+	verification is still off.
+
+2005-10-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c: Renamed to ..
+	* gpg.c: ..this.
+	* Makefile.am: Adjusted accordingly.
+
+2005-09-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Don't print an empty file
+	warning if the file is actually too large.
+	* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Ditto.
+	* progress.c (handle_progress): Adjusted for iobuf_get_filelength
+	change.
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): Ditto.
+
+2005-09-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Take care of a canceled passphrase
+	prompt.
+
+2005-09-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (reorder_keyblock, do_reorder_keyblock): Reorder
+	attribute IDs as well as regular text IDs.
+
+	* plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile): Use make_filename() on
+	filename so tilde expansion works.
+
+2005-09-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (parse_options): Add the ability to have help
+	strings in xxx-options commands.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_opts), import.c (parse_import_options),
+	export.c (parse_export_options), g10.c (parse_list_options, main):
+	Add help strings to xxx-options.
+
+2005-09-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_names): Moved name display code out from
+	show_key_with_all_names.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it here for pref and showpref so they can
+	show only the selected user ID.  Suggested by Timo Schulz.
+
+2005-09-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.h (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE): New.
+
+	* apdu.c, apdu.h, iso7816.c, iso7816.h
+	* ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h: Updated from GnuPG 1.9 source.
+	Changes are:
+	* iso7816.c (iso7816_select_path): New.
+	* iso7816.c (iso7816_read_binary): Use Le=0 when reading all
+	data.  Handle 6C00 error and take 6B00 as indication for EOF.
+	* apdu.h (SW_EXACT_LENGTH_P): New.
+	* apdu.c (new_reader_slot, reset_pcsc_reader, pcsc_get_status) 
+	(open_pcsc_reader): Set new reader state IS_T0.
+	(apdu_send_le): When doing T=0 make sure not to send Lc and Le.
+	Problem reported by Carl Meijer.
+	(apdu_send_direct): Initialize RESULTLEN.
+
+	* misc.c (parse_options): Allow meta option "help" to list all
+	options and to exit the program.
+
+2005-09-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt, parse_signature,
+	parse_attribute_subpkts): Make a number of warnings verbose items.
+	These fire on many slightly mangled keys in the field, so the
+	warning is becoming burdensome.
+
+2005-09-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.h, photoid.c (generate_photo_id): Allow passing in a
+	suggested filename.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_adduid): Call it here so "addphoto
+	filename" works.
+
+2005-08-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): Enable readline completion and
+	tilde expansion for the JPEG prompt.
+
+2005-08-30  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Print a warning and not an error in
+	case of a missing agent.  Should fix Debian bug #325578.
+
+2005-08-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Default to allowing CERT for
+	signing algorithms.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't request a signing key to make a
+	certification.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_add_key_flags): Force the certify flag on for all
+	primary keys, as the spec requires primary keys must be able to
+	certify (if nothing else, which key is going to issue the user ID
+	signature?)
+	(print_key_flags): Show certify flag.
+	(ask_key_flags, ask_algo): Don't allow setting the C flag for
+	subkeys.
+	
+	* keyid.c (usagestr_from_pk), getkey.c (parse_key_usage):
+	Distinguish between a sign/certify key and a certify-only key.
+
+	* keyedit.c (ask_revoke_sig): Add a revsig --with-colons mode.
+	Suggested by Michael Schierl.
+
+2005-08-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: No need to link with curl any longer.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (path_access): New.  Same as access() but does a
+	PATH search like execlp.
+
+	* keyserver.c (curl_can_handle): Removed.  Replaced by...
+	(curl_cant_handle): We are now relying on curl as the handler of
+	last resort.  This is necessary because PGP LDAP and curl LDAP are
+	apples and oranges.
+	(keyserver_typemap): Only test for ldap and ldaps.
+	(keyserver_spawn): If a given handler is unusable (as determined
+	by path_access()) then try gpgkeys_curl.
+
+	* exec.h, exec.c (make_tempdir, expand_args, exec_write,
+	exec_read): Minor cleanup to use bitfield flags instead of a bunch
+	of integers.
+
+2005-08-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add aliases sign-with->local-user and
+	user->recipient to make switching from PGP command line to GPG
+	easier.
+
+2005-08-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Remove the surfnet LDAP keyserver from the list of
+	samples since it is being shut down.
+
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Disable the '.' and '+' search
+	modes since they aren't supported yet.
+
+2005-08-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main), passphrase.c (set_passphrase_from_string): New
+	--passphrase command line option.  Only useful in very special
+	circumstances.
+
+2005-08-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c (keyserver_import_fprint): New stub.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Moved email checking code out to ..
+	* misc.c (is_valid_mailbox): .. new.
+	* mainproc.c (get_pka_address): Use it here.
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Add falback to auto-retrieve a key
+	via the PKA mechanism.
+
+	* options.h (KEYSERVER_AUTO_PKA_RETRIEVE): New.
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_opts): Ditto.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use it here to retrieve keys
+	from a PKA DNS record.
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Add comments to this function;
+	re-indented it.
+
+2005-08-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Sanity check items in keygen
+	batch file.  Noted by Michael Schierl.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Don't allow ownertrust level 0.
+	Noted by Michael Schierl.
+
+	* keygen.c (write_keyblock): Don't try and build deleted kbnodes
+	since we start our tree with one.
+
+2005-08-04  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Skip on-card keys when only subkeys
+	are to be exported.  It does not make sense to replace the on-card
+	key stub by a no-key stub.
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Check for non-online keys.
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (is_secret_key_protected): Return -3 for
+	non-online key stubs.  The old code assumes that a protection
+	algorithm is still set but in some cases this one is 0 and thus it
+	won't be possible to decide whether it is unprotected or
+	protected.
+
+2005-07-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am (other_libs): Add SRVLIBS.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical_notation): We know about
+	pka-address@gnupg.org.
+	* packet.h (PKT_signature): New fields PKA_INFO and PKA_TRIED. 
+	(pka_info_t): New.
+	* free-packet.c (cp_pka_info): New.
+	(free_seckey_enc, copy_signature): Support new fields.
+	* mainproc.c (get_pka_address, pka_uri_from_sig): New.
+	(check_sig_and_print): Try to get the keyserver from the PKA
+	record.
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Adjust the trust based on
+	the PKA.
+	* gpgv.c (parse_keyserver_uri): New stub.
+
+	* keygen.c (has_invalid_email_chars): Moved to ..
+	* misc.c (has_invalid_email_chars): .. here and made global.
+
+2005-07-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Make two strings translatable.
+
+2005-07-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_typemap): Special-case LDAP since curl
+	will report that it can handle it, and we don't want it to.
+
+2005-07-26  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Make sure to release the
+	saved codeset.
+	(agent_open): Add arg ORIG_CODESET and switch back to it in case
+	of error.  Changed all callers.
+
+2005-07-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't prompt for setting signature expiry
+	to match key expiry unless --ask-cert-expire is set.  Suggested by
+	Peter Palfrader.
+
+2005-07-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --exit-on-status-write-error.
+	* status.c (write_status_text): Make use of this option.
+
+2005-07-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Removed option --no-interactive-selection.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use --interactive to enable the uid
+	walking when signing a key with no uids specified to sign.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Fix silly typo.  Noted by Greg
+	Sabino Mullane.
+
+2005-07-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile): Disable FD caching for created files.
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Disable FD caching for
+	input files.
+	* verify.c (verify_one_file): Ditto.
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Ditto. This is bug #479.
+
+	* misc.c (get_libexecdir) [W32]: Changed to return the value of
+	program used to create the process.
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn) [DISABLE_KEYSERVER_PATH]: Don't
+	change the exec-path at all.
+
+2005-07-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (curl_can_handle): New.  Do a runtime check against
+	libcurl to see if it can handle a particular protocol.
+	(keyserver_typemap): Call it here.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Pull in libcurl for curl_version_info() if used.
+
+2005-07-19  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --limit-card-insert-tries.
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Use it.
+
+	* export.c (parse_export_options): New option
+	export-reset-subkey-passwd.
+	(do_export_stream): Implement it.
+
+	* misc.c (get_libexecdir): New.
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use it
+
+2005-07-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* tdbio.c (open_db): Check for EROFS.  Suggested by Bryce Nichols.
+
+2005-07-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key): Don't keep a valid selfsig
+	around when compacting a uid.  There is no reason to make an
+	attacker's job easier - this way they only have a revocation which
+	is useless in bringing the uid back.
+
+	* keydb.h, kbnode.c (undelete_kbnode): Removed.  No longer needed.
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Allow a uid revocation to be enough to
+	allow importing a particular uid (no self sig needed).  This
+	allows importing compacted uids.
+
+2005-06-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (save_unprotected_key_to_card): Better fix for gcc4
+	warning.
+
+2005-06-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-interactive-selection.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use it.
+
+2005-06-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Use log_info for messages
+	about missing timestamp or keyid.  In case we don't use that key
+	there won't be no further error and thus gpg does not need to
+	return with an error.
+
+2005-06-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (save_unprotected_key_to_card): Fix gcc4 warning.
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options, import_one): Add
+	import-clean-uids option to automatically compact unusable uids
+	when importing.  Like import-clean-sigs, this may nodify the local
+	keyring.
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key): Only allow selfsigs to be a
+	candidate for re-inclusion.
+
+2005-06-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options,
+	clean_sigs_from_all_uids, import_one): Add import-clean-sigs
+	option to automatically clean a key when importing.  Note that
+	when importing a key that is already on the local keyring, the
+	clean applies to the merged key - i.e. existing superceded or
+	invalid signatures are removed.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey): Make sure
+	that even after keys may be merged together, we only have one
+	chosen selfsig.
+
+2005-06-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options, delete_inv_parts):
+	import-unusable-sigs is now a noop.
+
+	* options.h, export.c (do_export_stream), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu,
+	menu_clean_subkeys_from_key), trustdb.h, trustdb.c
+	(clean_subkeys_from_key): Remove subkey cleaning function.  It is
+	of very limited usefulness since it cannot be used on any subkey
+	that can sign, and can only affect multiple selfsigs on
+	encryption-only subkeys.
+
+	* keydb.h, kbnode.c (undelete_kbnode): New function to undelete a
+	kbnode.
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key): Further tweak the algorithm so
+	that the last good selfsig is kept when the chosen selfsig is a
+	revocation.
+
+2005-06-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key), keyedit.c
+	(menu_clean_uids_from_key): Tweak algorithm to preserve the last
+	selfsig which helps prevent uid resurrections.
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main): Handle both
+	expired and revoked uids in fixup_uidnode().  No need to special
+	case in merge_selfsigs_main().  This also means that an expired
+	uid will have its selfsig tagged with chosen_selfsig.
+
+2005-06-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), export.c (parse_export_options,
+	do_export_stream): Add export-options export-clean-sigs,
+	export-clean-uids, export-clean-subkeys, and export-clean which is
+	all of the above.  Export-minimal is the same except it also
+	removes all non-selfsigs.  export-unusable-sigs is now a noop.
+
+2005-06-06  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Emit new CARDCTRL status 5 for no reader
+	available.
+
+2005-06-02  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_writekey): Typo fix.
+
+	* status.c, status.h: Removed STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE_PIN.
+
+2005-06-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* signal.c [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Fix unused function warnings on
+	mingw32.  Noted by Joe Vender.
+
+	* passphrase.c [_WIN32]: Remove unused variables.
+
+2005-05-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_clean_uids_from_key,
+	menu_clean_subkeys_from_key), trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key,
+	clean_subkeys_from_key): Fix mingw32 build warnings.  Noted by Joe
+	Vender.
+
+2005-05-31  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keydb.h [!ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT]: Define dummy types.
+
+	* cardglue.c (assuan_strerror, assuan_transact): Dummy functions
+	if not build with agent support. 
+
+	* armor.c (check_input): Don't bail out on invalid header lines
+	unless in struict rfc2440 mode.  Suggested by Richard Patterson.
+
+2005-05-30  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* tlv.c: Add hack to compile without gpg-error.h.
+
+2005-05-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clean_subkeys_from_key): New.  Walk
+	through the subkeys on a key, and mark any that aren't usable for
+	deletion.  Note that a signing subkey is never marked for deletion
+	since these keys are still useful after expiration or revocation.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_clean_subkeys_from_key): New function to call
+	clean_subkeys_from_key() on a key.  Note that the strings here are
+	not marked for translation yet.  The UI is still in flux, and
+	there is no point in annoying the translators twice.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it here as part of the "clean" command.
+
+2005-05-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clean_uids_from_key): New.  Walk through
+	the user IDs on a key, and mark any that aren't valid for
+	deletion.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_clean_uids_from_key): New function to call
+	clean_uids_from_key() on a key.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it from here as part of the "clean" command.
+
+2005-05-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Default {export|import}-unusable-sigs to off until
+	the "clean" UI can be finished.
+
+2005-05-24  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase): Unescape the description string.
+	* cardglue.c (unescape_status_string): Removed.  Changed all
+	caller to use ...
+	* misc.c (unescape_percent_string): New.
+
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Check number of at-signs.
+
+2005-05-23  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c, app-common.h: Again updated from gnupg 1.9 CVS.
+
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Check USE_AGENT.
+	(agent_scd_checkpin): Implemented Assuan part.
+	(agent_scd_change_pin): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Option --debug-ccid-driver may now be given
+	several times increase the debug level.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (parse_ccid_descriptor): Mark SCR335 FW version
+	5.14 as good.
+	(do_close_reader): Never do a reset. The caller should instead
+	make sure that the reader has been closed properly.  The new retry
+	code in ccid_slot_status will make sure that the readersatrts up
+	fine even if the last process didn't closed the USB connection
+	properly.
+	(ccid_get_atr): For certain readers try switching to ISO mode.
+	Thanks to Ludovic Rousseau for this hint and the magic numbers.
+	(print_command_failed): New.
+	(bulk_in): Use it here. Add new arg NO_DEBUG.
+	(ccid_slot_status): Disabled debugging.
+
+2005-05-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (send_status_info): Make CTRL optional.
+	(agent_scd_writekey, inq_writekey_parms): New.
+	(agent_openpgp_storekey): Removed.
+	* cardglue.h: Add a few more error code mappings.
+	* keygen.c (copy_mpi): Removed.
+	(save_unprotected_key_to_card): Changed to use agent_scd_writekey.
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, tlv.c, tlv.h: Updated from newer
+	version in gnupg 1.9 CVS.
+
+2005-05-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_transceive): Arghhh.  The seqno is another
+	bit in the R-block than in the I block, this was wrong at one
+	place. Fixes bug #419 and hopefully several others.
+
+2005-05-19  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, tlv.c, tlv.h: Updated from newer
+	version in gnupg 1.9 CVS.
+
+2005-05-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Made global and add arg TRY.
+	(agent_close): Made global.
+
+	* app-common.h (app_t): Add a field to store the Assuan context.
+
+2005-05-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_comment): Removed.
+	(build_packet): Ignore comment packets.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Don't export comment packets any
+	longer.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Remove --sk-comments and
+	--no-sk-comments options, and replace with no-op.
+
+2005-05-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (write_selfsigs): Rename from write_selfsig.  Write the
+	same selfsig into both the pk and sk, so that someone importing
+	their sk (which will get an autoconvert to the pk) won't end up
+	with two selfsigs.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Call it from here.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical_notation): New.  Check for
+	particular notation tags that we will accept when critical.
+	Currently, that's only preferred-email-encoding@pgp.com, since we
+	know how to handle it (pass it through to a mail program).
+	(can_handle_critical): Call it from here.
+	(parse_one_sig_subpkt): Sanity check that notations are
+	well-formed in that the internal lengths add up to the size of the
+	subpacket.
+
+2005-05-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (do_close_reader): Don't do a reset before close.
+	Some folks reported that it makes the SCR335 hang less often.
+	Look at the source on how to re-enable it.
+
+2005-05-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (parse_expire_string, ask_expire_interval),
+	sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), g10.c
+	(main), keyedit.c (sign_uids): Use seconds rather than days
+	internally to calculate expiration.  We no longer need the
+	day-based code as we don't generate v3 keys.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Use
+	the default sig expire value when signing in batchmode.
+
+2005-05-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am, packet.h, main.h, comment.c: Remove comment.c.  We
+	don't use any of these functions any longer.
+
+	* keygen.c (start_tree): New function to "prime" a KBNODE list.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Use it here rather than creating and
+	deleting a comment packet.
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_elg, gen_dsa): Do not put public factors in secret
+	key as a comment.
+
+	* options.h, encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt), keygen.c
+	(do_create): Remove disabled comment packet code.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Add SHA256 and BZip2 to default
+	preferences.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add new --default-sig-expire and
+	--default-cert-expire options.  Suggested by Florian Weimer.
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (parse_expire_string, ask_expire_interval): Use
+	defaults passed in, or "0" to control what default expiration is.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file,
+	sign_symencrypt_file): Call them here, so that default expiration
+	is used when --ask-xxxxx-expire is off.
+
+2005-05-03  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Add new arg CACHEID.
+	Changed all callers.
+	(ask_passphrase): Add new arg CACHEID and use it in agent mode.
+	Changed all callers.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): New arg CACHEID.  Changed all callers.
+	* cardglue.c (format_cacheid): New.
+	(pin_cb): Compute a cache ID.
+	(agent_scd_pksign, agent_scd_pkdecrypt): Use it.
+	(agent_clear_pin_cache): New.
+	* card-util.c (change_pin): Clear the PIN cache.
+	(check_pin_for_key_operation): Ditto.
+
+2005-04-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Add flags for the
+	no-pubkey and chosen revocation cases.
+	(clean_uid): New function to clean a user ID of unusable (as
+	defined by mark_usable_uid_certs) certs.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_clean_uids): Call it here for new
+	"clean" command that removes unusable sigs from a key.
+
+	* trustdb.h, keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_select_uid_namehash):
+	Allow specifying user ID via the namehash from --with-colons
+	--fixed-list-mode --list-keys.  Suggested by Peter Palfrader.
+
+2005-04-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids, keyedit_menu): When the user requests to
+	sign a key without specifying which user IDs to sign, and declines
+	to sign all user IDs, walk through the set of user IDs and prompt
+	for which to sign.
+
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): There is no need to have an
+	extra check for a bad passphrase and/or unknown cipher algorithm
+	here.  We'll fail quite happily later, and usually with a better
+	error message to boot.
+
+2005-04-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Allow for hash
+	debugging.
+
+2005-04-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Free some memory.
+
+	* sign.c (hash_for): Comments.
+
+2005-04-11  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main, add_notation_data, add_policy_url)
+	(add_keyserver_url): Use isascii() to protect the isfoo macros and
+	to replace direct tests.  Possible problems noted by Christian
+	Biere.
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Ditto.
+
+2005-04-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Declare --pipemode deprecated.
+	* misc.c (deprecated_command): New.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_slot_status): Fixed debug messages.
+
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Add command "verify".  Enhanced admin
+	command to allow optional arguments "on", "off" and "verify".
+	(card_status): Print private DOs in colon mode.
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_check_pin): Add hack to allow verification of
+	CHV3.
+
+2005-04-01  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Explain the chosen order of
+	AES key sizes. 
+
+2005-04-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Properly handle SIG+LITERAL
+	(old-style PGP) signatures that use hashes other than SHA-1,
+	RIPEMD160, or MD5.
+
+2005-03-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.h, exec.c (set_exec_path): Remove some dead code and change
+	all callers.  We no longer need to append to $PATH.
+
+2005-03-31  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Dropped support for W32 - is was
+	never actually used.  Removed support for the old non-assuan
+	protocol; there has never been a matured implementation and
+	gpg-agent is now arround for quite some time.  Rewritten to make
+	use of the Assuan code from ../util.
+	(gpga_protocol_codes): Removed.
+	(readn): Removed.
+	(agent_close): Simplified for use with Assuan.
+	(agent_get_passphrase, passphrase_clear_cache): Removed support
+	for old protocol.  Use only with ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT defined.
+	(agent_send_all_options): Take assuan context instead of a file
+	descriptor.
+	(agent_send_option): Likewise. Use assuan_transact.
+	* passphrase.c (writen, readaline): Removed.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print a warning if --use-agent has been used but
+	it has not been build with support for it.
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Clarify meaning of flags.  Add new
+	flag 4.  Use log_info for errors registering the default secret key.
+	* g10.c (main): Flag the default keyrings.
+
+2005-03-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Don't mess about with the $PATH.
+	Rather, call keyserver helpers with the full path.  This fixes
+	some PATH-inspired DLL problems on W32.  Noted by Carlo Luciano
+	Bianco.
+
+2005-03-30  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Print a warning if the info string hack is
+	not there.  This may happen due to typos in the translation.
+
+2005-03-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* misc.c (w32_shgetfolderpath) [W32]: Changed declaration of
+	function ptr.  Noted by Tim Costello. 
+	* apdu.c [W32]: Changed	declaration of dlopened function pointers.
+
+2005-03-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c: Stubs for tty_enable_completion() &
+	tty_disable_completion().
+
+	* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): Enable readline completion when
+	prompting for an output filename.
+
+	* plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile): Enable readline
+	completion when prompting for a detached sig datafile.
+
+2005-03-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (command_generator, keyedit_completion): Changed
+	indentation.
+	* card-util.c (command_generator, card_edit_completion): Ditto.
+
+2005-03-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (command_generator, card_edit_completion)
+	[GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION==1 && HAVE_LIBREADLINE]: New functions to
+	enable command completion in the --card-edit menu.
+	(card_edit): Call them here.
+
+2005-03-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (command_generator, keyedit_completion)
+	[HAVE_LIBREADLINE]: New functions to enable command completion in
+	the --edit-key menu.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call them here.
+
+2005-03-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_seckey_byname2): If no explicit default key is
+	set, don't pick a disabled default.  Noted by David Crick.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Calculate GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR directly.  Do not
+	redefine $libexecdir.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options)
+	(keyserver_spawn): Don't treat 'verbose' and 'include-disabled' as
+	special.  Just pass them through silently to the keyserver helper.
+
+2005-03-16  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (parse_ccid_descriptor): Make SCM workaround
+	reader type specific.
+	(scan_or_find_devices): Do not check the interface subclass in the
+	SPR532 kludge, as this depends on the firmware version.
+	(ccid_get_atr): Get the Slot status first.  This solves the
+	problem with readers hanging on recent Linux 2.6.x.
+	(bulk_in): Add argument TIMEOUT and changed all callers to pass an
+	appropriate one.  Change the standard timeout from 10 to 5 seconds.
+	(ccid_slot_status): Add a retry code with an initial short timeout.
+	(do_close_reader): Do an usb_reset before closing the reader.
+
+2005-03-14  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (card_status): Use isotimestamp and not the
+	localized asctimestamp to match the timezone used in the key
+	information.
+
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Disable debug output.
+
+2005-03-11  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_card_key_with_backup): Write status line with the
+	backup filename.
+
+	* status.h, status.h (STATUS_BACKUP_KEY_CREATED): New.
+
+2005-03-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Accept honor-http-proxy
+	as an alias for http-proxy.
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key, delete_keys): Fix problem with --expert
+	preventing --delete-secret-and-public-keys from deleting secret
+	keys.
+
+2005-03-10  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu) [W32]: Run the trustdb stale check
+	earlier.
+
+2005-03-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (agent_scd_pkdecrypt, agent_scd_pksign) 
+	(agent_scd_genkey, agent_scd_setattr, agent_scd_change_pin) 
+	(agent_scd_checkpin, agent_openpgp_storekey): Make sure to send a
+	SC_OP_FAILURE after card operations which might change data.
+	* card-util.c (change_pin): Send a SC_OP_SUCCESS after a PIN has
+	been changed.
+	(change_name): Removed a debug output.
+	* status.h, status.c: New codes BAD_PASSPHRASE_PIN, SC_OP_FAILURE
+	and SC_OP_SUCCESS.
+
+2005-02-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Only print the key signing hint when
+	signing from a place where it is useful (i.e. --edit-key and not
+	--sign-key).
+
+2005-02-16  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (fetch_url): Fetch the key from the default
+	keyserver if no URL is available.
+
+2005-02-15  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Don't call free_public_key
+	if PK is NULL.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto. Removed debug output.
+	(passphrase_to_dek): Ditto.
+
+2005-02-13  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (cmds): Limit code to 80 columns. Add command
+	BKUPTOCARD.
+
+2005-02-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Use it here to turn off the "quick
+	check" bytes for PK decryptions.  This is in regards to the Mister
+	and Zuccherato attack on OpenPGP CFB mode.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Set a flag to indicate that a
+	particular session key came from a passphrase and not a PK.
+
+2005-02-08  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* misc.c (w32_shgetfolderpath): New.
+	(default_homedir): Use it to avoid problems under Windows95.
+
+2005-02-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (trustdb_check_or_update): New.  If the
+	trustdb is dirty and --interactive is set, do an --update-trustdb.
+	If not interactive, do a --check_trustdb unless
+	--no-auto-check-trustdb is set.
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): Moved from here.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): Call it here after all
+	refreshing has happened so that we don't rebuild after each
+	preferred keyserver set of imports, but do one big rebuild at the
+	end.  This is Debian bug #293816, noted by Kurt Roeckx.
+
+2005-02-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Merged away definition from
+	the backsigs code.
+
+2005-01-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Write the auth key to the card
+	before the encryption key.  This is a partial workaround for a PGP
+	bug (as of this writing, all versions including 8.1), that causes
+	it to try and encrypt to the most recent subkey regardless of
+	whether that subkey is actually an encryption type.  In this case,
+	the auth key is an RSA key so it succeeds.
+
+2005-01-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_sk, keyid_from_pk): Use 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
+	instead of 0x0000000000000000 for the invalid key ID since
+	all-zeroes is reserved for the anonymous recipient.
+
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase), keygen.c (generate_subkeypair):
+	Fix a string ;)
+
+2005-01-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (listfp): New.
+	(set_packet_list_mode): Intialize it to stdout or stderr depending
+	on a global option.  Made all printing in list mode use LISTFP.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Detect primary key on-card and
+	ask for the passphrase.  Return an error if the primary key is a
+	plain stub.
+
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Don't ever change any stub key.
+	Print a note if a key consists of only stub keys.  Reported by
+	Dany Nativel.  These are bugs #401 and #402.
+
+2005-01-26  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (parse_ccid_descriptor): Need the CSM workaround
+	also for newer firmware versions.  Need to get a list of fixed
+	firmware versions and use that.
+
+2005-01-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Allow RFC-2732 IPv6 [literal
+	address] syntax in keyserver URLs.
+	(keyserver_typemap): Map ftps if we are supporting it.
+
+2005-01-25  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Don't continue after an error;
+	fixed at two places. Why at all didn't I used a goto to cleanup,
+	tsss?
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (get_cached_data): New arg GET_IMMEDIATE to bypass
+	the cache.  Changed all callers.
+	(get_one_do): Bypass the cache if the value would have been read
+	directly for v1.1 cards.  It makes things a bit slower but only for
+	1.0 cards and there are not that many cards out in the wild.  This
+	is required to fix a caching bug when generating new keys; as a
+	side effect of the retrieval of the the C4 DO from the 6E DO the
+	chaced fingerprint will get updated to the old value and later
+	when signing the generated key the checking of the fingerprint
+	fails becuase it won't match the new one.  Thanks to Moritz for
+	analyzing this problem.
+	(verify_chv3): Removed the CHV status reread logic because we
+	won't cache the C4 DO anymore.
+
+2005-01-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (free_keyserver_spec): Fix small leak.
+	(keyserver_typemap): Map https if we are supporting it.
+
+2005-01-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Issue new CARDCTRL(4) status.
+
+	* gpgv.c (tty_fprintf): New stub.
+
+	* card-util.c (card_status): Create a secret key stub on the fly
+	and print more information about a card key.
+	* import.c (pub_to_sec_keyblock, auto_create_card_key_stub): New.
+	* getkey.c (get_seckeyblock_byfprint): New.
+	* keylist.c (print_card_key_info): New.
+
+	* g10.c (i18n_init) [W32]: Pass registry key to gettext
+	initialization.
+	* gpgv.c (i18n_init) [W32]: Ditto.
+
+2005-01-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* misc.c (default_homedir): New.  Taken from gnupg 1.9.15.
+	* g10.c (main): Use it.
+	* gpgv.c (main): Ditto.
+
+	* keylist.c (public_key_list): Do a trustdb staleness check before
+	opening the keyring.
+	(secret_key_list): Ditto.
+
+2005-01-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Move command strings outside the
+	function to get ready for the readline completion code.
+
+	* passphrase.c (readline, agent_send_option, agent_open,
+	agent_get_passphrase, passphrase_clear_cache): Rename readline()
+	to readaline() to keep readline library namespace clear.
+
+2005-01-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* filter.h, armor.c (armor_filter): Use the eol string from the
+	armor filter context instead of hardcoding '\n' or '\r\n'.  If no
+	eol string is provided, default to '\n' or '\r\n' as appropriate.
+	(is_armor_header): Trim tabs in armor header lines as well.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use it here to force '\n' line
+	endings since the keyserver output file gets a LF->CRLF expansion
+	on win32.
+
+2005-01-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Typo.
+
+	* armor.c (is_armor_header): Allow CR and LF (not just actual
+	spaces) in an armor header line (-----BEGIN etc).  This is needed
+	due to CRLF issues on win32.  As before, --openpgp makes it
+	strict.
+
+2005-01-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Use @LIBUSB@ instead of @LIBUSB_LIBS@
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Comments on import-unusable-sigs.
+
+2005-01-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, import.c (parse_import_options, delete_inv_parts):
+	Add import-unusable-sigs flag to enable importing unusable
+	(currently: expired) sigs.
+
+	* options.h, export.c (parse_export_options, do_export_stream):
+	Add export-unusable-sigs flag to enable exporting unusable
+	(currently: expired) sigs.
+
+2004-12-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, sig_to_revoke_info),
+	keyid.c (revokestr_from_pk), keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names):
+	Show who revoked a key (either the same key or a designated
+	revoker) and when.
+
+2004-12-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (find_endpoint): New.
+	(scan_or_find_devices): Add new args to return endpoint info and
+	interface number.
+	(ccid_open_reader, ccid_shutdown_reader): Take care of these new
+	args.
+	(bulk_in, bulk_out): Use the correct endpoints.
+	(ccid_transceive_apdu_level): New.
+	(ccid_transceive): Divert to above.
+	(parse_ccid_descriptor): Allow APDU level exchange mode.
+	(do_close_reader): Pass the interface number to usb_release_interface.
+
+2004-12-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_typemap): Only map HTTP and FTP if
+	libcurl has specifically been selected to handle them.
+
+2004-12-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Properly parse
+	auth data from URLs and pass to keyserver helpers.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_typemap): New.  Map certain keyserver
+	types to a common type (e.g. ldaps -> ldap).  If we are building
+	with curl, map both http and ftp to curl.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Only allow one preferred
+	keyserver subpacket at a time.
+
+2004-12-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_set_keyserver_url): Make sure we only operate on
+	the chosen selfsig so we don't accidentally promote an older
+	selfsig to chosen.  Discovered by Simon Josefsson and 'Todd'.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Fix typo.
+
+2004-12-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Secret key listings should
+	always show everything (expired UIDs, revoked subkeys, etc, etc).
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add additional help for the "sign"
+	flags.
+
+2004-12-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): For better translations chnage 2
+	strings.
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Handle case when checksum was okay but
+	passphrase still wrong.  Roman Pavlik found such a case.
+
+2004-12-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Invisible alias "passwd" as
+	"password".
+
+	* passphrase.c: Don't check for __CYGWIN__, so it is treated as a
+	unix-like system.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), textfilter.c (standard): Use new option
+	--rfc2440-text to determine whether to filter "<space>\t\r\n" or
+	just "\r\n" before canonicalizing text line endings.  Default to
+	"<space>\t\r\n".
+
+2004-12-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_get_std_prefs): Set reference count when
+	creating the temporary user ID.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Merge updpref and setpref.  Keep
+	updpref as an invisible alias.  Add invisible alias for revphoto.
+	Fix small memory leak when using "setpref" (not all of the uid was
+	freed).
+	(menu_revkey): Trigger a trust rebuild after revoking a key.
+	Don't allow revoking an already-revoked whole key.
+	(menu_revsubkey): Don't allow revoking an already-revoked subkey.
+
+2004-12-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revkey): Rename to menu_revsubkey.
+	(menu_revkey): New.  Revoke a whole key.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it here for when 'revkey' is used without any
+	subkeys selected.  This is to be consistent with the other
+	functions which are "selected part if selected, whole key if not".
+
+	* signal.c: Use only HAVE_LIBREADLINE to detect readline
+	availability.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Link with readline where necessary.
+
+2004-12-17  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Define NREAD locally as
+	size_t or int.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Make field width an int.
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Ditto.
+
+2004-12-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --require-secmem/--no-require-secmem to cause
+	gpg to exit if it cannot lock memory.  Also remove --nrsign-key
+	and --nrlsign-key since this can better be done via --edit-key.
+
+2004-12-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_send_le, apdu_send_direct), keylist.c
+	(status_one_subpacket, print_one_subpacket): Fix some compiler
+	warnings.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Fix --compression-algo to take a string argument
+	like --compress-algo.
+
+	* trustdb.c (uid_trust_string_fixed): For safety, check for a pk.
+
+2004-12-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Re-remove the N_() markers.
+
+	* trustdb.c (uid_trust_string_fixed): Show uids as revoked if the
+	key is revoked.
+	
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Don't show validity for
+	secret key UIDs.
+
+	* keyedit.c (parse_sign_type): New.  Figure out the flags (local,
+	nonrevoke, trust) for a signature.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call it here so we can mix and match flags, and
+	don't need "nrltsign", "ltsign", "tnrsign", etc, etc, etc.
+
+2004-12-14  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Removed debug output
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_work, keyserver_spawn): Map ldaps to ldap.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Removed the N_() markers from the
+	command names.
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Ditto.
+
+2004-12-13  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): Fixed memory leak.
+	Noted by Andrei Darashenka.
+
+2004-12-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_preferred_keyserver): Force preferred
+	keyserver subpackets to have a URI scheme specified.
+
+2004-12-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), textfilter.c (standard): Use --rfc2440
+	or --openpgp directly to determine the end of line hashing rule.
+
+	* trustdb.c (uid_trust_string_fixed): Show uids as expired if the
+	key is expired.
+
+2004-12-10  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (send_fprtime_if_not_null): New.
+	(do_getattr): Add KEY_TIME.
+	(do_learn_status): Print KEY_TIME.
+	* cardglue.c (learn_status_cb): Parse KEY-TIME.
+	* card-util.c (card_status): Print creation time if available.
+
+2004-12-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), textfilter.c (len_without_trailing_ws):
+	Removed (not used).
+	(standard): 2440 says that textmode hashes should canonicalize
+	line endings to CRLF and remove spaces and tabs.  2440bis-12 says
+	to just canonicalize to CRLF.  So, we default to the 2440bis-12
+	behavior, but revert to the strict 2440 behavior if the user
+	specifies --rfc2440.  In practical terms this makes no difference
+	to any signatures in the real world except for a textmode detached
+	signature.
+
+2004-12-09  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): New args CUSTOM_PROMPT and
+	CUSTOM_DESCRIPTION. 	Changed all callers.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_getattr, do_learn_status, do_setattr): Support
+	the new private DOs.
+	(do_change_pin): Add a "N" prefix to the strings so that the
+	callback can act accordingly for a new PIN.  Unfortunately this
+	breaks existing translations but I see no wother way to overvome
+	this.
+
+	* cardglue.c (learn_status_cb): Ditto.
+	(agent_release_card_info): Ditto.
+	(struct pin_cb_info_s): Removed and changed all users.
+	(pin_cb): Reworked.
+
+	* card-util.c (card_status): Print them
+	(card_edit): New command PRIVATEDO.
+	(change_private_do): New.
+
+2004-12-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Add a choose-your-own-capabilities option
+	for DSA.
+
+2004-12-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Change strings to always use %u instead
+	of hardcoding key sizes.  Bump default to 2048.  Bump minimum down
+	to 512, where possible, but require --expert to get there.  DSA is
+	always 1024 unless --expert is given.
+
+2004-11-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (parse_key_usage): New function to parse out key usage
+	flags.  Set PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN to handle flags that we don't
+	understand.
+	(fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey): Call
+	it from here to remove duplicate code.
+
+2004-11-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Allow export-minimal to work with
+	secret keys, even though a non-selfsig secret key signature is
+	rare.
+
+	* options.h, export.c (parse_export_options, do_export_stream),
+	import.c (parse_import_options, import_keys_internal): Make the
+	import-options and export-options distinct since they can be mixed
+	together as part of keyserver-options.
+
+2004-11-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, export.c (parse_export_options, do_export_stream):
+	Add "export-minimal" option to disregard any sigs except selfsigs.
+
+	* trustdb.c (uid_trust_string_fixed): Use a string that can be
+	atoi-ed, but also has a comment for the translator.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (uid_trust_string_fixed): New.  Return a
+	fixed-size translatable string similar to trust_value_to_string.
+	This allows for easier lining up of displays.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names), keylist.c
+	(list_keyblock_print): Use it here to print validity strings.
+
+	* gpgv.c: Stub.
+
+2004-11-18  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c (S_IRGRP) [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Define to 0.
+
+2004-11-17  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c (open_info_file): New.
+	(main): Unconditionally implement --status-file, --logger-file,
+	--attribute-file, --passphrase-file, --command-file.  This is not
+	generally useful but easy to support and might make scripting
+	under Windows easier.
+
+2004-11-11  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (readn): Fixed test against EINTR.
+
+2004-11-05  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c: Made more strings translatable.
+	(verify_chv3, do_change_pin): Add a special prefix to the prompt
+	of the Admin PIN prompts.
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase): Add arg TRYAGAIN_TEXT.  Changed
+	call callers.
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Make use of the OPAQUE arg to pass
+	arguments to the PIN callback.  Use this to implement a way to
+	check for correct PIN repetition.  Changed all callers to pass an
+	opaque argument. Improved detection of Admin PIN prompts.
+
+2004-11-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Don't try and create a
+	zero-length filename when using --use-embedded-filename with input
+	that has no filename (clearsigned or message generated from a
+	pipe).
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt), progress.c
+	(handle_progress), sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Fix a few
+	inconsistent calls (NULL filename means a pipe here, so don't
+	bother to check it twice).
+
+2004-11-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (print_digest_algo_note): The latest 2440bis drafts
+	deprecates MD5, so give a warning.
+	(print_pubkey_algo_note, print_cipher_algo_note,
+	print_digest_algo_note): Give the algorithm name in the
+	experimental algo warning.
+
+2004-11-03  Timo Schulz  <twoaday@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (readn, writen): Use w32_strerror instead
+        of just showing the error number.
+	* misc.c [_WIN32]: Fix warning about missing prototypes.
+	
+2004-10-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Don't need to warn about
+	PGP-generated Elgamal signing keys since we no longer support any
+	Elgamal signing keys.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file): Use "writing to" instead of
+	"writing to file" to match other strings.
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Fix typo.  Noted by Moray
+	Allan.  This is Debian bug #278708.
+
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase, passphrase_to_dek): "password" ->
+	"passphrase".
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Show designated revoker as
+	part of translatable string.
+
+2004-10-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am (other_libs): New.  Also include LIBICONV.  Noted by
+	Tim Mooney.
+
+2004-10-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* apdu.c (open_pcsc_reader): Removed bad free in error handler.
+
+2004-10-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* card-util.c, delkey.c, keygen.c, plaintext.c, keyedit.c,
+	passphrase.c, revoke.c: Collapse the two different "can't do that
+	in batch mode" strings into one.
+
+	* keylist.c (status_one_subpacket): New.  Send the subpacket data
+	to the --status interface.
+
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Show when admin is enabled or not.
+
+	* status.h, status.c: New STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET type.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Multiple keyserver URLs are
+	allowed.
+
+	* keyring.c: Make some strings translatable.
+
+	* exec.c, sign.c: Change "can't open file" to "can't open" and
+	"can't create file" to "can't create" to be consistent with other
+	strings so we don't have to translate both.
+
+	* delkey.c, export.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, revoke.c, skclist.c:
+	Fix a few missed possible \"username\" quotes.
+
+2004-10-26  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (verify_chv3): The minimum length for CHV3 is
+	8. Changed string to match the other ones.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_send_all_options): Try to deduce the ttyname
+	from stdin.
+
+2004-10-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (fetch_url): Disable for gnupg 1.9
+	(card_generate_subkey): Ditto.
+	(card_store_subkey): Ditto.
+
+2004-10-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print):
+	Rename verify-option show-validity to show-uid-validity to match
+	the similar list-option.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (verify_chv3): Fix typo.
+
+2004-10-21  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-common.h (app_openpgp_storekey): Add prototype.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_sign): Replace asprintf by direct allocation.
+	This avoids problems with missing vasprintf implementations.
+
+	* card-util.c (generate_card_keys): Add a #warning for gnupg 1.9
+	and use the same string there.
+
+2004-10-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (parse_list_options): Fix non-constant initializer so we
+	can build with C89.
+
+2004-10-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (print_one_subpacket): The flags field should be hex.
+
+2004-10-17  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Cast UIDLEN to int.  Noted
+	by Christian Cornelssen.
+
+2004-10-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt, enum_sig_subpkt): Don't
+	BUG() on unknown subpackets.  Rather, just return them silently.
+	
+2004-10-15  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* status.h (STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN): New.
+	* status.c (get_status_string): Added.
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase): Moved status printing to ..
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): .. here and issue new status message.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't include the leading LF in the
+	translatable string but print them separately.
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_open_remote_reader) [_WIN32]: We don't have ENOSYS.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (parse_login_data): New. 
+	(app_select_openpgp): Call it.
+	(do_setattr): Reparse it after change.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Add a note to translators.
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto.
+
+	* helptext.c: Typo fix.
+
+2004-10-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Show the fingerprint after the
+	key, not after the first user ID.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Don't show validity if
+	we're just printing user IDs for signing.
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Properly handle the case where the line
+	is dash-space (i.e. a blank line that was quoted).  Give a warning
+	for bad dash escaping.
+
+2004-10-14  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream) [ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS]: Don't allow
+	secret key export.
+	* import.c (import_secret_one) [ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS]: Likewise 
+
+	* misc.c (is_secured_filename): New.
+	* keydb.c (maybe_create_keyring)
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname)
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext)
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file, open_outfile)
+	* exec.c (exec_write)
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair, gen_card_key_with_backup)
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file)
+	* keyring.c (create_tmp_file, do_copy): Check for secured files
+	before creating them. 
+
+	* keygen.c (print_status_key_created, read_parameter_file):
+	s/unsigned char/byte/ due to a strange typedef for RISC OS.  Noted
+	by Stefan.
+
+2004-10-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Allow arbitrary dash-escaped lines as per
+	2440bis-10.  This is bug #158.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Handle keyserver timeouts.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Different prompt when we're
+	using direct trust since the meaning is different.
+
+	* keyedit.c (trustsig_prompt): Change the strings to match the
+	ones in pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust to make translation easier.
+
+	* trustdb.c (trust_model_string, get_validity): Add direct trust
+	model which applies to the key as a whole and not per-uid.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (parse_trust_model): New.
+	(main): Call it from here to do string-to-trust-model.
+
+2004-10-13  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Removed all log_error_f and
+	reworded the messages.
+
+	* dermor.c: Include i18n.h.  Made 2 strings translatable.
+	
+	* misc.c (register_secured_file, is_secured_file)
+	(unregister_secured_file): New.
+	* keyring.c (do_copy, rename_tmp_file): Implement the SELinux hacks.
+	(keyring_register_filename): Ditto.
+	* tdbio.c (open_db): Ditto.
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file, open_sigfile): Ditto.
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures, verify_one_file): Ditto.
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Ditto.
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): Ditto.
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_message, decrypt_messages): Ditto.
+	* dearmor.c (dearmor_file, enarmor_file): Ditto.
+	* g10.c (main, print_mds): Ditto.
+	* exec.c (exec_write, exec_read): Ditto. 
+	* card-util.c (change_login): Ditto.
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Ditto.
+
+	* openfile.c (overwrite_filep, make_outfile_name, open_outfile) 
+	(open_sigfile): Use iobuf_is_pipe_filename to check for pipes so
+	that special filesnames are taken into account. This is bug 327.
+
+	* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto.
+
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Ditto.
+	(sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): 
+
+	* progress.c (handle_progress): Ditto.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Ditto.
+	(ask_for_detached_datafile, hash_datafiles): 
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Ditto. 
+
+2004-10-12  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Changed to use iobuf based file
+	reading to allow the special file name feature to work.
+
+	* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): New keyword "Handle".  This is
+	bug 287.
+	(print_status_key_not_created): New.
+	(print_status_key_created): Add new arg HANDLE.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Print not created status.
+	* status.c, tatus.h (STATUS_KEY_NOT_CREATED): New. 
+
+2004-10-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Use the same translated string
+	for showing the user ID as mainproc.c:print_pkenc_list.
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Allow translating the quotes
+	around the user ID.
+
+	* card-util.c, g10.c, photoid.c, trustdb.c: The last of the \"%s\"
+	-> `%s' quoting for things that aren't user IDs.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): If there is no keyserver host,
+	print the whole URI since it is self-contained.
+
+2004-10-11  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Print an empty string in log_info
+	if the host is not set (e.g. finger).
+
+2004-10-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* card-util.c, keyedit.c, openfile.c, pkclist.c, delkey.c,
+	keygen.c, photoid.c, revoke.c: Some yes-or-no prompts end in
+	"(y/n)".  Some don't.  Consistently use y/n everywhere.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_key_flags): New.
+	(ask_algo): Call it here in --expert mode so we don't need to
+	specify each possible variation of RSA capabilities.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_add_key_flags): The spec says that all primary keys
+	MUST be able to certify.  Force the certify flag on for primaries
+	(and off for subkeys).
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Fix generating keys with the auth
+	flag.
+
+2004-10-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Give a warning with a weak key, but
+	still allow to decrypt the message.
+
+2004-10-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Keystrify.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), pkclist.c
+	(do_edit_ownertrust): Improve translatability of user ID prompts.
+
+2004-10-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* helptext.c, pkclist.c (do_we_trust): It is not possible to get
+	here with a revoked or expired key, so BUG() that case.  Remove
+	question about overriding revoked/expired.  Also
+	--keyid-format-ify.
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Use print_pubkey_info() instead of printing the
+	info ourselves.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Improve translatability of
+	user ID prompts.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_pubkey_info): Use the user ID the pk was
+	selected by, if any.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids, ask_revoke_sig): Improve translatability
+	of user ID prompts.
+	(ask_revoke_sig, menu_revsig): Try and use common strings for
+	these two functions so they don't need to be translated twice.
+
+	* keyedit.c, keylist.c, keyserver.c, mainproc.c: The
+	revoked/expired/expires string change of 2004-09-29 was too
+	simple.  Use two styles for each tag.
+
+2004-10-06  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_open_reader): Store the vendor ID.
+	(ccid_transceive_secure): New.
+	(parse_ccid_descriptor): Workaround for an SCM reader problem.
+	(send_escape_cmd): New.
+
+2004-10-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Use keystrs for agent
+	strings, and fix sprintf warnings.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Fix BUG() with certain sets of
+	mixed regular and preferred keyserver refreshes.  Noted by
+	Sebastian Wiesinger.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Show uid validity in menu.
+
+2004-10-03  Timo Schulz  <twoaday@g10code.de>
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_open_remote_reader) [_WIN32]: Do not set ENOSYS.
+	
+2004-10-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig_colon): Fix bad keyids in
+	colon delsig output.  Noted by Peter Palfrader.
+	(show_prefs): Do not reference missing selfsig.  Noted by Alex
+	Moroz.
+
+2004-10-01  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c (i18n_init): Always use LC_ALL.
+
+2004-09-30  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (verify_chv3) [GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION!=1]: Typo fix.
+
+2004-09-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c, keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Factored keyring creation
+	out to ..
+	(maybe_create_keyring): .. new.  Make sure that we do the checks
+	in a locked state.  Problem reported by Stefan Haller.  Try to
+	create the home directory before acquiring a lock for the keyring.
+	From Werner on stable branch.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Blow up if we didn't lose setuid.  From Werner on
+	stable branch.
+
+2004-09-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c, keylist.c, keyserver.c, mainproc.c: Reduce the many
+	variations of "revoked" ("revoked", "[revoked]", " [revoked]",
+	"[revoked] ") "and" expired down to two to simplify translation.
+
+2004-09-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Account for the extra space
+	that show-sig-expire takes up so we do not wrap lines.
+	(show_key_with_all_names): No need to show subkey revocations as a
+	seperate line since we now show revocation date in the main subkey
+	line.
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): HAVE_DECL_SYS_SIGLIST is defined,
+	but zero if not found.  Noted by John Clizbe.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyrec): Fix problem with non-expiring keys
+	appearing expired in --search-keys results.
+
+2004-09-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Take admin only status from the table.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c: Made all strings translatable.
+	(verify_chv3) [GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION]: Make opt.allow_admin
+	available for use in gnupg 2. 
+	(verify_chv3): Reimplemented countdown showing to use only
+	functions from this module.  Flush the CVH status cache on a
+	successful read.
+	(get_one_do): Hack to bypass the cache for cards versions > 1.0.
+	(store_fpr): Store the creation date for card version > 1.0.
+
+2004-09-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), card-util.c (change_pin): If "admin" has
+	not been issued, skip right to the CHV1/CHV2 PIN change.  No need
+	to show the unblock or admin PIN change option.
+	(card_edit): Add "admin" command to add admin commands to the
+	menu.  Do not allow admin commands until "admin" is given.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (verify_chv3): Show a countdown of how many wrong
+	admin PINs can be entered before the card is locked.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), app-openpgp.c (verify_chv3): Remove
+	--allow-admin.
+
+2004-09-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h: Create S2K_DIGEST_ALGO macro so we do not need to always
+	set opt.s2k_digest_algo.  This helps fix a problem with PGP 2.x
+	encrypted symmetric messages.  Change all callers (encode.c,
+	g10.c, keyedit.c, keygen.c, passphrase.c, sign.c).
+
+	* armor.c, cardglue.c, getkey.c, import.c, keygen.c: Be consistent
+	in some more quoted strings.  Always use 'user ID', not 'user id',
+	"quotes" for user IDs, etc.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu), gpgv.c (agent_scd_getattr (stub)),
+	keygen.c (copy_mpi, generate_raw_key): Fix a compile problem and a
+	few warnings when building without card support.
+
+2004-09-23  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card_util.c (generate_card_keys): ask whether backup should be
+	created.
+	(card_store_subkey): Factored some code out to ..
+	* keygen.c (save_unprotected_key_to_card): .. new function.
+	(gen_card_key_with_backup): New.
+	(generate_raw_key): New.
+	(generate_keypair): New arg BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_DIR.  Changed all
+	callers.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Divert to gen_card_key_with_backup when
+	desired.
+
+	* apdu.c (open_pcsc_reader): Do not print empty reader string.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Allow creation of AUTH keys.
+
+	* keyid.c (usagestr_from_pk): New.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (app_openpgp_storekey): Call flush_cache.
+	(get_cached_data): Move local data initialization to ..
+	(app_select_openpgp): .. here. Read some flags for later use.
+	(do_getattr): New read-only attribute EXTCAP.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New command "keytocard"
+	(keyedit_menu): Bad hack for the not_with_sk element.
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Print the usage.
+	(find_pk_from_sknode): New.
+
+	* card-util.c (card_store_subkey): New.
+	(copy_mpi): New.
+
+	* cardglue.c (agent_openpgp_storekey): New.
+
+2004-09-22  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (card_generate_subkey, generate_card_keys): Factored
+	common code out to ...
+	(get_info_for_key_operation, check_pin_for_key_operation)
+	(restore_forced_chv1, replace_existing_key_p)
+	(show_card_key_info): ... new functions.
+
+2004-09-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), keyedit.c (show_prefs,
+	menu_set_keyserver_url): Make sure that keyserver URLs with
+	control characters inside are printed properly.  In fact, handle
+	them as UTF8.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Don't show "addcardkey" in the menu if
+	we do not have card support.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyserver.c (print_keyrec, keyserver_spawn): fpr is an
+	array of unsigned bytes.
+
+2004-09-20  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c: Make -K an alias for --list-secret-keys.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_card_serialno): New. Taken from gnupg 1.9.11.
+	(list_keyblock_print): Make use of it.
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Print the card S/N.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New command ADDCARDKEY.
+	* card-util.c (card_generate_subkey): New.
+	* keygen.c (generate_card_subkeypair): New.
+	(gen_card_key): New arg IS_PRIMARY; changed all callers.
+
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Use shutdown code if possible.
+	(check_card_serialno): Ditto.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (do_close_reader): Factored some code out from ...
+	(ccid_close_reader): ..here.
+	(ccid_shutdown_reader): New.
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_shutdown_reader): New.
+	(shutdown_ccid_reader): New.
+
+2004-09-17  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c (list_config): New config option ccid-reader-id.
+	(gpgconf_list): Add "reader-port".
+
+	* apdu.c (open_ccid_reader): New arg PORTSTR.  Pass it to
+	ccid_open_reader.
+	(apdu_open_reader): Pass portstr to open_ccid_reader.
+	(apdu_open_reader): No fallback if a full CCID reader id has been
+	given.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_get_reader_list): New.
+	(ccid_open_reader): Changed API to take a string for the reader.
+	Removed al the cruft for the libusb development vesion which seems
+	not to be maintained anymore and there are no packages anyway.
+	The stable library works just fine.
+	(struct ccid_reader_id_s): Deleted and replaced everywhere by a
+	simple string.
+	(usb_get_string_simple): Removed.
+	(bulk_in): Do valgrind hack here and not just everywhere.
+
+2004-09-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names, show_prefs): Show preferred
+	keyserver(s) in "showpref" output.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_keyserver_url), keyedit.c
+	(menu_set_keyserver_url): Allow setting a keyserver URL of "none"
+	to remove an existing keyserver URL.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_set_keyserver_url): Confirm replacement of a
+	keyserver URL before overwriting the old one.
+
+2004-09-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c (agent_scd_getattr): Stub.
+
+	* misc.c (get_signature_count): New.  Get the signature count from
+	a smartcard.
+	(pct_expando): Call it here so the %c expando becomes the number
+	of signatures issued.  This allows for notations or the like with
+	an automatic signature count.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (usb_get_string_simple): Replacement function to
+	work with older libusb.
+
+2004-09-15  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* g10.c [HAVE_LIBUSB]: New option --debug-ccid-driver.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (read_device_info): Removed.
+	(make_reader_id, scan_or_find_devices): New.
+	(ccid_open_reader): Simplified by make use of the new functions.
+	(ccid_set_debug_level): New.  Changed the macros to make use of
+	it.  It has turned out that it is often useful to enable debugging
+	at runtime so I added this option.
+
+2004-09-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Fix subkey<->binding sig
+	mismatch when some secret subkeys are missing.  Discovered by
+	Michael Roth.
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (print_subpackets_colon): Make a public
+	function.
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig_colon): New.  Print a
+	with-colons version of the sig record.
+	(menu_delsig): Call it here for a with-colons delsig.
+
+2004-09-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keylist.c (print_one_subpacket,
+	print_subpackets_colon): Print a spk record for each request
+	subpacket.
+	(list_keyblock_colon): Call them here.
+
+	* g10.c (parse_subpacket_list, parse_list_options): New.  Make the
+	list of subpackets we are going to print.
+	(main): Call them here.
+
+2004-09-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* card-util.c (fetch_url, card_edit): Use the pubkey URL stored on
+	the card to fetch an updated copy.  Works with either straight
+	URLs or HKP or LDAP keyservers.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_fprint),
+	import.c (revocation_present): Use a keyserver_spec so the caller
+	can pass in whatever keyserver they like.
+
+2004-09-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (get_cached_data): Avoid mallocing zero since it
+	breaks us when using --enable-m-guard.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (read_device_info): Fix segfault when usb device
+	is not accessible.
+	(ccid_open_reader): Allow working with an even older version of
+	libusb (usb_busses global instead of usb_get_busses()).
+
+2004-09-09  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* cardglue.h: Add members for CA fingerprints.
+	* cardglue.c (agent_release_card_info): Invalid them.
+	(learn_status_cb): Store them.
+
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, iso7816.c, iso7816.h
+	* apdu.c, apdu.h, ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h
+	* card-util.c: Updated from current gnupg-1.9.
+
+	Changes are:
+
+	* ccid-driver.h (CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED): New.
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_open_reader): Support the stable 0.1 version
+	of libusb.
+	(ccid_get_atr): Handle short messages.
+	* apdu.c (my_rapdu_get_status): Implemented.
+	* apdu.c: Include <signal.h>.
+	* apdu.c (reader_table_s):  Add function pointers for the backends.
+	(apdu_close_reader, apdu_get_status, apdu_activate) 
+	(send_apdu): Make use of them.
+	(new_reader_slot): Intialize them to NULL.
+	(dump_ccid_reader_status, ct_dump_reader_status): New.
+	(dump_pcsc_reader_status): New.
+	(open_ct_reader, open_pcsc_reader, open_ccid_reader) 
+	(open_osc_reader, open_rapdu_reader): Intialize function pointers.
+	(ct_activate_card, ct_send_apdu, pcsc_send_apdu, osc_send_apdu) 
+	(error_string): Removed.  Replaced by apdu_strerror.
+	(get_ccid_error_string): Removed.
+	(ct_activate_card): Remove the unused loop.
+	(reset_ct_reader): Implemented.
+	(ct_send_apdu): Activate the card if not yet done.
+	(pcsc_send_apdu): Ditto.
+	* ccid-driver.h: Add error codes.
+	* ccid-driver.c: Implement more or less proper error codes all
+	over the place.
+	* apdu.c (apdu_send_direct): New.
+	(get_ccid_error_string): Add some error code mappings.
+	(send_apdu): Pass error codes along for drivers already supporting
+	them.
+	(host_sw_string): New.
+	(get_ccid_error_string): Use above.
+	(send_apdu_ccid): Reset the reader if it has not yet been done.
+	(open_ccid_reader): Don't care if the ATR can't be read.
+	(apdu_activate_card): New.
+	(apdu_strerror): New.
+	(dump_reader_status): Only enable it with opt.VERBOSE.
+	* iso7816.c (map_sw): Add mappings for the new error codes.
+	* apdu.c (open_ct_reader, open_pcsc_reader, open_ccid_reader)
+	(reset_ccid_reader, open_osc_reader): Call dump_reader_status only
+	in verbose mode.
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_getattr): Fix for sending CA-FPR.
+	* app-openpgp.c (app_openpgp_readkey): Fixed check for valid
+	exponent.
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_setattr): Sync FORCE_CHV1.
+	* card-util.c (change_login): Kludge to allow reading data from a
+	file.
+	(card_edit): Pass ARG_STRING to change_login.
+	(card_status): Print CA fingerprints.
+	(change_cafpr): New.
+	(card_edit): New command CAFPR.
+
+2004-04-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main) <gpgconf>: Use gpg.conf and not /dev/null as
+	default filename.
+
+2004-04-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Remove PIN verification.
+	(generate_card_keys): New arg SERIALNO.  Do PIN verification here
+	after resetting forced_chv1.
+
+	
+2004-09-09  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Do readline cleanup.  Print signal
+	number if we can't print the name. Use new autoconf macro
+	HAVE_DECL_SYS_SIGLIST.
+	(get_signal_name): Removed.
+
+	* photoid.c: Include ttyio.h.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (skip_rest): Removed.  Changed all callers to use
+	the new iobuf_skip_reset.  Orginal patch by Florian Weimer.
+
+2004-09-07  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.de>
+
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): Use tty_printf and not just
+	printf.  Put _() around one string.
+
+2004-09-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyrec): Force the 'e'xpired flag on as soon
+	as we know the key is definitely expired.  Some translatable
+	string cleanup.
+
+2004-08-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* encode.c, exec.c, g10.c, sign.c: Some translatable string
+	cleanup.  Change some "this" to `this'.
+
+2004-08-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Show log line for what keyserver
+	action we are taking.
+
+	* keyid.c (keystr): If printing a keyid that lacks the high 4
+	bytes, print the low 4 alone.
+	(keystr_from_desc): Handle short keyids and warn on v3
+	fingerprints.
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_user_id_printable,
+	get_user_id_string_printable): Rename to get_user_id_native and
+	get_user_id_string_native and remove the printable stuff since
+	we're print-ifying valid utf8 characters.  Change all callers in
+	import.c, sign.c, keylist.c, and encode.c.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Make sure the search
+	string is converted from UTF-8 before display.
+
+2004-08-19  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.de>
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_session_key): Changed the zero random byte
+	substituting code to actually do clever things.  Thanks to
+	Matthias Urlichs for noting the implementation problem.
+
+2004-08-18  Marcus Brinkmann  <marcus@g10code.de>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Fix detection of gpg-agent
+	cancellation.
+
+2004-08-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Bigger buffer for extra safety.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New alias --throw-keyid for --throw-keyids, so
+	that it continues to work in old configuration files.  Noted by
+	Jens Adam.
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): --pgp8 now allows blowfish, zlib,
+	and bzip2.
+
+	* status.c (do_get_from_fd): Flush stdout if status isn't flushing
+	it for us.  This guarantees that any menus that were displayed
+	before the prompt don't get stuck in a buffer.  Noted by Peter
+	Palfrader.  This is Debian bug #254072.
+
+	* sign.c (update_keysig_packet): Revert change of 2004-05-18.  It
+	is not appropriate to strip policy and notations when remaking a
+	sig.  That should only happen when specifically requested by the
+	user.
+
+2004-08-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (radix64_read): No armor CRC is legal according to the
+	spec (the CRC is a MAY).
+
+2004-07-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (argsplit): Properly split quoted args from the keyword
+	and trim whitespace afterwards.
+
+2004-07-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (optsep): Add the ability to understand keyword="quoted
+	arg with spaces" type options.
+
+2004-07-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Always use the new listing
+	format where uids are always on a line for themselves.  Mark
+	expired secret keys as expired.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Rename list show-validity to
+	show-uid-validity as it only shows for uids.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Do not use padding to get us to 8 bytes
+	of header.  Rather, use 2+4 as two different chunks.  This avoids
+	a fake filename of "is".
+
+2004-07-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Properly handle remaking a self-sig on
+	revoked or expired user IDs.  Also, once we've established that a
+	given uid cannot or will not be signed, don't continue to ask
+	about each sig.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc), seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check
+	the S2K hash algorithm before we try to generate a passphrase
+	using it.  This prevents hitting BUG() when generating a
+	passphrase using a hash that we don't have.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Allow using --force-mdc in --sign
+	--symmetric messages.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Alias --charset as --display-charset to help avoid
+	the continuing confusion and make room for possible changes in
+	devel.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_plaintext): Show the hex value for the
+	literal packet mode since it may not be printable.
+
+	* keygen.c (make_backsig): Make sure that the backsig was built
+	successfully before we try and use it.
+
+	* status.h, status.c (get_status_string), plaintext.c
+	(handle_plaintext): New status tags PLAINTEXT and
+	PLAINTEXT_LENGTH.
+
+2004-06-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_secret_key): Get last fix right.
+
+2004-06-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_secret_key): Fixed memory leak when D is not
+	NULL.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Added a few comments to the
+	code.
+
+2004-05-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): Keep track of keys already
+	fetched so we don't do a regular keyserver fetch if the preferred
+	keyserver fetch has exhausted the list.
+
+2004-05-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures): Verify multiple files in the same
+	order in which we hashed them when issuing the signature.  Noted
+	by Nicholas Cole.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Fix a kbnode leak and do another
+	keyid-format conversion.
+
+2004-05-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_regexp): s/EXP/EXPR/.
+
+	* keyedit.c (trustsig_prompt): Remoev useless range check.
+
+	* options.h: Renamed ctrl to glo_ctrl.  Changed all users.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_open_reader): Print a warning when CCID
+	can't be used.
+
+2004-05-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): If we're honoring preferred
+	keyservers, and auto-key-retrieve is set, try and get a missing
+	key from the preferred keyserver subpacket when we verify the sig.
+
+	* gpgv.c (parse_preferred_keyserver, free_keyserver_spec): Stubs.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyidlist): Use new parse_preferred_keyserver
+	function.
+	(keyserver_work): Use the passed-in keyserver spec rather than the
+	options global one.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (parse_preferred_keyserver):
+	New function to take a sig and return a split out keyserver_spec.
+	(keyserver_import_keyid): Now takes a keyserver_spec.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyidlist): Go back to the old fast keyid lister.
+	Only merge selfsigs if we have to for honor-keyserver-url.
+	(keyserver_refresh): Keyserver URL handler moved here.
+	(calculate_keyid_fpr): Removed.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyid.c (keystr_from_desc): Calculate a key string from
+	a KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Fix keyserver options on tempfile
+	only platforms.  Noted by Roger Sondermann.
+
+2004-05-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Allow --refresh-keys with a
+	preferred keyserver to happen even if there is no global keyserver
+	set.
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check_messages): No need to check for Elgamal
+	signatures any longer.
+	(do_check_messages, do_check, check_key_signature2):
+	--keyid-format conversion.
+
+	* pkclist.c (show_paths, edit_ownertrust): Remove some unused
+	code.
+
+	* options.h (ctrl): New for member IN_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): track whether we are
+	retrieving a key.
+
+	* status.c (status_currently_allowed): New.
+	(write_status_text, write_status_text_and_buffer): Use it here.
+
+	* g10.c: New command --gpgconf-list.
+	(gpgconf_list): New.  From Werner on stable branch.
+
+2004-05-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key, get_it), keyedit.c
+	(show_key_with_all_names, show_basic_key_info): --keyid-format
+	conversion.
+
+2004-05-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (update_keysig_packet): Policies and notations should be
+	stripped out when remaking a self-signature.  Noted by Atom
+	Smasher.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Fix compiler warnings.
+
+2004-05-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c
+	(parse_keyserver_uri): Improved URI parser that keeps track of the
+	path information and doesn't modify the input string.
+	(keyserver_spawn): Tell keyserver plugins about the path.
+
+2004-05-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_keyserver_url, show_notation) 
+	(list_one): Use const char* for i18n string helpers.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair, read_parameter_file): Really
+	close the files.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Create the secret key file using safe
+	permissions.  Noted by Atom Smasher.
+
+2004-05-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey), keyserver.c
+	(struct keyrec, parse_keyrec, keyserver_search_prompt), keyedit.c
+	(keyedit_menu), g10.c (add_keyserver_url, add_policy_url): Fix
+	some compiler warnings.
+
+2004-05-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_set_keyserver_url): Allow passing
+	preferred keyserver on "keyserver" command line.  Sanity check
+	keyserver URL before accepting it.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c
+	(parse_keyserver_uri): Add an option to require the scheme:// and
+	change all callers.
+	(free_keyserver_spec): Make public.
+
+2004-05-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Fixed the detection of too
+	large files in the same way as in encode.c.
+
+2004-05-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (show_notation): Use bits to select which sort of
+	notation to show.  Don't allow a not-shown notation to prevent us
+	from issuing the proper --status-fd message.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add show-std/standard-notations and
+	show-user-notations.  show-notations is both.  Default is to show
+	standard notations only during verify.  Change all callers.
+
+2004-04-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (show_notation): Add argument to show only
+	user notations, only standard notations, or both.  Change all
+	callers.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): We still need EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY.
+
+2004-04-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): Require PIN only for generate. 
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_setattr): Sync FORCE_CHV1.
+
+2004-04-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn) [EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY]: Removed
+	setting use_temp_file because this option has been removed.
+
+	* g10.c: New commands --allow-admin and --deny-admin.
+	* options.h (opt): Add member ALLOW_ADMIN.
+
+	* tlv.h, tlv.c: New.  Copied from gnupg-1.9. 
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): The serialno is now set internally by
+	app_select_openpgp; changed invocation.
+	* cardglue.h (app_t, ctrl_t): New.
+	(GPG_ERR_EBUSY, GPG_ERR_ENOENT, GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND, GPG_ERR_BUG) 
+	(GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, GPG_ERR_EACCESS): New.
+	(gpg_err_code_from_errno): New.
+
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, iso7816.c, iso7816.h
+	* apdu.c, apdu.h, ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h
+	* card-util.c: Updated from current gnupg-1.9.
+
+	Changes are:
+
+	* app-common.h: New members FNC.DEINIT and APP_LOCAL.
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_deinit): New.
+	(get_cached_data, flush_cache_item, flush_cache_after_error)
+	(flush_cache): New.
+	(get_one_do): Replaced arg SLOT by APP.  Make used of cached data.
+	(verify_chv2, verify_chv3): Flush some cache item after error.
+	(do_change_pin): Ditto.
+	(do_sign): Ditto.
+	(do_setattr): Flush cache item.
+	(do_genkey): Flush the entire cache.
+	(compare_fingerprint): Use cached data.
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_send_le): Reinitialize RESULTLEN.  Handle
+	SW_EOF_REACHED like SW_SUCCESS.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (parse_ccid_descriptor): Store some of the reader
+	features away.  New arg HANDLE
+	(read_device_info): New arg HANDLE. Changed caller.
+	(bulk_in): Handle time extension requests.
+	(ccid_get_atr): Setup parameters and the IFSD.
+	(compute_edc): New. Factored out code.
+	(ccid_transceive): Use default NADs when required.
+
+	* apdu.h: New pseudo stati SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+	SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED and SW_HOST_BUSY.
+	* iso7816.c (map_sw): Map it.
+	
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_slot_status): Add arg STATUSBITS.
+	* apdu.c (apdu_get_status): New.
+	(ct_get_status, pcsc_get_status, ocsc_get_status): New stubs.
+	(get_status_ccid): New.
+	(apdu_reset): New.
+	(reset_ct_reader, reset_pcsc_reader, reset_osc_reader): New stubs.
+	(reset_ccid_reader): New.
+	(apdu_enum_reader): New.
+	
+	* apdu.c (lock_slot, trylock_slot, unlock_slot): New helpers.
+	(new_reader_slot) [USE_GNU_PTH]: Init mutex.
+	(apdu_reset, apdu_get_status, apdu_send_le): Run functions
+	in locked mode.
+	
+2004-04-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_seckey_byname2): Significantly simplify this
+	function by using key_byname to do the heavy lifting.  Note that
+	this also fixes an old problem when the first key on the secret
+	keyring has an unusable stub primary, but is still chosen.
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): If namelist is NULL, return the first key
+	in the keyring.
+
+2004-04-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (make_backsig): If DO_BACKSIGS is not defined, do not
+	create backsigs.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Find 0x19 backsigs on subkey
+	selfsigs and verify they are valid.  If DO_BACKSIGS is not
+	defined, fake this as always valid.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Make parse_signature
+	non-static so we can parse 0x19s in self-sigs.
+
+	* main.h, sig-check.c (check_backsig): Check a 0x19 signature.
+	(signature_check2): Give a backsig warning if there is no or a bad
+	0x19 with signatures from a subkey.
+
+2004-04-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt,
+	can_handle_critical): Parse and display 0x19 signatures.
+
+2004-04-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Do not accept "http" as an
+	alias for "hkp".  They are not the same thing.
+
+2004-04-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add keyserver-option
+	honor-keyserver-url.  parse_keyserver_options now returns a
+	success code.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Return error on failure
+	to parse.  Currently there is no way to fail as any unrecognized
+	options get saved to be sent to the keyserver plugins later.
+	Check length of keyserver option tokens since with =arguments we
+	must only match the prefix.
+	(free_keyserver_spec): Moved code from parse_keyserver_url.
+	(keyserver_work, keyserver_spawn): Pass in a struct keyserver_spec
+	rather than using the global keyserver option.
+	(calculate_keyid_fpr): New.  Fills in a KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC for a
+	key.
+	(keyidlist): New implementation using get_pubkey_bynames rather
+	than searching the keydb directly.  If honor-keyserver-url is set,
+	make up a keyserver_spec and try and fetch that key directly.  Do
+	not include it in the returned keyidlist in that case.
+
+2004-04-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Accept 'u' as a plaintext mode
+	that requires end of line conversion.  This is being considered
+	for a UTF8 text packet.  If this doesn't take place, no major harm
+	done.  If it does take place, we'll get a jump on starting the
+	changeover.
+
+	* g10.c (main): --no-use-embedded-filename.
+
+	* build-packet.c (calc_plaintext, do_plaintext): Do not create
+	illegal (packet header indicates a size larger than the actual
+	packet) encrypted data packets when not compressing and using a
+	filename longer than 255 characters.
+
+	* keyedit.c (no_primary_warning): Cleanup. (menu_expire): Don't
+	give primary warning for subkey expiration changes.  These cannot
+	reorder primaries.
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_elg, gen_dsa, gen_rsa, do_create,
+	do_generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): New is_subkey argument
+	to set whether a generated key is a subkey.  Do not overload the
+	ret_sk.  This is some early cleanup to do backsigs for signing
+	subkeys.
+
+	* keygen.c (write_keybinding, do_generate_keypair,
+	generate_subkeypair): Keep track of the unprotected subkey secret
+	key so we can make a backsig with it.
+
+	* keygen.c (make_backsig): New function to add a backsig to a
+	binding sig of signing subkeys.  Currently disabled.
+	(write_keybinding): Call it here, for signing subkeys only.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Allow generating 0x19 signatures
+	(same as 0x18 or 0x28, but used for backsigs).
+
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Add new
+	SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE type for embedded signatures.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (optsep, argsplit, optlen, parse_options):
+	Simplify code and properly handle a partial match against an
+	option with an argument.
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Use
+	new optsep and argsplit functions.
+
+2004-04-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (argsplit): Refactor argsep into argsplit and
+	argsep so they can be called separately.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Remove
+	duplicate code from parse_keyserver_options by calling the generic
+	parse_options.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn, keyserver_refresh), g10.c (main),
+	gpgv.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), import.c
+	(revocation_present): Change all callers.
+
+2004-04-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_subkey): Keep
+	track of which self-sig we actually chose.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire, menu_set_primary_uid,
+	menu_set_preferences): Use it here to avoid updating non-used
+	self-sigs and possibly promoting an old self-sig into
+	consideration again.
+
+	* options.h, import.c, keyserver-internal.h, g10.c, mainproc.c,
+	keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Parse keyserver URI into a
+	structure.  Cleanup for new "guess my keyserver" functionality, as
+	well as refreshing via a preferred keyserver subpacket.
+
+	* options.h: Encapsulate keyserver details.  Change all callers.
+
+2004-04-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.h (STATUS_NEWSIG): New.
+	* status.c (get_status_string): Add it. 
+
+2004-03-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Request a trustdb update when adding a
+	new user ID so the new ID gets validity set.  Reported by Owen
+	Taylor.
+
+2004-03-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), compress-bz2.c (init_uncompress):
+	Rename --bzip2-compress-lowmem to --bzip2-decompress-lowmem since
+	it applies to decompression, not compression.
+
+2004-03-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids, show_key_and_fingerprint, ask_revoke_sig,
+	menu_revsig, menu_showphoto): --keyid-format conversion.
+	(menu_addrevoker): Use print_pubkey_info() rather than duplicating
+	code.
+
+2004-03-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_min_ownertrust, validate_keys): Do not use
+	keystr functions in log_debug.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Try and collapse user IDs when importing
+	a key for the first time.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker): Allow appointing a subkey as a
+	designated revoker if the user forces it via keyid!, so long as
+	the subkey can certify.  Also use the proper date string when
+	prompting for confirmation.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Maintain ordering of multiple Comment lines.
+	Requested by Peter Hyman.
+
+2004-03-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc, print_pkenc_list, list_node):
+	--keyid-format conversion.
+
+2004-03-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (skip_unusable, merge_selfsigs_main,
+	premerge_public_with_secret, lookup, get_user_id_string):
+	--keyid-format conversion.
+
+2004-03-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (add_utk, verify_own_keys, update_min_ownertrust,
+	get_validity, ask_ownertrust, validate_keys): --keyid-format
+	conversion.
+
+	* import.c (check_prefs_warning, check_prefs): --keyid-format
+	conversion and a little better text.
+	(import_one, import_secret_one, import_revoke_cert, chk_self_sigs,
+	delete_inv_parts, merge_blocks): Still more --keyid-format
+	conversions.
+
+2004-03-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (print_seckey_info, print_pubkey_info): --keyid-format
+	conversion.
+	(list_keyblock_print): 0xshort should not push us into the new
+	list format since it is not much longer than regular 8-character
+	short keyids.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyid.c (keystr_from_pk, keystr_from_sk): New functions
+	to pull a key string from a key in one step.  This isn't faster
+	than before, but makes for neater code.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Use keystr_from_xx here.
+	(print_key_data): No need to pass a keyid in.
+
+2004-03-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_sk): Minor performance boost by caching
+	secret key keyids so we don't have to calculate them each time.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Do not mark subkeys valid if
+	we do not support their pk algorithm.  This allows for early
+	(during get_*) rejection of a subkey, and selection of another.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Give a little more information
+	when we have room to do so.
+
+2004-03-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* revoke.c (export_minimal_pk), export.c (do_export_stream),
+	passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek), keyserver.c (print_keyrec): A
+	few more places to use --keyid-format.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), export.c (parse_export_options,
+	do_export_stream): Remove --export-all and the "include-non-rfc"
+	export-option as they are no longer meaningful with the removal of
+	v3 Elgamal keys.
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet, armor_filter): Use the 2440 partial length
+	encoding for the faked plaintext packet.
+
+2004-03-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print):
+	Remove verify-option show-long-keyids and replace with
+	the more general keyid-format.
+
+	* build-packet.c (write_header2): Remove call to start old gpg
+	partial length mode and change all callers.
+	(do_plaintext): Turn off partial length encoding now that we're
+	done writing the packet.
+	(do_comment, do_user_id): Try for a headerlen of 2 since that's
+	the smallest and most likely encoding for these packets.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Remove call to start old gpg partial
+	length mode.
+
+2004-03-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add a more flexible --keyid-format
+	option to replace the list-option (and eventually verify-option)
+	show-long-keyids.  The format can be short, long, 0xshort, and
+	0xlong.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyid.c (keystr, keystrlen): New functions to generate
+	a printable keyid.
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig, show_key_with_all_names),
+	keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Use new keystr() function here to
+	print keyids.
+
+	* packet.h, free-packet.c (free_encrypted, free_plaintext),
+	parse-packet.c (copy_packet, skip_packet, skip_rest, read_rest,
+	parse_plaintext, parse_encrypted, parse_gpg_control): Use a flag
+	to indicate partial or indeterminate encoding.  This is the first
+	step in some minor surgery to remove the old gpg partial length
+	encoding.
+
+2004-03-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Only data-type packets are allowed to
+	use OpenPGP partial length encoding.
+
+2004-02-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Allow deleting a public key with a
+	secret present if --expert is set.
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Make bytecount static so it
+	works with multiple literal packets inside a message.
+
+	* encode.c, helptext.c (keygen.algo, keygen.algo.elg_se), keygen.c
+	(ask_algo), sig-check.c (do_check_messages), skclist.c
+	(build_sk_list): Rename "ElGamal" to "Elgamal" as that is the
+	proper spelling nowadays.  Suggested by Jon Callas.
+
+2004-02-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c: Copyright.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Show cipher with --verbose.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_keys): Add
+	--ask-cert-level option to enable cert level prompts during
+	sigs. Defaults to on.  Simplify --default-cert-check-level to
+	--default-cert-level.  If ask-cert-level is off, or batch is on,
+	use the default-cert-level as the cert level.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs):
+	Simplify --min-cert-check-level to --min-cert-level.
+
+2004-02-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Add
+	--min-cert-check-level option to specify minimum cert check level.
+	Defaults to 2 (so 0x11 sigs are ignored).  0x10 sigs cannot be
+	ignored.
+
+2004-02-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Properly handle a --max-output
+	of zero (do not limit output at all).
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use the full 64-bit keyid in the
+	INFO header lines, and include "sig:" records for the benefit of
+	people who store their keys in LDAP servers.  It makes it easy to
+	do queries for things like "all keys signed by Isabella".
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (hextobyte): Removed.  It's in libutil.a now.
+
+2004-02-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_export): Disallow user strings that
+	aren't key IDs.
+	(keyserver_import): Clarify error message.
+	(keyserver_spawn): Properly handle 8 bit characters in user IDs in
+	the info lines during SEND.
+
+	* mkdtemp.c: Removed.
+
+	* Makefile.am: We get mkdtemp.c from libutil.a now, so don't link
+	with @LIBOBJS@.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Pass the scheme to the keyserver
+	helper.
+
+2004-02-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Add
+	--max-output option to help people deal with decompression bombs.
+
+2004-02-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_user_id): Do not force a header for attribute
+	packets as they require a new CTB, and we don't support forced
+	headers for new CTBs yet.
+
+2004-02-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (write_header2): If a suggested header length is
+	provided along with a zero length, interpret this as an actual
+	zero length packet and not as an indeterminate length packet.
+	(do_comment, do_user_id): Use it here as these packets might be
+	naturally zero length.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Show packet type when failing due to an
+	indeterminate length packet.
+
+	* misc.c (parse_options): Only provide args for the true (i.e. not
+	"no-xxx") form of options.
+
+2004-02-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (argsep): Move to misc.c.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (parse_options), export.c (parse_export_options),
+	import.c (parse_import_options), g10.c (main): Use it here to
+	allow for options with optional arguments.  Change all callers.
+
+	* import.c (check_prefs): Some language fixes.
+	(sec_to_pub_keyblock, import_secret_one): Without knowing the
+	number of MPIs there are, we cannot try and sk-to-pk-ize a key.
+
+2004-02-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (check_prefs): New function to check preferences on a
+	public key to ensure that it does not advertise any that we cannot
+	fulfill.  Use the keyedit command list function to optionally
+	rewrite the prefs.
+	(import_one, import_secret_one): Use it here when importing a
+	public key that we have the secret half of, or when importing a
+	secret key that we have the public half of.
+
+	* main.h, keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Remove sign_mode and enhance
+	the more general command list functionality to replace it.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use the general command functionality to implement
+	--sign-key, --lsign-key, --nrsign-key, and --nrlsign-key.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Do the revocation check even in the case
+	when a key, a revocation key set in a direct key signature, and a
+	revocation from that revocation key, all arrive piecemeal.
+	Needless to say, this is pretty obscure.
+
+2004-02-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Add
+	"show-unusable-subkeys" list-option to show revoked and/or expired
+	subkeys.
+
+2004-02-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Prompt for subkey removal for both
+	secret and public subkeys.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print), keyedit.c
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Show the revocation date of a
+	key/subkey, and general formatting work.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
+	merge_selfsigs): Keep track of the revocation date of a key.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyid.c (revokestr_from_pk): New function to print the
+	revocation date of a key.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Build the default preferences
+	list at runtime as it properly handles algorithms disabled at
+	build or run time.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Properly handle expired user IDs
+	when the expired self-sig is not the only self-sig.
+
+	* misc.c (compress_algo_to_string): Return NULL on failure like
+	all of the other xxxx_algo_to_string() functions.
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Minor spacing tweak to match --list-keys
+	output.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print), mainproc.c (list_node): Mark
+	revoked subkeys as revoked.  Requested by Matthew Wilcox.  Revoked
+	overrides expiration when both apply.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Use compress algo constants.
+	(show_basic_key_info): Make revoked and expired tags translatable.
+
+	* g10.c (rm_group): Properly ungroup from a list of groups.
+
+2004-01-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main, rm_group): Add --ungroup command to remove a
+	particular group.
+	(add_group): When adding a group with the same name as an already
+	existing group, merge the two groups.
+	(list_config): Show an error message when listing a config item
+	that doesn't exist.
+	(main): Replace -z0 trick for no compression.
+
+	* packet.h, keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon), keylist.c
+	(list_keyblock_colon), mainproc.c (list_node, proc_tree): Minor
+	cleanup to remove local_id, which is no longer used.
+
+2004-01-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c: Set MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES and MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES to
+	PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE (set in ./configure).
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey): When reading key data into the cache,
+	properly handle keys that are partially (pk, no UIDs) cached
+	already.  This is Debian bug #176425 and #229549.
+
+	* compress.c (init_compress, push_compress_filter2): Do the right
+	thing (i.e. nothing) with compress algo 0.
+
+	* main.h, decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Accept filenames to
+	decrypt on stdin.  This is bug #253.
+
+2004-01-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Show sigs with --verbose.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (set_screen_dimensions): New function to look
+	at COLUMNS and LINES.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyrec, keyserver_search_prompt), keyedit.c
+	(print_and_check_one_sig): Use new screen dimension variables.
+
+2004-01-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (list_config): New function to dump config options to
+	stdout.  Currently requires --with-colons.
+	(collapse_args): New function to turn argc/argv into a single
+	string.
+	(main): Use it here to pass list_config() more than one argument
+	as a single string.
+	(print_algo_numbers): Helper to print algorithm number for
+	--list-config "pubkey", "cipher", "hash"/"digest", and "compress"
+	config options.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs, merge_selfsigs_main),
+	pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Indicate who has revoked a key
+	(the owner or a designated revoker).  If a key was revoked by
+	both, prefer the owner.  If a subkey is already revoked by the
+	owner, don't allow a designated revokation of the whole key to
+	override this.  We're still revoked either way, of course.
+	
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig, keyedit_menu): Use the
+	COLUMNS environment variable (if any) to hint how wide the
+	terminal is.  Disabled on _WIN32.  Suggested by Janusz
+	A. Urbanowicz.
+
+2004-01-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (set_attrib_fd): Open attribute fd in binary
+	mode. This isn't meaningful on POSIX systems, but the Mingw builds
+	aren't exactly POSIX.
+
+	* trustdb.c (reset_trust_records): New, faster, implementation
+	that doesn't involve a keyring scan.
+	(clear_validity): Removed.
+
+	* g10.c (main), keydb.h, keydb.c (keydb_rebuild_caches),
+	keyring.h, keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Add "noisy" flag so
+	cache rebuilds can remain noisy when called for itself, and quiet
+	when called as part of the trustdb rebuild.
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Rebuild the sig caches before
+	building the trustdb.  Note that this is going to require some
+	architectual re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
+
+2004-01-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Comments.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Clear sig cache for any
+	signatures that we can no longer process (say, if the user removed
+	support for a necessary pubkey or digest algorithm).
+
+2004-01-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (print_cipher_algo_note): May as well call Rijndael AES
+	at this point.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_create), misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Remove the
+	last bits of Elgamal type 20 support.
+
+2004-01-03  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* compress.c [__riscos__]: Only use RISC OS' own ZLib module if
+	configured to use it.
+
+2003-12-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), import.c (parse_import_options,
+	import_one, import_secret_one), keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh):
+	Change --merge-only to --import-option merge-only.  Deprecate
+	--merge-only.
+
+2003-12-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (pull_in_libs): Dead code.  Removed.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_revocation_keys): Comments.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Don't bother to check designated
+	revoker sigs if the key is already revoked.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): New "maybe_revoked"
+	flag on PKs.  It is set when there is a revocation signature from
+	a valid revocation key, but the revocation key is not present to
+	verify the signature.
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use it here to give a
+	warning when showing key trust.
+
+	* compress-bz2.c: Include stdio.h.  Solaris 9 has a very old bzip2
+	library and we can at least guarantee that it won't fail because
+	of the lack of stdio.h.
+
+	* tdbio.c: Fixed format string bugs related to the use of DB_NAME.
+	Reported by Florian Weimer.
+
+2003-12-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (keyserver_opts,
+	parse_keyserver_uri): honor-http-proxy is no longer an option
+	since we can do the same thing with http-proxy with no arguments.
+	Also remove broken-http-proxy since it can be better handled in
+	the HTTP helper.
+
+	* keyserver.c (argsep): New variation on strsep that knows about
+	optional arguments.
+	(parse_keyserver_options): Use it here for optional arguments.
+
+2003-12-28  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext) [__riscos__]: Don't mangle
+	filename if the user specified it.
+
+	* g10.c, gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Removal of unnecessary #ifdef
+	__riscos__ sections.
+
+2003-12-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (strip_leading_space, get_arg): New.
+	(parse_keyserver_options): Use them here to allow arguments to
+	keyserver-options.  Since none of our options need arguments yet,
+	just pass them through whole to the keyserver helper.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (parse_options): Add a "noisy" flag to enable and
+	disable the messages about which option didn't match or matched
+	ambiguously.  Change all callers (g10.c, keyserver.c).
+
+	* main.h, import.c (import_options), export.c (export_options):
+	Pass the noisy flag through.
+
+2003-12-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (write_fake_data, do_secret_key), seckey-cert.c
+	(do_check): Use an unsigned length for mpi_get_opaque.
+
+	* options.h: It's impolite to assign -1 to an unsigned
+	opt.force_ownertrust.
+
+	* sig-check.c (cmp_help, do_check), sign.c (do_sign): Remove old
+	unused code.
+
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_sk): Make sure lowbits is initialized.
+
+2003-12-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Move the signing algo and hash checks
+	from here...
+	(signature_check2): ... to here.
+	(check_key_signature2): ... and here.  This is a minor
+	optimization to avoid fetching a key (which can be expensive,
+	especially if it is not self-signed, and there are many key
+	signatures on it which need to be checked for ultimate trust) if
+	the signature would have failed anyway because of algorithm or
+	hash problems.
+
+2003-12-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
+
+	* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and
+	make a new one here that shares code with the fingerprint
+	calculations.  This removes some duplicated functionality, and is
+	also around 14% faster.  (Every bit helps).
+
+	* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import
+	warning.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure.
+	get_pubkey_fast returns the primary key when requesting a subkey,
+	so if a user has a key signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but
+	used to), AND that key is not self-signed, AND the algorithm of
+	the subkey in question is not present in GnuPG, AND the algorithm
+	of the primary key that owns the subkey in question is present in
+	GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey signature using the
+	primary key algorithm and hit a BUG().  The fix is to not return a
+	hit if the keyid is not the primary.  All other users of
+	get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
+
+2003-12-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyid.c (do_fingerprint_md): Remove the rules to hash the old v3
+	Elgamal keys.  They are no longer needed.
+
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_sk, keyid_from_pk, fingerprint_from_pk,
+	fingerprint_from_sk): Enforce the v3-is-only-RSA rule.  Anything
+	that isn't RSA gets a zero keyid and fingerprint.
+
+	* keyid.c (do_fingerprint_md): Properly handle hashing of keys
+	that we don't know the structure of by using the opaque MPI.
+	(do_fingerprint_md_sk): We cannot calculate the fingerprint from a
+	secret key unless we know the structure (since we can't leave off
+	the secret key parts), so fail early.....
+	(keyid_from_sk, fingerprint_from_sk): .... and return all zeroes.
+
+2003-12-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (strusage, main): Show development version warning in
+	--version output.
+	(main): Set --bzip2-compress-level to the default value at
+	startup.  Remove --emulate-checksum-bug noop.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), main.h, seskey.c (do_encode_md,
+	encode_md_value), sig-check.c (do_check), sign.c (do_sign): Remove
+	--emulate-md-encode-bug as it only applied to Elgamal signatures,
+	which are going away.
+
+2003-11-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc, proc_encrypted): Add ability to use
+	--override-session-key on --symmetric messages (new-style or
+	old-style).
+	(proc_pubkey_enc): Move code to show session key from here to
+	proc_encrypted() so it can work with any type of message.
+	Suggested by Michael Young.
+
+2003-11-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Reset the trustdb before checking if
+	we have any ultimately trusted keys.  This ensures that if we lose
+	all our ultimately trusted keys, we don't leave behind the old
+	validity calculations.  Noted by Peter Palfrader.
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Specify in the comment when a
+	designated revocation is generated.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
+	get_seckey_byname2): Remove Elgamal check since we are removing
+	type 20 keys altogether.
+
+2003-11-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Do not allow an empty PK list in
+	interactive mode.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Remove ability to generate Elgamal
+	sign+encrypt keys.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
+	get_seckey_byname2): Disallow use of sign+encrypt Elgamal keys.
+
+2003-11-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* seskey.c (do_encode_md): Comment about earlier (pre-PGP 2.3)
+	encodings.
+
+	* misc.c (compress_algo_to_string): Translate "Uncompressed".
+	Requested by Tommi Vainikainen.
+	(string_to_compress_algo): Include multi-string for
+	"uncompressed|none".
+
+2003-11-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), compress-bz2.c (init_uncompress): Add
+	--bz2-compress-lowmem to set bzlib "small" flag for low memory
+	(but slow) decompression.
+
+2003-11-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* compress.c (init_compress): Remove compress level 10 trick,
+	since it is no longer needed.
+
+	* g10.c: Fix typoed option name.
+
+	* compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Compression level 0 is not
+	meaningful for bzip2.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), compress.c (init_compress),
+	compress-bz2.c (init_compress): Add --compress-level and
+	--bzip2-compress-level.  -z sets them both.  Change various
+	callers.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple), sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file):
+	Properly use default_compress_algo (--compress-algo, followed by
+	the highest --personal-compress-preference, followed by ZIP) to
+	get the algorithm.
+
+2003-11-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, trustdb.c (trust_model_string, init_trustdb): Add
+	support for "external" trust model, where the user can provide a
+	pregenerated trustdb.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Do not allow editing ownertrust with
+	an external trust model trustdb.
+
+2003-11-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c, keyedit.c, keylist.c, mainproc.c: Clarify the
+	plurarility (or not) of various list and verify options.
+
+2003-11-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --sign --encrypt.
+
+	* main.h, encode.c (setup_symkey): New.  Prompt for a passphrase
+	and create a DEK for symmetric encryption.
+	(write_symkey_enc): New.  Write out symmetrically encrypted
+	session keys.
+	(encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Use them here here when creating a
+	message that can be decrypted with a passphrase or a pk.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Call setup_symkey if we are doing a
+	--symmetric --sign --encrypt.
+
+2003-11-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Don't show algorithm information
+	when --quiet is set.  Suggested by Duncan Harris.  Also don't fail
+	with BUG() when processing a --symmetric message with a cipher we
+	don't have.
+
+	* g10.c: Alias --personal-xxx-prefs to --personal-xxx-preferences.
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): When adding recipients interactively,
+	allow the user to stop at any point.
+
+2003-10-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (register_trusted_keyid): New.  Adds a
+	keyid to the list of ultimately trusted keys.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Use it here so that the ultimate
+	ownertrust happens before the trustdb (might be) rebuilt.  Also
+	fix an error where the newly generated pk is thought to be a
+	subkey by the trustdb.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Fix --export-all do actually do something
+	different than --export.
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Show all recipients rather than
+	showing each recipient as they are added.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc, proc_encrypted): Keep a count of
+	the number of passphrases that can decrypt a symmetric or mixed
+	symmetric/pk message and include it in the list of keys shown to
+	the user.
+
+2003-10-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (compress_algo_to_string, string_to_compress_algo,
+	check_compress_algo): Add bzip2.
+
+	* compress.c (compress_filter): Make static to help force the use
+	of push_compress_filter.  Remove default algorithm setting since
+	that is done in push_compress_filter now.
+
+	* main.h: Use named algorithm.
+
+	* filter.h, compress.c (push_compress_filter,
+	push_compress_filter2): New.  Figure out which is the appropriate
+	compression filter to use, and push it into place.
+
+	* compress.c (handle_compressed), encode.c (encode_simple,
+	encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), import.c
+	(read_block), export.c (do_export): Use push_compress_filter
+	instead of pushing the compression filter ourselves.
+
+	* compress-bz2.c: New.  Bzlib versions of the compression filter
+	routines.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Include compress-bz2.c if bz2lib is available.
+
+2003-10-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* apdu.c (close_ct_reader, close_pcsc_reader): Implemented.
+	(get_ccid_error_string): New.  Not very useful messages, though.
+
+2003-10-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Ask for card insertion.
+	(check_card_serialno): New.
+	(agent_scd_pksign, agent_scd_pkdecrypt): Use it here.
+	* cardglue.c (open_card): Issue insertion status message.
+	* status.h, status.c (STATUS_CARDCTRL): New.
+
+	* status.c (cpr_get_answer_okay_cancel): New.
+
+2003-10-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Denote secrets keys stored on a
+	card with an '>'. Print the '#' also for subkeys.
+	(list_keyblock_colon): Introduce new field 15 for sec/ssb to print
+	the serial number.
+
+2003-10-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Enhance the version-specific config file code to
+	try for more specific matches before giving up (e.g. 1.3.3-cvs,
+	1.3.3, 1.3, 1).
+
+2003-10-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --symmetric --encrypt command.  This generates
+	a message that can be decrypted via a passphrase or public key
+	system.
+
+	* main.h, encode.c (encode_seskey): Allow passing in an
+	already-created session key dek.
+	(encode_simple): Use the actual symmetric cipher when encrypting a
+	session key for a symmetric message.
+	(encode_crypt): Add a flag to trigger a hybrid mode that can be
+	decrypted via a passphrase or a pk.  Change all callers.
+
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): There is no way to tell the
+	difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm
+	that we don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear.
+	Use the actual list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is
+	invalid.  Return error if the decrypted cipher algorithm is
+	invalid.
+	(proc_symkey_enc): In a mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid
+	dek already exists from decrypting via pk, do not try to process
+	the passphrase.
+	(proc_symkey_enc): Indicate when we're decrypting a session key as
+	opposed to decrypting data.  If a passphrase is invalid, discard
+	the dek so we'll keep trying.
+
+2003-10-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_open_reader): Return an error if no USB
+	devices are found.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Replaced INTLLIBS by LIBINTL.
+
+	* g10.c (main) [ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT]: Add a default for
+	--pcsc-driver.
+
+	* cardglue.c (learn_status_cb): Fixed faulty use of !space.
+
+2003-10-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* apdu.c (apdu_open_reader): Hacks for PC/SC under Windows.
+
+2003-10-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase): Add optional promptid arg.
+	Changed all callers.
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Use it here, so the machine interface can
+	tell whether the Admin PIN is requested.
+
+	* cardglue.c (agent_scd_checkpin): New.
+
+	* misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Added AUTH usage.
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (check_against_given_fingerprint): New. Factored
+	out that code elsewhere.
+	(do_check_pin): New.
+	* card-util.c (card_edit): New command "passwd".  Add logic to
+	check the PIN in advance.
+	(card_status): Add new args to return the serial number.  Changed
+	all callers.
+
+2003-10-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Show the keyid when giving the Elgamal
+	slow import warning.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Older versions used --comment "" to indicate no
+	comment.  Don't add an empty comment.
+
+2003-10-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Ownertrust is only
+	meaningful for the PGP or classic trust models.  Both validity and
+	ownertrust are not meaningful for the always trust model.
+
+2003-10-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c: Always enable the gen_card_key prototype.
+
+2003-10-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cardglue.c (card_close): New.
+	(agent_scd_change_pin): Implemented.
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_close_reader): New.
+	* apdu.c (close_ccid_reader, close_ct_reader, close_csc_reader)
+	(close_osc_reader, apdu_close_reader): New.  Not all are properly
+	implemented yet.
+	* g10.c (g10_exit): Use close_card.
+
+2003-10-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Give a deprecated option warning for
+	--show-keyring, --show-photos, --show-policy-url, --show-notation,
+	and their respective no- forms.
+
+	* options.skel: Remove show-photos and replace with
+	list/verify-options show-photos.  Remove no-mangle-dos-filenames.
+
+	* misc.c (parse_options): Allow for incomplete (but unambiguous)
+	options.
+
+2003-10-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* ccid-driver.c (ccid_transceive): Add T=1 chaining for sending.
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign) [!ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT]: Return an error for
+	card keys.
+
+	* cardglue.c (agent_scd_pkdecrypt): Implemented.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it) [ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT]: Divert decryption
+	to card
+
+2003-10-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cardglue.c (pin_cb): Detect whether an admin or regular PIN is
+	requested.
+	(genkey_status_cb): New.
+	(agent_scd_genkey): Implemented.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): New arg CARD_SERIALNO and prepare
+	parameters for on card key generation. Changed all callers.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Add new arg card and merged casrd specific
+	changes from 1.9.
+	(proc_parameter_file): New arg card, apss it down to
+	do_generate_keypair and changed all callers.
+	(gen_card_key): New.
+
+	* g10.c: Include cardclue.h.
+	(main): s/app_set_default_reader_port/card_set_reader_port/.
+	* cardglue.c (card_set_reader_port): New to address include file
+	issues.
+
+2003-10-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cardglue.c (learn_status_cb): Release values before assignment
+	so that it can be used by getattr to update the structure.
+	(agent_scd_getattr): New.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_pubkey_info): Add FP arg for optional printing
+	to a stream.  Changed all callers.
+
+2003-10-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, iso7816.c, iso7816.h, apdu.c
+	* apdu.h, ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h, card-util.c: Updated
+	from current GnuPG 1.9. Changes over there are:
+	* card-util.c: Tweaked to use this source also under 1.3. 
+	(card_edit): New command "forcesig".
+	* card-util.c (print_name, print_isoname): Use 0 and not LF fro
+	the max_n arg of tty_print_utf8_string2.
+	* card-util.c (change_pin): Simplified.  We now have only a PIN
+	and an Admin PIN.
+	* ccid-driver.c: Detect GnuPG 1.3 and include appropriate files.
+	* apdu.c: Ditto.
+	* app-openpgp.c: Ditto.
+	* iso7816.c: Ditto.
+	(generate_keypair): Renamed to ..
+	(do_generate_keypair): .. this.
+	* app-common.h [GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION]: New.
+	* iso7816.h [GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION]: Include cardglue.h
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_change_pin): Make sure CVH1 and CHV2 are
+	always synced.
+	(verify_chv2, verify_chv3): New. Factored out common code.
+	(do_setattr, do_sign, do_auth, do_decipher): Change the names of
+	the prompts to match that we have only 2 different PINs.
+	(app_select_openpgp): Check whether the card enforced CHV1.
+	(convert_sig_counter_value): New. Factor out code from
+	get_sig_counter.
+
+	* Makefile.am (card_support_source): Depend on new AM conditional
+	to get the ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT off the way from source
+	copied files.
+	(update-source-from-gnupg-2): Maintainer helper.
+	
+2003-10-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --no-groups to zero --group list.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of
+	symmetrically encrypted session key.  Use --s2k-cipher-algo to
+	choose cipher, rather than the default cipher.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Give a warning if an
+	symmetrically encrypted session key is seen without salt.  Show in
+	--list-packets if a symetrically encrypted session key is present.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning
+	unless --quiet is set.  Use text name of cipher in warning.
+
+2003-09-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add
+	--verify-option show-unusable-uids.
+
+	* gpgv.c (check_trustdb_stale): Stub.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity): Move the up-to-date check to
+	check_trustdb_stale (new), so that it can be called before
+	validity is checked.
+	
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Disable the overall key
+	validity display until it can be thought about more.  Use
+	check_trustdb_stale here to avoid putting the check warning in the
+	middle of a listed key.
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Only verify_own_keys() for those trust
+	models that it applies to (i.e. classic and OpenPGP).
+
+2003-09-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (do_add_key_flags, parse_parameter_usage): Add support
+	the proposed AUTH key flag.
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main) 
+	(merge_selfsigs_subkey, premerge_public_with_secret): Ditto.
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Allow to parse the divert-to-card
+	S2K mode.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Handle divert-to-card S2K
+	* seckey-cert.c (is_secret_key_protected): Ditto.
+	(check_secret_key): Ditto.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_ask_passphrase): Renamed from ask_passphrase.
+	* passphrase.c (ask_passphrase): New.
+
+2003-09-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): New commands --card-edit, --card-status and
+	--change-pin.  New options --ctapi-driver, --pcsc-driver and
+	--disable-ccid
+	* options.h (DBG_CARD_IO): New.
+	* cardglue.c, cardclue.h: Enhanced.
+	* card-util.c: New. Taken from current the gnupg 1.9 branch.
+	* app-common.h, app-openpgp.c, iso7816.c, iso7816.h, apdu.c
+	* apdu.h, ccid-driver.c, ccid-driver.h: New.  Takem from the current
+	gnupg 1.9 branch withy minor changes to include directives.
+	* Makefile.am: Added these files.
+	
+2003-09-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign) [ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT]: Divert to card.
+	* cardglue.c, cardglue.h: New.
+	* Makefile.am (gpg_LDADD): Added.
+	(card_support_sources): New.
+	
+2003-09-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Add
+	"show-unusable-uids" list-option to show revoked and/or expired
+	user IDs.
+
+2003-09-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Show names a little neater
+	by putting the [revoked] or [expired] in the space used for the
+	[validity].  There is also no point in showing "[unknown]
+	[revoked]".
+
+2003-09-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_policy_etc): Capitalize "URL".
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Give a little more information while
+	rebuilding trustdb.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Clarify "don't know".
+
+	* g10.c (main): Default to --no-mangle-dos-filenames.
+
+	* keydb.h, keyring.c (keyring_search), trustdb.c (search_skipfnc):
+	Expand the skipfnc to include a pointer to the user ID that
+	matched.
+
+	* getkey.c (skip_disabled): Rename to skip_unusable, and add
+	checks for expired or revoked user IDs.
+
+2003-09-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Deprecate --default-comment in favor of
+	--no-comments.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), armor.c (armor_filter): Allow using
+	--comment multiple times to get multiple Comment: header lines.
+	--no-comments resets list.
+
+2003-09-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Trim --help to commonly used options.  Remove -f.
+
+2003-09-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Error out if --multifile is used with the commands
+	that don't support it yet (--sign, --clearsign, --detach-sign,
+	--symmetric, and --store).
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --multifile as an alias to turn --encrypt into
+	--encrypt-files (plus --verify-files, --decrypt-files).
+
+	* encode.c (use_mdc), g10.c (main): Use RFC1991 and RFC2440
+	directly to check for MDC usability.  Do not set the force_mdc or
+	disable_mdc flags since there is no point any longer.
+
+2003-09-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (parse_hash_header, armor_filter), g10.c (print_hex,
+	print_mds), pkclist.c (algo_available): Drop TIGER/192 support.
+
+2003-09-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Fix assertion failure when
+	using toggle to see a secret key.  Reported by Maxim Britov.
+
+2003-08-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (add_keyserver_url), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu), sign.c
+	(mk_notation_policy_etc): Clarify a few strings.  It's a
+	"preferred keyserver URL".
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use "keyserver-url" instead of
+	"preferred-keyserver" for the sake of short and simple commands.
+
+2003-08-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (keygen_add_keyserver_url): Signature callback
+	for adding a keyserver URL.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_set_keyserver_url): New command to
+	set preferred keyserver to specified (or all) user IDs.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Set preferred keyserver flag
+	while building a preferred keyserver subpacket.
+
+	* keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_keyserver_url): URLs might be
+	UTF8.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker): Fix leaking a few bytes.
+
+2003-08-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Use list-option
+	show-long-keyid in main --edit-key display.
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Use list-option
+	show-long-keyid in --edit-key "check" function.
+
+2003-08-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_send_all_options): Make use of $GPG_TTY.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Disable use-agent if passphrase-fd is given
+	later. Suggested by Kurt Garloff.
+
+	* exec.c, g10.c, gpgv.c, passphrase.c, photoid.c:
+	s/__MINGW32__/_WIN32/ to help building on native Windows
+	compilers.  Requested by Brian Gladman.  From Werner on stable
+	branch.
+
+2003-08-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add list-option
+	list-preferred-keyserver.
+
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): When responding 'no' to the blank
+	passphrase question, re-prompt for a new passphrase.  This is bug
+	#202.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use two different preferred
+	keyserver displays - one if the key is not present (to tell the
+	user where to get the key), the other if it is present (to tell
+	the user where the key can be refreshed).
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set flag if a
+	preferred keyserver is present.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Show keyserver url in listings
+	with list-option show-keyserver-url.
+
+2003-08-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Use NETLIBS instead of EGDLIBS.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Get the uid validity before
+	printing any sig results to avoid munging the output with trustdb
+	warnings.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Don't include --show-keyring in --help as it is
+	deprecated.
+
+2003-08-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c: Remove extra semicolon (typo).
+
+	* options.skel: Note that keyserver.pgp.com isn't synchronized,
+	and explain the roundrobin a bit better.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2), import.c (import_one,
+	import_revoke_cert, chk_self_sigs, delete_inv_parts,
+	collapse_uids, merge_blocks): Make much quieter during import of
+	slightly munged, but recoverable, keys. Use log_error for
+	unrecoverable import failures.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Comment.
+
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Making a v3 signature with
+	notations or policy urls is an error, not an info (i.e. increment
+	the errorcount). Don't print the notation or policy url to stdout
+	since it can be mixed into the output stream when piping and munge
+	the stream.
+
+2003-08-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, sig-check.c (signature_check2, do_check,
+	do_check_messages): Provide a signing-key-is-revoked flag.  Change
+	all callers.
+
+	* status.h, status.c (get_status_string): New REVKEYSIG status tag
+	for a good signature from a revoked key.
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig, check_sig_and_print): Use it here.
+
+	* import.c (import_revoke_cert, merge_blocks, merge_sigs): Compare
+	actual signatures on import rather than using keyid or class
+	matching.  This does not change actual behavior with a key, but
+	does mean that all sigs are imported whether they will be used or
+	not.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Don't give "signature packet
+	without xxxx" warnings for experimental pk algorithms.  An
+	experimental algorithm may not have a notion of (for example) a
+	keyid (i.e. PGP's x.509 stuff).
+
+2003-08-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print),
+	keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): New "show-sig-expire"
+	list-option to show signature expiration dates (if any).
+
+2003-07-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main, add_keyserver_url): Add
+	--sig-preferred-keyserver to implant a "where to get my key"
+	subpacket into a signature.
+
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Rename to
+	mk_notation_policy_etc and add preferred keyserver support for
+	signatures.
+
+2003-07-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (do_add_key_flags): Don't set the certify flag for
+	subkeys.
+	(ask_algo): Provide key flags for DSA, Elgamal_e, and Elgamal
+	subkeys.
+	(generate_keypair): Provide key flags for the default DSA/Elgamal
+	keys.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check, signature_check2,
+	check_key_signature, check_key_signature2): Allow passing NULLs
+	for unused parameters in the x2 form of each function to avoid the
+	need for dummy variables. getkey.c, mainproc.c: Change all
+	callers.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (read_trust_options): New.  Returns items
+	from the trustdb version record.
+
+	* keylist.c (public_key_list): Use it here for the new "tru"
+	record.
+
+	* gpgv.c (read_trust_options): Stub.
+
+2003-07-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Use list-option
+	show-validity in --edit-key interface as well.
+
+2003-07-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add
+	verify-options "show-validity" and "show-long-keyid" to show
+	trustdb validity and long keyids during (file) signature
+	verification.
+
+	* packet.h, main.h, sig-check.c (signature_check2,
+	check_key_signature2, do_check): If ret_pk is set, fill in the pk
+	used to verify the signature.  Change all callers in getkey.c,
+	mainproc.c, and sig-check.c.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use the ret_pk from above to
+	put the fingerprint of the signing key in "sig" records during a
+	--with-colons --check-sigs.  This requires --no-sig-cache as well
+	since we don't cache fingerprints.
+
+2003-07-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for
+	the unhashed signature cache any longer.
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's
+	fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p).
+
+	* Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few
+	months, they won't be the same thing.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for
+	"hkp", since it is occasionally written that way.
+	(keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the
+	email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields
+	when it is set.
+
+	* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or
+	expired uids do not count in the web of trust.
+
+	* signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use
+	sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we
+	have struct sigaction.  This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which
+	seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by
+	default.
+	(pause_on_sigusr): Typo.
+	(do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get
+	the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we
+	can't, fail with an explanation.
+
+	* signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code.  It was not
+	used in this version, and was causing some build problems on
+	quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89).
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values
+	when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or
+	misleading.  This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled
+	properly in 1.9/2.0.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available
+	from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently
+	present.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert
+	(same behavior as revoked uids).  Do not allow signing a user ID
+	without a self-signature.  --expert overrides.  Add additional
+	prompt to the signature level question.
+	(menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace
+	selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke
+	them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs.  This
+	is bug #181
+
+2003-07-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> (from Werner on stable branch)
+
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed
+	to iscntrl.  Noted by Christian Biere.
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto.
+	(get_parameter_algo): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto.
+	* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto.  s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/.
+	* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): 
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
+
+2003-06-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Disallow old style partial length for
+	all key material packets to avoid possible corruption of keyrings.
+
+2003-06-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): Invalidate the cache so that
+	the file descriptor gets closed.  Fixes bug reported by Juan
+	F. Codagnone.
+
+2003-06-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Use new hkp://subkeys.pgp.net as sample keyserver
+	since they at least handle subkeys correctly.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), main.h, keylist.c (show_keyserver_url),
+	mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt,
+	parse_one_sig_subpkt, can_handle_critical): Add read-only support
+	for preferred keyserver subpackets.  They're basically policy URLs
+	with a different name.  Add a verify-option
+	"show-preferred-keyserver" to turn them on and off (on by default,
+	as per stable branch).
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add "--set-notation" as alias to "--notation-data"
+	this is to make things consistent with --set-policy-url meaning
+	both sigs and certs.
+
+2003-06-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Add
+	"show-validity" and "show-long-keyid" list-options.
+
+	* gpgv.c (get_validity, trust_value_to_string): Stubs.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use SAFE_VERSION instead of VERSION in the
+	version-specific gpg.conf file so it can be overridden on RISCOS.
+
+2003-06-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main), keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation),
+	mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Emulate the old policy and
+	notation behavior (display by default).  Send to status-fd whether
+	it is displayed on the screen or not.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Since we now have some options in devel that won't
+	work in a stable branch gpg.conf file, try for a version-specific
+	gpg.conf-VERSION file before falling back to gpg.conf.
+
+	* main.h, options.h: Move various option flags to options.h.
+
+2003-05-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), main.h, keylist.c
+	(show_policy, show_notation): Collapse the old print_notation_data
+	into show_policy() and show_notation() so there is only one
+	function to print notations and policy URLs.
+
+	* options.h, main.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c
+	(print_and_check_one_sig), keylist.c (list_one,
+	list_keyblock_print), pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust), sign.c
+	(mk_notation_and_policy): New "list-options" and "verify-options"
+	commands.  These replace the existing
+	--show-photos/--no-show-photos,
+	--show-notation/--no-show-notation,
+	--show-policy-url/--no-show-policy-url, and --show-keyring
+	options.  The new method is more flexible since a user can specify
+	(for example) showing photos during sig verification, but not in
+	key listings.  The old options are emulated.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (parse_options): New general option line
+	parser. Fix the bug in the old version that did not handle report
+	syntax errors after a valid entry.
+
+	* import.c (parse_import_options), export.c
+	(parse_export_options): Call it here instead of duplicating the
+	code.
+
+2003-05-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Don't show the keyring filename when in
+	--with-colons mode.  Actually translate "Keyring" string.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): We can't currently handle multiple
+	signatures of different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
+	to run a different hash context for each), but if they are all the
+	same, make an exception.  This is Debian bug #194292.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Make string translatable.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Mark real primary uids
+	differently than assumed primaries.
+
+	* keyedit.c (no_primary_warning): Use the differently marked
+	primaries here in a new function to warn when an --edit-key
+	command might rearrange the self-sig dates enough to change which
+	uid is primary.
+	(menu_expire, menu_set_preferences): Use no_primary_warning()
+	here.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Use @DLLIBS@ for -ldl.
+
+2003-05-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Made "no secret subkey
+	for" warning a verbose item and translatable. (From wk on stable
+	branch)
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Made "no subkey for subkey
+	binding packet" a verbose item instead of a !quiet one.  There are
+	too many garbled keys out in the wild. (From wk on stable branch)
+
+	* filter.h: Remove const from WHAT. (From wk on stable branch)
+
+	* progress.c (handle_progress): Store a copy of
+	NAME. (progress_filter): Release WHAT, make sure not to print a
+	NULL WHAT. (From wk on stable branch)
+
+	* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Adjust free for new progress
+	semantics. (From wk on stable branch)
+
+	* plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile): Don't dealloc
+	pfx->WHAT. (From wk on stable branch)
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Issue the RSA_OR_IDEA status when the
+	cipher algo is IDEA to make it easier to track down the
+	problem. (From twoaday on stable branch)
+	
+2003-05-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c,
+	build-packet.c, getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c,
+	status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c, options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h,
+	encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c, signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit
+	all preprocessor instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'.
+	This is not required by C89, but there are some compilers out
+	there that don't like it.
+
+2003-05-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
+	is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not
+	just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to
+	re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy.  Cache the
+	result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than
+	once.
+	
+	* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call
+	is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
+	
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c
+	(print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the
+	cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via
+	cache_disabled_value if not available.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have
+	it handy and it might be useful later.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a
+	new key.  Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path
+	for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set
+	primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most
+	recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at
+	all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic.
+
+	* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
+	revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings.  This is for
+	consistency with --show-photos.
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c
+	(check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when
+	verifying signatures.
+	
+	* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various
+	--openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options.  This is the same as --no-XXXX
+	for those options.
+
+	* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user
+	elects to repeat question.  This is bug 153.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the
+	signature.
+
+2003-05-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* progress.c (handle_progress)
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet)
+	* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Make sure that a filename
+	of "-" is considered to be stdin so that iobuf_get_filelength
+	won't get called.  This fixes bug 156 reported by Gregery Barton.
+
+2003-05-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c
+	(do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import),
+	parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove
+	vestigal code for the old sig cache subpacket.  This wasn't
+	completely harmless as it caused subpacket 101 to disappear on
+	import and export.
+
+	* options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c,
+	sign.c, encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for
+	different levels of PGP-ness are massively complex.  This is step
+	one in simplifying them. No functional change yet, just use a
+	macro to check for compliance level.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression
+	preference warning.
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning
+	message from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a
+	non-v3 RSA key.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string,
+	compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file,
+	clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt,
+	write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New functions to put the "this
+	message may not be usable...." warning in one place.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification.  Use a
+	single enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440,
+	PGPx, etc.)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys,
+	recv-keys, and refresh-keys.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms
+	chosen against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules.
+
+	* keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in
+	--openpgp mode.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a
+	hint of 0.
+
+2003-05-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* tdbio.c (create_version_record): Only create new trustdbs with
+	TM_CLASSIC or TM_PGP.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (trust_string, get_ownertrust_string,
+	get_validity_string, ask_ownertrust, validate_keys), pkclist.c
+	(do_edit_ownertrust): Rename trust_string to trust_value_to_string
+	for naming consistency.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (string_to_trust_value): New function to
+	translate a string to a trust value.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use string_to_trust_value here for
+	--force-ownertrust.
+	
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (trust_model_string,
+	init_trustdb, check_trustdb, update_trustdb, get_validity,
+	validate_one_keyblock): An "OpenPGP" trust model is misleading
+	since there is no official OpenPGP trust model.  Use "PGP"
+	instead.
+
+2003-04-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Comments.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_write): Cast NULL to void* to properly terminate
+	varargs list.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Just for safety, catch an
+	invalid pk algorithm.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Crucial that the call to mksubpkt
+	comes LAST before the calls to finalize the sig as that makes it
+	possible for the mksubpkt function to get a reliable pointer to
+	the subpacket area.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): If an untrusted key was chosen by a
+	particular user ID, use that ID as the one to ask about when
+	prompting whether to use the key anyway.
+	(build_pk_list): Similar change here when adding keys to the
+	recipient list.
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_validity): Fix bug that prevented more than
+	one validity record per trust record.
+	(get_validity): When retrieving validity for a (user) supplied
+	user ID, return the validity for that user ID only, and do not
+	fall back to the general key validity.
+	(validate_one_keyblock): Some commentary on whether
+	non-self-signed user IDs belong in the web of trust (arguably,
+	they do).
+
+2003-04-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --no-textmode.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream), keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names,
+	menu_addrevoker), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), photoid.c
+	(show_photos), sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy), trustdb.c
+	(get_validity, reset_trust_records, validate_keys): Make some
+	strings translatable.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Show digest algorithm and sig
+	class when verifying a sig with --verbose on, and add version, pk
+	and hash algorithms and sig class to VALIDSIG.
+	
+	* parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Make a warning message a
+	--verbose warning message since we don't need to warn every time
+	we see an unknown critical (we only need to invalidate the
+	signature).
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Check the trustdb options even with
+	TM_AUTO since the auto may become TM_CLASSIC or TM_OPENPGP.
+
+2003-04-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Show the hash used when making a signature in
+	verbose mode.
+
+	* tdbio.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_read_model): New function to return the
+	trust model used in a given trustdb.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (init_trustdb, check_trustdb,
+	update_trustdb): Use tdbio_read_model to implement an "auto" trust
+	model which is set via the trustdb.
+
+2003-04-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_revoke_cert): Remove ultimate trust when
+	revoking an ultimately trusted key.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Allow replacing expired signatures.
+	Allow duplicate signatures with --expert.
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Don't display a null
+	fingerprint when checking a signature with --always-trust enabled.
+
+	* filter.h (progress_filter_context_t), progress.c
+	(handle_progress), plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile,
+	hash_datafiles): Fix compiler warnings.  Make "what" constant.
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_plaintext): Do not create invalid literal
+	packets with >255-byte names.
+
+2003-04-15  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* Makefile.am (AM_CFLAGS): Make use of AM_CFLAGS and AM_LDFLAGS.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --enable-progress-filter.
+	* progress.c (handle_progress): Make use of it.
+
+2003-04-15  Marcus Brinkmann  <marcus@g10code.de>
+
+	* progress.c: New file.
+	* Makefile.am (common_source): Add progress.c.
+	* filter.h (progress_filter_context_t): New type.
+	(progress_filter, handle_progress): New prototypes.
+	* main.h (open_sigfile): New argument for prototype.
+	* openfile.c (open_sigfile): New argument to install progress
+	filter.
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): New variable PFX.  Register
+	progress filter.  Install text_filter after that.
+	(encode_crypt): Likewise.
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Likewise.
+	(clearsign_file): Likewise.
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_message): Likewise.
+	(decrypt_messages): Likewise.
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures): Likewise.
+	(verify_one_file): Likewise.
+	* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): Likewise.
+	(ask_for_detached_datafile): Likewise.
+
+2003-04-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): Do a dummy read if the
+	agent is to be used.  Noted by Ingo Klöcker.
+	(agent_get_passphrase): Inhibit caching when we have no
+	fingerprint.  This is required for key generation as well as for
+	symmetric only encryption.
+
+	* passphrase .c (agent_get_passphrase): New arg CANCELED.
+	(passphrase_to_dek): Ditto.  Passed to above.  Changed all
+	callers to pass NULL.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): New arg CANCELED.
+	(check_secret_key): Terminate loop when canceled.
+
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Pass ERRTEXT untranslated to
+	passphrase_to_dek and translate where appropriate.
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (ask_passphrase): Ditto.
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Translate the TRYAGAIN_TEXT.
+	Switch the codeset to utf-8.
+
+2003-04-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Fixed error handling; the function
+	used to re-loop with same file after an error.  Reported by Joseph
+	Walton.
+
+2003-04-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), import.c (parse_import_options,
+	fix_pks_corruption): It's really PKS corruption, not HKP
+	corruption.  Keep the old repair-hkp-subkey-bug command as an
+	alias.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Rename --no-version to --no-emit-version for
+	consistency.  Keep --no-version as an alias.
+
+2003-04-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): PGP 8 can use the SHA-256 hash.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Remove
+	unused code.
+
+2003-04-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add primary key fpr to VALIDSIG
+	status.
+
+2003-03-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h: Err on the side of making an unknown signature a SIG
+	rather than a CERT.
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Discard any key signatures that
+	aren't key types (i.e. 0x00, 0x01, etc.)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add deprecated option warning for
+	--list-ownertrust.  Add --compression-algo alias for
+	--compress-algo.  Change --version output strings to match
+	"showpref" strings, and make translatable.
+
+	* status.c (do_get_from_fd): Accept 'y' as well as 'Y' for
+	--command-fd boolean input.
+
+	* trustdb.c: Fix typo (DISABLE_REGEXP -> DISABLE_REGEX)
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): Show no-ks-modify
+	flag.
+
+2003-03-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (kopts): Add "try-dns-srv"
+	keyserver option.  Defaults to on.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Fix memory leak with
+	symmetric messages.  Fix segfault with symmetric messages.  Fix
+	incorrect prompt with symmetric messages.
+
+2003-03-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* compress.c (init_uncompress): Use a 15 bit window size so that
+	the output of implementations which don't run for PGP 2
+	compatibility won't get garbled.
+
+2003-03-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Mask the ownertrust when building the
+	list of fully valid keys so that disabled keys are still counted
+	in the web of trust.
+	(get_ownertrust_with_min): Do the same for the minimum ownertrust
+	calculation.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Show the notation names for
+	not-human-readable notations.  Fix cosmetic off-by-one length
+	counter.
+
+	* options.skel: Add explantion and commented-out
+	"no-mangle-dos-filenames".
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Make string translatable.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Quote ':', '%', and any 8-bit
+	characters in the uid strings sent to the keyserver helper.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache): Lock the keyring while
+	rebuilding the signature caches to prevent another gpg from
+	tampering with the temporary copy.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Include AES192 and AES256 in
+	default prefs.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Make strings translatable.
+
+	* keydb.c: Double the maximum number of keyrings to 40.
+
+	* gpgv.c (main): Fix bug #113 - gpgv should accept the
+	--ignore-time-conflict option.
+
+	* g10.c (main): --openpgp disables --pgpX.  Double the amount of
+	secure memory to 32k (keys are getting bigger these days).
+
+	* Makefile.am: Makefile.am: Use @CAPLIBS@ to link in -lcap if we
+	are using capabilities.
+
+2003-02-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Include various pieces of
+	information about the key in the data sent to the keyserver
+	helper.  This allows the helper to use it in instructing a remote
+	server which may not have any actual OpenPGP smarts in parsing
+	keys.
+
+	* main.h, export.c (export_pubkeys_stream, do_export_stream): Add
+	ability to return only the first match in an exported keyblock for
+	keyserver usage.  This should be replaced at some point with a
+	more flexible solution where each key can be armored seperately.
+
+2003-02-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Do not push textmode filter onto an unopened
+	IOBUF (segfault).  Noted by Marcus Brinkmann.  Push and
+	reinitialize textmode filter for each file in a multiple file
+	list.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode), keyedit.c (show_prefs): Set
+	and show the keyserver no-modify flag.
+
+	* keygen.c (add_keyserver_modify): New.
+	(keygen_upd_std_prefs): Call it here.
+	(keygen_set_std_prefs): Accept "ks-modify" and "no-ks-modify" as
+	prefs to set and unset keyserver modify flag.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Accept "s1" in addition to "idea" to match the
+	other ciphers.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (idea_cipher_warn): We don't need this if IDEA
+	has been disabled.
+
+2003-02-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Don't put AES or CAST5 in
+	default prefs if they are disabled.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use 3DES instead of CAST5 if we don't have CAST5
+	support.  Use 3DES for the s2k cipher in --openpgp mode.
+	(print_mds): #ifdef all of the optional digest algorithms.
+
+2003-02-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (classify_user_id, classify_user_id2): Make
+	'exact' a per-desc item.  Merge into one function since
+	'force_exact' is no longer needed.
+	(key_byname): Use new classify_user_id function, and new exact
+	flag in KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC.
+
+	* keyring.h, keyring.c (keyring_search): Return an optional index
+	to show which KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC was the matching one.
+
+	* keydb.h, keydb.c (keydb_search): Rename to keydb_search2, and
+	pass the optional index to keyring_search.  Add a macro version of
+	keydb_search that calls this new function.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): If the keyid! syntax is used,
+	export only that specified key.  If the key in question is a
+	subkey, export the primary plus that subkey only.
+
+2003-02-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.c (set_exec_path): Add debugging line.
+
+	* g10.c (print_hex, print_mds): Print long hash strings a lot
+	neater.  This assumes at least an 80-character display, as there
+	are a few other similar assumptions here and there.  Users who
+	need unformatted hashes can still use with-colons.  Check that
+	SHA384 and 512 are available before using them as they are no
+	longer always available.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Use a local copy of libexecdir along with @PACKAGE@
+	as GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR so it can be easily overridden at make time.
+
+2003-02-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (parse_hash_header, armor_filter): Accept the new SHAs
+	in the armor Hash: header.
+
+	* g10.c (print_hex): Print long hash strings a little neater.
+	(print_mds): Add the new SHAs to the hash list.
+
+2003-02-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revuid): Properly handle a nonselfsigned uid on
+	a v4 key (treat as a v4 revocation).
+
+	* import.c (print_import_check): Do not re-utf8 convert user IDs.
+
+2003-01-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Show signature expiration date in
+	with-colons sig records.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon), mainproc.c (list_node): Show
+	trust sig information in with-colons sig records.
+
+2003-01-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (add_group): Trim whitespace after a group name so it does
+	not matter where the user puts the = sign.
+
+	* options.skel: Comment out the first three lines in case someone
+	manually copies the skel file to their homedir.
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Only use pgp2mode with v3 keys and
+	MD5. This matches what we do when decoding such messages and
+	prevents creating a message (v3+RIPEMD/160) that we can't verify.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Use G10ERR_GENERAL as the error
+	for signature digest conflict.  BAD_SIGN implies that a signature
+	was checked and we may try and print out a user ID for a key that
+	doesn't exist.
+
+2003-01-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb, get_validity): Don't use a changed
+	trust model to indicate a dirty trustdb, and never auto-rebuild a
+	dirty trustdb with the "always" trust model.
+
+	* g10.c (add_group): Last commit missed the \t ;)
+
+2003-01-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (setup_user_id), free-packet.c
+	(free_user_id), keydb.h, keyid.c (namehash_from_uid): New function
+	to rmd160-hash the contents of a user ID packet and cache it in
+	the uid object.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use namehash in field 8 of
+	uids.  Show dates for creation (selfsig date), and expiration in
+	fields 6 and 7.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity, get_validity_counts, update_validity):
+	Use new namehash function rather than hashing it locally.
+
+2003-01-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (add_group): Fixed group parsing to allow more than one
+	delimiter in a row and also allow tab as delimiter.
+
+2003-01-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Fix assertion failure with
+	non-fully-qualified trustdb names.
+
+2003-01-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity_info, get_ownertrust_info,
+	trust_letter): Simplify by returning a ? for error directly.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Use get_validity_string and
+	get_ownertrust_string to show full word versions of trust
+	(i.e. "full" instead of 'f').
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (get_ownertrust_string,
+	get_validity_string): Same as get_ownertrust_info, and
+	get_validity_info, except returns a full string.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_ownertrust_with_min): New.  Same as
+	'get_ownertrust' but takes the min_ownertrust value into account.
+
+2003-01-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Comment about PGP's end of line tab
+	problem.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (trust_letter): Make
+	static. (get_ownertrust_info, get_validity_info): Don't mask the
+	trust level twice.
+
+	* trustdb.h, gpgv.c, trustdb.c (get_validity, get_validity_info),
+	keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon), keyedit.c
+	(show_key_with_all_names_colon, menu_revuid): Pass a user ID in
+	rather than a namehash, so we only have to do the hashing in one
+	place.
+
+	* packet.h, pkclist.c (build_pk_list), free-packet.c
+	(release_public_key_parts): Remove unused namehash element for
+	public keys.
+
+2003-01-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Warn when setting an IDEA
+	preference when IDEA is not available.
+
+2003-01-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity_info): 'd' for disabled is not a
+	validity value any more.
+
+	* packet.h, tdbio.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_read_record,
+	tdbio_write_record), trustdb.c (update_validity): Store temporary
+	full & marginal counts in the trustdb.
+	(clear_validity, get_validity_counts): Return and clear temp
+	counts.
+	(store_validation_status): Keep track of which keyids have been
+	stored.
+	(validate_one_keyblock, validate_key_list): Use per-uid copies of
+	the full & marginal counts so they can be recalled for multiple
+	levels.
+	(validate_keys): Only use unused keys for each new round.
+	(reset_unconnected_keys): Rename to reset_trust_records, and only
+	skip specifically excluded records.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): Show 'D' for disabled keys in
+	capabilities section.
+
+	* trustdb.c (is_disabled): Remove incorrect comment.
+
+2003-01-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Only do the work to create the status
+	display for interactive import if status is enabled.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_search): skipfnc didn't work properly with
+	non-keyid searches.  Noted by Stefan Bellon.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Remove some unused code and make
+	sure that the pk selfsigversion member accounts for 1F direct
+	sigs.
+
+2003-01-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Don't assume that try_make_homedir
+	terminates but check again for the existence of the directory and
+	continue then.
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Print a warning if the skeleton
+	file has active options.
+
+2002-12-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main), main.h, sig-check.c
+	(check_key_signature2): Pass the ultimately trusted pk directly to
+	check_key_signature2 to avoid going through the key selection
+	mechanism.  This prevents a deadly embrace when two keys without
+	selfsigs each sign the other.
+
+2002-12-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): Don't print the "refreshing..."
+	line if there are no keys to refresh or if there is no keyserver
+	set.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Any valid user ID should make a
+	key valid, not just the last one.  This also fixes Debian bug
+	#174276.
+
+2002-12-27  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* import.c (print_import_check): Changed int to size_t.
+
+2002-12-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_revuid): Add "revuid" feature to
+	revoke a user ID.  This is the same as issuing a revocation for
+	the self-signature, but a much simpler interface to do it.
+
+2002-12-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (key_byname): Flag to enable or disable
+	including disabled keys.  Keys specified via keyid (i.e. 0x...)
+	are always included.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname, get_seckey_byname2,
+	get_seckey_bynames), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker):
+	Include disabled keys in these functions.
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Do not include disabled keys for -r
+	or the key prompt.  Do include disabled keys for the default key
+	and --encrypt-to.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled): New skipfnc for skipping
+	disabled keys.
+
+	* gpgv.c (is_disabled): Stub.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Properly handle updating a key
+	expiration to a no-expiration value.
+
+	* keyedit.c (enable_disable_key): Comment.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): When in interactive mode and --verbose,
+	don't repeat some key information twice.
+
+2002-12-22  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+	
+	* import.c (print_import_check): New.
+	(import_one): Use it here.
+        Use merge_keys_and_selfsig in the interactive mode to avoid
+        wrong key information.
+	* status.h: Add new status code.
+	* status.c: Ditto.
+	
+2002-12-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Tweak language to refer to the "named
+	user" rather than "owner".  Noted by Stefan Bellon.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (trustdb_pending_check): New function to
+	check if the trustdb needs a check.
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): Used here so we don't rebuild
+	the trustdb if it is still clean.
+	(import_one, chk_self_sigs): Only mark trustdb dirty if the key
+	that is being imported has any sigs other than self-sigs.
+	Suggested by Adrian von Bidder.
+
+	* options.skel: Include the required '=' sign in the sample
+	'group' option.  Noted by Stefan Bellon.
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Don't try and check a subkey as if it
+	was a signature.
+
+2002-12-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_read_record, tdbio_write_record): Compact the
+	RECTYPE_TRUST records a bit.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Comment out --list-trust-path until it can be
+	implemented.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Warn when importing an Elgamal primary
+	that this may take some time (to verify self-sigs).
+	(chk_self_sigs): Try and cache all self-sigs so the keyblock is
+	written to the keyring with a good rich cache.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Make the Elgamal sign+encrypt warning
+	stronger, and remove the RSA sign+encrypt warning.
+
+2002-12-06  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* options.h: Fixed typo (mangle_dos_names instead of
+	mangle_dos_filenames).
+
+2002-12-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New options --[no-]mangle-dos-filenames.
+	* options.h (opt): Added mangle-dos-filenames.
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile) [USE_ONLY_8DOT3]: Truncate the
+	filename only when this option is set; this is the default.
+
+2002-12-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keyedit.c, keygen.c: Back out previous (2002-12-01)
+	change.  Minimal isn't always best.
+
+	* sign.c (update_keysig_packet): Use the current time rather then
+	a modification of the original signature time.  Make sure that
+	this doesn't cause a time warp.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Properly handle a key
+	expiration date in the past (use a duration of 0).
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire): Use update_keysig_packet so any sig
+	subpackets are maintained during the update.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Mark sig expired or unexpired
+	when the sig expiration subpacket is added.
+	(build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Handle making an expiration subpacket
+	from a sig that has already expired (use a duration of 0).
+
+	* packet.h, sign.c (update_keysig_packet), keyedit.c
+	(menu_set_primary_uid, menu_set_preferences): Add ability to issue
+	0x18 subkey binding sigs to update_keysig_packet and change all
+	callers.
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Show trust parameters when building
+	the trustdb, and make sure that the version record update was
+	successful.
+	(init_trustdb): If the current parameters aren't what was used for
+	building the trustdb, the trustdb is invalid.
+
+	* tbio.c (tdbio_db_matches_options): Update to work with new
+	trustdbs.
+
+2002-12-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* tdbio.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_read_record, tdbio_write_record): Store
+	trust model in the trustdb version record.
+	(tdbio_update_version_record): New function to update version
+	record values during a trustdb check or update.
+	(tdbio_dump_record): Show trust model in dump.
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Call tdbio_update_version_record on
+	success so that the correct options are stored in the trustdb.
+
+	* options.h: rearrange trust models so that CLASSIC is 0 and
+	OPENPGP is 1.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list),
+	pkclist.c (algo_available), revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add --pgp8
+	mode.  This is basically identical to --pgp7 in all ways except
+	that signing subkeys, v4 data sigs (including expiration), and SK
+	comments are allowed.
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Comment.
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (reorder_keyblock), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu):
+	Reorder user ID display in the --edit-key menu to match that of
+	the --list-keys display.
+
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Fix initialization.
+
+2002-12-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire): Don't lose key flags when changing the
+	expiration date of a subkey.  This is not the most optimal
+	solution, but it is minimal change on the stable branch.
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (do_copy_key_flags): New function to copy key
+	flags, if any, from one sig to another.
+	(do_add_key_expire): New function to add key expiration to a sig.
+	(keygen_copy_flags_add_expire): New version of
+	keygen_add_key_expire that also copies key flags.
+	(keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire): Use do_add_key_expire.
+
+	* import.c (fix_hkp_corruption): Comment.
+
+2002-11-25  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext) [__riscos__]: If nooutput is set,
+	no filetype is needed obviously.
+
+2002-11-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (default_cipher_algo, default_compress_algo):
+	New.  Return the default algorithm by trying
+	--cipher-algo/--compress-algo, then the first item in the pref
+	list, then s2k-cipher-algo or ZIP.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), encode.c
+	(encode_simple, encode_crypt): Call default_cipher_algo and
+	default_compress_algo to get algorithms.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Allow pref selection for compress algo with
+	--openpgp.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use --s2k-digest-algo for
+	passphrase mangling rather than --digest-algo.
+
+	* sign.c (hash_for): If --digest-algo is not set, but
+	--personal-digest-preferences is, then use the first hash
+	algorithm in the personal list.  If the signing algorithm is DSA,
+	then use the first 160-bit hash algorithm in the personal list.
+	If --pgp2 is set and it's a v3 RSA key, use MD5.
+
+	* g10.c (main), keydb.c (keydb_add_resource,
+	keydb_locate_writable): Rename --default-keyring as
+	--primary-keyring.  Stefan wins the naming contest.
+
+2002-11-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Disallow notation names that do not
+	contain a '@', unless --expert is set.  This is to help prevent
+	people from polluting the (as yet unused) IETF namespace.
+
+	* main.h: Comments about default algorithms.
+
+	* photoid.c (image_type_to_string): Comments about 3-letter file
+	extensions.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple), passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek),
+	sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Use --s2k-digest-algo for
+	passphrase mangling rather than --digest-algo.
+
+2002-11-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Properly handle an empty
+	preference string.
+
+	* misc.c (string_to_compress_algo): "none" is a bad choice since
+	it conflicts with the "none" in setpref.
+
+2002-11-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Allow compression algorithm names as the argument
+	to --compress-algo.  The old algorithm names still work for
+	backwards compatibility.
+
+	* misc.c (string_to_compress_algo): Allow "none" as an alias for
+	"uncompressed".
+
+2002-11-13  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): Fixed type incompatibility,
+	was unsigned char instead of byte.
+
+2002-11-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Make sure that files larger than about
+	4G use partial length encoding.  This is required because OpenPGP
+	allows only for 32 bit length fields.  From Werner on stable
+	branch.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): Renamed to...
+	(get_pubkey_fast): this and made extern.
+	(get_pubkey_byfprint_fast): New.  From Werner on stable branch.
+
+	* keydb.h, import.c (import_one): Use get_pubkey_fast instead of
+	get_pubkey.  We don't need a merged key and actually this might
+	lead to recursions.
+	(revocation_present): Likewise for search by fingerprint.  From
+	Werner on stable branch.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Try to create the trustdb even for non-colon-mode
+	list-key operations.  This is required because getkey needs to
+	know whether a a key is ultimately trusted.  From Werner on stable
+	branch.
+	
+	* exec.c [__CYGWIN32__]: Keep cygwin separate from Mingw32;
+	we don't need it here as it behaves more like a Posix system.
+	From Werner on stable branch.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Ditto.  From Werner on
+	stable branch.
+
+	* tdbio.c (MY_O_BINARY): Need binary mode with Cygwin.  From
+	Werner on stable branch.
+
+       	* g10.c, gpgv.c (main) [__CYGWIN32__]: Don't get the homedir from
+	the registry.  From Werner on stable branch.
+	
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): Make --with-colons
+	--edit display match the validity and trust of --with-colons
+	--list-keys.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_send_all_options): Fix compile warning.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Validity for subkeys should
+	match that of the primary key, and not that of the last user ID.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Revoked/expired/invalid primary keys
+	carry these facts onto all their subkeys, but only after the
+	subkey has a chance to be marked valid.  This is to fix an
+	incorrect "invalid public key" error verifying a signature made by
+	a revoked signing subkey, with a valid unrevoked primary key.
+
+2002-11-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_send_all_options): Use tty_get_ttyname to
+	get the default ttyname.
+
+2002-11-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyring.h, keyring.c (keyring_register_filename): Return the
+	pointer if a given keyring is registered twice.
+
+	* keydb.h, keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Use flags to indicate a
+	default keyring.
+	(keydb_locate_writable): Prefer the default keyring if possible.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --default-keyring option.
+
+2002-11-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), trustdb.c (ask_ownertrust): Add
+	--force-ownertrust option for debugging purposes.  This allows
+	setting a whole keyring to a given trust during an
+	--update-trustdb.  Not for normal use - it's just easier than
+	hitting "4" all the time to test a large trustdb.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): With hidden recipients or try a
+	given passphrase against all secret keys rather than trying all
+	secret keys in turn.  Don't if --try-all-secrets or --status-fd is
+	enabled.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Mode 1 means do a regular
+	passphrase query, but don't prompt with the key info.
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check, check_secret_key): A negative ask count
+	means to enable passphrase mode 1.
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (enum_secret_keys): Add flag to include
+	secret-parts-missing keys (or not) in the list.
+
+2002-11-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): When --with-colons is
+	enabled, don't try and fit the search output to the screen size -
+	just dump the whole list.
+
+2002-11-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): When --with-colons is
+	enabled, just dump the raw keyserver protocol to stdout and don't
+	print the menu.
+
+	* keyserver.c (show_prompt): Don't show a prompt when command-fd
+	is being used.
+
+	* trustdb.c (trust_model_string, check_trustdb, update_trustdb,
+	validate_one_keyblock): It's not clear what a trustdb rebuild or
+	check means with a trust model other than "classic" or "openpgp",
+	so disallow this.
+
+2002-11-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add --trust-model option.  Current
+	models are "openpgp" which is classic+trustsigs, "classic" which
+	is classic only, and "always" which is the same as the current
+	option --always-trust (which still works).  Default is "openpgp".
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Use "openpgp" trust model to
+	enable trust sigs.
+
+	* gpgv.c (main), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print), pkclist.c
+	(do_we_trust, do_we_trust_pre, check_signatures_trust): Use new
+	--trust-model option in place of --always-trust.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_mk_attrib, trustsig_prompt, sign_uids,
+	keyedit_menu): Prompt for and create a trust signature with
+	"tsign".  This is functional, but needs better UI text.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Able to build trust and
+	regexp subpackets.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Comment.
+
+2002-11-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (set_one_pref, keygen_set_std_prefs): Allow using the
+	full algorithm name (CAST5, SHA1) rather than the short form (S3,
+	H2).
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (keygen_get_std_prefs), keyedit.c
+	(keyedit_menu): Return and use a fake uid packet rather than a
+	string since we already have a nice parser/printer in
+	keyedit.c:show_prefs.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (string_to_compress_algo): New.
+
+2002-11-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --no-throw-keyid.
+
+	* keydb.h, encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list), g10.c (main),
+	pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Add --hidden-recipient (-R) and
+	--hidden-encrypt-to, which do a single-user variation on
+	--throw-keyid.  The "hide this key" flag is carried in bit 0 of
+	the pk_list flags field.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyrec): Fix shadowing warning.
+
+2002-10-31  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* compress.c (init_compress) [__riscos__]: Use
+	riscos_load_module() to load ZLib module.
+
+	* g10.c (main) [__riscos__]: Renames due to changes in riscos.c
+	(e.g. prefixes all RISC OS specific functions with riscos_*).
+	* photoid.c (show_photos) [__riscos__]: Likewise.
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal) [__riscos__]: Likewise.
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_regexp) [__riscos__]: Branch to RISC OS RegEx
+	handling.
+
+2002-10-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_plaintext), encode.c (encode_sesskey,
+	encode_simple, encode_crypt), sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Use
+	wipememory() instead of memset() to wipe sensitive memory as the
+	memset() might be optimized away.
+
+2002-10-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_regexp): Modern regexps require REG_EXTENDED.
+
+2002-10-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, trustdb.h, trustdb.c (trust_string): New.  Return a
+	string like "fully trusted", "marginally trusted", etc.
+	(get_min_ownertrust): New.  Return minimum ownertrust.
+	(update_min_ownertrust): New.  Set minimum ownertrust.
+	(check_regexp): New.  Check a regular epression against a user ID.
+	(ask_ownertrust): Allow specifying a minimum value.
+	(get_ownertrust_info): Follow the minimum ownertrust when
+	returning a letter.
+	(clear_validity): Remove minimum ownertrust when a key becomes
+	invalid.
+	(release_key_items): Release regexp along with the rest of the
+	info.
+	(validate_one_keyblock, validate_keys): Build a trust sig chain
+	while validating.  Call check_regexp for regexps.  Use the minimum
+	ownertrust if the user does not specify a genuine ownertrust.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Only allow user to select a
+	trust level greater than the minimum value.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Can handle critical trust
+	and regexp subpackets.
+
+	* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (clear_ownertrusts), delkey.c
+	(do_delete_key), import.c (import_one): Rename clear_ownertrust to
+	clear_ownertrusts and have it clear the min_ownertrust value as
+	well.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Indent uid to match pub and
+	sig.
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig, show_key_and_fingerprint,
+	menu_addrevoker), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print,
+	print_fingerprint): Show "T" or the trust depth for trust
+	signatures, and add spaces to some strings to make room for it.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt,
+	parse_signature): Parse trust signature values.
+
+	* tdbio.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_read_record, tdbio_write_record):
+	Reserve a byte for the minimum ownertrust value (for use with
+	trust signatures).
+
+2002-10-29  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* build-packet.c (calc_plaintext, do_plaintext): Removed RISC OS
+	specific filetype parts (it's now done in make_basename()).
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Tidied up RISC OS specific
+	filetype parts.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Added argument to
+	make_basename() call.
+
+	* sign.c (write_plaintext_packet): Added argument to
+	make_basename() call.
+
+2002-10-28  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* build-packet.c (calc_plaintext, do_plaintext): Added filetype
+	handling for RISC OS' file types.
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext) [__riscos__]: Added filetype
+	handling for RISC OS' file types.
+
+2002-10-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, import.c (sec_to_pub_keyblock, import_secret_one,
+	parse_import_options), g10.c (main): New import-option
+	"convert-sk-to-pk" to convert a secret key into a public key
+	during import.  It is on by default.
+
+2002-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Fix segv, test for revoked only when PK
+	has been assigned.
+
+2002-10-18  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* keylist.c: (print_pubkey_info): New.
+	(print_seckey_info): New.
+	* main.h: Prototypes for the new functions.       
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Use it here.
+	* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Ditto.
+	
+2002-10-17  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Show all user IDs.  This should
+	be enhanced to also show the current trust level.  Suggested by
+	Florian Weimer.
+
+2002-10-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Handle --strict and --no-strict from the command
+	line before the options file is loaded.
+
+2002-10-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Disable --textmode when encrypting (symmetric or
+	pk) in --pgp2 mode as PGP 2 can't handle the unknown length
+	literal packet.  Reported by Michael Richardson.
+
+2002-10-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (print_keyrec, parse_keyrec,
+	show_prompt, keyserver_search_prompt, keyserver_spawn): Go to
+	version 1 of the keyserver protocol.  This is a better design,
+	similar to --with-colons, that allows for keys with multiple user
+	IDs rather than using multiple keys.  It also matches the machine
+	readable pksd format.  Also use a prettier --search-keys listing
+	format that can fill different size windows (currently set at 24
+	lines).
+
+2002-10-12  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (print_status_key_created): New.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Use it to print the fingerprint.
+	(generate_subkeypair): Likewise.
+
+2002-10-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker): Properly back out if the signature
+	fails.  Also, do not allow appointing the same revoker twice, and
+	report ALREADY_SIGNED if the user tries it.
+
+2002-10-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): Missed one s/inp/inp2/.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): Properly indicate per-key
+	capabilities of sign&encrypt primary keys that have
+	secret-parts-missing (i.e. no capabilities at all)
+
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): Fix compiler warning.
+
+2002-10-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): Don't cache keys retrieved via
+	this function as they may not have all their fields filled in.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Use new is_primary flag to check
+	rather than comparing main_keyid with keyid as this still works in
+	the case of a not fully filled in pk.
+
+2002-10-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_internal): s/inp/inp2/ to avoid shadowing
+	warning.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Fixed signed/unsigned char
+	problem in %-escaping.  Noted by Ingo Klöcker.
+
+2002-10-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main): Add --strict and --no-strict to switch
+	the log_warning severity level from info to error.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): Secret-parts-missing keys should
+	show that fact in the capabilities, and only primary signing keys
+	can certify other keys.
+
+	* packet.h, parse_packet.c (parse_key): Add is_primary flag for
+	public keys (it already exists for secret keys).
+
+2002-10-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_secret_one): Check for an illegal (>110)
+	protection cipher when importing a secret key.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Show a '#' for a
+	secret-parts-missing key.
+
+	* parse_packet.c (parse_key): Some comments.
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Remove some debugging code.
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Make trusted-key a non-deprecated
+	option again.
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Don't give the IDEA warning unless the
+	cipher in question is in fact IDEA.
+
+2002-10-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Make sure that a newly imported key
+	starts with a clean ownertrust.
+
+2002-10-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_direct): New.
+	(merge_selfsigs_main): Use it here to look for an ultimately
+	trusted key.  Using the full get_pubkey might lead to an
+	infinitive recursion.
+
+2002-09-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Force the keyserver URI
+	scheme to lowercase to be case-insensitive.
+
+2002-09-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Comment.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Properly handle a
+	non-designated revocation import.
+
+2002-09-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (set_homedir): New. Changed all direct assignments to use
+	this.
+	* gpgv.c (set_homedir): Ditto.
+
+2002-09-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Link gpg with EGDLIBS (i.e. NETLIBS) as EGD uses
+	sockets.  Remove the old NETLIBS variable since the keyserver
+	stuff is no longer internal.
+
+2002-09-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys_stream): Fix compiler type warning.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_rebuild_cache), sig-check.c
+	(check_key_signature2), import.c (import, chk_self_sigs): Minor
+	language cleanups.
+
+2002-09-23  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* main.h: Introduced fast-import as import option. Removed
+	fast as separate option from prototypes.
+	* import.c (parse_import_options): Added fast-import option.
+	(import_*): Removed fast as separate option.
+	* g10.c (main): Added option fast-import, removed old fast
+	as separate argument.
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Removed old fast as separate
+	argument.
+
+2002-09-22  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys, import_keys_stream,
+	import_keys_internal): Added trustdb update/check to key import if
+	not fast-import and interactive set/no-auto-check-trustdb unset.
+	Avoided function clone by introducing import_keys_internal.
+
+2002-09-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Properly handle line truncation.
+	Don't leak memory (~10-20 bytes) on searches.
+	(keyserver_search_prompt): Cleanup.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show 1F direct key signatures
+	in --with-colons listing.
+
+2002-09-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_addrevoker): The direct key signature for
+	revocation keys must be at least v4 to carry the revocation key
+	subpacket.  Add a PGP 2.x warning for revocation keys.
+
+2002-09-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (check_permissions): Rearrange strings to make translating
+	easier (don't incorporate string parts).
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Make strings translatable.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Make string translatable.
+
+2002-09-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): Move....
+	* main.h, sig-check.c (check_revocation_keys): to here.  Also
+	return the signature_check error code rather than 0/1 and cache
+	the sig result.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Divert to
+	check_revocation_keys if a revocation sig is made by someone other
+	than the pk owner.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Tidy.
+
+2002-09-13  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main) [__MINGW32__]: Activate oLoadExtension.
+
+2002-09-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am, hkp.c, hkp.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Remove
+	internal HKP support.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Remove whitespace after keyserver
+	commands.
+
+2002-09-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.c (expand_args): Remove loop left over from earlier
+	implementation.
+	(exec_write): Missed one tick.
+
+2002-09-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: Removed option --emulate-checksum-bug.
+	* misc.c (checksum_u16_nobug): Removed.
+	(checksum_u16): Removed the bug emulation.
+	(checksum_mpi): Ditto.
+	(checksum_mpi_counted_nbits): Removed and replaced all calls
+	with checksum_mpi.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (read_protected_v3_mpi): New.
+	(parse_key): Use it here to store it as an opaque MPI.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Changed the v3 unprotection to the new
+	why to store these keys.
+	(protect_secret_key): Likewise.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): And changed the writing.
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname, open_db): Use new macro MY_O_BINARY
+	to avoid silly ifdefs.
+	(open_db): Fallback to RDONLY so that gpg may be used from a
+	RO-medium.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Make sure we don't use an ESK packet
+	when we don't have a salt in the S2K.
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando) <case f>: Make sure that LEN is initialized.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_finish): Use ticks to denote filenames in messages.
+	(make_tempdir, exec_write): Changed format of messages.
+
+	* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): Release USERID in on error.
+	(keyserver_work) [!DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS]: Exclude the unused
+	code.
+
+2002-09-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname): Add new ar MAX_NAMELEN
+	for sanity checks.  Changed both callers. Limit the size of an %s.
+
+	* options.skel: Comment lock-once out, so that this file does not
+	change anything when copied to a new home directory.
+	* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Don't exit after copying the
+	option skeleton.
+
+	* options.h: Don't use a comma when declaring variables over more
+	than one line.
+
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): Check length of the session
+	key.
+
+	* hkp.c (dehtmlize): Use ascii_tolower to protect against weird
+	locales.  Cast the argument for isspace for the sake of broken
+	HP/UXes.
+	(parse_hkp_index): s/ascii_memcasecmp/ascii_strncasecmp/.
+
+	* g10.c: Removed option --emulate-3des-s2k-bug.
+
+	* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Was used here.
+
+	* export.c (parse_export_options)
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options)
+	* import.c (parse_import_options)
+	* g10.c (check_permissions): s/ascii_memcasecmp/ascii_strncasecmp/.
+
+2002-09-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (add_group): Use '=' to separate group name from group
+	members.  Use a better error message for when no = is found.
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_export): Use CRLF in headers.
+
+2002-09-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Don't increment the error counter
+	when printing the list of keys a message was encrypted to.  This
+	would make gpg give a non-zero exit code even for completely valid
+	messages if the message was encrypted to more than one key that
+	the user owned.
+
+2002-09-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Try to set a default character set.  Print the
+	used one in verbosity level 3.
+	* gpgv.c (main): Try to set a default character set.
+
+	* status.c, status.h (STATUS_IMPORT_OK): New.
+	* import.c (import_one,import_secret_one): Print new status.
+
+2002-08-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Add new status code to indicate an
+	untrusted user.  This (or a disabled key) fail with "unavailable
+	pubkey" (G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY).
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fail if any recipient keys are
+	unusable.
+
+	* options.skel: The PGP LDAP keyserver is back.  Use MIT keyserver
+	as a sample rather than cryptnet as cryptnet does not support
+	searching yet.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Fix error message
+	(preferences are userid/selfsig and not key specific).
+
+2002-08-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): Changed the wording of a warning.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): Use new style CTB for
+	compressssed packets when using MDC.  We need to do this so that
+	concatenated messages are properly decrypted.  Old style
+	compression assumes that it is the last packet; given that we
+	can't determine the length in advance, the uncompressor does not
+	know where to start.  Actually we should use the new CTB always
+	but this would break PGP 2 compatibility.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Special treatment for new style CTB
+	compressed packets.
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_mdc): Removed. Was not used.
+	(do_encrypted_mdc): Count in the version number and the MDC packet.
+
+2002-08-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check_messages, do_check): Show keyid in error
+	messages.
+
+	* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): More readable key listings for
+	--search-keys responses.
+
+2002-08-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, dehtmlize): Move HTML functionality into
+	new "dehtmlize" function.  Remove HTML before trying to parse each
+	line from the keyserver.  If the keyserver provides key type
+	information in the listing, use it.
+
+2002-08-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check, do_check_messages): Emit the usual sig
+	warnings even for cached sigs.  This also serves to protect
+	against missing a sig expiring while cached.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Don't check UID self-sigs twice.
+
+2002-08-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (clean_subkeys, chk_self_sigs): Merge clean_subkeys
+	into chk_self_sigs.  This improves efficiency as the same
+	signatures are not checked multiple times.  Clarify when a subkey
+	is revoked (any revocation signature, even if it is dated before
+	the binding signature).
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Subkey revocation comments.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Stats are only for public key listings.
+
+	* g10.c (main), options.skel: Default should be include-revoked
+	for keyserver operations.
+
+2002-08-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* import.c (import_print_stats): Print new non_imported counter
+	which is currently not used because we terminate on errors.
+
+2002-08-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Document no-include-attributes for
+	keyserver-options.
+
+	* keylist.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c, sign.c: Some TODOs and
+	comments.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Fix noop bug in exporting sensitive
+	revocation keys.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Comment out the option for
+	showing trust paths until it can be implemented.
+
+2002-08-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_user_id_native): Renamed to ..
+	(get_user_id_printable): this.  Filter out all dangerous
+	characters.  Checked all usages.
+	(get_user_id_string_native): Renamed to..
+	(get_user_id_string_printable): this.  Filter out all dangerous
+	characters.  Checked all usages.
+	* keyedit.c (show_basic_key_info): New.
+	* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): New mode 3.
+	* import.c (import_one): Use new function to display the user ID.
+
+2002-08-16  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Enable opt.interactive.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Ask the user if the key shall be
+	imported when the interactive mode is used. Useful to extract
+	selected keys from a file.
+	
+2002-08-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* seckey-cert.c: Workaround to allow decryption of v3 keys created
+	with a bug in the mpi_get_secure_buffer.
+
+2002-08-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Properly handle really large keys
+	(5 digit key length) in HKP searches.
+
+2002-08-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Fix problem with using compression
+	algo 2 and symmetric compressed files.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): If we are not using a
+	MDC, compress even if a file is already compressed.  This is to
+	help against the chosen ciphertext attack.
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fix requested algorithm bug
+	so the request succeeds even if the requested algorithm is not the
+	first found.
+
+	* cipher.c (write_header), encode.c (use_mdc, encode_simple,
+	encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), g10.c (main): Be more eager to use
+	a MDC.  We use a MDC if the keys directly support it, if the keys
+	list AES (any) or TWOFISH anywhere in the prefs, or if the cipher
+	chosen does not have a 64 bit blocksize.
+
+2002-08-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Some language tweaks, and remove the
+	load-extension section for random gatherers.
+
+	* keyring.c (create_tmp_file, rename_tmp_file): Create tmp files
+	with user-only permissions, but restore the original permissions
+	if the user has something special set.
+
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Create new options file
+	(gpg.conf) with user-only permissions.
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Create new keyrings with user-only
+	permissions.
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Create new trustdbs with user-only
+	permissions.
+
+2002-08-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Sanity check that the md has a
+	context for the hash that the sig is expecting.  This can happen
+	if a onepass sig header does not match the actual sig, and also if
+	the clearsign "Hash:" header is missing or does not match the
+	actual sig.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Properly show a uid is revoked without
+	restarting gpg.  This is Debian bug 124219, though their supplied
+	patch will not do the right thing.
+
+	* main.h, tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname), misc.c (removed
+	check_permissions), keydb.c (keydb_add_resource), g10.c (main,
+	check_permissions): Significant reworking of the permission check
+	mechanism.  The new behavior is to check everything in the homedir
+	by checking the homedir itself.  If the user wants to put
+	(possibly shared) keyrings outside the homedir, they are not
+	checked.  The options file and any extension files are checked
+	wherever they are, as well as their enclosing directories.  This
+	is Debian bug 147760.
+	
+2002-08-06  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use of EXTSEP_S in new gpg.conf string.
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Ditto.
+
+2002-08-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (proc_encrypted):
+	--ignore-mdc-error option to turn a MDC check error into a
+	warning.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt), g10.c (main), sign.c (sign_file,
+	clearsign_file): Use the same --pgpX warning string everywhere to
+	ease translations.
+
+	* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Warn when using
+	--throw-keyid with --pgpX.  Noted by Vedaal Nistar.
+
+	* revoke.c (export_minimal_pk, gen_desig_revoke, gen_revoke):
+	Export a minimal pk along with the revocation cert when in --pgpX
+	mode so that PGP can import it.
+
+2002-08-06  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* options.skel: Changed comments.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Try to use "gpg.conf" as default option file.
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Changed name of created file.
+
+2002-08-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* Makefile.am (LDFLAGS): Removed DYNLINK_LDFLAGS.
+
+2002-07-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Return a
+	decryption failed error if a MDC does not verify.  Warn if a MDC
+	is not present (can disable via --no-mdc-warning).
+
+	* exec.c (exec_write), g10.c (main), keyserver.c
+	(keyserver_spawn): Use new DISABLE_KEYSERVER_PATH rather than
+	FIXED_EXEC_PATH.
+
+2002-07-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Properly validate v4 sigs with no hashed
+	section at all.
+
+2002-07-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Always allow to delete a key in batch mode
+	when specified by fingerprint.  Suggested by Enzo Michelangeli.
+
+2002-07-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Change "revsig" to honor selected uids
+	so the user can revoke sigs from particular uids only.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't display expired uids in
+	--list-keys unless -v and not --list-sigs (just like revoked
+	uids).
+
+	* exec.c, export.c, import.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c, misc.c:
+	"Warning" -> "WARNING"
+
+2002-07-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, import.c (parse_import_options, fix_hkp_corruption,
+	import_one, delete_inv_parts), g10.c (main): New import-option
+	"repair-hkp-subkey-bug", which repairs as much as possible the HKP
+	mangling multiple subkeys bug.  It is on by default for keyserver
+	receives, and off by default for regular --import.
+
+	* main.h, import.c (import, import_one, delete_inv_parts), hkp.c
+	(hkp_ask_import), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use keyserver
+	import options when doing keyserver receives.
+
+	* options.h, exec.h, exec.c (set_exec_path, exec_write), g10.c
+	(main), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): If the user does not use
+	"exec-path", completely replace $PATH with GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR before
+	calling the keyserver helper.  If the user does use "exec-path",
+	append GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR after the specified path.
+
+2002-07-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (parse_import_options), export.c
+	(parse_export_options): Fix offset problem with reversed ("no-")
+	meanings.
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Discard subkey signatures (0x18 and
+	0x28) if found in the userid section of the key.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check2): Signatures made by invalid
+	subkeys (bad/missing binding sig) are also invalid.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): Show the primary as well as the
+	secondary key fingerprint in modes 1 & 2.
+
+2002-07-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, main.h, g10.c (main), import.c
+	(parse_import_options, delete_inv_parts), keyserver.c
+	(parse_keyserver_options): add new --import-options option.  The
+	only current flag is "allow-local-sigs".
+
+	* g10.c (main): Don't disable MDC in pgp7 mode.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options):
+	Remove old keyserver-option include-attributes now that there is
+	an export-option for the same thing.
+
+	* options.h, main.h, export.c (parse_export_options,
+	do_export_stream), g10.c (main): add new --export-options option.
+	Current flags are "include-non-rfc", "include-local-sigs",
+	"include-attributes", and "include-sensitive-revkeys".
+
+	* options.h, hkp.c (hkp_export), keyserver.c
+	(parse_keyserver_options, keyserver_spawn): try passing unknown
+	keyserver options to export options, and if successful, use them
+	when doing a keyserver --send-key.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): We do not generate
+	SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE anymore.
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Lots more comments about including
+	sensitive revkeys along with the revocation sig itself.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): Simpler implementation
+	that can skip one pass over the options.
+
+2002-07-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker): Allow specifying
+	"sensitive" as an argument to an addrevoker command.  This sets
+	the 0x40 sensitive revoker flag.
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): When generating a designated
+	revocation, include the direct key sig that contains the
+	designated revoker subpacket.  This allows sensitive designated
+	revocation subpackets to be exported.  Also indicate which
+	revokers are sensitive in the first place.
+
+2002-07-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): The 0x40 class bit in
+	a designated revoker means "sensitive", not "local".  It's
+	exportable under the right circumstances.
+
+	* main.h, options.h, export.c (do_export_stream), g10.c (main),
+	hkp.c (hkp_export), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn: Add a flag to
+	skip attribute packets and their signatures while exporting.  This
+	is to accomodate keyservers (pksd again) that choke on attributes.
+	Use keyserver-option "include-attributes" to control it.  This
+	defaults to ON (i.e. don't skip).
+
+2002-07-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri, keyserver_spawn,
+	keyserver_work), hkp.c (hkp_ask_import, hkp_export, hkp_search):
+	Use a much more strict reading of RFC-2396 for the keyserver URIs.
+	Specifically, don't try and be smart about checking the value of
+	":port" so long as it is all digits, and properly handle opaque
+	data (those scheme specific parts that do not start with "//").
+
+2002-07-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command, show_photos): Honor
+	FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER and DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use --show-photos to show
+	photos when verifying a sig made by a key with a photo.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Properly parse a URI with no
+	:port section and an empty file path, but with a terminating '/'.
+	(keyserver_work): Honor DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS.
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Display keyserver URI as a URI, but only
+	if verbose.
+
+	* exec.c, g10.c: USE_EXEC_PATH -> FIXED_EXEC_PATH
+
+2002-07-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.h, exec.c (set_exec_path, exec_write), g10.c (main): If
+	USE_EXEC_PATH is defined at compile time, use it to lock the
+	exec-path and not allow the user to change it.
+
+2002-07-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh):
+	Maintain and use the original keyserver URI for cosmetics rather
+	than trying to recreate it when needed.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Properly disregard expired
+	uids.  Make sure that the first uid listed is a real uid and not
+	an attribute (attributes should only be listed in the "aka"
+	section).  When there are no valid textual userids, try for an
+	invalid textual userid before using any attribute uid.
+
+2002-07-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Fix a few typos, clarify "group", and remove
+	sample photo viewers for Win32 since they are the defaults now.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname), keylist.c
+	(dump_attribs): Fix two typecast warnings.
+
+	* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt), exec.c
+	(expand_args), mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp), photoid.c
+	(parse_image_header): Fix some signedness compiler warnings.
+
+2002-07-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command): Also use __MINGW32__
+	instead of HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_symmetric): Do not use the new encryption code.
+
+2002-06-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* photoid.c: Use __MINGW32__ to include windows because
+	HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM is also set for OS/2 and plain DOS.  Provide
+	constant missing in older mingw installations. 
+
+2002-06-21  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* g10.c [__riscos__]: Moved RISC OS specific stuff to util/riscos.c
+	and include/util.h.
+
+	* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Likewise.
+
+2002-06-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Allow passing a
+	suggested algorithm which will be used if available.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter), sign.c (sign_file): Use
+	new select_algo_from_prefs feature to check if forcing an
+	algorithm would violate the recipient preferences.
+
+	* photoid.c (get_default_photo_command, show_photos): Use
+	different default viewers on different platforms.  Currently we
+	have Win 9x, Win NT (2k, xp), Mac OSX, RISC OS, and "everybody
+	else".  These are #ifdefs as much as possible to avoid clutter.
+
+	* g10.c (strusage, build_list), keyedit.c (show_prefs), main.h,
+	misc.c (compress_algo_to_string, check_compress_algo), pkclist.c
+	(algo_available), keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): New
+	algo_to_string and check functions for compress algorithms.
+
+2002-06-20  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* misc.c (setsysinfo): Removed a #warning for Alpha's uniligedn
+	trap disabling - it is quite possible that this is a debug relict.
+
+2002-06-20  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* g10.c [__riscos__]: Added image file system feature.
+
+	* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Added image file system feature.
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photos) [__riscos__]: Set RISC OS filetype of
+	photo id according to MIME type.
+
+2002-06-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Don't leak memory when failing out of a
+	bad HKP keyserver.
+
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Relax slightly the rules as to what
+	can go into a notation name - 2440 allows "@", for example.
+
+2002-06-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (clean_subkeys, import_one): Only allow at most 1
+	binding sig and at most 1 revocation sig on a subkey, as per
+	2440:11.1.
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, hkp_search): Error if the keyserver
+	returns an unparseable HKP response.
+
+2002-06-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names), keylist.c
+	(list_keyblock_print): Show "[expired]" before expired uids.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon), mainproc.c
+	(list_node), keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show flag 'e' for
+	expired user ids.  Use "uat" for user attribute packets instead of
+	"uid".  Also use '<count> <length>' rather than the fake user id
+	string on attributes.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_revkey): Remove unused code.
+
+	* misc.c (check_permissions): Check directory permissions
+	properly - they are not special files.
+
+	* pkclist.c (expand_id, expand_group, build_pk_list): When
+	expanding groups before building a pk list, inherit flags from the
+	original pre-expanded string.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): Don't use prefs from expired
+	uids.
+
+2002-06-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_signature): Properly copy a signature that
+	carries a revocation key on it.
+
+	* pkclist.c (expand_id, expand_group, build_pk_list): Groups now
+	work properly when used in the "Enter the user ID" prompt.
+
+2002-06-14  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Display warning if a user
+	tries to show prefs on a v3 key with a v3 selfsig.
+
+	* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Show if a uid is expired.
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks, import_revoke_cert): Show user ID
+	receiving a revocation certificate.
+
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_user_ids): Properly compare attribute ids.
+
+	* pkclist.c (expand_groups): Maintain the strlist flags while
+	expanding.  Members of an expansion inherit their flags from the
+	expansion key.
+
+	* options.h, cipher.c (write_header), g10.c (main), keygen.c
+	(keygen_set_std_prefs): remove the personal_mdc flag.  It no
+	longer serves a purpose now that the personal preference lists are
+	split into cipher/digest/zip.
+
+2002-06-14  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* skclist.c (is_insecure): Implemented.
+	
+2002-06-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Properly handle PROGRAM responses
+	when they have a CRLF ending.  Noted by Keith Ray.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Handle CRLF endings from
+	keyserver helpers.  Also don't leak the last line worth of memory
+	from the keyserver response.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (deprecated_warning): New function to warn about
+	deprecated options and commands.
+
+	* g10.c (main), keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c
+	(parse_keyserver_uri): Use new deprecated function to warn about
+	honor-http-proxy, auto-key-retrieve, and x-broken-hkp.
+
+2002-06-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: link gpg with NETLIBS for the built-in HKP access.
+
+2002-06-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_opts), g10.c (main): New
+	keyserver option "include-subkeys".  This feature already existed,
+	but now can be turned off.  It defaults to on.
+
+	* options.h, keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
+	keyserver_spawn): There are now enough options to justify making a
+	structure for the keyserver options rather than a page of
+	if-then-else-if-then-etc.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig, merge_selfsigs_main): Fix bug
+	in calculating key expiration dates.
+
+2002-06-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_user_id_native), import.c (import_one):
+	Display user ID while importing a key.  Note this applies to both
+	--import and keyserver --recv-keys.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_finish): Log unnatural exit (core dump, killed
+	manually, etc) for fork/exec/pipe child processes.
+
+2002-06-08  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_symmetric): Disable the compat flag
+	when the expert mode is enabled.
+	
+2002-06-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel, options.h, main.h, keydb.h, pkclist.c
+	(build_pk_list, expand_groups), g10.c (main, add_group): Add new
+	"group" command to allow one name to expand into multiple keys.
+	For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once
+	- you can't make an alias that points to an alias.
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (build_personal_digest_list):
+	Simplify the default digest list - there is really no need for the
+	other hashes since they will never be used after SHA-1 in the
+	list.
+
+	* options.skel, options.h, g10.c (main), hkp.c (hkp_ask_import,
+	hkp_export, hkp_search), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
+	parse_keyserver_uri, keyserver_work, keyserver_refresh): Make the
+	"x-broken-hkp" keyserver scheme into keyserver-option
+	"broken-http-proxy".  Move honor_http_proxy into
+	keyserver_options.  Canonicalize the three variations of "hkp",
+	"x-hkp", and "x-broken-hkp" into "hkp".
+
+2002-06-07  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* g10.c [__riscos__]: Added --attribute-file to do the same as
+	--attribute-fd, but with a filename not a fd as argument.
+	Added magic symbol for RISC OS to use different memory management.
+
+	* gpgv.c [__riscos__]: Added magic symbol for RISC OS to use
+	different memory management.
+
+2002-06-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (build_personal_digest_list): Put
+	in a default digest preference list consisting of SHA-1, followed
+	by every other installed digest except MD5.  Note this is the same
+	as having no digest preference at all except for SHA-1 being
+	favored.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs),
+	pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Split
+	--personal-preference-list into three:
+	--personal-{cipher|digest|compress}-preferences.  This allows a
+	user to set one without affecting another (i.e. setting only a
+	digest pref doesn't imply an empty cipher pref).
+
+	* exec.c (exec_read): This is a safer way of guessing the return
+	value of system().  Noted by Stefan Bellon.
+
+2002-06-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Be more robust with keyservers
+	returning very unparseable responses.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_read): Catch and display an error when the remote
+	process exits unnaturally (i.e. segfault) so the user knows what
+	happened.  Also fix exec_write stub which has a different number
+	of arguments now.
+
+2002-06-05  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Ignore the new mode for RFC1991.
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): Better check for weird
+	keysizes.
+	
+2002-06-05  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_sesskey): New.
+	(encode_simple): Use it here. But by default we use the compat
+	mode which supress to generate encrypted session keys.
+	
+2002-06-05  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_sesskey): New.
+	(proc_symkey_enc): Support for encrypted session keys.
+	
+2002-06-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (hash_for, sign_file): When encrypting and signing at the
+	same time, consult the various hash prefs to pick a hash algorithm
+	to use.  Pass in a 160-bit hint if any of the signing keys are
+	DSA.
+
+	* keydb.h, pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs, algo_available):
+	Pass a "hints" opaque pointer in to let the caller give hints as
+	to what algorithms would be acceptable.  The only current hint is
+	for PREFTYPE_HASH to require a 160-bit hash for DSA.  Change all
+	callers in encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter) and sign.c
+	(sign_file).  If we settle on MD5 as the best algorithm based
+	solely on recepient keys and SHA1 is also a possibility, use SHA1
+	unless the user intentionally chose MD5.  This is as per 2440:13.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Fix duplicated filename problem.
+
+2002-06-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Report back from
+	enum_sig_subpkt when a subpacket is critical and change all
+	callers in keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation), mainproc.c
+	(print_notation_data), and pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason).
+
+	* keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation): Display if the
+	policy or notation is critical.
+	
+2002-06-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), keylist.c (dump_attribs, set_attrib_fd,
+	list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon), status.h, status.c
+	(get_status_string): New --attribute-fd feature to dump the
+	contents of attribute subpackets for frontends.  If --status-fd is
+	also used, then a new status tag ATTRIBUTE is provided for each
+	subpacket.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs_main,
+	merge_selfsigs_subkey), parse-packet.c (setup_user_id): Keep track
+	of the expiration time of a user ID, and while we're at it, use
+	the expired flag from the selfsig rather than reparsing the
+	SIG_EXPIRE subpacket.
+
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id): When adding a new photo ID,
+	showing the photo for confirmation is not safe when noninteractive
+	since the "user" may not be able to dismiss a viewer window.
+	Noted by Timo Schulz.
+	
+2002-06-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: Sample photo viewers for Win32.
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando): Use the seckey for %k/%K if the pubkey is
+	not available.
+
+	* photoid.h, photoid.c (show_photos): Include the seckey in case a
+	user tries to view a photo on a secret key, and change all callers
+	in keyedit.c (menu_showphoto), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print),
+	and photoid.c (generate_photo_id).
+
+2002-06-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photos): Work properly when not called with a
+	public key.
+
+2002-05-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Free unneeded buffer.
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Properly handle the '&' character
+	(i.e. "&amp;") in HKP responses.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Fix reversed expiration time
+	check with self-sigs.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When making a new self-sig on a v3 key,
+	make a v3 self-sig unless it is currently a v3 self-sig being
+	promoted to v4.
+
+2002-05-31  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): Don't use capital
+	letters for non-interactive output.
+	(show_revocation_reason): Now it is global.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Show if the key has been revoked.
+	
+2002-05-30  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (write_signature_packets, sign_file, clearsign_file,
+	sign_symencrypt_file): Make a v4 signature if a policy URL or
+	notation is set, unless v3 sigs are forced via rfc1991 or
+	force-v3-sigs.  Also remove some doubled code and clarify an error
+	message (we don't sign in PGP2 mode - just detach-sign).
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Add KS_FLAGS to the "any
+	size" section.
+
+2002-05-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs, add_feature_mdc): Use "mdc" and
+	"no-mdc" in the prefs string to allow switching on and off the MDC
+	feature.  This is needed to properly export a key from GnuPG for
+	use on PGP which does not support MDC - without this, MDC-capable
+	implementations will still try and generate MDCs which will break
+	PGP.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_get_std_prefs): Show "[mdc]" in prefs string if
+	it is enabled.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), cipher.c (write_header), keygen.c
+	(keygen_set_std_prefs): For consistency, allow the user to specify
+	mdc/no-mdc in the --personal-preference-list.  If disabled, it
+	acts just like --disable-mdc.
+
+2002-05-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, exec.c: Add some debugging info, using the 1024 debug
+	flag.
+
+	* exec.c (win_system): New system()-like function for win32 that
+	does not return until the child process terminates.  Of course,
+	this doesn't help if the process itself exits before it is
+	finished.
+
+2002-05-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Intialize PKT when --no-literal is used.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): Renamed the record
+	for revocation keys to "rvk".
+
+2002-05-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names_colon): New.
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Divert to new function when required.
+	Sanitize printing of revoker name.
+
+2002-05-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Handle setting sig flags for
+	certain subpacket types (notation, policy url, exportable,
+	revocable).  keyedit.c (sign_mk_attrib): Flags no longer need to
+	be set here.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt), build-packet.c
+	(build_sig_subpkt): Call parse_one_sig_subpkt to sanity check
+	buffer lengths before building a sig subpacket.
+
+2002-05-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Include secret key to enable %s
+	expandos, and pass notations through pct_expando as well.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando): Add %s and %S expandos for
+	signer's keyid.
+
+2002-05-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (strusage, build_list): Add compress algorithms to
+	--version list.  Show algorithm numbers when --verbose --version
+	is done.
+
+2002-05-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, main.h, keygen.c (keygen_set_set_prefs,
+	keygen_get_std_prefs, keygen_upd_std_prefs), keyedit.c
+	(keyedit_menu), g10.c (main), pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs):
+	Add --personal-preference-list which allows the user to factor in
+	their own preferred algorithms when the preference lists are
+	consulted.  Obviously, this does not let the user violate a
+	recepient's preferences (and the RFC) - this only influences the
+	ranking of the agreed-on (and available) algorithms from the
+	recepients.  Suggested by David Hollenberg.
+
+	* options.h, keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs), g10.c (main): Rename
+	--preference-list to --default-preference-list (as that is what it
+	really is), and make it a true default in that if the user selects
+	"default" they get this list and not the compiled-in list.
+
+2002-05-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add missing LF in a info printout and made it
+	translatable.  Noted by Michael Tokarev.
+
+2002-05-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Removed the undef of USE_SHM_COPROCESSING which
+	was erroneously introduced on 2002-01-09.
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Don't write the Nul to stderr.
+	Reported by David Hollenberg.
+
+2002-05-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, g10.c (main), revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke): Generate a
+	designated revocation via --desig-revoke
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_addrevoker): New "addrevoker"
+	command to add a designated revoker to a key.
+
+2002-05-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* gpgv.c: Add stub for get_ownertrust().
+
+	* g10.c (main): --allow-freeform-uid should be implied by
+	OpenPGP.  Add --no-allow-freeform-uid.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Issue a warning when signing a
+	non-selfsigned uid.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If a key has no selfsigs, and
+	allow-non-selfsigned-uid is not set, still try and make the key
+	valid by checking all uids for a signature from an ultimately
+	trusted key.
+
+2002-05-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (keygen_add_revkey): Add revocation key
+	subpackets to a signature (callable by
+	make_keysig_packet). (write_direct_sig): Write a 1F direct key
+	signature. (parse_revocation_key): Parse a string in
+	algo:fpr:sensitive format into a revocation
+	key. (get_parameter_revkey, do_generate_keypair): Call above
+	functions when prompted from a batch key generation file.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Allow multiple revocation key
+	subpackets in a single sig.
+
+	* keydb.h, getkey.c (get_seckey_byfprint): Same as
+	get_pubkey_byfprint, except for secret keys.  We only know the
+	fingerprint of a revocation key, so this is needed to retrieve the
+	secret key needed to issue a revokation.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature, parse_revkeys): Split
+	revkey parsing off into a new function that can be used to reparse
+	after manipulating the revkey list.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Ability to make 1F direct key
+	signatures.
+
+2002-05-15  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.skel: keyserver.pgp.com is gone, so list pgp.surfnet.nl
+	as a sample LDAP server instead.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Properly handle multiple
+	revocation keys in a single packet.  Properly handle revocation
+	keys that are in out-of-order packets.  Remove duplicates in
+	revocation key list.
+
+2002-05-14  Timo Schulz   <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir) [MINGW32]: Added missing '\'.
+	
+2002-05-14  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Make use of EXTSEP_S instead of hardcoded
+	dot as extension separator.
+
+2002-05-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photos): Use the long keyid as the filename for
+	the photo.  Use the short keyid as the filename on 8.3 systems.
+
+	* exec.h, exec.c (make_tempdir, exec_write, exec_finish): Allow
+	caller to specify filename.  This should make things easier on
+	windows and macs where the file extension is required, but a whole
+	filename is even better.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names, show_prefs): Show proper
+	prefs for a v4 key uid with no selfsig at all.
+
+	* misc.c (check_permissions): Don't check permissions on
+	non-normal files (pipes, character devices, etc.)
+
+2002-05-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Avoid segv in case the parser
+	encountered an invalid packet.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_export): Get confirmation before sending
+	all keys.
+
+2002-05-10  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* g10.c, hkp.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c: Replaced all occurrances
+	of strcasecmp with ascii_strcasecmp and all occurrances of
+	strncasecmp with ascii_memcasecmp.
+
+2002-05-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (fixup_uidnode), keyedit.c (show_prefs): Show
+	assumed prefs for hash and compression as well as the cipher pref.
+	Show assumed prefs if there are no prefs at all on a v4
+	self-signed key.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), sign.c (make_keysig_packet): New
+	--cert-digest-algo function to override the default key signing
+	hash algorithm.
+
+2002-05-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Make sure the revocation key
+	list starts clean as this function may be called more than once
+	(e.g. from functions in --edit).
+
+	* g10.c, encode.c (encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file,
+	sign_symencrypt_file): Make --compress-algo work like the
+	documentation says.  It should be like --cipher-algo and
+	--digest-algo in that it can override the preferences calculation
+	and impose the setting the user wants.  No --compress-algo setting
+	allows the usual preferences calculation to take place.
+
+	* main.h, compress.c (compress_filter): use new
+	DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO define, and add a sanity check for compress
+	algo value.
+
+2002-05-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): There is an assumed
+	compression preference for uncompressed data.
+
+2002-05-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), getkey.c (finish_lookup), pkclist.c
+	(algo_available): --pgp7, identical to --pgp6 except that it
+	permits a few algorithms that PGP 7 added: AES128, AES192, AES256,
+	and TWOFISH.  Any more of these --pgpX flags, and it'll be time to
+	start looking at a generic --emulate-pgp X option.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Warn the user when exporting a
+	secret key if it or any of its secret subkeys are protected with
+	SHA1 while simple_sk_checksum is set.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Show when the SHA1 protection is
+	used in --list-packets.
+
+	* options.h, build-packet.c (do_comment), g10.c (main): Rename
+	--no-comment as --sk-comments/--no-sk-comments (--no-comment still
+	works) and make the default be --no-sk-comments.
+
+2002-05-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (get_parameter_algo): Never allow generation of the
+	deprecated RSA-E or RSA-S flavors of PGP RSA.
+	(ask_algo): Allow generation of RSA sign and encrypt in expert
+	mode.  Don't allow ElGamal S+E unless in expert mode.
+	* helptext.c: Added entry keygen.algo.rsa_se.
+
+2002-05-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): If --expert is set, allow re-signing a
+	uid to promote a v3 self-sig to a v4 one.  This essentially
+	deletes the old v3 self-sig and replaces it with a v4 one.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_key), getkey.c
+	(merge_keys_and_selfsig, merge_selfsigs_main): a v3 key with a v4
+	self-sig must never let the v4 self-sig express a key expiration
+	time that extends beyond the original v3 expiration time.
+
+2002-05-06  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When making a self-signature via "sign"
+	don't ask about sig level or expiration, and include the usual
+	preferences and such for v4 self-sigs.  (menu_set_preferences):
+	Convert uids from UTF8 to native before printing.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Convert uids from UTF8 to native before
+	printing.  (menu_set_primary_uid): Show error if the user tries to
+	make a uid with a v3 self-sig primary.
+
+2002-05-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (import_one): When merging with a key we already have,
+	don't let a key conflict (same keyid but different key) stop the
+	import: just skip the bad key and continue.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Under Win32, don't try environment
+	variables for temp directories - GetTempDir tries environment
+	variables internally, and it's better not to second-guess it in
+	case MS adds some sort of temp dir handling to Windows at some
+	point.
+
+2002-05-05  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Don't ask for a passphrase
+        in the list only mode.
+	
+2002-05-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): --refresh-keys implies
+	--merge-only so as not to import keys with keyids that match the
+	ones being refreshed.  Noted by Florian Weimer.
+
+2002-05-04  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Don't call m_alloc(0), therefore
+	added consistency check for revkey and numrefkeys.
+
+	* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): Added consistency check for
+	revkey and numrefkeys.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Likewise.
+
+2002-05-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.c: Provide default image viewer for Win32.
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando): %t means extension, not name ("jpg", not
+	"jpeg").
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn), photoid.c (show_photos), exec.h,
+	exec.c: Allow the caller to determine the temp file extension when
+	starting an exec_write and change all callers.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Nonrevocable key signatures cause an
+	automatic promotion to v4.
+
+	* exec.c: Provide stubs for exec_ functions when NO_EXEC is
+	defined.
+
+2002-05-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* photoid.h, photoid.c (parse_image_header, image_type_to_string):
+	Useful functions to return data about an image.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname,
+	parse_attribute_subpkts, parse_attribute), photoid.h, photoid.c
+	(show_photos): Handle multiple images in a single attribute
+	packet.
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando), sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy),
+	photoid.c (show_photos): Simpler expando code that does not
+	require using compile-time string sizes.  Call
+	image_type_to_string to get image strings (i.e. "jpg",
+	"image/jpeg").  Change all callers.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_showphoto), keylist.c (list_keyblock_print):
+	Allow viewing multiple images within a single attribute packet.
+
+	* gpgv.c: Various stubs for link happiness.
+
+2002-05-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), keyedit.c (sign_uids),
+	options.h, sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy), g10.c (main,
+	add_notation_data, add_policy_url (new), check_policy_url
+	(removed)): Allow multiple policy URLs on a given signature.
+	Split "--notation-data" into "--cert-notation" and
+	"--sig-notation" so the user can set different policies for key
+	and data signing.  For backwards compatibility, "--notation-data"
+	sets both, as before.
+
+2002-05-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* options.skel: Removed the comment on trusted-keys because this
+	option is now deprecated.
+
+2002-05-01  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): 2440bis04 says that multiple attribute
+	packets on a given key are legal.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): the fake v3 keyid hack applies
+	to "mailto" URLs as well since they are also served by pksd.
+
+2002-04-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	Added a copyright year for files changed this year.
+
+2002-04-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New options --display, --ttyname, --ttytype,
+	--lc-ctype, --lc-messages to be used with future versions of the
+	gpg-agent. 
+	* passphrase.c (agent_send_option,agent_send_all_options): New.
+	(agent_open): Send options to the agent.
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_ownertrust, clear_ownertrust): Do an explicit
+	do_sync because revalidation_mark does it only if when the
+	timestamp actually changes.
+
+2002-04-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, keygen.c (do_generate_keypair), keylist.c
+	(print_signature_stats, list_all, list_one, list_keyblock,
+	list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): After generating a new
+	key, show the key information (name, keyid, fingerprint, etc.)
+	Also do not print uncheckable signatures (missing key..) in
+	--check-sigs.  Print statistics (N missing keys, etc.) after
+	--check-sigs.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): When signing a key with an expiration
+	date on it, the "Do you want your signature to expire at the same
+	time?" question should default to YES.
+
+2002-04-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_plaintext), packet.h, plaintext.c
+	(handle_plaintext): Fix bug in handling literal packets with
+	zero-length data (no data was being confused with partial body
+	length).
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: %t means extension ("jpg").
+	%T means MIME type ("image/jpeg").
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Only trigger trust update if the keyring
+	is actually changed.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Missing a m_free.
+
+2002-04-22  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* keyid.c (expirestr_from_sk, expirestr_from_sig): Added _() to
+	string constant.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir) [__riscos__]: Better placement of
+	temporary file.
+
+2002-04-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): 2440bis04 adds that creating
+	subkeys on v3 keys is a MUST NOT.
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): The --pgp6 "use the primary key"
+	behavior should only apply while data signing and not encryption.
+	Noted by Roger Sondermann.
+
+2002-04-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Put back 3DES because the RFC
+	says it is good form to do so.
+
+2002-04-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_deluid): Only cause a trust update if we delete
+	a non-revoked user id.
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
+	keyserver_spawn), options.h: Remove fast-import keyserver option
+	(no longer meaningful).
+
+	* g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_uids), options.h: Change
+	--default-check-level to --default-cert-check-level as it makes
+	clear what it operates on.
+
+	* g10.c (main): --pgp6 also implies --no-ask-sig-expire.
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Comment.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids, keyedit_menu, menu_deluid, menu_delsig,
+	menu_expire, menu_revsig, menu_revkey): Only force a trustdb check
+	if we did something that changes it.
+
+	* g10.c: add "--auto-check-trustdb" to override a
+	"--no-auto-check-trustdb"
+
+2002-04-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_write_nextcheck): Return a status whether the
+	stamp was actually changed.
+	* trustdb.c (revalidation_mark): Sync the changes.  Removed the
+	sync operation done by its callers.
+	(get_validity): Add logic for maintaining a pending_check flag.
+	(clear_ownertrust): New.
+	
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't call revalidation_mark depending on
+	primary_pk.
+	(keyedit_menu): Call revalidation_mark after "trust".
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Print a warning on the wrong listed key
+	validity.
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Clear the owenertrust information when
+	deleting a public key.
+	
+2002-04-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Print an error message if a wrong
+	digest algorithm is used with DSA.  Changed all callers to cope
+	with a NULL return.  Problem noted by Imad R. Faiad.
+
+2002-04-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Properly handle nonrevocable
+	signatures that can expire.  In short, the only thing that can
+	override an unexpired nonrevocable signature is another unexpired
+	nonrevocable signature.
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Always use primary signing key for
+	signatures when --pgp6 is on since pgp6 and 7 do not understand
+	signatures made by signing subkeys.
+
+2002-04-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Never schedule a nextcheck into the
+	past.
+	(validate_key_list): New arg curtime use it to set next_expire.
+	(validate_one_keyblock): Take the current time from the caller.
+	(clear_validity, reset_unconnected_keys): New.
+	(validate_keys): Reset all unconnected keys.
+
+	* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Fixed 0x12345678! syntax
+	for use with secret keys.
+	(lookup): Advance the searchmode after a search FIRST.
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Always calculate the old checksum for
+	use after unprotection.
+
+	* g10.c, options.skel: New option --no-escape-from.  Made
+	--escape-from and --force-v3-sigs the default and removed them
+	from the options skeleton.
+
+2002-04-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Support a SHA1 checksum as per
+	draft-rfc2440-bis04.
+	* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Add field sha1chk.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check the SHA1 checksum
+	(protect_secret_key): And create it.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Mark it as sha-1 protected.
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --simple-sk-checksum.
+
+2002-04-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Minor fix - signatures should
+	expire at their expiration time and not one second later.
+
+	* keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Allow specifying preferences
+	string (i.e. "s5 s2 z1 z2", etc) in a batchmode key generation
+	file.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Print standard error message when
+	signing a revoked key (no new translation).
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Get the default set of key prefs from
+	the real (not attribute) primary uid.
+
+2002-04-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fix bug that allowed a key to be
+	selected twice in batch mode if one instance was the default
+	recipient and the other was an encrypt-to.  Noted by Stefan
+	Bellon.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Show data in trust and regexp
+	sig subpackets.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use new function real_uids_left to
+	prevent deleting the last real (i.e. non-attribute) uid.  Again,
+	according to the attribute draft. (menu_showphoto): Make another
+	string translatable.
+
+2002-04-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Delete subpackets from both
+	hashed and unhashed area on update.  (find_subpkt): No longer
+	needed.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): With --pgp2 on, refuse to sign a v3 key
+	with a v4 signature.  As usual, --expert overrides.  Try to tweak
+	some strings to a closer match so they can all be translated in
+	one place.  Use different helptext keys to allow different help
+	text for different questions.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_upd_std_prefs): Remove preferences from both
+	hashed and unhashed areas if they are not going to be used.
+
+2002-04-10  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: Use %t to indicate type of a
+	photo ID (in this version, it's always "jpeg").  Also tweak string
+	expansion loop to minimize reallocs.
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Variable type fix.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_set_primary_uid): Differentiate between true
+	user IDs and attribute user IDs when making one of them primary.
+	That is, if we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
+	If we are making an attribute packet primary, we alter attribute
+	packets.  This matches the language in the latest attribute packet
+	draft.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): No need for the empty string hack.
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Only accept preferences from the
+	hashed segment of the self-sig.
+
+2002-04-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Fixed the offset to read the old
+	ownertrust value and only add entries to the table if we really
+	have a value.
+
+2002-04-08  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* status.h, status.c (get_status_string): Add KEYEXPIRED, EXPSIG,
+	and EXPKEYSIG.  Add "deprecated-use-keyexpired-instead" to
+	SIGEXPIRED.
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Start transition from SIGEXPIRED to
+	KEYEXPIRED, since the actual event is signature verification by an
+	expired key and not an expired signature. (do_signature_check,
+	packet.h): Rename as signature_check2, make public, and change all
+	callers.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print, do_check_sig): Use status
+	EXPSIG for an expired, but good, signature.  Add the expiration
+	time (or 0) to the VALIDSIG status line.  Use status KEYEXPSIG for
+	a good signature from an expired key.
+
+	* g10.c (main): remove checks for no arguments now that argparse
+	does it.
+
+2002-04-06  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Disable the keylist mode here.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Only test on compressed
+	files if a compress level was not explicity set.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Removed Blowfish and Twofish
+	from the list of default preferences, swapped the preferences of
+	RMD160 and SHA1.  Don't include a preference to 3DES unless the
+	IDEA kludge gets used.
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_packet): call free_encrypted also for
+	PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
+
+	* compress.c (release_context): New.
+	(handle_compressed): Allocate the context and setup a closure to
+	release the context.  This is required because there is no
+	guarabntee that the filter gets popped from the chain at the end
+	of the function.  Problem noted by Timo and probably also the
+	cause for a couple of other reports.
+	(compress_filter): Use the release function if set.
+
+	* tdbio.c [__CYGWIN32__]: Don't rename ftruncate.  Noted by
+	Disastry.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Put parens around a bit test.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Double backslash for TMP directory
+	creation under Windows.  Better strlen the DIRSEP_S constants for
+	allocation measurements.
+
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Release the passphrase aquired
+	by get_last_passphrase.
+
+2002-04-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* Makefile.am (EXTRA_DIST): Removed OPTIONS an pubring.asc - they
+	are no longer of any use. 
+
+2002-04-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options): fix auto-key-retrieve to
+	actually work as a keyserver-option (noted by Roger Sondermann).
+
+	* keylist.c (reorder_keyblock): do not reorder the primary
+	attribute packet - the first user ID must be a genuine one.
+
+2002-03-31  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Fix ownertrust display with
+	--with-colons.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_user_id), photoid.c (generate_photo_id):
+	Properly initialize the user ID refcount.  A few more "y/n" ->
+	"y/N" in photoid.c.
+
+	* keyedit.c (ask_revoke_sig): Warn the user if they are about to
+	revoke an expired sig (not a problem, but they should know).  Also
+	tweak a few prompts to change "y/n" to "y/N", which is how most
+	other prompts are written.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Control-d escapes the
+	keyserver search prompt.
+
+	* pkclist.c (show_revocation_reason & callers): If a subkey is
+	considered revoked solely because the parent key is revoked, print
+	the revocation reason from the parent key.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity): Allow revocation/expiration to apply
+	to a uid/key with no entry in the trustdb.
+
+2002-03-29  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (printunquoted): unquote backslashes from keyserver
+	searches
+
+	* hkp.c (write_quoted): quote backslashes from keyserver searches
+
+2002-03-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Removed the warning for key sizes > 1536.
+
+2002-03-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Use 2 strings and not a %s so that
+	translations can be done the right way.
+	* helptext.c: Fixed small typo.
+
+2002-03-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (append_uid, merge_sigs): it is okay to import
+	completely non-signed uids now (with --allow-non-selfsigned-uid).
+
+	* getkey.c (get_primary_uid, merge_selfsigs_main): do not choose
+	an attribute packet (i.e. photo) as primary uid.  This prevents
+	oddities like "Good signature from [image of size 2671]".  This is
+	still not perfect (one can still select an attribute packet as
+	primary in --edit), but is closer to the way the draft is going.
+
+	* g10.c (build_list): algorithms should include 110.
+
+	* g10.c (main): --pgp2 implies --no-ask-sig-expire and
+	--no-ask-cert-expire as those would cause a v4 sig/cert.
+
+	* armor.c (is_armor_header): be more lenient in what constitutes a
+	valid armor header (i.e. -----BEGIN blah blah-----) as some
+	Windows programs seem to add spaces at the end.  --openpgp makes
+	it strict again.
+
+2002-03-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Properly handle a "no
+	keys found" case from the internal HKP code (external HKP is ok).
+	Also, make a COUNT -1 (i.e. streamed) keyserver response a little
+	more efficient.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
+
+2002-03-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): --openpgp implies --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If none of the uids are primary
+	(because none are valid) then pick the first to be primary (but
+	still invalid).  This is for cosmetics in case some display needs
+	to print a user ID from a non-selfsigned key.  Also use
+	--allow-non-selfsigned-uid to make such a key valid and not
+	--always-trust.  The key is *not* automatically trusted via
+	--allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Make sure non-selfsigned uids
+	print [uncertain] on verification even though one is primary now.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): If the main key is not valid, then
+	neither are the subkeys.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Allow --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work
+	on completely unsigned keys.  Print the uids in UTF8.  Remove
+	mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid().
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Show revocation key as
+	UTF8.
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Allow --not-dash-escaped to work with
+	v3 keys.
+
+2002-03-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* main.h: Changed the default algorithms to CAST5 and SHA1.
+
+2002-03-13  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Show which user ID a bad self-sig
+	(invald sig or unsupported public key algorithm) resides on.
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): any valid self-sig should mark a user
+	ID or subkey as valid - otherwise, an attacker could DoS the user
+	by inventing a bogus invalid self-signature.
+
+2002-03-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): make a few more strings translatable.
+
+	* options.h, options.skel, g10.c (main), gpgv.c, mainproc.c
+	(check_sig_and_print), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options):
+	--auto-key-retrieve should really be a keyserver-option variable.
+
+	* import.c (revocation_present): new function to print a warning
+	if a key is imported that has been revoked by designated revoker,
+	but the designated revoker is not present to verify the
+	revocation.  If keyserver-options auto-key-retrieve is set, try
+	and fetch the designated revoker from the keyserver.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): call revocation_present after importing a
+	new key.  Note that this applies to --import, --recv-keys, and
+	--search-keys.
+	
+	* keyserver-internal.h, keyserver.c (keyserver_import_fprint):
+	import via fingerprint (for revocation keys).
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_import_keyid): much simpler
+	implementation now that we're using KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC internally.
+
+2002-03-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): do not prompt for revocation reason for
+	v3 revocations (unless force-v4-certs is on) since they wouldn't
+	be used anyway.
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): show the status of the sigs
+	(exportable? revocable?) to the user before prompting for which
+	sig to revoke.  Also, make sure that local signatures get local
+	revocations.
+
+	* keyedit.c (ask_revoke_sig): remind the user which sigs are
+	local.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add "exec-path" variable to override PATH for
+	execing programs.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): properly check return code from
+	classify_user_id to catch unclassifiable keys.
+
+2002-03-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): variable type tweak for RISC
+	OS (from Stefan)
+
+2002-02-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): New function to check a
+	revocation against a list of potential revocation keys.  Note the
+	loop-breaking code here.  This is to prevent blowing up if A is
+	B's revocation key, while B is also A's.  Note also that this is
+	written so that a revoked revoker can still issue revocations:
+	i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still revoked.  I'm
+	not completely convinced this is the proper behavior, but it
+	matches how PGP does it.  It does at least have the advantage of
+	much simpler code - my first version of this had lots of loop
+	maintaining code so you could chain revokers many levels deep and
+	if D was revoked, C was not, which meant that B was, and so on.
+	It was sort of scary, actually.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add any revocation keys onto the
+	pk.  This is particularly interesting since we normally only get
+	data from the most recent 1F signature, but you need multiple 1F
+	sigs to properly handle revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and
+	a revocation key could be marked "sensitive" and hence in a
+	different signature).  Also, if a pk has a revocation key set,
+	check for revocation sigs that were not made by us - if made by a
+	valid revocation key, mark the pk revoked.
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (cache_public_key): do not cache key if
+	"dont_cache" is set.  This allows the revocation key code to look
+	up a key and return information that may be inaccurate to prevent
+	loops without caching the fake data.
+
+	* packet.h, sig-check.c (do_signature_check): Record if a
+	signature was made by a revoked pk.
+
+	* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt,
+	can_handle_critical, parse_signature): Get revocation key
+	information out of direct sigs.
+	
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): don't assume that the presence
+	of a 0x20 signature means the key is revoked.  With revocation
+	keys, this may not be true if the revocation key is not around to
+	verify it or if verification failed.  Also, 0x1F should get listed
+	as "sig", and not "unexpected signature class".
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Add a flag for printing
+	revoker information and change all callers.
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks): merge in any new direct key (0x1F)
+	sigs.
+
+	* import.c (import_revoke_cert): don't keep processing after a
+	revocation is rejected.
+	
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Allow importing a revocation
+	signature even if it was not issued by the key.  This allows a
+	revocation key to issue it.  Of course, the sig still needs to be
+	checked before we trust it.
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Include a new copy of the
+	revocation keys when duping a pk.
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc, release_public_key_parts): Free
+	any revocation keys that are attached to a sig or pk.
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not export signatures with
+	"sensitive" revocation keys in them.
+
+2002-02-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not include v3 keys in a
+	--export-secret-subkeys export.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): If a key isn't valid (say,
+	because of no self-signature), allow --always-trust to force it
+	valid so it can be trusted.
+
+2002-02-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import), hkp.h, keyserver.c (all): treat key
+	lists internally as fingerprints when possible.  All this is via
+	KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC - no point in reinventing the wheel. This allows
+	the helper program to search the keyserver by fingerprint if
+	desired (and the keyserver supports it).  Note that automatic
+	fingerprint promotion during refresh only applies to v4 keys as a
+	v4 fingerprint can be easily changed into a long or short key id,
+	and a v3 cannot.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c, getkey.c, misc.c, main.h: Take two copies of
+	hextobyte() from pubkey-enc.c and getkey.c and make them into one
+	copy in misc.c.
+
+2002-02-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Detect a "no keys found"
+	case even if the helper program does not explicitly say how many
+	keys were found.
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Bug fix - don't report non-revoked keys
+	as revoked in HKP key searches.
+
+2002-02-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Made parsing more robust.
+
+2002-02-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Catch corruption in HKP index lines
+	(can be caused by broken or malicious keyservers).
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_work): Add KEYSERVER_NOT_SUPPORTED for
+	unsupported actions (say, a keyserver that has no way to search,
+	or a readonly keyserver that has no way to add).  Also add a
+	USE_EXTERNAL_HKP define to disable the internal HKP keyserver
+	code.
+
+2002-02-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --no-use-agent. 
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Always print the warning for
+	unknown and undefined trust.  Removed the did_add cruft.  Reported
+	by Janusz A. Urbanowicz.
+
+2002-02-11  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index): Bug fix - properly handle user IDs with
+	colons (":") in them while HKP searching.
+
+2002-02-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (pct_expando): More comments.
+
+	* keydb.h, sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Clarify what is a sig
+	and what is a cert.  A sig has sigclass 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, or 0x40,
+	and everything else is a cert.
+
+	* g10.c (main), keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add a "nrlsign" for
+	nonrevocable and local key signatures.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add a --no-force-mdc to undo --force-mdc.
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), cipher.c (write_header): Add a knob to
+	--disable-mdc/--no-disable-mdc.  Off by default, of course, but is
+	used in --pgp2 and --pgp6 modes.
+	
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Allow specifying multiple users in
+	the "Enter the user ID" loop.  Enter a blank line to stop.  Show
+	each key+id as it is added.
+
+	* keylist.c (show_policy_url), mainproc.c (print_notation_data):
+	It is not illegal (though possibly silly) to have multiple policy
+	URLs in a given signature, so print all that are present.
+	
+	* hkp.c (hkp_search): More efficient implementation of URL-ifying
+	code.
+
+2002-02-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* main.h, misc.c (pct_expando): New function to generalize
+	%-expando processing in any arbitrary string.
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photo): Call the new pct_expando function rather
+	than expand strings internally.
+	
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Show policy URLs and notations
+	when making a signature if show-policy/show-notation is on.
+	%-expand policy URLs during generation.  This lets the user have
+	policy URLs of the form "http://notary.jabberwocky.com/keysign/%K"
+	which will generate a per-signature policy URL.
+
+	* main.h, keylist.c (show_policy_url, show_notation): Add amount
+	to indent so the same function can be used in key listings as well
+	as during sig generation.  Change all callers.
+
+2002-02-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c, options.h (parse_keyserver_options, keyidlist):
+	Workaround for the pksd and OKS keyserver bug that calculates v4
+	RSA keyids as if they were v3.  The workaround/hack is to fetch
+	both the v4 (e.g. 99242560) and v3 (e.g. 68FDDBC7) keyids.  This
+	only happens for key refresh while using the HKP scheme and the
+	refresh-add-fake-v3-keyids keyserver option must be set.  This
+	should stay off by default.
+
+2002-02-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Bug fix - do not append keys to
+	each other when --sending more than one.
+
+2002-02-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_uids), sign.c
+	(mk_notation_and_policy): Split "--set-policy-url" into
+	"--cert-policy-url" and "--sig-policy-url" so the user can set
+	different policies for key and data signing.  For backwards
+	compatibility, "--set-policy-url" sets both, as before.
+
+2002-01-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): --gen-random --armor does now output a base64
+	encoded string.
+
+2002-01-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main), options.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): --pgp6
+	flag.  This is not nearly as involved as --pgp2.  In short, it
+	turns off force_mdc, turns on no_comment, escape_from, and
+	force_v3_sigs, and sets compression to 1.  It also restricts the
+	user to IDEA (if present), 3DES, CAST5, MD5, SHA1, and RIPEMD160.
+	See the comments above algo_available() for lots of discussion on
+	why you would want to do this.
+
+2002-01-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Comment
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Bug fix - when signing with multiple
+	secret keys at the same time, make sure each key gets the sigclass
+	prompt.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_finish): Close the iobuf and FILE before trying to
+	waitpid, so the remote process will get a SIGPIPE and exit.  This
+	is only a factor when using a pipe to communicate.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_write): Disable cache-on-close of the fd iobuf (is
+	this right?  Why is a fd iobuf cached at all?)
+
+2002-01-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --gpg-agent-info
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Let it override the environment info.
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Always try 3 times when the
+	agent is enabled.
+	* options.skel: Describe --use-agent.
+
+2002-01-24  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs, get_it): Only check preferences
+	against keys with v4 self sigs - there is really little point in
+	warning for every single non-IDEA message encrypted to an old key.
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Only put in the fake IDEA
+	preference if --pgp2 is on.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print "Expired" for expired
+	but good signatures (this still prints "BAD" for expired but bad
+	signatures).
+
+2002-01-23  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Cosmetic: don't present a RSA signing
+	key as a "keypair" which can be 768 bits long (as RSA minimum is
+	1024).
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): Allow IDEA as a fake preference
+	for v3 keys with v3 selfsigs.
+
+2002-01-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* packet.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main), pkclist.c
+	(select_algo_from_prefs): Implement the fake IDEA preference as
+	per RFC2440:12.1.  This doesn't mean that IDEA will be used (the
+	plugin may not be present), but it does mean that a v3 key with a
+	v3 selfsig has an implicit IDEA preference instead of 3DES.  v3
+	keys with v4 selfsigs use preferences as normal.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt): if select_algo_from_prefs fails, this
+	means that we could not find a cipher that both keys like.  Since
+	all v4 keys have an implicit 3DES preference, this means there is
+	a v3 key with a v3 selfsig in the list.  Use 3DES in this case as
+	it is the safest option (we know the v4 key can handle it, and
+	we'll just hope the v3 key is being used in an implementation that
+	can handle it).  If --pgp2 is on, warn the user what we're doing
+	since it'll probably break PGP2 compatibility.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Do not force using IDEA for encrypted files in
+	--pgp2 mode - let the fake IDEA preference choose this for us for
+	better compatibility when encrypting to multiple keys, only some
+	of which are v3.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Put 3DES on the end of the
+	default cipher pref list (RFC2440: "...it is good form to place it
+	there explicitly.").  If the user has the IDEA plugin installed,
+	put a preference for IDEA *after* 3DES to effectively disable its
+	use for everything except encrypting along with v3 keys.
+
+	* encode.c, g10.c, sign.c: Change the PGP2 warning line from
+	"... will not be usable ..." to "... may not be usable ..." as the
+	user could be using one of the enhanced PGP2 variations.
+
+	* helptext.c: Revise the sign_uid.class help text as suggested by
+	Stefan.
+	
+2002-01-20  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Add tryagain_text arg to be
+	used with the agent.  Changed all callers.
+	(agent_get_passphrase): Likewise and send it to the agent
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): New arg tryagain_text.
+	(check_secret_key): Pass the string to do_check.
+	* keygen.c (ask_passphrase): Set the error text is required.
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Ditto.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Disable opt.use_agent in case of a
+	problem with the agent. 
+	(agent_get_passphrase): Ditto.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
+
+2002-01-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Add support for the new Assuan based
+	gpg-agent.  New arg to return the used protocol version.
+	(agent_get_passphrase): Implemented new protocol here.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
+	(readline): New.
+	
+2002-01-15  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): Fail if --output is used.
+	
+	* g10.c: New command --decrypt-files.
+
+	* decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): New.
+	
+2002-01-09  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c, misc.c, gpgv.c: move idea_cipher_warn to misc.c so gpgv.c
+	doesn't need a stub for it any longer.
+
+	* g10.c (get_temp_dir), main.h: no longer used (it's in exec.c now)
+
+	* g10.c (main), delkey.c (delete_keys), main.h : Allow
+	--delete-key (now --delete-keys, though --delete-key still works,
+	of course) to delete multiple keys in one go.  This applies to
+	--delete-secret-key(s) and --delete-secret-and-public-key(s) as
+	well.
+
+2002-01-09  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): Now it behaves like verify_files.
+	
+	* g10.c (main): We don't need to check argc for encode_crypt_files
+	any longer.
+
+2002-01-09  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* exec.c: Include windows.h for dosish systems.
+
+2002-01-08  Timo Schulz  <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): New description for --encrypt-files.
+
+2002-01-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Must register the secring for encryption because
+	it is needed to figure out the default recipient.  Reported by
+	Roger Sondermann.
+
+2002-01-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): Require --expert before adding a photo
+	ID to a v3 key, and before adding a second photo ID to any key.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Don't allow adding photo IDs in
+	rfc1991 or pgp2 mode.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey): Permit v3 subkeys.  Believe it
+	or not, this is allowed by rfc 2440, and both PGP 6 and PGP 7 work
+	fine with them.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h, keyedit.c, sign.c: Move the "ask for
+	expiration" switch off of --expert, which was getting quite
+	overloaded, and onto ask-sig-expire and ask-cert-expire.  Both
+	default to off.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Change the default compression algo to 1, to be
+	more OpenPGP compliant (PGP also uses this, so it'll help with
+	interoperability problems as well).
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt): Handle compression algo 2, since the
+	default is now 1.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): Fix off-by-one error.
+
+2002-01-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Do not register the secret keyrings for certain
+	commands.
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Use access to test for keyring
+	existence.  This avoids cached opened files which are bad under
+	RISC OS.
+
+2002-01-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): always use one-pass
+	packets unless rfc1991 is enabled.  This allows a signature made
+	with a v3 key to work in PGP 6 and 7.  Signatures made with v4
+	keys are unchanged.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Disallow non-detached signatures in PGP2 mode.
+	Move the "you must use files and not pipes" PGP2 warning up so all
+	the PGP2 stuff is together.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Use the actual filesize instead of
+	partial length packets in the internal literal packet from a
+	symmetric message.  This breaks PGP5(?), but fixes PGP2, 6, and 7.
+	It's a decent tradeoff.  Note there was only an issue with
+	old-style RFC1991 symmetric messages.  2440-style messages in 6
+	and 7 work with or without partial length packets.
+
+2002-01-03  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Removed --no-default-check-level option, as it is
+	not consistent with other "default" options.  Plus, it is the same
+	as saying --default-check-level 0.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_read): Disallow caching tempfile from child
+	process, as this keeps the file handle open and can cause unlink
+	problems on some platforms.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_search_prompt): Minor tweak - don't
+	bother to transform keyids into textual form if they're just going
+	to be transformed back to numbers.
+
+2002-01-03  Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New command --encrypt-files.
+    
+	* verify.c (print_file_status): Removed the static because
+	encode_crypt_files also uses this function.
+
+	* main.h (print_files_status): New.
+	(encode_crypt_files): New.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt_files): New.
+
+2002-01-02  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* keyserver.c: Moved util.h include down in order to avoid
+	redefinition problems on RISC OS.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_lock): Only lock keyrings that are writable.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_update_keyblock): Close unused iobuf.
+
+	* hkp.c (parse_hkp_index, hkp_search) [__riscos__]: Changed
+	unsigned char* to char* because of compiler issues.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_finish) [__riscos__]: Invalidate close cache so
+	that file can be unlinked.
+
+2001-12-28  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use a different strlist to check extensions since
+	they need to be handled seperately now.
+
+	* misc.c,main.h (check_permissions): Properly handle permission
+	and ownership checks on files in the lib directory
+	(e.g. /usr/local/lib/gnupg), which are owned by root and are
+	world-readable, and change all callers to specify extension or
+	per-user file.
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photo), keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Bug fix -
+	don't call exec_finish if exec_write fails.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Look for OPTIONS from the
+	keyserver helper - specifically, a "OUTOFBAND" option for the
+	email keyserver.
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node), keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon),
+	import.c (delete_inv_parts), export.c (do_export_stream): Use
+	signature flags for exportability check rather than re-parsing the
+	subpacket.
+
+	* keyid.c, keydb.h (get_lsign_letter): No longer needed.
+
+2001-12-27  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.c (exec_finish): Show errors when temp files cannot be
+	deleted for whatever reason.
+
+	* exec.c (exec_read): Don't rely on WEXITSTATUS being present.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): Add temp file creator for win32.  Don't
+	create an incoming temp file if the exec is write-only.
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Clean up error handling, for when
+	the spawn fails.
+
+	* photoid.c (show_photo): Clean up error handling.
+
+	* misc.c (check_permissions): Neaten.
+
+2001-12-25  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp): Add copyleft info and tweak the 'X' counter
+	to be a bit simpler.
+
+	* keyserver.c, photoid.c: Remove unused headers left over from
+	when the exec functions lived there.
+
+2001-12-23  Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
+
+	* misc.c (check_permissions): Do not use it for W32 systems.
+
+	* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Define ftruncate as chsize() for W32.
+
+	* mkdtemp.c: W32 support.
+
+	* photoid.c: Ditto.
+
+	* exec.c: Ditto.
+
+2001-12-22  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): avoid compiler warning with const
+
+	* mkdtemp.c (mkdtemp): catch the empty ("") string case in case
+	someone repurposes mkdtemp at some point.
+
+	* photoid.c (generate_photo_id, show_photo): some type changes
+	from Stefan Bellon.
+
+	* exec.c (make_tempdir): handle Win32 systems, suggested by Timo
+	Schulz.
+
+2001-12-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): i18n 2 strings.
+
+2001-12-22  Timo Schulz <ts@winpt.org>
+	
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Use is_file_compressed
+	to avoid to compress compressed files.
+
+2001-12-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Removed some variables
+	declaration due to shadowing warnings.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): s/index/idx/ to avoid
+	compiler warnig due to index(3).
+
+	* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): Use KEYDB_HANDLE as return value.
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Made resname const.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow "addphoto" only when --openpgp is
+	not used.
+
+	* options.skel: Changed one example photo viewer to qiv.
+
+2001-12-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Makefile.am: add exec.c, exec.h, photoid.c, and photoid.h
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): new function to build
+	the raw attribute subpacket.  Note that attribute subpackets have
+	the same format as signature subpackets.
+
+	* exec.c: new file with generic exec-a-program functionality.
+	Used by both photo IDs and keyserver helpers.  This is pretty much
+	the same code that used to be keyserver specific, with some
+	changes to be usable generically.
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_attributes (new)): function to free an
+	attribute packet.
+	
+	* gpgv.c: added stub show_photo
+	
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_adduid, menu_showphoto): can add a
+	photo (calls generate_photo_id), or display a photo (calls
+	show_photo) from the --edit menu.  New commands are "addphoto",
+	and "delphoto" (same as "deluid").
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): show photos during key list if
+	--show-photos enabled.
+	
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): use the generic exec_xxx
+	functions to call keyserver helper.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: three new options - --{no-}show-photos, and
+	--photo-viewer to give the command line to display a picture.
+
+	* options.skel: instructions for the photo viewer
+	
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id, setup_user_id (new)): common code
+	for both user IDs and attribute IDs moved to setup_user_id.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (make_attribute_uidname (new)): constructs a fake
+	"name" for attribute packets (e.g. "[image of size ...]")
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_attribute (replaces parse_photo_id),
+	parse_attribute_subpkts): Builds an array of individual
+	attributes.  Currently only handles attribute image / type jpeg
+	subpackets.
+
+	* sign.c (hash_uid): Fix bug in signing attribute (formerly
+	photo_id) packets.
+
+	* packet.h, and callers: globally change "photo_id" to "attribute"
+	and add structures for attributes.  The packet format is generic
+	attributes, even though the only attribute type thus far defined
+	is jpeg.
+
+2001-12-21  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Can handle critical
+	revocation subpackets now.
+
+	* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Disregard revocations for
+	nonrevocable sigs.  Note that this allows a newer revocable
+	signature to override an older nonrevocable signature.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): add a duration field and change all
+	callers.  This makes make_keysig_packet closer to
+	write_signature_packets and removes some duplicated expiration
+	code.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu, menu_revsig, sign_uids,
+	sign_mk_attrib): Add nrsign command, don't allow revoking a
+	nonrevocable signature,
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add --nrsign option to nonrevocably sign a key
+	from the command line.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Comment to explain
+	the use of CRITICAL.
+
+2001-12-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c. options.h : New option --show-keyring
+	* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): New.
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Implement option here.  By David Champion. 
+
+2001-12-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Use mkdtemp() to make temp
+	directory.
+
+	* mkdtemp.c: replacement function for those platforms that don't
+	have mkdtemp (make a temp directory securely).
+
+2001-12-19  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* misc.c (check_permissions): New function to stat() and ensure
+	the permissions of GNUPGHOME and the files have safe permissions.
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Check keyring permissions.
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Check permissions of trustdb.gpg
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Disable keyserver schemes that
+	involve running external programs if the options file has unsafe
+	permissions or ownership.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-permission-warning to disable
+	the permission warning message(s).  This also permits use of the
+	keyserver if it had been disabled (see above).  Also check the
+	permissions/ownership of random_seed.
+	
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): The new glibc prints a warning
+	when using mktemp() (the code was already secure, but the warning
+	was bound to cause confusion).  Use a different implementation
+	based on get_random_bits() instead.  Also try a few times to get
+	the temp dir before giving up.
+
+2001-12-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, passphrase.c [CYGWIN32]: Allow this as an alias for MINGW32.
+
+2001-12-18  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c (idea_cipher_warn): Add a flag to show the warning always
+	or once per session and change all callers (show always except for
+	the secret key protection and unknown cipher from an encrypted
+	message errors).  Also make the strings translatable.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Add the IDEA cipher warning if the user
+	tries to decrypt an IDEA encrypted message without the IDEA
+	plugin.
+
+	* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): More strict checking of the
+	keyserver URI.  Specifically, fail if the ":port" section is
+	anything except a number between 1 and 65535.
+
+2001-12-17  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyserver.c (print_keyinfo): No need to check for
+	control/illegal characters, as utf8_to_native does this for us.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use generic IDEA warning.
+
+	* gpgv.c: add stub for idea_cipher_warn
+
+	* g10.c, hkp.c, keyserver.c: Fix capitalization and plural issues.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt), sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file):
+	disable pgp2 mode after the message is no longer pgp2 compatible.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Tweak the PGP2.x IDEA warning to use the generic
+	warning, and not merely fail if the IDEA plugin isn't there.
+
+	* g10.c (main, idea_cipher_warn), keygen.c (set_one_pref),
+	seckey-cert.c (do_check): Add a generic IDEA warning for when the
+	IDEA plugin is not present.  This pops up when the user uses
+	"--cipher-algo idea", when setpref is used to set a "S1"
+	preference, and when a secret key protected with IDEA is used.
+
+2001-12-15  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Assert that we have dropped privs.
+
+2001-12-13  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Check that the public key
+	algorithm is indeed usable for en/decryption.  This avoid a
+	strange error message from pubkey_decrypt if for some reasons a
+	bad algorithm indentifier is passed.
+
+2001-12-12  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Fixed some types for portability.  Noted by Stefan Bellon.
+
+2001-12-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_export): Do not print possible control characters
+	from a keyserver response.
+	(parse_hkp_index): Made uid an unsigned char* because it is passed to
+	isspace().
+	(hkp_search): Ditto for the char* vars.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print the IDEA warning also for -c and -se.
+	
+	* g10.c (get_temp_dir): Assert that we have dropped privs
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt): Include the first key into the --pgp2
+	check.
+
+2001-12-07  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --pgp2.  This is identical to
+	"--rfc1991 --cipher-algo idea --compress-algo 1 --digest-algo md5
+	--force_v3_sigs" with the addition of an warning to advise the
+	user not to use a pipe (which would break pgp2 compatibility).
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt): warn if the user tries to encrypt to
+	any key that is not RSA and <= 2048 bits when the --pgp2 option is
+	used.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file): When using --pgp2, make a v3
+	sig, and warn if the signature is made with a non-v3 key.
+
+2001-12-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Prompt
+	for sig expiration if --expert is set and --force-v3-sigs is not
+	set (v3 sigs cannot expire).
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): After checking a sig, print
+	expiration status.  This causes a error return if the sig is
+	expired.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Include a critical
+	sig expiration subpacket if the sig is to expire.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign an expired key unless
+	--expert is set, in which case prompt.  Also, offer to expire a
+	signature when the key the user is signing expires.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Add a value to determine whether
+	to prompt for a key or sig expiration and change all callers.
+
+	* keyid.c: New functions: expirestr_from_sig and
+	colon_expirestr_from_sig.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Show sig expiration date in the
+	--with-colons listing.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet, write_signature_packets): Pass in an
+	optional timestamp for the signature packet, and change all
+	callers.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_mk_attrib): Include a critical expiration
+	subpacket in the signature if an expiration date is given.
+
+2001-12-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): If the user tries to sign a
+	locally-signed key, allow the cert to be promoted to a full
+	exportable signature.  This essentially deletes the old
+	non-exportable sig, and replaces it with a new exportable one.
+
+2001-12-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Do not allow signing a revoked key
+	unless --expert is set, and ask even then.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not allow signing a revoked UID unless
+	--expert is set, and ask even then.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h : New option --expert
+
+2001-11-16  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Allow the user to select no compression via "--compress-algo 0"
+	on the command line.
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Show compression preferences in the
+	long-form "showpref" style.
+
+	* keygen.c (set_one_pref): Permit setting a no-compression ("Z0")
+	preference.
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Fix compression preference corruption
+	bug.
+
+2001-12-02  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c: Add advisory --for-your-eyes-only option as per section
+	5.9 of 2440.
+
+2001-12-05  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* Force a V4 sig if the user has a notation or policy URL set.
+
+2001-12-04  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* g10.c: Add options --keyserver-options, --temp-directory, and
+	auto-key-retrieve (the opposite of no-auto-key-retrieve).
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_search): New function to handle searching a HKP
+	keyserver for a key
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import, hkp_export): Pretty large changes to make
+	them communicate via the generic functions in keyserver.c
+
+	* keyserver.c: new file with generic keyserver routines for
+	getting keys from a keyserver, sending keys to a keyserver, and
+	searching for keys on a keyserver.  Calls the internal HKP stuff
+	in hkp.c for HKP keyserver functions.  Other calls are handled by
+	an external program which is spawned and written to and read from
+	via pipes.  Platforms that don't have pipes use temp files.
+
+2001-11-20  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* options.h, g10.c: New options show-notation, no-show-notation,
+	default-check-level, no-default-check-level, show-policy-url,
+	no-show-policy-url.
+
+	* packet.h, sign.c (make_keysig_packet), parse-packet.c
+	(parse_signature), free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc): Fill in
+	structures for notation, policy, sig class, exportability, etc.
+
+	* keyedit.c, keylist.c (print_and_check_one_sig,
+	list_keyblock_print): Show flags in signature display for cert
+	details (class, local, notation, policy, revocable).  If selected,
+	show the notation and policy url.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Prompt for and use different key sig
+	classes.
+
+	* helptext.c (helptexts): Add help text to explain different
+	key signature classes
+
+2001-11-26  David Shaw  <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
+
+	* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Fix segfault from bad
+	initialization and fix reversed key signature expiration check.
+
+2001-11-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Put all given names into a search
+	description and change the loop so that all matching names are
+	returned.
+
+2001-11-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): To reduce the number of questions on the
+	MLs print the the name of cipher algorithm 1 with the error message.
+
+	* mainproc.c: Changed the way old rfc1991 encryption cipher is
+	selected. Based on a patch by W Lewis.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow to skip over keys, the non
+	working "show info" is now assigned to "i" 
+	* trustdb.c (ask_ownertrust, validate_keys): Implement a real quit
+	here.  Both are by David Shaw.
+	
+	* trustdb.c (validate_keys): Make sure next_exipire is initialized.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Use SHA-1 with v4 RSA keys.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h : New option --[no-]froce-v4-certs.
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Create v4 sigs on v4 keys even with
+	a v3 key.  Use that new option.  By David Shaw
+
+	* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Allow to select "no reason".
+	By David Shaw.
+
+	* keyid.c (fingerprint_from_sk): Calculation of an v3 fpr was
+	plain wrong - nearly the same code in fingerprint_from_pk is correct.
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Added a few comments to the code.
+
+2001-11-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print a warning when -r is used w/o encryption.
+	Suggested by Pascal Scheffers.
+
+2001-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Changed helptext for showpref
+	command.  Suggested by Reinhard Wobst.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_search): When marking the offtbl ready, take
+	into account that we may have more than one keyring.
+
+2001-10-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Do not use OMIT_DEPENDENCIES
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Default is now to put all
+	types of subpackets into the hashed area and only list those which
+	should go into the unhashed area.
+
+2001-10-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keydb.c (keydb_add_resource): Rearranged the way we keep track
+	of the resource. There will now be an entry for each keyring here
+	and not in keyring.c itself.  Store a token to allow creation of a
+	keyring handle.  Changed all functions to utilize this new design.
+	(keydb_locate_writable): Make a real implementation.
+	* keyring.c (next_kr): Removed and changed all callers to set the
+	resource directly from the one given with the handle.
+	(keyring_is_writable): New. 
+	(keyring_rebuild_cache): Add an arg to pass the token from keydb.
+
+2001-10-17  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_search): Enabled word search mode but print a
+	warning that it is buggy.
+	
+2001-10-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): No more need to set the port number for
+	the x-hkp scheme. 
+	(hkp_export): Ditto.
+
+2001-10-06  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* passphrase.c [__riscos__]: Disabled agent specific stuff.
+	* g10.c: New option --no-force-v3-sigs.
+
+2001-10-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Do not push the compress filter
+	here because the context would run out of scope due to the
+	iobuf_close done by the caller.
+	(do_export): Do it here instead. 
+
+2001-09-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Always use the primary key to sign keys.
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Hack to return only the primary key if
+	a certification key has been requested.
+
+	* trustdb.c (cmp_kid_for_make_key_array): Renamed to
+	(validate_one_keyblock): this and changed arg for direct calling.
+	(make_key_array): Renamed to
+	(validate_one_keyblock): this and changed args for direct calling.
+	(mark_usable_uid_certs, validate_one_keyblock)
+	(validate_key_list): Add next_expire arg to keep track of
+	expiration times.  
+	(validate_keys): Ditto for UTKs and write the stamp.
+
+	* tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Check return code of tbdio_sync.
+
+	* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Do a tdbio_sync().
+
+	* keyring.c: Made the offtbl an global object.
+
+2001-09-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow settin of ultimate trust.
+
+	* trustdb.c (mark_keyblock_seen): New.
+	(make_key_array): Use it to mark the subkeys too.
+	(validate_keys): Store validity for ultimatly trusted keys.
+
+2001-09-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust, do_we_trust): Removed the
+	invocation of add_ownertrust. Minor changes to the wording.
+	(add_ownertrust, add_ownertrust_cb): Removed.
+
+	* trustdb.c (get_validity): Allow to lookup the validity using a
+	subkey.
+
+	* trustdb.c (new_key_hash_table): Increased the table size to 1024
+	and changed the masks accordingly.
+	(validate): Changed stats printing.
+	(mark_usable_uid_certs): New.
+	(cmp_kid_for_make_key_array): Does now check the signatures and
+	figures out a usable one.
+
+2001-09-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyring.c (new_offset_item,release_offset_items)
+	(new_offset_hash_table, lookup_offset_hash_table)
+	(update_offset_hash_table, update_offset_hash_table_from_kb): New.
+	(keyring_search): Use a offset table to optimize search for
+	unknown keys.
+	(keyring_update_keyblock, keyring_insert_keyblock): Insert new
+	offsets.
+	* getkey.c (MAX_UNK_CACHE_ENTRIES): Removed the unknown keys
+	caching code.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h, import.c: Removed the entire
+	allow-secret-key-import stuff because the validity is now
+	controlled by other means.
+
+	* g10.c: New command --rebuild-keydb-caches.
+	* keydb.c (keydb_rebuild_caches): New.
+	* keyring.c (do_copy): Moved some code to
+	(create_tmp_file, rename_tmp_file, write_keyblock): new functions.
+	(keyring_rebuild_cache): New.
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_ring_trust): Add sigcache field.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Parse sigcache.
+	* keyring.c (do_copy): Always insert a sigcache packet.
+	(keyring_get_keyblock): Copy the sigcache packet to the signature.
+	* sig-check.c (cache_sig_result): Renamed from
+	cache_selfsig_result. Changed implementation to use the flag bits
+	and changed all callers.
+	(mdc_kludge_check): Removed this unused code.
+	(do_check): Do not set the sig flags here.
+
+	* import.c (read_block): Make sure that ring_trust packets are
+	never imported.
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): and never export them.
+
+	* trustdb.c (make_key_array): Skip revoked and expired keys.
+
+2001-09-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-auto-check-trustdb.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Set newly created keys to
+	ultimately trusted.
+
+	* tdbio.h, tdbio.c: Removed all support for records DIR, KEY, UID,
+	PREF, SIG, SDIR and CACH. Changed migration function to work
+	direct on the file.
+	(tdbio_read_nextcheck): New.
+	(tdbio_write_nextcheck): New. 
+
+2001-09-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	Revamped the entire key validation system.
+	* trustdb.c: Complete rewrite. No more validation on demand,
+	removed some functions, adjusted to all callers to use the new 
+	and much simpler interface. Does not use the LID anymore.
+	* tdbio.c, tdbio.h: Add new record types trust and valid. Wrote a
+	migration function to convert to the new trustdb layout.
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Do not allow the use of the "#"
+	prefix. 
+	* keydb.h: Removed the TDBIDX mode add a skipfnc to the
+	descriptor.
+	* keyring.c (keyring_search): Implemented skipfnc.
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_open): Add missing bracket.  Include windows.h.
+
+2001-09-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keylist.c (print_fingerprint): Renamed from fingerprint, made
+	global available. Added new arg to control the print style.
+	* mainproc.c (print_fingerprint): Removed. 
+	* pkclist.c (print_fpr, fpr_info): Removed and changed callers to
+	use print_fingerprint.
+	* keyedit.c (show_fingerprint): Ditto.
+
+	* passphrase.c (writen, readn)
+	(agent_open, agent_close)
+	(agent_get_passphrase)
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): Support for W32.  Contributed by Timo.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Release keydb handles at 2 more places.
+
+	* keyring.c (keyring_release): Close the iobuf.
+	(keyring_get_keyblock): Init ret_kb to NULL and store error contidion.
+
+	* import.c (import_new_stats_handle): New. 
+	(import_release_stats_handle): New.
+	(import_print_stats): Renamed from static fnc print_stats.
+	(import_keys, import_keys_stream): Add an optional status handle
+	arg and changed all callers.
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Add an stats_handle arg and changed all
+	callers.
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Use print_utf8_string2().
+
+2001-09-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New command --refresh-keys.
+	* hkp.c (hkp_refresh_keys): New. Contributed by Timo Schulz.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Stop on impossible packet lengths.
+
+2001-09-17  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Wrap notation data status lines
+	after 50 chars.
+	
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Make option try-all-secrets work.
+	By disastry@saiknes.lv.
+
+2001-09-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): List key server preferences
+	and show the revocable flag correctly. Contributed by David Shaw.
+
+2001-09-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): No need to define another p.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): s/used/use/ so that it
+	does not shadow a global.
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Renamed arg encrypt to encryptflag
+	* keygen.c: Replaced all "usage" by "use".
+	* misc.c (openpgp_pk_algo_usage): Ditto.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Renamed arg k to enc so that the later
+	defined k does not shadow it.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_gpg_control): No need to define another i.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint): Must use the enum values and not
+	the fprint_len.
+	* keyring.c (keyring_search): Removed a non-sense break.  Both
+	bugs pointed out by Stefan.
+
+2001-09-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c, status.h: Added NO_RECP and ALREADY_SIGNED.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Issue NO_RECP.
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Added experimental ALREADY_SIGNED
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_import): Use log_error. Bug reported by Neal H
+	Walfield. 
+
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Change args to take the desc union
+	direct.  It was a stupid idea to pass the individual fields of an
+	union to this function. Changed all callers.
+	(classify_user_id): Ditto and allow to pass NULL as the description.
+
+2001-09-06  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Features flag is now a bit vector.
+	* keygen.c (add_feature_mdc): Ditto.
+
+	Revamped the entire key I/O code to be prepared for other ways of
+	key storages and to get rid of the existing shit.  GDBM support has
+	gone.
+	* keydb.c: New
+	* keyring.c, keyring.h: New.
+	* ringedit.c: Removed.  Moved some stuff to keyring.c
+	* getkey.c: Changed everything related to the key retrieving
+	functions which are now using the keydb_ functions.  
+	(prepare_search, word_match_chars, word_match)
+	(prepare_word_match, compare_name): Moved to keyring.c
+	(get_pubkey_byname): Removed ctx arg and add ret_kdbhd
+	arg.  Changed all callers.
+	(key_byname): Use get_pubkey_end to release the context and take
+	new ret_kbdhd arg.  Changed all callers.
+	(classify_user_id2): Fill the 16 byte fingerprint up with 4 null
+	bytes not with zero bytes of value 4, tsss.
+	* import.c (import_one): Updated to use the new keydb interface.
+	(import_secret_one): Ditto.
+	(import_revoke_cert): Ditto.
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Ditto. 
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto.
+	(get_keyblock_byname): Removed.
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Ditto. 
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Ditto.
+	* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
+	* g10.c, gpgv.c (main): Renamed add_keyblock_resource to
+	keydb_add_resource. 
+	* Makefile.am:  Added and removed files.
+
+	* keydb.h: Moved KBNODE typedef and MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN to
+	* global.h: this new header.
+ 	
+2001-09-03  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (agent_get_passphrase): Changed nread to size_t.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): Ditto.
+
+	* keyid.c (mk_datestr): Avoid trigraphs.
+	(fingerprint_from_pk): Cache the keyid in the pk.
+
+	* options.h: Add opt.with_fingerprint so that we know whether the
+	corresponding options was used.
+	* g10.c (main): Set it here.
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Always print fingerprint
+	when this option is used.  Mixed a minor memory leak.
+
+	* status.c, status.h: New status INV_RECP.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Issue this status.
+
+2001-08-31  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key,parse_pubkeyenc)
+	(parse_signature): Return error on reading bad MPIs.
+	
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Always print the user ID even
+	if it is not bound by a signature.  Use the primary UID in the
+	status messages and encode them in UTF-8
+	* status.c (write_status_text_and_buffer): New.
+
+2001-08-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* packet.h (sigsubpkttype_t): Add SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES.
+	(PKT_public_key, PKT_user_id): Add a flag for it.
+	* parse-packet.c, build-packet.c: Add support for them.
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode, merge_selfsigs): Set the MDC flags.
+	* keygen.c (add_feature_mdc): New.
+	(keygen_upd_std_prefs): Always set the MDC feature.
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): List the MDC flag
+	* pkclist.c (select_mdc_from_pklist): New.
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Test whether MDC
+	should be used.
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Set MDC use depending on the above test.
+	Print more status info.
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Kludge to delete a secret key with no
+	public key available.
+
+	* ringedit.c (find_secret_keyblock_direct): New.
+	* getkey.c (seckey_available): Simplified.
+
+	* ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Now compares the secret key against the
+	public key while ignoring all secret parts.
+	(keyring_search): Use a public key packet as arg.  Allow to search
+	for subnkeys
+	(search): Likewise. Changed all callers.
+	(find_secret_keyblock_bypk): New.
+	(find_secret_keyblock_byname): First locate the pubkey and then
+	find the correponding secret key.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Renamed pkttype arg to onlykeypkts and
+	changed code accordingly.  Changed all callers.
+	(search_packet): Removed pkttype arg.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): First locate the public key and then
+	try to locate a secret key.
+
+	* ringedit.c (locate_keyblock_by_fpr): Removed.
+	(locate_keyblock_by_keyid): Removed.
+	(find_keyblock_bysk): Removed.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Print the keyid along with
+	the wrong sig class errors.
+
+2001-08-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Stripped the disabled comment packet code.
+	(sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common code to ..
+	(write_onepass_sig_packets): .. this new function.
+	(sign_file, clearsign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common
+	code to 
+	(write_signature_packets): this new function.
+	(write_signature_packets, make_keysig_packet)
+	(update_keysig_packet): Moved common code to 
+	(hash_uid, hash_sigclass_to_magic): these new functions
+	(sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file): Moved common code to 
+	(write_plaintext_packet):  this new function.
+
+2001-08-21  Stefan Bellon  <sbellon@sbellon.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): Changed trustlevel to signed int.
+	* g10.c [__riscos__]: Fixed handling of --use-agent --lock-multiple.
+
+2001-08-20  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Keep track on whether we already
+	printed information about the used algorithm.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Removed the non-working IDEA hack
+	and print a message about the assumed algorithm.
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use the same algorithm as above.
+	(proc_symkey_enc): Print the algorithm, so that the user knows it
+	before entering the passphrase.
+	(proc_pubkey_enc, proc_pubkey_enc): Zero the DEK out.
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt, encrypt_filter): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c: Allow for --sign --symmetric.
+	* sign.c (sign_and_symencrypt): New.
+
+	Applied patches from Stefan Bellon <sbellon@sbellon.de> to support
+	RISC OS.  Nearly all of these patches are identified by the
+	__riscos__ macro.
+	* compress.c: Added a couple of casts.
+	* g10.c [__riscos__]: Some patches and new options foo-file similar
+	to all foo-fd options.
+	* gpgv.c, openfile.c, ringedit.c, tdbio.c: Minor fixes.  Mainly
+	replaced hardcoded path	separators with EXTSEP_S like macros.  
+	* passprase.c [__riscos__]: Disabled agent stuff
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Changed r_trustlevel to signed int to
+	avoid mismatch problems in pkclist.c
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Ditto.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext) [__riscos__]: Print a note when
+	file can't be created.
+	* options.h [__riscos__]: Use an extern unless included from the
+	main module.
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal) [__riscos__]: Close all files.
+	
+2001-08-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): New arg r_usage.  Allow for RSA keys.
+	(gen_rsa): Enabled the code.
+	(do_create): Enabled RSA branch.
+	(parse_parameter_usage): New.
+	(proc_parameter_file): Handle usage parameter.
+	(read_parameter_file): Ditto.
+	(generate_keypair): Ditto.
+	(generate_subkeypair): Ditto.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Ditto.
+	(do_add_key_flags): New.
+	(keygen_add_std_prefs): Use the new function.
+	(keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire): New.
+	(write_selfsig, write_keybinding): Handle new usage arg.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Make sure that key flags go
+	into the hashed area.
+	
+	* keygen.c (write_uid): Initialize the reference cunter.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): No more need to update the trustdb for
+	preferences.  Added calls to merge keblock.
+
+	* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Print some more flags.
+
+2001-08-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+        Revamped the preference handling.
+
+	* packet.h (prefitem_t, preftype_t): New.
+	(PKT_public_key): Added a uid field.
+	(PKT_user_id): Added field to store preferences and a reference
+	counter.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id,parse_photo_id): Initialize them
+	* free-packet.c (free_user_id): Free them.
+	(copy_user_id): Removed.
+	(scopy_user_id): New. 
+	(cmp_user_ids): Optimized for identical pointers.
+	(release_public_key_parts): Release the uid.
+	(copy_public_key_with_new_namehash): Removed.
+	(copy_prefs): New.
+	* keyedit.c (menu_adduid): Use the new shallow copy user id.
+	(show_prefs): Adjusted implementation.
+	(keyedit_menu): No more need to update the trustdb after changing
+	preferences.
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Store preferences.
+	(find_by_name): Return a user id packet and remove namehash stuff.
+	(lookup): Removed the unused namehash stuff.
+	(finish_lookup): Added foundu arg.
+	(pk_from_block): Removed the namehash arg and changed all callers.
+	(merge_selfsigs): Copy prefs to all keys.
+	* trustdb.c (get_pref_data): Removed.
+ 	(is_algo_in_prefs): Removed.
+	(make_pref_record): Deleted and removed all class.
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Adjusted for the new
+	preference implementation.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (is_algo_in_prefs): New.
+	(get_it): Use that new function. 
+
+2001-08-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Fixed calculation of
+	newarea->size.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option "--preference-list"
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New commands "setpref" and "updpref".
+	(menu_set_preferences): New.
+	* keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): New.
+	(set_one_pref): New.
+	(check_zip_algo): New.
+	(keygen_get_std_prefs): New.
+	(keygen_upd_std_prefs): New
+	(keygen_add_std_prefs): Move the pref setting code into the above fnc.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Updated the list of allowed
+	to update subpackets.
+
+2001-08-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* packet.h (subpktarea_t): New.
+	(PKT_signature): Use that type for hashed_data and unhashed_data and
+	removed the _data prefix from those fields.  Changed all users.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Changed allocation for that.
+	(parse_sig_subpkt): Changed declaration
+	(enum_sig_subpkt): Ditto and changed implementation accordingly.
+	* free-packet.c (cp_subpktarea): Renamed from cp_data_block and
+	adjusted implementation. Changed caller.
+	* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): Adjusted the hashing.
+	(do_check): Ditto.
+	* sign.c (sign_file, clearsign_file, make_keysig_packet,
+	update_keysig_packet): Ditto.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Partial rewrite.
+	(find_subpkt): Adjusted and made static.
+	(delete_sig_subpkt): Adjusted.
+	(do_signature): Ditto.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_keysize): Do not print the notes about suggested
+	key sizes if just a DSA key is generated.
+
+	* trustdb.c (add_ultimate_key): s/log_error/log_info/ for
+	duplicated inserted trusted keys.
+
+2001-08-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (sleep): Redefine for W32.
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: Set new flag opt.no_homedir_creation when
+	--no-options is given.
+	* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Don't create the homedir in that case.
+
+2001-08-03  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Removed the default comment string
+	because it could get us in trouble due to translations using non
+	ascii characters.
+
+2001-08-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Do not list revoked UIDs unless
+	in verbose mode and we do no signature listing.
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Skip subkeys which are not yet valid.
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --ignore-valid-from.
+
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Added new sigversion argument to
+	allow the caller to force generation of required signature
+	version. Changed all callers. Suggested by Thomas Roessler.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Force v4 signature generation for local
+	sigs.  Removed the check for local signature and pre-v4 keys.
+
+2001-07-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Check that we are not trying to to a
+	lsign with a pre-v4 key.  Bug noticed by Thomas Roessler.
+
+2001-07-26  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_photo_id): Reset all variables.
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Removed checks on PHOTO_ID
+	because this is handled identically to a user ID.
+
+2001-07-06  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Don't use MDC with --rfc1991.  Suggested
+	by disastry@saiknes.lv.
+
+2001-07-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --preserve-permissions.
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Use it here
+	(keyring_copy): and here.
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Be more silent on --quiet.
+	Suggested by Thomas Roessler.
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Ditto.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted, proc_tree): Ditto
+	* getkey.c (lookup): Ditto.
+
+2001-07-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Restore filename in case of error.
+
+2001-06-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Print the signature timestamp.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New menu point "primary".
+	(change_primary_uid_cb): New.
+	(menu_set_primary_uid): New.
+	* sign.c (update_keysig_packet): New.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Put the primary UID flag into
+	the hashed area. Allow update of some more packets.
+
+2001-06-15  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Exit gracefully when a secret key is
+	encountered.  May happen if a secret key is in public keyring.
+	Reported by Francesco Potorti.
+	
+2001-06-12  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (compare_name): Use ascii_memistr(), ascii_memcasecmp()
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use ascii_strcasecmp().
+	* armor.c (radix64_read): Use ascii_toupper().  
+	* ringedit.c (do_bm_search): Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Ditto.
+	* openfile.c (CMP_FILENAME): Ditto.
+	* g10.c (i18n_init): We can now use just LC_ALL.
+
+2001-05-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Print a warning if a subkey is
+	created on a v3 key. Suggested by Brian M. Carlson.
+
+2001-05-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyid.c (get_lsign_letter): New.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use it here.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): and here.
+
+	* getkey.c, packet.h, free-packet.c: Removed that useless key
+	created field; I dunno why I introducded this at all - the
+	creation time is always bound to the key packet and subject to
+	fingerprint calculation etc.
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Add keycreated arg and use this
+	instead of the signature timestamp to calculate the
+	help_key_expire.  Bug reported by David R. Bergstein.
+	(merge_selfsigs_main): Correct key expiration time calculation.
+	(merge_selfsigs_subkey): Ditto.
+
+2001-05-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add a cast to a tty_printf arg.
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Ditto.
+	(ask_revoke_sig): Ditto.
+	(menu_revsig): Ditto.
+	(check_all_keysigs): Removed unused arg.
+
+2001-05-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (opts): Typo fix by Robert C. Ames.
+
+2001-05-06  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* revoke.c: Small typo fix
+
+2001-05-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_clear_cache): Shortcut if agent usage
+	is not enabled.
+
+2001-05-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (writen): Replaced ssize_t by int.  Thanks to 
+	to Robert Joop for reporting that SunOS 4.1.4 does not have it.
+
+2001-04-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_public_with_secret): pkttype was not set to subkey.
+
+2001-04-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Changed one log_debug to log_info.
+
+2001-04-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Add a verbose mode.
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Pass verbose flag for special value of
+	with_pref.
+	(keyedit_menu): New command "showpref"
+	(show_key_with_all_names): Mark revoked uids and the primary key.
+
+2001-04-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (get_primary_uid): Return a different string in case of
+	error and made it translatable.
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Ugly, we wrote a zero
+	instead of the computed ndays.  Thanks to M Taylor for complaining
+	about a secret key import problem.
+
+2001-04-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Allow to specify a port number for the 
+	keyserver.  Add a kudge to set the no_shutdown flag.
+	(hkp_export): Ditto.
+	* options.skel: Document the changes 
+
+2001-04-20  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* options.skel: Add some more comments.
+
+2001-04-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keyid.c (mk_datestr): New.  Handles negative times.  We must do
+	this because Windoze segvs on negative times passed to gmtime().
+	Changed all datestr_from function to use this one.
+
+	* keyid.c, keyid.h (colon_strtime): New. To implement the
+	fixed-list-mode.
+	(colon_datestr_from_pk): New.
+	(colon_datestr_from_sk): New.
+	(colon_datestr_from_sig): New.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Use these functions here.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
+
+2001-04-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Fixed the handling of ".sign".
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Use iobuf_get_real_fname.
+	Both are by Vincent Broman.
+
+2001-04-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Removed check for !sig which is
+	pointless here.  Thanks to Jan Niehusmann.
+
+2001-04-10  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Use log_info instead of
+	log_error so that messed up keys do not let gpg return an error.
+	Suggested by Christian Kurz.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Do a fixup_uidnode only if we
+	have both, uid and sig.  Thanks to M Taylor.
+
+2001-04-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* armor.c (unarmor_pump_new,unarmor_pump_release): New.
+	(unarmor_pump): New. 
+	* pipemode.c (pipemode_filter): Use the unarmor_pump to handle
+	armored or non-armored detached signatures.  We can't use the
+	regular armor_filter becuase this does only chack for armored
+	signatures the very first time.  In pipemode we may have a mix of
+	armored and binary detached signatures.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Do not print the "old style" notice when
+	this is a pipemode processes detached signature.
+	(proc_plaintext): Special handling of pipemode detached sigs.
+
+	* packet.h (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK): New.
+	* parse-packet.c (create_gpg_control): New.
+	* kbnode.c (dump_kbnode): Support it here.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Fixed the check for bad
+	sequences of multiple signatures.
+	(proc_plaintext): Add the marker packet.
+	(proc_tree): We can now check multiple detached signatures.
+
+2001-04-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	The length of encrypted packets for blocksizes != 8 was not
+	correct encoded.  I think this is a minor problem, because we
+	usually use partial length packets.  Kudos to Kahil D. Jallad for
+	pointing this out.
+	* packet.h: Add extralen to PKT_encrypted.
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Set extralen.
+	* build-packet.c (do_encrypted): Use extralen instead of const 10.
+	(do_encrypted_mdc): Ditto.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Set extralen to 0 because we
+	don't know it here.
+
+2001-03-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Changed wording an add
+	the keyID to the info message.
+
+2001-03-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Use log_info instead of
+	log_error when no secret key was found for a public one.
+	Fix the usage if the secret parts of a key are not available.
+
+	* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): Trim spaces.
+	(open_outfile): Allow to enter an alternate filename.  Thanks to
+	Stefan Bellon.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Ditto.
+
+2001-03-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Allow direct key and subkey
+	revocation signature.
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Check direct key signatures.
+	Print the signature class along with an error.
+
+2001-03-27  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* packet.h: Add a missing typedef to an enum.  Thanks to Stefan Bellon.
+
+	* g10.c: New option --no-sig-create-check.
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Implement it here.
+	* g10.c: New option --no-sig-cache.
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Implement it here.
+	(cache_selfsig_result): and here.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Removed debugging stuff.
+
+	* getkey.c (cache_public_key): Made global.
+	* keygen.c (write_selfsig, write_keybinding): Cache the new key.
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): Add new arg secmode and changed all
+	callers to request explicitly the mode.  Deriving this information
+	from the other supplied parameters does not work if neither pk nor
+	sk are supplied.
+
+2001-03-25  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* packet.h (ctrlpkttype_t): New.
+	* mainproc.c (add_gpg_control,proc_plaintext,proc_tree): Use the
+	new enum values.
+	* pipemode.c (make_control): Ditto.
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Ditto.
+
+2001-03-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Verify the signature right after creation.
+
+2001-03-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c, status.h (STATUS_UNEXPECTED): New.
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): And emit it here.
+
+2001-03-21  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c: Add sys/types.h so that it runs on Ultrix.  Reported
+	by Georg Schwarz.x
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Fixed generaton of packet
+	length header in case where 2 bytes headers are needed.  Thanks to
+	Piotr Krukowiecki.
+
+2001-03-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): the default keyring is no always used unless
+	--no-default-keyring is given.  
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): invalidate cache after file
+	creation.
+
+2001-03-15  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Changed the warning of the ElGamal S+E Algo.
+
+	* keylist.c (print_capabilities): New.
+	(list_keyblock_colon): and use it here.
+
+2001-03-13  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* main.c, options.h: New option --fixed_list_mode.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): use it here.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig): Divert merging of public keys
+	to the function used in key selection..
+	* keylist.c (is_uid_valid): Removed.
+	(list_keyblock): Splitted into ..
+	(list_keyblock_print, list_keyblock_colon): .. these.
+	functions.  Changed them to use the flags set in the key lookup code.
+	(reorder_keyblock): New, so that primary user IDs are listed first.
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): flush the new iobuf chaces before
+	rename or remove operations.  This is mainly needed for W32.
+
+	* hkp.c [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Removed the disabled code because we
+	have now W32 socket support in ../util/http.c
+
+	* skclist.c (key_present_in_sk_list): New.
+	(is_duplicated_entry): New.
+	(build_sk_list): Check for duplicates and do that before unlocking.
+
+2001-03-12  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* armor.c (parse_header_line): Removed double empty line check.
+	(parse_header_line): Replaced trim_trailing_ws with a counting
+	function so that we can adjust for the next read.
+
+	* options.skel: Fixed 3 typos. By Thomas Klausner. Replaced the
+	keyserver example by a better working server. 
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Return Invalid_Packet on error.
+	(parse_pubkeyenc): Ditto.
+	(parse_onepass_sig): Ditto.
+	(parse_plaintext): Ditto.
+	(parse_encrypted): Ditto.
+	(parse_signature): Return error at other places too.
+	(parse_key): Ditto.
+	* g10.c (main): Set opt.list_packets to another value when invoked
+	with the --list-packets command.
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Don's stop processing when running
+	under --list-packets command.
+
+	* signal.c (do_sigaction): Removed.
+	(init_one_signal): New to replace the above.  Needed to support
+	systems without sigactions. Suggested by Dave Dykstra.
+	(got_fatal_signal,init_signals): Use the above here. 
+	(do_block): Use sigset() if sigprocmask() is not available.
+
+	* armor.c (parse_hash_header): Test on TIGER192, which is the
+	correct value as per rfc2440.  By Edwin Woudt.
+
+2001-03-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* misc.c: Include time.h. By James Troup.
+
+	* getkey.c: Re-enabled the unknown user Id and PK caches and
+	increased their sizes.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Set expire date and continue
+	processing even if we found a revoked key.
+	(merge_selfsigs_subkeys): Ditto.
+	
+	* packet.h: Add an is_revoked flag to the user_id packet.
+	* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Set that flag here.
+	(merge_selfsigs_main): Fix so that the latest signature is used to
+	find the self-signature for an UID.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Zero out all fields.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print the primary user ID
+	according the the node flag and then all other non-revoked user IDs.
+	(is_uid_revoked): Removed; it is now handled by the key selection code.
+	
+	Changed the year list of all copyright notices.
+	
+2001-03-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Print an info message only in verbose mode.
+
+2001-03-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* packet.h: Replaced sigsubpkt_t value 101 by PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE.
+	We have never used the old value, so we can do this without any harm.
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
+	(parse_one_sig_subpkt): Parse that new sub packet.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Removed the old one from the
+	hashed area.
+	(delete_sig_subpkt): New.
+	(build_sig_subpkt): Allow an update of that new subpkt.
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Add verification caching
+	(cache_selfsig_result): New.
+	* export.c (do_export_stream): Delete that sig subpkt before exporting.
+	* import.c (remove_bad_stuff): New.
+	(import): Apply that function to all imported data 
+
+2001-03-03  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c: Introduced a new lookup context flag "exact" and used 
+	it in all place where we once used primary.
+	(classify_user_id2): Replaced the old function and add an extra
+	argument to return whether an exact keyID has been requested.
+	(key_byname): Removed the unused ctx.primary flag
+	(get_seckey_byname2): Ditto.
+	(finish_lookup): Changed debugging output.
+
+2001-03-02  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Remove the merge key calls. 
+
+2001-03-01  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Don't use it if we no specific usage
+	has been requested.
+	(merge_selfsigs_main): fix UID only if we have an signature.
+	(lookup): Return UNU_PUBKEY etc. instead of NO_PUBKEY if we found
+	a key but the requested usage does not allow this key.
+	* import.c (import_one): Take UNU_PUBKEY into account.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Ditto. 
+
+2001-02-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* delkey.c (delete_key): Removed that silly assert which rendered
+	the whole new stuff meaningless.
+
+2001-02-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): It can happen that we have both, sk and pk
+	NULL, fix for that.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Add support for
+	primary_uid and key_flags.
+	(can_handle_critical): Ditto
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Fixed listing of pktlen for
+	MDC packets.
+
+	* getkey.c: Backported the version of this file from gpg 1.1. this
+	involved some changes in other files too.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear req_usage.
+	* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Use req_usage to pass the usage
+	information to the lookup function.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Ditto.
+	* free-packet.c (copy_public_parts_to_secret_key): New.
+	* keydb.h: Add IS_* macros to check the sig_class.
+	* misc.c (openpgp_cipher_test_algo): New.
+	(openpgp_pk_test_algo): New.
+	(openpgp_pk_algo_usage): New.
+	(openpgp_md_test_algo): New.
+	* packet.h: Add a few fields to PKT_{public,secret}_key and
+	PKT_user_id.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Use the new main_keyid field.
+
+2001-02-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Catch error when we had problems to
+	parse the encrypted packet. By Timo.
+
+2001-01-29  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): --batch does now set nogreeting.
+
+	* delkey.c (do_delete_key): Fixed delete-both functionality.
+
+2001-01-22  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New command --delete-secret-and-public-key.
+	* delkey.c (delete_key): Add new arg allow_both.
+	(do_delete_key): Move most stuff from above to this new function.
+
+2001-01-12  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Use MD5 when IDEA is installed
+	and we have no S2K.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Likewise
+
+2001-01-11  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Print the signature key expire message
+	only in verbose mode and added the keyID.
+
+2001-01-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c, status.h: New status USERID_HINT. 
+	(write_status_text): Replace LF and CR int text by C-escape sequence.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Fixed the NEED_PASSPHRASE
+	output.  It does now always print 2 keyIDs.  Emit the new
+	USERID_HINT.
+
+2001-01-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New option --no-expensive-trust-checks.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Act on this option.
+
+2001-01-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Set homedir only in the pre-parsing phase and
+	replace backslashes in the W32 version.
+
+2001-01-03  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c, status.h : New status KEY_CREATED
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair,generate_subkeypair): Emit it.
+
+2000-12-28  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Remove lockfiles here because the
+	atexit stuff does not work due to the use of raise. Suggested by
+	Peter Fales.
+	* gpgv.c (remove_lockfiles): New stub.
+	
+2000-12-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c, status.h (cpr_get_no_help): New.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use it here because we have our own
+	help list here.
+
+2000-12-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_failed_pkenc): Don't print the sometimes
+	confusing message about unavailabe secret key.  Renamed ...
+	(print_pkenc_list): ... to this and introduced failed arg.
+	(proc_encrypted): Print the failed encryption keys and then
+	the one to be used.
+	(proc_pubkey_enc): Store also the key we are going to use.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Don't list revoked user IDs.
+	(is_uid_revoked): New.
+
+2000-12-08  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* pipemode.c: Made the command work.  Currently only for
+	non-armored detached signatures.
+	* mainproc.c (release_list): Reset the new pipemode vars.
+	(add_gpg_control): Handle the control packets for pipemode
+	* status.c, status.h: New stati {BEGIN,END}_STREAM.
+
+2000-12-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --allow-secret-key-import.
+	* import.c (import_keys,import_keys_stream): Honor this option.
+	(import): New arg allow_secret and pass that arg down to ...
+	(import_secret_one): to this and print a warning if secret key
+	importing is not allowed.
+
+2000-12-05  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* cipher.c (cipher_filter): Moved the end_encryption status ...
+	* encode.c (encode_simple,encode_crypt): to here
+	* sign.c (sign_file): and here.
+
+	* status.c (mywrite): Removed.
+	(get_status_string): Removed the LFs from the strings.
+	(set_status_fd,is_status_enabed,write_status_text,
+	write_status_buffer): Replaced all mywrite by stdio calls and use
+	fdopen to create a strem.  This is needed to make things smoother
+	in the W32 version.
+
+2000-12-04  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks): Increment n_sigs for revocations.
+
+2000-11-30  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Use iobuf_translate_file_handle for all options
+	with filehandles as arguments.  This is function does some magic
+	for the W32 API.
+
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures): Add a comment rant about the
+	detached signature problem.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Issue an error if a detached signature
+	is assumed but a standard one was found.
+	* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): Don't fall back to read signature
+	from stdin.
+	* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Print verbose message only if the
+	file could be accessed.
+
+2000-11-24  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* passphrase.c [HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM]: Disabled all the agent stuff.
+
+2000-11-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+        * g10.c: New option --use-agent
+        * passphrase.c (agent_open,agent_close): New.
+        (agent_get_passphrase,agent_clear_passphrase): New.
+	(passphrase_clear_cache): New.
+        (passphrase_to_dek): Use the agent here.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Clear cached passphrases.
+
+2000-11-15  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* status.c (write_status_text): Moved the big switch to ...
+	(get_status_string): ... new function.
+	(write_status_buffer): New.
+
+	* status.c (mywrite): New and replaced all write() by this.
+
+	* status.c, status.h: Add 3 status lcodes for notaions and policy.
+	* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Do status output of notations.
+	
+2000-11-13  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Use LF macro to print linefeed.
+	
+2000-11-11  Paul Eggert  <eggert@twinsun.com>
+
+	Clean up the places in the code that incorrectly use "long" or
+        "unsigned long" for file offsets.  The correct type to use is
+        "off_t".  The difference is important on large-file hosts,
+        where "off_t" is longer than "long".
+
+        * keydb.h (struct keyblock_pos_struct.offset):
+        Use off_t, not ulong, for file offsets.
+        * packet.h (dbg_search_packet, dbg_copy_some_packets,
+        search_packet, copy_some_packets): Likewise.
+        * parse-packet.c (parse, dbg_search_packet, search_packet,
+        dbg_copy_some_packets, copy_some_packets): Likewise.
+        * ringedit.c (keyring_search): Likewise.
+
+        * parse-packet.c (parse): Do not use %lu to report file
+        offsets in error diagnostics; it's not portable.
+        * ringedit.c (keyring_search): Likewise.
+
+2000-11-09  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --enable-special-filenames.
+
+2000-11-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+ 
+	* g10.c (main): New command --pipemode.
+	* pipemode.c: New.
+
+2000-10-23  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Changed output of hdrlines, so that a CR
+	is emitted for DOS systems.
+
+	* keygen.c (read_parameter_file): Add a cast for isspace().
+
+	* status.c (myread): Use SIGINT instead of SIGHUP for DOS. 
+
+2000-10-19  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --ignore-crc-error
+	* armor.c (invalid_crc): New.
+	(radix64_read): Act on new option.
+
+	* openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Klaus Singvogel fixed a stupid
+	error introduced on Sep 6th. 
+
+2000-10-18  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* misc.c (print_cipher_algo_note): Don't print the note for AES.
+	Changed wording.
+
+2000-10-16  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Hack to fix the problem that
+	signatures are not detected when there is a MDC packet but no
+	compression packet.
+	
+	* g10.c (print_hashline): New.
+	(print_mds): Use above func with --with-colons.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Detect multiple signatures
+	and don't verify them.
+
+2000-10-14  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (add_onepass_sig): There is an easier solution to the
+	error fixed yesterday; just check that we only have onepass
+	packets.  However, the other solution provides an cleaner
+	interface and opens the path to get access to other information
+	from the armore headers.
+	(release_list): Reset some more variables.
+
+2000-10-13  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* mainproc.c (add_gpg_control): New.
+	(do_proc_packets): use it.
+	(proc_plaintext): Changed logic to detect clearsigns.
+	(proc_tree): Check the cleartext sig with some new code.
+
+	* packet.h: New packet PKT_GPG_CONTROL.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_gpg_control): New.
+	* misc.c (get_session_marker): New.
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Replaced the faked 1-pass packet by the
+	new control packet.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow batchmode with a command_fd. 
+	* status.c (my_read): New.
+	(do_get_from_fd): use it.
+
+2000-10-12  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Add Rijndael to the prefs.
+
+2000-10-07  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.org>
+
+	* gpgv.c: Add more stubs for ununsed code to make the binary smaller.
+
+Wed Oct  4 15:50:18 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * sign.c (hash_for): New arg to take packet version in account, changed
+        call callers.
+
+        * gpgv.c: New.
+        * Makefile.am: Rearranged source files so that gpgv can be build with
+        at least files as possible.
+
+Mon Sep 18 12:13:52 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * hkp.c (not_implemented): Print a notice for W32
+
+Fri Sep 15 18:40:36 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Changed order of preferences to
+        twofish, cast5, blowfish.
+
+        * pkclist.c (algo_available): Removed hack to disable Twofish.
+
+Thu Sep 14 17:45:11 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Dump key flags. Print special
+        warning in case of faked ARRs.
+
+        * getkey.c (finsih_lookup): Hack so that for v4 RSA keys the subkey
+        is used for encryption.
+
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * g10.c (main): Default S2K algorithms are now SHA1 and CAST5 - this
+        should solve a lot of compatibility problems with other OpenPGP
+        apps because those algorithms are SHOULD and not optional.  The old
+        way to force it was by using the --openpgp option whith the drawback 
+        that this would disable a couple of workarounds for PGP.
+
+        * g10.c (main): Don't set --quite along with --no-tty.  By Frank Tobin.
+
+        * misc.c (disable_core_dump): Don't display a warning here but a return
+        a status value and ...
+        * g10.c (main): ...print warnining here. Suggested by Sam Roberts.
+
+Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow to use "debug" on the secret key.
+
+        * ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Fix for v4 RSA keys.
+        * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Workaround for PGP 7 bug.
+
+Wed Sep  6 17:55:47 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): Do not print the RSA notice.
+        * sig-check.c (do_signature_check): Do not emit the RSA status message.
+        * pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
+
+        * encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Fix for large files.
+        * sign.c (sign_file): Ditto.
+
+Wed Sep  6 14:59:09 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Removed funny assert.  Reported by
+        David Mathog.
+
+        * openfile.c (try_make_homedir): Changes for non-Posix systems.
+        * g10.c (main): Take the default homedir from macro.
+
+        * g10.c: The --trusted-key option is back.
+        * trustdb.c (verify_own_key): Handle this option.
+        (add_ultimate_key): Moved stuff from verify_own_key to this new func.
+        (register_trusted_key): New.
+
+Fri Aug 25 16:05:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Print info about the ARR.
+
+        * openfile.c (overwrite_filep): Always return okay if the file is
+        called /dev/null. 
+        (make_outfile_name): Add ".sign" to the list of know extensions.
+        (open_sigfile): Ditto.
+
+Wed Aug 23 19:52:51 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * g10.c: New option --allow-freeform-uid. By Jeroen C. van Gelderen.
+        * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Implemented here.
+
+Fri Aug  4 14:23:05 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * status.c (do_get_from_fd): Ooops, we used fd instead of opt.command_fd.
+  Thanks to Michael Tokarev.
+
+Tue Aug  1 20:06:23 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * g10.c: New opttion --try-all-secrets on suggestion from Matthias Urlichs.
+  * pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Quite easy to implement here.
+
+Thu Jul 27 17:33:04 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * g10.c: New option --merge-only.  Suggested by Brendan O'Dea.
+  * import.c (import_one): Implemented it here
+  (import_secret_one): Ditto.
+  (print_stats): and give some stats.
+
+Thu Jul 27 12:01:00 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * g10.c: New options --show-session-key and --override-session-key
+  * pubkey-enc.c (hextobyte): New.
+  (get_override_session_key): New.
+  * mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Add session-key stuff.
+  * status.h, status.c (STATUS_SESSION_KEY): New.
+
+Thu Jul 27 10:02:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * g10.c (main): Use setmode(O_BINARY) for MSDOS while generating random bytes
+  (print_mds): Likewise for stdin.
+  * plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Likewise for stdout.
+
+Mon Jul 24 10:30:17 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * keyedit.c (menu_expire): expire date for primary key can be set again.
+
+Wed Jul 19 11:26:43 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * keylist.c (is_uid_valid): New.
+  (list_keyblock): Print validity information for all user IDs.  Note, this
+  has to be done at other places too; for now we have only minimal support.
+
+Wed Jul 12 13:32:06 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * helptext.c, pkclist.c: s/superseeded/superseded/
+
+Mon Jul 10 16:08:57 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Fixed testing on crtitical bit in case
+  of a NULL buffer.  Reported by Peter Marschall.
+
+Wed Jul  5 13:28:45 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * keyedit.c, keyid.c: Add some _()
+
+  * argparse.c:  Changed the flag to suppress --version handling to also
+  suppress --help.
+
+Wed Jun 28 11:54:44 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * armor.c (armor_filter): Set sigclass to 0 in case of non-dash-escaped
+  clearsig.  This makes this mode work again.
+
+  * mainproc.c (proc_tree): Fixed handling of one-pass-sig packets in textmode.
+  Disabled the ugly workaround for PGP 5 - let's see whether thi breaks less
+  cases. Found by Ted Cabeen.
+
+  * options.h (DBG_HASHING): New.  All commented md_start_debug are now
+  controlled by this debug option.
+
+  * sign.c (print_status_sig_created): New and called from 2 places.
+
+  * keygen.c (gen_rsa): New, but commented.
+  (ask_algo): Commented support for RSA.
+
+  * seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): Started to fix the code for v4 RSA
+  keys - it is not solved yet. However, we have time until, Sep 20th ;)
+
+Wed Jun 14 12:27:09 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * status.c (init_shm_coprocessing): Changed the sequence of the get,attach
+  to cope with the changes in newer Linux kernels.  This bug has been found
+  by <dmitri@advantrix.com> who also proposed this solution.  Hopefully
+  this does not break gpg on to many systems.
+
+  * cipher.c (write_header): Protect the IV with the MDC too.
+  * encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Likewise.
+
+Fri Jun  9 10:09:52 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * g10.c: New options --no-auto-key-retrieve
+  * options.h (auto_key_retrieve): New.
+  * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Implemented that.
+
+Wed Jun  7 19:19:09 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * sig-check.c (do_check): Use EMULATE_MDENCODE also on v4 packets.
+
+Wed Jun  7 17:25:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * cipher.c (write_header): Use plain CFB mode for MDC encrypted packets.
+  * encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Ditto.
+
+Mon Jun  5 23:41:54 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * seskey.c (do_encode_md, encode_md_value): Add new arg v3compathack to work
+  around a bug in old versions.
+  * sig-check.c (do_check): use the aboved workaround when enabled.
+  * g10.c: New option --emulate-md-decode-bug
+
+Mon Jun  5 12:37:43 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+  * build-packet.c (do_mdc): New.
+  (do_encrypted_mdc): Changed for the new proposal.
+  * parse-packet.c (parse_mdc): New.
+  (parse_encrypted): Fixed for the new proposal.
+  * packet.h (PKT_MDC): New.
+  * cipher.c (cipher_filter): Build the MDC packet here.
+  * g10.c (main): Enable --force-mdc.
+  * encr-data.c (mdc_decode_filter): Fixed for new MDC method
+
+  * options.h(rfc2440): New.
+  * g10.c (main): Changed the selected values for --openpgp to not include
+  optional algorithms.
+
+Thu May 18 11:38:54 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add a keyword arg to the prompt.
+
+	* status.c, status.h: Added 3 new status tokens.
+	* status.c (do_get_from_fd): New.
+	(cpr_enabled,cpr_get,cpr_get_hidden,cpr_kill_prompt,
+	 cpr_get_answer_is_yes,cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit): Modified to work
+	 with the new function.
+	* g10.c: Add new option --command-fd.
+
+	* status.c (progress_cb): New.
+	(set_status_fd): Register progress functions
+
+Fri May 12 14:01:20 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* delkey.c (delete_key): Add 2 new status messages
+	* status.c, status.h (STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM): New.
+
+	Fixed years of copyright in all source files.
+
+Mon May  1 17:08:14 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (propagate_validity): Fixed the bug that only one uid
+	gets fully trusted even when all are signed by an ultimate key.
+
+Mon May  1 15:38:04 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): Always returned a defined context.  Fixed
+	a segv for invalid user id specifications. Reported by Walter Koch.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_user_id): I18ned "no user id" string. By Walter.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): Typo fixes.
+	* helptext.c: Ditto.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed some CRLF issues.  By Mike McEwan.
+
+Fri Apr 14 19:37:08 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): New.
+	(show_revocation_reason): New and called at various places.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Fixed small typo.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Act on always_trust but not for revoked
+	keys. Suggested by Chip Salzenberg.
+
+	* g10.c: New option --lock-never.
+
+	* ringedit.c (get_writable_keyblock_file): New.
+	* keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Use this instead of the hardwired one.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Check that the email address is in the
+	correct field.	Suggested by Christian Kurz.
+
+Mon Apr 10 13:34:19 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): s/sbb/ssb/
+
+Tue Mar 28 14:26:58 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Do not print warning about unprotected
+	key when in quiet mode.
+
+Wed Mar 22 13:50:24 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_userid): Do UTF8 conversion before printing.
+	* import.c (import_one): Ditto.
+	(import_secret_one): Ditto.
+	(delete_inv_parts): Ditto.
+
+Thu Mar 16 16:20:23 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+	* keylist.c (print_key_data): Handle a NULL pk gracefully.
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Fixed silly code for
+	getting the primary keys keyID but kept using the one from the
+	subkey.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Print a note for expired subkeys.
+
+	* getkey.c (has_expired): New.
+	(subkeys_expiretime): New.
+	(finish_lookup): Check for expired subkeys needed for encryption.
+	(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Fixed expiration date merging for subkeys.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Print expiration time for "sub".
+	(list_one): Add missing merging for public keys.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
+
+2000-03-14 13:49:38  Werner Koch  (wk@habibti.openit.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (keyedit_menu): Do not allow to use certain commands
+	while the secret key is selected.
+
+2000-03-09 12:53:09  Werner Koch  (wk@habibti.openit.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Movede parsig to ...
+	(parse_expire_string): ... this new function. And some new control
+	commands.
+	(proc_parameter_file): Add expire date parsing.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Allow the use of specified output files.
+
+2000-03-08 10:38:38  Werner Koch  (wk@habibti.openit.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Removed is_v4 return value and the commented
+	code to create Elg keys in a v3 packet. Removed the rounding
+	of key sizes here.
+	(do_create): Likewise removed arg v4_packet.
+	(gen_elg): Likewise removed arg version. Now rounding keysizes here.
+	(gen_dsa): Rounding keysize now here.
+	(release_parameter_list): New
+	(get_parameter*): New.
+	(proc_parameter_file): New.
+	(read_parameter_file): New.
+	(generate_keypair): Splitted. Now uses read_parameter_file when in
+	batch mode.  Additional argument to specify a parameter file.
+	(do_generate_keypair): Main bulk of above fucntion and uses the
+	parameter list.
+	(do_create): Don't print long notice in batch mode.
+	* g10.c (main): Allow batched key generation.
+
+Thu Mar  2 15:37:46 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Print a note about unknown cipher algos.
+
+	* g10.c (opts): Add a note to the help listing about the man page
+	and removed some options from the help listing.
+
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Use a new function to truncate
+	the output of the user ID.  Suggested by Jan-Benedict Glaw.
+
+Wed Feb 23 10:07:57 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* helptext.c: typo fix.
+
+Thu Feb 17 13:39:32 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* revoke.c: Removed a bunch of commented code.
+
+	* packet.h (SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON): New.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support new sub packet.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
+	(dump_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
+	* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): New.
+	(release_revocation_reason_info): New.
+	(revocation_reason_build_cb): New.
+	(gen_revoke): Ask for reason.
+	* main.h (struct revocation_reason_info): Add declaration.
+	* keyedit.c (menu_revsig): Add support for revocation reason.
+	(menu_revkey): Ditto.
+	(sign_uid_mk_attrib): Renamed to ...
+	(sign_mk_attrib): ... this, made static and add support for reasons.
+
+Tue Feb 15 08:48:13 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_packet): Fixed fixing of old comment packets.
+
+	* import.c (import_keys): Fixed importing from stdin when called with
+	nnames set to zero as it normally happens.
+
+Mon Feb 14 14:30:20 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Add new arg r_expired.
+	(do_signature_check): New arg to pass it down to ...
+	(do_check): New arg r-expire which is set when the signature
+	has expired.
+	* trustdb.c (check_sig_record): Set SIGF_EXPIRED flag and set
+	the expiretime to zero so that thi signature will not be checked
+	anymore.
+
+Fri Feb 11 17:44:40 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* g10.c (g10_exit): Update the random seed_file.
+	(main): Set the random seed file.  New option --no-random-seed-file.
+
+Thu Feb 10 17:39:44 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire): Fixed segv due to unitialized sub_pk.
+	By Rémi.
+
+Thu Feb 10 11:39:41 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Don't print warnings in the middle of
+	regulat output lines.  By Rémi.
+
+	* sig-check.c: Include options.h
+
+Wed Feb  9 15:33:44 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* gpg.c: New option --ignore-time-conflict
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Implemented this option.
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Ditto.
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Ditto.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): use iobuf_cancel after open failure.
+	Reported by Huy Le.
+
+Fri Jan 14 18:32:01 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* packet.h (STRING2KEY): Changed mode from byte to int.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Add the special GNU protection stuff
+	* build-packet.c (so_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (change_passphrase): Ditto.
+	* export.c (export_secsubkeys): New.
+	(do_export_stream): Hack to export the primary key using mode 1001.
+	* g10.c: New command --export-secret-subkeys
+
+Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* armor.c (is_armored): Check for 1-pass-sig packets. Reported by
+	David Hallinan <hallinan@rtd.com>.
+	(armor_filter): Replaced one LF by the LF macro.  Reported by
+	Wolfgang Redtenbacher.
+
+Wed Jan  5 11:51:17 CET 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Reset new global flag opt.pgp2_workarounds
+	when --openpgp is used.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Do the PGP2,5 workarounds only
+	when the global flag is set.
+	(proc_tree): Ditto.
+	* textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): Ditto.
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c: New option --list-only
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Don't do it if opt.list_only is active.
+	(proc_pubkey_enc): Implement option.
+
+	* status.h, status.c ({BEGIN,END}_{EN,DE}CRYPTION): New.
+	* cipher.c (cipher_filter): New status outputs.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): New status outputs.
+
+Fri Dec 31 14:08:15 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Made the "Comment:" header translatable.
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_import): Make sure that the program does not return
+	success when there is a connection problem.  Reported by Phillip Jones.
+
+Sun Dec 19 15:22:26 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* armor.c (LF): Use this new macro at all places where a line LF
+	is needed.  This way DOSish textfiles should be created when the
+	input data is also in dos mode.
+	* sign.c (LF): Ditto.
+	* textfilter.c (LF): Ditto.
+	(copy_clearsig_text): Disabled the forcing of CR,LF sequences
+	for DOS systems.
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Fixes for line endings on DOS.
+	and react on a LF in cleartext.
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Restore the original line ending after
+	removing trailing spaces.
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): DOS fix.
+
+Thu Dec 16 10:07:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_failed_pkenc): Fix for unknown algorithm.
+	Found by fygrave@epr0.org.
+
+Thu Dec  9 10:31:05 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* hkp.c: i18n the strings.
+
+Sat Dec  4 15:32:20 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_key): Shortcut for ultimately trusted keys.
+
+Sat Dec  4 12:30:28 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Validate the trust using the namehash
+	if this one has been set by the key lookup.
+
+	* g10.c: Add --delete-secret-key to the help page.
+
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_file): Made static.
+	(try_make_homedir): New.
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Use the try_make_hoemdir logic.
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Likewise.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_user_id): Use m_alloc_clear() here. We should
+	better use an allocation function specific to the user_id packet.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Changed symmetric preferences
+	to include Blowfish again.  This is due to it's better speed compared
+	to CAST5.
+
+	* g10.c (strusage): Print the home directory.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Take action on the cancel control msg.
+	* filter.h (armor_filter_context_t): Add cancel flag.
+
+Mon Nov 29 21:52:11 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --fast-list-mode ..
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): .. and implemented.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
+
+	* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): Fixed the case that there
+	is a uid without any packet following.
+
+Mon Nov 22 11:14:53 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Never enable the hash processing
+	when skip_verify is active.
+
+	* armor.c (parse_header_line): Stop parsing on a WS line too.
+	Suggested by Aric Cyr.
+
+	* tdbdump.c (HEXTOBIN): Changed the name of the argument, so that
+	traditional cpp don't mess up the macros. Suggested by Jos Backus.
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Print the PK algo in the --with-colon mode.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Found the reason why exit(8) did not
+	work - it is better to set the disposition back to default before
+	raising the signal.  Print the notice on stderr always.
+
+Fri Nov 12 20:33:19 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* g10.c (make_username): Swapped the logic.
+	* keylist.c (public_key_list): Now takes a STRLIST as arg and moved
+	the creation ot this list to the caller, so that he can copy with
+	UTF-conversion of user IDs.  Changed all callers.
+	(secret_key_list): Likewise.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_user_id_string_native): New and ...
+	* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): ... use it here.
+
+	* pubring.asc: Updated.
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_PHOTO_ID): New.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_photo_id): New.
+	* build-packet.c (do_user_id: Handle photo IDs.
+	(build_packet): Change CTB for photo IDs
+	* free-packet.c (free_user_id): Release memory used for photo IDs
+	* sig-check.c (hash_uid_node): Handle photo IDs too.
+	* trustdb.c (print_uid_from_keyblock): Hash photo ID.
+	(make_uid_records): Ditto.
+	* getkey.c (find_by_name): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (show_prefs): Ditto.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Ditto.
+
+Thu Oct 28 16:08:20 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Print a warning for systems
+	with a signed 32 time_t if the exiration time is beyoind 2038.
+
+Fri Oct  8 20:40:50 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): The last fix way really stupid;
+	reverted and set rt to Unknown.
+
+Fri Oct  8 20:32:01 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Zero the entire kbpos out on open.
+
+	* g10.c (oEntropyDLL): Removed option.
+	(main): Made the warning on development versions more verbose.
+
+	* g10.c (oHonorHttpProxy): New option.
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import,hkp_export): Implement this option.
+	* options.skel: Enable this option for new installations
+
+Mon Oct  4 21:23:04 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* import.c (import_keys): Changed calling interface, adjusted caller.
+	(import): Moved printing of stats out ...
+	(print_stats): New. ... to here.
+	(import_keys_stream): Call stats print here.
+	(import_keys): Print stats as totals for all files.
+
+	* tdbio.h (DIRF_NEWKEYS): New
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_dump_record): Print the new flag.
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust_record): New arg sigs_only.  Adapted all
+	callers.
+	(do_update_trust_record): Removed recheck arg and add a new sigs_only
+	do we can later improve on the performance.  Changed all callers too.
+	(check_trustdb): Evalutate the new flag and add a status output.
+	Do a check when the dir record has not been checked.
+	(build_cert_tree): Evaluate the new flag.
+	(check_trust): Ditto.  Do a trust_record check, when the dir record
+	is not marked as checked.
+	(mark_fresh_keys): New.
+	(clear_lid_table): New.
+	(sync_trustdb): New.
+	* import.c (import_keys): Call sync_trustdb() after processing.
+	(import_keys_stream): Ditto.
+	* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto.
+
+	* import.c (import_revoke_cert): Notify the trust DB.
+	(do_update_trust_record): Use |= to set the REVOKED bit and not &=;
+	shame on me for this bad copy+paste introduced bug.
+	(do_we_trust): Add trustmask to allow revoked key override to work.
+	Chnaged are to allow return of a mofified trustlevel. Adapted the
+	one caller.
+
+	* g10.c: New options --emulate-3des-s2k-bug
+	* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Implemented above.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Check for standalone signatures.
+	(do_check_sig): Print a notice for a standalone revocation
+	(check_sig_and_print): Do not print an error for unchecked standalone
+	revocations.
+
+Tue Sep 28 20:54:37 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@gnupg.de>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Use new CTB when we don't have the
+	length of the file.  This is somewhat strange as the comment above
+	indicates that this part is actually fixed for PGP 5 - maybe I simply
+	lost the source line, tsss.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Set a flag if no OpenPGP data has been found.
+	* verify.c (verify_signatures): Add an error helptext.
+
+Thu Sep 23 19:24:30 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile): Fixed the 8dot3 handling.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Print uid using utf8 func.
+	* delkey.c (delete_key): Ditto.
+	* pkclist.c (show_paths,do_edit_ownertrust,do_we_trust): Ditto
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Ditto.
+	* trustdb.c (print_user_id,check_uidsigs): Ditto.
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke,ask_revoke_sig): Ditto.
+
+Thu Sep 23 09:52:58 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* verify.c (print_file_status): New.
+	(verify_one_file): Moved status print to th new fnc. Add error status.
+	* status.c, status.h (STATUS_FILE_ERROR): New
+
+Wed Sep 22 10:14:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): Use case-insenstive compare for
+	DOS systems.  Add ".pgp" to the list of know extensions.
+	(open_outfile): For DOS systems try to replace the suffiy instead of
+	appending it.
+
+	* status.c, status.h: Add STATUS_FILE_{START,DONE}.
+	* verify.c (verify_one_file): Emit these new stati.
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Avoid duplicated Entries in the "Hash:"
+	line.  Those headers are now only _not_ printed when there are
+	only old-style keys _and_ all hashs are MD5.
+
+Mon Sep 20 12:24:41 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* verify.c (verify_files, ferify_one_file): New.
+	* g10.c:  New command --verify-files
+
+Fri Sep 17 12:56:42 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c: Add UK spelling as alias for armor options ;-)
+
+	* import.c (append_uid): Fixed a SEGV when there is no selfsig and
+	no subkey.
+	(merge_sigs): Ditto.  Removed the assertion.
+
+Wed Sep 15 16:22:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --entropy-dll-name
+
+Mon Sep 13 10:51:29 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Print message using write(2) and
+	only for development versions.
+
+Mon Sep  6 19:59:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Use mkdir macro
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Ditto.
+
+Fri Sep  3 10:04:45 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Skip keys set with --encrypt-to also
+	when asking for a key.
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Make sure that we don't read a
+	second EOF in the read loop for partial length packets.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): print user ID as utf-8.
+
+Thu Sep  2 16:40:55 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks): First add new subkeys, then merge subkey
+	certificates.
+	(merge_sigs): Don't merge subkey signatures here.
+
+Wed Sep  1 15:30:44 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Fixed bug related to cpr_xx (tnx
+	Francis J. Lacoste).
+
+Tue Aug 31 17:20:44 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* plaintext.c (do_hash): Hash CR,LF for a single CR.
+	(ask_for_detached_datafile): Changed arguments to be closer to
+	those of hash_datafiles and cleanup the code a bit.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Workaround for pgp5 textmode detached
+	signatures.  Changed behavior of asking for data file to be the same
+	as with provided data files.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Use UTF8 print functions.
+
+Mon Aug 30 20:38:33 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): some s/log_error/log_info/ so that gpg
+	does not return an error if a key has some invalid packets.
+
+	* helptext.c: Fixed some typos and changed the way the
+	translation works.  The english text is now the keyword for gettext
+	and not anymore the keyword supplied to the function.  Done after
+	some discussion with Walter who thinks this is much easier for the
+	translators.
+
+	* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): Don't do it for DOSish systems.
+
+	* signal.c (signal_name): Bounds check on signum.
+
+Wed Aug  4 10:34:18 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pubring.asc: Updated.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre,check_signatures_trust): Do not print
+	the warning about --always_trust when --quiet is used.
+
+	* pkclist.c (fpr_info): New and called at several places.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): List revocation key contents.
+
+Mon Jul 26 09:34:46 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fixed typo in format string.
+
+	* trustdb.c (create_shadow_dir): Don't translate the error string.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Fixed spelling of user-id.
+	* getkey.c (find_by_name_pk,find_by_name_sk,
+	find_by_keyid,find_by_keyid_sk): Ditto and translate it.
+	* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid,delete_inv_parts): Ditto.
+
+
+Mon Jul 26 01:01:39 CEST 1999  Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
+
+	* g10.c, options.h: New options --no-literal and --set-filesize
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt): Support for the options
+	--no-literal and --set-filesize.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): ditto.
+
+Fri Jul 23 13:53:03 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Removed annoying error message in cases
+	when we have no keyring at all to enum.
+
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Rewrote to relax the recognition of
+	keyIDs and fingerprints (Michael).
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print status NO_PUBKEY.
+	(print_failed_pkenc): Print status NO_SECKEY.
+
+	* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): New.
+	* g10.c: New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
+
+	* pkclist.c (print_fpr): New.
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Print the fpr before asking whether to use the key
+	anyway.
+	(do_edit_ownertrust): Likewise.
+
+Thu Jul 22 20:03:03 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): Removed annoying error message in cases
+	when we have no keyring at all to enum.
+
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Rewrote to relax the recognition of
+	keyIDs and fingerprints (Michael).
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print status NO_PUBKEY.
+	(print_failed_pkenc): Print status NO_SECKEY.
+
+	* import.c (mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid): New.
+	* g10.c: New option --allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
+
+Thu Jul 15 10:15:35 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New options --disable-{cipher,pubkey}-algo.
+
+Wed Jul 14 19:42:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* status.h (STATUS_IMPORTED): New.
+	* import.c (import): Print some status information (Holger Schurig).
+
+	* g10.c (main): Make --no-greeting work again. Add a warning when
+	--force-mds is used.
+
+Tue Jul 13 17:39:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Changed the way help works.
+	(build_pk_list): Implemented default recipient stuff.
+	* g10.c: New options --default-recipient[-self]
+	(main): Suppress greeting in most cases, entering a passphrase or
+	a missing value is not considered to be interactive use.
+	Merged --print-md and --print-mds; the latter is now obsolete.
+	Changed the way --gen-random works and documented it.
+	Changed the way --gen-prime works and add a man entry.
+	* g10.c (MAINTAINER_OPTIONS): Removed.
+
+Mon Jul 12 18:45:57 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add arg sign_mode and changed callers
+	* g10.c (main): New command --lsign-key.
+
+Mon Jul 12 14:55:34 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (kidlist_item): New.
+	(release_list): Release failed pk-enc-list.
+	(print_failed_pkenc): New
+	(proc_encrypted): Print info about failed PK enc.
+
+	* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): s/error/info/
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Return an empty passphrase when
+	in batch mode and don't make the warning message fatal
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): Try only once when in batch mode.
+
+	* g10.c (make_username): New.
+
+Thu Jul  8 16:21:27 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_ring_trust): New
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Store trust value
+	* build-packet (build_packet): Ignore ring trust packets.
+	* mainproc.c (add_ring_trust): New.
+	(list_node): Print "rtv" records.
+	* g10.c: New option --with-fingerprint.
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_own_keys): Don't insert if we are dry running
+	(check_trust): Ditto.
+
+Wed Jul  7 13:08:40 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* Makefile.am: Support for libtool.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Hack to allow for an expire date.
+
+	* trustdb.c (do_update_trust_record,update_trust_record): Splitted.
+	(check_trust_record): New.
+	(check_trust,build_cert_tree): Check the dir record as needed.
+	(upd_pref_record): Removed.
+	(make_pref_record): New.
+	(propagate_validity): Stop as soon as we have enough validity.
+
+	* tbdio.c (MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_HARD): Increased the limit.
+
+
+Fri Jul  2 11:45:54 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (g10_exit): Dump random stats.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature,check_key_signature2): Enhanced
+	version and wrapper for old function.
+	(do_signature_check,signature_check): Ditto.
+
+Thu Jul  1 12:47:31 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Print a notice for disabled keys.
+	(enable_disable_keys): Add functionality
+	* pkclist.c (edit_ownertrust): preserve disabled state.
+	(build_pk_list): Skip disabled keys.
+	* trustdb.c (upd_one_ownertrust): Ditto.
+	(build_cert_tree): Mask the ownertrust.
+	(trust_letter): Mask the value.
+	(do_check): Take disabled flag into account.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Add a pubkey_algo arg and changed
+	all callers.
+
+	* g10.c (utf8_strings): 2 new options.
+
+	* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record_by_pk): New, replaces the next one.
+	(insert_trust_record): Now takes a keyblock as arg.  Changed all
+	callers to use the appropritae function.
+
+	* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): New.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Ask for filename if there is
+	no valid syntax. Don't use fname varbatim but filter it.
+
+Tue Jun 29 21:44:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* trustdb.h (TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED): New.
+
+	* status.c (USE_CAPABILITIES): Capabilities support (Remi).
+
+	* tdbio.c : Added new fields to the DIR record.
+	(tdbio_write_record): Fixed the update of the hash tables.
+	(tdbio_delete_record): Drop the record from the hash tables.
+	(drop_from_hashtbl): New.
+
+	* status.c (cpr_get): Special online help mode.
+	* helptext.c ("keyedit.cmd"): Removed.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use only help system.
+	(enable_disable_key): New bit doies not yet work.
+
+Sat Jun 26 12:15:59 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): Fixed comment string.
+	* tdbdump.c (export_ownertrust): Text fix.
+	* tbio.c (tdbio_invalid): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Made temp buffer larger.
+
+	* Makefile.am (install-data-local): Add missing backslashes
+
+Tue Jun 15 12:21:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Made iterated+salted the default S2K method.
+
+	* Makefile.am (install-data-local): Use DESTDIR.
+
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Emit missing-passphrase while in
+	batchmode.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_pubkeyenc): Fixed a SEGV.
+
+Mon Jun 14 21:18:54 CEST 1999 Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New options --openpgp, --no-tty, --emit-version,
+	  --default-comment and --lock-multiple
+
+Thu Jun 10 14:18:23 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_encrypted): Fixed EOF case (Remi).
+	(free_plaintext): Ditto.
+
+	* helptext.c (keyedit.delsig.unknown): New (Remi).
+	* keyedit.c (print_and_check_one_sig): Add arg print_without_key and
+	changed all callers to make use of it (Remi):
+
+Tue Jun  8 13:36:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keylist.c (print_key_data): New and called elsewhere.
+	* g10.c: New option --with-key-data
+
+Wed Jun  2 14:17:19 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Yet another bad hack to cope with
+	broken pgp2 created detached messages in textmode.
+
+Tue Jun  1 16:01:46 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): New.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Outputfile is now the inputfile
+	without the suffix.
+	* g10.c: New option --use-embedded-filename
+
+Mon May 31 19:41:10 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Fix for SHM init (Michael).
+
+	* compress.c, encr-data.c, mdfilter.c,
+	  plaintext.c, free-packet.c: Speed patches (Rémi).
+
+Thu May 27 09:40:55 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* status.c (cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit): New.
+	* keyedit.c (menu_delsig): New.
+	(check_all_keysigs): Splitted.
+	(print_and_check_one_sig): New.
+
+Wed May 26 14:36:29 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support large packets.
+	* parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Replaces parse_sig_subpkt.
+	* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): Print all notation packets.
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): Add a way to specify the critical flag.
+	(main): Add option --set-policy-url.
+	(check_policy_url): Basic checks.
+	* sign.c (mk_notation_and_policy): Replaces mk_notation.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Moved decision whether we can
+	handle critical subpacket to an extra function.
+
+Tue May 25 19:50:32 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Always use compression algo 1 for signed
+	onyl file becuase we can´ be sure the the verifier supports other
+	algorithms.
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Support for notation data.
+	* sign.c (sign_file,clearsign_file,make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
+	(mk_notation): New.
+	* g10.c (add_notation_data): New and add option -N
+	* mainproc.c (print_notation_data): New.
+	(check_sig_and_print): Print any notation data of the signed text.
+
+Sun May 23 14:20:22 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Print a warning and return
+	immediateley if opt.always_trust is true.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Corrected handling of no-default-keyring
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): Disable Twofish until we have settled
+	how to do the MDC.
+
+	* hkp.c: Disable everything for mingw32
+
+Sat May 22 22:47:26 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Add sig creation time to the
+	VALIDSIG status output. Add more info to the ERRSIG output.
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): Add sig time after epoch to SIG_ID.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Merge duplicate user IDs.
+	(collapse_uids): New.
+	* kbnode.c (move_kbnode): New.
+	(remove_kbnode): New.
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Call collapse_uids.
+
+	* g10.c: new option --logger-fd.
+
+	* import.c: s/log_*_f/log_*/
+
+Thu May 20 14:04:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* misc.c (pull_in_libs): do the volatile only for gcc
+
+	* sig-check (signature_check): Emit SIG_iD only for classes 0 and 1.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Add detection of PGP2 created clearsigs.
+	(fake_packet): A tab is not a WS for pgp2 - handle this.
+	* textfilter.c (len_without_trailing_chars): New.
+	(copy_clearsig_text): Add pgp2mode arg.
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): pass old_style to the above fnc.
+
+
+Wed May 19 16:04:30 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --interactive.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Add workaround for pgp2 bug
+	(do_check_sig): Ditto.
+	(proc_tree): Ditto.
+	* plaintext.c (do_hash): Ditto.
+	(hash_datafiles): Ditto, add an arg, changed all callers.
+	* mdfilter.c (md_filter): Add support for the alternate hash context.
+
+Mon May 17 21:54:43 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Support for PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
+	* build-packet.c (do_encrypted_mdc): Ditto.
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Add mdc hashing.
+	(cipher_filter): write out the hash.
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Add PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC.
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Add mdc hashing.
+	(mdc_decode_filter): New.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt): Fixed stupid bug for subpkt
+	length calculation
+	(parse_signature): Fixed even more stupid bug.
+
+Sat May  8 19:28:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_signature): Removed MDC hack.
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt_mdc): Removed.
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Removed MDC hack.
+	(check_sig_and_print): Ditto.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Ditto.
+	* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): Ditto.
+	* free-packte.c (copy_signature, free_seckey_enc): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature,parse_key): Store data of
+	unknown algorithms with mpi_set_opaque inseatd of the old
+	faked data stuff.
+	(read_rest): Removed.
+	(read_rest2): Renamed to read_rest
+	* build-packet.c (write_fake_data): Use mpi_get_opaque.
+	* free-packet.c (cp_fake_data): Removed and cahnged all callers
+	to use mpi_copy.
+	(free_pubkey_enc,free_seckey_enc,release_public_key_parts,
+	 release_secret_key_parts): Use mpi_free for opaque data.
+
+Thu May  6 14:18:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Check for revoked subkeys.
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Handled revoked subkeys.
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Ditto.
+	(check_signatures_trust): Ditto.
+
+	* build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Fix for ancient g10 keys.
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Return EOF if no data has been read.
+	* g10.c (main): Catch errors for default operation.
+
+Thu Apr 29 12:29:22 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Fixed hashing in case of no subpackets.
+	(clearsign_file): Ditto.
+	(make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
+
+Wed Apr 28 13:03:03 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Add new command revkey.
+	* (menu_revkey): New.
+
+
+Mon Apr 26 17:48:15 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Add the MDC hack.
+	* build-packet.c (do_signature): Ditto.
+	* free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc,copy_signature,cmp_signatures): Ditto.
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
+	* sig-check.c (mdc_kludge_check): New.
+	* encode.c (encrypt_mdc_file): New.
+
+	* keyedit.c (check_all_keysigs): List revocations.
+	* (menu_revsig): New.
+	* sign (make_keysig_packet): Support for class 0x30.
+
+Sun Apr 18 20:48:15 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Fixed the case that one key
+	has no preferences (Remi Guyomarch).
+
+	keylist.c (list_keyblock): ulti_hack to propagate trust to all uids.
+
+Sun Apr 18 10:11:28 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Use real IV instead of a 0 one, so that
+	it works even if the length of the IV doesn't match the blocksize.
+	Removed the save_iv stuff.
+	(protect_secret_key): Likewise.  Create the IV here.
+	* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Increased size of IV field and add a
+	ivlen field.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Use the len protect.ivlen.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key). Ditto.
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): Close keyblocks.
+
+	* Makefile.am (gpgm): Removed this
+	* g10.c: Merged gpg and gpgm
+
+	* import.c (import): Utilize option quiet.
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Ditto.
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource,keyring_copy): Ditto.
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Add some batch support.
+
+	* g10.c (main): add call to tty_batchmode.
+
+Fri Apr  9 12:26:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* status.c (write_status_text): Some more status codes.
+	* passphrase_to_dek (passphrase_to_dek): add a status code.
+	* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Likewise.
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Reverse the last changes
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Dropped kludge for ancient blowfish mode.
+
+Thu Apr  8 09:35:53 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Ditto.
+	* status.h status.c: Add new status tokens.
+
+Wed Apr  7 20:51:39 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Fixes for 128 bit blocksize
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Ditto.
+	(protect_secret_key). Ditto.
+	* misc.c (print_cipher_algo_note): Twofish is now a standard algo.
+
+	* keygen.c (do_create): Fixed spelling (Gaël Quéri)
+	(ask_keysize): Only allow keysizes up to 4096
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): chmod newly created secrings.
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Fixed accidently deleted subkeys.
+
+Tue Apr  6 19:58:12 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c: Removed duped include (John Bley)
+	* mainproc.c: Ditto.
+
+	* build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Fixed hashing of the header.
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Allow import of own non-exportable sigs.
+
+Sat Mar 20 13:59:47 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Fix for not not-dash-escaped
+
+Sat Mar 20 11:44:21 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): Added command --recv-keys
+	* hkp.c (hkp_import): New.
+
+Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): add new arg add_fnc and changed all callers.
+	(do_check): Ditto.
+	(verify_key): Ditto.
+	(propagate_validity): Use the new add_fnc arg.
+	(print_user_id): Add the FILE arg.
+	(propagate_ownertrust): New.
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust_cb): New and changed the add_ownertrust
+	logic.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_keyblock_bylid): New.
+	* trustdb.c (print_uid_from_keyblock): New.
+	(dump_tn_tree_with_colons): New.
+	(list_trust_path): Add colon print mode.
+
+	* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record): Always use the primary key.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Added text_mode filter (Rémi Guyomarch)
+	(encode_crypt): Ditto.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Added status ENC_TO.
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Added status NODATA.
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Always print NEED_PASSPHRASE
+	* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Added BAD_PASS status.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Set g10_opt_homedir.
+
+Sun Mar 14 19:34:36 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keygen.c (do_create): Changed wording of the note (Hugh Daniel)
+
+Thu Mar 11 16:39:46 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* tdbdump.c: New
+
+	* trustdb.c (walk_sigrecs,do_list_sigs,list_sigs,
+	list_records,list_trustdb,export_ownertrust,import_ownertrust): Moved
+	to tdbdump.c
+	(init_trustdb): renamed to setup_trustdb.  Changed all callers.
+	(do_init_trustdb): renamed to init_trustdb().
+	* trustdb.c (die_invalid_db): replaced by tdbio_invalid.
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_invalid): New.
+
+	* import.c (delete_inv_parts): Skip non exportable signatures.
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uid_mk_attrib): New.
+	(sign_uids): Add the local argument.
+	(keyedit_menu): New "lsign" command.
+	* trustdb.c (register_trusted_key): Removed this and all related stuff.
+	* g10.c (oTrustedKey): Removed option.
+
+	* tdbio.h (dir.valcheck): New trustdb field.
+	* tdbio.c: Add support for this field
+	(tdbio_read_modify_stamp): New.
+	(tdbio_write_modify_stamp): New.
+	* trustdb.c (do_check): Check against this field. Removed cache update.
+	(verify_key): Add cache update.
+	(upd_uid_record): Some functional changes.
+	(upd_cert_record): Ditto
+
+Wed Mar 10 11:26:18 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): Fixed segv in uid. Print 'u' as
+	validity of sks.
+
+Mon Mar  8 20:47:17 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* getkey.c (classify_user_id): Add new mode 12 (#<lid>).
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_secret_key): replaced error by info.
+
+	* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): Add another arg, changed all callers.
+	(check_trust): Ditto.
+	(do_check): Ditto.
+	(verify_key): Handle namehash.
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): print trust info for user ids.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): Add sig-created to status output.
+
+Tue Mar  2 16:44:57 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* textfilter.c (copy_clearsig_text): New.
+	(clearsign): Removed.
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): does not use textfiler anymore.
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): print a note about the used charset.
+
+Tue Mar  2 10:38:42 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): sig-id now works for all algos.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Fixed armor bypassing.
+
+Sun Feb 28 19:11:00 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Don't change the case of email addresses.
+	(has_invalid_email_chars): Adjusted.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Really list serect keys (Remi Guyomarch)
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_select_uid): Add some braces to make egcs happy.
+	(menu_select_key): Ditto.
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): List sym-enc packets (Remi Guyomarch)
+
+Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Return error if there are no recipients.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): New signature id feature.
+	* armor.c (make_radic64_string): New.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): early check for seckey availability.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): print user id before asking.
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource,get_keyblock_handle): Cleaner
+	handling of default resource.
+
+
+Thu Feb 25 18:47:39 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (algo_available): New.
+	(select_algo_from_prefs): Check whether algo is available.
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): Take care of opt.dry_run.
+	(do_gdbm_store): Ditto.
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile). Ditto.
+	(copy_options_file): Ditto.
+	* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
+	(clear_trust_checked_flag): Ditto.
+	(update_trust_record): Ditto.
+	(insert_trust_record): Ditto.
+
+Wed Feb 24 11:07:27 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* keylist.c (secret_key_list): Now really list the secret key.
+
+	* trustdb.c (do_init_trustdb): New. Init is now deferred.
+
+Mon Feb 22 20:04:00 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* getkey.c (lookup_sk): Return G10ERR_NO_SECKEY and not x_PUBKEY.
+
+Fri Feb 19 15:49:15 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): retrieve LID if not there.
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Replaced ugly lineending handling.
+
+	* g10.c (oNoEncryptTo): New.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Implemented this option.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Greeting is now printed to stderr and not to tty.
+	Use add_to_strlist() instead of direct coding.
+
+	* import.c (import): Use iobuf_push_filter2.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print all user ids
+	for good signatures.
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkeyblock): New.
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Fixed SEGV for unbounded class 0x18 keys.
+	(delete_inv_parts): Delete special marked packets.
+
+Tue Feb 16 14:10:02 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --encrypt-to
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Implemented encrypt-to.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Removed the hack to work with
+	utf-8 strings.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Install lockfile cleanup handler.
+	* tdbio.c (cleanup): Removed: this is now handled by dotlock.
+
+Sat Feb 13 14:13:04 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Init lockhandle for a new trustdb
+
+Wed Feb 10 17:15:39 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): check for development version now in configure
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_write_record): Add uid.validity
+	(tdbio_read_record) : Ditto.
+	(tdbio_dump_record) : Ditto.
+
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_std_prefs): Replaced Blowfish by Twofish,
+	removed MD5 and Tiger.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Suppress warning about missing Blowfish
+	in preferences in certain cases.
+
+	* ringedit.c (lock_rentry,unlock_rentry): New.
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): Pass ret_kb down to lookup_xx.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): No output of of empty comment lines.
+	Add option --no-version to suppress the output of the version string.
+
+	* getkey.c: Release the getkey context for auto context variables.
+
+Sun Jan 24 18:16:26 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* getkey.c: Changed the internal design to allow simultaneous
+	lookup of multible user ids
+	(get_pubkey_bynames): New.
+	(get_seckey_bynames): New.
+	(get_seckey_next): New.
+	(get_seckey_end): New.
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Use the new functions.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_keyblock): add a newline for normal listings.
+
+	* g10.c (--recipient): New option name to replace --remote-user
+
+
+Wed Jan 20 18:59:49 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* textfilter.c: Mostly rewritten
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Use now text_filter semantics.
+
+Tue Jan 19 19:34:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* export.c (export_pubkeys_stream): New.
+	(do_export_stream): New.
+	* g10.c (aSendKeys): New command.
+	* hkp.c (hkp_export): New.
+
+	* compress.c (do_uncompress): Hack for algo 1 and 1.1.3
+
+Sun Jan 17 11:04:33 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* textfilter.c (text_filter): Now uses iobuf_read_line().
+	(read_line): Removed.
+
+	* armor.c (trim_trailing_spaces): Removed and replaced
+	by trim_trailing_ws from libutil
+
+Sat Jan 16 12:03:27 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* hkp.c (hkp_ask_import): Use only the short keyid
+
+Sat Jan 16 09:27:30 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* import.c (import_key_stream): New
+	(import): New, moved most of import_keys here.
+	* g10.c: New option --keyserver
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Hook to import a pubkey.
+
+	* pref.c pref.h : Removed
+
+	* hkp.c hkp.h: New
+
+Wed Jan 13 14:10:15 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c (radix64_read): Print an error if a bad armor was detected.
+
+Wed Jan 13 12:49:36 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c (radix64_read): Now handles malformed armors produced
+	by some buggy MUAs.
+
+Tue Jan 12 11:17:18 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* ringedit.c (find_keyblock_bysk): New.
+
+	* skc_list.c (is_insecure): New.
+	(build_sk_list): usage check for insecure keys.
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Add handling for subkeys.
+	(delete_inv_parts): Skip unsigned subkeys
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Print info if the signature is older
+	than the key.
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): Fail on time warp.
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Ditto.
+
+Sun Jan 10 15:10:02 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Fixed not-dash-escaped bug.
+
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Output time diff on error
+
+	* status.c (STATUS_VALIDSIG): New.
+	(is_status_enabled): New.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Issue that status message.
+
+	* plaintext.c (special_md_putc): Removed
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): print error for truncated lines.
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_encrypted): Revomed call to set_block_mode.
+	(free_plaintext): Ditto.
+
+Thu Jan  7 18:00:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Fixed return value.
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Disabled iobuf_set_limit and
+	iobuf_pop_filter stuff.
+	* compress.c (handle_compressed): Disabled iobuf_pop_filter.
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Add is_primary flag.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Set this flag.
+	* passphrase.c (passphrase_to_dek): Kludge to print the primary
+	keyid - changed the API: keyid must now hold 2 keyids.
+	* getkey.c (get_primary_seckey): New.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): pass primary keyid to passphrase query
+
+	* tbdio.c (open_db): removed the atexit
+	(tdbio_set_dbname): and moved it to here.
+
+	* armor.c: Rewrote large parts.
+
+Tue Dec 29 19:55:38 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Removed compression.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): special check for revoked keys
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Fixed revoke flag.
+
+Tue Dec 29 14:41:47 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): Check for EINVAL (Atari)
+
+	* getkey (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Fixed search of expiredate.
+	(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Ditto.
+
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_public_keys): cmp expire only for v3 packets
+	(cmp_secret_keys): Ditto.
+	(cmp_public_secret_key): Ditto.
+
+Wed Dec 23 17:12:24 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): Reset not_dashed at every header
+
+Wed Dec 23 13:18:14 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Refresh validity values.
+
+	* trustdb.c (enum_cert_paths_print): New arg refresh.
+
+	* ringedit.c: Fixed problems fix keyrings
+	* parse-packet.c (dbg_parse_packet): New debug functions.
+
+	* getkey.c (getkey_disable_caches): New.
+	* import.c (import_keys): Disable caches.
+
+Thu Dec 17 18:31:15 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* misc.c (trap_unaligned): Only for glibc 1
+
+	* sign.c (write_dash_escaped): Now escapes "From " lines
+	* g10.c: New option --escape-from-lines
+
+	* trustdb.c (sort_tsl_list): New
+	(list_trust_path): Now prints sorted list.
+	(enum_cert_paths): Likewise.
+	(enum_cert_paths_print): New.
+	(print_paths): New printing format.
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): New arg quit.
+	(edit_ownertrust): New quit selection and does not query
+	the recipients ownertrust anymore.
+	(add_ownertrust): Print the ceritficate path.
+
+
+Mon Dec 14 21:18:49 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Now checks for critical bit
+	(parse_sig_subpkt): Splitted.
+	(parse_one_sig_subpkt): New.
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): handle critical bit.
+
+Sun Dec 13 14:10:56 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pcklist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Preferences should
+	now work (lost the != ? )
+
+Thu Dec 10 20:15:36 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* ringedit.c (gdbm_store): Fix for inserts
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --export-all
+	* export.c (export_pubkeys): New arg.
+	(do_export): Now may skip old keys.
+
+	* status.c: Minor patches for Sun's cc
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_algo): Disabled v3 ElGamal choice, rearranged
+	 the numbers.  Add a warning question when a sign+encrypt key
+	 is selected.
+
+	* g10.c (do_not_use_RSA): Removed.
+	* misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): New as replacement for the
+	do_not_use_RSA() and chnaged all callers.
+	(print_cipher_algo_note): New.
+	(print_hash_algo_note): New.
+
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Add a call to print_cipher_algo_note.
+	* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): Ditto
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Add a call to print_digest_algo_note.
+
+	* getkey.c (get_long_user_id_string): New.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Changed the format of the
+	status output.
+
+	* encrypt.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): print used symmetric cipher.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Changed a message.
+
+Wed Dec  9 13:41:06 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* misc.c (trap_unaligned) [ALPHA]: Only if UAC_SIGBUS is defined.
+
+	* sign.c (write_dash_escaped): Add the forgotten patch by Brian Moore.
+
+	* compress.c (do_uncompress): Fixed the inflating bug.
+
+
+Tue Dec  8 13:15:16 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (upd_uid_record): Now uses the newest self-signature
+	(insert_trust_record): Now calls update with recheck set to true.
+	(register_trusted_key): New.
+	(verify_own_keys): Enhanced by list of trusted keys.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Print a warning when a devel version is used.
+	(main): New option --trusted-key
+
+	* import.c (merge_blocks): Fixed merging of new user ids and
+	added merging of subkeys.
+	(append_uid): Ditto.
+	(merge_keysig): New.
+	(append_key): New.
+	* getkey.c (merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Get the expiration time
+	from the newest self-signature.
+	(merge_keys_and_selfsig): Ditto.
+
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_secret_key): New.
+
+
+Fri Nov 27 21:37:41 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* g10.c: New option --lock-once
+	* tdbio.c (open_db): Add an atexit
+	(cleanup): New.
+	(tdbio_sync): Add locking.
+	(tdbio_end_transaction): Ditto.
+	(put_record_into_cache): Ditto.
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): Ditto.
+	(cleanup): New.
+	(add_keyblock_resource): Add an atexit.
+
+Fri Nov 27 15:30:24 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	 * armor.c (find_header): Another fix for clearsigs.
+
+Fri Nov 27 12:39:29 CET 1998  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+
+	* status.c (display_help): Removed.
+	* helptext.c: New and removed the N_() from all cpr_gets.
+
+
+Fri Nov 20 16:54:52 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --not-dash-escaped
+	* sign.c (write_dashed_escaped): Ditto.
+	* armor.c (find_header): Support for NotDashEscaped header.
+
+	* getkey.c: print "disabled cache.." only if verbose is used.
+
+Thu Nov 19 07:17:31 1998  Werner Koch  <werner.koch@guug.de>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Fixed expire listing
+	* getkey.c (merge_keys_and_selfsig): Fixed expire calculation.
+	(merge_one_pk_and_selfsig): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire). Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (keygen_add_key_expire): Ditto.
+	(ask_expire_interval): New and changed all local function to use
+	this instead.
+	(keygen_add_key_expire): Opaque should now be a public key;
+	changed all callers.
+
+	* parse.packet.c (parse): use skip_rest to skip packets.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): New arg for cmdline cmds.
+
+Wed Nov 18 20:33:50 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trustdb): Now rechecks all gived userids.
+	(collect_paths): Some fixes.
+	(upd_pref_records): Skips empty items, evaluate all items.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Better listing of prefs.
+	(skip_packet): Now knows about marker packet
+
+	* g10.c: removed cmd "--edit-sig".
+
+	* pubring.asc: Updated.
+
+Sat Nov 14 14:01:29 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Changed syntax of --list-trust-path
+	* trustdb.c (list_trust_path): Replaced max_depth by
+	opt.max_cert_depth
+
+Fri Nov 13 07:39:58 1998  Werner Koch  <werner.koch@guug.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (collect_paths): Removed a warning message.
+	(enum_trust_web): Removed.
+	(enum_cert_paths): New.
+	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Changed to use enum_cert_paths.
+	(edit_ownertrust): Now list ceritficates on request.
+	(show_paths): New.
+
+Wed Nov 11 18:05:44 1998  Werner Koch  <werner.koch@guug.de>
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --max-cert-depth
+	* tdbio.h: add new fields to ver and dir record.
+	* tdbio.c: read/write/dump of these fields.
+	(tdbio_db_matches_options): New.
+	* trustdb.c: replaced MAC_CERT_DEPTH by opt.max_cert_depth.
+	(do_check): cache validity and changed other functions
+	to reset the cached value.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Now lists the ownertrust.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Ditto.
+
+Tue Nov 10 10:08:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (g10_exit): Now looks at the new g10_errors_seen.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Sets g10_errors_seen.
+
+	* *.c : i18n many more strings.
+
+	* ringedit.c (locate_keyblock_by_keyid): Add HAVE_LIBGDBM
+	(locate_keyblock_by_fpr): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c (main): removed unsused "int errors".
+	(main): Add new option --charset.
+
+	* g10.c (main): special message for the unix newbie.
+
+Mon Nov  9 07:17:42 1998  Werner Koch  <werner.koch@guug.de>
+
+	* getkey.c (finish_lookup): Kludge to prefere algo 16.
+
+	* trustdb.c (new_lid_table): Clear cached item.
+
+	* status.c (cpr_get_utf8): New.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Uses this.
+
+Sun Nov  8 17:20:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Why did I use strlen()-1
+	in the printf? - This truncated the TZ.
+
+Sat Nov  7 15:57:28 1998  me,,,  (wk@tobold)
+
+	* getkey.c (lookup): Changes to support a read_next.
+	(get_pubkey): Fixed a memory leak.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Now lists all matching user IDs.
+
+Tue Nov  3 16:19:21 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Now converted to UTF-8
+
+	* g10.c (main): Kludge for pgp clearsigs and textmode.
+
+Fri Oct 30 16:40:39 1998  me,,,  (wk@tobold)
+
+	* signal.c (block_all_signals): New.
+	(unblock_all_signals): New
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_end_transaction): Now blocks all signals.
+
+	* trustdb.c (new_lid_table): Changed the representation of the
+	former local_lid_info stuff.
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Reorganized the whole thing.
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Now handles class 0x28
+
+
+Wed Oct 28 18:56:33 1998  me,,,  (wk@tobold)
+
+	* export.c (do_export): Takes care of the exportable sig flag.
+
+Tue Oct 27 14:53:04 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): New "fast" parameter.
+
+Sun Oct 25 19:32:05 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* openfile.c (copy_options_File): New.
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Creates options file
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Ditto.
+
+Sat Oct 24 14:10:53 1998  brian moore <bem@cmc.net>
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Don't release the DEK
+	(do_proc_packets): Ditto.
+
+Fri Oct 23 06:49:38 1998  me,,,  (wk@tobold)
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Comments are now allowed
+
+	* trustdb.c: Rewrote large parts.
+
+
+Thu Oct 22 15:56:45 1998  Michael Roth	(mroth@nessie.de)
+
+	* encode.c: (encode_simple): Only the plain filename without
+	a given directory is stored in generated packets.
+	(encode_crypt): Ditto.
+
+	* sign.c: (sign_file) Ditto.
+
+
+Thu Oct 22 10:53:41 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): Add new optional arg.
+
+	* import.c (import_keys): Add statistics output
+	* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): Ditto.
+	(insert_trustdb): Ditto.
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_begin_transaction): New.
+	(tdbio_end_transaction): New.
+	(tdbio_cancel_transaction): New.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option --quit.
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_hint_sig): No tests for user-id w/o sig.
+	This caused an assert while checking the sigs.
+
+	* trustdb.c (upd_sig_record): Splitted into several functions.
+
+	* import.c (import_keys): New arg "fast".
+	* g10.c (main): New command --fast-import.
+
+Wed Oct 21 18:19:36 1998  Michael Roth <mroth@nessie.de>
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Directory is now created.
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): New info message.
+
+Wed Oct 21 11:52:04 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trustdb): released keyblock in loop.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_block): New.
+	(list_all): Changed to use list_block.
+
+	* trustdb.c: Completed support for GDBM
+
+	* sign.c (only_old_style): Changed the way force_v3 is handled
+	(sign_file): Ditto.
+	(clearsign_file): Ditto.
+
+	* keygen.c (has_invalid_email_chars): Splitted into mailbox and
+	host part.
+
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Add a merge_keys_and_selfsig.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Ditto.
+
+Sun Oct 18 11:49:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sign.c (only_old_style): Add option force_v3_sigs
+	(sign_file): Fixed a bug in sig->version
+	(clearsign_file): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): New
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire): New.
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_signatures): New
+
+
+Sat Oct 17 10:22:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c: changed output line length from 72 to 64.
+
+	* keyedit.c (fix_keyblock): New.
+
+Fri Oct 16 10:24:47 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c: Rewrote most.
+	* tdbio.c: Add cache and generalized hash tables.
+
+	* options.h (ENABLE_COMMENT_PACKETS): New but undef'ed.
+	* encode.c, sign.c, keygen.c: Disabled comment packets.
+	* export.c (do_export): Comment packets are never exported,
+	except for those in the secret keyring.
+
+	* g10.c (main): Removed option do-no-export-rsa; should be
+	be replaced by a secpial tool.
+	* export.c (do_export): Removed the code for the above option.
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): Support for new only_keyblocks.
+	* import.c (import_keys): Only looks for keyblock armors.
+
+	* packet.h: replaced valid_days by expiredate and changed all users.
+	* build-packet.c (do_public_key): calculates valid-days
+	(do_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): expiredate is calucated from the
+	valid_period in v3 packets.
+	* keyid.c (do_fingerprint_md): calculates valid_dates.
+
+	* keygen.c (add_key_expire): fixed key expiration time for v4 packets.
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): A LF in the first 28 bytes
+	was skipped for non-armored data.
+
+Thu Oct  8 11:35:51 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (is_armored): Add test on old comment packets.
+
+	* tdbio.c (tdbio_search_dir_bypk): fixed memory leak.
+
+	* getkey.c: Changed the caching algorithms.
+
+Wed Oct  7 19:33:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* kbnodes.c (unused_nodes): New.
+
+Wed Oct  7 11:15:36 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Fixed a problem with SK which could caused
+	a save of an unprotected key.
+	(menu_adduid): Ditto.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Prefs are now correctly listed for
+	new user ids.
+
+	* trustdb.c (update_trust_record): New.
+	(insert_trust_record): Now makes use of update_trust_record.
+
+Tue Oct  6 16:18:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (read_record): replaces most of the tdbio_read_records.
+	(write_record): Ditto.
+
+Sat Oct  3 11:01:21 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (ask_alogo): enable ElGamal enc-only only for addmode.
+
+Wed Sep 30 10:15:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Fixed update of wrong keyblock.
+
+Tue Sep 29 08:32:08 1998  me,,,  (wk@tobold)
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Display note for special filename.
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Suppress output of special file.
+
+Mon Sep 28 12:57:12 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (verify_own_keys): Add warning if a key is not protected.
+
+	* passphrase (hash_passphrase): Fixed iterated+salted mode and
+	setup for keysizes > hashsize.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New options: --s2k-{cipher,digest,mode}.
+
+Fri Sep 25 09:34:23 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c: Chnaged some help texts.
+
+Tue Sep 22 19:34:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): fixed bug for long
+	passphrases.
+
+Mon Sep 21 11:28:05 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@(none))
+
+	* getkey.c (lookup): Add code to use the sub key if the primary one
+	does not match the usage.
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): New error message: no valid data found.
+	(radix64_read): Changes to support multiple messages.
+	(i18n.h): New.
+	* mainproc.c (add_onepass_sig): bug fix.
+
+Mon Sep 21 08:03:16 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Add keyid to most messages.
+
+	* passphrase.c (read_passphrase_from_fd): New.
+	(have_static_passphrase): New
+	(get_passphrase_fd): Removed.
+	(set_passphrase_fd): Removed.
+	* g10.c (main): passphrase is now read here.
+
+	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): "help" texts should now translate fine.
+
+Mon Sep 21 06:40:02 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Now disables compression
+	when --rfc1991 is used.
+	(encode_crypt): Ditto.
+
+Fri Sep 18 16:50:32 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (merge_key_and_selfsig): New.
+
+Fri Sep 18 10:20:11 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): Removed 3DES kludge.
+
+	* seskey.c (make_session_key): Fixed SERIOUS bug introduced
+	by adding the weak key detection code.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Changed aremor header in certain cases.
+
+Tue Sep 15 17:52:55 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Replaced ascime by asctimestamp.
+
+Mon Sep 14 11:40:52 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seskey.c (make_session_key): Now detects weak keys.
+
+	* trustdb (clear_trust_checked_flag): New.
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Does no anymore suppress CR from
+	cleartext signed messages.
+
+Sun Sep 13 12:54:29 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (insert_trust_record): Fixed a stupid bug in the free
+	liunked list loops.
+
+Sat Sep 12 15:49:16 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* status.c (remove_shmid): New.
+	(init_shm_comprocess): Now sets permission to the real uid.
+
+Wed Sep  9 11:15:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_pubkey_enc): New flah throw_keyid, and add logic to
+	implement it.
+	* g10.c (main): New Option --throw-keyid
+
+	* getkey.c (enum_secret_keys): Add new ar and changed all callers.
+
+Tue Sep  8 20:04:09 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* delkey.c (delete_key): Moved from keyedit.c.
+
+Mon Sep  7 16:37:52 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (calc_length_header): New arg new_ctb to correctly
+	calculate the length of new style packets.
+
+	* armor.c (is_armored): Checks for symkey_enc packets.
+
+	* pkclist.c (select_algo_from_prefs): 3DEs substitute is now CAST5.
+
+Tue Aug 11 17:54:50 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Fixed handling of old keys.
+
+	* getkey.c (compare_name): Fixed exact and email matching
+
+	* openfile.c (open_outfile): Changed arguments and all callers.
+
+Tue Aug 11 09:14:35 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Applied option set-filename and comment.
+	(encode_crypt): Ditto.
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Ditto.
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Applied option comment.
+
+	* encode.c (encode_crypt): Moved init_packet to the begin.
+	(encode_simple): add an init_packet().
+
+	* comment (write_comment): Now enforces a hash sign as the 1st byte.
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Add explanation for "no user ids".
+
+	* compress.c (do_uncompress): Applied Brian Warner's patch to support
+	zlib 1.1.3 etc.
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Fixed a problem after inserting new keys.
+
+	* getkey (lookup): do not return the primary key if usage is given
+	(lookup_sk): Ditto and take usage into account.
+
+	* status.c (cpr_get_answer_is_yes): add display_help.
+
+Mon Aug 10 10:11:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (lookup_sk): Now always returns the primary if arg
+	primary is true.
+	(lookup): Likewise.
+	(get_pubkey_byname): Now returns the primary key
+	(get_seckey_byname): Ditto.
+
+
+Mon Aug 10 08:34:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keyid.c (pubkey_letter): ELG_E is now a small g.
+
+Sat Aug  8 17:26:12 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* openfile (overwrite_filep): Changed semantics and all callers.
+
+Sat Aug  8 12:17:07 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* status.c (display_help): New.
+
+Thu Aug  6 16:30:41 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_session_key): Now uses get_random_bits().
+
+Thu Aug  6 07:34:56 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_copy): No more backupfiles for
+	secret keyrings and add additional warning in case of
+	a failed secret keyring operation.
+
+Wed Aug  5 11:54:37 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (check_opts): Moved to main.  Changed def_cipher_algo
+	semantics and chnaged all users.
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_sssion_key): New informational output
+	about preferences.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Fixed salted+iterated S2K
+	(parse_key): Ditto.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Ditto.
+	(do_symkey_enc): Ditto.
+
+Tue Aug  4 08:59:10 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (enum_secret_keys): Now returns only primary keys.
+
+	* getkey (lookup): Now sets the new namehash field.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt2): New.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): one-pass sigs are now emiited reverse.
+	Preference data is considered when selecting the compress algo.
+
+Wed Jul 29 12:53:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* free-packet.c (copy_signature): New.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): rewritten
+	* g10.c (aKeyadd): Removed option --add-key
+
+Mon Jul 27 10:37:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Additional check on cipher blocksize.
+	(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* encr-data.c: Support for other blocksizes.
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
+
+Fri Jul 24 16:47:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* kbnode.c (insert_kbnode): Changed semantics and all callers.
+	* keyedit.c : More or less a complete rewrite
+
+Wed Jul 22 17:10:04 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (write_sign_packet_header): New.
+
+Tue Jul 21 14:37:09 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* import.c (import_one): Now creates a trustdb record.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New command --check-trustdb
+
+Mon Jul 20 11:15:07 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* genkey.c (generate_keypair): Default key is now DSA with
+	encryption only ElGamal subkey.
+
+Thu Jul 16 10:58:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_fingerprint): New.
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byfprint): New.
+
+Tue Jul 14 18:09:51 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keyid.c (fingerprint_from_pk): Add argument and changed all callers.
+	(fingerprint_from_sk): Ditto.
+
+Tue Jul 14 10:10:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): Now returns create error if
+	the file could not be created or the user responded not to overwrite
+	the file.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Tries again if the file could not
+	be created to check the signature without output.
+
+	* misc.c (disable_core_dumps): New.
+	* g10.c (main): disable coredumps for gpg
+
+	* g10.c (MAINTAINER_OPTIONS): New to disable some options
+
+Mon Jul 13 16:47:54 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): New arg for better support of
+	detached sigs. Changed all callers.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_signature_packets): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option "compress-sigs"
+	* sig.c (sign_file): detached signatures are not anymore compressed
+	unless the option --compress-sigs is used.
+
+Thu Jul  9 19:54:54 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c: Fixes to allow zero length cleartext signatures
+
+Thu Jul  9 14:52:47 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (build_list): Now drops setuid.
+	(main): Changed the way keyrings  and algorithms are registered .
+
+Wed Jul  8 14:17:30 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_public_key): Add field keyid.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Reset the above field.
+	* keyid.c (keyid_from_pk): Use above field as cache.
+
+	* tdbio.c, tdbio.h: New
+	* trustdb.c: Moved some functions to tdbio.c.
+	(print_keyid): New.
+
+	* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): New.
+
+Wed Jul  8 10:45:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* plaintext.c (special_md_putc): New.
+	(handle_plaintext): add clearsig argument
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): detection of clearsig
+	* sign.c (write_dased_escaped): Changed clearsig format
+
+Tue Jul  7 18:56:19 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): Now makes sure that there is only one
+	empty line for clearsigs, as this is what OP now says.
+
+Mon Jul  6 13:09:07 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): New option default-secret-key
+	* getkey.c (get_seckey_byname): support for this option.
+
+Mon Jul  6 09:03:49 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (add_keyring): Keyrings are now added to end of the
+	list of keyrings.  The first added keyringwill be created.
+	(add_secret_keyring): Likewise.
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource): Files are created here.
+
+	* g10.c (aNOP): Removed
+
+	* getkey.c (lookup): Add checking of usage for name lookups
+	* packet.h (pubkey_usage): Add a field which may be used to store
+	usage capabilities.
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): getkey now called with usage arg.
+	* skclist.c (build_sk_list): Ditto.
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fixed "Hash:" headers
+
+Sat Jul  4 13:33:31 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (list_ownertrust): New.
+	* g10.c (aListOwnerTrust): New.
+
+	* g10.c (def_pubkey_algo): Removed.
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_private_data): Removed and also the call to it.
+	(sign_private_data): Removed.
+
+Fri Jul  3 13:26:10 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (aEditKey): was aEditSig. Changed usage msg.
+
+	* keyedit.c: Done some i18n stuff.
+
+	* g10.c (do_not_use_RSA): New.
+	* sign.c (do_sign): Add call to above function.
+	* encode.c (write_pubkey_enc_from_list): Ditto.
+
+Thu Jul  2 21:01:25 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c: Now is able sto store data of unknown
+	algorithms.
+	* free-packet.c: Support for this.
+	* build-packet.c: Can write data of packet with unknown algos.
+
+Thu Jul  2 11:46:36 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): fixed 4 byte length header
+
+Wed Jul  1 12:36:55 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h (new_ctb): New field for some packets
+	* build-packet.c (build_packet): Support for new_ctb
+	* parse-packet.c (parse): Ditto.
+
+Mon Jun 29 12:54:45 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h: changed all "_cert" to "_key", "subcert" to "subkey".
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_packet): Removed memory leak for subkeys.
+
+Sun Jun 28 18:32:27 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* import.c (import_keys): Renamed from import_pubkeys.
+	(import_secret_one): New.
+
+	* g10.c (aExportSecret): New.
+
+	* export.c (export_seckeys): New.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Cleaned up.
+	(parse_packet): Trust packets are now considered as unknown.
+	(parse_pubkey_warning): New.
+
+Fri Jun 26 10:37:35 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (has_invalid_email_chars): New.
+
+Wed Jun 24 16:40:22 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Now creates valid onepass_sig packets
+	with all detected hash algorithms.
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Now uses the hash algos as specified
+	in the onepass_sig packets (if there are any)
+
+Mon Jun 22 11:54:08 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* plaintext.c (handle_plaintext): add arg to disable outout
+	* mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): disable output when in sigs_only mode.
+
+Thu Jun 18 13:17:27 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c: Removed all rsa packet stuff, chnaged defaults
+	for key generation.
+
+Sun Jun 14 21:28:31 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* misc.c (checksum_u16): Fixed a stupid bug which caused a
+	wrong checksum calculation for the secret key protection and
+	add a backward compatibility option.
+	* g10.c (main): Add option --emulate-checksum-bug.
+
+Thu Jun 11 13:26:44 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h: Major changes to the structure of public key material
+	which is now stored in an array and not anaymore in a union of
+	algorithm specific structures.	These is needed to make the system
+	more extendable and makes a lot of stuff much simpler. Changed
+	all over the system.
+
+	* dsa.c, rsa.c, elg.c: Removed.
+
+Wed Jun 10 07:22:02 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* g10.c ("load-extension"): New option.
+
+Mon Jun  8 22:23:37 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Removed cipher constants
+	(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
+
+Fri May 29 10:00:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (query_trust_info): New.
+	* keylist.c (list_one): Add output of trust info
+	* mainproc (list_node): ditto.
+	* g10.c (main): full trustdb init if -with-colons and any of the
+	key list modes.
+
+Thu May 28 10:34:42 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* status.c (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA): New.
+	* sig-check.c (check_signature): Output special status message.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Changed format of output.
+	* passpharse.c (passphrase_to_dek): Likewise.
+
+Wed May 27 13:46:48 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (aListSecretKeys): New option --list-secret-keys
+	* keylist.c (std_key_list): Renamed to public_key_list.
+	(secret_key_list): New
+	(list_one, list_all): Add support for secret keys.
+	* getkey.c (get_secret_keyring): New.
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Add option --with-colons for secret keys
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): detection of selfsigs
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): fixed listing.
+
+	* g10.c (aListSecretKeys): New option --always-trust
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Override per option added
+
+	* status.c (write_status_text): Add a prefix to every output line.
+
+Wed May 27 07:49:21 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10 (--compress-keys): New.
+	* options.h (compress_keys): New.
+	* export.c (export_pubkeys): Only compresses with the new option.
+
+Tue May 26 11:24:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* passphrase.c (get_last_passphrase): New
+	(set_next_passphrase): New.
+	(passphrase_to_dek): add support for the above functions.
+	* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Add sigclass 0x18,
+	changed all callers due to a new argument.
+	* keygen.c (write_keybinding): New
+	(generate_subkeypair): Add functionality
+	(ask_algo, ask_keysize, ask_valid_days): Broke out of generate_keypair
+	(ask_user_id, ask_passphrase): Ditto.
+
+Thu May 21 11:26:13 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c,gpgd.c (main): Does now return an int, so that egcs does
+	not complain.
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Removed erro message and add a noticed
+	that this part should be fixed.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Compression now comes in front of encryption.
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): Ditto.
+	(encode_crypt): Ditto.
+
+Tue May 19 16:18:19 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (fake_packet): Changed assertion to log_error
+
+Sat May 16 16:02:06 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (build_packet): Add SUBKEY packets.
+
+Fri May 15 17:57:23 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sign.c (hash_for): New and used in all places here.
+	* main.h (DEFAULT_): new macros.
+	* g10.c  (opt.def_digest_algo): Now set to 0
+
+	* compress.c (init_compress): Add support for algo 1
+	* options.h (def_compress_algo): New
+	* g10.c (main): New option --compress-algo
+
+Fri May 15 13:23:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (print_mds): New feature to print only one hash,
+	chnaged formatting.
+
+Thu May 14 15:36:24 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* misc.c (trap_unaligned) [__alpha__]: New
+	* g10.c (trap_unaligned): Add call to this to track down SIGBUS
+	on Alphas (to avoid the slow emulation code).
+
+Wed May 13 11:48:27 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (do_signature): Support for v4 pakets.
+	* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Ditto.
+	* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): New.
+	(build_sig_subpkt): New.
+
+	* elg.c (g10_elg_sign): removed keyid_from_skc.
+	* dsa.c (g10_dsa_sign): Ditto.
+	* rsa.c (g10_rsa_sign): Ditto.
+	* keyedit.c (make_keysig_packet): Add call to keyid_from_skc
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Support for v4 signatures.
+	(sign_file): Ditto.
+
+Wed May  6 09:31:24 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (do_parse): add support for 5 byte length leader.
+	(parse_subpkt): Ditto.
+	* build-packet.c (write_new_header): Ditto.
+
+	* packet.h (SIGSUBPKT_): New constants.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_sig_subpkt): Changed name, made global,
+	and arg to return packet length, chnaged all callers
+
+
+Tue May  5 22:11:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (gen_dsa): New.
+	* build_packet.c (do_secret_cert): Support for DSA
+
+Mon May  4 19:01:25 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* compress.c: doubled buffer sizes
+	* parse-packet.c (do_plaintext): now uses iobuf_read/write.
+
+Mon May  4 09:35:53 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Add optional argument hash_algo,
+	changed all callers.
+
+	* passphrase.c (make_dek_from_passphrase): Removed
+	* (get_passhrase_hash): Changed name to passphrase_to_dek, add arg,
+	changed all callers.
+
+	* all: Introduced the new ELG identifier and added support for the
+	encryption only one (which is okay to use by GNUPG for signatures).
+
+Sun May  3 17:50:26 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h (PKT_OLD_COMMENT): New name for type 16.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_comment): Now uses type 61
+
+Fri May  1 12:44:39 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* packet.h (count): Chnaged s2k count from byte to u32.
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Changed s2k algo 3 to 4, changed
+	reading of count.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_cert): ditto.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): New.
+	* build-packet.c (do_symkey_enc): New.
+
+Thu Apr 30 16:33:34 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fixed "Hash: " armor line.
+
+Tue Apr 28 14:27:42 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_subpkt): Some new types.
+
+Mon Apr 27 12:53:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add option --skip-verify.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Ditto.
+
+	* g10.c (print_mds): Add output for Tiger.
+
+	* sign.c (sign_file): Now uses partial length headers if used
+	in canonical textmode (kludge to fix a bug).
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Changed BLOWFISH id.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
+	* seskey.c (make_session_key): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key,do_check): Add BLOWFISH160.
+
+Fri Apr 24 17:38:48 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Add sig-class 0x14..0x17
+	* keyedit.c (sign-key): Some changes to start with support of
+	the above new sig-classes.
+
+Wed Apr 22 09:01:57 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* getkey.c (compare_name): add email matching
+
+Tue Apr 21 16:17:12 1998  Werner Koch,mobil,,,	(wk@tobold)
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): fixed missing last LF before CSUM.
+
+Thu Apr  9 11:35:22 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): New; combines all the check functions
+	into one.
+
+	* sign.c: removed all key management functions
+	* keyedit.c: New.
+
+Thu Apr  9 09:49:36 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* import.c (chk_self_sigs): Changed an error message.
+
+Wed Apr  8 16:19:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* packet.h: packet structs now uses structs from the pubkey,
+	removed all copy operations from packet to pubkey structs.
+
+Wed Apr  8 13:40:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (verify_own_certs): Fixed "public key not found".
+
+	* getkey.c (key_byname): New, combines public and secret key search.
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pkc_list): Add new arg usage, changed all callers.
+	* skclist.c (build_skc_list): Likewise.
+
+	* ringedit.c (find_keyblock, keyring_search2): Removed.
+
+Wed Apr  8 09:47:21 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Applied small fix from Ulf Möller.
+
+Tue Apr  7 19:28:07 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* cipher.c, encr-data.c, seckey-cert.c: Now uses cipher_xxxx
+	functions instead of blowfish_xxx or cast_xxx
+
+Tue Apr  7 11:04:02 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* Makefile.am (g10maint.o): Changed the way it is created.
+
+Mon Apr  6 11:17:08 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* misc.c: New.
+	* keygen.c (checksum,checksum_u16,checksum_mpi): Moved to misc.c
+	* seckey-cert.c: Kludge for wrong ELG checksum implementation.
+
+Sat Apr  4 20:07:01 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* cipher.c (cipher_filter): Support for CAST5
+	* encr-data.c (decode_filter): Ditto.
+	(decrypt_data): Ditto.
+	* seskey.c (make_session_key): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_elg, check_dsa): Ditto,
+	(protect_secret_key): Ditto.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Ditto.
+	* passphrase.c (hash_passphrase): Ditto.
+
+Thu Apr  2 20:22:35 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* gpgd.c: New
+
+Thu Apr  2 10:38:16 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Add valid_days stuff.
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Add check for valid_days.
+
+Wed Apr  1 16:15:58 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Addional question whether the
+	selected large keysize is really needed.
+
+Wed Apr  1 15:56:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): merged protect_xxx to here.
+
+Wed Apr  1 10:34:46 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* Makefile.am (g10maint.c): Changed creation rule, so that it works
+	on FreeBSD (missing CFLAGS).
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_subkey): Removed.
+
+Thu Mar 19 15:22:36 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_enum): Fixed problem with reading too
+	many packets. Add support to read secret keyrings.
+
+	* getkey.c (scan_keyring): Removed
+	(lookup): New to replace scan_keyring.
+	(scan_secret_keyring): Removed.
+	(lookup_skc): New.
+
+Wed Mar 18 11:47:34 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): New read mode 11.
+
+	* keyid.c (elg_fingerprint_md): New and changed all other functions
+	to call this if the packet version is 4 or above.
+
+Tue Mar 17 20:46:16 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Add listing support for subkeys.
+
+Tue Mar 17 20:32:22 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (is_armored): Allow marker packet.
+
+Thu Mar 12 13:36:49 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Checks timestamp of pubkey.
+	* sig-check. (do_check): Compares timestamps.
+
+Tue Mar 10 17:01:56 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add call to init_signals.
+	* signal.c: New.
+
+Mon Mar  9 12:43:42 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* dsa.c: New
+	* packet.h, free-packet.c, parse-packet.c : Add support for DSA
+	* sig-check.c, getkey.c, keyid.c, ringedit.c: Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c: Ditto.
+
+	* packet.h : Moved .digest_algo of signature packets to outer
+	structure. Changed all references
+
+Sun Mar  8 13:06:42 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* openfile.c : Support for stdout filename "-".
+
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Enhanced status output:
+	* status.c (write_status_text): New.
+
+Fri Mar  6 16:10:54 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* kbnode.c (clone_kbnode): Fixed private_flag.
+
+	* mainproc.c (list_node): Output of string "Revoked" as user-id.
+
+Fri Mar  6 14:26:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Add userids to "-kv" and cleaned up this stuff.
+
+Fri Mar  6 12:45:58 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Changed semantics of the list-... commands
+	and added a new one. Removed option "-d"
+
+	* decrypt.c: New.
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Autocreate directory only if it ends
+	in "/.gnupg".
+
+Thu Mar  5 12:12:11 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): New. Common part of proc_packet.
+	(proc_signature_packets): special version to handle signature data.
+	* verify.c: New.
+	* g10.c (aVerify): New.
+	* plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): New.
+	* compress.c (handle_compressed): Add callback arg, changed caller.
+
+Thu Mar  5 10:20:06 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c: Is nom the common source for gpg and gpgm
+	* g10maint.c: Removed
+	* Makefile.am: Add rule to build g10maint.c
+
+Thu Mar  5 08:43:59 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Changed the way clear text sigs are faked.
+
+Wed Mar  4 19:47:37 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10maint.c (aMuttKeyList): New
+	* keylist.c: New.
+
+Wed Mar  4 17:20:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Kludge to allow 0x prefix.
+
+Tue Mar  3 13:46:55 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10maint.c (main): New option --gen-random.
+
+Tue Mar  3 09:50:08 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (aDeleteSecretKey): New.
+	(aEditSig): Add option "--edit-key" as synonym for "--edit-sig".
+	(aDeleteSecretKey): New.
+	* getkey.c (seckey_available): New.
+	* sign.c (delete_key): Enhanced to delete secret keys, changed all
+	callers.
+
+Mon Mar  2 21:23:48 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* pkc_list.c (build_pkc_list): Add interactive input of user ID.
+
+Mon Mar  2 20:54:05 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): New.
+	(add_ownertrust): Add message.
+	* trustdb.c (enum_trust_web): Quick fix.
+
+Mon Mar  2 13:50:53 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): New action aDeleteKey
+	* sign.c (delete_key): New.
+
+Sun Mar  1 16:38:58 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (do_check): No returns TRUST_UNDEFINED instead of
+	eof error.
+
+Fri Feb 27 18:14:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): Removed trailing CR on headers.
+
+Fri Feb 27 18:02:48 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyring_search) [MINGW32]: Open and close file here
+	because rename does not work on open files. Chnaged callers.
+
+Fri Feb 27 16:43:11 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Add an md_enable.
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Use md_open in case of detached sig
+	(proc_tree): Take detached sigs into account.
+
+Fri Feb 27 15:22:46 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): Make use of GNUPGHOME envvar.
+	* g10main.c (main): Ditto.
+
+Wed Feb 25 11:40:04 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* plaintext.c (ask_for_detached_datafile): add opt.verbose to
+	info output.
+
+	* openfile.c (open_sigfile): Try also name ending in ".asc"
+
+Wed Feb 25 08:41:00 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Fixed memory overflow.
+
+Tue Feb 24 15:51:55 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Support for S2K.
+	* build-packet.c (do_secret_cert): Ditto.
+	* keygen.c (gen_elg): Ditto.
+	* seckey-cert.c (check_elg): Ditto
+	(protect_elg): Ditto.
+	* sign.c (chnage_passphrase): Ditto.
+	* passphrase.c (get_passphrase_hash): Support for a salt and
+	changed all callers.
+	(make_dek_from_passphrase): Ditto.
+
+Tue Feb 24 12:30:56 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* build-packet.c (hash_public_cert): Disabled debug output.
+
+Fri Feb 20 17:22:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb) [MINGW32]: Removed 2nd mkdir arg.
+	(keyring_copy) [MINGW32]: Add a remove prior to the renames.
+
+Wed Feb 18 18:39:02 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* Makefile.am (OMIT_DEPENDENCIES): New.
+
+	* rsa.c: Replaced log_bug by BUG.
+
+Wed Feb 18 13:35:58 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Now uses hash_public_cert.
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Removed hashing.
+	* packet.h (public_cert): Removed hash variable.
+	* free-packet.c (copy_public_cert, free_public_cert): Likewise.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signatures): Changed semantics.
+
+Wed Feb 18 12:11:28 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* trustdb.c (do_check): Add handling for revocation certificates.
+	(build_sigrecs): Ditto.
+	(check_sigs): Ditto.
+
+Wed Feb 18 09:31:04 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Add afx->hdrlines.
+	* revoke.c (gen_revoke): Add comment line.
+	* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): Ditto.
+
+	* sig-check.c (check_key_signature): Add handling for class 0x20.
+	* mainproc.c : Ditto.
+
+Tue Feb 17 21:24:17 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c : Add header lines "...ARMORED FILE .."
+	* dearmor.c (enarmor_file): New.
+	* g10maint.c (main): New option "--enarmor"
+
+Tue Feb 17 19:03:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c : Changed a lot, because the packets are now stored
+	a simple linlked list and not anymore in a complicatd tree structure.
+
+Tue Feb 17 10:14:48 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* free_packet.c (cmp_public_certs): New.
+	(cmp_user_ids): New.
+
+	* kbnode.c (clone_kbnode): New.
+	(release_kbnode): Add clone support.
+
+	* ringedit.c (find_keyblock_bypkc): New.
+
+	* sign.c (remove_keysigs): Self signatures are now skipped,
+	changed arguments and all callers.
+
+	* import.c : Add functionality.
+
+Tue Feb 17 09:31:40 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* options.h (homedir): New option.
+	* g10.c, g10maint.c, getkey.c, keygen.c, trustdb.c (opt.homedir): New.
+
+	* trustdb.c (init_trustdb): mkdir for hoem directory
+	(sign_private_data): Renamed "sig" to "g10.sig"
+
+Mon Feb 16 20:02:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* kbnode.c (commit_kbnode): New.
+	(delete_kbnode): removed unused first arg. Changed all Callers.
+
+	* ringedit.c (keyblock_resource_name): New.
+	(get_keyblock_handle): NULL for filename returns default resource.
+
+Mon Feb 16 19:38:48 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sig-check.s (check_key_signature): Now uses the supplied
+	public key to check the signature and not any more the one
+	from the getkey.c
+	(do_check): New.
+	(check_signature): Most work moved to do_check.
+
+Mon Feb 16 14:48:57 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (find_header): Fixed another bug.
+
+Mon Feb 16 12:18:34 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* getkey.c (scan_keyring): Add handling of compressed keyrings.
+
+Mon Feb 16 10:44:51 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c, g10maint.c (strusage): Rewrote.
+	(build_list): New
+
+Mon Feb 16 08:58:41 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (use_armor): New.
+
+Sat Feb 14 14:30:57 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Sigclass fix.
+
+Sat Feb 14 14:16:33 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): Changed version and comment string.
+	* encode.c, sign.c, keygen.c: Changed all comment packet strings.
+
+Sat Feb 14 12:39:24 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (aGenRevoke): New command.
+	* revoke.c: New.
+	* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Add support for sigclass 0x20.
+
+Fri Feb 13 20:18:14 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks, keyring_enum): New.
+
+Fri Feb 13 19:33:40 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* export.c: Add functionality.
+
+	* keygen.c (generate_keypair): Moved the leading comment behind the
+	key packet.
+	* kbnode.c (walk_kbnode): Fixed.
+
+	* g10.c (main): listing armored keys now work.
+
+Fri Feb 13 16:17:43 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_publickey, parse_signature): Fixed calls
+	to mpi_read used for ELG b.
+
+Fri Feb 13 15:13:23 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* g10.c (main): changed formatting of help output.
+
+Thu Feb 12 22:24:42 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@frodo)
+
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): rewritten
+
+
+ Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+	   2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+ This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+ unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+ modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+ This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
+ implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.am b/g10/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa4e0b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+#               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of GnuPG.
+#
+# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+# 
+# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+# 
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
+
+## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
+
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/intl @LIBUSB_CPPFLAGS@
+
+EXTRA_DIST = options.skel
+# it seems that we can't use this with automake 1.5
+#OMIT_DEPENDENCIES = zlib.h zconf.h
+
+if ! HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+AM_CPPFLAGS += -DGNUPG_LIBEXECDIR="\"$(libexecdir)/@PACKAGE@\""
+endif
+
+needed_libs = ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a ../util/libutil.a
+other_libs = $(LIBICONV) $(DNSLIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(CAPLIBS)
+
+bin_PROGRAMS = gpg gpgv
+
+if ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT
+bzip2_source = compress-bz2.c
+else
+bzip2_source =
+endif
+
+common_source =  \
+	      global.h          \
+	      build-packet.c	\
+	      compress.c	\
+	      $(bzip2_source)   \
+	      filter.h		\
+	      free-packet.c	\
+	      getkey.c		\
+	      keydb.c keydb.h    \
+	      keyring.c keyring.h \
+	      seskey.c		\
+	      kbnode.c		\
+	      main.h		\
+	      mainproc.c	\
+	      armor.c		\
+	      mdfilter.c	\
+	      textfilter.c	\
+	      progress.c	\
+	      misc.c		\
+	      options.h 	\
+	      openfile.c	\
+	      keyid.c		\
+	      packet.h		\
+	      parse-packet.c	\
+	      status.c		\
+	      status.h		\
+	      plaintext.c	\
+	      sig-check.c	\
+	      keylist.c 	\
+	      signal.c
+
+if ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+card_support_source_gpg = card-util.c 
+card_support_source_scd = \
+	app-common.h \
+	app-openpgp.c \
+	iso7816.c iso7816.h \
+	apdu.c apdu.h \
+	ccid-driver.c ccid-driver.h
+card_support_source_local = cardglue.c cardglue.h tlv.c tlv.h
+else
+card_support_source_gpg =
+card_support_source_scd = 
+card_support_source_local =
+endif
+
+card_support_source = $(card_support_source_local) $(card_support_source_gpg) $(card_support_source_scd)
+
+gpg_SOURCES  = gpg.c		\
+	      $(common_source)	\
+	      $(card_support_source) \
+	      pkclist.c 	\
+	      skclist.c 	\
+	      pubkey-enc.c	\
+	      passphrase.c	\
+	      seckey-cert.c	\
+	      encr-data.c	\
+	      cipher.c		\
+	      encode.c		\
+	      sign.c		\
+	      verify.c		\
+	      revoke.c		\
+	      decrypt.c 	\
+	      keyedit.c 	\
+	      dearmor.c 	\
+	      import.c		\
+	      export.c		\
+	      trustdb.c 	\
+	      trustdb.h 	\
+	      tdbdump.c 	\
+	      tdbio.c		\
+	      tdbio.h		\
+	      delkey.c		\
+	      keygen.c          \
+	      pipemode.c        \
+	      helptext.c        \
+	      keyserver.c       \
+	      keyserver-internal.h \
+	      photoid.c photoid.h \
+	      exec.c exec.h
+
+gpgv_SOURCES = gpgv.c           \
+	      $(common_source)  \
+	      verify.c          
+
+LDADD =  $(needed_libs) $(other_libs) @ZLIBS@ @W32LIBS@ @LIBREADLINE@
+gpg_LDADD = $(LDADD) @DLLIBS@ @NETLIBS@ @LIBUSB@
+
+$(PROGRAMS): $(needed_libs)
+
+install-data-local:
+	$(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)
+	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/options.skel \
+				$(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/options.skel
+	@set -e;\
+	 if test -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpgm ; then \
+	   echo "removing obsolete gpgm binary" ;   \
+	   rm $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpgm ;	    \
+	 fi
+
+# Helper to update some source files.
+update-source-from-gnupg-2:
+	@set -e; \
+	 if test -d ../../gnupg-1.9/scd; then dir="../../gnupg-1.9"; \
+	 elif test -d ../../gnupg/scd; then dir="../../gnupg"; \
+	 else exit 1; \
+	 fi; \
+	 for i in $(card_support_source_scd); do \
+           cp $$dir/scd/$$i $$i; echo $$i; \
+	 done ;\
+	 for i in $(card_support_source_gpg); do \
+           cp $$dir/g10/$$i $$i; echo $$i; \
+	 done ; \
+	 echo "Please remember to update the ChangeLog accordingly!"
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.in b/g10/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20d7899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,801 @@
+# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.9.6 from Makefile.am.
+# @configure_input@
+
+# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+# 2003, 2004, 2005  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+@SET_MAKE@
+
+# Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+#               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of GnuPG.
+#
+# GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+# 
+# GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+# 
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
+
+srcdir = @srcdir@
+top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
+VPATH = @srcdir@
+pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@
+pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@
+pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@
+top_builddir = ..
+am__cd = CDPATH="$${ZSH_VERSION+.}$(PATH_SEPARATOR)" && cd
+INSTALL = @INSTALL@
+install_sh_DATA = $(install_sh) -c -m 644
+install_sh_PROGRAM = $(install_sh) -c
+install_sh_SCRIPT = $(install_sh) -c
+INSTALL_HEADER = $(INSTALL_DATA)
+transform = $(program_transform_name)
+NORMAL_INSTALL = :
+PRE_INSTALL = :
+POST_INSTALL = :
+NORMAL_UNINSTALL = :
+PRE_UNINSTALL = :
+POST_UNINSTALL = :
+build_triplet = @build@
+host_triplet = @host@
+# it seems that we can't use this with automake 1.5
+#OMIT_DEPENDENCIES = zlib.h zconf.h
+@HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@am__append_1 = -DGNUPG_LIBEXECDIR="\"$(libexecdir)/@PACKAGE@\""
+bin_PROGRAMS = gpg$(EXEEXT) gpgv$(EXEEXT)
+subdir = g10
+DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.am $(srcdir)/Makefile.in ChangeLog
+ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4
+am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/m4/autobuild.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/codeset.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/gettext.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/glibc21.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/iconv.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/intdiv0.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/intmax.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/inttypes-pri.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/inttypes.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/inttypes_h.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/isc-posix.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/lcmessage.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/ldap.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/lib-ld.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/lib-link.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/lib-prefix.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/libcurl.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/libusb.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/longdouble.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/longlong.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/nls.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/noexecstack.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/po.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/printf-posix.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/progtest.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/readline.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/signed.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/size_max.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/stdint_h.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/tar-ustar.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/uintmax_t.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/ulonglong.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/wchar_t.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/m4/wint_t.m4 $(top_srcdir)/m4/xsize.m4 \
+	$(top_srcdir)/acinclude.m4 $(top_srcdir)/configure.ac
+am__configure_deps = $(am__aclocal_m4_deps) $(CONFIGURE_DEPENDENCIES) \
+	$(ACLOCAL_M4)
+mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/scripts/mkinstalldirs
+CONFIG_HEADER = $(top_builddir)/config.h
+CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES =
+am__installdirs = "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)"
+binPROGRAMS_INSTALL = $(INSTALL_PROGRAM)
+PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS)
+am__gpg_SOURCES_DIST = gpg.c global.h build-packet.c compress.c \
+	compress-bz2.c filter.h free-packet.c getkey.c keydb.c keydb.h \
+	keyring.c keyring.h seskey.c kbnode.c main.h mainproc.c \
+	armor.c mdfilter.c textfilter.c progress.c misc.c options.h \
+	openfile.c keyid.c packet.h parse-packet.c status.c status.h \
+	plaintext.c sig-check.c keylist.c signal.c cardglue.c \
+	cardglue.h tlv.c tlv.h card-util.c app-common.h app-openpgp.c \
+	iso7816.c iso7816.h apdu.c apdu.h ccid-driver.c ccid-driver.h \
+	pkclist.c skclist.c pubkey-enc.c passphrase.c seckey-cert.c \
+	encr-data.c cipher.c encode.c sign.c verify.c revoke.c \
+	decrypt.c keyedit.c dearmor.c import.c export.c trustdb.c \
+	trustdb.h tdbdump.c tdbio.c tdbio.h delkey.c keygen.c \
+	pipemode.c helptext.c keyserver.c keyserver-internal.h \
+	photoid.c photoid.h exec.c exec.h
+@ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_TRUE@am__objects_1 = compress-bz2.$(OBJEXT)
+am__objects_2 = build-packet.$(OBJEXT) compress.$(OBJEXT) \
+	$(am__objects_1) free-packet.$(OBJEXT) getkey.$(OBJEXT) \
+	keydb.$(OBJEXT) keyring.$(OBJEXT) seskey.$(OBJEXT) \
+	kbnode.$(OBJEXT) mainproc.$(OBJEXT) armor.$(OBJEXT) \
+	mdfilter.$(OBJEXT) textfilter.$(OBJEXT) progress.$(OBJEXT) \
+	misc.$(OBJEXT) openfile.$(OBJEXT) keyid.$(OBJEXT) \
+	parse-packet.$(OBJEXT) status.$(OBJEXT) plaintext.$(OBJEXT) \
+	sig-check.$(OBJEXT) keylist.$(OBJEXT) signal.$(OBJEXT)
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@am__objects_3 = cardglue.$(OBJEXT) \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	tlv.$(OBJEXT)
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@am__objects_4 = card-util.$(OBJEXT)
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@am__objects_5 = app-openpgp.$(OBJEXT) \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	iso7816.$(OBJEXT) apdu.$(OBJEXT) \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	ccid-driver.$(OBJEXT)
+am__objects_6 = $(am__objects_3) $(am__objects_4) $(am__objects_5)
+am_gpg_OBJECTS = gpg.$(OBJEXT) $(am__objects_2) $(am__objects_6) \
+	pkclist.$(OBJEXT) skclist.$(OBJEXT) pubkey-enc.$(OBJEXT) \
+	passphrase.$(OBJEXT) seckey-cert.$(OBJEXT) encr-data.$(OBJEXT) \
+	cipher.$(OBJEXT) encode.$(OBJEXT) sign.$(OBJEXT) \
+	verify.$(OBJEXT) revoke.$(OBJEXT) decrypt.$(OBJEXT) \
+	keyedit.$(OBJEXT) dearmor.$(OBJEXT) import.$(OBJEXT) \
+	export.$(OBJEXT) trustdb.$(OBJEXT) tdbdump.$(OBJEXT) \
+	tdbio.$(OBJEXT) delkey.$(OBJEXT) keygen.$(OBJEXT) \
+	pipemode.$(OBJEXT) helptext.$(OBJEXT) keyserver.$(OBJEXT) \
+	photoid.$(OBJEXT) exec.$(OBJEXT)
+gpg_OBJECTS = $(am_gpg_OBJECTS)
+am__DEPENDENCIES_1 = ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a \
+	../util/libutil.a
+am__DEPENDENCIES_2 =
+am__DEPENDENCIES_3 = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_2) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_2) \
+	$(am__DEPENDENCIES_2) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_2)
+am__DEPENDENCIES_4 = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_3)
+gpg_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_4)
+am__gpgv_SOURCES_DIST = gpgv.c global.h build-packet.c compress.c \
+	compress-bz2.c filter.h free-packet.c getkey.c keydb.c keydb.h \
+	keyring.c keyring.h seskey.c kbnode.c main.h mainproc.c \
+	armor.c mdfilter.c textfilter.c progress.c misc.c options.h \
+	openfile.c keyid.c packet.h parse-packet.c status.c status.h \
+	plaintext.c sig-check.c keylist.c signal.c verify.c
+am_gpgv_OBJECTS = gpgv.$(OBJEXT) $(am__objects_2) verify.$(OBJEXT)
+gpgv_OBJECTS = $(am_gpgv_OBJECTS)
+gpgv_LDADD = $(LDADD)
+gpgv_DEPENDENCIES = $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_3)
+DEFAULT_INCLUDES = -I. -I$(srcdir) -I$(top_builddir)
+depcomp = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/scripts/depcomp
+am__depfiles_maybe = depfiles
+COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	$(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
+CCLD = $(CC)
+LINK = $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
+SOURCES = $(gpg_SOURCES) $(gpgv_SOURCES)
+DIST_SOURCES = $(am__gpg_SOURCES_DIST) $(am__gpgv_SOURCES_DIST)
+ETAGS = etags
+CTAGS = ctags
+DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(DIST_SOURCES) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST)
+ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@
+ALLOCA = @ALLOCA@
+AMDEP_FALSE = @AMDEP_FALSE@
+AMDEP_TRUE = @AMDEP_TRUE@
+AMTAR = @AMTAR@
+AR = @AR@
+AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@
+AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@
+AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@
+AWK = @AWK@
+BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL = @BUILD_INCLUDED_LIBINTL@
+CAPLIBS = @CAPLIBS@
+CATOBJEXT = @CATOBJEXT@
+CC = @CC@
+CCAS = @CCAS@
+CCASFLAGS = @CCASFLAGS@
+CCDEPMODE = @CCDEPMODE@
+CC_FOR_BUILD = @CC_FOR_BUILD@
+CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
+CPP = @CPP@
+CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
+CROSS_COMPILING_FALSE = @CROSS_COMPILING_FALSE@
+CROSS_COMPILING_TRUE = @CROSS_COMPILING_TRUE@
+CYGPATH_W = @CYGPATH_W@
+DATADIRNAME = @DATADIRNAME@
+DEFS = @DEFS@
+DEPDIR = @DEPDIR@
+DLLIBS = @DLLIBS@
+DNSLIBS = @DNSLIBS@
+DOCBOOK_TO_MAN = @DOCBOOK_TO_MAN@
+DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI = @DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI@
+ECHO_C = @ECHO_C@
+ECHO_N = @ECHO_N@
+ECHO_T = @ECHO_T@
+EGREP = @EGREP@
+ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT_FALSE = @ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT_FALSE@
+ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT_TRUE = @ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT_TRUE@
+ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_FALSE = @ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_FALSE@
+ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_TRUE = @ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_TRUE@
+ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_FALSE = @ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_FALSE@
+ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE = @ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@
+ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB_FALSE = @ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB_FALSE@
+ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB_TRUE = @ENABLE_LOCAL_ZLIB_TRUE@
+EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@
+FAKE_CURL_FALSE = @FAKE_CURL_FALSE@
+FAKE_CURL_TRUE = @FAKE_CURL_TRUE@
+FAQPROG = @FAQPROG@
+GENCAT = @GENCAT@
+GETOPT = @GETOPT@
+GLIBC21 = @GLIBC21@
+GMSGFMT = @GMSGFMT@
+GPGKEYS_CURL = @GPGKEYS_CURL@
+GPGKEYS_FINGER = @GPGKEYS_FINGER@
+GPGKEYS_HKP = @GPGKEYS_HKP@
+GPGKEYS_LDAP = @GPGKEYS_LDAP@
+GPGKEYS_MAILTO = @GPGKEYS_MAILTO@
+GREP = @GREP@
+HAVE_ASPRINTF = @HAVE_ASPRINTF@
+HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN_FALSE = @HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN_FALSE@
+HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN_TRUE = @HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN_TRUE@
+HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI_FALSE = @HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI_FALSE@
+HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI_TRUE = @HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_TEXI_TRUE@
+HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE = @HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_FALSE@
+HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_TRUE = @HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM_TRUE@
+HAVE_POSIX_PRINTF = @HAVE_POSIX_PRINTF@
+HAVE_SNPRINTF = @HAVE_SNPRINTF@
+HAVE_USTAR_FALSE = @HAVE_USTAR_FALSE@
+HAVE_USTAR_TRUE = @HAVE_USTAR_TRUE@
+HAVE_W32_SYSTEM_FALSE = @HAVE_W32_SYSTEM_FALSE@
+HAVE_W32_SYSTEM_TRUE = @HAVE_W32_SYSTEM_TRUE@
+HAVE_WPRINTF = @HAVE_WPRINTF@
+IDEA_O = @IDEA_O@
+INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@
+INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@
+INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@
+INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM@
+INSTOBJEXT = @INSTOBJEXT@
+INTLBISON = @INTLBISON@
+INTLLIBS = @INTLLIBS@
+INTLOBJS = @INTLOBJS@
+INTL_LIBTOOL_SUFFIX_PREFIX = @INTL_LIBTOOL_SUFFIX_PREFIX@
+LDAPLIBS = @LDAPLIBS@
+LDAP_CPPFLAGS = @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
+LIBCURL = @LIBCURL@
+LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS = @LIBCURL_CPPFLAGS@
+LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@
+LIBINTL = @LIBINTL@
+LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@
+LIBREADLINE = @LIBREADLINE@
+LIBS = @LIBS@
+LIBUSB = @LIBUSB@
+LIBUSB_CPPFLAGS = @LIBUSB_CPPFLAGS@
+LTLIBICONV = @LTLIBICONV@
+LTLIBINTL = @LTLIBINTL@
+LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@
+MAINT = @MAINT@
+MAINTAINER_MODE_FALSE = @MAINTAINER_MODE_FALSE@
+MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE = @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@
+MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
+MKINSTALLDIRS = @MKINSTALLDIRS@
+MPI_EXTRA_ASM_OBJS = @MPI_EXTRA_ASM_OBJS@
+MPI_OPT_FLAGS = @MPI_OPT_FLAGS@
+MPI_SFLAGS = @MPI_SFLAGS@
+MSGFMT = @MSGFMT@
+MSGMERGE = @MSGMERGE@
+NETLIBS = @NETLIBS@
+NM = @NM@
+NOEXECSTACK_FLAGS = @NOEXECSTACK_FLAGS@
+OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@
+PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@
+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT = @PACKAGE_BUGREPORT@
+PACKAGE_NAME = @PACKAGE_NAME@
+PACKAGE_STRING = @PACKAGE_STRING@
+PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
+PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
+PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
+PERL = @PERL@
+POSUB = @POSUB@
+RANLIB = @RANLIB@
+SENDMAIL = @SENDMAIL@
+SET_MAKE = @SET_MAKE@
+SHELL = @SHELL@
+STRIP = @STRIP@
+TAR = @TAR@
+USE_DNS_SRV_FALSE = @USE_DNS_SRV_FALSE@
+USE_DNS_SRV_TRUE = @USE_DNS_SRV_TRUE@
+USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL = @USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL@
+USE_INTERNAL_REGEX_FALSE = @USE_INTERNAL_REGEX_FALSE@
+USE_INTERNAL_REGEX_TRUE = @USE_INTERNAL_REGEX_TRUE@
+USE_NLS = @USE_NLS@
+USE_RNDEGD_FALSE = @USE_RNDEGD_FALSE@
+USE_RNDEGD_TRUE = @USE_RNDEGD_TRUE@
+USE_RNDLINUX_FALSE = @USE_RNDLINUX_FALSE@
+USE_RNDLINUX_TRUE = @USE_RNDLINUX_TRUE@
+USE_RNDUNIX_FALSE = @USE_RNDUNIX_FALSE@
+USE_RNDUNIX_TRUE = @USE_RNDUNIX_TRUE@
+USE_RNDW32_FALSE = @USE_RNDW32_FALSE@
+USE_RNDW32_TRUE = @USE_RNDW32_TRUE@
+USE_SHA512_FALSE = @USE_SHA512_FALSE@
+USE_SHA512_TRUE = @USE_SHA512_TRUE@
+USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT_FALSE = @USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT_FALSE@
+USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT_TRUE = @USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT_TRUE@
+VERSION = @VERSION@
+W32LIBS = @W32LIBS@
+WORKING_FAQPROG_FALSE = @WORKING_FAQPROG_FALSE@
+WORKING_FAQPROG_TRUE = @WORKING_FAQPROG_TRUE@
+XGETTEXT = @XGETTEXT@
+ZLIBS = @ZLIBS@
+_libcurl_config = @_libcurl_config@
+_usb_config = @_usb_config@
+ac_ct_CC = @ac_ct_CC@
+am__fastdepCC_FALSE = @am__fastdepCC_FALSE@
+am__fastdepCC_TRUE = @am__fastdepCC_TRUE@
+am__include = @am__include@
+am__leading_dot = @am__leading_dot@
+am__quote = @am__quote@
+am__tar = @am__tar@
+am__untar = @am__untar@
+bindir = @bindir@
+build = @build@
+build_alias = @build_alias@
+build_cpu = @build_cpu@
+build_os = @build_os@
+build_vendor = @build_vendor@
+datadir = @datadir@
+datarootdir = @datarootdir@
+docdir = @docdir@
+dvidir = @dvidir@
+exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@
+host = @host@
+host_alias = @host_alias@
+host_cpu = @host_cpu@
+host_os = @host_os@
+host_vendor = @host_vendor@
+htmldir = @htmldir@
+includedir = @includedir@
+infodir = @infodir@
+install_sh = @install_sh@
+libdir = @libdir@
+libexecdir = @libexecdir@
+localedir = @localedir@
+localstatedir = @localstatedir@
+mandir = @mandir@
+mkdir_p = @mkdir_p@
+oldincludedir = @oldincludedir@
+pdfdir = @pdfdir@
+prefix = @prefix@
+program_transform_name = @program_transform_name@
+psdir = @psdir@
+sbindir = @sbindir@
+sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@
+sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@
+target_alias = @target_alias@
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/intl \
+	@LIBUSB_CPPFLAGS@ $(am__append_1)
+EXTRA_DIST = options.skel
+needed_libs = ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a ../util/libutil.a
+other_libs = $(LIBICONV) $(DNSLIBS) $(LIBINTL) $(CAPLIBS)
+@ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_FALSE@bzip2_source = 
+@ENABLE_BZIP2_SUPPORT_TRUE@bzip2_source = compress-bz2.c
+common_source = \
+	      global.h          \
+	      build-packet.c	\
+	      compress.c	\
+	      $(bzip2_source)   \
+	      filter.h		\
+	      free-packet.c	\
+	      getkey.c		\
+	      keydb.c keydb.h    \
+	      keyring.c keyring.h \
+	      seskey.c		\
+	      kbnode.c		\
+	      main.h		\
+	      mainproc.c	\
+	      armor.c		\
+	      mdfilter.c	\
+	      textfilter.c	\
+	      progress.c	\
+	      misc.c		\
+	      options.h 	\
+	      openfile.c	\
+	      keyid.c		\
+	      packet.h		\
+	      parse-packet.c	\
+	      status.c		\
+	      status.h		\
+	      plaintext.c	\
+	      sig-check.c	\
+	      keylist.c 	\
+	      signal.c
+
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_FALSE@card_support_source_gpg = 
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@card_support_source_gpg = card-util.c 
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_FALSE@card_support_source_scd = 
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@card_support_source_scd = \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	app-common.h \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	app-openpgp.c \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	iso7816.c iso7816.h \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	apdu.c apdu.h \
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@	ccid-driver.c ccid-driver.h
+
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_FALSE@card_support_source_local = 
+@ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT_TRUE@card_support_source_local = cardglue.c cardglue.h tlv.c tlv.h
+card_support_source = $(card_support_source_local) $(card_support_source_gpg) $(card_support_source_scd)
+gpg_SOURCES = gpg.c		\
+	      $(common_source)	\
+	      $(card_support_source) \
+	      pkclist.c 	\
+	      skclist.c 	\
+	      pubkey-enc.c	\
+	      passphrase.c	\
+	      seckey-cert.c	\
+	      encr-data.c	\
+	      cipher.c		\
+	      encode.c		\
+	      sign.c		\
+	      verify.c		\
+	      revoke.c		\
+	      decrypt.c 	\
+	      keyedit.c 	\
+	      dearmor.c 	\
+	      import.c		\
+	      export.c		\
+	      trustdb.c 	\
+	      trustdb.h 	\
+	      tdbdump.c 	\
+	      tdbio.c		\
+	      tdbio.h		\
+	      delkey.c		\
+	      keygen.c          \
+	      pipemode.c        \
+	      helptext.c        \
+	      keyserver.c       \
+	      keyserver-internal.h \
+	      photoid.c photoid.h \
+	      exec.c exec.h
+
+gpgv_SOURCES = gpgv.c           \
+	      $(common_source)  \
+	      verify.c          
+
+LDADD = $(needed_libs) $(other_libs) @ZLIBS@ @W32LIBS@ @LIBREADLINE@
+gpg_LDADD = $(LDADD) @DLLIBS@ @NETLIBS@ @LIBUSB@
+all: all-am
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .c .o .obj
+$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(srcdir)/Makefile.am  $(am__configure_deps)
+	@for dep in $?; do \
+	  case '$(am__configure_deps)' in \
+	    *$$dep*) \
+	      cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh \
+		&& exit 0; \
+	      exit 1;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	echo ' cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  g10/Makefile'; \
+	cd $(top_srcdir) && \
+	  $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  g10/Makefile
+.PRECIOUS: Makefile
+Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status
+	@case '$?' in \
+	  *config.status*) \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh;; \
+	  *) \
+	    echo ' cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe)'; \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe);; \
+	esac;
+
+$(top_builddir)/config.status: $(top_srcdir)/configure $(CONFIG_STATUS_DEPENDENCIES)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+
+$(top_srcdir)/configure: @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(am__configure_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+$(ACLOCAL_M4): @MAINTAINER_MODE_TRUE@ $(am__aclocal_m4_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+install-binPROGRAMS: $(bin_PROGRAMS)
+	@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
+	test -z "$(bindir)" || $(mkdir_p) "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)"
+	@list='$(bin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  p1=`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'`; \
+	  if test -f $$p \
+	  ; then \
+	    f=`echo "$$p1" | sed 's,^.*/,,;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \
+	   echo " $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(binPROGRAMS_INSTALL) '$$p' '$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$f'"; \
+	   $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(binPROGRAMS_INSTALL) "$$p" "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$f" || exit 1; \
+	  else :; fi; \
+	done
+
+uninstall-binPROGRAMS:
+	@$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+	@list='$(bin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \
+	  f=`echo "$$p" | sed 's,^.*/,,;s/$(EXEEXT)$$//;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \
+	  echo " rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$f'"; \
+	  rm -f "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$f"; \
+	done
+
+clean-binPROGRAMS:
+	-test -z "$(bin_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(bin_PROGRAMS)
+
+installcheck-binPROGRAMS: $(bin_PROGRAMS)
+	bad=0; pid=$$$$; list="$(bin_PROGRAMS)"; for p in $$list; do \
+	  case ' $(AM_INSTALLCHECK_STD_OPTIONS_EXEMPT) ' in \
+	   *" $$p "* | *" $(srcdir)/$$p "*) continue;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  f=`echo "$$p" | \
+	     sed 's,^.*/,,;s/$(EXEEXT)$$//;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \
+	  for opt in --help --version; do \
+	    if "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$f" $$opt >c$${pid}_.out \
+	         2>c$${pid}_.err </dev/null \
+		 && test -n "`cat c$${pid}_.out`" \
+		 && test -z "`cat c$${pid}_.err`"; then :; \
+	    else echo "$$f does not support $$opt" 1>&2; bad=1; fi; \
+	  done; \
+	done; rm -f c$${pid}_.???; exit $$bad
+gpg$(EXEEXT): $(gpg_OBJECTS) $(gpg_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	@rm -f gpg$(EXEEXT)
+	$(LINK) $(gpg_LDFLAGS) $(gpg_OBJECTS) $(gpg_LDADD) $(LIBS)
+gpgv$(EXEEXT): $(gpgv_OBJECTS) $(gpgv_DEPENDENCIES) 
+	@rm -f gpgv$(EXEEXT)
+	$(LINK) $(gpgv_LDFLAGS) $(gpgv_OBJECTS) $(gpgv_LDADD) $(LIBS)
+
+mostlyclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.$(OBJEXT)
+
+distclean-compile:
+	-rm -f *.tab.c
+
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/apdu.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/app-openpgp.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/armor.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/build-packet.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/card-util.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/cardglue.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ccid-driver.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/cipher.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/compress-bz2.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/compress.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/dearmor.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/decrypt.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/delkey.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/encode.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/encr-data.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/exec.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/export.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/free-packet.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/getkey.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/gpg.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/gpgv.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/helptext.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/import.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/iso7816.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/kbnode.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keydb.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keyedit.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keygen.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keyid.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keylist.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keyring.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keyserver.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/mainproc.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/mdfilter.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/misc.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/openfile.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/parse-packet.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/passphrase.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/photoid.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pipemode.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pkclist.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/plaintext.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/progress.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pubkey-enc.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/revoke.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/seckey-cert.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/seskey.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/sig-check.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/sign.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/signal.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/skclist.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/status.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/tdbdump.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/tdbio.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/textfilter.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/tlv.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/trustdb.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/verify.Po@am__quote@
+
+.c.o:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	if $(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo" -c -o $@ $<; \
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	then mv -f "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo" "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Po"; else rm -f "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo"; exit 1; fi
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='$<' object='$@' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(COMPILE) -c $<
+
+.c.obj:
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	if $(COMPILE) -MT $@ -MD -MP -MF "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo" -c -o $@ `$(CYGPATH_W) '$<'`; \
+@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	then mv -f "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo" "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Po"; else rm -f "$(DEPDIR)/$*.Tpo"; exit 1; fi
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='$<' object='$@' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
+@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(COMPILE) -c `$(CYGPATH_W) '$<'`
+uninstall-info-am:
+
+ID: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	mkid -fID $$unique
+tags: TAGS
+
+TAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	here=`pwd`; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	if test -z "$(ETAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique"; then :; else \
+	  test -n "$$unique" || unique=$$empty_fix; \
+	  $(ETAGS) $(ETAGSFLAGS) $(AM_ETAGSFLAGS) $(ETAGS_ARGS) \
+	    $$tags $$unique; \
+	fi
+ctags: CTAGS
+CTAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	here=`pwd`; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	test -z "$(CTAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique" \
+	  || $(CTAGS) $(CTAGSFLAGS) $(AM_CTAGSFLAGS) $(CTAGS_ARGS) \
+	     $$tags $$unique
+
+GTAGS:
+	here=`$(am__cd) $(top_builddir) && pwd` \
+	  && cd $(top_srcdir) \
+	  && gtags -i $(GTAGS_ARGS) $$here
+
+distclean-tags:
+	-rm -f TAGS ID GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS GPATH tags
+
+distdir: $(DISTFILES)
+	@srcdirstrip=`echo "$(srcdir)" | sed 's|.|.|g'`; \
+	topsrcdirstrip=`echo "$(top_srcdir)" | sed 's|.|.|g'`; \
+	list='$(DISTFILES)'; for file in $$list; do \
+	  case $$file in \
+	    $(srcdir)/*) file=`echo "$$file" | sed "s|^$$srcdirstrip/||"`;; \
+	    $(top_srcdir)/*) file=`echo "$$file" | sed "s|^$$topsrcdirstrip/|$(top_builddir)/|"`;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  if test -f $$file || test -d $$file; then d=.; else d=$(srcdir); fi; \
+	  dir=`echo "$$file" | sed -e 's,/[^/]*$$,,'`; \
+	  if test "$$dir" != "$$file" && test "$$dir" != "."; then \
+	    dir="/$$dir"; \
+	    $(mkdir_p) "$(distdir)$$dir"; \
+	  else \
+	    dir=''; \
+	  fi; \
+	  if test -d $$d/$$file; then \
+	    if test -d $(srcdir)/$$file && test $$d != $(srcdir); then \
+	      cp -pR $(srcdir)/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	    fi; \
+	    cp -pR $$d/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	  else \
+	    test -f $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || cp -p $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || exit 1; \
+	  fi; \
+	done
+check-am: all-am
+check: check-am
+all-am: Makefile $(PROGRAMS)
+installdirs:
+	for dir in "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)"; do \
+	  test -z "$$dir" || $(mkdir_p) "$$dir"; \
+	done
+install: install-am
+install-exec: install-exec-am
+install-data: install-data-am
+uninstall: uninstall-am
+
+install-am: all-am
+	@$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) install-exec-am install-data-am
+
+installcheck: installcheck-am
+install-strip:
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) INSTALL_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" \
+	  install_sh_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG=-s \
+	  `test -z '$(STRIP)' || \
+	    echo "INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV=STRIPPROG='$(STRIP)'"` install
+mostlyclean-generic:
+
+clean-generic:
+
+distclean-generic:
+	-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
+
+maintainer-clean-generic:
+	@echo "This command is intended for maintainers to use"
+	@echo "it deletes files that may require special tools to rebuild."
+clean: clean-am
+
+clean-am: clean-binPROGRAMS clean-generic mostlyclean-am
+
+distclean: distclean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+distclean-am: clean-am distclean-compile distclean-generic \
+	distclean-tags
+
+dvi: dvi-am
+
+dvi-am:
+
+html: html-am
+
+info: info-am
+
+info-am:
+
+install-data-am: install-data-local
+
+install-exec-am: install-binPROGRAMS
+
+install-info: install-info-am
+
+install-man:
+
+installcheck-am: installcheck-binPROGRAMS
+
+maintainer-clean: maintainer-clean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+maintainer-clean-am: distclean-am maintainer-clean-generic
+
+mostlyclean: mostlyclean-am
+
+mostlyclean-am: mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic
+
+pdf: pdf-am
+
+pdf-am:
+
+ps: ps-am
+
+ps-am:
+
+uninstall-am: uninstall-binPROGRAMS uninstall-info-am
+
+.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am check check-am clean clean-binPROGRAMS \
+	clean-generic ctags distclean distclean-compile \
+	distclean-generic distclean-tags distdir dvi dvi-am html \
+	html-am info info-am install install-am install-binPROGRAMS \
+	install-data install-data-am install-data-local install-exec \
+	install-exec-am install-info install-info-am install-man \
+	install-strip installcheck installcheck-am \
+	installcheck-binPROGRAMS installdirs maintainer-clean \
+	maintainer-clean-generic mostlyclean mostlyclean-compile \
+	mostlyclean-generic pdf pdf-am ps ps-am tags uninstall \
+	uninstall-am uninstall-binPROGRAMS uninstall-info-am
+
+
+$(PROGRAMS): $(needed_libs)
+
+install-data-local:
+	$(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)
+	$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/options.skel \
+				$(DESTDIR)$(pkgdatadir)/options.skel
+	@set -e;\
+	 if test -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpgm ; then \
+	   echo "removing obsolete gpgm binary" ;   \
+	   rm $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/gpgm ;	    \
+	 fi
+
+# Helper to update some source files.
+update-source-from-gnupg-2:
+	@set -e; \
+	 if test -d ../../gnupg-1.9/scd; then dir="../../gnupg-1.9"; \
+	 elif test -d ../../gnupg/scd; then dir="../../gnupg"; \
+	 else exit 1; \
+	 fi; \
+	 for i in $(card_support_source_scd); do \
+           cp $$dir/scd/$$i $$i; echo $$i; \
+	 done ;\
+	 for i in $(card_support_source_gpg); do \
+           cp $$dir/g10/$$i $$i; echo $$i; \
+	 done ; \
+	 echo "Please remember to update the ChangeLog accordingly!"
+# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
+# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
+.NOEXPORT:
diff --git a/g10/apdu.c b/g10/apdu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5df9ebf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/apdu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3013 @@
+/* apdu.c - ISO 7816 APDU functions and low level I/O
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: apdu.c 4034 2006-03-05 15:13:18Z wk $
+ */
+
+/* NOTE: This module is also used by other software, thus the use of
+   the macro USE_GNU_PTH is mandatory.  For GnuPG this macro is
+   guaranteed to be defined true. */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+# include <pth.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+
+/* If requested include the definitions for the remote APDU protocol
+   code. */
+#ifdef USE_G10CODE_RAPDU
+#include "rapdu.h"
+#endif /*USE_G10CODE_RAPDU*/
+
+#if defined(GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER)
+#include GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER
+#elif GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+/* This is used with GnuPG version < 1.9.  The code has been source
+   copied from the current GnuPG >= 1.9  and is maintained over
+   there. */
+#include "options.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#else /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+#include "scdaemon.h"
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+
+#include "apdu.h"
+#include "dynload.h"
+#include "ccid-driver.h"
+
+
+/* Due to conflicting use of threading libraries we usually can't link
+   against libpcsclite.   Instead we use a wrapper program.  */
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+#if !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+
+#define MAX_READER 4 /* Number of readers we support concurrently. */
+
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define DLSTDCALL __stdcall
+#else
+#define DLSTDCALL
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _POSIX_OPEN_MAX
+#define MAX_OPEN_FDS _POSIX_OPEN_MAX
+#else
+#define MAX_OPEN_FDS 20
+#endif
+
+/* Helper to pass patrameters related to keypad based operations. */
+struct pininfo_s
+{
+  int mode;
+  int minlen;
+  int maxlen;
+  int padlen;
+};
+
+/* A structure to collect information pertaining to one reader
+   slot. */
+struct reader_table_s {
+  int used;            /* True if slot is used. */
+  unsigned short port; /* Port number:  0 = unused, 1 - dev/tty */
+
+  /* Function pointers intialized to the various backends.  */
+  int (*close_reader)(int);
+  int (*shutdown_reader)(int);
+  int (*reset_reader)(int);
+  int (*get_status_reader)(int, unsigned int *);
+  int (*send_apdu_reader)(int,unsigned char *,size_t,
+                          unsigned char *, size_t *, struct pininfo_s *);
+  int (*check_keypad)(int, int, int, int, int, int);
+  void (*dump_status_reader)(int);
+
+  struct {
+    ccid_driver_t handle;
+  } ccid;
+  struct {
+    unsigned long context;
+    unsigned long card;
+    unsigned long protocol;
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+    int req_fd;
+    int rsp_fd;
+    pid_t pid;
+#endif /*NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+  } pcsc;
+#ifdef USE_G10CODE_RAPDU
+  struct {
+    rapdu_t handle;
+  } rapdu;
+#endif /*USE_G10CODE_RAPDU*/
+  char *rdrname;     /* Name of the connected reader or NULL if unknown. */
+  int last_status;
+  int status;
+  int is_t0;         /* True if we know that we are running T=0. */
+  unsigned char atr[33];
+  size_t atrlen;           /* A zero length indicates that the ATR has
+                              not yet been read; i.e. the card is not
+                              ready for use. */
+  unsigned int change_counter;
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+  int lock_initialized;
+  pth_mutex_t lock;
+#endif
+};
+typedef struct reader_table_s *reader_table_t;
+
+/* A global table to keep track of active readers. */
+static struct reader_table_s reader_table[MAX_READER];
+
+
+/* ct API function pointer. */
+static char (* DLSTDCALL CT_init) (unsigned short ctn, unsigned short Pn);
+static char (* DLSTDCALL CT_data) (unsigned short ctn, unsigned char *dad,
+                                   unsigned char *sad, unsigned short lc,
+                                   unsigned char *cmd, unsigned short *lr,
+                                   unsigned char *rsp);
+static char (* DLSTDCALL CT_close) (unsigned short ctn);
+
+/* PC/SC constants and function pointer. */
+#define PCSC_SCOPE_USER      0
+#define PCSC_SCOPE_TERMINAL  1
+#define PCSC_SCOPE_SYSTEM    2
+#define PCSC_SCOPE_GLOBAL    3
+
+#define PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0     1
+#define PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1     2
+#define PCSC_PROTOCOL_RAW    4
+
+#define PCSC_SHARE_EXCLUSIVE 1
+#define PCSC_SHARE_SHARED    2
+#define PCSC_SHARE_DIRECT    3
+
+#define PCSC_LEAVE_CARD      0
+#define PCSC_RESET_CARD      1
+#define PCSC_UNPOWER_CARD    2
+#define PCSC_EJECT_CARD      3
+
+#define PCSC_UNKNOWN    0x0001
+#define PCSC_ABSENT     0x0002  /* Card is absent.  */
+#define PCSC_PRESENT    0x0004  /* Card is present.  */
+#define PCSC_SWALLOWED  0x0008  /* Card is present and electrical connected. */
+#define PCSC_POWERED    0x0010  /* Card is powered.  */
+#define PCSC_NEGOTIABLE 0x0020  /* Card is awaiting PTS.  */
+#define PCSC_SPECIFIC   0x0040  /* Card is ready for use.  */
+
+#define PCSC_STATE_UNAWARE     0x0000  /* Want status.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_IGNORE      0x0001  /* Ignore this reader.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_CHANGED     0x0002  /* State has changed.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_UNKNOWN     0x0004  /* Reader unknown.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_UNAVAILABLE 0x0008  /* Status unavailable.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_EMPTY       0x0010  /* Card removed.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_PRESENT     0x0020  /* Card inserted.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_ATRMATCH    0x0040  /* ATR matches card. */
+#define PCSC_STATE_EXCLUSIVE   0x0080  /* Exclusive Mode.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_INUSE       0x0100  /* Shared mode.  */
+#define PCSC_STATE_MUTE	       0x0200  /* Unresponsive card.  */
+
+/* Some PC/SC error codes.  */
+#define PCSC_E_CANCELLED               0x80100002
+#define PCSC_E_CANT_DISPOSE            0x8010000E
+#define PCSC_E_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER     0x80100008
+#define PCSC_E_INVALID_ATR             0x80100015
+#define PCSC_E_INVALID_HANDLE          0x80100003
+#define PCSC_E_INVALID_PARAMETER       0x80100004
+#define PCSC_E_INVALID_TARGET          0x80100005
+#define PCSC_E_INVALID_VALUE           0x80100011
+#define PCSC_E_NO_MEMORY               0x80100006
+#define PCSC_E_UNKNOWN_READER          0x80100009
+#define PCSC_E_TIMEOUT                 0x8010000A
+#define PCSC_E_SHARING_VIOLATION       0x8010000B
+#define PCSC_E_NO_SMARTCARD            0x8010000C
+#define PCSC_E_UNKNOWN_CARD            0x8010000D
+#define PCSC_E_PROTO_MISMATCH          0x8010000F
+#define PCSC_E_NOT_READY               0x80100010
+#define PCSC_E_SYSTEM_CANCELLED        0x80100012
+#define PCSC_E_NOT_TRANSACTED          0x80100016
+#define PCSC_E_READER_UNAVAILABLE      0x80100017
+#define PCSC_W_REMOVED_CARD            0x80100069
+
+
+struct pcsc_io_request_s
+{
+  unsigned long protocol;
+  unsigned long pci_len;
+};
+
+typedef struct pcsc_io_request_s *pcsc_io_request_t;
+
+struct pcsc_readerstate_s
+{
+  const char *reader;
+  void *user_data;
+  unsigned long current_state;
+  unsigned long event_state;
+  unsigned long atrlen;
+  unsigned char atr[33];
+};
+
+typedef struct pcsc_readerstate_s *pcsc_readerstate_t;
+
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_establish_context) (unsigned long scope,
+                                           const void *reserved1,
+                                           const void *reserved2,
+                                           unsigned long *r_context);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_release_context) (unsigned long context);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_list_readers) (unsigned long context,
+                                      const char *groups,
+                                      char *readers, unsigned long*readerslen);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_get_status_change) (unsigned long context,
+                                           unsigned long timeout,
+                                           pcsc_readerstate_t readerstates,
+                                           unsigned long nreaderstates);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_connect) (unsigned long context,
+                                 const char *reader,
+                                 unsigned long share_mode,
+                                 unsigned long preferred_protocols,
+                                 unsigned long *r_card,
+                                 unsigned long *r_active_protocol);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_reconnect) (unsigned long card,
+                                   unsigned long share_mode,
+                                   unsigned long preferred_protocols,
+                                   unsigned long initialization,
+                                   unsigned long *r_active_protocol);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_disconnect) (unsigned long card,
+                                    unsigned long disposition);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_status) (unsigned long card,
+                                char *reader, unsigned long *readerlen,
+                                unsigned long *r_state,
+                                unsigned long *r_protocol,
+                                unsigned char *atr, unsigned long *atrlen);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_begin_transaction) (unsigned long card);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_end_transaction) (unsigned long card);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_transmit) (unsigned long card,
+                                  const pcsc_io_request_t send_pci,
+                                  const unsigned char *send_buffer,
+                                  unsigned long send_len,
+                                  pcsc_io_request_t recv_pci,
+                                  unsigned char *recv_buffer,
+                                  unsigned long *recv_len);
+long (* DLSTDCALL pcsc_set_timeout) (unsigned long context,
+                                     unsigned long timeout);
+
+
+/*  Prototypes.  */
+static int pcsc_get_status (int slot, unsigned int *status);
+
+
+
+/*
+      Helper
+ */
+
+
+/* Find an unused reader slot for PORTSTR and put it into the reader
+   table.  Return -1 on error or the index into the reader table. */
+static int
+new_reader_slot (void)
+{
+  int i, reader = -1;
+
+  for (i=0; i < MAX_READER; i++)
+    {
+      if (!reader_table[i].used && reader == -1)
+        reader = i;
+    }
+  if (reader == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("new_reader_slot: out of slots\n");
+      return -1;
+    }
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+  if (!reader_table[reader].lock_initialized)
+    {
+      if (!pth_mutex_init (&reader_table[reader].lock))
+        {
+          log_error ("error initializing mutex: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+          return -1;
+        }
+      reader_table[reader].lock_initialized = 1;
+    }
+#endif /*USE_GNU_PTH*/
+  reader_table[reader].close_reader = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].shutdown_reader = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].reset_reader = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].get_status_reader = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].send_apdu_reader = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].check_keypad = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].dump_status_reader = NULL;
+
+  reader_table[reader].used = 1;
+  reader_table[reader].last_status = 0;
+  reader_table[reader].is_t0 = 1;
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+  reader_table[reader].pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  reader_table[reader].pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  reader_table[reader].pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+#endif
+
+  return reader;
+}
+
+
+static void
+dump_reader_status (int slot)
+{
+  if (!opt.verbose)
+    return;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader)
+    reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader (slot);
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].status != -1
+      && reader_table[slot].atrlen)
+    {
+      log_info ("slot %d: ATR=", slot);
+      log_printhex ("", reader_table[slot].atr, reader_table[slot].atrlen);
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+static const char *
+host_sw_string (long err)
+{
+  switch (err)
+    {
+    case 0: return "okay";
+    case SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE: return "out of core";
+    case SW_HOST_INV_VALUE: return "invalid value";
+    case SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER: return "no driver";
+    case SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED: return "not supported";
+    case SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED: return "locking failed";
+    case SW_HOST_BUSY: return "busy";
+    case SW_HOST_NO_CARD: return "no card";
+    case SW_HOST_CARD_INACTIVE: return "card inactive";
+    case SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR: return "card I/O error";
+    case SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR: return "general error";
+    case SW_HOST_NO_READER: return "no reader";
+    case SW_HOST_ABORTED: return "aborted";
+    case SW_HOST_NO_KEYPAD: return "no keypad"; 
+    default: return "unknown host status error";
+    }
+}
+
+
+const char *
+apdu_strerror (int rc)
+{
+  switch (rc)
+    {
+    case SW_EOF_REACHED    : return "eof reached";
+    case SW_EEPROM_FAILURE : return "eeprom failure";
+    case SW_WRONG_LENGTH   : return "wrong length";
+    case SW_CHV_WRONG      : return "CHV wrong";
+    case SW_CHV_BLOCKED    : return "CHV blocked";
+    case SW_USE_CONDITIONS : return "use conditions not satisfied";
+    case SW_BAD_PARAMETER  : return "bad parameter";
+    case SW_NOT_SUPPORTED  : return "not supported";
+    case SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND : return "file not found";
+    case SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND:return "record not found";
+    case SW_REF_NOT_FOUND  : return "reference not found";
+    case SW_BAD_P0_P1      : return "bad P0 or P1";
+    case SW_INS_NOT_SUP    : return "instruction not supported";
+    case SW_CLA_NOT_SUP    : return "class not supported";
+    case SW_SUCCESS        : return "success";
+    default:
+      if ((rc & ~0x00ff) == SW_MORE_DATA)
+        return "more data available";
+      if ( (rc & 0x10000) )
+        return host_sw_string (rc);
+      return "unknown status error";
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+       ct API Interface
+ */
+
+static const char *
+ct_error_string (long err)
+{
+  switch (err)
+    {
+    case 0: return "okay";
+    case -1: return "invalid data";
+    case -8: return "ct error";
+    case -10: return "transmission error";
+    case -11: return "memory allocation error";
+    case -128: return "HTSI error";
+    default: return "unknown CT-API error";
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+ct_dump_reader_status (int slot)
+{
+  log_info ("reader slot %d: %s\n", slot,
+            reader_table[slot].status == 1? "Processor ICC present" :
+            reader_table[slot].status == 0? "Memory ICC present" :
+            "ICC not present" );
+}
+
+
+/* Wait for the card in SLOT and activate it.  Return a status word
+   error or 0 on success. */
+static int
+ct_activate_card (int slot)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char dad[1], sad[1], cmd[11], buf[256];
+  unsigned short buflen;
+
+  /* Check whether card has been inserted. */
+  dad[0] = 1;     /* Destination address: CT. */
+  sad[0] = 2;     /* Source address: Host. */
+
+  cmd[0] = 0x20;  /* Class byte. */
+  cmd[1] = 0x13;  /* Request status. */
+  cmd[2] = 0x00;  /* From kernel. */
+  cmd[3] = 0x80;  /* Return card's DO. */
+  cmd[4] = 0x00;
+
+  buflen = DIM(buf);
+
+  rc = CT_data (slot, dad, sad, 5, cmd, &buflen, buf);
+  if (rc || buflen < 2 || buf[buflen-2] != 0x90)
+    {
+      log_error ("ct_activate_card: can't get status of reader %d: %s\n",
+                 slot, ct_error_string (rc));
+      return SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  /* Connected, now activate the card. */
+  dad[0] = 1;    /* Destination address: CT. */
+  sad[0] = 2;    /* Source address: Host. */
+
+  cmd[0] = 0x20;  /* Class byte. */
+  cmd[1] = 0x12;  /* Request ICC. */
+  cmd[2] = 0x01;  /* From first interface. */
+  cmd[3] = 0x01;  /* Return card's ATR. */
+  cmd[4] = 0x00;
+
+  buflen = DIM(buf);
+
+  rc = CT_data (slot, dad, sad, 5, cmd, &buflen, buf);
+  if (rc || buflen < 2 || buf[buflen-2] != 0x90)
+    {
+      log_error ("ct_activate_card(%d): activation failed: %s\n",
+                 slot, ct_error_string (rc));
+      if (!rc)
+        log_printhex ("  received data:", buf, buflen);
+      return SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  /* Store the type and the ATR. */
+  if (buflen - 2 > DIM (reader_table[0].atr))
+    {
+      log_error ("ct_activate_card(%d): ATR too long\n", slot);
+      return SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  reader_table[slot].status = buf[buflen - 1];
+  memcpy (reader_table[slot].atr, buf, buflen - 2);
+  reader_table[slot].atrlen = buflen - 2;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+close_ct_reader (int slot)
+{
+  CT_close (slot);
+  reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+reset_ct_reader (int slot)
+{
+  /* FIXME: Check is this is sufficient do do a reset. */
+  return ct_activate_card (slot);
+}
+
+
+static int
+ct_get_status (int slot, unsigned int *status)
+{
+  *status = 1|2|4;  /* FIXME */
+  return 0;
+
+  return SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* Actually send the APDU of length APDULEN to SLOT and return a
+   maximum of *BUFLEN data in BUFFER, the actual retruned size will be
+   set to BUFLEN.  Returns: CT API error code. */
+static int
+ct_send_apdu (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+              unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buflen, struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char dad[1], sad[1];
+  unsigned short ctbuflen;
+
+  /* If we don't have an ATR, we need to reset the reader first. */
+  if (!reader_table[slot].atrlen
+      && (rc = reset_ct_reader (slot)))
+    return rc;
+
+  dad[0] = 0;     /* Destination address: Card. */
+  sad[0] = 2;     /* Source address: Host. */
+  ctbuflen = *buflen;
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_printhex ("  CT_data:", apdu, apdulen);
+  rc = CT_data (slot, dad, sad, apdulen, apdu, &ctbuflen, buffer);
+  *buflen = ctbuflen;
+
+  return rc? SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR: 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Open a reader and return an internal handle for it.  PORT is a
+   non-negative value with the port number of the reader. USB readers
+   do have port numbers starting at 32769. */
+static int
+open_ct_reader (int port)
+{
+  int rc, reader;
+
+  if (port < 0 || port > 0xffff)
+    {
+      log_error ("open_ct_reader: invalid port %d requested\n", port);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  reader = new_reader_slot ();
+  if (reader == -1)
+    return reader;
+  reader_table[reader].port = port;
+
+  rc = CT_init (reader, (unsigned short)port);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("apdu_open_ct_reader failed on port %d: %s\n",
+                 port, ct_error_string (rc));
+      reader_table[reader].used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  /* Only try to activate the card. */
+  rc = ct_activate_card (reader);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      reader_table[reader].atrlen = 0;
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+
+  reader_table[reader].close_reader = close_ct_reader;
+  reader_table[reader].reset_reader = reset_ct_reader;
+  reader_table[reader].get_status_reader = ct_get_status;
+  reader_table[reader].send_apdu_reader = ct_send_apdu;
+  reader_table[reader].check_keypad = NULL;
+  reader_table[reader].dump_status_reader = ct_dump_reader_status;
+
+  dump_reader_status (reader);
+  return reader;
+}
+
+
+/*
+       PC/SC Interface
+ */
+
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+static int
+writen (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+  size_t nleft = nbytes;
+  int nwritten;
+
+/*   log_printhex (" writen:", buf, nbytes); */
+
+  while (nleft > 0)
+    {
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+      nwritten = pth_write (fd, buf, nleft);
+#else
+      nwritten = write (fd, buf, nleft);
+#endif
+      if (nwritten < 0 && errno == EINTR)
+        continue;
+      if (nwritten < 0)
+        return -1;
+      nleft -= nwritten;
+      buf = (const char*)buf + nwritten;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Read up to BUFLEN bytes from FD and return the number of bytes
+   actually read in NREAD.  Returns -1 on error or 0 on success. */
+static int
+readn (int fd, void *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *nread)
+{
+  size_t nleft = buflen;
+  int n;
+/*   void *orig_buf = buf; */
+
+  while (nleft > 0)
+    {
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+      n = pth_read (fd, buf, nleft);
+#else
+      n = read (fd, buf, nleft);
+#endif
+      if (n < 0 && errno == EINTR)
+        continue;
+      if (n < 0)
+        return -1; /* read error. */
+      if (!n)
+        break; /* EOF */
+      nleft -= n;
+      buf = (char*)buf + n;
+    }
+  if (nread)
+    *nread = buflen - nleft;
+
+/*   log_printhex ("  readn:", orig_buf, *nread); */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif /*NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+
+static const char *
+pcsc_error_string (long err)
+{
+  const char *s;
+
+  if (!err)
+    return "okay";
+  if ((err & 0x80100000) != 0x80100000)
+    return "invalid PC/SC error code";
+  err &= 0xffff;
+  switch (err)
+    {
+    case 0x0002: s = "cancelled"; break;
+    case 0x000e: s = "can't dispose"; break;
+    case 0x0008: s = "insufficient buffer"; break;
+    case 0x0015: s = "invalid ATR"; break;
+    case 0x0003: s = "invalid handle"; break;
+    case 0x0004: s = "invalid parameter"; break;
+    case 0x0005: s = "invalid target"; break;
+    case 0x0011: s = "invalid value"; break;
+    case 0x0006: s = "no memory"; break;
+    case 0x0013: s = "comm error"; break;
+    case 0x0001: s = "internal error"; break;
+    case 0x0014: s = "unknown error"; break;
+    case 0x0007: s = "waited too long"; break;
+    case 0x0009: s = "unknown reader"; break;
+    case 0x000a: s = "timeout"; break;
+    case 0x000b: s = "sharing violation"; break;
+    case 0x000c: s = "no smartcard"; break;
+    case 0x000d: s = "unknown card"; break;
+    case 0x000f: s = "proto mismatch"; break;
+    case 0x0010: s = "not ready"; break;
+    case 0x0012: s = "system cancelled"; break;
+    case 0x0016: s = "not transacted"; break;
+    case 0x0017: s = "reader unavailable"; break;
+    case 0x0065: s = "unsupported card"; break;
+    case 0x0066: s = "unresponsive card"; break;
+    case 0x0067: s = "unpowered card"; break;
+    case 0x0068: s = "reset card"; break;
+    case 0x0069: s = "removed card"; break;
+    case 0x006a: s = "inserted card"; break;
+    case 0x001f: s = "unsupported feature"; break;
+    case 0x0019: s = "PCI too small"; break;
+    case 0x001a: s = "reader unsupported"; break;
+    case 0x001b: s = "duplicate reader"; break;
+    case 0x001c: s = "card unsupported"; break;
+    case 0x001d: s = "no service"; break;
+    case 0x001e: s = "service stopped"; break;
+    default:     s = "unknown PC/SC error code"; break;
+    }
+  return s;
+}
+
+/* Map PC/SC error codes to our special host status words.  */
+static int
+pcsc_error_to_sw (long ec)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  switch (ec)
+    {
+    case 0:  rc = 0; break;
+
+    case PCSC_E_CANCELLED:           rc = SW_HOST_ABORTED; break;
+    case PCSC_E_NO_MEMORY:           rc = SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE; break;
+    case PCSC_E_TIMEOUT:             rc = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR; break;
+    case PCSC_E_SHARING_VIOLATION:   rc = SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED; break;
+    case PCSC_E_NO_SMARTCARD:        rc = SW_HOST_NO_CARD; break;
+    case PCSC_W_REMOVED_CARD:        rc = SW_HOST_NO_CARD; break;
+
+    case PCSC_E_INVALID_TARGET:
+    case PCSC_E_INVALID_VALUE:
+    case PCSC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: 
+    case PCSC_E_INVALID_PARAMETER:
+    case PCSC_E_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER: rc = SW_HOST_INV_VALUE; break;
+
+    default:  rc = SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR; break;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+dump_pcsc_reader_status (int slot)
+{
+  log_info ("reader slot %d: active protocol:", slot);
+  if ((reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0))
+    log_printf (" T0");
+  else if ((reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1))
+    log_printf (" T1");
+  else if ((reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_RAW))
+    log_printf (" raw");
+  log_printf ("\n");
+}
+
+
+/* Send an PC/SC reset command and return a status word on error or 0
+   on success. */
+static int
+reset_pcsc_reader (int slot)
+{
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+  long err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  size_t len;
+  int i, n;
+  unsigned char msgbuf[9];
+  unsigned int dummy_status;
+  int sw = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  if (slotp->pcsc.req_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.pid == (pid_t)(-1) )
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_get_status: pcsc-wrapper not running\n");
+      return sw;
+    }
+
+  msgbuf[0] = 0x05; /* RESET command. */
+  len = 0;
+  msgbuf[1] = (len >> 24);
+  msgbuf[2] = (len >> 16);
+  msgbuf[3] = (len >>  8);
+  msgbuf[4] = (len      );
+  if ( writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, msgbuf, 5) )
+    {
+      log_error ("error sending PC/SC RESET request: %s\n",
+                 strerror (errno));
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  /* Read the response. */
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, msgbuf, 9, &len)) || len != 9)
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC RESET response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
+  if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+  if (len > DIM (slotp->atr))
+    {
+      log_error ("PC/SC returned a too large ATR (len=%lx)\n",
+                 (unsigned long)len);
+      sw = SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR;
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  err = (msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16) | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8];
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("PC/SC RESET failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      /* If the error code is no smart card, we should not considere
+         this a major error and close the wrapper.  */
+      sw = pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+      if (err == PCSC_E_NO_SMARTCARD)
+        return sw;
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  /* The open function may return a zero for the ATR length to
+     indicate that no card is present.  */
+  n = len;
+  if (n)
+    {
+      if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, slotp->atr, n, &len)) || len != n)
+        {
+          log_error ("error receiving PC/SC RESET response: %s\n",
+                     i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+          goto command_failed;
+        }
+    }
+  slotp->atrlen = len;
+
+  /* Read the status so that IS_T0 will be set. */
+  pcsc_get_status (slot, &dummy_status);
+
+  return 0;
+
+ command_failed:
+  close (slotp->pcsc.req_fd);
+  close (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  kill (slotp->pcsc.pid, SIGTERM);
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  return sw;
+
+#else /* !NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER */
+  long err;
+  char reader[250];
+  unsigned long nreader, atrlen;
+  unsigned long card_state, card_protocol;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].pcsc.card)
+    {
+      err = pcsc_disconnect (reader_table[slot].pcsc.card, PCSC_LEAVE_CARD);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          log_error ("pcsc_disconnect failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                     pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+          return SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+      reader_table[slot].pcsc.card = 0;
+    }
+
+  err = pcsc_connect (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context,
+                      reader_table[slot].rdrname,
+                      PCSC_SHARE_EXCLUSIVE,
+                      PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0|PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1,
+                      &reader_table[slot].pcsc.card,
+                      &reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_connect failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                  pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      reader_table[slot].pcsc.card = 0;
+      return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+    }
+
+
+  atrlen = 33;
+  nreader = sizeof reader - 1;
+  err = pcsc_status (reader_table[slot].pcsc.card,
+                     reader, &nreader,
+                     &card_state, &card_protocol,
+                     reader_table[slot].atr, &atrlen);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_status failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                  pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      reader_table[slot].atrlen = 0;
+      return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  if (atrlen >= DIM (reader_table[0].atr))
+    log_bug ("ATR returned by pcsc_status is too large\n");
+  reader_table[slot].atrlen = atrlen;
+  reader_table[slot].is_t0 = !!(card_protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0);
+
+  return 0;
+#endif /* !NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER */
+}
+
+
+static int
+pcsc_get_status (int slot, unsigned int *status)
+{
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+  long err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  size_t len, full_len;
+  int i, n;
+  unsigned char msgbuf[9];
+  unsigned char buffer[16];
+  int sw = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  if (slotp->pcsc.req_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.pid == (pid_t)(-1) )
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_get_status: pcsc-wrapper not running\n");
+      return sw;
+    }
+
+  msgbuf[0] = 0x04; /* STATUS command. */
+  len = 0;
+  msgbuf[1] = (len >> 24);
+  msgbuf[2] = (len >> 16);
+  msgbuf[3] = (len >>  8);
+  msgbuf[4] = (len      );
+  if ( writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, msgbuf, 5) )
+    {
+      log_error ("error sending PC/SC STATUS request: %s\n",
+                 strerror (errno));
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  /* Read the response. */
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, msgbuf, 9, &len)) || len != 9)
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC STATUS response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
+  if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+  err = (msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16) | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8];
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_status failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      /* This is a proper error code, so return immediately.  */
+      return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+    }
+
+  full_len = len;
+
+  /* The current version returns 3 words but we allow also for old
+     versions returning only 2 words. */
+  n = 12 < len ? 12 : len;
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, buffer, n, &len))
+      || (len != 8 && len != 12))
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC STATUS response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  slotp->is_t0 = (len == 12 && !!(buffer[11] & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0));
+
+
+  full_len -= len;
+  /* Newer versions of the wrapper might send more status bytes.
+     Read them. */
+  while (full_len)
+    {
+      unsigned char dummybuf[128];
+
+      n = full_len < DIM (dummybuf) ? full_len : DIM (dummybuf);
+      if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, dummybuf, n, &len)) || len != n)
+        {
+          log_error ("error receiving PC/SC TRANSMIT response: %s\n",
+                     i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+          goto command_failed;
+        }
+      full_len -= n;
+    }
+
+  /* We are lucky: The wrapper already returns the data in the
+     required format. */
+  *status = buffer[3];
+
+  return 0;
+
+ command_failed:
+  close (slotp->pcsc.req_fd);
+  close (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  kill (slotp->pcsc.pid, SIGTERM);
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  return sw;
+
+#else /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+
+  long err;
+  struct pcsc_readerstate_s rdrstates[1];
+
+  memset (rdrstates, 0, sizeof *rdrstates);
+  rdrstates[0].reader = reader_table[slot].rdrname;
+  rdrstates[0].current_state = PCSC_STATE_UNAWARE;
+  err = pcsc_get_status_change (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context,
+                                0,
+                                rdrstates, 1);
+  if (err == PCSC_E_TIMEOUT)
+    err = 0; /* Timeout is no error error here. */
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_get_status_change failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+    }
+
+
+  /*   log_debug  */
+  /*     ("pcsc_get_status_change: %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_IGNORE)? " ignore":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_CHANGED)? " changed":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_UNKNOWN)? " unknown":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_UNAVAILABLE)?" unavail":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_EMPTY)? " empty":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_PRESENT)? " present":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_ATRMATCH)? " atr":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_EXCLUSIVE)? " excl":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_INUSE)? " unuse":"", */
+  /*      (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_MUTE)? " mute":"" ); */
+
+  *status = 0;
+  if ( (rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_PRESENT) )
+    *status |= 2;
+  if ( !(rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_MUTE) )
+    *status |= 4;
+  /* We indicate a useful card if it is not in use by another
+     application.  This is because we only use exclusive access
+     mode.  */
+  if ( (*status & 6) == 6
+       && !(rdrstates[0].event_state & PCSC_STATE_INUSE) )
+    *status |= 1;
+
+  return 0;
+#endif /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+}
+
+
+/* Actually send the APDU of length APDULEN to SLOT and return a
+   maximum of *BUFLEN data in BUFFER, the actual returned size will be
+   set to BUFLEN.  Returns: CT API error code. */
+static int
+pcsc_send_apdu (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+                unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buflen, 
+                struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+  long err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  size_t len, full_len;
+  int i, n;
+  unsigned char msgbuf[9];
+  int sw = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+
+  if (!reader_table[slot].atrlen
+      && (err = reset_pcsc_reader (slot)))
+    return err;
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_printhex ("  PCSC_data:", apdu, apdulen);
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  if (slotp->pcsc.req_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.pid == (pid_t)(-1) )
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_send_apdu: pcsc-wrapper not running\n");
+      return sw;
+    }
+
+  msgbuf[0] = 0x03; /* TRANSMIT command. */
+  len = apdulen;
+  msgbuf[1] = (len >> 24);
+  msgbuf[2] = (len >> 16);
+  msgbuf[3] = (len >>  8);
+  msgbuf[4] = (len      );
+  if ( writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, msgbuf, 5)
+       || writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, apdu, len))
+    {
+      log_error ("error sending PC/SC TRANSMIT request: %s\n",
+                 strerror (errno));
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  /* Read the response. */
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, msgbuf, 9, &len)) || len != 9)
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC TRANSMIT response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
+  if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+  err = (msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16) | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8];
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_transmit failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+    }
+
+   full_len = len;
+
+   n = *buflen < len ? *buflen : len;
+   if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, buffer, n, &len)) || len != n)
+     {
+       log_error ("error receiving PC/SC TRANSMIT response: %s\n",
+                  i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+       goto command_failed;
+     }
+   *buflen = n;
+
+   full_len -= len;
+   if (full_len)
+     {
+       log_error ("pcsc_send_apdu: provided buffer too short - truncated\n");
+       err = SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;
+     }
+   /* We need to read any rest of the response, to keep the
+      protocol runnng. */
+   while (full_len)
+     {
+       unsigned char dummybuf[128];
+
+       n = full_len < DIM (dummybuf) ? full_len : DIM (dummybuf);
+       if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, dummybuf, n, &len)) || len != n)
+         {
+           log_error ("error receiving PC/SC TRANSMIT response: %s\n",
+                      i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+           goto command_failed;
+         }
+       full_len -= n;
+     }
+
+   return err;
+
+ command_failed:
+  close (slotp->pcsc.req_fd);
+  close (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  kill (slotp->pcsc.pid, SIGTERM);
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  return sw;
+
+#else /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+
+  long err;
+  struct pcsc_io_request_s send_pci;
+  unsigned long recv_len;
+
+  if (!reader_table[slot].atrlen
+      && (err = reset_pcsc_reader (slot)))
+    return err;
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_printhex ("  PCSC_data:", apdu, apdulen);
+
+  if ((reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1))
+      send_pci.protocol = PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1;
+  else
+      send_pci.protocol = PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0;
+  send_pci.pci_len = sizeof send_pci;
+  recv_len = *buflen;
+  err = pcsc_transmit (reader_table[slot].pcsc.card,
+                       &send_pci, apdu, apdulen,
+                       NULL, buffer, &recv_len);
+  *buflen = recv_len;
+  if (err)
+    log_error ("pcsc_transmit failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+               pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+
+  return pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+#endif /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+}
+
+
+static int
+close_pcsc_reader (int slot)
+{
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+  long err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  size_t len;
+  int i;
+  unsigned char msgbuf[9];
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  if (slotp->pcsc.req_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd == -1
+      || slotp->pcsc.pid == (pid_t)(-1) )
+    {
+      log_error ("close_pcsc_reader: pcsc-wrapper not running\n");
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  msgbuf[0] = 0x02; /* CLOSE command. */
+  len = 0;
+  msgbuf[1] = (len >> 24);
+  msgbuf[2] = (len >> 16);
+  msgbuf[3] = (len >>  8);
+  msgbuf[4] = (len      );
+  if ( writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, msgbuf, 5) )
+    {
+      log_error ("error sending PC/SC CLOSE request: %s\n",
+                 strerror (errno));
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  /* Read the response. */
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, msgbuf, 9, &len)) || len != 9)
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC CLOSE response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
+  if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+  err = (msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16) | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8];
+  if (err)
+    log_error ("pcsc_close failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+               pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+
+  /* We will close the wrapper in any case - errors are merely
+     informational. */
+
+ command_failed:
+  close (slotp->pcsc.req_fd);
+  close (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  kill (slotp->pcsc.pid, SIGTERM);
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  return 0;
+
+#else /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+
+  pcsc_release_context (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+  xfree (reader_table[slot].rdrname);
+  reader_table[slot].rdrname = NULL;
+  reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+  return 0;
+#endif /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+}
+
+/* Note:  It is a pitty that we can't return proper error codes.  */
+static int
+open_pcsc_reader (const char *portstr)
+{
+#ifdef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+/* Open the PC/SC reader using the pcsc_wrapper program.  This is
+   needed to cope with different thread models and other peculiarities
+   of libpcsclite. */
+  int slot;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  int fd, rp[2], wp[2];
+  int n, i;
+  pid_t pid;
+  size_t len;
+  unsigned char msgbuf[9];
+  int err;
+  unsigned int dummy_status;
+  int sw = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+
+  slot = new_reader_slot ();
+  if (slot == -1)
+    return -1;
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  /* Fire up the pcsc wrapper.  We don't use any fork/exec code from
+     the common directy but implement it direclty so that this file
+     may still be source copied. */
+
+  if (pipe (rp) == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("error creating a pipe: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      slotp->used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+  if (pipe (wp) == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("error creating a pipe: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      close (rp[0]);
+      close (rp[1]);
+      slotp->used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  pid = fork ();
+  if (pid == -1)
+    {
+      log_error ("error forking process: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      close (rp[0]);
+      close (rp[1]);
+      close (wp[0]);
+      close (wp[1]);
+      slotp->used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = pid;
+
+  if (!pid)
+    { /*
+         === Child ===
+       */
+
+      /* Double fork. */
+      pid = fork ();
+      if (pid == -1)
+        _exit (31);
+      if (pid)
+        _exit (0); /* Immediate exit this parent, so that the child
+                      gets cleaned up by the init process. */
+
+      /* Connect our pipes. */
+      if (wp[0] != 0 && dup2 (wp[0], 0) == -1)
+        log_fatal ("dup2 stdin failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      if (rp[1] != 1 && dup2 (rp[1], 1) == -1)
+        log_fatal ("dup2 stdout failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+
+      /* Send stderr to the bit bucket. */
+      fd = open ("/dev/null", O_WRONLY);
+      if (fd == -1)
+        log_fatal ("can't open `/dev/null': %s", strerror (errno));
+      if (fd != 2 && dup2 (fd, 2) == -1)
+        log_fatal ("dup2 stderr failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+
+      /* Close all other files. */
+      n = sysconf (_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+      if (n < 0)
+        n = MAX_OPEN_FDS;
+      for (i=3; i < n; i++)
+        close(i);
+      errno = 0;
+
+      execl (GNUPG_LIBDIR "/pcsc-wrapper",
+             "pcsc-wrapper",
+             "--",
+             "1", /* API version */
+             opt.pcsc_driver, /* Name of the PC/SC library. */
+              NULL);
+      _exit (31);
+    }
+
+  /*
+     === Parent ===
+   */
+  close (wp[0]);
+  close (rp[1]);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = wp[1];
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = rp[0];
+
+  /* Wait for the intermediate child to terminate. */
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+#define WAIT pth_waitpid
+#else
+#define WAIT waitpid
+#endif
+  while ( (i=WAIT (pid, NULL, 0)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+    ;
+#undef X
+
+  /* Now send the open request. */
+  msgbuf[0] = 0x01; /* OPEN command. */
+  len = portstr? strlen (portstr):0;
+  msgbuf[1] = (len >> 24);
+  msgbuf[2] = (len >> 16);
+  msgbuf[3] = (len >>  8);
+  msgbuf[4] = (len      );
+  if ( writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, msgbuf, 5)
+       || (portstr && writen (slotp->pcsc.req_fd, portstr, len)))
+    {
+      log_error ("error sending PC/SC OPEN request: %s\n",
+                 strerror (errno));
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  /* Read the response. */
+  if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, msgbuf, 9, &len)) || len != 9)
+    {
+      log_error ("error receiving PC/SC OPEN response: %s\n",
+                 i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len = (msgbuf[1] << 24) | (msgbuf[2] << 16) | (msgbuf[3] << 8 ) | msgbuf[4];
+  if (msgbuf[0] != 0x81 || len < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid response header from PC/SC received\n");
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  len -= 4; /* Already read the error code. */
+  if (len > DIM (slotp->atr))
+    {
+      log_error ("PC/SC returned a too large ATR (len=%lx)\n",
+                 (unsigned long)len);
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+  err = (msgbuf[5] << 24) | (msgbuf[6] << 16) | (msgbuf[7] << 8 ) | msgbuf[8];
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("PC/SC OPEN failed: %s\n", pcsc_error_string (err));
+      sw = pcsc_error_to_sw (err);
+      goto command_failed;
+    }
+
+  slotp->last_status = 0;
+
+  /* The open request may return a zero for the ATR length to
+     indicate that no card is present.  */
+  n = len;
+  if (n)
+    {
+      if ((i=readn (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd, slotp->atr, n, &len)) || len != n)
+        {
+          log_error ("error receiving PC/SC OPEN response: %s\n",
+                     i? strerror (errno) : "premature EOF");
+          goto command_failed;
+        }
+      /* If we got to here we know that a card is present
+         and usable.  Thus remember this.  */
+      slotp->last_status = (1|2|4| 0x8000);
+    }
+  slotp->atrlen = len;
+
+  reader_table[slot].close_reader = close_pcsc_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].reset_reader = reset_pcsc_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].get_status_reader = pcsc_get_status;
+  reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader = pcsc_send_apdu;
+  reader_table[slot].check_keypad = NULL;
+  reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader = dump_pcsc_reader_status;
+
+  /* Read the status so that IS_T0 will be set. */
+  pcsc_get_status (slot, &dummy_status);
+
+  dump_reader_status (slot);
+  return slot;
+
+ command_failed:
+  close (slotp->pcsc.req_fd);
+  close (slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd);
+  slotp->pcsc.req_fd = -1;
+  slotp->pcsc.rsp_fd = -1;
+  kill (slotp->pcsc.pid, SIGTERM);
+  slotp->pcsc.pid = (pid_t)(-1);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  /* There is no way to return SW. */
+  return -1;
+
+#else /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER */
+  long err;
+  int slot;
+  char *list = NULL;
+  unsigned long nreader, listlen, atrlen;
+  char *p;
+  unsigned long card_state, card_protocol;
+
+  slot = new_reader_slot ();
+  if (slot == -1)
+    return -1;
+
+  err = pcsc_establish_context (PCSC_SCOPE_SYSTEM, NULL, NULL,
+                                &reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_establish_context failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  err = pcsc_list_readers (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context,
+                           NULL, NULL, &nreader);
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      list = xtrymalloc (nreader+1); /* Better add 1 for safety reasons. */
+      if (!list)
+        {
+          log_error ("error allocating memory for reader list\n");
+          pcsc_release_context (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+          reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+          return -1 /*SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE*/;
+        }
+      err = pcsc_list_readers (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context,
+                               NULL, list, &nreader);
+    }
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_list_readers failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                 pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      pcsc_release_context (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+      reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+      xfree (list);
+      return -1 /*pcsc_error_to_sw (err)*/;
+    }
+
+  listlen = nreader;
+  p = list;
+  while (nreader)
+    {
+      if (!*p && !p[1])
+        break;
+      if (*p)
+        log_info ("detected reader `%s'\n", p);
+      if (nreader < (strlen (p)+1))
+        {
+          log_error ("invalid response from pcsc_list_readers\n");
+          break;
+        }
+      nreader -= strlen (p)+1;
+      p += strlen (p) + 1;
+    }
+
+  reader_table[slot].rdrname = xtrymalloc (strlen (portstr? portstr : list)+1);
+  if (!reader_table[slot].rdrname)
+    {
+      log_error ("error allocating memory for reader name\n");
+      pcsc_release_context (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+      reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+      return -1 /*SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE*/;
+    }
+  strcpy (reader_table[slot].rdrname, portstr? portstr : list);
+  xfree (list);
+  list = NULL;
+
+  err = pcsc_connect (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context,
+                      reader_table[slot].rdrname,
+                      PCSC_SHARE_EXCLUSIVE,
+                      PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0|PCSC_PROTOCOL_T1,
+                      &reader_table[slot].pcsc.card,
+                      &reader_table[slot].pcsc.protocol);
+  if (err == PCSC_E_NO_SMARTCARD) 
+    reader_table[slot].pcsc.card = 0;
+  else if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("pcsc_connect failed: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+                  pcsc_error_string (err), err);
+      pcsc_release_context (reader_table[slot].pcsc.context);
+      xfree (reader_table[slot].rdrname);
+      reader_table[slot].rdrname = NULL;
+      reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+      return -1 /*pcsc_error_to_sw (err)*/;
+    }
+
+  reader_table[slot].atrlen = 0;
+  reader_table[slot].last_status = 0;
+  if (!err)
+    {
+      char reader[250];
+      unsigned long readerlen;
+
+      atrlen = 32;
+      readerlen = sizeof reader -1 ;
+      err = pcsc_status (reader_table[slot].pcsc.card,
+                         reader, &readerlen,
+                         &card_state, &card_protocol,
+                         reader_table[slot].atr, &atrlen);
+      if (err)
+        log_error ("pcsc_status failed: %s (0x%lx) %lu\n",
+                   pcsc_error_string (err), err, readerlen);
+      else
+        {
+          if (atrlen >= DIM (reader_table[0].atr))
+            log_bug ("ATR returned by pcsc_status is too large\n");
+          reader_table[slot].atrlen = atrlen;
+          /* If we got to here we know that a card is present
+             and usable.  Thus remember this.  */
+          reader_table[slot].last_status = (1|2|4| 0x8000);
+          reader_table[slot].is_t0 = !!(card_protocol & PCSC_PROTOCOL_T0);
+        }
+    }
+
+  reader_table[slot].close_reader = close_pcsc_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].reset_reader = reset_pcsc_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].get_status_reader = pcsc_get_status;
+  reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader = pcsc_send_apdu;
+  reader_table[slot].check_keypad = NULL;
+  reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader = dump_pcsc_reader_status;
+
+/*   log_debug ("state    from pcsc_status: 0x%lx\n", card_state); */
+/*   log_debug ("protocol from pcsc_status: 0x%lx\n", card_protocol); */
+
+  dump_reader_status (slot);
+  return slot;
+#endif /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER */
+}
+
+
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUSB
+/*
+     Internal CCID driver interface.
+ */
+
+
+static void
+dump_ccid_reader_status (int slot)
+{
+  log_info ("reader slot %d: using ccid driver\n", slot);
+}
+
+static int
+close_ccid_reader (int slot)
+{
+  ccid_close_reader (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle);
+  reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+shutdown_ccid_reader (int slot)
+{
+  ccid_shutdown_reader (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+reset_ccid_reader (int slot)
+{
+  int err;
+  reader_table_t slotp = reader_table + slot;
+  unsigned char atr[33];
+  size_t atrlen;
+
+  err = ccid_get_atr (slotp->ccid.handle, atr, sizeof atr, &atrlen);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+  /* If the reset was successful, update the ATR. */
+  assert (sizeof slotp->atr >= sizeof atr);
+  slotp->atrlen = atrlen;
+  memcpy (slotp->atr, atr, atrlen);
+  dump_reader_status (slot);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+get_status_ccid (int slot, unsigned int *status)
+{
+  int rc;
+  int bits;
+
+  rc = ccid_slot_status (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle, &bits);
+  if (rc)
+    return -1;
+
+  if (bits == 0)
+    *status = 1|2|4;
+  else if (bits == 1)
+    *status = 2;
+  else
+    *status = 0;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Actually send the APDU of length APDULEN to SLOT and return a
+   maximum of *BUFLEN data in BUFFER, the actual returned size will be
+   set to BUFLEN.  Returns: Internal CCID driver error code. */
+static int
+send_apdu_ccid (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+                unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buflen,
+                struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+  long err;
+  size_t maxbuflen;
+
+  /* If we don't have an ATR, we need to reset the reader first. */
+  if (!reader_table[slot].atrlen
+      && (err = reset_ccid_reader (slot)))
+    return err;
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_printhex ("  APDU_data:", apdu, apdulen);
+
+  maxbuflen = *buflen;
+  if (pininfo)
+    err = ccid_transceive_secure (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle,
+                                  apdu, apdulen,
+                                  pininfo->mode,
+                                  pininfo->minlen,
+                                  pininfo->maxlen,
+                                  pininfo->padlen,
+                                  buffer, maxbuflen, buflen);
+  else
+    err = ccid_transceive (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle,
+                           apdu, apdulen,
+                           buffer, maxbuflen, buflen);
+  if (err)
+    log_error ("ccid_transceive failed: (0x%lx)\n",
+               err);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
+
+/* Check whether the CCID reader supports the ISO command code COMMAND
+   on the keypad.  Return 0 on success.  For a description of the pin
+   parameters, see ccid-driver.c */
+static int
+check_ccid_keypad (int slot, int command, int pin_mode,
+                   int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen)
+{
+  unsigned char apdu[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0x81 };
+
+  apdu[1] = command;
+  return ccid_transceive_secure (reader_table[slot].ccid.handle,
+                                 apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                                 pin_mode, pinlen_min, pinlen_max, pin_padlen,
+                                 NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/* Open the reader and try to read an ATR.  */
+static int
+open_ccid_reader (const char *portstr)
+{
+  int err;
+  int slot;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+
+  slot = new_reader_slot ();
+  if (slot == -1)
+    return -1;
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  err = ccid_open_reader (&slotp->ccid.handle, portstr);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      slotp->used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  err = ccid_get_atr (slotp->ccid.handle,
+                      slotp->atr, sizeof slotp->atr, &slotp->atrlen);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      slotp->atrlen = 0;
+      err = 0;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* If we got to here we know that a card is present
+         and usable.  Thus remember this.  */
+      reader_table[slot].last_status = (1|2|4| 0x8000);
+    }
+
+  reader_table[slot].close_reader = close_ccid_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].shutdown_reader = shutdown_ccid_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].reset_reader = reset_ccid_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].get_status_reader = get_status_ccid;
+  reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader = send_apdu_ccid;
+  reader_table[slot].check_keypad = check_ccid_keypad;
+  reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader = dump_ccid_reader_status;
+
+  dump_reader_status (slot);
+  return slot;
+}
+
+
+
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBUSB */
+
+
+
+#ifdef USE_G10CODE_RAPDU
+/*
+     The Remote APDU Interface.
+
+     This uses the Remote APDU protocol to contact a reader.
+
+     The port number is actually an index into the list of ports as
+     returned via the protocol.
+ */
+
+
+static int
+rapdu_status_to_sw (int status)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  switch (status)
+    {
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_SUCCESS:  rc = 0; break;
+
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_INVCMD:
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_INVPROT:
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_INVSEQ:
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_INVCOOKIE:
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_INVREADER:  rc = SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;  break;
+
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_TIMEOUT:  rc = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR; break;
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_CARDIO:   rc = SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR; break;
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_NOCARD:   rc = SW_HOST_NO_CARD; break;
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_CARDCHG:  rc = SW_HOST_NO_CARD; break;
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_BUSY:     rc = SW_HOST_BUSY; break;
+    case RAPDU_STATUS_NEEDRESET: rc = SW_HOST_CARD_INACTIVE; break;
+
+    default: rc = SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR; break;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+close_rapdu_reader (int slot)
+{
+  rapdu_release (reader_table[slot].rapdu.handle);
+  reader_table[slot].used = 0;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+reset_rapdu_reader (int slot)
+{
+  int err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  rapdu_msg_t msg = NULL;
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  err = rapdu_send_cmd (slotp->rapdu.handle, RAPDU_CMD_RESET);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("sending rapdu command RESET failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  err = rapdu_read_msg (slotp->rapdu.handle, &msg);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("receiving rapdu message failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  if (msg->cmd != RAPDU_STATUS_SUCCESS || !msg->datalen)
+    {
+      int sw = rapdu_status_to_sw (msg->cmd);
+      log_error ("rapdu command RESET failed: %s\n",
+                 rapdu_strerror (msg->cmd));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return sw;
+    }
+  if (msg->datalen >= DIM (slotp->atr))
+    {
+      log_error ("ATR returned by the RAPDU layer is too large\n");
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+  slotp->atrlen = msg->datalen;
+  memcpy (slotp->atr, msg->data, msg->datalen);
+
+  rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+my_rapdu_get_status (int slot, unsigned int *status)
+{
+  int err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  rapdu_msg_t msg = NULL;
+  int oldslot;
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  oldslot = rapdu_set_reader (slotp->rapdu.handle, slot);
+  err = rapdu_send_cmd (slotp->rapdu.handle, RAPDU_CMD_GET_STATUS);
+  rapdu_set_reader (slotp->rapdu.handle, oldslot);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("sending rapdu command GET_STATUS failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  err = rapdu_read_msg (slotp->rapdu.handle, &msg);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("receiving rapdu message failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  if (msg->cmd != RAPDU_STATUS_SUCCESS || !msg->datalen)
+    {
+      int sw = rapdu_status_to_sw (msg->cmd);
+      log_error ("rapdu command GET_STATUS failed: %s\n",
+                 rapdu_strerror (msg->cmd));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return sw;
+    }
+  *status = msg->data[0];
+
+  rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Actually send the APDU of length APDULEN to SLOT and return a
+   maximum of *BUFLEN data in BUFFER, the actual returned size will be
+   set to BUFLEN.  Returns: APDU error code. */
+static int
+my_rapdu_send_apdu (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+                    unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buflen,
+                    struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+  int err;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  rapdu_msg_t msg = NULL;
+  size_t maxlen = *buflen;
+
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  *buflen = 0;
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_printhex ("  APDU_data:", apdu, apdulen);
+
+  if (apdulen < 4)
+    {
+      log_error ("rapdu_send_apdu: APDU is too short\n");
+      return SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+
+  err = rapdu_send_apdu (slotp->rapdu.handle, apdu, apdulen);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("sending rapdu command APDU failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  err = rapdu_read_msg (slotp->rapdu.handle, &msg);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error ("receiving rapdu message failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return rapdu_status_to_sw (err);
+    }
+  if (msg->cmd != RAPDU_STATUS_SUCCESS || !msg->datalen)
+    {
+      int sw = rapdu_status_to_sw (msg->cmd);
+      log_error ("rapdu command APDU failed: %s\n",
+                 rapdu_strerror (msg->cmd));
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return sw;
+    }
+
+  if (msg->datalen > maxlen)
+    {
+      log_error ("rapdu response apdu too large\n");
+      rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+      return SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+
+  *buflen = msg->datalen;
+  memcpy (buffer, msg->data, msg->datalen);
+
+  rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+open_rapdu_reader (int portno,
+                   const unsigned char *cookie, size_t length,
+                   int (*readfnc) (void *opaque,
+                                   void *buffer, size_t size),
+                   void *readfnc_value,
+                   int (*writefnc) (void *opaque,
+                                    const void *buffer, size_t size),
+                   void *writefnc_value,
+                   void (*closefnc) (void *opaque),
+                   void *closefnc_value)
+{
+  int err;
+  int slot;
+  reader_table_t slotp;
+  rapdu_msg_t msg = NULL;
+
+  slot = new_reader_slot ();
+  if (slot == -1)
+    return -1;
+  slotp = reader_table + slot;
+
+  slotp->rapdu.handle = rapdu_new ();
+  if (!slotp->rapdu.handle)
+    {
+      slotp->used = 0;
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rapdu_set_reader (slotp->rapdu.handle, portno);
+
+  rapdu_set_iofunc (slotp->rapdu.handle,
+                    readfnc, readfnc_value,
+                    writefnc, writefnc_value,
+                    closefnc, closefnc_value);
+  rapdu_set_cookie (slotp->rapdu.handle, cookie, length);
+
+  /* First try to get the current ATR, but if the card is inactive
+     issue a reset instead.  */
+  err = rapdu_send_cmd (slotp->rapdu.handle, RAPDU_CMD_GET_ATR);
+  if (err == RAPDU_STATUS_NEEDRESET)
+    err = rapdu_send_cmd (slotp->rapdu.handle, RAPDU_CMD_RESET);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_info ("sending rapdu command GET_ATR/RESET failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      goto failure;
+    }
+  err = rapdu_read_msg (slotp->rapdu.handle, &msg);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_info ("receiving rapdu message failed: %s\n",
+                err < 0 ? strerror (errno): rapdu_strerror (err));
+      goto failure;
+    }
+  if (msg->cmd != RAPDU_STATUS_SUCCESS || !msg->datalen)
+    {
+      log_info ("rapdu command GET ATR failed: %s\n",
+                 rapdu_strerror (msg->cmd));
+      goto failure;
+    }
+  if (msg->datalen >= DIM (slotp->atr))
+    {
+      log_error ("ATR returned by the RAPDU layer is too large\n");
+      goto failure;
+    }
+  slotp->atrlen = msg->datalen;
+  memcpy (slotp->atr, msg->data, msg->datalen);
+
+  reader_table[slot].close_reader = close_rapdu_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].reset_reader = reset_rapdu_reader;
+  reader_table[slot].get_status_reader = my_rapdu_get_status;
+  reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader = my_rapdu_send_apdu;
+  reader_table[slot].check_keypad = NULL;
+  reader_table[slot].dump_status_reader = NULL;
+
+  dump_reader_status (slot);
+  rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+  return slot;
+
+ failure:
+  rapdu_msg_release (msg);
+  rapdu_release (slotp->rapdu.handle);
+  slotp->used = 0;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /*USE_G10CODE_RAPDU*/
+
+
+
+/*
+       Driver Access
+ */
+
+
+static int
+lock_slot (int slot)
+{
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+  if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&reader_table[slot].lock, 0, NULL))
+    {
+      log_error ("failed to acquire apdu lock: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      return SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED;
+    }
+#endif /*USE_GNU_PTH*/
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+trylock_slot (int slot)
+{
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+  if (!pth_mutex_acquire (&reader_table[slot].lock, TRUE, NULL))
+    {
+      if (errno == EBUSY)
+        return SW_HOST_BUSY;
+      log_error ("failed to acquire apdu lock: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      return SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED;
+    }
+#endif /*USE_GNU_PTH*/
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+unlock_slot (int slot)
+{
+#ifdef USE_GNU_PTH
+  if (!pth_mutex_release (&reader_table[slot].lock))
+    log_error ("failed to release apdu lock: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+#endif /*USE_GNU_PTH*/
+}
+
+
+/* Open the reader and return an internal slot number or -1 on
+   error. If PORTSTR is NULL we default to a suitable port (for ctAPI:
+   the first USB reader.  For PC/SC the first listed reader). */
+int
+apdu_open_reader (const char *portstr)
+{
+  static int pcsc_api_loaded, ct_api_loaded;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUSB
+  if (!opt.disable_ccid)
+    {
+      int slot, i;
+      const char *s;
+
+      slot = open_ccid_reader (portstr);
+      if (slot != -1)
+        return slot; /* got one */
+
+      /* If a CCID reader specification has been given, the user does
+         not want a fallback to other drivers. */
+      if (portstr)
+        for (s=portstr, i=0; *s; s++)
+          if (*s == ':' && (++i == 3))
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBUSB */
+
+  if (opt.ctapi_driver && *opt.ctapi_driver)
+    {
+      int port = portstr? atoi (portstr) : 32768;
+
+      if (!ct_api_loaded)
+        {
+          void *handle;
+
+          handle = dlopen (opt.ctapi_driver, RTLD_LAZY);
+          if (!handle)
+            {
+              log_error ("apdu_open_reader: failed to open driver: %s\n",
+                         dlerror ());
+              return -1;
+            }
+          CT_init = dlsym (handle, "CT_init");
+          CT_data = dlsym (handle, "CT_data");
+          CT_close = dlsym (handle, "CT_close");
+          if (!CT_init || !CT_data || !CT_close)
+            {
+              log_error ("apdu_open_reader: invalid CT-API driver\n");
+              dlclose (handle);
+              return -1;
+            }
+          ct_api_loaded = 1;
+        }
+      return open_ct_reader (port);
+    }
+
+
+  /* No ctAPI configured, so lets try the PC/SC API */
+  if (!pcsc_api_loaded)
+    {
+#ifndef NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER
+      void *handle;
+
+      handle = dlopen (opt.pcsc_driver, RTLD_LAZY);
+      if (!handle)
+        {
+          log_error ("apdu_open_reader: failed to open driver `%s': %s\n",
+                     opt.pcsc_driver, dlerror ());
+          return -1;
+        }
+
+      pcsc_establish_context = dlsym (handle, "SCardEstablishContext");
+      pcsc_release_context   = dlsym (handle, "SCardReleaseContext");
+      pcsc_list_readers      = dlsym (handle, "SCardListReaders");
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+      if (!pcsc_list_readers)
+        pcsc_list_readers    = dlsym (handle, "SCardListReadersA");
+#endif
+      pcsc_get_status_change = dlsym (handle, "SCardGetStatusChange");
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+      if (!pcsc_get_status_change)
+        pcsc_get_status_change = dlsym (handle, "SCardGetStatusChangeA");
+#endif
+      pcsc_connect           = dlsym (handle, "SCardConnect");
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+      if (!pcsc_connect)
+        pcsc_connect         = dlsym (handle, "SCardConnectA");
+#endif
+      pcsc_reconnect         = dlsym (handle, "SCardReconnect");
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+      if (!pcsc_reconnect)
+        pcsc_reconnect       = dlsym (handle, "SCardReconnectA");
+#endif
+      pcsc_disconnect        = dlsym (handle, "SCardDisconnect");
+      pcsc_status            = dlsym (handle, "SCardStatus");
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+      if (!pcsc_status)
+        pcsc_status          = dlsym (handle, "SCardStatusA");
+#endif
+      pcsc_begin_transaction = dlsym (handle, "SCardBeginTransaction");
+      pcsc_end_transaction   = dlsym (handle, "SCardEndTransaction");
+      pcsc_transmit          = dlsym (handle, "SCardTransmit");
+      pcsc_set_timeout       = dlsym (handle, "SCardSetTimeout");
+
+      if (!pcsc_establish_context
+          || !pcsc_release_context
+          || !pcsc_list_readers
+          || !pcsc_get_status_change
+          || !pcsc_connect
+          || !pcsc_reconnect
+          || !pcsc_disconnect
+          || !pcsc_status
+          || !pcsc_begin_transaction
+          || !pcsc_end_transaction
+          || !pcsc_transmit
+          /* || !pcsc_set_timeout */)
+        {
+          /* Note that set_timeout is currently not used and also not
+             available under Windows. */
+          log_error ("apdu_open_reader: invalid PC/SC driver "
+                     "(%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d)\n",
+                     !!pcsc_establish_context,
+                     !!pcsc_release_context,
+                     !!pcsc_list_readers,
+                     !!pcsc_get_status_change,
+                     !!pcsc_connect,
+                     !!pcsc_reconnect,
+                     !!pcsc_disconnect,
+                     !!pcsc_status,
+                     !!pcsc_begin_transaction,
+                     !!pcsc_end_transaction,
+                     !!pcsc_transmit,
+                     !!pcsc_set_timeout );
+          dlclose (handle);
+          return -1;
+        }
+#endif /*!NEED_PCSC_WRAPPER*/
+      pcsc_api_loaded = 1;
+    }
+
+  return open_pcsc_reader (portstr);
+}
+
+
+/* Open an remote reader and return an internal slot number or -1 on
+   error. This function is an alternative to apdu_open_reader and used
+   with remote readers only.  Note that the supplied CLOSEFNC will
+   only be called once and the slot will not be valid afther this.
+
+   If PORTSTR is NULL we default to the first availabe port.
+*/
+int
+apdu_open_remote_reader (const char *portstr,
+                         const unsigned char *cookie, size_t length,
+                         int (*readfnc) (void *opaque,
+                                         void *buffer, size_t size),
+                         void *readfnc_value,
+                         int (*writefnc) (void *opaque,
+                                          const void *buffer, size_t size),
+                         void *writefnc_value,
+                         void (*closefnc) (void *opaque),
+                         void *closefnc_value)
+{
+#ifdef USE_G10CODE_RAPDU
+  return open_rapdu_reader (portstr? atoi (portstr) : 0,
+                            cookie, length,
+                            readfnc, readfnc_value,
+                            writefnc, writefnc_value,
+                            closefnc, closefnc_value);
+#else
+#ifdef _WIN32
+  errno = ENOENT;
+#else
+  errno = ENOSYS;
+#endif
+  return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+int
+apdu_close_reader (int slot)
+{
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+  if (reader_table[slot].close_reader)
+    return reader_table[slot].close_reader (slot);
+  return SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* Shutdown a reader; that is basically the same as a close but keeps
+   the handle ready for later use. A apdu_reset_header should be used
+   to get it active again. */
+int
+apdu_shutdown_reader (int slot)
+{
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+  if (reader_table[slot].shutdown_reader)
+    return reader_table[slot].shutdown_reader (slot);
+  return SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+/* Enumerate all readers and return information on whether this reader
+   is in use.  The caller should start with SLOT set to 0 and
+   increment it with each call until an error is returned. */
+int
+apdu_enum_reader (int slot, int *used)
+{
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER)
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+  *used = reader_table[slot].used;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Do a reset for the card in reader at SLOT. */
+int
+apdu_reset (int slot)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if ((sw = lock_slot (slot)))
+    return sw;
+
+  reader_table[slot].last_status = 0;
+  if (reader_table[slot].reset_reader)
+    sw = reader_table[slot].reset_reader (slot);
+
+  if (!sw)
+    {
+      /* If we got to here we know that a card is present
+         and usable.  Thus remember this.  */
+      reader_table[slot].last_status = (1|2|4| 0x8000);
+    }
+
+  unlock_slot (slot);
+  return sw;
+}
+
+
+/* Activate a card if it has not yet been done.  This is a kind of
+   reset-if-required.  It is useful to test for presence of a card
+   before issuing a bunch of apdu commands.  It does not wait on a
+   locked card. */
+int
+apdu_activate (int slot)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned int s;
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if ((sw = trylock_slot (slot)))
+    return sw;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].get_status_reader)
+    sw = reader_table[slot].get_status_reader (slot, &s);
+
+  if (!sw)
+    {
+      if (!(s & 2))  /* Card not present.  */
+        sw = SW_HOST_NO_CARD;
+      else if ( ((s & 2) && !(s & 4))
+                || !reader_table[slot].atrlen )
+        {
+          /* We don't have an ATR or a card is present though inactive:
+             do a reset now. */
+          if (reader_table[slot].reset_reader)
+            {
+              reader_table[slot].last_status = 0;
+              sw = reader_table[slot].reset_reader (slot);
+              if (!sw)
+                {
+                  /* If we got to here we know that a card is present
+                     and usable.  Thus remember this.  */
+                  reader_table[slot].last_status = (1|2|4| 0x8000);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  unlock_slot (slot);
+  return sw;
+}
+
+
+
+unsigned char *
+apdu_get_atr (int slot, size_t *atrlen)
+{
+  unsigned char *buf;
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return NULL;
+
+  buf = xtrymalloc (reader_table[slot].atrlen);
+  if (!buf)
+    return NULL;
+  memcpy (buf, reader_table[slot].atr, reader_table[slot].atrlen);
+  *atrlen = reader_table[slot].atrlen;
+  return buf;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Retrieve the status for SLOT. The function does only wait for the
+   card to become available if HANG is set to true. On success the
+   bits in STATUS will be set to
+
+     bit 0 = card present and usable
+     bit 1 = card present
+     bit 2 = card active
+     bit 3 = card access locked [not yet implemented]
+
+   For must application, testing bit 0 is sufficient.
+
+   CHANGED will receive the value of the counter tracking the number
+   of card insertions.  This value may be used to detect a card
+   change.
+*/
+int
+apdu_get_status (int slot, int hang,
+                 unsigned int *status, unsigned int *changed)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned int s;
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if ((sw = hang? lock_slot (slot) : trylock_slot (slot)))
+    return sw;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].get_status_reader)
+    sw = reader_table[slot].get_status_reader (slot, &s);
+
+  unlock_slot (slot);
+
+  if (sw)
+    {
+      reader_table[slot].last_status = 0;
+      return sw;
+    }
+
+  /* Keep track of changes.  We use one extra bit to test whether we
+     have checked the status at least once. */
+  if ( s != (reader_table[slot].last_status & 0x07ff)
+       || !reader_table[slot].last_status )
+    {
+      reader_table[slot].change_counter++;
+      /* Make sure that the ATR is invalid so that a reset will be by
+         activate.  */
+      reader_table[slot].atrlen = 0;
+    }
+  reader_table[slot].last_status = (s | 0x8000);
+
+  if (status)
+    *status = s;
+  if (changed)
+    *changed = reader_table[slot].change_counter;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Check whether the reader supports the ISO command code COMMAND on
+   the keypad.  Return 0 on success.  For a description of the pin
+   parameters, see ccid-driver.c */
+int
+apdu_check_keypad (int slot, int command, int pin_mode,
+                   int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen)
+{
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].check_keypad)
+    return reader_table[slot].check_keypad (slot, command,
+                                            pin_mode, pinlen_min, pinlen_max,
+                                            pin_padlen);
+  else
+    return SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+
+/* Dispatcher for the actual send_apdu function. Note, that this
+   function should be called in locked state. */
+static int
+send_apdu (int slot, unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+           unsigned char *buffer, size_t *buflen, struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if (reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader)
+    return reader_table[slot].send_apdu_reader (slot,
+                                                apdu, apdulen,
+                                                buffer, buflen, pininfo);
+  else
+    return SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+}
+
+
+/* Core APDU trabceiver function. Parameters are described at
+   apdu_send_le with the exception of PININFO which indicates keypad
+   related operations if not NULL. */
+static int
+send_le (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+         int lc, const char *data, int le,
+         unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen,
+         struct pininfo_s *pininfo)
+{
+#define RESULTLEN 256
+  unsigned char result[RESULTLEN+10]; /* 10 extra in case of bugs in
+                                         the driver. */
+  size_t resultlen;
+  unsigned char apdu[5+256+1];
+  size_t apdulen;
+  int sw;
+  long rc; /* we need a long here due to PC/SC. */
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    log_debug ("send apdu: c=%02X i=%02X p0=%02X p1=%02X lc=%d le=%d\n",
+               class, ins, p0, p1, lc, le);
+
+  if (lc != -1 && (lc > 255 || lc < 0))
+    return SW_WRONG_LENGTH;
+  if (le != -1 && (le > 256 || le < 0))
+    return SW_WRONG_LENGTH;
+  if ((!data && lc != -1) || (data && lc == -1))
+    return SW_HOST_INV_VALUE;
+
+  if ((sw = lock_slot (slot)))
+    return sw;
+
+  apdulen = 0;
+  apdu[apdulen++] = class;
+  apdu[apdulen++] = ins;
+  apdu[apdulen++] = p0;
+  apdu[apdulen++] = p1;
+  if (lc != -1)
+    {
+      apdu[apdulen++] = lc;
+      memcpy (apdu+apdulen, data, lc);
+      apdulen += lc;
+      /* T=0 does not allow the use of Lc together with Le; thus
+         disable Le in this case. */
+      if (reader_table[slot].is_t0)
+        le = -1;
+    }
+  if (le != -1)
+    apdu[apdulen++] = le; /* Truncation is okay because 0 means 256. */
+  assert (sizeof (apdu) >= apdulen);
+  /* As safeguard don't pass any garbage from the stack to the driver. */
+  memset (apdu+apdulen, 0, sizeof (apdu) - apdulen);
+  resultlen = RESULTLEN;
+  rc = send_apdu (slot, apdu, apdulen, result, &resultlen, pininfo);
+  if (rc || resultlen < 2)
+    {
+      log_error ("apdu_send_simple(%d) failed: %s\n",
+                 slot, apdu_strerror (rc));
+      unlock_slot (slot);
+      return rc? rc : SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE;
+    }
+  sw = (result[resultlen-2] << 8) | result[resultlen-1];
+  /* store away the returned data but strip the statusword. */
+  resultlen -= 2;
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    {
+      log_debug (" response: sw=%04X  datalen=%d\n",
+                 sw, (unsigned int)resultlen);
+      if ( !retbuf && (sw == SW_SUCCESS || (sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA))
+        log_printhex ("     dump: ", result, resultlen);
+    }
+
+  if (sw == SW_SUCCESS || sw == SW_EOF_REACHED)
+    {
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuf = xtrymalloc (resultlen? resultlen : 1);
+          if (!*retbuf)
+            {
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+            }
+          *retbuflen = resultlen;
+          memcpy (*retbuf, result, resultlen);
+        }
+    }
+  else if ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA)
+    {
+      unsigned char *p = NULL, *tmp;
+      size_t bufsize = 4096;
+
+      /* It is likely that we need to return much more data, so we
+         start off with a large buffer. */
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuf = p = xtrymalloc (bufsize);
+          if (!*retbuf)
+            {
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+            }
+          assert (resultlen < bufsize);
+          memcpy (p, result, resultlen);
+          p += resultlen;
+        }
+
+      do
+        {
+          int len = (sw & 0x00ff);
+
+          if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+            log_debug ("apdu_send_simple(%d): %d more bytes available\n",
+                       slot, len);
+          apdulen = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = class;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0xC0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = len;
+          memset (apdu+apdulen, 0, sizeof (apdu) - apdulen);
+          resultlen = RESULTLEN;
+          rc = send_apdu (slot, apdu, apdulen, result, &resultlen, NULL);
+          if (rc || resultlen < 2)
+            {
+              log_error ("apdu_send_simple(%d) for get response failed: %s\n",
+                         slot, apdu_strerror (rc));
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return rc? rc : SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE;
+            }
+          sw = (result[resultlen-2] << 8) | result[resultlen-1];
+          resultlen -= 2;
+          if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+            {
+              log_debug ("     more: sw=%04X  datalen=%d\n",
+                         sw, (unsigned int)resultlen);
+              if (!retbuf && (sw==SW_SUCCESS || (sw&0xff00)==SW_MORE_DATA))
+                log_printhex ("     dump: ", result, resultlen);
+            }
+
+          if ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA
+              || sw == SW_SUCCESS
+              || sw == SW_EOF_REACHED )
+            {
+              if (retbuf && resultlen)
+                {
+                  if (p - *retbuf + resultlen > bufsize)
+                    {
+                      bufsize += resultlen > 4096? resultlen: 4096;
+                      tmp = xtryrealloc (*retbuf, bufsize);
+                      if (!tmp)
+                        {
+                          unlock_slot (slot);
+                          return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+                        }
+                      p = tmp + (p - *retbuf);
+                      *retbuf = tmp;
+                    }
+                  memcpy (p, result, resultlen);
+                  p += resultlen;
+                }
+            }
+          else
+            log_info ("apdu_send_simple(%d) "
+                      "got unexpected status %04X from get response\n",
+                      slot, sw);
+        }
+      while ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA);
+
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuflen = p - *retbuf;
+          tmp = xtryrealloc (*retbuf, *retbuflen);
+          if (tmp)
+            *retbuf = tmp;
+        }
+    }
+
+  unlock_slot (slot);
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO && retbuf && sw == SW_SUCCESS)
+    log_printhex ("      dump: ", *retbuf, *retbuflen);
+
+  return sw;
+#undef RESULTLEN
+}
+
+/* Send an APDU to the card in SLOT.  The APDU is created from all
+   given parameters: CLASS, INS, P0, P1, LC, DATA, LE.  A value of -1
+   for LC won't sent this field and the data field; in this case DATA
+   must also be passed as NULL.  The return value is the status word
+   or -1 for an invalid SLOT or other non card related error.  If
+   RETBUF is not NULL, it will receive an allocated buffer with the
+   returned data.  The length of that data will be put into
+   *RETBUFLEN.  The caller is reponsible for releasing the buffer even
+   in case of errors.  */
+int
+apdu_send_le(int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+             int lc, const char *data, int le,
+             unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen)
+{
+  return send_le (slot, class, ins, p0, p1,
+                  lc, data, le,
+                  retbuf, retbuflen,
+                  NULL);
+}
+
+
+/* Send an APDU to the card in SLOT.  The APDU is created from all
+   given parameters: CLASS, INS, P0, P1, LC, DATA.  A value of -1 for
+   LC won't sent this field and the data field; in this case DATA must
+   also be passed as NULL. The return value is the status word or -1
+   for an invalid SLOT or other non card related error.  If RETBUF is
+   not NULL, it will receive an allocated buffer with the returned
+   data.  The length of that data will be put into *RETBUFLEN.  The
+   caller is reponsible for releasing the buffer even in case of
+   errors.  */
+int
+apdu_send (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+           int lc, const char *data, unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen)
+{
+  return send_le (slot, class, ins, p0, p1, lc, data, 256,
+                  retbuf, retbuflen, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Send an APDU to the card in SLOT.  The APDU is created from all
+   given parameters: CLASS, INS, P0, P1, LC, DATA.  A value of -1 for
+   LC won't sent this field and the data field; in this case DATA must
+   also be passed as NULL. The return value is the status word or -1
+   for an invalid SLOT or other non card related error.  No data will be
+   returned. */
+int
+apdu_send_simple (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+                  int lc, const char *data)
+{
+  return send_le (slot, class, ins, p0, p1, lc, data, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/* Same as apdu_send_simple but uses the keypad of the reader. */
+int
+apdu_send_simple_kp (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+                     int lc, const char *data,  
+                     int pin_mode,
+                     int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen)
+{
+  struct pininfo_s pininfo;
+
+  pininfo.mode = pin_mode;
+  pininfo.minlen = pinlen_min;
+  pininfo.maxlen = pinlen_max;
+  pininfo.padlen = pin_padlen;
+  return send_le (slot, class, ins, p0, p1, lc, data, -1,
+                  NULL, NULL, &pininfo);
+}
+
+
+/* This is a more generic version of the apdu sending routine.  It
+   takes an already formatted APDU in APDUDATA or length APDUDATALEN
+   and returns the with the APDU including the status word.  With
+   HANDLE_MORE set to true this function will handle the MORE DATA
+   status and return all APDUs concatenated with one status word at
+   the end.  The function does not return a regular status word but 0
+   on success.  If the slot is locked, the fucntion returns
+   immediately.*/
+int
+apdu_send_direct (int slot, const unsigned char *apdudata, size_t apdudatalen,
+                  int handle_more,
+                  unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen)
+{
+#define RESULTLEN 256
+  unsigned char apdu[5+256+1];
+  size_t apdulen;
+  unsigned char result[RESULTLEN+10]; /* 10 extra in case of bugs in
+                                         the driver. */
+  size_t resultlen;
+  int sw;
+  long rc; /* we need a long here due to PC/SC. */
+  int class;
+
+  if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
+    return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
+
+  if ((sw = trylock_slot (slot)))
+    return sw;
+
+  /* We simply trunctate a too long APDU.  */
+  if (apdudatalen > sizeof apdu)
+    apdudatalen = sizeof apdu;
+  apdulen = apdudatalen;
+  memcpy (apdu, apdudata, apdudatalen);
+  class = apdulen? *apdu : 0;
+
+  resultlen = RESULTLEN;
+  rc = send_apdu (slot, apdu, apdulen, result, &resultlen, NULL);
+  if (rc || resultlen < 2)
+    {
+      log_error ("apdu_send_direct(%d) failed: %s\n",
+                 slot, apdu_strerror (rc));
+      unlock_slot (slot);
+      return rc? rc : SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE;
+    }
+  sw = (result[resultlen-2] << 8) | result[resultlen-1];
+  /* Store away the returned data but strip the statusword. */
+  resultlen -= 2;
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+    {
+      log_debug (" response: sw=%04X  datalen=%d\n",
+                 sw, (unsigned int)resultlen);
+      if ( !retbuf && (sw == SW_SUCCESS || (sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA))
+        log_printhex ("     dump: ", result, resultlen);
+    }
+
+  if (handle_more && (sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA)
+    {
+      unsigned char *p = NULL, *tmp;
+      size_t bufsize = 4096;
+
+      /* It is likely that we need to return much more data, so we
+         start off with a large buffer. */
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuf = p = xtrymalloc (bufsize + 2);
+          if (!*retbuf)
+            {
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+            }
+          assert (resultlen < bufsize);
+          memcpy (p, result, resultlen);
+          p += resultlen;
+        }
+
+      do
+        {
+          int len = (sw & 0x00ff);
+
+          if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+            log_debug ("apdu_send_direct(%d): %d more bytes available\n",
+                       slot, len);
+          apdulen = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = class;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0xC0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = 0;
+          apdu[apdulen++] = len;
+          memset (apdu+apdulen, 0, sizeof (apdu) - apdulen);
+          resultlen = RESULTLEN;
+          rc = send_apdu (slot, apdu, apdulen, result, &resultlen, NULL);
+          if (rc || resultlen < 2)
+            {
+              log_error ("apdu_send_direct(%d) for get response failed: %s\n",
+                         slot, apdu_strerror (rc));
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return rc ? rc : SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE;
+            }
+          sw = (result[resultlen-2] << 8) | result[resultlen-1];
+          resultlen -= 2;
+          if (DBG_CARD_IO)
+            {
+              log_debug ("     more: sw=%04X  datalen=%d\n",
+                         sw, (unsigned int)resultlen);
+              if (!retbuf && (sw==SW_SUCCESS || (sw&0xff00)==SW_MORE_DATA))
+                log_printhex ("     dump: ", result, resultlen);
+            }
+
+          if ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA
+              || sw == SW_SUCCESS
+              || sw == SW_EOF_REACHED )
+            {
+              if (retbuf && resultlen)
+                {
+                  if (p - *retbuf + resultlen > bufsize)
+                    {
+                      bufsize += resultlen > 4096? resultlen: 4096;
+                      tmp = xtryrealloc (*retbuf, bufsize + 2);
+                      if (!tmp)
+                        {
+                          unlock_slot (slot);
+                          return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+                        }
+                      p = tmp + (p - *retbuf);
+                      *retbuf = tmp;
+                    }
+                  memcpy (p, result, resultlen);
+                  p += resultlen;
+                }
+            }
+          else
+            log_info ("apdu_send_sdirect(%d) "
+                      "got unexpected status %04X from get response\n",
+                      slot, sw);
+        }
+      while ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA);
+
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuflen = p - *retbuf;
+          tmp = xtryrealloc (*retbuf, *retbuflen + 2);
+          if (tmp)
+            *retbuf = tmp;
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (retbuf)
+        {
+          *retbuf = xtrymalloc ((resultlen? resultlen : 1)+2);
+          if (!*retbuf)
+            {
+              unlock_slot (slot);
+              return SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE;
+            }
+          *retbuflen = resultlen;
+          memcpy (*retbuf, result, resultlen);
+        }
+    }
+
+  unlock_slot (slot);
+
+  /* Append the status word - we reseved the two extra bytes while
+     allocating the buffer. */
+  if (retbuf)
+    {
+      (*retbuf)[(*retbuflen)++] = (sw >> 8);
+      (*retbuf)[(*retbuflen)++] = sw;
+    }
+
+  if (DBG_CARD_IO && retbuf)
+    log_printhex ("      dump: ", *retbuf, *retbuflen);
+
+  return 0;
+#undef RESULTLEN
+}
diff --git a/g10/apdu.h b/g10/apdu.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8e3b36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/apdu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* apdu.h - ISO 7816 APDU functions and low level I/O
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: apdu.h 3916 2005-10-27 09:14:27Z wk $
+ */
+
+#ifndef APDU_H
+#define APDU_H
+
+/* ISO 7816 values for the statusword are defined here because they
+   should not be visible to the users of the actual ISO command
+   API. */
+enum {
+  SW_MORE_DATA      = 0x6100, /* Note: that the low byte must be
+                                 masked of.*/
+  SW_EOF_REACHED    = 0x6282,
+  SW_EEPROM_FAILURE = 0x6581,
+  SW_WRONG_LENGTH   = 0x6700,
+  SW_CHV_WRONG      = 0x6982,
+  SW_CHV_BLOCKED    = 0x6983,
+  SW_USE_CONDITIONS = 0x6985,
+  SW_BAD_PARAMETER  = 0x6a80, /* (in the data field) */
+  SW_NOT_SUPPORTED  = 0x6a81,
+  SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND = 0x6a82,
+  SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND = 0x6a83,
+  SW_REF_NOT_FOUND  = 0x6a88,
+  SW_BAD_P0_P1      = 0x6b00,
+  SW_EXACT_LENGTH   = 0x6c00,
+  SW_INS_NOT_SUP    = 0x6d00,
+  SW_CLA_NOT_SUP    = 0x6e00,
+  SW_SUCCESS        = 0x9000,
+
+  /* The follwoing statuswords are no real ones but used to map host
+     OS errors into status words.  A status word is 16 bit so that
+     those values can't be issued by a card. */
+  SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE = 0x10001,  /* No way yet to differentiate
+                                     between errnos on a failed malloc. */
+  SW_HOST_INV_VALUE     = 0x10002,
+  SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE = 0x10003,
+  SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER     = 0x10004,
+  SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED = 0x10005,
+  SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED= 0x10006,
+  SW_HOST_BUSY          = 0x10007,
+  SW_HOST_NO_CARD       = 0x10008,
+  SW_HOST_CARD_INACTIVE = 0x10009,
+  SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR = 0x1000a,
+  SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR = 0x1000b,
+  SW_HOST_NO_READER     = 0x1000c,
+  SW_HOST_ABORTED       = 0x1000d,
+  SW_HOST_NO_KEYPAD     = 0x1000e
+};
+
+
+#define SW_EXACT_LENGTH_P(a) (((a)&~0xff) == SW_EXACT_LENGTH)
+
+
+/* Note , that apdu_open_reader returns no status word but -1 on error. */
+int apdu_open_reader (const char *portstr);
+int apdu_open_remote_reader (const char *portstr,
+                             const unsigned char *cookie, size_t length,
+                             int (*readfnc) (void *opaque,
+                                             void *buffer, size_t size),
+                             void *readfnc_value,
+                             int (*writefnc) (void *opaque,
+                                              const void *buffer, size_t size),
+                             void *writefnc_value,
+                             void (*closefnc) (void *opaque),
+                             void *closefnc_value);
+int apdu_shutdown_reader (int slot);
+int apdu_close_reader (int slot);
+int apdu_enum_reader (int slot, int *used);
+unsigned char *apdu_get_atr (int slot, size_t *atrlen);
+
+const char *apdu_strerror (int rc);
+
+
+/* These apdu functions do return status words. */
+
+int apdu_activate (int slot);
+int apdu_reset (int slot);
+int apdu_get_status (int slot, int hang,
+                     unsigned int *status, unsigned int *changed);
+int apdu_check_keypad (int slot, int command, int pin_mode,
+                       int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen);
+int apdu_send_simple (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+                      int lc, const char *data);
+int apdu_send_simple_kp (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+                         int lc, const char *data,  
+                         int pin_mode,
+                         int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen);
+int apdu_send (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+               int lc, const char *data,
+               unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen);
+int apdu_send_le (int slot, int class, int ins, int p0, int p1,
+                  int lc, const char *data, int le,
+                  unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen);
+int apdu_send_direct (int slot,
+                      const unsigned char *apdudata, size_t apdudatalen,
+                      int handle_more,
+                      unsigned char **retbuf, size_t *retbuflen);
+
+
+#endif /*APDU_H*/
+
+
+
diff --git a/g10/app-common.h b/g10/app-common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d517425
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/app-common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/* app-common.h - Common declarations for all card applications
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: app-common.h 3754 2005-05-31 10:11:01Z wk $
+ */
+
+#ifndef GNUPG_SCD_APP_COMMON_H
+#define GNUPG_SCD_APP_COMMON_H
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+# ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+# include "assuan.h"
+# endif 
+#else
+# include <ksba.h>
+#endif
+
+
+struct app_local_s;  /* Defined by all app-*.c.  */
+
+struct app_ctx_s {
+  int initialized;  /* The application has been initialied and the
+                       function pointers may be used.  Note that for
+                       unsupported operations the particular
+                       function pointer is set to NULL */
+  int slot;         /* Used reader. */
+
+  /* If this is used by GnuPG 1.4 we need to know the assuan context
+     in case we need to divert the operation to an already running
+     agent.  This if ASSUAN_CTX is not NULL we take this as indication
+     that all operations are diverted to gpg-agent. */
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  assuan_context_t assuan_ctx;
+#endif /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1*/
+
+  unsigned char *serialno; /* Serialnumber in raw form, allocated. */
+  size_t serialnolen;      /* Length in octets of serialnumber. */
+  const char *apptype;
+  unsigned int card_version;
+  int did_chv1;
+  int force_chv1;   /* True if the card does not cache CHV1. */
+  int did_chv2;
+  int did_chv3;
+  struct app_local_s *app_local;  /* Local to the application. */
+  struct {
+    void (*deinit) (app_t app);
+    gpg_error_t (*learn_status) (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl);
+    gpg_error_t (*readcert) (app_t app, const char *certid,
+                     unsigned char **cert, size_t *certlen);
+    gpg_error_t (*readkey) (app_t app, const char *certid,
+                    unsigned char **pk, size_t *pklen);
+    gpg_error_t (*getattr) (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name);
+    gpg_error_t (*setattr) (app_t app, const char *name,
+                    gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                    void *pincb_arg,
+                    const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen);
+    gpg_error_t (*sign) (app_t app,
+                 const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
+                 gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                 void *pincb_arg,
+                 const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                 unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen );
+    gpg_error_t (*auth) (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+                 gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                 void *pincb_arg,
+                 const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                 unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen);
+    gpg_error_t (*decipher) (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+                     gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                     void *pincb_arg,
+                     const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                     unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen);
+    gpg_error_t (*writekey) (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                             const char *certid, unsigned int flags,
+                             gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*,const char *,char **),
+                             void *pincb_arg,
+                             const unsigned char *pk, size_t pklen);
+    gpg_error_t (*genkey) (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                   const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags,
+                   gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                   void *pincb_arg);
+    gpg_error_t (*change_pin) (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                       const char *chvnostr, int reset_mode,
+                       gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                       void *pincb_arg);
+    gpg_error_t (*check_pin) (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+                      gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                      void *pincb_arg);
+  } fnc;
+
+};
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+gpg_error_t app_select_openpgp (app_t app);
+gpg_error_t app_get_serial_and_stamp (app_t app, char **serial, time_t *stamp);
+gpg_error_t app_openpgp_storekey (app_t app, int keyno,
+                          unsigned char *template, size_t template_len,
+                          time_t created_at,
+                          const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen,
+                          const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+                          gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                          void *pincb_arg);
+#else
+/*-- app-help.c --*/
+gpg_error_t app_help_get_keygrip_string (ksba_cert_t cert, char *hexkeygrip);
+size_t app_help_read_length_of_cert (int slot, int fid, size_t *r_certoff);
+
+
+/*-- app.c --*/
+gpg_error_t select_application (ctrl_t ctrl, int slot, const char *name,
+                                app_t *r_app);
+void release_application (app_t app);
+gpg_error_t app_munge_serialno (app_t app);
+gpg_error_t app_get_serial_and_stamp (app_t app, char **serial, time_t *stamp);
+gpg_error_t app_write_learn_status (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl);
+gpg_error_t app_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid,
+                  unsigned char **cert, size_t *certlen);
+gpg_error_t app_readkey (app_t app, const char *keyid,
+                 unsigned char **pk, size_t *pklen);
+gpg_error_t app_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name);
+gpg_error_t app_setattr (app_t app, const char *name,
+                 gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                 void *pincb_arg,
+                 const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen);
+gpg_error_t app_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
+              gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+              void *pincb_arg,
+              const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+              unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen );
+gpg_error_t app_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+              gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+              void *pincb_arg,
+              const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+              unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen);
+gpg_error_t app_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+                  gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                  void *pincb_arg,
+                  const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                  unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen );
+gpg_error_t app_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                          const char *keyidstr, unsigned int flags,
+                          gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                          void *pincb_arg,
+                          const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen);
+gpg_error_t app_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags,
+                gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                void *pincb_arg);
+gpg_error_t app_get_challenge (app_t app, size_t nbytes,
+                               unsigned char *buffer);
+gpg_error_t app_change_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+                    const char *chvnostr, int reset_mode,
+                    gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                    void *pincb_arg);
+gpg_error_t app_check_pin (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+                   gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+                   void *pincb_arg);
+
+
+/*-- app-openpgp.c --*/
+gpg_error_t app_select_openpgp (app_t app);
+
+/*-- app-nks.c --*/
+gpg_error_t app_select_nks (app_t app);
+
+/*-- app-dinsig.c --*/
+gpg_error_t app_select_dinsig (app_t app);
+
+/*-- app-p15.c --*/
+gpg_error_t app_select_p15 (app_t app);
+
+
+#endif
+
+
+
+#endif /*GNUPG_SCD_APP_COMMON_H*/
+
+
+
diff --git a/g10/app-openpgp.c b/g10/app-openpgp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d83963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/app-openpgp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2528 @@
+/* app-openpgp.c - The OpenPGP card application.
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: app-openpgp.c 4178 2006-06-28 09:37:42Z wk $
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+/* This is used with GnuPG version < 1.9.  The code has been source
+   copied from the current GnuPG >= 1.9  and is maintained over
+   there. */
+#include "options.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#else /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+#include "scdaemon.h"
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "iso7816.h"
+#include "app-common.h"
+#include "tlv.h"
+
+
+static struct {
+  int tag;
+  int constructed;
+  int get_from;  /* Constructed DO with this DO or 0 for direct access. */
+  int binary;
+  int dont_cache;
+  int flush_on_error;
+  int get_immediate_in_v11; /* Enable a hack to bypass the cache of
+                               this data object if it is used in 1.1
+                               and later versions of the card.  This
+                               does not work with composite DO and is
+                               currently only useful for the CHV
+                               status bytes. */
+  char *desc;
+} data_objects[] = {
+  { 0x005E, 0,    0, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Login Data" },
+  { 0x5F50, 0,    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "URL" },
+  { 0x0065, 1,    0, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Cardholder Related Data"},
+  { 0x005B, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Name" },
+  { 0x5F2D, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Language preferences" },
+  { 0x5F35, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Sex" },
+  { 0x006E, 1,    0, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Application Related Data" },
+  { 0x004F, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, "AID" },
+  { 0x0073, 1,    0, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Discretionary Data Objects" },
+  { 0x0047, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Card Capabilities" },
+  { 0x00C0, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Extended Card Capabilities" },
+  { 0x00C1, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Signature" },
+  { 0x00C2, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Decryption" },
+  { 0x00C3, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Authentication" },
+  { 0x00C4, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 1, 1, "CHV Status Bytes" },
+  { 0x00C5, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Fingerprints" },
+  { 0x00C6, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, "CA Fingerprints" },
+  { 0x00CD, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Generation time" },
+  { 0x007A, 1,    0, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Security Support Template" },
+  { 0x0093, 0, 0x7A, 1, 1, 0, 0, "Digital Signature Counter" },
+  { 0x0101, 0,    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Private DO 1"},
+  { 0x0102, 0,    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Private DO 2"},
+  { 0x0103, 0,    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Private DO 3"},
+  { 0x0104, 0,    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Private DO 4"},
+  { 0 }
+};
+
+
+/* One cache item for DOs.  */
+struct cache_s {
+  struct cache_s *next;
+  int tag;
+  size_t length;
+  unsigned char data[1];
+};
+
+
+/* Object with application (i.e. OpenPGP card) specific data.  */
+struct app_local_s {
+  /* A linked list with cached DOs.  */
+  struct cache_s *cache;
+  
+  /* Keep track of the public keys.  */
+  struct
+  {
+    int read_done;   /* True if we have at least tried to read them.  */
+    unsigned char *key; /* This is a malloced buffer with a canonical
+                           encoded S-expression encoding a public
+                           key. Might be NULL if key is not
+                           available.  */
+    size_t keylen;      /* The length of the above S-expression.  Thsi
+                           is usullay only required for corss checks
+                           because the length of an S-expression is
+                           implicitly available.  */
+  } pk[3];
+
+  /* Keep track of card capabilities.  */
+  struct 
+  {
+    unsigned int get_challenge:1;
+    unsigned int key_import:1;
+    unsigned int change_force_chv:1;
+    unsigned int private_dos:1;
+  } extcap;
+
+  /* Flags used to control the application.  */
+  struct
+  {
+    unsigned int no_sync:1;   /* Do not sync CHV1 and CHV2 */
+    unsigned int def_chv2:1;  /* Use 123456 for CHV2.  */
+  } flags;
+};
+
+
+
+/***** Local prototypes  *****/
+static unsigned long convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value,
+                                                size_t valuelen);
+static unsigned long get_sig_counter (app_t app);
+
+
+
+
+
+/* Deconstructor. */
+static void
+do_deinit (app_t app)
+{
+  if (app && app->app_local)
+    {
+      struct cache_s *c, *c2;
+      int i;
+
+      for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2)
+        {
+          c2 = c->next;
+          xfree (c);
+        }
+
+      for (i=0; i < DIM (app->app_local->pk); i++)
+        {
+          xfree (app->app_local->pk[i].key);
+          app->app_local->pk[i].read_done = 0;
+        }
+      xfree (app->app_local);
+      app->app_local = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Wrapper around iso7816_get_data which first tries to get the data
+   from the cache.  With GET_IMMEDIATE passed as true, the cache is
+   bypassed. */
+static gpg_error_t
+get_cached_data (app_t app, int tag, 
+                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen,
+                 int get_immediate)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  int i;
+  unsigned char *p;
+  size_t len;
+  struct cache_s *c;
+
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  if (!get_immediate)
+    {
+      for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next)
+        if (c->tag == tag)
+          {
+            if(c->length)
+              {
+                p = xtrymalloc (c->length);
+                if (!p)
+                  return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+                memcpy (p, c->data, c->length);
+                *result = p;
+              }
+            
+            *resultlen = c->length;
+            
+            return 0;
+          }
+    }
+  
+  err = iso7816_get_data (app->slot, tag, &p, &len);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+  *result = p;
+  *resultlen = len;
+
+  /* Check whether we should cache this object. */
+  if (get_immediate)
+    return 0;
+
+  for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++)
+    if (data_objects[i].tag == tag)
+      {
+        if (data_objects[i].dont_cache)
+          return 0;
+        break;
+      }
+
+  /* Okay, cache it. */
+  for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next)
+    assert (c->tag != tag);
+  
+  c = xtrymalloc (sizeof *c + len);
+  if (c)
+    {
+      memcpy (c->data, p, len);
+      c->length = len;
+      c->tag = tag;
+      c->next = app->app_local->cache;
+      app->app_local->cache = c;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Remove DO at TAG from the cache. */
+static void
+flush_cache_item (app_t app, int tag)
+{
+  struct cache_s *c, *cprev;
+  int i;
+
+  if (!app->app_local)
+    return;
+
+  for (c=app->app_local->cache, cprev=NULL; c ; cprev=c, c = c->next)
+    if (c->tag == tag)
+      {
+        if (cprev)
+          cprev->next = c->next;
+        else
+          app->app_local->cache = c->next;
+        xfree (c);
+
+        for (c=app->app_local->cache; c ; c = c->next)
+          {
+            assert (c->tag != tag); /* Oops: duplicated entry. */
+          }
+        return;
+      }
+
+  /* Try again if we have an outer tag. */
+  for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++)
+    if (data_objects[i].tag == tag && data_objects[i].get_from
+        && data_objects[i].get_from != tag)
+      flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].get_from);
+}
+
+/* Flush all entries from the cache which might be out of sync after
+   an error. */
+static void
+flush_cache_after_error (app_t app)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++)
+    if (data_objects[i].flush_on_error)
+      flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].tag);
+}
+
+
+/* Flush the entire cache. */
+static void
+flush_cache (app_t app)
+{
+  if (app && app->app_local)
+    {
+      struct cache_s *c, *c2;
+
+      for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2)
+        {
+          c2 = c->next;
+          xfree (c);
+        }
+      app->app_local->cache = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Get the DO identified by TAG from the card in SLOT and return a
+   buffer with its content in RESULT and NBYTES.  The return value is
+   NULL if not found or a pointer which must be used to release the
+   buffer holding value. */
+static void *
+get_one_do (app_t app, int tag, unsigned char **result, size_t *nbytes,
+            int *r_rc)
+{
+  int rc, i;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t buflen;
+  unsigned char *value;
+  size_t valuelen;
+  int dummyrc;
+
+  if (!r_rc)
+    r_rc = &dummyrc;
+
+  *result = NULL;
+  *nbytes = 0;
+  *r_rc = 0;
+  for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].tag != tag; i++)
+    ;
+
+  if (app->card_version > 0x0100 && data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11)
+    {
+      rc = iso7816_get_data (app->slot, tag, &buffer, &buflen);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          *r_rc = rc;
+          return NULL;
+        }
+      *result = buffer;
+      *nbytes = buflen;
+      return buffer;
+    }
+
+  value = NULL;
+  rc = -1;
+  if (data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].get_from)
+    {
+      rc = get_cached_data (app, data_objects[i].get_from,
+                            &buffer, &buflen,
+                            (data_objects[i].dont_cache 
+                             || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11));
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          const unsigned char *s;
+
+          s = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen, tag, &valuelen);
+          if (!s)
+            value = NULL; /* not found */
+          else if (valuelen > buflen - (s - buffer))
+            {
+              log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n");
+              value = NULL;
+              xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL;
+            }
+          else
+            value = buffer + (s - buffer);
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!value) /* Not in a constructed DO, try simple. */
+    {
+      rc = get_cached_data (app, tag, &buffer, &buflen,
+                            (data_objects[i].dont_cache 
+                             || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11));
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          value = buffer;
+          valuelen = buflen;
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      *nbytes = valuelen;
+      *result = value;
+      return buffer;
+    }
+  *r_rc = rc;
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static void
+dump_all_do (int slot)
+{
+  int rc, i, j;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t buflen;
+  
+  for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++)
+    {
+      if (data_objects[i].get_from)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, data_objects[i].tag, &buffer, &buflen);
+      if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ)
+        ;
+      else if (rc) 
+        log_info ("DO `%s' not available: %s\n",
+                  data_objects[i].desc, gpg_strerror (rc));
+      else
+        {
+          if (data_objects[i].binary)
+            {
+              log_info ("DO `%s': ", data_objects[i].desc);
+              log_printhex ("", buffer, buflen);
+            }
+          else
+            log_info ("DO `%s': `%.*s'\n",
+                      data_objects[i].desc,
+                      (int)buflen, buffer); /* FIXME: sanitize */
+
+          if (data_objects[i].constructed)
+            {
+              for (j=0; data_objects[j].tag; j++)
+                {
+                  const unsigned char *value;
+                  size_t valuelen;
+                  
+                  if (j==i || data_objects[i].tag != data_objects[j].get_from)
+                    continue;
+                  value = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen,
+                                              data_objects[j].tag, &valuelen);
+                  if (!value)
+                    ; /* not found */
+                  else if (valuelen > buflen - (value - buffer))
+                    log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n");
+                  else
+                    {
+                      if (data_objects[j].binary)
+                        {
+                          log_info ("DO `%s': ", data_objects[j].desc);
+                          log_printhex ("", value, valuelen);
+                        }
+                      else
+                        log_info ("DO `%s': `%.*s'\n",
+                                  data_objects[j].desc,
+                                  (int)valuelen, value); /* FIXME: sanitize */
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+      xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Count the number of bits, assuming the A represents an unsigned big
+   integer of length LEN bytes. */
+static unsigned int
+count_bits (const unsigned char *a, size_t len)
+{
+  unsigned int n = len * 8;
+  int i;
+
+  for (; len && !*a; len--, a++, n -=8)
+    ;
+  if (len)
+    {
+      for (i=7; i && !(*a & (1<<i)); i--)
+        n--;
+    }
+  return n;
+}
+
+/* GnuPG makes special use of the login-data DO, this fucntion parses
+   the login data to store the flags for later use.  It may be called
+   at any time and should be called after changing the login-data DO.
+
+   Everything up to a LF is considered a mailbox or account name.  If
+   the first LF is followed by DC4 (0x14) control sequence are
+   expected up to the next LF.  Control sequences are separated by FS
+   (0x28) and consist of key=value pairs.  There is one key defined:
+
+    F=<flags>
+
+    Were FLAGS is a plain hexadecimal number representing flag values.
+    The lsb is here the rightmost bit.  Defined flags bits are:
+
+      Bit 0 = CHV1 and CHV2 are not syncronized
+      Bit 1 = CHV2 has been been set to the default PIN of "123456"
+              (this implies that bit 0 is also set).
+
+*/
+static void
+parse_login_data (app_t app)
+{
+  unsigned char *buffer, *p;
+  size_t buflen, len;
+  void *relptr;
+
+  /* Set defaults.  */
+  app->app_local->flags.no_sync = 0;
+  app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = 0;
+
+  /* Read the DO.  */
+  relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x005E, &buffer, &buflen, NULL);
+  if (!relptr)
+    return; /* Ooops. */
+  for (; buflen; buflen--, buffer++)
+    if (*buffer == '\n')
+      break;
+  if (buflen < 2 || buffer[1] != '\x14')
+    return; /* No control sequences.  */
+  buflen--;
+  buffer++;
+  do
+    {
+      buflen--;
+      buffer++;
+      if (buflen > 1 && *buffer == 'F' && buffer[1] == '=')
+        {
+          /* Flags control sequence found.  */
+          int lastdig = 0;
+
+          /* For now we are only interested in the last digit, so skip
+             any leading digits but bail out on invalid characters. */
+          for (p=buffer+2, len = buflen-2; len && hexdigitp (p); p++, len--)
+            lastdig = xtoi_1 (p);
+          if (len && !(*p == '\n' || *p == '\x18'))
+            goto next;  /* Invalid characters in field.  */
+          app->app_local->flags.no_sync = !!(lastdig & 1);
+          app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = (lastdig & 3) == 3;
+        }
+    next:
+      for (; buflen && *buffer != '\x18'; buflen--, buffer++)
+        if (*buffer == '\n')
+          buflen = 1; 
+    }
+  while (buflen);
+
+  xfree (relptr);
+}
+
+/* Note, that FPR must be at least 20 bytes. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+store_fpr (int slot, int keynumber, u32 timestamp,
+           const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen,
+           const unsigned char *e, size_t elen, 
+           unsigned char *fpr, unsigned int card_version)
+{
+  unsigned int n, nbits;
+  unsigned char *buffer, *p;
+  int rc;
+  
+  for (; mlen && !*m; mlen--, m++) /* strip leading zeroes */
+    ;
+  for (; elen && !*e; elen--, e++) /* strip leading zeroes */
+    ;
+
+  n = 6 + 2 + mlen + 2 + elen;
+  p = buffer = xtrymalloc (3 + n);
+  if (!buffer)
+    return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+  
+  *p++ = 0x99;     /* ctb */
+  *p++ = n >> 8;   /* 2 byte length header */
+  *p++ = n;
+  *p++ = 4;        /* key packet version */
+  *p++ = timestamp >> 24;
+  *p++ = timestamp >> 16;
+  *p++ = timestamp >>  8;
+  *p++ = timestamp;
+  *p++ = 1; /* RSA */
+  nbits = count_bits (m, mlen);
+  *p++ = nbits >> 8;
+  *p++ = nbits;
+  memcpy (p, m, mlen); p += mlen;
+  nbits = count_bits (e, elen);
+  *p++ = nbits >> 8;
+  *p++ = nbits;
+  memcpy (p, e, elen); p += elen;
+    
+  gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, buffer, n+3);
+
+  xfree (buffer);
+
+  rc = iso7816_put_data (slot, (card_version > 0x0007? 0xC7 : 0xC6)
+                               + keynumber, fpr, 20);
+  if (rc)
+    log_error (_("failed to store the fingerprint: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+  if (!rc && card_version > 0x0100)
+    {
+      unsigned char buf[4];
+
+      buf[0] = timestamp >> 24;
+      buf[1] = timestamp >> 16;
+      buf[2] = timestamp >>  8;
+      buf[3] = timestamp;
+
+      rc = iso7816_put_data (slot, 0xCE + keynumber, buf, 4);
+      if (rc)
+        log_error (_("failed to store the creation date: %s\n"),
+                   gpg_strerror (rc));
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+       
+static void
+send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword,
+                      int number, const unsigned char *fpr)
+{                      
+  int i;
+  char buf[41];
+  char numbuf[25];
+
+  for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++)
+    ;
+  if (i==20)
+    return; /* All zero. */
+  for (i=0; i< 20; i++)
+    sprintf (buf+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i]);
+  if (number == -1)
+    *numbuf = 0; /* Don't print the key number */
+  else
+    sprintf (numbuf, "%d", number);
+  send_status_info (ctrl, keyword,
+                    numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf),
+                    buf, (size_t)strlen (buf), NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword,
+                          int number, const unsigned char *stamp)
+{                      
+  char numbuf1[50], numbuf2[50];
+  unsigned long value;
+
+  value = (stamp[0] << 24) | (stamp[1]<<16) | (stamp[2]<<8) | stamp[3];
+  if (!value)
+    return;
+  sprintf (numbuf1, "%d", number);
+  sprintf (numbuf2, "%lu", value);
+  send_status_info (ctrl, keyword,
+                    numbuf1, (size_t)strlen(numbuf1),
+                    numbuf2, (size_t)strlen(numbuf2), NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+send_key_data (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, 
+               const unsigned char *a, size_t alen)
+{
+  char *p, *buf = xmalloc (alen*2+1);
+  
+  for (p=buf; alen; a++, alen--, p += 2)
+    sprintf (p, "%02X", *a);
+
+  send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-DATA",
+                    name, (size_t)strlen(name), 
+                    buf, (size_t)strlen (buf),
+                    NULL, 0);
+  xfree (buf);
+}
+
+/* Implement the GETATTR command.  This is similar to the LEARN
+   command but returns just one value via the status interface. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name)
+{
+  static struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int tag;
+    int special;
+  } table[] = {
+    { "DISP-NAME",    0x005B },
+    { "LOGIN-DATA",   0x005E },
+    { "DISP-LANG",    0x5F2D },
+    { "DISP-SEX",     0x5F35 },
+    { "PUBKEY-URL",   0x5F50 },
+    { "KEY-FPR",      0x00C5, 3 },
+    { "KEY-TIME",     0x00CD, 4 },
+    { "CA-FPR",       0x00C6, 3 },
+    { "CHV-STATUS",   0x00C4, 1 }, 
+    { "SIG-COUNTER",  0x0093, 2 },
+    { "SERIALNO",     0x004F, -1 },
+    { "AID",          0x004F },
+    { "EXTCAP",       0x0000, -2 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104 },
+    { NULL, 0 }
+  };
+  int idx, i, rc;
+  void *relptr;
+  unsigned char *value;
+  size_t valuelen;
+
+  for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++)
+    ;
+  if (!table[idx].name)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); 
+  
+  if (table[idx].special == -1)
+    {
+      /* The serial number is very special.  We could have used the
+         AID DO to retrieve it, but we have it already in the app
+         context and the stamp argument is required anyway which we
+         can't by other means. The AID DO is available anyway but not
+         hex formatted. */
+      char *serial;
+      time_t stamp;
+      char tmp[50];
+
+      if (!app_get_serial_and_stamp (app, &serial, &stamp))
+        {
+          sprintf (tmp, "%lu", (unsigned long)stamp);
+          send_status_info (ctrl, "SERIALNO",
+                            serial, strlen (serial),
+                            tmp, strlen (tmp),
+                            NULL, 0);
+          xfree (serial);
+        }
+      return 0;
+    }
+  if (table[idx].special == -2)
+    {
+      char tmp[50];
+
+      sprintf (tmp, "gc=%d ki=%d fc=%d pd=%d", 
+               app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge,
+               app->app_local->extcap.key_import,
+               app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv,
+               app->app_local->extcap.private_dos);
+      send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  relptr = get_one_do (app, table[idx].tag, &value, &valuelen, &rc);
+  if (relptr)
+    {
+      if (table[idx].special == 1)
+        {
+          char numbuf[7*23];
+          
+          for (i=0,*numbuf=0; i < valuelen && i < 7; i++)
+            sprintf (numbuf+strlen (numbuf), " %d", value[i]); 
+          send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name,
+                            numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0);
+        }
+      else if (table[idx].special == 2)
+        {
+          char numbuf[50];
+
+          sprintf (numbuf, "%lu", convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen));
+          send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name,
+                            numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0);
+        }
+      else if (table[idx].special == 3)
+        {
+          if (valuelen >= 60)
+            for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
+              send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*20);
+        }
+      else if (table[idx].special == 4)
+        {
+          if (valuelen >= 12)
+            for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
+              send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*4);
+        }
+      else
+        send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, value, valuelen, NULL, 0);
+
+      xfree (relptr);
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve the fingerprint from the card inserted in SLOT and write
+   the according hex representation to FPR.  Caller must have provide
+   a buffer at FPR of least 41 bytes.  Returns 0 on success or an
+   error code. */
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1
+static gpg_error_t
+retrieve_fpr_from_card (app_t app, int keyno, char *fpr)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err = 0;
+  void *relptr;
+  unsigned char *value;
+  size_t valuelen;
+  int i;
+
+  assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2);
+
+  relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C5, &value, &valuelen, NULL);
+  if (relptr && valuelen >= 60)
+    {
+      for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
+        sprintf (fpr + (i * 2), "%02X", value[(keyno*20)+i]);
+    }
+  else
+    err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
+  xfree (relptr);
+  return err;
+}
+#endif /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1*/
+
+
+/* Retrieve the public key material for the RSA key, whose fingerprint
+   is FPR, from gpg output, which can be read through the stream FP.
+   The RSA modulus will be stored at the address of M and MLEN, the
+   public exponent at E and ELEN.  Returns zero on success, an error
+   code on failure.  Caller must release the allocated buffers at M
+   and E if the function returns success.  */
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1
+static gpg_error_t
+retrieve_key_material (FILE *fp, const char *hexkeyid,
+		       const unsigned char **m, size_t *mlen,
+		       const unsigned char **e, size_t *elen)
+{
+  gcry_error_t err = 0;
+  char *line = NULL;    /* read_line() buffer. */
+  size_t line_size = 0; /* Helper for for read_line. */
+  int found_key = 0;    /* Helper to find a matching key. */
+  unsigned char *m_new = NULL;
+  unsigned char *e_new = NULL;
+  size_t m_new_n = 0;
+  size_t e_new_n = 0;
+
+  /* Loop over all records until we have found the subkey
+     corresponsing to the fingerprint. Inm general the first record
+     should be the pub record, but we don't rely on that.  Given that
+     we only need to look at one key, it is sufficient to compare the
+     keyid so that we don't need to look at "fpr" records. */
+  for (;;)
+    {
+      char *p;
+      char *fields[6];
+      int nfields;
+      size_t max_length;
+      gcry_mpi_t mpi;
+      int i;
+
+      max_length = 4096;
+      i = read_line (fp, &line, &line_size, &max_length);
+      if (!i)
+        break; /* EOF. */
+      if (i < 0)
+	{
+	  err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  goto leave; /* Error. */
+	}
+      if (!max_length)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED);
+          goto leave;  /* Line truncated - we better stop processing.  */
+        }
+
+      /* Parse the line into fields. */
+      for (nfields=0, p=line; p && nfields < DIM (fields); nfields++)
+        {
+          fields[nfields] = p;
+          p = strchr (p, ':');
+          if (p)
+            *(p++) = 0;
+        }
+      if (!nfields)
+        continue; /* No fields at all - skip line.  */
+
+      if (!found_key)
+        {
+          if ( (!strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") )
+               && nfields > 4 && !strcmp (fields[4], hexkeyid))
+            found_key = 1;
+          continue;
+      	}
+      
+      if ( !strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") )
+        break; /* Next key - stop.  */
+
+      if ( strcmp (fields[0], "pkd") )
+        continue; /* Not a key data record.  */
+      i = 0; /* Avoid erroneous compiler warning. */
+      if ( nfields < 4 || (i = atoi (fields[1])) < 0 || i > 1
+           || (!i && m_new) || (i && e_new))
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+          goto leave; /* Error: Invalid key data record or not an RSA key.  */
+        }
+      
+      err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, fields[3], 0, NULL);
+      if (err)
+        mpi = NULL;
+      else if (!i)
+        err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &m_new, &m_new_n, mpi);
+      else
+        err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &e_new, &e_new_n, mpi);
+      gcry_mpi_release (mpi);
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+  
+  if (m_new && e_new)
+    {
+      *m = m_new;
+      *mlen = m_new_n;
+      m_new = NULL;
+      *e = e_new;
+      *elen = e_new_n;
+      e_new = NULL;
+    }
+  else
+    err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+
+ leave:
+  xfree (m_new);
+  xfree (e_new);
+  xfree (line);
+  return err;
+}
+#endif /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1*/
+
+
+/* Get the public key for KEYNO and store it as an S-expresion with
+   the APP handle.  On error that field gets cleared.  If we already
+   know about the public key we will just return.  Note that this does
+   not mean a key is available; this is soley indicated by the
+   presence of the app->app_local->pk[KEYNO-1].key field.
+
+   Note that GnuPG 1.x does not need this and it would be too time
+   consuming to send it just for the fun of it. However, given that we
+   use the same code in gpg 1.4, we can't use the gcry S-expresion
+   here but need to open encode it. */
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1
+static gpg_error_t
+get_public_key (app_t app, int keyno)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err = 0;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  const unsigned char *keydata, *m, *e;
+  size_t buflen, keydatalen, mlen, elen;
+  unsigned char *mbuf = NULL;
+  unsigned char *ebuf = NULL;
+  unsigned char *keybuf = NULL;
+  unsigned char *keybuf_p;
+
+  if (keyno < 1 || keyno > 3)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  keyno--;
+
+  /* Already cached? */
+  if (app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done)
+    return 0;
+
+  xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key);
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0;
+
+  if (app->card_version > 0x0100)
+    {
+      /* We may simply read the public key out of these cards.  */
+      err = iso7816_read_public_key (app->slot, 
+                                    keyno == 0? "\xB6" :
+                                    keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4",
+                                    2,  
+                                    &buffer, &buflen);
+      if (err)
+        {
+          log_error (_("reading public key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      keydata = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &keydatalen);
+      if (!keydata)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+          log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n"));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+ 
+      m = find_tlv (keydata, keydatalen, 0x0081, &mlen);
+      if (!m)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+          log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA modulus\n"));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      
+
+      e = find_tlv (keydata, keydatalen, 0x0082, &elen);
+      if (!e)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+          log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA public exponent\n"));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      /* Prepend numbers with a 0 if needed.  */
+      if (mlen && (*m & 0x80))
+        {
+          mbuf = xtrymalloc ( mlen + 1);
+          if (!mbuf)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          *mbuf = 0;
+          memcpy (mbuf+1, m, mlen);
+          mlen++;
+          m = mbuf;
+        }
+      if (elen && (*e & 0x80))
+        {
+          ebuf = xtrymalloc ( elen + 1);
+          if (!ebuf)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          *ebuf = 0;
+          memcpy (ebuf+1, e, elen);
+          elen++;
+          e = ebuf;
+        }
+
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Due to a design problem in v1.0 cards we can't get the public
+         key out of these cards without doing a verify on CHV3.
+         Clearly that is not an option and thus we try to locate the
+         key using an external helper.
+
+	 The helper we use here is gpg itself, which should know about
+	 the key in any case.  */
+
+      char fpr[41];
+      char *hexkeyid;
+      char *command = NULL;
+      FILE *fp;
+      int ret;
+
+      buffer = NULL; /* We don't need buffer.  */
+
+      err = retrieve_fpr_from_card (app, keyno, fpr);
+      if (err)
+	{
+	  log_error ("error while retrieving fpr from card: %s\n",
+		     gpg_strerror (err));
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+      hexkeyid = fpr + 24;
+
+      ret = asprintf (&command,
+		      "gpg --list-keys --with-colons --with-key-data '%s'",
+		      fpr);
+      if (ret < 0)
+	{
+	  err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+
+      fp = popen (command, "r");
+      free (command);
+      if (!fp)
+	{
+	  err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+	  log_error ("running gpg failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+
+      err = retrieve_key_material (fp, hexkeyid, &m, &mlen, &e, &elen);
+      fclose (fp);
+      if (err)
+	{
+	  log_error ("error while retrieving key material through pipe: %s\n",
+                     gpg_strerror (err));
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+
+  /* Allocate a buffer to construct the S-expression.  */
+  /* FIXME: We should provide a generalized S-expression creation
+     mechanism. */
+  keybuf = xtrymalloc (50 + 2*35 + mlen + elen + 1);
+  if (!keybuf)
+    {
+      err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  
+  sprintf (keybuf, "(10:public-key(3:rsa(1:n%u:", (unsigned int) mlen);
+  keybuf_p = keybuf + strlen (keybuf);
+  memcpy (keybuf_p, m, mlen);
+  keybuf_p += mlen;
+  sprintf (keybuf_p, ")(1:e%u:", (unsigned int)elen);
+  keybuf_p += strlen (keybuf_p);
+  memcpy (keybuf_p, e, elen);
+  keybuf_p += elen;
+  strcpy (keybuf_p, ")))");
+  keybuf_p += strlen (keybuf_p);
+  
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = keybuf;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = (keybuf_p - keybuf);
+
+ leave:
+  /* Set a flag to indicate that we tried to read the key.  */
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 1;
+
+  xfree (buffer);
+  xfree (mbuf);
+  xfree (ebuf);
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1 */
+
+
+
+/* Send the KEYPAIRINFO back. KEYNO needs to be in the range [1,3].
+   This is used by the LEARN command. */
+static gpg_error_t
+send_keypair_info (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int keyno)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err = 0;
+  /* Note that GnuPG 1.x does not need this and it would be too time
+     consuming to send it just for the fun of it. */
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1
+  unsigned char grip[20];
+  char gripstr[41];
+  char idbuf[50];
+  int i;
+
+  err = get_public_key (app, keyno);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+  
+  assert (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3);
+  if (!app->app_local->pk[keyno-1].key)
+    goto leave; /* No such key - ignore. */
+
+  err = keygrip_from_canon_sexp (app->app_local->pk[keyno-1].key,
+                                 app->app_local->pk[keyno-1].keylen,
+                                 grip);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+  
+  for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+    sprintf (gripstr+i*2, "%02X", grip[i]);
+
+  sprintf (idbuf, "OPENPGP.%d", keyno);
+  send_status_info (ctrl, "KEYPAIRINFO", 
+                    gripstr, 40, 
+                    idbuf, strlen (idbuf), 
+                    NULL, (size_t)0);
+
+ leave:
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1 */
+
+  return err; 
+}
+
+
+/* Handle the LEARN command for OpenPGP.  */
+static gpg_error_t
+do_learn_status (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl)
+{
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "EXTCAP");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-NAME");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-LANG");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-SEX");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PUBKEY-URL");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "LOGIN-DATA");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-FPR");
+  if (app->card_version > 0x0100)
+    do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-TIME");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CA-FPR");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CHV-STATUS");
+  do_getattr (app, ctrl, "SIG-COUNTER");
+  if (app->app_local->extcap.private_dos)
+    {
+      do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-1");
+      do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-2");
+      if (app->did_chv2)
+        do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-3");
+      if (app->did_chv3)
+        do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-4");
+    }
+  send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 1);
+  send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 2);
+  send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 3);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Handle the READKEY command for OpenPGP.  On success a canonical
+   encoded S-expression with the public key will get stored at PK and
+   its length (for assertions) at PKLEN; the caller must release that
+   buffer. On error PK and PKLEN are not changed and an error code is
+   returned.  */
+static gpg_error_t
+do_readkey (app_t app, const char *keyid, unsigned char **pk, size_t *pklen)
+{
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION > 1
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  int keyno;
+  unsigned char *buf;
+
+  if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1"))
+    keyno = 1;
+  else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2"))
+    keyno = 2;
+  else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3"))
+    keyno = 3;
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+  err = get_public_key (app, keyno);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+
+  buf = app->app_local->pk[keyno-1].key;
+  if (!buf)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
+  *pk = buf;
+  *pklen = app->app_local->pk[keyno-1].keylen;;
+  return 0;
+#else
+  return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/* Verify CHV2 if required.  Depending on the configuration of the
+   card CHV1 will also be verified. */
+static gpg_error_t
+verify_chv2 (app_t app,
+             gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+             void *pincb_arg)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  if (!app->did_chv2) 
+    {
+      char *pinvalue;
+
+      rc = pincb (pincb_arg, "PIN", &pinvalue); 
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+          return rc;
+        }
+
+      if (strlen (pinvalue) < 6)
+        {
+          log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;"
+                       " minimum length is %d\n"), 2, 6);
+          xfree (pinvalue);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+        }
+
+      rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x82, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 2, gpg_strerror (rc));
+          xfree (pinvalue);
+          flush_cache_after_error (app);
+          return rc;
+        }
+      app->did_chv2 = 1;
+
+      if (!app->did_chv1 && !app->force_chv1)
+        {
+          rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x81, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+          if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN)
+            rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED);
+          if (rc)
+            {
+              log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 1, gpg_strerror (rc));
+              xfree (pinvalue);
+              flush_cache_after_error (app);
+              return rc;
+            }
+          app->did_chv1 = 1;
+        }
+      xfree (pinvalue);
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Verify CHV3 if required. */
+static gpg_error_t
+verify_chv3 (app_t app,
+             gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+             void *pincb_arg)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1
+  if (!opt.allow_admin)
+    {
+      log_info (_("access to admin commands is not configured\n"));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EACCES);
+    }
+#endif
+      
+  if (!app->did_chv3) 
+    {
+      char *pinvalue;
+      void *relptr;
+      unsigned char *value;
+      size_t valuelen;
+
+      relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL);
+      if (!relptr || valuelen < 7)
+        {
+          log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n"));
+          xfree (relptr);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+        }
+      if (value[6] == 0)
+        {
+          log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n"));
+          xfree (relptr);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+        }
+
+      log_info(_("%d Admin PIN attempts remaining before card"
+                 " is permanently locked\n"), value[6]);
+      xfree (relptr);
+
+      /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|A|" prefix but
+         keep it at the start of the string.  We need this elsewhere
+         to get some infos on the string. */
+      rc = pincb (pincb_arg, _("|A|Admin PIN"), &pinvalue); 
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+          return rc;
+        }
+
+      if (strlen (pinvalue) < 8)
+        {
+          log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;"
+                       " minimum length is %d\n"), 3, 8);
+          xfree (pinvalue);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+        }
+
+      rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x83, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+      xfree (pinvalue);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 3, gpg_strerror (rc));
+          flush_cache_after_error (app);
+          return rc;
+        }
+      app->did_chv3 = 1;
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Handle the SETATTR operation. All arguments are already basically
+   checked. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_setattr (app_t app, const char *name,
+            gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+            void *pincb_arg,
+            const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen)
+{
+  gpg_error_t rc;
+  int idx;
+  static struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int tag;
+    int need_chv;
+    int special;
+  } table[] = {
+    { "DISP-NAME",    0x005B, 3 },
+    { "LOGIN-DATA",   0x005E, 3, 2 },
+    { "DISP-LANG",    0x5F2D, 3 },
+    { "DISP-SEX",     0x5F35, 3 },
+    { "PUBKEY-URL",   0x5F50, 3 },
+    { "CHV-STATUS-1", 0x00C4, 3, 1 },
+    { "CA-FPR-1",     0x00CA, 3 },
+    { "CA-FPR-2",     0x00CB, 3 },
+    { "CA-FPR-3",     0x00CC, 3 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101, 2 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102, 3 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103, 2 },
+    { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104, 3 },
+    { NULL, 0 }
+  };
+
+
+  for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++)
+    ;
+  if (!table[idx].name)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); 
+
+  switch (table[idx].need_chv)
+    {
+    case 2:
+      rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+      break;
+    case 3:
+      rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+      break;
+    default:
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  /* Flush the cache before writing it, so that the next get operation
+     will reread the data from the card and thus get synced in case of
+     errors (e.g. data truncated by the card). */
+  flush_cache_item (app, table[idx].tag);
+  rc = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, table[idx].tag, value, valuelen);
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("failed to set `%s': %s\n", table[idx].name, gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+  if (table[idx].special == 1)
+    app->force_chv1 = (valuelen && *value == 0);
+  else if (table[idx].special == 2)
+    parse_login_data (app);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Handle the PASSWD command. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_change_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,  const char *chvnostr, int reset_mode,
+               gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+               void *pincb_arg)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  int chvno = atoi (chvnostr);
+  char *pinvalue;
+
+  if (reset_mode && chvno == 3)
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  else if (reset_mode || chvno == 3)
+    {
+      /* we always require that the PIN is entered. */
+      app->did_chv3 = 0;
+      rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+  else if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2)
+    {
+      /* CHV1 and CVH2 should always have the same value, thus we
+         enforce it here.  */
+      int save_force = app->force_chv1;
+
+      app->force_chv1 = 0;
+      app->did_chv1 = 0;
+      app->did_chv2 = 0;
+      rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+      app->force_chv1 = save_force;
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if (chvno == 3)
+    app->did_chv3 = 0;
+  else
+    app->did_chv1 = app->did_chv2 = 0;
+
+  /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|*|" prefixes but
+     keep it at the start of the string.  We need this elsewhere
+     to get some infos on the string. */
+  rc = pincb (pincb_arg, chvno == 3? _("|AN|New Admin PIN") : _("|N|New PIN"), 
+              &pinvalue); 
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("error getting new PIN: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if (reset_mode)
+    {
+      rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app->slot, 0x81,
+                                        pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+      if (!rc)
+        rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app->slot, 0x82,
+                                          pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2)
+        {
+          rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x81, NULL, 0,
+                                              pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+          if (!rc)
+            rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x82, NULL, 0,
+                                                pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+        }
+      else
+        rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x80 + chvno, NULL, 0,
+                                            pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+    }
+  xfree (pinvalue);
+  if (rc)
+    flush_cache_after_error (app);
+
+ leave:
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Check whether a key already exists.  KEYIDX is the index of the key
+   (0..2).  If FORCE is TRUE a diagnositic will be printed but no
+   error returned if the key already exists. */
+static gpg_error_t
+does_key_exist (app_t app, int keyidx, int force)
+{
+  const unsigned char *fpr;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t buflen, n;
+  int i;
+
+  assert (keyidx >=0 && keyidx <= 2);
+
+  if (iso7816_get_data (app->slot, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen))
+    {
+      log_error (_("error reading application data\n"));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+    }
+  fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n);
+  if (!fpr || n < 60)
+    {
+      log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n"));
+      xfree (buffer);
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+    }
+  fpr += 20*keyidx;
+  for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++)
+    ;
+  xfree (buffer);
+  if (i!=20 && !force)
+    {
+      log_error (_("key already exists\n"));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST);
+    }
+  else if (i!=20)
+    log_info (_("existing key will be replaced\n"));
+  else
+    log_info (_("generating new key\n"));
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Handle the WRITEKEY command for OpenPGP.  This function expects a
+   canonical encoded S-expression with the secret key in KEYDATA and
+   its length (for assertions) in KEYDATALEN.  KEYID needs to be the
+   usual keyid which for OpenPGP is the string "OPENPGP.n" with
+   n=1,2,3.  Bit 0 of FLAGS indicates whether an existing key shall
+   get overwritten.  PINCB and PINCB_ARG are the usual arguments for
+   the pinentry callback.  */
+static gpg_error_t
+do_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
+             const char *keyid, unsigned int flags,
+             gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+             void *pincb_arg,
+             const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen)
+{
+  gpg_error_t err;
+  int force = (flags & 1);
+  int keyno;
+  const unsigned char *buf, *tok;
+  size_t buflen, toklen;
+  int depth, last_depth1, last_depth2;
+  const unsigned char *rsa_n = NULL;
+  const unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL;
+  const unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL;
+  const unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL;
+  size_t rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
+  unsigned int nbits;
+  unsigned char *template = NULL;
+  unsigned char *tp;
+  size_t template_len;
+  unsigned char fprbuf[20];
+  u32 created_at = 0;
+
+  if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1"))
+    keyno = 0;
+  else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2"))
+    keyno = 1;
+  else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3"))
+    keyno = 2;
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  
+  err = does_key_exist (app, keyno, force);
+  if (err)
+    return err;
+
+
+  /* 
+     Parse the S-expression
+   */
+  buf = keydata;
+  buflen = keydatalen;
+  depth = 0;
+  if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+    goto leave;
+  if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+    goto leave;
+  if (!tok || toklen != 11 || memcmp ("private-key", tok, toklen))
+    {
+      if (!tok)
+        ;
+      else if (toklen == 21 && !memcmp ("protected-private-key", tok, toklen))
+        log_info ("protected-private-key passed to writekey\n");
+      else if (toklen == 20 && !memcmp ("shadowed-private-key", tok, toklen))
+        log_info ("shadowed-private-key passed to writekey\n");
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+    goto leave;
+  if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+    goto leave;
+  if (!tok || toklen != 3 || memcmp ("rsa", tok, toklen))
+    {
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  last_depth1 = depth;
+  while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))
+         && depth && depth >= last_depth1)
+    {
+      if (tok)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+        goto leave;
+      if (tok && toklen == 1)
+        {
+          const unsigned char **mpi;
+          size_t *mpi_len;
+
+          switch (*tok)
+            {
+            case 'n': mpi = &rsa_n; mpi_len = &rsa_n_len; break; 
+            case 'e': mpi = &rsa_e; mpi_len = &rsa_e_len; break; 
+            case 'p': mpi = &rsa_p; mpi_len = &rsa_p_len; break; 
+            case 'q': mpi = &rsa_q; mpi_len = &rsa_q_len;break; 
+            default: mpi = NULL;  mpi_len = NULL; break;
+            }
+          if (mpi && *mpi)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+            goto leave;
+          if (tok && mpi)
+            {
+              /* Strip off leading zero bytes and save. */
+              for (;toklen && !*tok; toklen--, tok++)
+                ;
+              *mpi = tok;
+              *mpi_len = toklen;
+            }
+        }
+      /* Skip until end of list. */
+      last_depth2 = depth;
+      while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))
+             && depth && depth >= last_depth2)
+        ;
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+  /* Parse other attributes. */
+  last_depth1 = depth;
+  while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))
+         && depth && depth >= last_depth1)
+    {
+      if (tok)
+        {
+          err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)))
+        goto leave;
+      if (tok && toklen == 10 && !memcmp ("created-at", tok, toklen))
+        {
+          if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf,&buflen,&depth,&tok,&toklen)))
+            goto leave;
+          if (tok)
+            {
+              for (created_at=0; toklen && *tok && *tok >= '0' && *tok <= '9';
+                   tok++, toklen--)
+                created_at = created_at*10 + (*tok - '0');
+            }
+        }
+      /* Skip until end of list. */
+      last_depth2 = depth;
+      while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))
+             && depth && depth >= last_depth2)
+        ;
+      if (err)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+
+
+  /* Check that we have all parameters and that they match the card
+     description. */
+  if (!created_at)
+    {
+      log_error (_("creation timestamp missing\n"));
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  nbits = rsa_n? count_bits (rsa_n, rsa_n_len) : 0;
+  if (nbits != 1024)
+    {
+      log_error (_("RSA modulus missing or not of size %d bits\n"), 1024);
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  nbits = rsa_e? count_bits (rsa_e, rsa_e_len) : 0;
+  if (nbits < 2 || nbits > 32)
+    {
+      log_error (_("RSA public exponent missing or larger than %d bits\n"),
+                 32);
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  nbits = rsa_p? count_bits (rsa_p, rsa_p_len) : 0;
+  if (nbits != 512)
+    {
+      log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), "P", 512);
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  nbits = rsa_q? count_bits (rsa_q, rsa_q_len) : 0;
+  if (nbits != 512)
+    {
+      log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), "Q", 512);
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  
+
+  /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.6 of
+     the OpenPGP card specs:
+         0xC0   <length> public exponent
+         0xC1   <length> prime p 
+         0xC2   <length> prime q 
+  */
+  assert (rsa_e_len <= 4);
+  template_len = (1 + 1 + 4
+                  + 1 + 1 + rsa_p_len
+                  + 1 + 1 + rsa_q_len);
+  template = tp = xtrymalloc_secure (template_len);
+  if (!template)
+    {
+      err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  *tp++ = 0xC0;
+  *tp++ = 4;
+  memcpy (tp, rsa_e, rsa_e_len);
+  if (rsa_e_len < 4)
+    {
+      /* Right justify E. */
+      memmove (tp+4-rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len);
+      memset (tp, 0, 4-rsa_e_len);
+    }                 
+  tp += 4;
+
+  *tp++ = 0xC1;
+  *tp++ = rsa_p_len;
+  memcpy (tp, rsa_p, rsa_p_len);
+  tp += rsa_p_len;
+
+  *tp++ = 0xC2;
+  *tp++ = rsa_q_len;
+  memcpy (tp, rsa_q, rsa_q_len);
+  tp += rsa_q_len;
+
+  assert (tp - template == template_len);
+
+
+  /* Obviously we need to remove the cached public key.  */
+  xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key);
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0;
+
+  /* Prepare for storing the key.  */
+  err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+
+  /* Store the key. */
+  err = iso7816_put_data (app->slot,
+                         (app->card_version > 0x0007? 0xE0 : 0xE9) + keyno,
+                         template, template_len);
+  if (err)
+    {
+      log_error (_("failed to store the key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+ 
+  err = store_fpr (app->slot, keyno, created_at,
+                  rsa_n, rsa_n_len, rsa_e, rsa_e_len,
+                  fprbuf, app->card_version);
+  if (err)
+    goto leave;
+
+
+ leave:
+  xfree (template);
+  return err;
+}
+
+
+/* Handle the GENKEY command. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,  const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags,
+          gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+          void *pincb_arg)
+{
+  int rc;
+  char numbuf[30];
+  unsigned char fprbuf[20];
+  const unsigned char *keydata, *m, *e;
+  unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+  size_t buflen, keydatalen, mlen, elen;
+  time_t created_at;
+  int keyno = atoi (keynostr);
+  int force = (flags & 1);
+  time_t start_at;
+
+  if (keyno < 1 || keyno > 3)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  keyno--;
+
+  /* We flush the cache to increase the traffic before a key
+     generation.  This _might_ help a card to gather more entropy. */
+  flush_cache (app);
+
+  /* Obviously we need to remove the cached public key.  */
+  xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key);
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0;
+  app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0;
+
+  /* Check whether a key already exists.  */
+  rc = does_key_exist (app, keyno, force);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  /* Prepare for key generation by verifying the ADmin PIN.  */
+  rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+  if (rc)
+    goto leave;
+   
+#if 1
+  log_info (_("please wait while key is being generated ...\n"));
+  start_at = time (NULL);
+  rc = iso7816_generate_keypair 
+#else
+#warning key generation temporary replaced by reading an existing key.
+  rc = iso7816_read_public_key
+#endif
+                              (app->slot, 
+                                 keyno == 0? "\xB6" :
+                                 keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4",
+                                 2,
+                                 &buffer, &buflen);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      log_error (_("generating key failed\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  log_info (_("key generation completed (%d seconds)\n"),
+            (int)(time (NULL) - start_at));
+  keydata = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &keydatalen);
+  if (!keydata)
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+ 
+  m = find_tlv (keydata, keydatalen, 0x0081, &mlen);
+  if (!m)
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA modulus\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+/*    log_printhex ("RSA n:", m, mlen); */
+  send_key_data (ctrl, "n", m, mlen);
+
+  e = find_tlv (keydata, keydatalen, 0x0082, &elen);
+  if (!e)
+    {
+      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA public exponent\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+/*    log_printhex ("RSA e:", e, elen); */
+  send_key_data (ctrl, "e", e, elen);
+
+  created_at = gnupg_get_time ();
+  sprintf (numbuf, "%lu", (unsigned long)created_at);
+  send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-CREATED-AT",
+                    numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf), NULL, 0);
+
+  rc = store_fpr (app->slot, keyno, (u32)created_at,
+                  m, mlen, e, elen, fprbuf, app->card_version);
+  if (rc)
+    goto leave;
+  send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, "KEY-FPR", -1, fprbuf);
+
+
+ leave:
+  xfree (buffer);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static unsigned long
+convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen)
+{
+  unsigned long ul;
+
+  if (valuelen == 3 )
+    ul = (value[0] << 16) | (value[1] << 8) | value[2];
+  else
+    {
+      log_error (_("invalid structure of OpenPGP card (DO 0x93)\n"));
+      ul = 0;
+    }
+  return ul;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+get_sig_counter (app_t app)
+{
+  void *relptr;
+  unsigned char *value;
+  size_t valuelen;
+  unsigned long ul;
+
+  relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x0093, &value, &valuelen, NULL);
+  if (!relptr)
+    return 0;
+  ul = convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen);
+  xfree (relptr);
+  return ul;
+}
+
+static gpg_error_t
+compare_fingerprint (app_t app, int keyno, unsigned char *sha1fpr)
+{
+  const unsigned char *fpr;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t buflen, n;
+  int rc, i;
+  
+  assert (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3);
+
+  rc = get_cached_data (app, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("error reading application data\n"));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+    }
+  fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n);
+  if (!fpr || n != 60)
+    {
+      xfree (buffer);
+      log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n"));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+    }
+  fpr += (keyno-1)*20;
+  for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+    if (sha1fpr[i] != fpr[i])
+      {
+        xfree (buffer);
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+      }
+  xfree (buffer);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+  /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
+     the card.  This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
+     the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
+     known to gpg was not updated.  If there is no fingerprint we
+     assume that this is okay. */
+static gpg_error_t
+check_against_given_fingerprint (app_t app, const char *fpr, int keyno)
+{
+  unsigned char tmp[20];
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+
+  for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (n != 40)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  else if (!*s)
+    ; /* okay */
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+  for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++)
+        tmp[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+  return compare_fingerprint (app, keyno, tmp);
+}
+
+
+
+/* Compute a digital signature on INDATA which is expected to be the
+   raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of
+   the serialnumber and the fingerprint delimited by a slash.
+
+   Note that this fucntion may return the error code
+   GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does
+   not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the
+   serial number does not match). */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
+         gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+         void *pincb_arg,
+         const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+         unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen )
+{
+  static unsigned char sha1_prefix[15] = /* Object ID is 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+  { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03,
+    0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 };
+  static unsigned char rmd160_prefix[15] = /* Object ID is 1.3.36.3.2.1 */
+  { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03,
+    0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 };
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char data[35];
+  unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* actually 16 but we use it also for the fpr. */
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+  const char *fpr = NULL;
+  unsigned long sigcount;
+
+  if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  if (indatalen == 20)
+    ;
+  else if (indatalen == (15 + 20) && hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1
+           && !memcmp (indata, sha1_prefix, 15))
+    ;
+  else if (indatalen == (15 + 20) && hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160
+           && !memcmp (indata, rmd160_prefix, 15))
+    ;
+  else
+    {
+      log_error(_("card does not support digest algorithm %s\n"),
+		digest_algo_to_string(hashalgo));
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+    }
+
+  /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
+  if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (n != 32)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  else if (!*s)
+    ; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
+  else if (*s == '/')
+    fpr = s + 1; 
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
+    tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+
+  if (app->serialnolen != 16)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
+  if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
+
+  /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
+     the card.  This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
+     the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
+     known to gpg was not updated.  If there is no fingerprint, gpg
+     will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
+     verify-after-signing feature. */
+  rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 1) : 0;
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1)
+    memcpy (data, sha1_prefix, 15);
+  else if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160)
+    memcpy (data, rmd160_prefix, 15);
+  else 
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+  memcpy (data+15, indata, indatalen);
+
+  sigcount = get_sig_counter (app);
+  log_info (_("signatures created so far: %lu\n"), sigcount);
+
+  if (!app->did_chv1 || app->force_chv1 ) 
+    {
+      char *pinvalue;
+
+      {
+        char *prompt;
+#define PROMPTSTRING  _("||Please enter the PIN%%0A[sigs done: %lu]")
+
+        prompt = malloc (strlen (PROMPTSTRING) + 50);
+        if (!prompt)
+          return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+        sprintf (prompt, PROMPTSTRING, sigcount);
+        rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &pinvalue); 
+        free (prompt);
+#undef PROMPTSTRING
+      }
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+          return rc;
+        }
+
+      if (strlen (pinvalue) < 6)
+        {
+          log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;"
+                       " minimum length is %d\n"), 1, 6);
+          xfree (pinvalue);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+        }
+
+      rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x81, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 1, gpg_strerror (rc));
+          xfree (pinvalue);
+          flush_cache_after_error (app);
+          return rc;
+        }
+      app->did_chv1 = 1;
+      if (!app->did_chv2)
+        {
+          /* We should also verify CHV2. */
+          rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x82, pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue));
+          if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN)
+            rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED);
+          if (rc)
+            {
+              log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 2, gpg_strerror (rc));
+              xfree (pinvalue);
+              flush_cache_after_error (app);
+              return rc;
+            }
+          app->did_chv2 = 1;
+        }
+      xfree (pinvalue);
+    }
+
+  rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, data, 35, outdata, outdatalen);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Compute a digital signature using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command
+   on INDATA which is expected to be the raw message digest. For this
+   application the KEYIDSTR consists of the serialnumber and the
+   fingerprint delimited by a slash.  Optionally the id OPENPGP.3 may
+   be given.
+
+   Note that this fucntion may return the error code
+   GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does
+   not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the
+   serial number does not match). */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+         gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+         void *pincb_arg,
+         const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+         unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen )
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* actually 16 but we use it also for the fpr. */
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+  const char *fpr = NULL;
+
+  if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  if (indatalen > 50) /* For a 1024 bit key. */
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
+  if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3"))
+    ;
+  else if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  else
+    {
+      for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+        ;
+      if (n != 32)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+      else if (!*s)
+        ; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
+      else if (*s == '/')
+        fpr = s + 1; 
+      else
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+      for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
+        tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+      
+      if (app->serialnolen != 16)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
+      if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
+    }
+
+  /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
+     the card.  This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
+     the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
+     known to gpg was not updated.  If there is no fingerprint, gpg
+     will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
+     verify-after-signing feature. */
+  rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 3) : 0;
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = iso7816_internal_authenticate (app->slot, indata, indatalen,
+                                        outdata, outdatalen);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+             gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+             void *pincb_arg,
+             const void *indata, size_t indatalen,
+             unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen )
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; /* actually 16 but we use it also for the fpr. */
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+  const char *fpr = NULL;
+
+  if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr || !indatalen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
+  if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (n != 32)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  else if (!*s)
+    ; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
+  else if (*s == '/')
+    fpr = s + 1; 
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
+    tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+
+  if (app->serialnolen != 16)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
+  if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
+
+  /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
+     the card.  This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
+     the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
+     known to gpg was not updated.  If there is no fingerprint, the
+     decryption will won't produce the right plaintext anyway. */
+  rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 2) : 0;
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = iso7816_decipher (app->slot, indata, indatalen, 0,
+                           outdata, outdatalen);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Perform a simple verify operation for CHV1 and CHV2, so that
+   further operations won't ask for CHV2 and it is possible to do a
+   cheap check on the PIN: If there is something wrong with the PIN
+   entry system, only the regular CHV will get blocked and not the
+   dangerous CHV3.  KEYIDSTR is the usual card's serial number; an
+   optional fingerprint part will be ignored.
+
+   There is a special mode if the keyidstr is "<serialno>[CHV3]" with
+   the "[CHV3]" being a literal string:  The Admin Pin is checked if
+   and only if the retry counter is still at 3. */
+static gpg_error_t 
+do_check_pin (app_t app, const char *keyidstr,
+              gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
+              void *pincb_arg)
+{
+  unsigned char tmp_sn[20]; 
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+  int admin_pin = 0;
+
+  if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
+  if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (n != 32)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+  else if (!*s)
+    ; /* No fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
+  else if (*s == '/')
+    ; /* We ignore a fingerprint. */
+  else if (!strcmp (s, "[CHV3]") )
+    admin_pin = 1;
+  else
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+
+  for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
+    tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+
+  if (app->serialnolen != 16)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
+  if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
+
+  /* Yes, there is a race conditions: The user might pull the card
+     right here and we won't notice that.  However this is not a
+     problem and the check above is merely for a graceful failure
+     between operations. */
+
+  if (admin_pin)
+    {
+      void *relptr;
+      unsigned char *value;
+      size_t valuelen;
+      int count;
+      
+      relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL);
+      if (!relptr || valuelen < 7)
+        {
+          log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n"));
+          xfree (relptr);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+        }
+      count = value[6];
+      xfree (relptr);
+
+      if (!count)
+        {
+          log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n"));
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN);
+        }
+      else if (value[6] < 3)
+        {
+          log_info (_("verification of Admin PIN is currently prohibited "
+                      "through this command\n"));
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+        }
+
+      app->did_chv3 = 0; /* Force verification.  */
+      return verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+    }
+  else
+    return verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* Select the OpenPGP application on the card in SLOT.  This function
+   must be used before any other OpenPGP application functions. */
+gpg_error_t
+app_select_openpgp (app_t app)
+{
+  static char const aid[] = { 0xD2, 0x76, 0x00, 0x01, 0x24, 0x01 };
+  int slot = app->slot;
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t buflen;
+  void *relptr;
+  
+  rc = iso7816_select_application (slot, aid, sizeof aid);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      unsigned int manufacturer;
+
+      app->apptype = "OPENPGP";
+
+      app->did_chv1 = 0;
+      app->did_chv2 = 0;
+      app->did_chv3 = 0;
+      app->app_local = NULL;
+
+      /* The OpenPGP card returns the serial number as part of the
+         AID; because we prefer to use OpenPGP serial numbers, we
+         replace a possibly already set one from a EF.GDO with this
+         one.  Note, that for current OpenPGP cards, no EF.GDO exists
+         and thus it won't matter at all. */
+      rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, 0x004F, &buffer, &buflen);
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+      if (opt.verbose)
+        {
+          log_info ("AID: ");
+          log_printhex ("", buffer, buflen);
+        }
+
+      app->card_version = buffer[6] << 8;
+      app->card_version |= buffer[7];
+      manufacturer = (buffer[8]<<8 | buffer[9]);
+
+      xfree (app->serialno);
+      app->serialno = buffer;
+      app->serialnolen = buflen;
+      buffer = NULL;
+      app->app_local = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *app->app_local);
+      if (!app->app_local)
+        {
+          rc = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &buffer, &buflen, NULL);
+      if (!relptr)
+        {
+          log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"),
+                     "CHV Status Bytes");
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      app->force_chv1 = (buflen && *buffer == 0);
+      xfree (relptr);
+
+      relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C0, &buffer, &buflen, NULL);
+      if (!relptr)
+        {
+          log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"),
+                     "Extended Capability Flags" );
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      if (buflen)
+        {
+          app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge    = !!(*buffer & 0x40);
+          app->app_local->extcap.key_import       = !!(*buffer & 0x20);
+          app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = !!(*buffer & 0x10);
+          app->app_local->extcap.private_dos      = !!(*buffer & 0x08);
+        }
+      xfree (relptr);
+      
+      /* Some of the first cards accidently don't set the
+         CHANGE_FORCE_CHV bit but allow it anyway. */
+      if (app->card_version <= 0x0100 && manufacturer == 1)
+        app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = 1;
+
+      parse_login_data (app);
+
+      if (opt.verbose > 1)
+        dump_all_do (slot);
+
+      app->fnc.deinit = do_deinit;
+      app->fnc.learn_status = do_learn_status;
+      app->fnc.readkey = do_readkey;
+      app->fnc.getattr = do_getattr;
+      app->fnc.setattr = do_setattr;
+      app->fnc.writekey = do_writekey;
+      app->fnc.genkey = do_genkey;
+      app->fnc.sign = do_sign;
+      app->fnc.auth = do_auth;
+      app->fnc.decipher = do_decipher;
+      app->fnc.change_pin = do_change_pin;
+      app->fnc.check_pin = do_check_pin;
+   }
+
+leave:
+  if (rc)
+    do_deinit (app);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65804a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1474 @@
+/* armor.c - Armor flter
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#define MAX_LINELEN 20000
+
+#define CRCINIT 0xB704CE
+#define CRCPOLY 0X864CFB
+#define CRCUPDATE(a,c) do {						    \
+			a = ((a) << 8) ^ crc_table[((a)&0xff >> 16) ^ (c)]; \
+			a &= 0x00ffffff;				    \
+		    } while(0)
+static u32 crc_table[256];
+static byte bintoasc[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+			 "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+			 "0123456789+/";
+static byte asctobin[256]; /* runtime initialized */
+static int is_initialized;
+
+
+typedef enum {
+    fhdrHASArmor = 0,
+    fhdrNOArmor,
+    fhdrINIT,
+    fhdrINITCont,
+    fhdrINITSkip,
+    fhdrCHECKBegin,
+    fhdrWAITHeader,
+    fhdrWAITClearsig,
+    fhdrSKIPHeader,
+    fhdrCLEARSIG,
+    fhdrREADClearsig,
+    fhdrNullClearsig,
+    fhdrEMPTYClearsig,
+    fhdrCHECKClearsig,
+    fhdrCHECKClearsig2,
+    fhdrCHECKDashEscaped,
+    fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2,
+    fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3,
+    fhdrREADClearsigNext,
+    fhdrENDClearsig,
+    fhdrENDClearsigHelp,
+    fhdrTESTSpaces,
+    fhdrCLEARSIGSimple,
+    fhdrCLEARSIGSimpleNext,
+    fhdrTEXT,
+    fhdrTEXTSimple,
+    fhdrERROR,
+    fhdrERRORShow,
+    fhdrEOF
+} fhdr_state_t;
+
+
+/* if we encounter this armor string with this index, go
+ * into a mode which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */
+#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE 2
+#define BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX 3
+static char *head_strings[] = {
+    "BEGIN PGP MESSAGE",
+    "BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK",
+    "BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE",
+    "BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE",
+    "BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE",       /* gnupg extension */
+    "BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK",
+    "BEGIN PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK",   /* only used by pgp2 */
+    NULL
+};
+static char *tail_strings[] = {
+    "END PGP MESSAGE",
+    "END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK",
+    "END PGP SIGNATURE",
+    "END dummy",
+    "END PGP ARMORED FILE",
+    "END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK",
+    "END PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK",
+    NULL
+};
+
+
+/* Create a new context for armor filters.  */
+armor_filter_context_t *
+new_armor_context (void)
+{
+  armor_filter_context_t *afx;
+
+  afx = xcalloc (1, sizeof *afx);
+  afx->refcount = 1;
+
+  return afx;
+}
+
+/* Release an armor filter context.  Passing NULL is explicitly
+   allowed and a no-op.  */
+void
+release_armor_context (armor_filter_context_t *afx)
+{
+  if (!afx)
+    return;
+
+  /* In contrast to 2.0, we use in 1.4 heap based contexts only in a
+     very few places and in general keep the stack based contexts.  A
+     REFCOUNT of 0 indicates a stack based context and thus we don't
+     do anything in this case. */
+  if (!afx->refcount)
+    return;
+
+  if ( --afx->refcount )
+    return;
+  xfree (afx);
+}
+
+/* Push the armor filter onto the iobuf stream IOBUF.  */
+int
+push_armor_filter (armor_filter_context_t *afx, iobuf_t iobuf)
+{
+  int rc; 
+
+  if (!afx->refcount)
+    return iobuf_push_filter (iobuf, armor_filter, afx);
+    
+  afx->refcount++;
+  rc = iobuf_push_filter (iobuf, armor_filter, afx);
+  if (rc)
+    afx->refcount--;
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+static void
+initialize(void)
+{
+    int i, j;
+    u32 t;
+    byte *s;
+
+    /* init the crc lookup table */
+    crc_table[0] = 0;
+    for(i=j=0; j < 128; j++ ) {
+	t = crc_table[j];
+	if( t & 0x00800000 ) {
+	    t <<= 1;
+	    crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
+	    crc_table[i++] = t;
+	}
+	else {
+	    t <<= 1;
+	    crc_table[i++] = t;
+	    crc_table[i++] = t ^ CRCPOLY;
+	}
+    }
+    /* build the helptable for radix64 to bin conversion */
+    for(i=0; i < 256; i++ )
+	asctobin[i] = 255; /* used to detect invalid characters */
+    for(s=bintoasc,i=0; *s; s++,i++ )
+	asctobin[*s] = i;
+
+    is_initialized=1;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether this is an armored file or not See also
+ * parse-packet.c for details on this code For unknown historic
+ * reasons we use a string here but only the first byte will be used.
+ * Returns: True if it seems to be armored
+ */
+static int
+is_armored( const byte *buf )
+{
+    int ctb, pkttype;
+
+    ctb = *buf;
+    if( !(ctb & 0x80) )
+	return 1; /* invalid packet: assume it is armored */
+    pkttype =  ctb & 0x40 ? (ctb & 0x3f) : ((ctb>>2)&0xf);
+    switch( pkttype ) {
+      case PKT_MARKER:
+      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+      case PKT_COMMENT:
+      case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	return 0; /* seems to be a regular packet: not armored */
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Try to check whether the iobuf is armored
+ * Returns true if this may be the case; the caller should use the
+ *	   filter to do further processing.
+ */
+int
+use_armor_filter( IOBUF a )
+{
+    byte buf[1];
+    int n;
+
+    /* fixme: there might be a problem with iobuf_peek */
+    n = iobuf_peek(a, buf, 1 );
+    if( n == -1 )
+	return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter whether armored or not */
+    if( !n )
+	return 1; /* can't check it: try armored */
+    return is_armored(buf);
+}
+
+
+
+
+static void
+invalid_armor(void)
+{
+    write_status(STATUS_BADARMOR);
+    g10_exit(1); /* stop here */
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * check whether the armor header is valid on a signed message.
+ * this is for security reasons: the header lines are not included in the
+ * hash and by using some creative formatting rules, Mallory could fake
+ * any text at the beginning of a document; assuming it is read with
+ * a simple viewer. We only allow the Hash Header.
+ */
+static int
+parse_hash_header( const char *line )
+{
+    const char *s, *s2;
+    unsigned found = 0;
+
+    if( strlen(line) < 6  || strlen(line) > 60 )
+	return 0; /* too short or too long */
+    if( memcmp( line, "Hash:", 5 ) )
+	return 0; /* invalid header */
+    s = line+5;
+    for(s=line+5;;s=s2) {
+	for(; *s && (*s==' ' || *s == '\t'); s++ )
+	    ;
+	if( !*s )
+	    break;
+	for(s2=s+1; *s2 && *s2!=' ' && *s2 != '\t' && *s2 != ','; s2++ )
+	    ;
+	if( !strncmp( s, "RIPEMD160", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 1;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA1", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 2;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "MD5", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 4;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA224", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 8;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA256", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 16;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA384", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 32;
+	else if( !strncmp( s, "SHA512", s2-s ) )
+	    found |= 64;
+	else
+	    return 0;
+	for(; *s2 && (*s2==' ' || *s2 == '\t'); s2++ )
+	    ;
+	if( *s2 && *s2 != ',' )
+	    return 0;
+	if( *s2 )
+	    s2++;
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether this is a armor line.
+ * returns: -1 if it is not a armor header or the index number of the
+ * armor header.
+ */
+static int
+is_armor_header( byte *line, unsigned len )
+{
+    const char *s;
+    byte *save_p, *p;
+    int save_c;
+    int i;
+
+    if( len < 15 )
+	return -1; /* too short */
+    if( memcmp( line, "-----", 5 ) )
+	return -1; /* no */
+    p = strstr( line+5, "-----");
+    if( !p )
+	return -1;
+    save_p = p;
+    p += 5;
+
+    /* Some Windows environments seem to add whitespace to the end of
+       the line, so we strip it here.  This becomes strict if
+       --rfc2440 is set since 2440 reads "The header lines, therefore,
+       MUST start at the beginning of a line, and MUST NOT have text
+       following them on the same line."  It is unclear whether "text"
+       refers to all text or just non-whitespace text. */
+
+    if(RFC2440)
+      {
+	if( *p == '\r' )
+	  p++;
+	if( *p == '\n' )
+	  p++;
+      }
+    else
+      while(*p==' ' || *p=='\r' || *p=='\n' || *p=='\t')
+	p++;
+
+    if( *p )
+	return -1; /* garbage after dashes */
+    save_c = *save_p; *save_p = 0;
+    p = line+5;
+    for(i=0; (s=head_strings[i]); i++ )
+	if( !strcmp(s, p) )
+	    break;
+    *save_p = save_c;
+    if( !s )
+	return -1; /* unknown armor line */
+
+    if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	log_info(_("armor: %s\n"), head_strings[i]);
+    return i;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Parse a header lines
+ * Return 0: Empty line (end of header lines)
+ *	 -1: invalid header line
+ *	 >0: Good header line
+ */
+static int
+parse_header_line( armor_filter_context_t *afx, byte *line, unsigned int len )
+{
+    byte *p;
+    int hashes=0;
+    unsigned int len2;
+
+    len2 = check_trailing_ws( line, len );
+    if( !len2 ) {
+        afx->buffer_pos = len2;  /* (it is not the fine way to do it here) */
+	return 0; /* WS only: same as empty line */
+    }
+
+    /*
+      This is fussy.  The spec says that a header line is delimited
+      with a colon-space pair.  This means that a line such as
+      "Comment: " (with nothing else) is actually legal as an empty
+      string comment.  However, email and cut-and-paste being what it
+      is, that trailing space may go away.  Therefore, we accept empty
+      headers delimited with only a colon.  --rfc2440, as always,
+      makes this strict and enforces the colon-space pair. -dms
+    */
+
+    p = strchr( line, ':');
+    if( !p || (RFC2440 && p[1]!=' ')
+	|| (!RFC2440 && p[1]!=' ' && p[1]!='\n' && p[1]!='\r'))
+      {
+	log_error(_("invalid armor header: "));
+	print_string( stderr, line, len, 0 );
+	putc('\n', stderr);
+	return -1;
+      }
+
+    /* Chop off the whitespace we detected before */
+    len=len2;
+    line[len2]='\0';
+
+    if( opt.verbose ) {
+	log_info(_("armor header: "));
+	print_string( stderr, line, len, 0 );
+	putc('\n', stderr);
+    }
+
+    if( afx->in_cleartext ) {
+	if( (hashes=parse_hash_header( line )) )
+	    afx->hashes |= hashes;
+	else if( strlen(line) > 15 && !memcmp( line, "NotDashEscaped:", 15 ) )
+	    afx->not_dash_escaped = 1;
+	else {
+	    log_error(_("invalid clearsig header\n"));
+	    return -1;
+	}
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+/* figure out whether the data is armored or not */
+static int
+check_input( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int i;
+    byte *line;
+    unsigned len;
+    unsigned maxlen;
+    int hdr_line = -1;
+
+    /* read the first line to see whether this is armored data */
+    maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+    len = afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+					     &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+    line = afx->buffer;
+    if( !maxlen ) {
+	/* line has been truncated: assume not armored */
+	afx->inp_checked = 1;
+	afx->inp_bypass = 1;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    if( !len ) {
+	return -1; /* eof */
+    }
+
+    /* (the line is always a C string but maybe longer) */
+    if( *line == '\n' || ( len && (*line == '\r' && line[1]=='\n') ) )
+	;
+    else if( !is_armored( line ) ) {
+	afx->inp_checked = 1;
+	afx->inp_bypass = 1;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* find the armor header */
+    while(len) {
+	i = is_armor_header( line, len );
+	if( i >= 0 && !(afx->only_keyblocks && i != 1 && i != 5 && i != 6 )) {
+	    hdr_line = i;
+	    if( hdr_line == BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX ) {
+		if( afx->in_cleartext ) {
+		    log_error(_("nested clear text signatures\n"));
+		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
+		}
+		afx->in_cleartext = 1;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+	/* read the next line (skip all truncated lines) */
+	do {
+	    maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	    afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+					       &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	    line = afx->buffer;
+	    len = afx->buffer_len;
+	} while( !maxlen );
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the header lines.  */
+    while(len) {
+	/* Read the next line (skip all truncated lines). */
+	do {
+	    maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	    afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+					       &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	    line = afx->buffer;
+	    len = afx->buffer_len;
+	} while( !maxlen );
+
+	i = parse_header_line( afx, line, len );
+	if( i <= 0 ) {
+	    if (i && RFC2440)
+		rc = G10ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+
+    if( rc )
+	invalid_armor();
+    else if( afx->in_cleartext )
+	afx->faked = 1;
+    else {
+	afx->inp_checked = 1;
+	afx->crc = CRCINIT;
+	afx->idx = 0;
+	afx->radbuf[0] = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#define PARTIAL_CHUNK 512
+#define PARTIAL_POW   9
+
+/****************
+ * Fake a literal data packet and wait for the next armor line
+ * fixme: empty line handling and null length clear text signature are
+ *	  not implemented/checked.
+ */
+static int
+fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
+	     size_t *retn, byte *buf, size_t size  )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    size_t len = 0;
+    int lastline = 0;
+    unsigned maxlen, n;
+    byte *p;
+    byte tempbuf[PARTIAL_CHUNK];
+    size_t tempbuf_len=0;
+
+    while( !rc && size-len>=(PARTIAL_CHUNK+1)) {
+	/* copy what we have in the line buffer */
+	if( afx->faked == 1 )
+	    afx->faked++; /* skip the first (empty) line */
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* It's full, so write this partial chunk */
+	    if(tempbuf_len==PARTIAL_CHUNK)
+	      {
+		buf[len++]=0xE0+PARTIAL_POW;
+		memcpy(&buf[len],tempbuf,PARTIAL_CHUNK);
+		len+=PARTIAL_CHUNK;
+		tempbuf_len=0;
+		continue;
+	      }
+
+	    while( tempbuf_len < PARTIAL_CHUNK
+		   && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
+	      tempbuf[tempbuf_len++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+	    if( tempbuf_len==PARTIAL_CHUNK )
+	      continue;
+	  }
+
+	/* read the next line */
+	maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	afx->buffer_pos = 0;
+	afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+					   &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	if( !afx->buffer_len ) {
+	    rc = -1; /* eof (should not happen) */
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if( !maxlen )
+	    afx->truncated++;
+
+	p = afx->buffer;
+	n = afx->buffer_len;
+
+	/* Armor header or dash-escaped line? */
+	if(p[0]=='-')
+	  {
+	    /* 2440bis-10: When reversing dash-escaping, an
+	       implementation MUST strip the string "- " if it occurs
+	       at the beginning of a line, and SHOULD warn on "-" and
+	       any character other than a space at the beginning of a
+	       line.  */
+
+	    if(p[1]==' ' && !afx->not_dash_escaped)
+	      {
+		/* It's a dash-escaped line, so skip over the
+		   escape. */
+		afx->buffer_pos = 2;
+	      }
+	    else if(p[1]=='-' && p[2]=='-' && p[3]=='-' && p[4]=='-')
+	      {
+		/* Five dashes in a row mean it's probably armor
+		   header. */
+		int type = is_armor_header( p, n );
+		if( afx->not_dash_escaped && type != BEGIN_SIGNATURE )
+		  ; /* this is okay */
+		else
+		  {
+		    if( type != BEGIN_SIGNATURE )
+		      {
+			log_info(_("unexpected armor: "));
+			print_string( stderr, p, n, 0 );
+			putc('\n', stderr);
+		      }
+
+		    lastline = 1;
+		    rc = -1;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else if(!afx->not_dash_escaped)
+	      {
+		/* Bad dash-escaping. */
+		log_info(_("invalid dash escaped line: "));
+		print_string( stderr, p, n, 0 );
+		putc('\n', stderr);
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	/* Now handle the end-of-line canonicalization */
+	if( !afx->not_dash_escaped )
+	  {
+	    int crlf = n > 1 && p[n-2] == '\r' && p[n-1]=='\n';
+
+	    /* PGP2 does not treat a tab as white space character */
+	    afx->buffer_len=
+	      trim_trailing_chars( &p[afx->buffer_pos], n-afx->buffer_pos,
+				   afx->pgp2mode ? " \r\n" : " \t\r\n");
+	    afx->buffer_len+=afx->buffer_pos;
+	    /* the buffer is always allocated with enough space to append
+	     * the removed [CR], LF and a Nul
+	     * The reason for this complicated procedure is to keep at least
+	     * the original type of lineending - handling of the removed
+	     * trailing spaces seems to be impossible in our method
+	     * of faking a packet; either we have to use a temporary file
+	     * or calculate the hash here in this module and somehow find
+	     * a way to send the hash down the processing line (well, a special
+	     * faked packet could do the job).
+	     */
+	    if( crlf )
+	      afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len++] = '\r';
+	    afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len++] = '\n';
+	    afx->buffer[afx->buffer_len] = '\0';
+	  }
+    }
+
+    if( lastline ) { /* write last (ending) length header */
+        if(tempbuf_len<192)
+	  buf[len++]=tempbuf_len;
+	else
+	  {
+	    buf[len++]=((tempbuf_len-192)/256) + 192;
+	    buf[len++]=(tempbuf_len-192) % 256;
+	  }
+	memcpy(&buf[len],tempbuf,tempbuf_len);
+	len+=tempbuf_len;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	afx->faked = 0;
+	afx->in_cleartext = 0;
+	/* and now read the header lines */
+	afx->buffer_pos = 0;
+	for(;;) {
+	    int i;
+
+	    /* read the next line (skip all truncated lines) */
+	    do {
+		maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+		afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+						 &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	    } while( !maxlen );
+	    p = afx->buffer;
+	    n = afx->buffer_len;
+	    if( !n ) {
+		rc = -1;
+		break; /* eof */
+	    }
+	    i = parse_header_line( afx, p , n );
+	    if( i <= 0 ) {
+		if( i )
+		    invalid_armor();
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	afx->inp_checked = 1;
+	afx->crc = CRCINIT;
+	afx->idx = 0;
+	afx->radbuf[0] = 0;
+    }
+
+    *retn = len;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+invalid_crc(void)
+{
+    if ( opt.ignore_crc_error )
+        return 0;
+    log_inc_errorcount();
+    return G10ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
+}
+
+
+static int
+radix64_read( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a, size_t *retn,
+	      byte *buf, size_t size )
+{
+    byte val;
+    int c=0, c2; /*init c because gcc is not clever enough for the continue*/
+    int checkcrc=0;
+    int rc = 0;
+    size_t n = 0;
+    int  idx, i, onlypad=0;
+    u32 crc;
+
+    crc = afx->crc;
+    idx = afx->idx;
+    val = afx->radbuf[0];
+    for( n=0; n < size; ) {
+
+	if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
+	    c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+	else { /* read the next line */
+	    unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	    afx->buffer_pos = 0;
+	    afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+					       &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	    if( !maxlen )
+		afx->truncated++;
+	    if( !afx->buffer_len )
+		break; /* eof */
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+      again:
+	if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' )
+	    continue;
+	else if( c == '=' ) { /* pad character: stop */
+	    /* some mailers leave quoted-printable encoded characters
+	     * so we try to workaround this */
+	    if( afx->buffer_pos+2 < afx->buffer_len ) {
+		int cc1, cc2, cc3;
+		cc1 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos];
+		cc2 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos+1];
+		cc3 = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos+2];
+		if( isxdigit(cc1) && isxdigit(cc2)
+				  && strchr( "=\n\r\t ", cc3 )) {
+		    /* well it seems to be the case - adjust */
+		    c = isdigit(cc1)? (cc1 - '0'): (ascii_toupper(cc1)-'A'+10);
+		    c <<= 4;
+		    c |= isdigit(cc2)? (cc2 - '0'): (ascii_toupper(cc2)-'A'+10);
+		    afx->buffer_pos += 2;
+		    afx->qp_detected = 1;
+		    goto again;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if(n==0)
+	      onlypad=1;
+
+	    if( idx == 1 )
+		buf[n++] = val;
+	    checkcrc++;
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( (c = asctobin[(c2=c)]) == 255 ) {
+	    log_error(_("invalid radix64 character %02X skipped\n"), c2);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	switch(idx) {
+	  case 0: val =  c << 2; break;
+	  case 1: val |= (c>>4)&3; buf[n++]=val;val=(c<<4)&0xf0;break;
+	  case 2: val |= (c>>2)&15; buf[n++]=val;val=(c<<6)&0xc0;break;
+	  case 3: val |= c&0x3f; buf[n++] = val; break;
+	}
+	idx = (idx+1) % 4;
+    }
+
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	crc = (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ buf[i]];
+    crc &= 0x00ffffff;
+    afx->crc = crc;
+    afx->idx = idx;
+    afx->radbuf[0] = val;
+
+    if( checkcrc ) {
+	afx->any_data = 1;
+	afx->inp_checked=0;
+	afx->faked = 0;
+	for(;;) { /* skip lf and pad characters */
+	    if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
+		c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+	    else { /* read the next line */
+		unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+		afx->buffer_pos = 0;
+		afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+						   &afx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+		if( !maxlen )
+		    afx->truncated++;
+		if( !afx->buffer_len )
+		    break; /* eof */
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r'
+		|| c == '\t' || c == '=' )
+		continue;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if( c == -1 )
+	    log_error(_("premature eof (no CRC)\n"));
+	else {
+	    u32 mycrc = 0;
+	    idx = 0;
+	    do {
+		if( (c = asctobin[c]) == 255 )
+		    break;
+		switch(idx) {
+		  case 0: val =  c << 2; break;
+		  case 1: val |= (c>>4)&3; mycrc |= val << 16;val=(c<<4)&0xf0;break;
+		  case 2: val |= (c>>2)&15; mycrc |= val << 8;val=(c<<6)&0xc0;break;
+		  case 3: val |= c&0x3f; mycrc |= val; break;
+		}
+		for(;;) {
+		    if( afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
+			c = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+		    else { /* read the next line */
+			unsigned maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+			afx->buffer_pos = 0;
+			afx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &afx->buffer,
+							   &afx->buffer_size,
+								&maxlen );
+			if( !maxlen )
+			    afx->truncated++;
+			if( !afx->buffer_len )
+			    break; /* eof */
+			continue;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		}
+		if( !afx->buffer_len )
+		    break; /* eof */
+	    } while( ++idx < 4 );
+	    if( c == -1 ) {
+		log_info(_("premature eof (in CRC)\n"));
+		rc = invalid_crc();
+	    }
+	    else if( idx == 0 ) {
+	        /* No CRC at all is legal ("MAY") */
+	        rc=0;
+	    }
+	    else if( idx != 4 ) {
+		log_info(_("malformed CRC\n"));
+		rc = invalid_crc();
+	    }
+	    else if( mycrc != afx->crc ) {
+                log_info (_("CRC error; %06lX - %06lX\n"),
+				    (ulong)afx->crc, (ulong)mycrc);
+                rc = invalid_crc();
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = 0;
+                /* FIXME: Here we should emit another control packet,
+                 * so that we know in mainproc that we are processing
+                 * a clearsign message */
+#if 0
+		for(rc=0;!rc;) {
+		    rc = 0 /*check_trailer( &fhdr, c )*/;
+		    if( !rc ) {
+			if( (c=iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
+			    rc = 2;
+		    }
+		}
+		if( rc == -1 )
+		    rc = 0;
+		else if( rc == 2 ) {
+		    log_error(_("premature eof (in trailer)\n"));
+		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
+		}
+		else {
+		    log_error(_("error in trailer line\n"));
+		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_ARMOR;
+		}
+#endif
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( !n && !onlypad )
+	rc = -1;
+
+    *retn = n;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * This filter is used to handle the armor stuff
+ */
+int
+armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	     IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    armor_filter_context_t *afx = opaque;
+    int rc=0, i, c;
+    byte radbuf[3];
+    int  idx, idx2;
+    size_t n=0;
+    u32 crc;
+#if 0
+    static FILE *fp ;
+
+    if( !fp ) {
+	fp = fopen("armor.out", "w");
+	assert(fp);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("armor-filter: control: %d\n", control );
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && afx->inp_bypass ) {
+	n = 0;
+	if( afx->buffer_len ) {
+	    for(; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; n++ )
+		buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+	    if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
+		afx->buffer_len = 0;
+	}
+	for(; n < size; n++ ) {
+	    if( (c=iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    buf[n] = c & 0xff;
+	}
+	if( !n )
+	    rc = -1;
+	*ret_len = n;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+        /* We need some space for the faked packet.  The minmum
+         * required size is the PARTIAL_CHUNK size plus a byte for the
+         * length itself */
+	if( size < PARTIAL_CHUNK+1 ) 
+	    BUG(); /* supplied buffer too short */
+
+	if( afx->faked )
+	    rc = fake_packet( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
+	else if( !afx->inp_checked ) {
+	    rc = check_input( afx, a );
+	    if( afx->inp_bypass ) {
+		for(n=0; n < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len; )
+		    buf[n++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
+		if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len )
+		    afx->buffer_len = 0;
+		if( !n )
+		    rc = -1;
+	    }
+	    else if( afx->faked ) {
+	        unsigned int hashes = afx->hashes;
+                const byte *sesmark;
+                size_t sesmarklen;
+                
+                sesmark = get_session_marker( &sesmarklen );
+                if ( sesmarklen > 20 )
+                    BUG();
+
+		/* the buffer is at least 15+n*15 bytes long, so it
+		 * is easy to construct the packets */
+
+		hashes &= 1|2|4|8|16|32|64;
+		if( !hashes ) {
+		    hashes |= 4;  /* default to MD 5 */
+		    /* This is non-ideal since PGP 5-8 have the same
+		       end-of-line bugs as PGP 2. However, we only
+		       enable pgp2mode if there is no Hash: header. */
+		    if( opt.pgp2_workarounds )
+			afx->pgp2mode = 1;
+		}
+		n=0;
+                /* First a gpg control packet... */
+                buf[n++] = 0xff; /* new format, type 63, 1 length byte */
+                n++;   /* see below */
+                memcpy(buf+n, sesmark, sesmarklen ); n+= sesmarklen;
+                buf[n++] = CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START; 
+                buf[n++] = afx->not_dash_escaped? 0:1; /* sigclass */
+                if( hashes & 1 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+                if( hashes & 2 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+                if( hashes & 4 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+                if( hashes & 8 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224;
+                if( hashes & 16 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
+                if( hashes & 32 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384;
+                if( hashes & 64 )
+                    buf[n++] = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;
+                buf[1] = n - 2;
+
+		/* ...followed by an invented plaintext packet.
+		   Amusingly enough, this packet is not compliant with
+		   2440 as the initial partial length is less than 512
+		   bytes.  Of course, we'll accept it anyway ;) */
+
+		buf[n++] = 0xCB; /* new packet format, type 11 */
+		buf[n++] = 0xE1; /* 2^1 == 2 bytes */
+		buf[n++] = 't';  /* canonical text mode */
+		buf[n++] = 0;	 /* namelength */
+		buf[n++] = 0xE2; /* 2^2 == 4 more bytes */
+		memset(buf+n, 0, 4); /* timestamp */
+		n += 4;
+	    }
+	    else if( !rc )
+		rc = radix64_read( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
+	}
+	else
+	    rc = radix64_read( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
+#if 0
+	if( n )
+	    if( fwrite(buf, n, 1, fp ) != 1 )
+		BUG();
+#endif
+	*ret_len = n;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH && !afx->cancel ) {
+	if( !afx->status ) { /* write the header line */
+	    const char *s;
+	    STRLIST comment=opt.comments;
+
+	    if( afx->what >= DIM(head_strings) )
+		log_bug("afx->what=%d", afx->what);
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, "-----");
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, head_strings[afx->what] );
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, "-----" );
+	    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	    if( !opt.no_version )
+	      {
+		iobuf_writestr(a, "Version: GnuPG v"  VERSION " ("
+			       PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")" );
+		iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	      }
+
+	    /* write the comment strings */
+	    for(s=comment->d;comment;comment=comment->next,s=comment->d)
+	      {
+		iobuf_writestr(a, "Comment: " );
+		for( ; *s; s++ )
+		  {
+		    if( *s == '\n' )
+		      iobuf_writestr(a, "\\n" );
+		    else if( *s == '\r' )
+		      iobuf_writestr(a, "\\r" );
+		    else if( *s == '\v' )
+		      iobuf_writestr(a, "\\v" );
+		    else
+		      iobuf_put(a, *s );
+		  }
+
+		iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	      }
+
+	    if ( afx->hdrlines ) {
+                for ( s = afx->hdrlines; *s; s++ ) {
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+                    if ( *s == '\n' )
+                        iobuf_put( a, '\r');
+#endif
+                    iobuf_put(a, *s );
+                }
+            }
+
+	    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	    afx->status++;
+	    afx->idx = 0;
+	    afx->idx2 = 0;
+	    afx->crc = CRCINIT;
+
+	}
+	crc = afx->crc;
+	idx = afx->idx;
+	idx2 = afx->idx2;
+	for(i=0; i < idx; i++ )
+	    radbuf[i] = afx->radbuf[i];
+
+	for(i=0; i < size; i++ )
+	    crc = (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ buf[i]];
+	crc &= 0x00ffffff;
+
+	for( ; size; buf++, size-- ) {
+	    radbuf[idx++] = *buf;
+	    if( idx > 2 ) {
+		idx = 0;
+		c = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
+		iobuf_put(a, c);
+		c = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+		iobuf_put(a, c);
+		c = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
+		iobuf_put(a, c);
+		c = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
+		iobuf_put(a, c);
+		if( ++idx2 >= (64/4) )
+		  { /* pgp doesn't like 72 here */
+		    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+		    idx2=0;
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+	for(i=0; i < idx; i++ )
+	    afx->radbuf[i] = radbuf[i];
+	afx->idx = idx;
+	afx->idx2 = idx2;
+	afx->crc  = crc;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_INIT )
+      {
+	if( !is_initialized )
+	  initialize();
+
+	/* Figure out what we're using for line endings if the caller
+	   didn't specify. */
+	if(afx->eol[0]==0)
+	  {
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+	    afx->eol[0]='\r';
+	    afx->eol[1]='\n';
+#else
+	    afx->eol[0]='\n';
+#endif
+	  }
+      }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_CANCEL ) {
+	afx->cancel = 1;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+	if( afx->cancel )
+	    ;
+	else if( afx->status ) { /* pad, write cecksum, and bottom line */
+	    crc = afx->crc;
+	    idx = afx->idx;
+	    idx2 = afx->idx2;
+	    for(i=0; i < idx; i++ )
+		radbuf[i] = afx->radbuf[i];
+	    if( idx ) {
+		c = bintoasc[(*radbuf>>2)&077];
+		iobuf_put(a, c);
+		if( idx == 1 ) {
+		    c = bintoasc[((*radbuf << 4) & 060) & 077];
+		    iobuf_put(a, c);
+		    iobuf_put(a, '=');
+		    iobuf_put(a, '=');
+		}
+		else { /* 2 */
+		    c = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1]>>4)&017))&077];
+		    iobuf_put(a, c);
+		    c = bintoasc[((radbuf[1] << 2) & 074) & 077];
+		    iobuf_put(a, c);
+		    iobuf_put(a, '=');
+		}
+		if( ++idx2 >= (64/4) )
+		  { /* pgp doesn't like 72 here */
+		    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+		    idx2=0;
+		  }
+	    }
+	    /* may need a linefeed */
+	    if( idx2 )
+	      iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	    /* write the CRC */
+	    iobuf_put(a, '=');
+	    radbuf[0] = crc >>16;
+	    radbuf[1] = crc >> 8;
+	    radbuf[2] = crc;
+	    c = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
+	    iobuf_put(a, c);
+	    c = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+	    iobuf_put(a, c);
+	    c = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
+	    iobuf_put(a, c);
+	    c = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
+	    iobuf_put(a, c);
+	    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	    /* and the the trailer */
+	    if( afx->what >= DIM(tail_strings) )
+		log_bug("afx->what=%d", afx->what);
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, "-----");
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, tail_strings[afx->what] );
+	    iobuf_writestr(a, "-----" );
+	    iobuf_writestr(a,afx->eol);
+	}
+	else if( !afx->any_data && !afx->inp_bypass ) {
+	    log_error(_("no valid OpenPGP data found.\n"));
+	    afx->no_openpgp_data = 1;
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "1" );
+	}
+	if( afx->truncated )
+	    log_info(_("invalid armor: line longer than %d characters\n"),
+		      MAX_LINELEN );
+	/* issue an error to enforce dissemination of correct software */
+	if( afx->qp_detected )
+	    log_error(_("quoted printable character in armor - "
+			"probably a buggy MTA has been used\n") );
+	xfree( afx->buffer );
+	afx->buffer = NULL;
+        release_armor_context (afx);
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+	*(char**)buf = "armor_filter";
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * create a radix64 encoded string.
+ */
+char *
+make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len )
+{
+    char *buffer, *p;
+
+    buffer = p = xmalloc( (len+2)/3*4 + 1 );
+    for( ; len >= 3 ; len -= 3, data += 3 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[1]<<2)&074)|((data[2]>>6)&03))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[data[2]&077];
+    }
+    if( len == 2 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[((data[1]<<2)&074)];
+    }
+    else if( len == 1 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] <<4)&060];
+    }
+    *p = 0;
+    return buffer;
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************
+ *  For the pipemode command we can't use the armor filter for various
+ *  reasons, so we use this new unarmor_pump stuff to remove the armor 
+ */
+
+enum unarmor_state_e {
+    STA_init = 0,
+    STA_bypass,
+    STA_wait_newline,
+    STA_wait_dash,
+    STA_first_dash, 
+    STA_compare_header,
+    STA_found_header_wait_newline,
+    STA_skip_header_lines,
+    STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws,
+    STA_read_data,
+    STA_wait_crc,
+    STA_read_crc,
+    STA_ready
+};
+
+struct unarmor_pump_s {
+    enum unarmor_state_e state;
+    byte val;
+    int checkcrc;
+    int pos;   /* counts from 0..3 */
+    u32 crc;
+    u32 mycrc; /* the one store in the data */
+};
+
+
+
+UnarmorPump
+unarmor_pump_new (void)
+{
+    UnarmorPump x;
+
+    if( !is_initialized )
+        initialize();
+    x = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *x);
+    return x;
+}
+
+void
+unarmor_pump_release (UnarmorPump x)
+{
+    xfree (x);
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Get the next character from the ascii armor taken from the IOBUF
+ * created earlier by unarmor_pump_new().
+ * Return:  c = Character
+ *        256 = ignore this value
+ *         -1 = End of current armor 
+ *         -2 = Premature EOF (not used)
+ *         -3 = Invalid armor
+ */
+int
+unarmor_pump (UnarmorPump x, int c)
+{
+    int rval = 256; /* default is to ignore the return value */
+
+    switch (x->state) {
+      case STA_init:
+        { 
+            byte tmp[1];
+            tmp[0] = c; 
+            if ( is_armored (tmp) )
+                x->state = c == '-'? STA_first_dash : STA_wait_newline;
+            else {
+                x->state = STA_bypass;
+                return c;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+      case STA_bypass:
+        return c; /* return here to avoid crc calculation */
+      case STA_wait_newline:
+        if (c == '\n')
+            x->state = STA_wait_dash;
+        break;
+      case STA_wait_dash:
+        x->state = c == '-'? STA_first_dash : STA_wait_newline;
+        break;
+      case STA_first_dash: /* just need for initalization */
+        x->pos = 0;
+        x->state = STA_compare_header;
+      case STA_compare_header:
+        if ( "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----"[++x->pos] == c ) {
+            if ( x->pos == 28 ) 
+                x->state = STA_found_header_wait_newline;
+        }
+        else 
+            x->state = c == '\n'? STA_wait_dash : STA_wait_newline;
+        break;
+      case STA_found_header_wait_newline:
+        /* to make CR,LF issues easier we simply allow for white space
+           behind the 5 dashes */
+        if ( c == '\n' )
+            x->state = STA_skip_header_lines;
+        else if ( c != '\r' && c != ' ' && c != '\t' )
+            x->state = STA_wait_dash; /* garbage after the header line */
+        break;
+      case STA_skip_header_lines:
+        /* i.e. wait for one empty line */
+        if ( c == '\n' ) {
+            x->state = STA_read_data;
+            x->crc = CRCINIT;
+            x->val = 0;
+            x->pos = 0;
+        }
+        else if ( c != '\r' && c != ' ' && c != '\t' )
+            x->state = STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws;
+        break;
+      case STA_skip_header_lines_non_ws:
+        /* like above but we already encountered non white space */
+        if ( c == '\n' )
+            x->state = STA_skip_header_lines;
+        break;
+      case STA_read_data:
+        /* fixme: we don't check for the trailing dash lines but rely
+         * on the armor stop characters */
+        if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' )
+            break; /* skip all kind of white space */
+
+        if( c == '=' ) { /* pad character: stop */
+            if( x->pos == 1 ) /* in this case val has some value */
+                rval = x->val;
+            x->state = STA_wait_crc;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        {
+            int c2;
+            if( (c = asctobin[(c2=c)]) == 255 ) {
+                log_error(_("invalid radix64 character %02X skipped\n"), c2);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        
+        switch(x->pos) {
+          case 0:
+            x->val = c << 2;
+            break;
+          case 1:
+            x->val |= (c>>4)&3;
+            rval = x->val;
+            x->val = (c<<4)&0xf0;
+            break;
+          case 2:
+            x->val |= (c>>2)&15;
+            rval = x->val;
+            x->val = (c<<6)&0xc0;
+            break;
+          case 3:
+            x->val |= c&0x3f;
+            rval = x->val;
+            break;
+        }
+        x->pos = (x->pos+1) % 4;
+        break;
+      case STA_wait_crc:
+        if( c == '\n' || c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\t' || c == '=' )
+            break; /* skip ws and pad characters */
+        /* assume that we are at the next line */
+        x->state = STA_read_crc;
+        x->pos = 0;
+        x->mycrc = 0;
+      case STA_read_crc:
+        if( (c = asctobin[c]) == 255 ) {
+            rval = -1; /* ready */
+            if( x->crc != x->mycrc ) {
+                log_info (_("CRC error; %06lX - %06lX\n"),
+                          (ulong)x->crc, (ulong)x->mycrc);
+                if ( invalid_crc() )
+                    rval = -3;
+            }
+            x->state = STA_ready; /* not sure whether this is correct */
+            break;
+        }
+        
+        switch(x->pos) {
+          case 0:
+            x->val = c << 2;
+            break;
+          case 1:
+            x->val |= (c>>4)&3;
+            x->mycrc |= x->val << 16;
+            x->val = (c<<4)&0xf0;
+            break;
+          case 2:
+            x->val |= (c>>2)&15;
+            x->mycrc |= x->val << 8;
+            x->val = (c<<6)&0xc0;
+            break;
+          case 3:
+            x->val |= c&0x3f;
+            x->mycrc |= x->val;
+            break;
+        }
+        x->pos = (x->pos+1) % 4;
+        break;
+      case STA_ready:
+        rval = -1;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if ( !(rval & ~255) ) { /* compute the CRC */
+        x->crc = (x->crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((x->crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ rval];
+        x->crc &= 0x00ffffff;
+    }
+
+    return rval;
+}
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7ac5d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1308 @@
+/* build-packet.c - assemble packets and write them
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+static int do_user_id( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_user_id *uid );
+static int do_public_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk );
+static int do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *pk );
+static int do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc );
+static int do_pubkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc );
+static u32 calc_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt );
+static int do_plaintext( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_plaintext *pt );
+static int do_encrypted( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_encrypted *ed );
+static int do_encrypted_mdc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_encrypted *ed );
+static int do_compressed( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_compressed *cd );
+static int do_signature( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_signature *sig );
+static int do_onepass_sig( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_onepass_sig *ops );
+
+static int calc_header_length( u32 len, int new_ctb );
+static int write_16(IOBUF inp, u16 a);
+static int write_32(IOBUF inp, u32 a);
+static int write_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len );
+static int write_sign_packet_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len );
+static int write_header2( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen );
+static int write_new_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen );
+static int write_version( IOBUF out, int ctb );
+
+/****************
+ * Build a packet and write it to INP
+ * Returns: 0 := okay
+ *	   >0 := error
+ * Note: Caller must free the packet
+ */
+int
+build_packet( IOBUF out, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    int new_ctb=0, rc=0, ctb;
+    int pkttype;
+
+    if( DBG_PACKET )
+	log_debug("build_packet() type=%d\n", pkt->pkttype );
+    assert( pkt->pkt.generic );
+
+    switch( (pkttype = pkt->pkttype) )
+      {
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT: new_ctb = pkt->pkt.plaintext->new_ctb; break;
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: new_ctb = pkt->pkt.encrypted->new_ctb; break;
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:new_ctb = pkt->pkt.compressed->new_ctb; break;
+      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	if( pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+	  pkttype = PKT_ATTRIBUTE;
+	break;
+      default: break;
+      }
+
+    if( new_ctb || pkttype > 15 ) /* new format */
+	ctb = 0xc0 | (pkttype & 0x3f);
+    else
+	ctb = 0x80 | ((pkttype & 15)<<2);
+    switch( pkttype )
+      {
+      case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
+      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	rc = do_user_id( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.user_id );
+	break;
+      case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
+      case PKT_COMMENT:
+	/*
+	  Ignore these.  Theoretically, this will never be called as
+	  we have no way to output comment packets any longer, but
+	  just in case there is some code path that would end up
+	  outputting a comment that was written before comments were
+	  dropped (in the public key?) this is a no-op.
+	*/
+	break;
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	rc = do_public_key( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.public_key );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	rc = do_secret_key( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+	rc = do_symkey_enc( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.symkey_enc );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+	rc = do_pubkey_enc( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
+	rc = do_plaintext( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.plaintext );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	rc = do_encrypted( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.encrypted );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+	rc = do_encrypted_mdc( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.encrypted );
+	break;
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+	rc = do_compressed( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.compressed );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+	rc = do_signature( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.signature );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
+	rc = do_onepass_sig( out, ctb, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig );
+	break;
+      case PKT_RING_TRUST:
+	break; /* ignore it (keyring.c does write it directly)*/
+      case PKT_MDC: /* we write it directly, so we should never see it here. */
+      default:
+	log_bug("invalid packet type in build_packet()\n");
+	break;
+      }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * calculate the length of a packet described by PKT
+ */
+u32
+calc_packet_length( PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    u32 n=0;
+    int new_ctb = 0;
+
+    assert( pkt->pkt.generic );
+    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
+	n = calc_plaintext( pkt->pkt.plaintext );
+	new_ctb = pkt->pkt.plaintext->new_ctb;
+	break;
+      case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
+      case PKT_USER_ID:
+      case PKT_COMMENT:
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
+      case PKT_RING_TRUST:
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+      default:
+	log_bug("invalid packet type in calc_packet_length()");
+	break;
+    }
+
+    n += calc_header_length(n, new_ctb);
+    return n;
+}
+
+static void
+write_fake_data( IOBUF out, MPI a )
+{
+    if( a ) {
+        unsigned int i;
+	void *p;
+
+	p = mpi_get_opaque( a, &i );
+	iobuf_write( out, p, i );
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+do_user_id( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_user_id *uid )
+{
+    if( uid->attrib_data )
+      {
+	write_header(out, ctb, uid->attrib_len);
+	if( iobuf_write( out, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len ) )
+	  return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+        write_header2( out, ctb, uid->len, 2 );
+	if( iobuf_write( out, uid->name, uid->len ) )
+	  return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+      }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_public_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n, i;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+
+    if( !pk->version )
+	iobuf_put( a, 3 );
+    else
+	iobuf_put( a, pk->version );
+    write_32(a, pk->timestamp );
+    if( pk->version < 4 ) {
+	u16 ndays;
+	if( pk->expiredate )
+	    ndays = (u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
+	else
+	    ndays = 0;
+	write_16(a, ndays );
+    }
+    iobuf_put(a, pk->pubkey_algo );
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	write_fake_data( a, pk->pkey[0] );
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	mpi_write(a, pk->pkey[i] );
+
+    write_header2(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a), pk->hdrbytes);
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_secret_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int i, nskey, npkey;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp(); /* build in a self-enlarging buffer */
+
+    /* Write the version number - if none is specified, use 3 */
+    if( !sk->version )
+	iobuf_put( a, 3 );
+    else
+	iobuf_put( a, sk->version );
+    write_32(a, sk->timestamp );
+
+    /* v3  needs the expiration time */
+    if( sk->version < 4 ) {
+	u16 ndays;
+	if( sk->expiredate )
+	    ndays = (u16)((sk->expiredate - sk->timestamp) / 86400L);
+	else
+	    ndays = 0;
+	write_16(a, ndays);
+    }
+
+    iobuf_put(a, sk->pubkey_algo );
+
+    /* get number of secret and public parameters.  They are held in
+       one array first the public ones, then the secret ones */
+    nskey = pubkey_get_nskey( sk->pubkey_algo );
+    npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( sk->pubkey_algo );
+
+    /* If we don't have any public parameters - which is the case if
+       we don't know the algorithm used - the parameters are stored as
+       one blob in a faked (opaque) MPI */
+    if( !npkey ) {
+	write_fake_data( a, sk->skey[0] );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    assert( npkey < nskey );
+
+    /* Writing the public parameters is easy */
+    for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
+	mpi_write(a, sk->skey[i] );
+
+    /* build the header for protected (encrypted) secret parameters */
+    if( sk->is_protected ) {
+	if( is_RSA(sk->pubkey_algo) && sk->version < 4
+				    && !sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
+            /* the simple rfc1991 (v3) way */
+	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.algo );
+	    iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
+	}
+	else {
+          /* OpenPGP protection according to rfc2440 */
+	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.sha1chk? 0xfe : 0xff );
+	    iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.algo );
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode >= 1000 ) {
+                /* These modes are not possible in OpenPGP, we use them
+                   to implement our extensions, 101 can be seen as a
+                   private/experimental extension (this is not
+                   specified in rfc2440 but the same scheme is used
+                   for all other algorithm identifiers) */
+		iobuf_put(a, 101 ); 
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+		iobuf_write(a, "GNU", 3 );
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.mode - 1000 );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.mode );
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+	    }
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1
+		|| sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 )
+		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.s2k.salt, 8 );
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 )
+		iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.s2k.count ); 
+
+            /* For out special modes 1001, 1002 we do not need an IV */
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1001 
+              && sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1002 )
+		iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
+	}
+    }
+    else
+	iobuf_put(a, 0 );
+
+    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
+        ; /* GnuPG extension - don't write a secret key at all */ 
+    else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
+      {  /* GnuPG extension - divert to OpenPGP smartcard. */ 
+	iobuf_put(a, sk->protect.ivlen ); /* length of the serial
+                                             number or 0 for no serial
+                                             number. */
+        /* The serial number gets stored in the IV field. */
+        iobuf_write(a, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen);
+      }
+    else if( sk->is_protected && sk->version >= 4 ) {
+        /* The secret key is protected - write it out as it is */
+	byte *p;
+	unsigned int ndata;
+
+	assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[npkey] ) );
+	p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[npkey], &ndata );
+	iobuf_write(a, p, ndata );
+    }
+    else if( sk->is_protected ) {
+        /* The secret key is protected te old v4 way. */
+	for(   ; i < nskey; i++ ) {
+            byte *p;
+            unsigned int ndata;
+
+            assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
+            p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
+            iobuf_write (a, p, ndata);
+        }
+	write_16(a, sk->csum );
+    }
+    else {
+        /* non-protected key */
+	for(   ; i < nskey; i++ )
+	    mpi_write(a, sk->skey[i] );
+	write_16(a, sk->csum );
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    /* Build the header of the packet - which we must do after writing all
+       the other stuff, so that we know the length of the packet */
+    write_header2(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a), sk->hdrbytes);
+    /* And finally write it out the real stream */
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a); /* close the remporary buffer */
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+do_symkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+
+    assert( enc->version == 4 );
+    switch( enc->s2k.mode ) {
+      case 0: case 1: case 3: break;
+      default: log_bug("do_symkey_enc: s2k=%d\n", enc->s2k.mode );
+    }
+    iobuf_put( a, enc->version );
+    iobuf_put( a, enc->cipher_algo );
+    iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.mode );
+    iobuf_put( a, enc->s2k.hash_algo );
+    if( enc->s2k.mode == 1 || enc->s2k.mode == 3 ) {
+	iobuf_write(a, enc->s2k.salt, 8 );
+	if( enc->s2k.mode == 3 )
+	    iobuf_put(a, enc->s2k.count);
+    }
+    if( enc->seskeylen )
+	iobuf_write(a, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen );
+
+    write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_pubkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n, i;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+
+    write_version( a, ctb );
+    if( enc->throw_keyid ) {
+	write_32(a, 0 );  /* don't tell Eve who can decrypt the message */
+	write_32(a, 0 );
+    }
+    else {
+	write_32(a, enc->keyid[0] );
+	write_32(a, enc->keyid[1] );
+    }
+    iobuf_put(a,enc->pubkey_algo );
+    n = pubkey_get_nenc( enc->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	write_fake_data( a, enc->data[0] );
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	mpi_write(a, enc->data[i] );
+
+    write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static u32
+calc_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt )
+{
+  /* Truncate namelen to the maximum 255 characters.  Note this means
+     that a function that calls build_packet with an illegal literal
+     packet will get it back legalized. */
+
+  if(pt->namelen>255)
+    pt->namelen=255;
+
+  return pt->len? (1 + 1 + pt->namelen + 4 + pt->len) : 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_plaintext( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_plaintext *pt )
+{
+    int i, rc = 0;
+    u32 n;
+    byte buf[1000]; /* this buffer has the plaintext! */
+    int nbytes;
+
+    write_header(out, ctb, calc_plaintext( pt ) );
+    iobuf_put(out, pt->mode );
+    iobuf_put(out, pt->namelen );
+    for(i=0; i < pt->namelen; i++ )
+	iobuf_put(out, pt->name[i] );
+    if( write_32(out, pt->timestamp ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    n = 0;
+    while( (nbytes=iobuf_read(pt->buf, buf, 1000)) != -1 ) {
+	if( iobuf_write(out, buf, nbytes) == -1 ) {
+	    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	n += nbytes;
+    }
+    wipememory(buf,1000); /* burn the buffer */
+    if( (ctb&0x40) && !pt->len )
+      iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(out, 0 ); /* turn off partial */
+    if( pt->len && n != pt->len )
+      log_error("do_plaintext(): wrote %lu bytes but expected %lu bytes\n",
+		(ulong)n, (ulong)pt->len );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+do_encrypted( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_encrypted *ed )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    u32 n;
+
+    n = ed->len ? (ed->len + ed->extralen) : 0;
+    write_header(out, ctb, n );
+
+    /* This is all. The caller has to write the real data */
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+do_encrypted_mdc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_encrypted *ed )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    u32 n;
+
+    assert( ed->mdc_method );
+
+    /* Take version number and the following MDC packet in account. */
+    n = ed->len ? (ed->len + ed->extralen + 1 + 22) : 0;
+    write_header(out, ctb, n );
+    iobuf_put(out, 1 );  /* version */
+
+    /* This is all. The caller has to write the real data */
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_compressed( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_compressed *cd )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    /* We must use the old convention and don't use blockmode for tyhe
+       sake of PGP 2 compatibility.  However if the new_ctb flag was
+       set, CTB is already formatted as new style and write_header2
+       does create a partial length encoding using new the new
+       style. */
+    write_header2(out, ctb, 0, 0);
+    iobuf_put(out, cd->algorithm );
+
+    /* This is all. The caller has to write the real data */
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Delete all subpackets of type REQTYPE and return a bool whether a packet
+ * was deleted.
+ */
+int
+delete_sig_subpkt (subpktarea_t *area, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype )
+{
+    int buflen;
+    sigsubpkttype_t type;
+    byte *buffer, *bufstart;
+    size_t n;
+    size_t unused = 0;
+    int okay = 0;
+
+    if( !area )
+	return 0;
+    buflen = area->len;
+    buffer = area->data;
+    for(;;) {
+	if( !buflen ) {
+            okay = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+	bufstart = buffer;
+	n = *buffer++; buflen--;
+	if( n == 255 ) {
+	    if( buflen < 4 )
+		break;
+	    n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+                | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
+	    buffer += 4;
+	    buflen -= 4;
+	}
+	else if( n >= 192 ) {
+	    if( buflen < 2 )
+		break;
+	    n = (( n - 192 ) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
+	    buffer++;
+	    buflen--;
+	}
+	if( buflen < n )
+	    break;
+        
+	type = *buffer & 0x7f;
+	if( type == reqtype ) {
+	    buffer++;
+            buflen--;
+	    n--;
+	    if( n > buflen )
+		break;
+            buffer += n; /* point to next subpkt */
+            buflen -= n;
+            memmove (bufstart, buffer, buflen); /* shift */
+            unused +=  buffer - bufstart;
+            buffer = bufstart;
+	}
+        else {
+            buffer += n; buflen -=n;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!okay)
+        log_error ("delete_subpkt: buffer shorter than subpacket\n");
+    assert (unused <= area->len);
+    area->len -= unused;
+    return !!unused;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Create or update a signature subpacket for SIG of TYPE.  This
+ * functions knows where to put the data (hashed or unhashed).  The
+ * function may move data from the unhashed part to the hashed one.
+ * Note: All pointers into sig->[un]hashed (e.g. returned by
+ * parse_sig_subpkt) are not valid after a call to this function.  The
+ * data to put into the subpaket should be in a buffer with a length
+ * of buflen. 
+ */
+void
+build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
+		  const byte *buffer, size_t buflen )
+{
+    byte *p;
+    int critical, hashed;
+    subpktarea_t *oldarea, *newarea;
+    size_t nlen, n, n0;
+
+    critical = (type & SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL);
+    type &= ~SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL;
+
+    /* Sanity check buffer sizes */
+    if(parse_one_sig_subpkt(buffer,buflen,type)<0)
+      BUG();
+
+    switch(type)
+      {
+      case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+      case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+	/* we do allow multiple subpackets */
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	/* we don't allow multiple subpackets */
+	delete_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,type);
+	delete_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,type);
+	break;
+      }
+
+    /* Any special magic that needs to be done for this type so the
+       packet doesn't need to be reparsed? */
+    switch(type)
+      {
+      case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+	sig->flags.notation=1;
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+	sig->flags.policy_url=1;
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
+	sig->flags.pref_ks=1;
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
+	if(buffer[0])
+	  sig->flags.exportable=1;
+	else
+	  sig->flags.exportable=0;
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
+	if(buffer[0])
+	  sig->flags.revocable=1;
+	else
+	  sig->flags.revocable=0;
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
+	sig->trust_depth=buffer[0];
+	sig->trust_value=buffer[1];
+	break;
+
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
+	sig->trust_regexp=buffer;
+	break;
+
+	/* This should never happen since we don't currently allow
+	   creating such a subpacket, but just in case... */
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+	if(buffer_to_u32(buffer)+sig->timestamp<=make_timestamp())
+	  sig->flags.expired=1;
+	else
+	  sig->flags.expired=0;
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	break;
+      }
+
+    if( (buflen+1) >= 8384 )
+	nlen = 5; /* write 5 byte length header */
+    else if( (buflen+1) >= 192 )
+	nlen = 2; /* write 2 byte length header */
+    else
+	nlen = 1; /* just a 1 byte length header */
+
+    switch( type )
+      {
+	/* The issuer being unhashed is a historical oddity.  It
+	   should work equally as well hashed.  Of course, if even an
+	   unhashed issuer is tampered with, it makes it awfully hard
+	   to verify the sig... */
+      case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+        hashed = 0;
+        break;
+      default: 
+        hashed = 1;
+        break;
+      }
+
+    if( critical )
+	type |= SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL;
+
+    oldarea = hashed? sig->hashed : sig->unhashed;
+
+    /* Calculate new size of the area and allocate */
+    n0 = oldarea? oldarea->len : 0;
+    n = n0 + nlen + 1 + buflen; /* length, type, buffer */
+    if (oldarea && n <= oldarea->size) { /* fits into the unused space */
+        newarea = oldarea;
+        /*log_debug ("updating area for type %d\n", type );*/
+    }
+    else if (oldarea) {
+        newarea = xrealloc (oldarea, sizeof (*newarea) + n - 1);
+        newarea->size = n;
+        /*log_debug ("reallocating area for type %d\n", type );*/
+    }
+    else {
+        newarea = xmalloc (sizeof (*newarea) + n - 1);
+        newarea->size = n;
+        /*log_debug ("allocating area for type %d\n", type );*/
+    }
+    newarea->len = n;
+
+    p = newarea->data + n0;
+    if (nlen == 5) {
+	*p++ = 255;
+	*p++ = (buflen+1) >> 24;
+	*p++ = (buflen+1) >> 16;
+	*p++ = (buflen+1) >>  8;
+	*p++ = (buflen+1);
+	*p++ = type;
+	memcpy (p, buffer, buflen);
+    }
+    else if (nlen == 2) {
+	*p++ = (buflen+1-192) / 256 + 192;
+	*p++ = (buflen+1-192) % 256;
+	*p++ = type;
+	memcpy (p, buffer, buflen);
+    }
+    else {
+	*p++ = buflen+1;
+	*p++ = type;
+	memcpy (p, buffer, buflen);
+    }
+
+    if (hashed) 
+	sig->hashed = newarea;
+    else
+	sig->unhashed = newarea;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Put all the required stuff from SIG into subpackets of sig.
+ * Hmmm, should we delete those subpackets which are in a wrong area?
+ */
+void
+build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    u32  u;
+    byte buf[8];
+
+    u = sig->keyid[0];
+    buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
+    buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
+    buf[2] = (u >>  8) & 0xff;
+    buf[3] = u & 0xff;
+    u = sig->keyid[1];
+    buf[4] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
+    buf[5] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
+    buf[6] = (u >>  8) & 0xff;
+    buf[7] = u & 0xff;
+    build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER, buf, 8 );
+
+    u = sig->timestamp;
+    buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
+    buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
+    buf[2] = (u >>  8) & 0xff;
+    buf[3] = u & 0xff;
+    build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, buf, 4 );
+
+    if(sig->expiredate)
+      {
+	if(sig->expiredate>sig->timestamp)
+	  u=sig->expiredate-sig->timestamp;
+	else
+	  u=1; /* A 1-second expiration time is the shortest one
+		  OpenPGP has */
+
+	buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
+	buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
+	buf[2] = (u >>  8) & 0xff;
+	buf[3] = u & 0xff;
+
+	/* Mark this CRITICAL, so if any implementation doesn't
+           understand sigs that can expire, it'll just disregard this
+           sig altogether. */
+
+	build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE | SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL,
+			  buf, 4 );
+      }
+}
+
+void
+build_attribute_subpkt(PKT_user_id *uid,byte type,
+		       const void *buf,u32 buflen,
+		       const void *header,u32 headerlen)
+{
+  byte *attrib;
+  int idx;
+
+  if(1+headerlen+buflen>8383)
+    idx=5;
+  else if(1+headerlen+buflen>191)
+    idx=2;
+  else
+    idx=1;
+
+  /* realloc uid->attrib_data to the right size */
+
+  uid->attrib_data=xrealloc(uid->attrib_data,
+			     uid->attrib_len+idx+1+headerlen+buflen);
+
+  attrib=&uid->attrib_data[uid->attrib_len];
+
+  if(idx==5)
+    {
+      attrib[0]=255;
+      attrib[1]=(1+headerlen+buflen) >> 24;
+      attrib[2]=(1+headerlen+buflen) >> 16;
+      attrib[3]=(1+headerlen+buflen) >> 8;
+      attrib[4]=1+headerlen+buflen;
+    }
+  else if(idx==2)
+    {
+      attrib[0]=(1+headerlen+buflen-192) / 256 + 192;
+      attrib[1]=(1+headerlen+buflen-192) % 256;
+    }
+  else
+    attrib[0]=1+headerlen+buflen; /* Good luck finding a JPEG this small! */
+
+  attrib[idx++]=type;
+
+  /* Tack on our data at the end */
+
+  if(headerlen>0)
+    memcpy(&attrib[idx],header,headerlen);
+  memcpy(&attrib[idx+headerlen],buf,buflen);
+  uid->attrib_len+=idx+headerlen+buflen;
+}
+
+struct notation *
+string_to_notation(const char *string,int is_utf8)
+{
+  const char *s;
+  int saw_at=0;
+  struct notation *notation;
+
+  notation=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*notation));
+
+  if(*string=='-')
+    {
+      notation->flags.ignore=1;
+      string++;
+    }
+
+  if(*string=='!')
+    {
+      notation->flags.critical=1;
+      string++;
+    }
+
+  /* If and when the IETF assigns some official name tags, we'll have
+     to add them here. */
+
+  for( s=string ; *s != '='; s++ )
+    {
+      if( *s=='@')
+	saw_at++;
+
+      /* -notationname is legal without an = sign */
+      if(!*s && notation->flags.ignore)
+	break;
+
+      if( !*s || !isascii (*s) || (!isgraph(*s) && !isspace(*s)) )
+	{
+	  log_error(_("a notation name must have only printable characters"
+		      " or spaces, and end with an '='\n") );
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+    }
+
+  notation->name=xmalloc((s-string)+1);
+  strncpy(notation->name,string,s-string);
+  notation->name[s-string]='\0';
+
+  if(!saw_at && !opt.expert)
+    {
+      log_error(_("a user notation name must contain the '@' character\n"));
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  if (saw_at > 1)
+    {
+      log_error(_("a notation name must not contain more than"
+		  " one '@' character\n"));
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  if(*s)
+    {
+      const char *i=s+1;
+      int highbit=0;
+
+      /* we only support printable text - therefore we enforce the use
+	 of only printable characters (an empty value is valid) */
+      for(s++; *s ; s++ )
+	{
+	  if ( !isascii (*s) )
+	    highbit=1;
+	  else if (iscntrl(*s))
+	    {
+	      log_error(_("a notation value must not use any"
+			  " control characters\n"));
+	      goto fail;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(!highbit || is_utf8)
+	notation->value=xstrdup(i);
+      else
+	notation->value=native_to_utf8(i);
+    }
+
+  return notation;
+
+ fail:
+  free_notation(notation);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+struct notation *
+sig_to_notation(PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t len;
+  int seq=0,crit;
+  struct notation *list=NULL;
+
+  while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,&len,&seq,&crit)))
+    {
+      int n1,n2;
+      struct notation *n=NULL;
+
+      if(len<8)
+	{
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      n1=(p[4]<<8)|p[5];
+      n2=(p[6]<<8)|p[7];
+
+      if(8+n1+n2!=len)
+	{
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      n=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*n));
+      n->name=xmalloc(n1+1);
+
+      memcpy(n->name,&p[8],n1);
+      n->name[n1]='\0';
+
+      if(p[0]&0x80)
+	{
+	  n->value=xmalloc(n2+1);
+	  memcpy(n->value,&p[8+n1],n2);
+	  n->value[n2]='\0';
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  n->bdat=xmalloc(n2);
+	  n->blen=n2;
+	  memcpy(n->bdat,&p[8+n1],n2);
+
+	  n->value=xmalloc(2+strlen(_("not human readable"))+2+1);
+	  strcpy(n->value,"[ ");
+	  strcat(n->value,_("not human readable"));
+	  strcat(n->value," ]");
+	}
+
+      n->flags.critical=crit;
+
+      n->next=list;
+      list=n;
+    }
+
+  return list;
+}
+
+void
+free_notation(struct notation *notation)
+{
+  while(notation)
+    {
+      struct notation *n=notation;
+
+      xfree(n->name);
+      xfree(n->value);
+      xfree(n->altvalue);
+      xfree(n->bdat);
+      notation=n->next;
+      xfree(n);
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+do_signature( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n, i;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+
+    if( !sig->version )
+	iobuf_put( a, 3 );
+    else
+	iobuf_put( a, sig->version );
+    if( sig->version < 4 )
+	iobuf_put(a, 5 ); /* constant */
+    iobuf_put(a, sig->sig_class );
+    if( sig->version < 4 ) {
+	write_32(a, sig->timestamp );
+	write_32(a, sig->keyid[0] );
+	write_32(a, sig->keyid[1] );
+    }
+    iobuf_put(a, sig->pubkey_algo );
+    iobuf_put(a, sig->digest_algo );
+    if( sig->version >= 4 ) {
+	size_t nn;
+	/* timestamp and keyid must have been packed into the
+	 * subpackets prior to the call of this function, because
+	 * these subpackets are hashed */
+	nn = sig->hashed? sig->hashed->len : 0;
+	write_16(a, nn);
+	if( nn )
+	    iobuf_write( a, sig->hashed->data, nn );
+	nn = sig->unhashed? sig->unhashed->len : 0;
+	write_16(a, nn);
+	if( nn )
+	    iobuf_write( a, sig->unhashed->data, nn );
+    }
+    iobuf_put(a, sig->digest_start[0] );
+    iobuf_put(a, sig->digest_start[1] );
+    n = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	write_fake_data( a, sig->data[0] );
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	mpi_write(a, sig->data[i] );
+
+    if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) && sig->version < 4 )
+	write_sign_packet_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
+    else
+	write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_onepass_sig( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_onepass_sig *ops )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    IOBUF a = iobuf_temp();
+
+    write_version( a, ctb );
+    iobuf_put(a, ops->sig_class );
+    iobuf_put(a, ops->digest_algo );
+    iobuf_put(a, ops->pubkey_algo );
+    write_32(a, ops->keyid[0] );
+    write_32(a, ops->keyid[1] );
+    iobuf_put(a, ops->last );
+
+    write_header(out, ctb, iobuf_get_temp_length(a) );
+    if( iobuf_write_temp( out, a ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    iobuf_close(a);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_16(IOBUF out, u16 a)
+{
+    iobuf_put(out, a>>8);
+    if( iobuf_put(out,a) )
+	return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+write_32(IOBUF out, u32 a)
+{
+    iobuf_put(out, a>> 24);
+    iobuf_put(out, a>> 16);
+    iobuf_put(out, a>> 8);
+    if( iobuf_put(out, a) )
+	return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * calculate the length of a header
+ */
+static int
+calc_header_length( u32 len, int new_ctb )
+{
+    if( !len )
+	return 1; /* only the ctb */
+
+    if( new_ctb ) {
+	if( len < 192 )
+	    return 2;
+	if( len < 8384 )
+	    return 3;
+	else
+	    return 6;
+    }
+    if( len < 256 )
+	return 2;
+    if( len < 65536 )
+	return 3;
+
+    return 5;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Write the CTB and the packet length
+ */
+static int
+write_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len )
+{
+    return write_header2( out, ctb, len, 0 );
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_sign_packet_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len )
+{
+    /* work around a bug in the pgp read function for signature packets,
+     * which are not correctly coded and silently assume at some
+     * point 2 byte length headers.*/
+    iobuf_put(out, 0x89 );
+    iobuf_put(out, len >> 8 );
+    return iobuf_put(out, len ) == -1 ? -1:0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * If HDRLEN is > 0, try to build a header of this length.  We need
+ * this so that we can hash packets without reading them again.  If
+ * len is 0, write a partial or indeterminate length header, unless
+ * hdrlen is specified in which case write an actual zero length
+ * (using the specified hdrlen).
+ */
+static int
+write_header2( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen )
+{
+  if( ctb & 0x40 )
+    return write_new_header( out, ctb, len, hdrlen );
+
+  if( hdrlen )
+    {
+      if( hdrlen == 2 && len < 256 )
+	;
+      else if( hdrlen == 3 && len < 65536 )
+	ctb |= 1;
+      else
+	ctb |= 2;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if( !len )
+	ctb |= 3;
+      else if( len < 256 )
+	;
+      else if( len < 65536 )
+	ctb |= 1;
+      else
+	ctb |= 2;
+    }
+
+  if( iobuf_put(out, ctb ) )
+    return -1;
+
+  if( len || hdrlen )
+    {
+      if( ctb & 2 )
+	{
+	  if(iobuf_put(out, len >> 24 ))
+	    return -1;
+	  if(iobuf_put(out, len >> 16 ))
+	    return -1;
+	}
+
+      if( ctb & 3 )
+	if(iobuf_put(out, len >> 8 ))
+	  return -1;
+
+      if( iobuf_put(out, len ) )
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_new_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen )
+{
+    if( hdrlen )
+	log_bug("can't cope with hdrlen yet\n");
+
+    if( iobuf_put(out, ctb ) )
+	return -1;
+    if( !len ) {
+	iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(out, 512 );
+    }
+    else {
+	if( len < 192 ) {
+	    if( iobuf_put(out, len ) )
+		return -1;
+	}
+	else if( len < 8384 ) {
+	    len -= 192;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, (len / 256) + 192) )
+		return -1;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, (len % 256) )  )
+		return -1;
+	}
+	else {
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, 0xff ) )
+		return -1;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, (len >> 24)&0xff ) )
+		return -1;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, (len >> 16)&0xff ) )
+		return -1;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, (len >> 8)&0xff )  )
+		return -1;
+	    if( iobuf_put( out, len & 0xff ) )
+		return -1;
+	}
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+write_version( IOBUF out, int ctb )
+{
+    if( iobuf_put( out, 3 ) )
+	return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/g10/card-util.c b/g10/card-util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c83654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/card-util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1610 @@
+/* card-util.c - Utility functions for the OpenPGP card.
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1
+#include "gpg.h"
+#endif /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1*/
+#include "util.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <readline/readline.h>
+#endif /*HAVE_LIBREADLINE*/
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#else /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION!=1*/
+#include "call-agent.h"
+#endif /*GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION!=1*/
+
+#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
+
+
+/* Change the PIN of a an OpenPGP card.  This is an interactive
+   function. */
+void
+change_pin (int chvno, int allow_admin)
+{
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int rc;
+
+  rc = agent_learn (&info);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("OpenPGP card not available: %s\n"),
+                  gpg_strerror (rc));
+      return;
+    }
+  
+  log_info (_("OpenPGP card no. %s detected\n"),
+              info.serialno? info.serialno : "[none]");
+
+  agent_clear_pin_cache (info.serialno);
+
+  if (opt.batch)
+    {
+      agent_release_card_info (&info);
+      log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+      return;
+    }
+
+  if(!allow_admin)
+    {
+      rc = agent_scd_change_pin (1, info.serialno);
+      if (rc)
+	tty_printf ("Error changing the PIN: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      else
+        {
+          write_status (STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS);
+          tty_printf ("PIN changed.\n");
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    for (;;)
+      {
+	char *answer;
+
+	tty_printf ("\n");
+	tty_printf ("1 - change PIN\n"
+		    "2 - unblock PIN\n"
+		    "3 - change Admin PIN\n"
+		    "Q - quit\n");
+	tty_printf ("\n");
+
+	answer = cpr_get("cardutil.change_pin.menu",_("Your selection? "));
+	cpr_kill_prompt();
+	if (strlen (answer) != 1)
+	  continue;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	if (*answer == '1')
+	  {
+	    rc = agent_scd_change_pin (1, info.serialno);
+	    if (rc)
+	      tty_printf ("Error changing the PIN: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+	    else
+              {
+                write_status (STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS);
+                tty_printf ("PIN changed.\n");
+              }
+	  }
+	else if (*answer == '2')
+	  {
+	    rc = agent_scd_change_pin (101, info.serialno);
+	    if (rc)
+	      tty_printf ("Error unblocking the PIN: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+	    else
+              {
+                write_status (STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS);
+                tty_printf ("PIN unblocked and new PIN set.\n");
+              }
+          }
+	else if (*answer == '3')
+	  {
+	    rc = agent_scd_change_pin (3, info.serialno);
+	    if (rc)
+	      tty_printf ("Error changing the PIN: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+	    else
+              {
+                write_status (STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS);
+                tty_printf ("PIN changed.\n");
+              }
+	  }
+	else if (*answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q')
+	  {
+	    break;
+	  }
+      }
+
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+}
+
+static const char *
+get_manufacturer (unsigned int no)
+{
+  /* Note:  Make sure that there is no colon or linefeed in the string. */
+  switch (no)
+    {
+    case 0:
+    case 0xffff: return "test card";
+    case 0x0001: return "PPC Card Systems";
+    case 0x0002: return "Prism";
+    case 0x0003: return "OpenFortress";
+    default: return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_sha1_fpr (FILE *fp, const unsigned char *fpr)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (fpr)
+    {
+      for (i=0; i < 20 ; i+=2, fpr += 2 )
+        {
+          if (i == 10 )
+            tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
+          tty_fprintf (fp, " %02X%02X", *fpr, fpr[1]);
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    tty_fprintf (fp, " [none]");
+  tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_sha1_fpr_colon (FILE *fp, const unsigned char *fpr)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (fpr)
+    {
+      for (i=0; i < 20 ; i++, fpr++)
+        fprintf (fp, "%02X", *fpr);
+    }
+  putc (':', fp);
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_name (FILE *fp, const char *text, const char *name)
+{
+  tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", text);
+
+  /* FIXME: tty_printf_utf8_string2 eats everything after and
+     including an @ - e.g. when printing an url. */
+  if (name && *name)
+    {
+      if (fp)
+        print_utf8_string2 (fp, name, strlen (name), '\n');
+      else
+        tty_print_utf8_string2 (name, strlen (name), 0);
+    }
+  else
+    tty_fprintf (fp, _("[not set]"));
+  tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
+}
+
+static void
+print_isoname (FILE *fp, const char *text, const char *tag, const char *name)
+{
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    fprintf (fp, "%s:", tag);
+  else
+    tty_fprintf (fp, "%s", text);
+
+  if (name && *name)
+    {
+      char *p, *given, *buf = xstrdup (name);
+
+      given = strstr (buf, "<<");
+      for (p=buf; *p; p++)
+        if (*p == '<')
+          *p = ' ';
+      if (given && given[2])
+        {
+          *given = 0;
+          given += 2;
+          if (opt.with_colons)
+            print_string (fp, given, strlen (given), ':');
+          else if (fp)
+            print_utf8_string2 (fp, given, strlen (given), '\n');
+          else
+            tty_print_utf8_string2 (given, strlen (given), 0);
+
+          if (opt.with_colons)
+            putc (':', fp);
+          else if (*buf)
+            tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
+        }
+
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        print_string (fp, buf, strlen (buf), ':');
+      else if (fp)
+        print_utf8_string2 (fp, buf, strlen (buf), '\n');
+      else
+        tty_print_utf8_string2 (buf, strlen (buf), 0);
+      xfree (buf);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        putc (':', fp);
+      else
+        tty_fprintf (fp, _("[not set]"));
+    }
+
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    fputs (":\n", fp);
+  else
+    tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
+}
+
+/* Return true if the SHA1 fingerprint FPR consists only of zeroes. */
+static int
+fpr_is_zero (const char *fpr)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++)
+    ;
+  return (i == 20);
+}
+
+
+/* Print all available information about the current card. */
+void
+card_status (FILE *fp, char *serialno, size_t serialnobuflen)
+{
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
+  int rc;
+  unsigned int uval;
+  const unsigned char *thefpr;
+  int i;
+
+  if (serialno && serialnobuflen)
+    *serialno = 0;
+
+  rc = agent_learn (&info);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        fputs ("AID:::\n", fp);
+      log_error (_("OpenPGP card not available: %s\n"),
+                  gpg_strerror (rc));
+      xfree (pk);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    fprintf (fp, "AID:%s:", info.serialno? info.serialno : "");
+  else
+    tty_fprintf (fp, "Application ID ...: %s\n",
+                 info.serialno? info.serialno : "[none]");
+  if (!info.serialno || strncmp (info.serialno, "D27600012401", 12) 
+      || strlen (info.serialno) != 32 )
+    {
+      if (opt.with_colons)
+        fputs ("unknown:\n", fp);
+      log_info ("not an OpenPGP card\n");
+      agent_release_card_info (&info);
+      xfree (pk);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  if (!serialno)
+    ;
+  else if (strlen (serialno)+1 > serialnobuflen)
+    log_error ("serial number longer than expected\n");
+  else 
+    strcpy (serialno, info.serialno);
+
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    fputs ("openpgp-card:\n", fp);
+
+
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    {
+      fprintf (fp, "version:%.4s:\n", info.serialno+12);
+      uval = xtoi_2(info.serialno+16)*256 + xtoi_2 (info.serialno+18);
+      fprintf (fp, "vendor:%04x:%s:\n", uval, get_manufacturer (uval));
+      fprintf (fp, "serial:%.8s:\n", info.serialno+20);
+      
+      print_isoname (fp, "Name of cardholder: ", "name", info.disp_name);
+
+      fputs ("lang:", fp);
+      if (info.disp_lang)
+        print_string (fp, info.disp_lang, strlen (info.disp_lang), ':');
+      fputs (":\n", fp);
+
+      fprintf (fp, "sex:%c:\n", (info.disp_sex == 1? 'm':
+                                 info.disp_sex == 2? 'f' : 'u'));
+
+      fputs ("url:", fp);
+      if (info.pubkey_url)
+        print_string (fp, info.pubkey_url, strlen (info.pubkey_url), ':');
+      fputs (":\n", fp);
+
+      fputs ("login:", fp);
+      if (info.login_data)
+        print_string (fp, info.login_data, strlen (info.login_data), ':');
+      fputs (":\n", fp);
+
+      fprintf (fp, "forcepin:%d:::\n", !info.chv1_cached);
+      fprintf (fp, "maxpinlen:%d:%d:%d:\n",
+                   info.chvmaxlen[0], info.chvmaxlen[1], info.chvmaxlen[2]);
+      fprintf (fp, "pinretry:%d:%d:%d:\n",
+                   info.chvretry[0], info.chvretry[1], info.chvretry[2]);
+      fprintf (fp, "sigcount:%lu:::\n", info.sig_counter);
+
+      for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
+        {
+          if (info.private_do[i])
+            {
+              fprintf (fp, "private_do:%d:", i+1);
+              print_string (fp, info.private_do[i],
+                            strlen (info.private_do[i]), ':');
+              fputs (":\n", fp);
+            }
+        }
+
+      fputs ("cafpr:", fp);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.cafpr1valid? info.cafpr1:NULL);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.cafpr2valid? info.cafpr2:NULL);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.cafpr3valid? info.cafpr3:NULL);
+      putc ('\n', fp);
+      fputs ("fpr:", fp);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.fpr1valid? info.fpr1:NULL);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.fpr2valid? info.fpr2:NULL);
+      print_sha1_fpr_colon (fp, info.fpr3valid? info.fpr3:NULL);
+      putc ('\n', fp);
+      fprintf (fp, "fprtime:%lu:%lu:%lu:\n",
+               (unsigned long)info.fpr1time, (unsigned long)info.fpr2time,
+               (unsigned long)info.fpr3time);
+    }
+  else 
+    {
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Version ..........: %.1s%c.%.1s%c\n",
+                   info.serialno[12] == '0'?"":info.serialno+12,
+                   info.serialno[13],
+                   info.serialno[14] == '0'?"":info.serialno+14,
+                   info.serialno[15]);
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Manufacturer .....: %s\n", 
+                   get_manufacturer (xtoi_2(info.serialno+16)*256
+                                     + xtoi_2 (info.serialno+18)));
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Serial number ....: %.8s\n", info.serialno+20);
+      
+      print_isoname (fp, "Name of cardholder: ", "name", info.disp_name);
+      print_name (fp, "Language prefs ...: ", info.disp_lang);
+      tty_fprintf (fp,    "Sex ..............: %s\n",
+                   info.disp_sex == 1? _("male"):
+                   info.disp_sex == 2? _("female") : _("unspecified"));
+      print_name (fp, "URL of public key : ", info.pubkey_url);
+      print_name (fp, "Login data .......: ", info.login_data);
+      if (info.private_do[0])
+        print_name (fp, "Private DO 1 .....: ", info.private_do[0]);
+      if (info.private_do[1])
+        print_name (fp, "Private DO 2 .....: ", info.private_do[1]);
+      if (info.private_do[2])
+        print_name (fp, "Private DO 3 .....: ", info.private_do[2]);
+      if (info.private_do[3])
+        print_name (fp, "Private DO 4 .....: ", info.private_do[3]);
+      if (info.cafpr1valid)
+        {
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "CA fingerprint %d .:", 1);
+          print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.cafpr1);
+        }
+      if (info.cafpr2valid)
+        {
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "CA fingerprint %d .:", 2);
+          print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.cafpr2);
+        }
+      if (info.cafpr3valid)
+        {
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "CA fingerprint %d .:", 3);
+          print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.cafpr3);
+        }
+      tty_fprintf (fp,    "Signature PIN ....: %s\n",
+                   info.chv1_cached? _("not forced"): _("forced"));
+      tty_fprintf (fp,    "Max. PIN lengths .: %d %d %d\n",
+                   info.chvmaxlen[0], info.chvmaxlen[1], info.chvmaxlen[2]);
+      tty_fprintf (fp,    "PIN retry counter : %d %d %d\n",
+                   info.chvretry[0], info.chvretry[1], info.chvretry[2]);
+      tty_fprintf (fp,    "Signature counter : %lu\n", info.sig_counter);
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Signature key ....:");
+      print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.fpr1valid? info.fpr1:NULL);
+      if (info.fpr1valid && info.fpr1time)
+        tty_fprintf (fp, "      created ....: %s\n",
+                     isotimestamp (info.fpr1time));
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Encryption key....:");
+      print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.fpr2valid? info.fpr2:NULL);
+      if (info.fpr2valid && info.fpr2time)
+        tty_fprintf (fp, "      created ....: %s\n",
+                     isotimestamp (info.fpr2time));
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "Authentication key:");
+      print_sha1_fpr (fp, info.fpr3valid? info.fpr3:NULL);
+      if (info.fpr3valid && info.fpr3time)
+        tty_fprintf (fp, "      created ....: %s\n",
+                     isotimestamp (info.fpr3time));
+      tty_fprintf (fp, "General key info..: "); 
+
+      thefpr = (info.fpr1valid? info.fpr1 : info.fpr2valid? info.fpr2 : 
+                info.fpr3valid? info.fpr3 : NULL);
+      if ( thefpr && !get_pubkey_byfprint (pk, thefpr, 20))
+        {
+          KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+
+          print_pubkey_info (fp, pk);
+
+          if ( !get_seckeyblock_byfprint (&keyblock, thefpr, 20) )
+            print_card_key_info (fp, keyblock);
+          else if ( !get_keyblock_byfprint (&keyblock, thefpr, 20) )
+            {
+              release_kbnode (keyblock);
+              keyblock = NULL;
+              
+              if (!auto_create_card_key_stub (info.serialno,
+                                              info.fpr1valid? info.fpr1:NULL,
+                                              info.fpr2valid? info.fpr2:NULL,
+                                              info.fpr3valid? info.fpr3:NULL))
+                {
+                  if ( !get_seckeyblock_byfprint (&keyblock, thefpr, 20) )
+                    print_card_key_info (fp, keyblock);
+                }
+            }
+
+          release_kbnode (keyblock);
+        }
+      else
+        tty_fprintf (fp, "[none]\n");
+    }
+      
+  free_public_key (pk);
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+}
+
+
+static char *
+get_one_name (const char *prompt1, const char *prompt2)
+{
+  char *name;
+  int i;
+
+  for (;;)
+    {
+      name = cpr_get (prompt1, prompt2);
+      if (!name)
+        return NULL;
+      trim_spaces (name);
+      cpr_kill_prompt ();
+      for (i=0; name[i] && name[i] >= ' ' && name[i] <= 126; i++)
+        ;
+
+      /* The name must be in Latin-1 and not UTF-8 - lacking the code
+         to ensure this we restrict it to ASCII. */
+      if (name[i])
+        tty_printf (_("Error: Only plain ASCII is currently allowed.\n"));
+      else if (strchr (name, '<'))
+        tty_printf (_("Error: The \"<\" character may not be used.\n"));
+      else if (strstr (name, "  "))
+        tty_printf (_("Error: Double spaces are not allowed.\n"));    
+      else
+        return name;
+      xfree (name);
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+change_name (void)
+{
+  char *surname = NULL, *givenname = NULL;
+  char *isoname, *p;
+  int rc;
+
+  surname = get_one_name ("keygen.smartcard.surname",
+                                    _("Cardholder's surname: "));
+  givenname = get_one_name ("keygen.smartcard.givenname",
+                                       _("Cardholder's given name: "));
+  if (!surname || !givenname || (!*surname && !*givenname))
+    {
+      xfree (surname);
+      xfree (givenname);
+      return -1; /*canceled*/
+    }
+
+  isoname = xmalloc ( strlen (surname) + 2 + strlen (givenname) + 1);
+  strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (isoname, surname), "<<"), givenname);
+  xfree (surname);
+  xfree (givenname);
+  for (p=isoname; *p; p++)
+    if (*p == ' ')
+      *p = '<';
+
+  if (strlen (isoname) > 39 )
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: Combined name too long "
+                    "(limit is %d characters).\n"), 39);    
+      xfree (isoname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("DISP-NAME", isoname, strlen (isoname), NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting Name: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+  xfree (isoname);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+change_url (void)
+{
+  char *url;
+  int rc;
+
+  url = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_url", _("URL to retrieve public key: "));
+  if (!url)
+    return -1;
+  trim_spaces (url);
+  cpr_kill_prompt ();
+
+  if (strlen (url) > 254 )
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: URL too long "
+                    "(limit is %d characters).\n"), 254);    
+      xfree (url);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("PUBKEY-URL", url, strlen (url), NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting URL: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  xfree (url);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Fetch the key from the URL given on the card or try to get it from
+   the default keyserver.  */
+static int
+fetch_url(void)
+{
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  int rc;
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+
+  memset(&info,0,sizeof(info));
+
+  rc=agent_scd_getattr("PUBKEY-URL",&info);
+  if(rc)
+    log_error("error retrieving URL from card: %s\n",gpg_strerror(rc));
+  else
+    {
+      struct keyserver_spec *spec=NULL;
+
+      rc=agent_scd_getattr("KEY-FPR",&info);
+      if(rc)
+	log_error("error retrieving key fingerprint from card: %s\n",
+		  gpg_strerror(rc));
+      else if (info.pubkey_url && *info.pubkey_url)
+	{
+	  spec=parse_keyserver_uri(info.pubkey_url,1,NULL,0);
+	  if(spec && info.fpr1valid)
+	    {
+	      /* This is not perfectly right.  Currently, all card
+		 fingerprints are 20 digits, but what about
+		 fingerprints for a future v5 key?  We should get the
+		 length from somewhere lower in the code.  In any
+		 event, the fpr/keyid is not meaningful for straight
+		 HTTP fetches, but using it allows the card to point
+		 to HKP and LDAP servers as well. */
+	      rc=keyserver_import_fprint(info.fpr1,20,spec);
+	      free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+	    }
+	}
+      else if (info.fpr1valid)
+	{
+          rc = keyserver_import_fprint (info.fpr1, 20, opt.keyserver);
+	}
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+#else
+  return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int
+change_login (const char *args)
+{
+  char *data;
+  int n;
+  int rc;
+
+  if (args && *args == '<')  /* Read it from a file */
+    {
+      FILE *fp;
+
+      for (args++; spacep (args); args++)
+        ;
+      fp = fopen (args, "rb");
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+      if (fp && is_secured_file (fileno (fp)))
+        {
+          fclose (fp);
+          fp = NULL;
+          errno = EPERM;
+        }
+#endif
+      if (!fp)
+        {
+          tty_printf (_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), args, strerror (errno));
+          return -1;
+        }
+          
+      data = xmalloc (254);
+      n = fread (data, 1, 254, fp);
+      fclose (fp);
+      if (n < 0)
+        {
+          tty_printf (_("error reading `%s': %s\n"), args, strerror (errno));
+          xfree (data);
+          return -1;
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      data = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_login",
+                      _("Login data (account name): "));
+      if (!data)
+        return -1;
+      trim_spaces (data);
+      cpr_kill_prompt ();
+      n = strlen (data);
+    }
+
+  if (n > 254 )
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: Login data too long "
+                    "(limit is %d characters).\n"), 254);    
+      xfree (data);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("LOGIN-DATA", data, n, NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting login data: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  xfree (data);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+change_private_do (const char *args, int nr)
+{
+  char do_name[] = "PRIVATE-DO-X";
+  char *data;
+  int n;
+  int rc; 
+
+  assert (nr >= 1 && nr <= 4);
+  do_name[11] = '0' + nr;
+
+  if (args && (args = strchr (args, '<')))  /* Read it from a file */
+    {
+      FILE *fp;
+
+      /* Fixme: Factor this duplicated code out. */
+      for (args++; spacep (args); args++)
+        ;
+      fp = fopen (args, "rb");
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+      if (fp && is_secured_file (fileno (fp)))
+        {
+          fclose (fp);
+          fp = NULL;
+          errno = EPERM;
+        }
+#endif
+      if (!fp)
+        {
+          tty_printf (_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), args, strerror (errno));
+          return -1;
+        }
+          
+      data = xmalloc (254);
+      n = fread (data, 1, 254, fp);
+      fclose (fp);
+      if (n < 0)
+        {
+          tty_printf (_("error reading `%s': %s\n"), args, strerror (errno));
+          xfree (data);
+          return -1;
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      data = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_private_do",
+                      _("Private DO data: "));
+      if (!data)
+        return -1;
+      trim_spaces (data);
+      cpr_kill_prompt ();
+      n = strlen (data);
+    }
+
+  if (n > 254 )
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: Private DO too long "
+                    "(limit is %d characters).\n"), 254);    
+      xfree (data);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr (do_name, data, n, NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting private DO: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  xfree (data);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+change_lang (void)
+{
+  char *data, *p;
+  int rc;
+
+  data = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_lang",
+                  _("Language preferences: "));
+  if (!data)
+    return -1;
+  trim_spaces (data);
+  cpr_kill_prompt ();
+
+  if (strlen (data) > 8 || (strlen (data) & 1))
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: invalid length of preference string.\n"));
+      xfree (data);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  for (p=data; *p && *p >= 'a' && *p <= 'z'; p++)
+    ;
+  if (*p)
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: invalid characters in preference string.\n"));
+      xfree (data);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("DISP-LANG", data, strlen (data), NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting lang: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  xfree (data);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+change_sex (void)
+{
+  char *data;
+  const char *str;
+  int rc;
+
+  data = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_sex",
+                  _("Sex ((M)ale, (F)emale or space): "));
+  if (!data)
+    return -1;
+  trim_spaces (data);
+  cpr_kill_prompt ();
+
+  if (!*data)
+    str = "9";
+  else if ((*data == 'M' || *data == 'm') && !data[1])
+    str = "1";
+  else if ((*data == 'F' || *data == 'f') && !data[1])
+    str = "2";
+  else 
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: invalid response.\n"));
+      xfree (data);
+      return -1;
+    }
+     
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("DISP-SEX", str, 1, NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting sex: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  xfree (data);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+change_cafpr (int fprno)
+{
+  char *data;
+  const char *s;
+  int i, c, rc;
+  unsigned char fpr[20];
+
+  data = cpr_get ("cardedit.change_cafpr", _("CA fingerprint: "));
+  if (!data)
+    return -1;
+  trim_spaces (data);
+  cpr_kill_prompt ();
+
+  for (i=0, s=data; i < 20 && *s; )
+    {
+      while (spacep(s))
+        s++;
+      if (*s == ':')
+        s++;
+      while (spacep(s))
+        s++;
+      c = hextobyte (s);
+      if (c == -1)
+        break;
+      fpr[i++] = c;
+      s += 2;
+    }
+  xfree (data);
+  if (i != 20 || *s)
+    {
+      tty_printf (_("Error: invalid formatted fingerprint.\n"));
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr (fprno==1?"CA-FPR-1":
+                          fprno==2?"CA-FPR-2":
+                          fprno==3?"CA-FPR-3":"x", fpr, 20, NULL );
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error setting cafpr: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+toggle_forcesig (void)
+{
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int rc;
+  int newstate;
+
+  memset (&info, 0, sizeof info);
+  rc = agent_scd_getattr ("CHV-STATUS", &info);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("error getting current status: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      return;
+    }
+  newstate = !info.chv1_cached;
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+
+  rc = agent_scd_setattr ("CHV-STATUS-1", newstate? "\x01":"", 1, NULL);
+  if (rc)
+    log_error ("error toggling signature PIN flag: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for the key generation/edit functions.  */
+static int
+get_info_for_key_operation (struct agent_card_info_s *info)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  memset (info, 0, sizeof *info);
+  rc = agent_scd_getattr ("SERIALNO", info);
+  if (rc || !info->serialno || strncmp (info->serialno, "D27600012401", 12) 
+      || strlen (info->serialno) != 32 )
+    {
+      log_error (_("key operation not possible: %s\n"),
+                 rc ? gpg_strerror (rc) : _("not an OpenPGP card"));
+      return rc? rc: -1;
+    }
+  rc = agent_scd_getattr ("KEY-FPR", info);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = agent_scd_getattr ("CHV-STATUS", info);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = agent_scd_getattr ("DISP-NAME", info);
+  if (rc)
+    log_error (_("error getting current key info: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for the key generation/edit functions.  */
+static int
+check_pin_for_key_operation (struct agent_card_info_s *info, int *forced_chv1)
+{     
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  agent_clear_pin_cache (info->serialno);
+
+  *forced_chv1 = !info->chv1_cached;
+  if (*forced_chv1)
+    { /* Switch of the forced mode so that during key generation we
+         don't get bothered with PIN queries for each
+         self-signature. */
+      rc = agent_scd_setattr ("CHV-STATUS-1", "\x01", 1, info->serialno);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error ("error clearing forced signature PIN flag: %s\n",
+                     gpg_strerror (rc));
+          *forced_chv1 = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      /* Check the PIN now, so that we won't get asked later for each
+         binding signature. */
+      rc = agent_scd_checkpin (info->serialno);
+      if (rc)
+        log_error ("error checking the PIN: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Helper for the key generation/edit functions.  */
+static void 
+restore_forced_chv1 (int *forced_chv1)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  if (*forced_chv1)
+    { /* Switch back to forced state. */
+      rc = agent_scd_setattr ("CHV-STATUS-1", "", 1, NULL);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error ("error setting forced signature PIN flag: %s\n",
+                     gpg_strerror (rc));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+/* Helper for the key generation/edit functions.  */
+static void
+show_card_key_info (struct agent_card_info_s *info)
+{
+  tty_fprintf (NULL, "Signature key ....:");
+  print_sha1_fpr (NULL, info->fpr1valid? info->fpr1:NULL);
+  tty_fprintf (NULL, "Encryption key....:");
+  print_sha1_fpr (NULL, info->fpr2valid? info->fpr2:NULL);
+  tty_fprintf (NULL, "Authentication key:");
+  print_sha1_fpr (NULL, info->fpr3valid? info->fpr3:NULL);
+  tty_printf ("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+/* Helper for the key generation/edit functions.  */
+static int
+replace_existing_key_p (struct agent_card_info_s *info, int keyno)
+{
+  assert (keyno >= 0 && keyno <= 3);
+
+  if ((keyno == 1 && info->fpr1valid)
+      || (keyno == 2 && info->fpr2valid)
+      || (keyno == 3 && info->fpr3valid))
+    {
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      log_info ("WARNING: such a key has already been stored on the card!\n");
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      if ( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes( "cardedit.genkeys.replace_key",
+                                  _("Replace existing key? (y/N) ")))
+        return -1;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static void
+generate_card_keys (const char *serialno)
+{
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int forced_chv1;
+  int want_backup;
+
+  if (get_info_for_key_operation (&info))
+    return;
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  {
+    char *answer=cpr_get("cardedit.genkeys.backup_enc",
+			 _("Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) "));
+
+    want_backup=answer_is_yes_no_default(answer,1);
+    cpr_kill_prompt();
+    xfree(answer);
+  }
+#else
+  want_backup = cpr_get_answer_is_yes 
+                  ( "cardedit.genkeys.backup_enc",
+                    _("Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) "));
+  /*FIXME: we need answer_is_yes_no_default()*/
+#endif
+
+  if ( (info.fpr1valid && !fpr_is_zero (info.fpr1))
+       || (info.fpr2valid && !fpr_is_zero (info.fpr2))
+       || (info.fpr3valid && !fpr_is_zero (info.fpr3)))
+    {
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      log_info ("NOTE: keys are already stored on the card!\n");
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      if ( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes( "cardedit.genkeys.replace_keys",
+                                  _("Replace existing keys? (y/N) ")))
+        {
+          agent_release_card_info (&info);
+          return;
+        }
+    }
+  else if (!info.disp_name || !*info.disp_name)
+    {
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      tty_printf (_("Please note that the factory settings of the PINs are\n"
+                    "   PIN = `%s'     Admin PIN = `%s'\n"
+                    "You should change them using the command --change-pin\n"),
+                  "123456", "12345678");
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+    }
+
+  if (check_pin_for_key_operation (&info, &forced_chv1))
+    goto leave;
+  
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  generate_keypair (NULL, info.serialno,
+                    want_backup? opt.homedir:NULL);
+#else
+  generate_keypair (NULL, info.serialno);
+#endif
+
+ leave:
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+  restore_forced_chv1 (&forced_chv1);
+}
+
+
+/* This function is used by the key edit menu to generate an arbitrary
+   subkey. */
+int
+card_generate_subkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock)
+{
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int okay = 0;
+  int forced_chv1 = 0;
+  int keyno;
+
+  if (get_info_for_key_operation (&info))
+    return 0;
+
+  show_card_key_info (&info);
+
+  tty_printf (_("Please select the type of key to generate:\n"));
+
+  tty_printf (_("   (1) Signature key\n"));
+  tty_printf (_("   (2) Encryption key\n"));
+  tty_printf (_("   (3) Authentication key\n"));
+
+  for (;;) 
+    {
+      char *answer = cpr_get ("cardedit.genkeys.subkeytype",
+                              _("Your selection? "));
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+      if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
+        {
+          xfree (answer);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      keyno = *answer? atoi(answer): 0;
+      xfree(answer);
+      if (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3)
+        break; /* Okay. */
+      tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+    }
+
+  if (replace_existing_key_p (&info, keyno))
+    goto leave;
+
+  if (check_pin_for_key_operation (&info, &forced_chv1))
+    goto leave;
+
+  okay = generate_card_subkeypair (pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
+                                   keyno, info.serialno);
+
+ leave:
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+  restore_forced_chv1 (&forced_chv1);
+  return okay;
+#else
+  return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/* Store the key at NODE into the smartcard and modify NODE to
+   carry the serialno stuff instead of the actual secret key
+   parameters.  USE is the usage for that key; 0 means any
+   usage. */
+int 
+card_store_subkey (KBNODE node, int use)
+{
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int okay = 0;
+  int rc;
+  int keyno, i;
+  PKT_secret_key *copied_sk = NULL;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  size_t n;
+  const char *s;
+  int allow_keyno[3];
+
+  assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+          || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
+  sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+  if (get_info_for_key_operation (&info))
+    return 0;
+
+  show_card_key_info (&info);
+
+  if (!is_RSA (sk->pubkey_algo) || nbits_from_sk (sk) != 1024 )
+    {
+      tty_printf ("You may only store a 1024 bit RSA key on the card\n");
+      tty_printf ("\n");
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  allow_keyno[0] = (!use || (use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)));
+  allow_keyno[1] = (!use || (use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)));
+  allow_keyno[2] = (!use || (use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)));
+
+  tty_printf (_("Please select where to store the key:\n"));
+
+  if (allow_keyno[0])
+    tty_printf (_("   (1) Signature key\n"));
+  if (allow_keyno[1])
+    tty_printf (_("   (2) Encryption key\n"));
+  if (allow_keyno[2])
+    tty_printf (_("   (3) Authentication key\n"));
+
+  for (;;) 
+    {
+      char *answer = cpr_get ("cardedit.genkeys.storekeytype",
+                              _("Your selection? "));
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+      if (*answer == CONTROL_D || !*answer)
+        {
+          xfree (answer);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      keyno = *answer? atoi(answer): 0;
+      xfree(answer);
+      if (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3 && allow_keyno[keyno-1])
+        break; /* Okay. */
+      tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+    }
+
+  if (replace_existing_key_p (&info, keyno))
+    goto leave;
+
+  /* Unprotect key.  */
+  switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk) )
+    {
+    case 0: /* Not protected. */
+      break;
+    case -1:
+      log_error (_("unknown key protection algorithm\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    default:
+      if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
+        {
+          log_error (_("secret parts of key are not available\n"));
+          goto leave;
+	}
+      if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+        {
+          log_error (_("secret key already stored on a card\n"));
+          goto leave;
+	}
+      /* We better copy the key before we unprotect it.  */
+      copied_sk = sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+      rc = check_secret_key (sk, 0);
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+    }
+
+  rc = save_unprotected_key_to_card (sk, keyno);
+  if (rc)
+    goto leave;
+
+  /* Get back to the maybe protected original secret key.  */
+  if (copied_sk)
+    {
+      free_secret_key (copied_sk);
+      copied_sk = NULL; 
+    }
+  sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+  /* Get rid of the secret key parameters and store the serial numer. */
+  n = pubkey_get_nskey (sk->pubkey_algo);
+  for (i=pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo); i < n; i++)
+    {
+      mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
+      sk->skey[i] = NULL;
+    }
+  i = pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo);
+  sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10);
+  sk->is_protected = 1;
+  sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
+  s = info.serialno;
+  for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
+       sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
+    sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
+
+  okay = 1;
+
+ leave:
+  if (copied_sk)
+    free_secret_key (copied_sk);
+  agent_release_card_info (&info);
+  return okay;
+#else
+  return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/* Data used by the command parser.  This needs to be outside of the
+   function scope to allow readline based command completion.  */
+enum cmdids
+  {
+    cmdNOP = 0,
+    cmdQUIT, cmdADMIN, cmdHELP, cmdLIST, cmdDEBUG, cmdVERIFY,
+    cmdNAME, cmdURL, cmdFETCH, cmdLOGIN, cmdLANG, cmdSEX, cmdCAFPR,
+    cmdFORCESIG, cmdGENERATE, cmdPASSWD, cmdPRIVATEDO,
+    cmdINVCMD
+  };
+
+static struct
+{
+  const char *name;
+  enum cmdids id;
+  int admin_only;
+  const char *desc;
+} cmds[] =
+  {
+    { "quit"    , cmdQUIT  , 0, N_("quit this menu")},
+    { "q"       , cmdQUIT  , 0, NULL },
+    { "admin"   , cmdADMIN , 0, N_("show admin commands")},
+    { "help"    , cmdHELP  , 0, N_("show this help")},
+    { "?"       , cmdHELP  , 0, NULL },
+    { "list"    , cmdLIST  , 0, N_("list all available data")},
+    { "l"       , cmdLIST  , 0, NULL },
+    { "debug"   , cmdDEBUG , 0, NULL },
+    { "name"    , cmdNAME  , 1, N_("change card holder's name")},
+    { "url"     , cmdURL   , 1, N_("change URL to retrieve key")},
+    { "fetch"   , cmdFETCH , 0, N_("fetch the key specified in the card URL")},
+    { "login"   , cmdLOGIN , 1, N_("change the login name")},
+    { "lang"    , cmdLANG  , 1, N_("change the language preferences")},
+    { "sex"     , cmdSEX   , 1, N_("change card holder's sex")},
+    { "cafpr"   , cmdCAFPR , 1, N_("change a CA fingerprint")},
+    { "forcesig", cmdFORCESIG, 1, N_("toggle the signature force PIN flag")},
+    { "generate", cmdGENERATE, 1, N_("generate new keys")},
+    { "passwd"  , cmdPASSWD, 0, N_("menu to change or unblock the PIN")},
+    { "verify"  , cmdVERIFY, 0, N_("verify the PIN and list all data")},
+    /* Note, that we do not announce this command yet. */
+    { "privatedo", cmdPRIVATEDO, 0, NULL },
+    { NULL, cmdINVCMD, 0, NULL } 
+  };
+
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1 && defined (HAVE_LIBREADLINE)
+
+/* These two functions are used by readline for command completion. */
+
+static char *
+command_generator(const char *text,int state)
+{
+  static int list_index,len;
+  const char *name;
+
+  /* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now.  This includes
+     saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
+     index variable to 0. */
+  if(!state)
+    {
+      list_index=0;
+      len=strlen(text);
+    }
+
+  /* Return the next partial match */
+  while((name=cmds[list_index].name))
+    {
+      /* Only complete commands that have help text */
+      if(cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp(name,text,len)==0)
+	return strdup(name);
+    }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static char **
+card_edit_completion(const char *text, int start, int end)
+{
+  /* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
+     If not, just do nothing for now. */
+
+  if(start==0)
+    return rl_completion_matches(text,command_generator);
+
+  rl_attempted_completion_over=1;
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1 && HAVE_LIBREADLINE */
+
+/* Menu to edit all user changeable values on an OpenPGP card.  Only
+   Key creation is not handled here. */
+void
+card_edit (STRLIST commands)
+{
+  enum cmdids cmd = cmdNOP;
+  int have_commands = !!commands;
+  int redisplay = 1;
+  char *answer = NULL;
+  int did_checkpin = 0, allow_admin=0;
+  char serialnobuf[50];
+
+
+  if (opt.command_fd != -1)
+    ;
+  else if (opt.batch && !have_commands)
+    {
+      log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  for (;;)
+    {
+      int arg_number;
+      const char *arg_string = "";
+      char *p;
+      int i;
+      int cmd_admin_only;
+      
+      tty_printf("\n");
+      if (redisplay )
+        {
+          if (opt.with_colons)
+            {
+              card_status (stdout, serialnobuf, DIM (serialnobuf));
+              fflush (stdout);
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              card_status (NULL, serialnobuf, DIM (serialnobuf));
+              tty_printf("\n");
+            }
+          redisplay = 0;
+	}
+
+      do
+        {
+          xfree (answer);
+          if (have_commands)
+            {
+              if (commands)
+                {
+                  answer = xstrdup (commands->d);
+                  commands = commands->next;
+		}
+              else if (opt.batch)
+                {
+                  answer = xstrdup ("quit");
+		}
+              else
+                have_commands = 0;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!have_commands)
+              {
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+		tty_enable_completion (card_edit_completion);
+#endif
+		answer = cpr_get_no_help("cardedit.prompt", _("Command> "));
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+		tty_disable_completion ();
+#endif
+	    }
+	    trim_spaces(answer);
+	}
+      while ( *answer == '#' );
+
+      arg_number = 0; /* Yes, here is the init which egcc complains about */
+      cmd_admin_only = 0;
+      if (!*answer)
+        cmd = cmdLIST; /* Default to the list command */
+      else if (*answer == CONTROL_D)
+        cmd = cmdQUIT;
+      else 
+        {
+          if ((p=strchr (answer,' ')))
+            {
+              *p++ = 0;
+              trim_spaces (answer);
+              trim_spaces (p);
+              arg_number = atoi(p);
+              arg_string = p;
+            }
+          
+          for (i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ )
+            if (!ascii_strcasecmp (answer, cmds[i].name ))
+              break;
+
+          cmd = cmds[i].id;
+          cmd_admin_only = cmds[i].admin_only;
+        }
+
+      if (!allow_admin && cmd_admin_only)
+	{
+          tty_printf ("\n");
+          tty_printf (_("Admin-only command\n"));
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      switch (cmd)
+        {
+        case cmdHELP:
+          for (i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ )
+            if(cmds[i].desc
+	       && (!cmds[i].admin_only || (cmds[i].admin_only && allow_admin)))
+              tty_printf("%-10s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc) );
+          break;
+
+	case cmdADMIN:
+          if ( !strcmp (arg_string, "on") )
+            allow_admin = 1;
+          else if ( !strcmp (arg_string, "off") )
+            allow_admin = 0;
+          else if ( !strcmp (arg_string, "verify") )
+            {
+              /* Force verification of the Admin Command.  However,
+                 this is only done if the retry counter is at initial
+                 state.  */
+              char *tmp = xmalloc (strlen (serialnobuf) + 6 + 1);
+              strcpy (stpcpy (tmp, serialnobuf), "[CHV3]");
+              allow_admin = !agent_scd_checkpin (tmp);
+              xfree (tmp);
+            }
+          else /* Toggle. */
+            allow_admin=!allow_admin;
+	  if(allow_admin)
+	    tty_printf(_("Admin commands are allowed\n"));
+	  else
+	    tty_printf(_("Admin commands are not allowed\n"));
+	  break;
+
+        case cmdVERIFY:
+          agent_scd_checkpin (serialnobuf);
+          redisplay = 1;
+          break;
+
+        case cmdLIST:
+          redisplay = 1;
+          break;
+
+        case cmdNAME:
+	  change_name ();
+          break;
+
+        case cmdURL:
+	  change_url ();
+          break;
+
+	case cmdFETCH:
+	  fetch_url();
+	  break;
+
+        case cmdLOGIN:
+	  change_login (arg_string);
+          break;
+
+        case cmdLANG:
+	  change_lang ();
+          break;
+
+        case cmdSEX:
+	  change_sex ();
+          break;
+
+        case cmdCAFPR:
+          if ( arg_number < 1 || arg_number > 3 )
+            tty_printf ("usage: cafpr N\n"
+                        "       1 <= N <= 3\n");
+          else
+            change_cafpr (arg_number);
+          break;
+
+        case cmdPRIVATEDO:
+          if ( arg_number < 1 || arg_number > 4 )
+            tty_printf ("usage: privatedo N\n"
+                        "       1 <= N <= 4\n");
+          else
+            change_private_do (arg_string, arg_number);
+          break;
+
+        case cmdFORCESIG:
+          toggle_forcesig ();
+          break;
+
+        case cmdGENERATE:
+          generate_card_keys (serialnobuf);
+          break;
+
+        case cmdPASSWD:
+          change_pin (0, allow_admin);
+          did_checkpin = 0; /* Need to reset it of course. */
+          break;
+
+        case cmdQUIT:
+          goto leave;
+
+        case cmdNOP:
+          break;
+
+        case cmdINVCMD:
+        default:
+          tty_printf ("\n");
+          tty_printf (_("Invalid command  (try \"help\")\n"));
+          break;
+        } /* End command switch. */
+    } /* End of main menu loop. */
+
+ leave:
+  xfree (answer);
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/cardglue.c b/g10/cardglue.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bfb9e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/cardglue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1432 @@
+/* cardglue.c - mainly dispatcher for card related functions.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#ifndef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+#error  not configured for card support.
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#include "apdu.h"
+#include "app-common.h"
+
+
+
+struct ctrl_ctx_s 
+{
+  assuan_error_t (*status_cb)(void *opaque, const char *line);
+  void *status_cb_arg;
+};
+
+
+struct pincb_parm_s
+{
+  const char *sn;
+};
+
+
+struct writekey_parm_s
+{
+  assuan_context_t ctx;
+  const unsigned char *keydata;
+  size_t keydatalen;
+};
+
+
+
+static char *default_reader_port;
+static app_t current_app;
+
+
+/* Local prototypes. */
+static assuan_error_t learn_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line);
+
+
+/* To avoid cluttering the code with bunches of ifdefs we use a few
+   dummy functions instead and defines. */
+#ifndef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+
+#define ASSUAN_LINELENGTH 100
+
+static assuan_context_t 
+agent_open (int try, const char *orig_codeset)
+{
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void 
+agent_close (assuan_context_t ctx)
+{
+}
+
+const char *
+assuan_strerror (assuan_error_t err)
+{
+  return "no Assuan support";
+}
+
+assuan_error_t 
+assuan_transact (assuan_context_t ctx,
+                 const char *command,
+                 assuan_error_t (*data_cb)(void *, const void *, size_t),
+                 void *data_cb_arg,
+                 assuan_error_t (*inquire_cb)(void*, const char *),
+                 void *inquire_cb_arg,
+                 assuan_error_t (*status_cb)(void*, const char *),
+                 void *status_cb_arg)
+{
+  return 100; /* ASSUAN_NOT_IMPLEMENTED */
+}
+assuan_error_t 
+assuan_send_data (assuan_context_t ctx, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  return 100; /* ASSUAN_NOT_IMPLEMENTED */
+}  
+#endif /*!ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+/* Create a serialno/fpr string from the serial number and the secret
+   key.  caller must free the returned string.  There is no error
+   return. [Taken from 1.9's keyid.c]*/
+char *
+serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (const unsigned char *sn, size_t snlen,
+                          PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  size_t fprlen;
+  char *buffer, *p;
+  int i;
+  
+  fingerprint_from_sk (sk, fpr, &fprlen);
+  buffer = p = xmalloc (snlen*2 + 1 + fprlen*2 + 1);
+  for (i=0; i < snlen; i++, p+=2)
+    sprintf (p, "%02X", sn[i]);
+  *p++ = '/';
+  for (i=0; i < fprlen; i++, p+=2)
+    sprintf (p, "%02X", fpr[i]);
+  *p = 0;
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+
+/* Send a line with status information via assuan and escape all given
+   buffers. The variable elements are pairs of (char *, size_t),
+   terminated with a (NULL, 0). */
+void
+send_status_info (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, ...)
+{
+  va_list arg_ptr;
+  const unsigned char *value;
+  size_t valuelen;
+  char buf[950], *p;
+  size_t n;
+  
+  va_start (arg_ptr, keyword);
+
+  p = buf; 
+  n = 0;
+  valuelen = strlen (keyword);
+  for ( ; valuelen && n < DIM (buf)-2; n++, valuelen--, keyword++)
+    *p++ = *keyword;
+
+  while ( (value = va_arg (arg_ptr, const unsigned char *)) )
+    {
+      valuelen = va_arg (arg_ptr, size_t);
+      if (!valuelen)
+        continue; /* empty buffer */
+      if (n)
+        {
+          *p++ = ' ';
+          n++;
+        }
+      for ( ; valuelen && n < DIM (buf)-2; n++, valuelen--, value++)
+        {
+          if (*value < ' ' || *value == '+')
+            {
+              sprintf (p, "%%%02X", *value);
+              p += 3;
+            }
+          else if (*value == ' ')
+            *p++ = '+';
+          else
+            *p++ = *value;
+        }
+    }
+  *p = 0;
+  if (ctrl && ctrl->status_cb)
+    ctrl->status_cb (ctrl->status_cb_arg, buf);
+
+  va_end (arg_ptr);
+}
+
+
+/* Replacement function of the Libgcrypt onewhich is used in gnupg
+   1.9.  Thus function computes the digest of ALGO from the data in
+   BUFFER of LENGTH.  ALGO must be supported. */
+void 
+gcry_md_hash_buffer (int algo, void *digest,
+                     const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  MD_HANDLE h = md_open (algo, 0);
+  if (!h)
+    BUG();
+  md_write (h, (byte *) buffer, length);
+  md_final (h);
+  memcpy (digest, md_read (h, algo), md_digest_length (algo));
+  md_close (h);
+}
+
+
+/* This is a limited version of the one in 1.9 but it should be
+   sufficient here. */
+void
+log_printf (const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+  va_list arg_ptr;
+
+  va_start (arg_ptr, fmt);
+  vfprintf (log_stream (), fmt, arg_ptr);
+  va_end (arg_ptr);
+}
+
+
+
+/* Print a hexdump of BUFFER.  With TEXT of NULL print just the raw
+   dump, with TEXT just an empty string, print a trailing linefeed,
+   otherwise print an entire debug line. */
+void
+log_printhex (const char *text, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  if (text && *text)
+    log_debug ("%s ", text);
+  if (length)
+    {
+      const unsigned char *p = buffer;
+      log_printf ("%02X", *p);
+      for (length--, p++; length--; p++)
+        log_printf (" %02X", *p);
+    }
+  if (text)
+    log_printf ("\n");
+}
+
+
+
+void
+app_set_default_reader_port (const char *portstr)
+{
+  xfree (default_reader_port);
+  default_reader_port = portstr? xstrdup (portstr): NULL;
+}
+
+
+void
+card_set_reader_port (const char *portstr)
+{
+  app_set_default_reader_port (portstr);
+}
+
+
+/* Retrieve the serial number and the time of the last update of the
+   card.  The serial number is returned as a malloced string (hex
+   encoded) in SERIAL and the time of update is returned in STAMP.  If
+   no update time is available the returned value is 0.  Caller must
+   free SERIAL unless the function returns an error. */
+int 
+app_get_serial_and_stamp (app_t app, char **serial, time_t *stamp)
+{
+  unsigned char *buf, *p;
+  int i;
+
+  if (!app || !serial || !stamp)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  *serial = NULL;
+  *stamp = 0; /* not available */
+
+  buf = xtrymalloc (app->serialnolen * 2 + 1);
+  if (!buf)
+    return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+  for (p=buf, i=0; i < app->serialnolen; p +=2, i++)
+    sprintf (p, "%02X", app->serialno[i]);
+  *p = 0;
+  *serial = buf;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Release the card info structure. */
+void 
+agent_release_card_info (struct agent_card_info_s *info)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (!info)
+    return;
+
+  xfree (info->serialno); info->serialno = NULL;
+  xfree (info->disp_name); info->disp_name = NULL;
+  xfree (info->disp_lang); info->disp_lang = NULL;
+  xfree (info->pubkey_url); info->pubkey_url = NULL;
+  xfree (info->login_data); info->login_data = NULL;
+  info->fpr1valid = info->fpr2valid = info->fpr3valid = 0;
+  info->cafpr1valid = info->cafpr2valid = info->cafpr3valid = 0;
+  for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
+    {
+      xfree (info->private_do[i]);
+      info->private_do[i] = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Print an error message for a failed assuan_transact and return a
+   gpg error code. No error is printed if RC is 0. */
+static gpg_error_t
+test_transact (int rc, const char *command)
+{
+  if (!rc)
+    return 0;
+  log_error ("sending command `%s' to agent failed: %s\n",
+             command, assuan_strerror (rc));
+  return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+}
+
+
+/* Try to open a card using an already running agent.  Prepare a
+   proper application context and return it. */
+static app_t
+open_card_via_agent (int *scd_available)
+{
+  assuan_context_t ctx;
+  app_t app;
+  struct agent_card_info_s info;
+  int rc;
+
+  *scd_available = 0;
+  ctx = agent_open (1, NULL);
+  if (!ctx)
+    return NULL;
+
+  /* Request the serialbnumber of the card.  If we get
+     NOT_SUPPORTED or NO_SCDAEMON back, the gpg-agent either has
+     disabled scdaemon or it can't be used.  We close the connection
+     in this case and use our own code.  This may happen if just the
+     gpg-agent has been installed for the sake of passphrase
+     caching. */
+  memset (&info, 0, sizeof info);
+  rc = assuan_transact (ctx, "SCD SERIALNO openpgp",
+                        NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                        learn_status_cb, &info);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      if ((rc & 0xffff) == 60 || (rc & 0xffff) == 119)
+        ;  /* No scdaemon available to gpg-agent. */
+      else
+        {
+          write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, "4");
+          log_info ("selecting openpgp failed: %s\n", assuan_strerror (rc));
+          *scd_available = 1;
+        }
+      agent_release_card_info (&info);
+      agent_close (ctx);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  
+  app = xcalloc (1, sizeof *app);
+  app->assuan_ctx = ctx;
+
+  return app;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Open the current card and select the openpgp application.  Return
+   an APP context handle to be used for further procesing or NULL on
+   error or if no OpenPGP application exists.*/
+static app_t
+open_card (void)
+{
+  int slot = -1;
+  int rc;
+  app_t app;
+  int did_shutdown = 0;
+  int retry_count = 0;
+
+  /* First check whether we can contact a gpg-agent and divert all
+     operation to it. This is required because gpg as well as the
+     agent require exclusive access to the reader. */
+  if (opt.use_agent)
+    {
+      int scd_available;
+
+      app = open_card_via_agent (&scd_available);
+      if (app)
+        goto ready; /* Yes, there is a agent with a usable card, go that way. */
+      if (scd_available)
+        return NULL; /* agent avilabale but card problem. */
+    }
+
+
+  /* No agent or usable agent, thus we do it on our own. */
+  card_close ();
+  
+ retry:
+  if (did_shutdown)
+    apdu_reset (slot);
+  else
+    {
+      slot = apdu_open_reader (default_reader_port);
+      if (slot == -1)
+        {
+          write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, "5");
+          log_error (_("card reader not available\n"));
+          return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+  app = xcalloc (1, sizeof *app);
+  app->slot = slot;
+  rc = app_select_openpgp (app);
+  if (opt.limit_card_insert_tries 
+      && ++retry_count >= opt.limit_card_insert_tries)
+    ;
+  else if (rc && !opt.batch)
+    {
+      write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, "1");
+      
+      did_shutdown = !!apdu_shutdown_reader (slot);
+
+      if ( cpr_get_answer_okay_cancel ("cardctrl.insert_card.okay",
+           _("Please insert the card and hit return or enter 'c' to cancel: "),
+                                       1) )
+        {
+          if (!did_shutdown)
+            apdu_close_reader (slot);
+          xfree (app);
+          goto retry;
+        }
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, "4");
+      log_info (_("selecting openpgp failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+      apdu_close_reader (slot);
+      xfree (app);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+ ready:
+  app->initialized = 1;
+  current_app = app;
+  if (is_status_enabled () )
+    {
+      int i;
+      char *p, *buf;
+
+      buf = xmalloc (5 + app->serialnolen * 2 + 1);
+      p = stpcpy (buf, "3 ");
+      for (i=0; i < app->serialnolen; p +=2, i++)
+        sprintf (p, "%02X", app->serialno[i]);
+      write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, buf);
+      xfree (buf);
+    }
+
+  return app;
+}
+
+
+void
+card_close (void)
+{
+  if (current_app)
+    {
+      app_t app = current_app;
+      current_app = NULL;
+
+      if (app->assuan_ctx)
+        agent_close (app->assuan_ctx);
+      else
+        apdu_close_reader (app->slot);
+      xfree (app);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Format a cache ID from the serialnumber in SN and return it as an
+   allocated string.  In case of an error NULL is returned. */
+static char *
+format_cacheid (const char *sn)
+{
+  const char *s;
+  size_t snlen;
+  char *cacheid = NULL;
+
+  /* The serialnumber we use for a card is "CARDSN:serialno".  Where
+     serialno is the BCD string (i.e. hex string) with the full
+     number.  The serial number expect here constsis of hexdigits
+     followed by other characters, we cut off these other
+     characters. */
+  if (sn)
+    {
+      for (s=sn,snlen=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, snlen++)
+        ;
+      if (snlen == 32)
+        {
+          /* Yes, this looks indeed like an OpenPGP card S/N. */
+          cacheid = xtrymalloc (7+snlen+1);
+          if (cacheid)
+            {
+              memcpy (cacheid, "CARDSN:", 7);
+              memcpy (cacheid+7, sn, snlen);
+              cacheid[7+snlen] = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  return cacheid;
+}
+
+
+/* If RC is not 0, write an appropriate status message. */
+static void
+status_sc_op_failure (int rc)
+{
+  if (rc == G10ERR_CANCELED)
+    write_status_text (STATUS_SC_OP_FAILURE, "1");
+  else if (rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS)
+    write_status_text (STATUS_SC_OP_FAILURE, "2");
+  else if (rc)
+    write_status (STATUS_SC_OP_FAILURE);
+}  
+
+
+/* Check that the serial number of the current card (as described by
+   APP) matches SERIALNO.  If there is no match and we are not in
+   batch mode, present a prompt to insert the desired card.  The
+   function returnd 0 if the present card is okay, -1 if the user
+   selected to insert a new card or an error value.  Note that the
+   card context will be closed in all cases except for 0 as return
+   value and if it was possible to merely shutdown the reader. */
+static int
+check_card_serialno (app_t app, const char *serialno)
+{
+  const char *s;
+  int ask = 0;
+  int n;
+
+  for (s = serialno, n=0; *s != '/' && hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (n != 32)
+    {
+      log_error ("invalid serial number in keyring detected\n");
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+    }
+  if (app->serialnolen != 16)
+    ask = 1;
+  for (s = serialno, n=0; !ask && n < 16; s += 2, n++)
+    if (app->serialno[n] != xtoi_2 (s))
+      ask = 1;
+  if (ask)
+    {
+      char buf[5+32+1];
+      int did_shutdown = 0;
+
+      if (current_app && !apdu_shutdown_reader (current_app->slot))
+        did_shutdown = 1;
+      else
+        card_close ();
+
+      if (!opt.batch)
+        tty_printf (_("Please remove the current card and "
+                      "insert the one with serial number:\n"
+                      "   %.*s\n"), 32, serialno);
+
+      sprintf (buf, "1 %.32s", serialno);
+      write_status_text (STATUS_CARDCTRL, buf);
+
+      if ( !opt.batch
+           && cpr_get_answer_okay_cancel ("cardctrl.change_card.okay",
+                                          _("Hit return when ready "
+                                            "or enter 'c' to cancel: "),
+                                          1) )
+        {
+          card_close ();
+          return -1;
+        }
+      if (did_shutdown)
+        apdu_reset (current_app->slot);
+      else
+        card_close ();
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Take a 20 byte hexencoded string and put it into the the provided
+   20 byte buffer FPR in binary format. */
+static int
+unhexify_fpr (const char *hexstr, unsigned char *fpr)
+{
+  const char *s;
+  int n;
+
+  for (s=hexstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
+    ;
+  if (*s || (n != 40))
+    return 0; /* no fingerprint (invalid or wrong length). */
+  n /= 2;
+  for (s=hexstr, n=0; *s; s += 2, n++)
+    fpr[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
+  return 1; /* okay */
+}
+
+/* Take the serial number from LINE and return it verbatim in a newly
+   allocated string.  We make sure that only hex characters are
+   returned. */
+static char *
+store_serialno (const char *line)
+{
+  const char *s;
+  char *p;
+
+  for (s=line; hexdigitp (s); s++)
+    ;
+  p = xmalloc (s + 1 - line);
+  memcpy (p, line, s-line);
+  p[s-line] = 0;
+  return p;
+}
+
+
+
+static assuan_error_t
+learn_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
+{
+  struct agent_card_info_s *parm = opaque;
+  const char *keyword = line;
+  int keywordlen;
+  int i;
+
+/*   log_debug ("got status line `%s'\n", line); */
+  for (keywordlen=0; *line && !spacep (line); line++, keywordlen++)
+    ;
+  while (spacep (line))
+    line++;
+
+  if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "SERIALNO", keywordlen))
+    {
+      xfree (parm->serialno);
+      parm->serialno = store_serialno (line);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 9 && !memcmp (keyword, "DISP-NAME", keywordlen))
+    {
+      xfree (parm->disp_name);
+      parm->disp_name = unescape_percent_string (line);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 9 && !memcmp (keyword, "DISP-LANG", keywordlen))
+    {
+      xfree (parm->disp_lang);
+      parm->disp_lang = unescape_percent_string (line);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "DISP-SEX", keywordlen))
+    {
+      parm->disp_sex = *line == '1'? 1 : *line == '2' ? 2: 0;
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 10 && !memcmp (keyword, "PUBKEY-URL", keywordlen))
+    {
+      xfree (parm->pubkey_url);
+      parm->pubkey_url = unescape_percent_string (line);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 10 && !memcmp (keyword, "LOGIN-DATA", keywordlen))
+    {
+      xfree (parm->login_data);
+      parm->login_data = unescape_percent_string (line);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 11 && !memcmp (keyword, "SIG-COUNTER", keywordlen))
+    {
+      parm->sig_counter = strtoul (line, NULL, 0);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 10 && !memcmp (keyword, "CHV-STATUS", keywordlen))
+    {
+      char *p, *buf;
+
+      buf = p = unescape_percent_string (line);
+      if (buf)
+        {
+          while (spacep (p))
+            p++;
+          parm->chv1_cached = atoi (p);
+          while (*p && !spacep (p))
+            p++;
+          while (spacep (p))
+            p++;
+          for (i=0; *p && i < 3; i++)
+            {
+              parm->chvmaxlen[i] = atoi (p);
+              while (*p && !spacep (p))
+                p++;
+              while (spacep (p))
+                p++;
+            }
+          for (i=0; *p && i < 3; i++)
+            {
+              parm->chvretry[i] = atoi (p);
+              while (*p && !spacep (p))
+                p++;
+              while (spacep (p))
+                p++;
+            }
+          xfree (buf);
+        }
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 7 && !memcmp (keyword, "KEY-FPR", keywordlen))
+    {
+      int no = atoi (line);
+      while (* line && !spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      while (spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      if (no == 1)
+        parm->fpr1valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->fpr1);
+      else if (no == 2)
+        parm->fpr2valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->fpr2);
+      else if (no == 3)
+        parm->fpr3valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->fpr3);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "KEY-TIME", keywordlen))
+    {
+      int no = atoi (line);
+      while (* line && !spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      while (spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      if (no == 1)
+        parm->fpr1time = strtoul (line, NULL, 10);
+      else if (no == 2)
+        parm->fpr2time = strtoul (line, NULL, 10);
+      else if (no == 3)
+        parm->fpr3time = strtoul (line, NULL, 10);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 6 && !memcmp (keyword, "CA-FPR", keywordlen))
+    {
+      int no = atoi (line);
+      while (*line && !spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      while (spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      if (no == 1)
+        parm->cafpr1valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->cafpr1);
+      else if (no == 2)
+        parm->cafpr2valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->cafpr2);
+      else if (no == 3)
+        parm->cafpr3valid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->cafpr3);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 12 && !memcmp (keyword, "PRIVATE-DO-", 11)
+           && strchr ("1234", keyword[11]))
+    {
+      int no = keyword[11] - '1';
+      assert (no >= 0 && no <= 3);
+      xfree (parm->private_do[no]);
+      parm->private_do[no] = unescape_percent_string (line);
+    }
+ 
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Return card info. */
+int 
+agent_learn (struct agent_card_info_s *info)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+  struct ctrl_ctx_s ctrl;
+  time_t stamp;
+  char *serial;
+  
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  memset (info, 0, sizeof *info);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      rc = assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, "SCD LEARN --force",
+                            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            learn_status_cb, info);
+      rc = test_transact (rc, "SCD LEARN");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      memset (&ctrl, 0, sizeof ctrl);
+      ctrl.status_cb = learn_status_cb;
+      ctrl.status_cb_arg = info;
+
+      rc = app_get_serial_and_stamp (app, &serial, &stamp);
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          send_status_info (&ctrl, "SERIALNO",
+                            serial, strlen(serial), NULL, 0);
+          xfree (serial);
+          rc = app->fnc.learn_status (app, &ctrl);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Get an attribute from the card. Make sure info is initialized. */
+int 
+agent_scd_getattr (const char *name, struct agent_card_info_s *info)
+{
+  int rc;
+  app_t app;
+  struct ctrl_ctx_s ctrl;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+
+      /* We assume that NAME does not need escaping. */
+      if (12 + strlen (name) > DIM(line)-1)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      stpcpy (stpcpy (line, "SCD GETATTR "), name); 
+
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                           learn_status_cb, info),
+                          "SCD GETATTR");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      ctrl.status_cb = learn_status_cb;
+      ctrl.status_cb_arg = info;
+      rc = app->fnc.getattr (app, &ctrl, name);
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+static int 
+pin_cb (void *opaque, const char *info, char **retstr)
+{
+  struct pincb_parm_s *parm = opaque;
+  char *value;
+  int canceled;
+  int isadmin = 0;
+  int newpin = 0;
+  const char *again_text = NULL;
+  const char *ends, *s;
+  char *cacheid = NULL;
+
+  *retstr = NULL;
+  /*   log_debug ("asking for PIN '%s'\n", info); */
+
+  /* We use a special prefix to check whether the Admin PIN has been
+     requested. */
+  if (info && *info =='|' && (ends=strchr (info+1, '|')))
+    {
+      for (s=info+1; s < ends; s++)
+        {
+          if (*s == 'A')
+            isadmin = 1;
+          else if (*s == 'N')
+            newpin = 1;
+        }
+      info = ends+1;
+    }
+  else if (info && *info == '|')
+    log_debug ("pin_cb called without proper PIN info hack\n");
+
+  /* If we are not requesting a new PIN and we are not requesting an
+     AdminPIN, compute a string to be used as the cacheID for
+     gpg-agent. */
+  if (!newpin && !isadmin && parm)
+    {
+      cacheid = format_cacheid (parm->sn);
+    }
+  else if (newpin && parm)
+    {
+      /* Make really sure that it is not cached anymore. */
+      agent_clear_pin_cache (parm->sn);
+    }
+
+
+ again:
+  if (is_status_enabled())
+    {
+      if (parm && parm->sn && *parm->sn)
+        {
+          char *buf = xmalloc ( 10 + strlen (parm->sn) + 1);
+          strcpy (stpcpy (buf, isadmin? "OPENPGP 3 ":"OPENPGP 1 "), parm->sn);
+          write_status_text (STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN, buf);
+          xfree (buf);
+        }
+      else  
+        write_status_text (STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN,
+                           isadmin? "OPENPGP 3" : "OPENPGP 1");
+    }
+
+  value = ask_passphrase (info, again_text,
+                          newpin && isadmin? "passphrase.adminpin.new.ask" :
+                          newpin?  "passphrase.pin.new.ask" :
+                          isadmin? "passphrase.adminpin.ask" :
+                                   "passphrase.pin.ask", 
+                          newpin && isadmin? _("Enter New Admin PIN: ") :
+                          newpin?  _("Enter New PIN: ") :
+                          isadmin? _("Enter Admin PIN: ")
+                                 : _("Enter PIN: "),
+                          cacheid,
+                          &canceled);
+  xfree (cacheid);
+  cacheid = NULL;
+  again_text = NULL;
+  if (!value && canceled)
+    return G10ERR_CANCELED;
+  else if (!value)
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  if (newpin)
+    {
+      char *value2;
+
+      value2 = ask_passphrase (info, NULL,
+                               "passphrase.pin.repeat", 
+                               _("Repeat this PIN: "),
+                               NULL,
+                               &canceled);
+      if (!value2 && canceled)
+        {
+          xfree (value);
+          return G10ERR_CANCELED;
+        }
+      else if (!value2)
+        {
+          xfree (value);
+          return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+        }
+      if (strcmp (value, value2))
+        {
+          again_text = N_("PIN not correctly repeated; try again");
+          xfree (value2);
+          xfree (value);
+          value = NULL;
+          goto again;
+        }
+      xfree (value2);
+    }
+
+  *retstr = value;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Send a SETATTR command to the SCdaemon. */
+int 
+agent_scd_setattr (const char *name,
+                   const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen,
+                   const char *serialno)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+      char *p;
+
+      /* We assume that NAME does not need escaping. */
+      if (12 + strlen (name) > DIM(line)-1)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      p = stpcpy (stpcpy (line, "SCD SETATTR "), name); 
+      *p++ = ' ';
+      for (; valuelen; value++, valuelen--)
+        {
+          if (p >= line + DIM(line)-5 )
+            return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+          if (*value < ' ' || *value == '+' || *value == '%')
+            {
+              sprintf (p, "%%%02X", *value);
+              p += 3;
+            }
+          else if (*value == ' ')
+            *p++ = '+';
+          else
+            *p++ = *value;
+        }
+      *p = 0;
+
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD SETATTR");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = app->fnc.setattr (app, name, pin_cb, &parm, value, valuelen);
+    }
+
+  status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Handle a KEYDATA inquiry.  Note, we only send the data,
+   assuan_transact takes care of flushing and writing the end */
+static assuan_error_t
+inq_writekey_parms (void *opaque, const char *keyword)
+{
+  struct writekey_parm_s *parm = opaque; 
+
+  return assuan_send_data (parm->ctx, parm->keydata, parm->keydatalen);
+}
+
+
+/* Send a WRITEKEY command to the SCdaemon. */
+int 
+agent_scd_writekey (int keyno, const char *serialno,
+                    const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+  char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      struct writekey_parm_s parms;
+
+      snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SCD WRITEKEY --force OPENPGP.%d", keyno);
+      line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+      parms.ctx = app->assuan_ctx;
+      parms.keydata = keydata;
+      parms.keydatalen = keydatalen;
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL,
+                                           inq_writekey_parms, &parms,
+                                           NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD WRITEKEY");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "OPENPGP.%d", keyno);
+      line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+      rc = app->fnc.writekey (app, NULL, line, 0x0001,
+                              pin_cb, &parm,
+                              keydata, keydatalen);
+    }
+
+  status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+static assuan_error_t
+genkey_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
+{
+  struct agent_card_genkey_s *parm = opaque;
+  const char *keyword = line;
+  int keywordlen;
+
+/*   log_debug ("got status line `%s'\n", line); */
+  for (keywordlen=0; *line && !spacep (line); line++, keywordlen++)
+    ;
+  while (spacep (line))
+    line++;
+
+  if (keywordlen == 7 && !memcmp (keyword, "KEY-FPR", keywordlen))
+    {
+      parm->fprvalid = unhexify_fpr (line, parm->fpr);
+    }
+  if (keywordlen == 8 && !memcmp (keyword, "KEY-DATA", keywordlen))
+    {
+      MPI a;
+      const char *name = line;
+      char *buf;
+
+      while (*line && !spacep (line))
+        line++;
+      while (spacep (line))
+        line++;
+
+      buf = xmalloc ( 2 + strlen (line) + 1);
+      strcpy (stpcpy (buf, "0x"), line);
+      a = mpi_alloc (300);
+      if( mpi_fromstr (a, buf) )
+        log_error ("error parsing received key data\n");
+      else if (*name == 'n' && spacep (name+1))
+        parm->n = a;
+      else if (*name == 'e' && spacep (name+1))
+        parm->e = a;
+      else
+        {
+          log_info ("unknown parameter name in received key data\n");
+          mpi_free (a);
+        }
+      xfree (buf);
+    }
+  else if (keywordlen == 14 && !memcmp (keyword,"KEY-CREATED-AT", keywordlen))
+    {
+      parm->created_at = (u32)strtoul (line, NULL, 10);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Send a GENKEY command to the SCdaemon. */
+int 
+agent_scd_genkey (struct agent_card_genkey_s *info, int keyno, int force,
+                  const char *serialno)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+  struct ctrl_ctx_s ctrl;
+  int rc;
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  memset (info, 0, sizeof *info);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SCD GENKEY %s%d",
+                force? "--force ":"", keyno);
+      line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                                           genkey_status_cb, info),
+                          "SCD GENKEY");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "%d", keyno);
+      ctrl.status_cb = genkey_status_cb;
+      ctrl.status_cb_arg = info;
+      rc = app->fnc.genkey (app, &ctrl, line,
+                            force? 1:0,
+                            pin_cb, &parm);
+    }
+
+  status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static assuan_error_t
+membuf_data_cb (void *opaque, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+  membuf_t *data = opaque;
+
+  if (buffer)
+    put_membuf (data, buffer, length);
+  return 0;
+}
+  
+
+/* Send a PKSIGN command to the SCdaemon. */
+int 
+agent_scd_pksign (const char *serialno, int hashalgo,
+                  const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                  unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen)
+{
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+
+  *r_buf = NULL;
+  *r_buflen = 0;
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+ retry:
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char *p, line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+      membuf_t data;
+      size_t len;
+      int i;
+
+      if (indatalen*2 + 50 > DIM(line))
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+
+      p = stpcpy (line, "SCD SETDATA ");
+      for (i=0; i < indatalen ; i++, p += 2 )
+        sprintf (p, "%02X", indata[i]);
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD SETDATA");
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          init_membuf (&data, 1024);
+          snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SCD PKSIGN %s%s",
+                    hashalgo == GCRY_MD_RMD160? "--hash=rmd160 ": "",
+                    serialno);
+          line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+          rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                               membuf_data_cb, &data,
+                                               NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                              "SCD PKSIGN");
+          if (rc)
+            xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len));
+          else
+            *r_buf = get_membuf (&data, r_buflen);
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Check that the card's serialnumber is as required.*/
+      rc = check_card_serialno (app, serialno);
+      if (rc == -1)
+        goto retry;
+
+      if (!rc)
+        rc = app->fnc.sign (app, serialno, hashalgo,
+                            pin_cb, &parm,
+                            indata, indatalen,
+                            r_buf, r_buflen);
+    }
+
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+      if (!app->assuan_ctx)
+        agent_clear_pin_cache (serialno);
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Send a PKDECRYPT command to the SCdaemon. */
+int 
+agent_scd_pkdecrypt (const char *serialno,
+                     const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                     unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen)
+{
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+
+  *r_buf = NULL;
+  *r_buflen = 0;
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+ retry:
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char *p, line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+      membuf_t data;
+      size_t len;
+      int i;
+
+      if (indatalen*2 + 50 > DIM(line))
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+
+      p = stpcpy (line, "SCD SETDATA ");
+      for (i=0; i < indatalen ; i++, p += 2 )
+        sprintf (p, "%02X", indata[i]);
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD SETDATA");
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          init_membuf (&data, 1024);
+          snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SCD PKDECRYPT %s", serialno);
+          line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+          rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                               membuf_data_cb, &data,
+                                               NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                              "SCD PKDECRYPT");
+          if (rc)
+            xfree (get_membuf (&data, &len));
+          else
+            *r_buf = get_membuf (&data, r_buflen);
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* Check that the card's serialnumber is as required.*/
+      rc = check_card_serialno (app, serialno);
+      if (rc == -1)
+        goto retry;
+      
+      if (!rc)
+        rc = app->fnc.decipher (app, serialno, 
+                                pin_cb, &parm,
+                                indata, indatalen,
+                                r_buf, r_buflen);
+    }
+
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+      if (!app->assuan_ctx)
+        agent_clear_pin_cache (serialno);
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Change the PIN of an OpenPGP card or reset the retry
+   counter. SERIALNO may be NULL or a hex string finally passed to the
+   passphrase callback. */
+int 
+agent_scd_change_pin (int chvno, const char *serialno)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  int reset = 0;
+  int rc;
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialno;
+
+  reset = (chvno >= 100);
+  chvno %= 100;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+
+      snprintf (line, DIM(line)-1, "SCD PASSWD%s %d",
+                reset? " --reset":"", chvno);
+      line[DIM(line)-1] = 0;
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD PASSWD");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      char chvnostr[50];
+
+      sprintf (chvnostr, "%d", chvno);
+      rc = app->fnc.change_pin (app, NULL, chvnostr, reset,
+                                pin_cb, &parm);
+    }
+
+  status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Perform a CHECKPIN operation.  SERIALNO should be the serial
+   number of the card - optionally followed by the fingerprint;
+   however the fingerprint is ignored here. */
+int
+agent_scd_checkpin (const char *serialnobuf)
+{
+  app_t app;
+  int rc;
+  struct pincb_parm_s parm;
+
+  memset (&parm, 0, sizeof parm);
+  parm.sn = serialnobuf;
+
+  app = current_app? current_app : open_card ();
+  if (!app)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+
+  if (app->assuan_ctx)
+    {
+      char line[ASSUAN_LINELENGTH];
+
+      if (15 + strlen (serialnobuf) > DIM(line)-1)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD);
+      stpcpy (stpcpy (line, "SCD CHECKPIN "), serialnobuf); 
+      rc = test_transact (assuan_transact (app->assuan_ctx, line,
+                                           NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL),
+                          "SCD CHECKPIN");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = app->fnc.check_pin (app, serialnobuf, pin_cb, &parm);
+    }
+
+  status_sc_op_failure (rc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+void
+agent_clear_pin_cache (const char *sn)
+{
+  char *cacheid = format_cacheid (sn);
+  if (cacheid)
+    {
+      passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, cacheid, 0);
+      xfree (cacheid);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/cardglue.h b/g10/cardglue.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1f2811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/cardglue.h
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* cardglue.h - Divert operations to the agent
+ * Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+#ifndef GNUPG_G10_CARDGLUE_H
+#define GNUPG_G10_CARDGLUE_H 
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+/* 
+   Note, that most card related code has been taken from 1.9.x branch
+   and is maintained over there if at all possible.  Thus, if you make
+   changes here, please check that a similar change has been commited
+   to the 1.9.x branch.
+*/
+
+
+struct agent_card_info_s {
+  int error;         /* private. */
+  char *serialno;    /* malloced hex string. */
+  char *disp_name;   /* malloced. */
+  char *disp_lang;   /* malloced. */
+  int  disp_sex;     /* 0 = unspecified, 1 = male, 2 = female */
+  char *pubkey_url;  /* malloced. */
+  char *login_data;  /* malloced. */
+  char *private_do[4]; /* malloced. */
+  char cafpr1valid;
+  char cafpr2valid;
+  char cafpr3valid;
+  char cafpr1[20];
+  char cafpr2[20];
+  char cafpr3[20];
+  char fpr1valid;
+  char fpr2valid;
+  char fpr3valid;
+  char fpr1[20];
+  char fpr2[20];
+  char fpr3[20];
+  u32  fpr1time;
+  u32  fpr2time;
+  u32  fpr3time;
+  unsigned long sig_counter;
+  int chv1_cached;   /* True if a PIN is not required for each
+                        signing.  Note that the gpg-agent might cache
+                        it anyway. */
+  int chvmaxlen[3];  /* Maximum allowed length of a CHV. */
+  int chvretry[3];   /* Allowed retries for the CHV; 0 = blocked. */
+};
+
+struct agent_card_genkey_s {
+  char fprvalid;
+  char fpr[20];
+  u32  created_at;
+  MPI  n;
+  MPI  e;
+};
+
+
+struct app_ctx_s;
+struct ctrl_ctx_s;
+
+typedef struct app_ctx_s *APP; /* deprecated. */
+typedef struct app_ctx_s *app_t;
+typedef struct ctrl_ctx_s *CTRL; /* deprecated. */
+typedef struct ctrl_ctx_s *ctrl_t;
+
+
+#define GPG_ERR_GENERAL           G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN           G10ERR_BAD_PASS
+#define GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY           G10ERR_BAD_KEY
+#define GPG_ERR_CARD              G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_EEXIST            G10ERR_FILE_EXISTS
+#define GPG_ERR_ENOMEM            G10ERR_RESOURCE_LIMIT
+#define GPG_ERR_GENERAL           G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_HARDWARE          G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_CARD          G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_ID            G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_NAME          G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE         G10ERR_INV_ARG
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP          G10ERR_INV_ARG
+#define GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED     G10ERR_UNSUPPORTED
+#define GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ            G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_PIN_BLOCKED       G10ERR_PASSPHRASE
+#define GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO 
+#define GPG_ERR_USE_CONDITIONS    G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD        G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY      G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY
+#define GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED    G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND         G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_BUG               G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED   G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_BAD_BER           G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_EOF               (-1)
+#define GPG_ERR_CARD_NOT_PRESENT  G10ERR_NO_CARD
+#define GPG_ERR_CARD_RESET        G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO
+#define GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP      G10ERR_INV_ARG
+#define GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE         G10ERR_INV_ARG
+#define GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY        G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY
+#define GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE         G10ERR_GENERAL
+
+#define GPG_ERR_EBUSY             G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_ENOENT            G10ERR_OPEN_FILE
+#define GPG_ERR_EACCES            G10ERR_UNSUPPORTED
+#define GPG_ERR_EIO               G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_ENODEV            G10ERR_GENERAL
+#define GPG_ERR_CANCELED          G10ERR_CANCELED
+
+typedef int gpg_error_t;
+typedef int gpg_err_code_t;
+
+#define gpg_error(n) (n)
+#define gpg_err_code(n) (n)
+#define gpg_strerror(n) g10_errstr ((n))
+#define gpg_error_from_errno(n) (G10ERR_GENERAL) /*FIXME*/
+#define gpg_err_code_from_errno(n) (G10ERR_GENERAL)
+
+/* We are not using it in a library, so we even let xtrymalloc
+   abort. Because we won't never return from these malloc functions,
+   we also don't need the out_of_core function, we simply define it to
+   return -1 */
+#define xtrymalloc(n)    xmalloc((n))
+#define xtrycalloc(n,m)  xcalloc((n),(m))
+#define xtryrealloc(n,m) xrealloc((n),(m))
+#define xtrymalloc_secure(n)  xmalloc_secure((n))
+#define out_of_core()    (-1) 
+
+#define gnupg_get_time() make_timestamp ()
+
+
+void card_set_reader_port (const char *portstr);
+
+char *serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (const unsigned char *sn, size_t snlen,
+                                PKT_secret_key *sk);
+void send_status_info (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, ...);
+void gcry_md_hash_buffer (int algo, void *digest,
+			  const void *buffer, size_t length);
+void log_printf (const char *fmt, ...);
+void log_printhex (const char *text, const void *buffer, size_t length);
+
+
+#define GCRY_MD_SHA1 DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+#define GCRY_MD_RMD160 DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
+
+void card_close (void);
+
+
+/* Release the card info structure. */
+void agent_release_card_info (struct agent_card_info_s *info);
+
+/* Return card info. */
+int agent_learn (struct agent_card_info_s *info);
+
+/* Check whether the secret key for the key identified by HEXKEYGRIP
+   is available.  Return 0 for yes or an error code. */
+int agent_havekey (const char *hexkeygrip);
+
+/* Return card info. */
+int agent_scd_getattr (const char *name, struct agent_card_info_s *info);
+
+/* Send a SETATTR command to the SCdaemon. */
+int agent_scd_setattr (const char *name,
+                       const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen,
+                       const char *serialno);
+
+/* Send a WRITEKEY command to the SCdaemon. */
+int agent_scd_writekey (int keyno, const char *serialno,
+                        const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen);
+
+/* Send a GENKEY command to the SCdaemon. */
+int agent_scd_genkey (struct agent_card_genkey_s *info, int keyno, int force,
+                      const char *serialno);
+
+/* Send a PKSIGN command to the SCdaemon. */
+int agent_scd_pksign (const char *keyid, int hashalgo,
+                      const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                      unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen);
+
+/* Send a PKDECRYPT command to the SCdaemon. */
+int agent_scd_pkdecrypt (const char *serialno,
+                         const unsigned char *indata, size_t indatalen,
+                         unsigned char **r_buf, size_t *r_buflen);
+
+/* Change the PIN of an OpenPGP card or reset the retry counter. */
+int agent_scd_change_pin (int chvno, const char *serialno);
+
+/* Send a CHECKPIN command. */
+int agent_scd_checkpin (const char *serialnobuf);
+
+/* Clear a cached PIN. */
+void agent_clear_pin_cache (const char *sn);
+
+
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+#endif /*GNUPG_G10_CARDGLUE_H*/
+
diff --git a/g10/ccid-driver.c b/g10/ccid-driver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da8edb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/ccid-driver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2745 @@
+/* ccid-driver.c - USB ChipCardInterfaceDevices driver
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *      Written by Werner Koch.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this file may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * following license, in which case the provisions of this license are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the GNU General Public License. If you wish to
+ * allow use of your version of this file only under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License, and not to allow others to use your
+ * version of this file under the terms of the following license,
+ * indicate your decision by deleting this paragraph and the license
+ * below.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $Date: 2006-02-14 17:28:34 +0100 (Tue, 14 Feb 2006) $
+ */
+
+
+/* CCID (ChipCardInterfaceDevices) is a specification for accessing
+   smartcard via a reader connected to the USB.  
+
+   This is a limited driver allowing to use some CCID drivers directly
+   without any other specila drivers. This is a fallback driver to be
+   used when nothing else works or the system should be kept minimal
+   for security reasons.  It makes use of the libusb library to gain
+   portable access to USB.
+
+   This driver has been tested with the SCM SCR335 and SPR532
+   smartcard readers and requires that a reader implements APDU or
+   TPDU level exchange and does fully automatic initialization.
+*/
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBUSB) || defined(TEST)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <usb.h>
+
+#include "ccid-driver.h"
+
+#define DRVNAME "ccid-driver: "
+
+
+/* Depending on how this source is used we either define our error
+   output to go to stderr or to the jnlib based logging functions.  We
+   use the latter when GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION is defines or when both,
+   GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER and HAVE_JNLIB_LOGGING are defined.
+*/
+#if defined(GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION) \
+    || (defined(GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER) && defined(HAVE_JNLIB_LOGGING))
+
+#if defined(GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER)
+#  include GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER
+#elif GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1 /* GnuPG Version is < 1.9. */
+#  include "options.h"
+#  include "util.h"
+#  include "memory.h"
+#  include "cardglue.h"
+# else /* This is the modularized GnuPG 1.9 or later. */
+#  include "scdaemon.h"
+#endif
+
+
+# define DEBUGOUT(t)         do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_debug (DRVNAME t); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_1(t,a)     do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_debug (DRVNAME t,(a)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_2(t,a,b)   do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_debug (DRVNAME t,(a),(b)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_3(t,a,b,c) do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_debug (DRVNAME t,(a),(b),(c));} while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_4(t,a,b,c,d) do { if (debug_level) \
+                              log_debug (DRVNAME t,(a),(b),(c),(d));} while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT(t)    do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_printf (t); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_1(t,a)  do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_printf (t,(a)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_2(t,a,b)   do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_printf (t,(a),(b)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_3(t,a,b,c) do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_printf (t,(a),(b),(c)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_LF()       do { if (debug_level) \
+                                  log_printf ("\n"); } while (0)
+
+#else /* Other usage of this source - don't use gnupg specifics. */
+
+# define DEBUGOUT(t)          do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, DRVNAME t); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_1(t,a)      do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, DRVNAME t, (a)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_2(t,a,b)    do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, DRVNAME t, (a), (b)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_3(t,a,b,c)  do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, DRVNAME t, (a), (b), (c)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_4(t,a,b,c,d)  do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, DRVNAME t, (a), (b), (c), (d));} while(0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT(t)     do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, t); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_1(t,a) do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, t, (a)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_2(t,a,b) do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, t, (a), (b)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_CONT_3(t,a,b,c) do { if (debug_level) \
+                     fprintf (stderr, t, (a), (b), (c)); } while (0)
+# define DEBUGOUT_LF()        do { if (debug_level) \
+                     putc ('\n', stderr); } while (0)
+
+#endif /* This source not used by scdaemon. */
+
+
+
+enum {
+  RDR_to_PC_NotifySlotChange= 0x50,
+  RDR_to_PC_HardwareError   = 0x51,
+
+  PC_to_RDR_SetParameters   = 0x61,
+  PC_to_RDR_IccPowerOn      = 0x62,
+  PC_to_RDR_IccPowerOff     = 0x63,
+  PC_to_RDR_GetSlotStatus   = 0x65,
+  PC_to_RDR_Secure          = 0x69,
+  PC_to_RDR_T0APDU          = 0x6a,
+  PC_to_RDR_Escape          = 0x6b,
+  PC_to_RDR_GetParameters   = 0x6c,
+  PC_to_RDR_ResetParameters = 0x6d,
+  PC_to_RDR_IccClock        = 0x6e,
+  PC_to_RDR_XfrBlock        = 0x6f,
+  PC_to_RDR_Mechanical      = 0x71,
+  PC_to_RDR_Abort           = 0x72,
+  PC_to_RDR_SetDataRate     = 0x73,
+
+  RDR_to_PC_DataBlock       = 0x80,
+  RDR_to_PC_SlotStatus      = 0x81,
+  RDR_to_PC_Parameters      = 0x82,
+  RDR_to_PC_Escape          = 0x83,
+  RDR_to_PC_DataRate        = 0x84
+};
+
+
+/* Two macro to detect whether a CCID command has failed and to get
+   the error code.  These macros assume that we can access the
+   mandatory first 10 bytes of a CCID message in BUF. */
+#define CCID_COMMAND_FAILED(buf) ((buf)[7] & 0x40)
+#define CCID_ERROR_CODE(buf)     (((unsigned char *)(buf))[8])
+
+
+/* We need to know the vendor to do some hacks. */
+enum {
+  VENDOR_CHERRY = 0x046a,
+  VENDOR_SCM    = 0x04e6,
+  VENDOR_OMNIKEY= 0x076b,
+  VENDOR_GEMPC  = 0x08e6
+};
+
+/* A list and a table with special transport descriptions. */
+enum {
+  TRANSPORT_USB    = 0, /* Standard USB transport. */
+  TRANSPORT_CM4040 = 1  /* As used by the Cardman 4040. */
+};
+
+static struct
+{ 
+  char *name;  /* Device name. */
+  int  type;
+
+} transports[] = {
+  { "/dev/cmx0", TRANSPORT_CM4040 },  
+  { "/dev/cmx1", TRANSPORT_CM4040 },  
+  { NULL },
+};
+
+
+/* Store information on the driver's state.  A pointer to such a
+   structure is used as handle for most functions. */
+struct ccid_driver_s 
+{
+  usb_dev_handle *idev;
+  char *rid;
+  int dev_fd;  /* -1 for USB transport or file descriptor of the
+                   transport device. */
+  unsigned short id_vendor;
+  unsigned short id_product;
+  unsigned short bcd_device;
+  int ifc_no;
+  int ep_bulk_out;
+  int ep_bulk_in;
+  int ep_intr;
+  int seqno;
+  unsigned char t1_ns;
+  unsigned char t1_nr;
+  int nonnull_nad;
+  int auto_ifsd;
+  int max_ifsd;
+  int ifsd;
+  int powered_off;
+  int has_pinpad;
+  int apdu_level;     /* Reader supports short APDU level exchange.  */
+};
+
+
+static int initialized_usb; /* Tracks whether USB has been initialized. */
+static int debug_level;     /* Flag to control the debug output. 
+                               0 = No debugging
+                               1 = USB I/O info
+                               2 = T=1 protocol tracing
+                              */
+
+
+static unsigned int compute_edc (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                 int use_crc);
+static int bulk_out (ccid_driver_t handle, unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen);
+static int bulk_in (ccid_driver_t handle, unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+                    size_t *nread, int expected_type, int seqno, int timeout,
+                    int no_debug);
+
+/* Convert a little endian stored 4 byte value into an unsigned
+   integer. */
+static unsigned int 
+convert_le_u32 (const unsigned char *buf)
+{
+  return buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24); 
+}
+
+static void
+set_msg_len (unsigned char *msg, unsigned int length)
+{
+  msg[1] = length;
+  msg[2] = length >> 8;
+  msg[3] = length >> 16;
+  msg[4] = length >> 24;
+}
+
+
+/* Pint an error message for a failed CCID command including a textual
+   error code.  MSG is shall be the CCID message of at least 10 bytes. */
+static void
+print_command_failed (const unsigned char *msg)
+{
+  const char *t;
+  char buffer[100];
+  int ec;
+
+  if (!debug_level)
+    return;
+
+  ec = CCID_ERROR_CODE (msg);
+  switch (ec)
+    {
+    case 0x00: t = "Command not supported"; break;
+    
+    case 0xE0: t = "Slot busy"; break;
+    case 0xEF: t = "PIN cancelled"; break;
+    case 0xF0: t = "PIN timeout"; break;
+
+    case 0xF2: t = "Automatic sequence ongoing"; break;
+    case 0xF3: t = "Deactivated Protocol"; break;
+    case 0xF4: t = "Procedure byte conflict"; break;
+    case 0xF5: t = "ICC class not supported"; break;
+    case 0xF6: t = "ICC protocol not supported"; break;
+    case 0xF7: t = "Bad checksum in ATR"; break;
+    case 0xF8: t = "Bad TS in ATR"; break;
+
+    case 0xFB: t = "An all inclusive hardware error occurred"; break;
+    case 0xFC: t = "Overrun error while talking to the ICC"; break;
+    case 0xFD: t = "Parity error while talking to the ICC"; break;
+    case 0xFE: t = "CCID timed out while talking to the ICC"; break;
+    case 0xFF: t = "Host aborted the current activity"; break;
+
+    default:
+      if (ec > 0 && ec < 128)
+        sprintf (buffer, "Parameter error at offset %d", ec);
+      else
+        sprintf (buffer, "Error code %02X", ec);
+      t = buffer;
+      break;
+    }
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("CCID command failed: %s\n", t);
+}
+  
+
+/* Given a handle used for special transport prepare it for use.  In
+   particular setup all information in way that resembles what
+   parse_cccid_descriptor does. */
+static void
+prepare_special_transport (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+  assert (!handle->id_vendor);
+
+  handle->nonnull_nad = 0;
+  handle->auto_ifsd = 0;
+  handle->max_ifsd = 32;
+  handle->ifsd = 0;
+  handle->has_pinpad = 0;
+  handle->apdu_level = 0;
+  switch (handle->id_product)
+    {
+    case TRANSPORT_CM4040:
+      DEBUGOUT ("setting up transport for CardMan 4040\n");
+      handle->apdu_level = 1;
+      break;
+
+    default: assert (!"transport not defined");
+    }
+}
+
+/* Parse a CCID descriptor, optionally print all available features
+   and test whether this reader is usable by this driver.  Returns 0
+   if it is usable.
+
+   Note, that this code is based on the one in lsusb.c of the
+   usb-utils package, I wrote on 2003-09-01. -wk. */
+static int
+parse_ccid_descriptor (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                       const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned int us;
+  int have_t1 = 0, have_tpdu=0, have_auto_conf = 0;
+
+
+  handle->nonnull_nad = 0;
+  handle->auto_ifsd = 0;
+  handle->max_ifsd = 32;
+  handle->ifsd = 0;
+  handle->has_pinpad = 0;
+  handle->apdu_level = 0;
+  DEBUGOUT_3 ("idVendor: %04X  idProduct: %04X  bcdDevice: %04X\n",
+              handle->id_vendor, handle->id_product, handle->bcd_device);
+  if (buflen < 54 || buf[0] < 54)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("CCID device descriptor is too short\n");
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  DEBUGOUT   ("ChipCard Interface Descriptor:\n");
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bLength             %5u\n", buf[0]);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bDescriptorType     %5u\n", buf[1]);
+  DEBUGOUT_2 ("  bcdCCID             %2x.%02x", buf[3], buf[2]);
+    if (buf[3] != 1 || buf[2] != 0) 
+      DEBUGOUT_CONT("  (Warning: Only accurate for version 1.0)");
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  nMaxSlotIndex       %5u\n", buf[4]);
+  DEBUGOUT_2 ("  bVoltageSupport     %5u  %s\n",
+              buf[5], (buf[5] == 1? "5.0V" : buf[5] == 2? "3.0V"
+                       : buf[5] == 3? "1.8V":"?"));
+
+  us = convert_le_u32 (buf+6);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwProtocols         %5u ", us);
+  if ((us & 1))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" T=0");
+  if ((us & 2))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_CONT (" T=1");
+      have_t1 = 1;
+    }
+  if ((us & ~3))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" (Invalid values detected)");
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+10);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwDefaultClock      %5u\n", us);
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+14);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwMaxiumumClock     %5u\n", us);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bNumClockSupported  %5u\n", buf[18]);
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+19);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwDataRate        %7u bps\n", us);
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+23);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwMaxDataRate     %7u bps\n", us);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bNumDataRatesSupp.  %5u\n", buf[27]);
+        
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+28);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwMaxIFSD           %5u\n", us);
+  handle->max_ifsd = us;
+
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+32);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwSyncProtocols  %08X ", us);
+  if ((us&1))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ( " 2-wire");
+  if ((us&2))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ( " 3-wire");
+  if ((us&4))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ( " I2C");
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+36);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwMechanical     %08X ", us);
+  if ((us & 1))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" accept");
+  if ((us & 2))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" eject");
+  if ((us & 4))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" capture");
+  if ((us & 8))
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT (" lock");
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+40);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwFeatures       %08X\n", us);
+  if ((us & 0x0002))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    Auto configuration based on ATR\n");
+      have_auto_conf = 1;
+    }
+  if ((us & 0x0004))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto activation on insert\n");
+  if ((us & 0x0008))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto voltage selection\n");
+  if ((us & 0x0010))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto clock change\n");
+  if ((us & 0x0020))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto baud rate change\n");
+  if ((us & 0x0040))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto parameter negotation made by CCID\n");
+  else if ((us & 0x0080))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    Auto PPS made by CCID\n");
+  else if ((us & (0x0040 | 0x0080)))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    WARNING: conflicting negotation features\n");
+
+  if ((us & 0x0100))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    CCID can set ICC in clock stop mode\n");
+  if ((us & 0x0200))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    NAD value other than 0x00 accepted\n");
+      handle->nonnull_nad = 1;
+    }
+  if ((us & 0x0400))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    Auto IFSD exchange\n");
+      handle->auto_ifsd = 1;
+    }
+
+  if ((us & 0x00010000))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    TPDU level exchange\n");
+      have_tpdu = 1;
+    } 
+  else if ((us & 0x00020000))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    Short APDU level exchange\n");
+      handle->apdu_level = 1;
+    }
+  else if ((us & 0x00040000))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("    Short and extended APDU level exchange\n");
+      handle->apdu_level = 1;
+    }
+  else if ((us & 0x00070000))
+    DEBUGOUT ("    WARNING: conflicting exchange levels\n");
+
+  us = convert_le_u32(buf+44);
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  dwMaxCCIDMsgLen     %5u\n", us);
+
+  DEBUGOUT (  "  bClassGetResponse    ");
+  if (buf[48] == 0xff)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ("echo\n");
+  else
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 ("  %02X\n", buf[48]);
+
+  DEBUGOUT (  "  bClassEnvelope       ");
+  if (buf[49] == 0xff)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ("echo\n");
+  else
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 ("  %02X\n", buf[48]);
+
+  DEBUGOUT (  "  wlcdLayout           ");
+  if (!buf[50] && !buf[51])
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT ("none\n");
+  else
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_2 ("%u cols %u lines\n", buf[50], buf[51]);
+        
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bPINSupport         %5u ", buf[52]);
+  if ((buf[52] & 1))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_CONT ( " verification");
+      handle->has_pinpad |= 1;
+    }
+  if ((buf[52] & 2))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_CONT ( " modification");
+      handle->has_pinpad |= 2;
+    }
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+        
+  DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bMaxCCIDBusySlots   %5u\n", buf[53]);
+
+  if (buf[0] > 54) {
+    DEBUGOUT ("  junk             ");
+    for (i=54; i < buf[0]-54; i++)
+      DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", buf[i]);
+    DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+  }
+
+  if (!have_t1 || !(have_tpdu  || handle->apdu_level) || !have_auto_conf)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("this drivers requires that the reader supports T=1, "
+                "TPDU or APDU level exchange and auto configuration - "
+                "this is not available\n");
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+
+  /* SCM drivers get stuck in their internal USB stack if they try to
+     send a frame of n*wMaxPacketSize back to us.  Given that
+     wMaxPacketSize is 64 for these readers we set the IFSD to a value
+     lower than that:
+        64 - 10 CCID header -  4 T1frame - 2 reserved = 48
+     Product Ids:
+	 0xe001 - SCR 331 
+	 0x5111 - SCR 331-DI 
+	 0x5115 - SCR 335 
+	 0xe003 - SPR 532 
+  */
+  if (handle->id_vendor == VENDOR_SCM
+      && handle->max_ifsd > 48      
+      && (  (handle->id_product == 0xe001 && handle->bcd_device < 0x0516)
+          ||(handle->id_product == 0x5111 && handle->bcd_device < 0x0620)
+          ||(handle->id_product == 0x5115 && handle->bcd_device < 0x0514)
+          ||(handle->id_product == 0xe003 && handle->bcd_device < 0x0504)
+          ))
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("enabling workaround for buggy SCM readers\n");
+      handle->max_ifsd = 48;
+    }
+
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static char *
+get_escaped_usb_string (usb_dev_handle *idev, int idx,
+                        const char *prefix, const char *suffix)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char buf[280];
+  unsigned char *s;
+  unsigned int langid;
+  size_t i, n, len;
+  char *result;
+
+  if (!idx)
+    return NULL;
+
+  /* Fixme: The next line is for the current Valgrid without support
+     for USB IOCTLs. */
+  memset (buf, 0, sizeof buf);
+
+  /* First get the list of supported languages and use the first one.
+     If we do don't find it we try to use English.  Note that this is
+     all in a 2 bute Unicode encoding using little endian. */
+  rc = usb_control_msg (idev, USB_ENDPOINT_IN, USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR,
+                        (USB_DT_STRING << 8), 0, 
+                        (char*)buf, sizeof buf, 1000 /* ms timeout */);
+  if (rc < 4)
+    langid = 0x0409; /* English.  */
+  else
+    langid = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
+
+  rc = usb_control_msg (idev, USB_ENDPOINT_IN, USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR,
+                        (USB_DT_STRING << 8) + idx, langid,
+                        (char*)buf, sizeof buf, 1000 /* ms timeout */);
+  if (rc < 2 || buf[1] != USB_DT_STRING)
+    return NULL; /* Error or not a string. */
+  len = buf[0];
+  if (len > rc)
+    return NULL; /* Larger than our buffer. */
+
+  for (s=buf+2, i=2, n=0; i+1 < len; i += 2, s += 2)
+    {
+      if (s[1])
+        n++; /* High byte set. */
+      else if (*s <= 0x20 || *s >= 0x7f || *s == '%' || *s == ':')
+        n += 3 ;
+      else 
+        n++;
+    }
+
+  result = malloc (strlen (prefix) + n + strlen (suffix) + 1);
+  if (!result)
+    return NULL;
+
+  strcpy (result, prefix);
+  n = strlen (prefix);
+  for (s=buf+2, i=2; i+1 < len; i += 2, s += 2)
+    {
+      if (s[1])
+        result[n++] = '\xff'; /* High byte set. */
+      else if (*s <= 0x20 || *s >= 0x7f || *s == '%' || *s == ':')
+        {
+          sprintf (result+n, "%%%02X", *s);
+          n += 3;
+        }
+      else 
+        result[n++] = *s;
+    }
+  strcpy (result+n, suffix);
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+/* This function creates an reader id to be used to find the same
+   physical reader after a reset.  It returns an allocated and possibly
+   percent escaped string or NULL if not enough memory is available. */
+static char *
+make_reader_id (usb_dev_handle *idev,
+                unsigned int vendor, unsigned int product,
+                unsigned char serialno_index)
+{
+  char *rid;
+  char prefix[20];
+
+  sprintf (prefix, "%04X:%04X:", (vendor & 0xffff), (product & 0xffff));
+  rid = get_escaped_usb_string (idev, serialno_index, prefix, ":0");
+  if (!rid)
+    {
+      rid = malloc (strlen (prefix) + 3 + 1);
+      if (!rid)
+        return NULL;
+      strcpy (rid, prefix);
+      strcat (rid, "X:0");
+    }
+  return rid;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper to find the endpoint from an interface descriptor.  */
+static int
+find_endpoint (struct usb_interface_descriptor *ifcdesc, int mode)
+{
+  int no;
+  int want_bulk_in = 0;
+
+  if (mode == 1)
+    want_bulk_in = 0x80;
+  for (no=0; no < ifcdesc->bNumEndpoints; no++)
+    {
+      struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ep = ifcdesc->endpoint + no;
+      if (ep->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_ENDPOINT)
+        ;
+      else if (mode == 2
+          && ((ep->bmAttributes & USB_ENDPOINT_TYPE_MASK)
+              == USB_ENDPOINT_TYPE_INTERRUPT)
+          && (ep->bEndpointAddress & 0x80))
+        return (ep->bEndpointAddress & 0x0f);
+      else if (((ep->bmAttributes & USB_ENDPOINT_TYPE_MASK)
+                == USB_ENDPOINT_TYPE_BULK)
+               && (ep->bEndpointAddress & 0x80) == want_bulk_in)
+        return (ep->bEndpointAddress & 0x0f);
+    }
+  /* Should never happen.  */
+  return mode == 2? 0x83 : mode == 1? 0x82 :1;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for scan_or_find_devices. This function returns true if a
+   requested device has been found or the caller should stop scanning
+   for other reasons. */
+static int
+scan_or_find_usb_device (int scan_mode,
+                         int *readerno, int *count, char **rid_list,
+                         const char *readerid,
+                         struct usb_device *dev,
+                         char **r_rid,
+                         struct usb_device **r_dev,
+                         usb_dev_handle **r_idev,
+                         unsigned char **ifcdesc_extra,
+                         size_t *ifcdesc_extra_len,
+                         int *interface_number,
+                         int *ep_bulk_out, int *ep_bulk_in, int *ep_intr)
+{
+  int cfg_no;
+  int ifc_no;
+  int set_no;
+  struct usb_config_descriptor *config;
+  struct usb_interface *interface;          
+  struct usb_interface_descriptor *ifcdesc;
+  char *rid;
+  usb_dev_handle *idev;
+
+  *r_idev = NULL;
+
+  for (cfg_no=0; cfg_no < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; cfg_no++)
+    {
+      config = dev->config + cfg_no;
+      if(!config)
+        continue;
+
+      for (ifc_no=0; ifc_no < config->bNumInterfaces; ifc_no++)
+        {
+          interface = config->interface + ifc_no;
+          if (!interface)
+            continue;
+                  
+          for (set_no=0; set_no < interface->num_altsetting; set_no++)
+            {
+              ifcdesc = (interface->altsetting + set_no);
+              /* The second condition is for older SCM SPR 532 who did
+                 not know about the assigned CCID class.  Instead of
+                 trying to interpret the strings we simply check the
+                 product ID. */
+              if (ifcdesc && ifcdesc->extra
+                  && ((ifcdesc->bInterfaceClass == 11
+                       && ifcdesc->bInterfaceSubClass == 0
+                       && ifcdesc->bInterfaceProtocol == 0)
+                      || (ifcdesc->bInterfaceClass == 255
+                          && dev->descriptor.idVendor == VENDOR_SCM
+                          && dev->descriptor.idProduct == 0xe003)))
+                {
+                  idev = usb_open (dev);
+                  if (!idev)
+                    {
+                      DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_open failed: %s\n",
+                                  strerror (errno));
+                      continue; /* with next setting. */
+                    }
+                  
+                  rid = make_reader_id (idev,
+                                        dev->descriptor.idVendor,
+                                        dev->descriptor.idProduct,
+                                        dev->descriptor.iSerialNumber);
+                  if (rid)
+                    {
+                      if (scan_mode)
+                        {
+                          char *p;
+                          
+                          /* We are collecting infos about all
+                             available CCID readers.  Store them and
+                             continue. */
+                          DEBUGOUT_2 ("found CCID reader %d (ID=%s)\n",
+                                      *count, rid );
+                          p = malloc ((*rid_list? strlen (*rid_list):0) + 1
+                                      + strlen (rid) + 1);
+                          if (p)
+                            {
+                              *p = 0;
+                              if (*rid_list)
+                                {
+                                  strcat (p, *rid_list);
+                                  free (*rid_list);
+                                }
+                              strcat (p, rid);
+                              strcat (p, "\n");
+                              *rid_list = p;
+                            }
+                          else /* Out of memory. */
+                            free (rid);
+                          
+                          rid = NULL;
+                          ++*count;
+                        }
+                      else if (!*readerno
+                               || (*readerno < 0
+                                   && readerid
+                                   && !strcmp (readerid, rid)))
+                        {
+                          /* We found the requested reader. */
+                          if (ifcdesc_extra && ifcdesc_extra_len)
+                            {
+                              *ifcdesc_extra = malloc (ifcdesc
+                                                       ->extralen);
+                              if (!*ifcdesc_extra)
+                                {
+                                  usb_close (idev);
+                                  free (rid);
+                                  return 1; /* Out of core. */
+                                }
+                              memcpy (*ifcdesc_extra, ifcdesc->extra,
+                                      ifcdesc->extralen);
+                              *ifcdesc_extra_len = ifcdesc->extralen;
+                            }
+
+                          if (interface_number)
+                            *interface_number = (ifcdesc->bInterfaceNumber);
+
+                          if (ep_bulk_out)
+                            *ep_bulk_out = find_endpoint (ifcdesc, 0);
+                          if (ep_bulk_in)
+                            *ep_bulk_in = find_endpoint (ifcdesc, 1);
+                          if (ep_intr)
+                            *ep_intr = find_endpoint (ifcdesc, 2);
+
+                          if (r_dev)
+                            *r_dev = dev;
+                          if (r_rid)
+                            {
+                              *r_rid = rid;
+                              rid = NULL;
+                            }
+                          else
+                            free (rid);
+                          
+                          *r_idev = idev;
+                          return 1; /* Found requested device. */
+                        }
+                      else
+                        {
+                          /* This is not yet the reader we want.
+                             fixme: We should avoid the extra usb_open
+                             in this case. */
+                          if (*readerno >= 0)
+                            --*readerno;
+                        }
+                      free (rid);
+                    }
+                  
+                  usb_close (idev);
+                  idev = NULL;
+                  return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Combination function to either scan all CCID devices or to find and
+   open one specific device. 
+
+   The function returns 0 if a reader has been found or when a scan
+   returned without error.
+
+   With READERNO = -1 and READERID is NULL, scan mode is used and
+   R_RID should be the address where to store the list of reader_ids
+   we found.  If on return this list is empty, no CCID device has been
+   found; otherwise it points to an allocated linked list of reader
+   IDs.  Note that in this mode the function always returns NULL.
+
+   With READERNO >= 0 or READERID is not NULL find mode is used.  This
+   uses the same algorithm as the scan mode but stops and returns at
+   the entry number READERNO and return the handle for the the opened
+   USB device. If R_RID is not NULL it will receive the reader ID of
+   that device.  If R_DEV is not NULL it will the device pointer of
+   that device.  If IFCDESC_EXTRA is NOT NULL it will receive a
+   malloced copy of the interfaces "extra: data filed;
+   IFCDESC_EXTRA_LEN receive the length of this field.  If there is
+   no reader with number READERNO or that reader is not usable by our
+   implementation NULL will be returned.  The caller must close a
+   returned USB device handle and free (if not passed as NULL) the
+   returned reader ID info as well as the IFCDESC_EXTRA.  On error
+   NULL will get stored at R_RID, R_DEV, IFCDESC_EXTRA and
+   IFCDESC_EXTRA_LEN.  With READERID being -1 the function stops if
+   the READERID was found.
+
+   If R_FD is not -1 on return the device is not using USB for
+   transport but the device associated with that file descriptor.  In
+   this case INTERFACE will receive the transport type and the other
+   USB specific return values are not used; the return value is
+   (void*)(1).
+
+   Note that the first entry of the returned reader ID list in scan mode
+   corresponds with a READERNO of 0 in find mode.
+*/
+static int
+scan_or_find_devices (int readerno, const char *readerid,
+                      char **r_rid,
+                      struct usb_device **r_dev,
+                      unsigned char **ifcdesc_extra,
+                      size_t *ifcdesc_extra_len,
+                      int *interface_number,
+                      int *ep_bulk_out, int *ep_bulk_in, int *ep_intr,
+                      usb_dev_handle **r_idev,
+                      int *r_fd)
+{
+  char *rid_list = NULL;
+  int count = 0;
+  struct usb_bus *busses, *bus;
+  struct usb_device *dev = NULL;
+  usb_dev_handle *idev = NULL;
+  int scan_mode = (readerno == -1 && !readerid);
+  int i;
+
+  /* Set return values to a default. */
+  if (r_rid)
+    *r_rid = NULL;
+  if (r_dev)
+    *r_dev = NULL; 
+  if (ifcdesc_extra)
+    *ifcdesc_extra = NULL;
+  if (ifcdesc_extra_len)
+    *ifcdesc_extra_len = 0;
+  if (interface_number)
+    *interface_number = 0;
+  if (r_idev)
+    *r_idev = NULL;
+  if (r_fd)
+    *r_fd = -1;
+
+  /* See whether we want scan or find mode. */
+  if (scan_mode) 
+    {
+      assert (r_rid);
+    }
+
+  usb_find_busses();
+  usb_find_devices();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_USB_GET_BUSSES
+  busses = usb_get_busses();
+#else
+  busses = usb_busses;
+#endif
+
+  for (bus = busses; bus; bus = bus->next) 
+    {
+      for (dev = bus->devices; dev; dev = dev->next)
+        {
+          if (scan_or_find_usb_device (scan_mode, &readerno, &count, &rid_list,
+                                       readerid,
+                                       dev,
+                                       r_rid,
+                                       r_dev,
+                                       &idev,
+                                       ifcdesc_extra,
+                                       ifcdesc_extra_len,
+                                       interface_number,
+                                       ep_bulk_out, ep_bulk_in, ep_intr))
+            {
+              /* Found requested device or out of core. */
+              if (!idev)
+                {
+                  free (rid_list);
+                  return -1; /* error */
+                }
+              *r_idev = idev;
+              return 0; 
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Now check whether there are any devices with special transport types. */
+  for (i=0; transports[i].name; i++)
+    {
+      int fd;
+      char *rid, *p;
+
+      fd = open (transports[i].name, O_RDWR);
+      if (fd == -1)
+        continue;
+
+      rid = malloc (strlen (transports[i].name) + 30 + 10);
+      if (!rid)
+        {
+          close (fd);
+          free (rid_list);
+          return -1; /* Error. */
+        }
+      sprintf (rid, "0000:%04X:%s:0", transports[i].type, transports[i].name);
+      if (scan_mode)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_2 ("found CCID reader %d (ID=%s)\n", count, rid);
+          p = malloc ((rid_list? strlen (rid_list):0) + 1 + strlen (rid) + 1);
+          if (!p)
+            {
+              close (fd);
+              free (rid_list);
+              free (rid);
+              return -1; /* Error. */
+            }
+          *p = 0;
+          if (rid_list)
+            {
+              strcat (p, rid_list);
+              free (rid_list);
+            }
+          strcat (p, rid);
+          strcat (p, "\n");
+          rid_list = p;
+          ++count;
+        }
+      else if (!readerno ||
+               (readerno < 0 && readerid && !strcmp (readerid, rid)))
+        {
+          /* Found requested device. */
+          if (interface_number)
+            *interface_number = transports[i].type;
+          if (r_rid)
+            *r_rid = rid;
+          else
+            free (rid);
+          if (r_fd)
+            *r_fd = fd;
+          return 0; /* Okay, found device */
+        }
+      else /* This is not yet the reader we want. */
+        {
+          if (readerno >= 0)
+            --readerno;
+        }
+      free (rid);
+      close (fd);
+    }
+
+  if (scan_mode)
+    {
+      *r_rid = rid_list;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  else
+    return -1;
+}
+
+
+/* Set the level of debugging to LEVEL and return the old level.  -1
+   just returns the old level.  A level of 0 disables debugging, 1
+   enables debugging, 2 enables additional tracing of the T=1
+   protocol, other values are not yet defined. */
+int
+ccid_set_debug_level (int level)
+{
+  int old = debug_level;
+  if (level != -1)
+    debug_level = level;
+  return old;
+}
+
+
+char *
+ccid_get_reader_list (void)
+{
+  char *reader_list;
+
+  if (!initialized_usb)
+    {
+      usb_init ();
+      initialized_usb = 1;
+    }
+
+  if (scan_or_find_devices (-1, NULL, &reader_list, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+    return NULL; /* Error. */
+  return reader_list;
+}
+
+
+/* Open the reader with the internal number READERNO and return a 
+   pointer to be used as handle in HANDLE.  Returns 0 on success. */
+int 
+ccid_open_reader (ccid_driver_t *handle, const char *readerid)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  struct usb_device *dev = NULL;
+  usb_dev_handle *idev = NULL;
+  int dev_fd = -1;
+  char *rid = NULL;
+  unsigned char *ifcdesc_extra = NULL;
+  size_t ifcdesc_extra_len;
+  int readerno;
+  int ifc_no, ep_bulk_out, ep_bulk_in, ep_intr;
+
+  *handle = NULL;
+
+  if (!initialized_usb)
+    {
+      usb_init ();
+      initialized_usb = 1;
+    }
+
+  /* See whether we want to use the reader ID string or a reader
+     number. A readerno of -1 indicates that the reader ID string is
+     to be used. */
+  if (readerid && strchr (readerid, ':'))
+    readerno = -1; /* We want to use the readerid.  */
+  else if (readerid)
+    {
+      readerno = atoi (readerid);
+      if (readerno < 0)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT ("no CCID readers found\n");
+          rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    readerno = 0;  /* Default. */
+
+  if (scan_or_find_devices (readerno, readerid, &rid, &dev,
+                            &ifcdesc_extra, &ifcdesc_extra_len,
+                            &ifc_no, &ep_bulk_out, &ep_bulk_in, &ep_intr,
+                            &idev, &dev_fd) )
+    {
+      if (readerno == -1)
+        DEBUGOUT_1 ("no CCID reader with ID %s\n", readerid );
+      else
+        DEBUGOUT_1 ("no CCID reader with number %d\n", readerno );
+      rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Okay, this is a CCID reader. */
+  *handle = calloc (1, sizeof **handle);
+  if (!*handle)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("out of memory\n");
+      rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_OUT_OF_CORE;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  (*handle)->rid = rid;
+  if (idev) /* Regular USB transport. */
+    {
+      (*handle)->idev = idev;
+      (*handle)->dev_fd = -1;
+      (*handle)->id_vendor = dev->descriptor.idVendor;
+      (*handle)->id_product = dev->descriptor.idProduct;
+      (*handle)->bcd_device = dev->descriptor.bcdDevice;
+      (*handle)->ifc_no = ifc_no;
+      (*handle)->ep_bulk_out = ep_bulk_out;
+      (*handle)->ep_bulk_in = ep_bulk_in;
+      (*handle)->ep_intr = ep_intr;
+    }
+  else if (dev_fd != -1) /* Device transport. */
+    {
+      (*handle)->idev = NULL;
+      (*handle)->dev_fd = dev_fd;
+      (*handle)->id_vendor = 0;  /* Magic vendor for special transport. */
+      (*handle)->id_product = ifc_no; /* Transport type */
+      prepare_special_transport (*handle);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      assert (!"no transport"); /* Bug. */
+    }
+
+  DEBUGOUT_2 ("using CCID reader %d (ID=%s)\n",  readerno, rid );
+
+  if (idev)
+    {
+      if (parse_ccid_descriptor (*handle, ifcdesc_extra, ifcdesc_extra_len))
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT ("device not supported\n");
+          rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      
+      rc = usb_claim_interface (idev, ifc_no);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_claim_interface failed: %d\n", rc);
+          rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  free (ifcdesc_extra);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      free (rid);
+      if (idev)
+        usb_close (idev);
+      if (dev_fd != -1)
+        close (dev_fd);
+      free (*handle);
+      *handle = NULL;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+do_close_reader (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char msg[100];
+  size_t msglen;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  
+  if (!handle->powered_off)
+    {
+      msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_IccPowerOff;
+      msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+      msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+      msg[7] = 0; /* RFU */
+      msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+      msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+      set_msg_len (msg, 0);
+      msglen = 10;
+      
+      rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+      if (!rc)
+        bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_SlotStatus,
+                 seqno, 2000, 0);
+      handle->powered_off = 1;
+    }
+  if (handle->idev)
+    {
+      usb_release_interface (handle->idev, handle->ifc_no);
+      usb_close (handle->idev);
+      handle->idev = NULL;
+    }
+  if (handle->dev_fd != -1)
+    {
+      close (handle->dev_fd);
+      handle->dev_fd = -1;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Reset a reader on HANDLE.  This is useful in case a reader has been
+   plugged of and inserted at a different port.  By resetting the
+   handle, the same reader will be get used.  Note, that on error the
+   handle won't get released. 
+
+   This does not return an ATR, so ccid_get_atr should be called right
+   after this one.
+*/
+int 
+ccid_shutdown_reader (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  struct usb_device *dev = NULL;
+  usb_dev_handle *idev = NULL;
+  unsigned char *ifcdesc_extra = NULL;
+  size_t ifcdesc_extra_len;
+  int ifc_no, ep_bulk_out, ep_bulk_in, ep_intr;
+
+  if (!handle || !handle->rid)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
+  do_close_reader (handle);
+
+  if (scan_or_find_devices (-1, handle->rid, NULL, &dev,
+                            &ifcdesc_extra, &ifcdesc_extra_len,
+                            &ifc_no, &ep_bulk_out, &ep_bulk_in, &ep_intr,
+                            &idev, NULL) || !idev)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("no CCID reader with ID %s\n", handle->rid);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER;
+    }
+
+  if (idev)
+    {
+      handle->idev = idev;
+      handle->ifc_no = ifc_no;
+      handle->ep_bulk_out = ep_bulk_out;
+      handle->ep_bulk_in = ep_bulk_in;
+      handle->ep_intr = ep_intr;
+
+      if (parse_ccid_descriptor (handle, ifcdesc_extra, ifcdesc_extra_len))
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT ("device not supported\n");
+          rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      
+      rc = usb_claim_interface (idev, ifc_no);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_claim_interface failed: %d\n", rc);
+          rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  free (ifcdesc_extra);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      if (handle->idev)
+        usb_close (handle->idev);
+      handle->idev = NULL;
+      if (handle->dev_fd != -1)
+        close (handle->dev_fd);
+      handle->dev_fd = -1;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+
+}
+
+
+/* Close the reader HANDLE. */
+int 
+ccid_close_reader (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+  if (!handle || (!handle->idev && handle->dev_fd == -1))
+    return 0;
+
+  do_close_reader (handle);
+  free (handle->rid);
+  free (handle);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Return False if a card is present and powered. */
+int
+ccid_check_card_presence (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+
+  return -1;
+}
+
+
+/* Write NBYTES of BUF to file descriptor FD. */
+static int
+writen (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+  size_t nleft = nbytes;
+  int nwritten;
+  
+  while (nleft > 0)
+    {
+      nwritten = write (fd, buf, nleft);
+      if (nwritten < 0)
+        {
+          if (errno == EINTR)
+            nwritten = 0;
+          else
+            return -1;
+        }
+      nleft -= nwritten;
+      buf = (const char*)buf + nwritten;
+    }
+    
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Write a MSG of length MSGLEN to the designated bulk out endpoint.
+   Returns 0 on success. */
+static int
+bulk_out (ccid_driver_t handle, unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  if (handle->idev)
+    {
+      rc = usb_bulk_write (handle->idev, 
+                           handle->ep_bulk_out,
+                           (char*)msg, msglen,
+                           1000 /* ms timeout */);
+      if (rc == msglen)
+        return 0;
+      if (rc == -1)
+        DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_bulk_write error: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      else
+        DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_bulk_write failed: %d\n", rc);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = writen (handle->dev_fd, msg, msglen);
+      if (!rc)
+        return 0;
+      DEBUGOUT_2 ("writen to %d failed: %s\n",
+                  handle->dev_fd, strerror (errno));
+      
+    }
+  return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+}
+
+
+/* Read a maximum of LENGTH bytes from the bulk in endpoint into
+   BUFFER and return the actual read number if bytes in NREAD. SEQNO
+   is the sequence number used to send the request and EXPECTED_TYPE
+   the type of message we expect. Does checks on the ccid
+   header. TIMEOUT is the timeout value in ms. NO_DEBUG may be set to
+   avoid debug messages in case of no error. Returns 0 on success. */
+static int
+bulk_in (ccid_driver_t handle, unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+         size_t *nread, int expected_type, int seqno, int timeout,
+         int no_debug)
+{
+  int i, rc;
+  size_t msglen;
+
+  /* Fixme: The next line for the current Valgrind without support
+     for USB IOCTLs. */
+  memset (buffer, 0, length);
+ retry:
+  if (handle->idev)
+    {
+      rc = usb_bulk_read (handle->idev, 
+                          handle->ep_bulk_in,
+                          (char*)buffer, length,
+                          timeout);
+      if (rc < 0)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_bulk_read error: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+      *nread = msglen = rc;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = read (handle->dev_fd, buffer, length);
+      if (rc < 0)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_2 ("read from %d failed: %s\n",
+                      handle->dev_fd, strerror (errno));
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+      *nread = msglen = rc;
+    }
+
+
+  if (msglen < 10)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("bulk-in msg too short (%u)\n", (unsigned int)msglen);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+  if (buffer[0] != expected_type)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("unexpected bulk-in msg type (%02x)\n", buffer[0]);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+  if (buffer[5] != 0)    
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("unexpected bulk-in slot (%d)\n", buffer[5]);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+  if (buffer[6] != seqno)    
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_2 ("bulk-in seqno does not match (%d/%d)\n",
+                  seqno, buffer[6]);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+
+  if ( !(buffer[7] & 0x03) && (buffer[7] & 0xC0) == 0x80)
+    { 
+      /* Card present and active, time extension requested. */
+      DEBUGOUT_2 ("time extension requested (%02X,%02X)\n",
+                  buffer[7], buffer[8]);
+      goto retry;
+    }
+
+  if (!no_debug)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_3 ("status: %02X  error: %02X  octet[9]: %02X\n"
+                  "               data:",  buffer[7], buffer[8], buffer[9] );
+      for (i=10; i < msglen; i++)
+        DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", buffer[i]);
+      DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+    }
+  if (CCID_COMMAND_FAILED (buffer))
+    print_command_failed (buffer);
+
+  /* Check whether a card is at all available.  Note: If you add new
+     error codes here, check whether they need to be ignored in
+     send_escape_cmd. */
+  switch ((buffer[7] & 0x03))
+    {
+    case 0: /* no error */ break;
+    case 1: return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_INACTIVE;
+    case 2: return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD;
+    case 3: /* RFU */ break;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Note that this function won't return the error codes NO_CARD or
+   CARD_INACTIVE.  IF RESULT is not NULL, the result from the
+   operation will get returned in RESULT and its length in RESULTLEN.
+   If the response is larger than RESULTMAX, an error is returned and
+   the required buffer length returned in RESULTLEN.  */
+static int 
+send_escape_cmd (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                 unsigned char *result, size_t resultmax, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int i, rc;
+  unsigned char msg[100];
+  size_t msglen;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+
+  if (resultlen)
+    *resultlen = 0;
+
+  if (datalen > sizeof msg - 10)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE; /* Escape data too large.  */
+
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_Escape;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  memcpy (msg+10, data, datalen);
+  msglen = 10 + datalen;
+  set_msg_len (msg, datalen);
+
+  DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+  for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_Escape,
+                seqno, 5000, 0);
+  if (result)
+    switch (rc)
+      {
+        /* We need to ignore certain errorcode here. */
+      case 0:
+      case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_INACTIVE:
+      case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD:
+        {
+          if (msglen > resultmax)
+            rc = CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE; /* Response too large. */
+          else
+            {
+              memcpy (result, msg, msglen);
+              *resultlen = msglen;
+            }
+          rc = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+      default:
+        break;
+      }
+  
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+ccid_transceive_escape (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                        const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                        unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen, size_t *nresp)
+{
+  return send_escape_cmd (handle, data, datalen, resp, maxresplen, nresp);
+}
+
+
+
+/* experimental */
+int
+ccid_poll (ccid_driver_t handle)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char msg[10];
+  size_t msglen;
+  int i, j;
+
+  if (handle->idev)
+    {
+      rc = usb_bulk_read (handle->idev, 
+                          handle->ep_intr,
+                          (char*)msg, sizeof msg,
+                          0 /* ms timeout */ );
+      if (rc < 0 && errno == ETIMEDOUT)
+        return 0;
+    }
+  else 
+    return 0;
+
+  if (rc < 0)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("usb_intr_read error: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+  msglen = rc;
+  rc = 0;
+
+  if (msglen < 1)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("intr-in msg too short\n");
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+    }
+
+  if (msg[0] == RDR_to_PC_NotifySlotChange)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("notify slot change:");
+      for (i=1; i < msglen; i++)
+        for (j=0; j < 4; j++)
+          DEBUGOUT_CONT_3 (" %d:%c%c",
+                           (i-1)*4+j, 
+                           (msg[i] & (1<<(j*2)))? 'p':'-',
+                           (msg[i] & (2<<(j*2)))? '*':' ');
+      DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+    }
+  else if (msg[0] == RDR_to_PC_HardwareError)    
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("hardware error occured\n");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("unknown intr-in msg of type %02X\n", msg[0]);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Note that this fucntion won't return the error codes NO_CARD or
+   CARD_INACTIVE */
+int 
+ccid_slot_status (ccid_driver_t handle, int *statusbits)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char msg[100];
+  size_t msglen;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  int retries = 0;
+
+ retry:
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_GetSlotStatus;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  set_msg_len (msg, 0);
+
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, 10);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  /* Note that we set the NO_DEBUG flag here, so that the logs won't
+     get cluttered up by a ticker function checking for the slot
+     status and debugging enabled. */
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_SlotStatus,
+                seqno, retries? 1000 : 200, 1);
+  if (rc == CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR && retries < 3)
+    {
+      if (!retries)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT ("USB: CALLING USB_CLEAR_HALT\n");
+          usb_clear_halt (handle->idev, handle->ep_bulk_in);
+          usb_clear_halt (handle->idev, handle->ep_bulk_out);
+        }
+      else
+          DEBUGOUT ("USB: RETRYING bulk_in AGAIN\n");
+      retries++;
+      goto retry;
+    }
+  if (rc && rc != CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD
+      && rc != CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_INACTIVE)
+    return rc;
+  *statusbits = (msg[7] & 3);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+int 
+ccid_get_atr (ccid_driver_t handle,
+              unsigned char *atr, size_t maxatrlen, size_t *atrlen)
+{
+  int rc;
+  int statusbits;
+  unsigned char msg[100];
+  unsigned char *tpdu;
+  size_t msglen, tpdulen;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  int use_crc = 0;
+  unsigned int edc;
+  int i;
+  int tried_iso = 0;
+  int got_param;
+
+  /* First check whether a card is available.  */
+  rc = ccid_slot_status (handle, &statusbits);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  if (statusbits == 2)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD;
+
+    
+  /* For an inactive and also for an active card, issue the PowerOn
+     command to get the ATR.  */
+ again:
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_IccPowerOn;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 0; /* power select (0=auto, 1=5V, 2=3V, 3=1.8V) */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  set_msg_len (msg, 0);
+  msglen = 10;
+
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_DataBlock,
+                seqno, 5000, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  if (!tried_iso && CCID_COMMAND_FAILED (msg) && CCID_ERROR_CODE (msg) == 0xbb
+      && ((handle->id_vendor == VENDOR_CHERRY
+           && handle->id_product == 0x0005)
+          || (handle->id_vendor == VENDOR_GEMPC
+              && handle->id_product == 0x4433)
+          ))
+    {
+      tried_iso = 1;
+      /* Try switching to ISO mode. */
+      if (!send_escape_cmd (handle, (const unsigned char*)"\xF1\x01", 2,
+                            NULL, 0, NULL))
+        goto again;
+    }
+  else if (CCID_COMMAND_FAILED (msg))
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+
+
+  handle->powered_off = 0;
+  
+  if (atr)
+    {
+      size_t n = msglen - 10;
+
+      if (n > maxatrlen)
+        n = maxatrlen;
+      memcpy (atr, msg+10, n);
+      *atrlen = n;
+    }
+
+  got_param = 0;
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_GetParameters;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  set_msg_len (msg, 0);
+  msglen = 10;
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_Parameters,
+                  seqno, 2000, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    DEBUGOUT ("GetParameters failed\n");
+  else
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("GetParametes returned");
+      for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+        DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+      DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+      if (msglen >= 10)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_1 ("  protocol ..........: T=%d\n", msg[9]);
+          if (msglen == 17 && msg[9] == 1)
+            {
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bmFindexDindex ....: %02X\n", msg[10]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bmTCCKST1 .........: %02X\n", msg[11]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bGuardTimeT1 ......: %02X\n", msg[12]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bmWaitingIntegersT1: %02X\n", msg[13]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bClockStop ........: %02X\n", msg[14]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bIFSC .............: %d\n", msg[15]);
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("  bNadValue .........: %d\n", msg[16]);
+              got_param = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Setup parameters to select T=1. */
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_SetParameters;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 1; /* Select T=1. */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+
+  if (!got_param)
+    {
+      /* FIXME: Get those values from the ATR. */
+      msg[10]= 0x01; /* Fi/Di */
+      msg[11]= 0x10; /* LRC, direct convention. */
+      msg[12]= 0;    /* Extra guardtime. */
+      msg[13]= 0x41; /* BWI/CWI */
+      msg[14]= 0;    /* No clock stoppping. */
+      msg[15]= 254;  /* IFSC */
+      msg[16]= 0;    /* Does not support non default NAD values. */
+    }
+  set_msg_len (msg, 7);
+  msglen = 10 + 7;
+
+  DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+  for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen, RDR_to_PC_Parameters,
+                seqno, 5000, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    DEBUGOUT ("SetParameters failed (ignored)\n");
+
+  handle->t1_ns = 0;
+  handle->t1_nr = 0;
+
+  /* Send an S-Block with our maximum IFSD to the CCID.  */
+  if (!handle->apdu_level && !handle->auto_ifsd)
+    {
+      tpdu = msg+10;
+      /* NAD: DAD=1, SAD=0 */
+      tpdu[0] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+      tpdu[1] = (0xc0 | 0 | 1); /* S-block request: change IFSD */
+      tpdu[2] = 1;
+      tpdu[3] = handle->max_ifsd? handle->max_ifsd : 32; 
+      tpdulen = 4;
+      edc = compute_edc (tpdu, tpdulen, use_crc);
+      if (use_crc)
+        tpdu[tpdulen++] = (edc >> 8);
+      tpdu[tpdulen++] = edc;
+
+      msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_XfrBlock;
+      msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+      msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+      msg[7] = 0; 
+      msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+      msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+      set_msg_len (msg, tpdulen);
+      msglen = 10 + tpdulen;
+
+      DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+      for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+        DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+      DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+      if (debug_level > 1)
+        DEBUGOUT_3 ("T=1: put %c-block seq=%d%s\n",
+                      ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? 'R' :
+                                (msg[11] & 0x80)? 'S' : 'I',
+                      ((msg[11] & 0x80)? !!(msg[11]& 0x10)
+                                       : !!(msg[11] & 0x40)),
+                    (!(msg[11] & 0x80) && (msg[11] & 0x20)? " [more]":""));
+
+      rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+      if (rc)
+        return rc;
+
+
+      rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof msg, &msglen,
+                    RDR_to_PC_DataBlock, seqno, 5000, 0);
+      if (rc)
+        return rc;
+      
+      tpdu = msg + 10;
+      tpdulen = msglen - 10;
+      
+      if (tpdulen < 4) 
+        return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED; 
+
+      if (debug_level > 1)
+        DEBUGOUT_4 ("T=1: got %c-block seq=%d err=%d%s\n",
+                    ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? 'R' :
+                              (msg[11] & 0x80)? 'S' : 'I',
+                    ((msg[11] & 0x80)? !!(msg[11]& 0x10)
+                                     : !!(msg[11] & 0x40)),
+                    ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? (msg[11] & 0x0f) : 0,
+                    (!(msg[11] & 0x80) && (msg[11] & 0x20)? " [more]":""));
+
+      if ((tpdu[1] & 0xe0) != 0xe0 || tpdu[2] != 1)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT ("invalid response for S-block (Change-IFSD)\n");
+          return -1;
+        }
+      DEBUGOUT_1 ("IFSD has been set to %d\n", tpdu[3]);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+
+static unsigned int 
+compute_edc (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, int use_crc)
+{
+  if (use_crc)
+    {
+      return 0x42; /* Not yet implemented. */
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      unsigned char crc = 0;
+      
+      for (; datalen; datalen--)
+        crc ^= *data++;
+      return crc;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for ccid_transceive used for APDU level exchanges.  */
+static int
+ccid_transceive_apdu_level (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                            const unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t apdu_buflen,
+                            unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen,
+                            size_t *nresp)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char send_buffer[10+259], recv_buffer[10+259];
+  const unsigned char *apdu;
+  size_t apdulen;
+  unsigned char *msg;
+  size_t msglen;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  int i;
+
+  msg = send_buffer;
+
+  apdu = apdu_buf;
+  apdulen = apdu_buflen;
+  assert (apdulen);
+
+  if (apdulen > 254)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE; /* Invalid length. */
+
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_XfrBlock;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 4; /* bBWI */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  memcpy (msg+10, apdu, apdulen);
+  set_msg_len (msg, apdulen);
+  msglen = 10 + apdulen;
+
+  DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+  for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+  
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  msg = recv_buffer;
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof recv_buffer, &msglen,
+                RDR_to_PC_DataBlock, seqno, 5000, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+      
+  apdu = msg + 10;
+  apdulen = msglen - 10;
+      
+  if (resp)
+    {
+      if (apdulen > maxresplen)
+        {
+          DEBUGOUT_2 ("provided buffer too short for received data "
+                      "(%u/%u)\n",
+                      (unsigned int)apdulen, (unsigned int)maxresplen);
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+        }
+      
+      memcpy (resp, apdu, apdulen); 
+      *nresp = apdulen;
+    }
+          
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+  Protocol T=1 overview
+
+  Block Structure:
+           Prologue Field:
+   1 byte     Node Address (NAD) 
+   1 byte     Protocol Control Byte (PCB)
+   1 byte     Length (LEN) 
+           Information Field:
+   0-254 byte APDU or Control Information (INF)
+           Epilogue Field:
+   1 byte     Error Detection Code (EDC)
+
+  NAD:  
+   bit 7     unused
+   bit 4..6  Destination Node Address (DAD)
+   bit 3     unused
+   bit 2..0  Source Node Address (SAD)
+
+   If node adresses are not used, SAD and DAD should be set to 0 on
+   the first block sent to the card.  If they are used they should
+   have different values (0 for one is okay); that first block sets up
+   the addresses of the nodes.
+
+  PCB:
+   Information Block (I-Block):
+      bit 7    0
+      bit 6    Sequence number (yep, that is modulo 2)
+      bit 5    Chaining flag 
+      bit 4..0 reserved
+   Received-Ready Block (R-Block):
+      bit 7    1
+      bit 6    0
+      bit 5    0
+      bit 4    Sequence number
+      bit 3..0  0 = no error
+                1 = EDC or parity error
+                2 = other error
+                other values are reserved
+   Supervisory Block (S-Block):
+      bit 7    1
+      bit 6    1
+      bit 5    clear=request,set=response
+      bit 4..0  0 = resyncronisation request
+                1 = information field size request
+                2 = abort request
+                3 = extension of BWT request
+                4 = VPP error
+                other values are reserved
+
+*/
+
+int
+ccid_transceive (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                 const unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t apdu_buflen,
+                 unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen, size_t *nresp)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char send_buffer[10+259], recv_buffer[10+259];
+  const unsigned char *apdu;
+  size_t apdulen;
+  unsigned char *msg, *tpdu, *p;
+  size_t msglen, tpdulen, last_tpdulen, n;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  int i;
+  unsigned int edc;
+  int use_crc = 0;
+  size_t dummy_nresp;
+  int next_chunk = 1;
+  int sending = 1;
+  int retries = 0;
+
+  if (!nresp)
+    nresp = &dummy_nresp;
+  *nresp = 0;
+
+  /* Smarter readers allow to send APDUs directly; divert here. */
+  if (handle->apdu_level)
+    return ccid_transceive_apdu_level (handle, apdu_buf, apdu_buflen,
+                                       resp, maxresplen, nresp);
+
+  /* The other readers we support require sending TPDUs.  */
+
+  tpdulen = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning about no initialization. */
+  msg = send_buffer;
+  for (;;)
+    {
+      if (next_chunk)
+        {
+          next_chunk = 0;
+
+          apdu = apdu_buf;
+          apdulen = apdu_buflen;
+          assert (apdulen);
+
+          /* Construct an I-Block. */
+          if (apdulen > 254)
+            return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE; /* Invalid length. */
+
+          tpdu = msg+10;
+          /* NAD: DAD=1, SAD=0 */
+          tpdu[0] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+          tpdu[1] = ((handle->t1_ns & 1) << 6); /* I-block */
+          if (apdulen > 128 /* fixme: replace by ifsc */)
+            {
+              apdulen = 128;
+              apdu_buf += 128;  
+              apdu_buflen -= 128;
+              tpdu[1] |= (1 << 5); /* Set more bit. */
+            }
+          tpdu[2] = apdulen;
+          memcpy (tpdu+3, apdu, apdulen);
+          tpdulen = 3 + apdulen;
+          edc = compute_edc (tpdu, tpdulen, use_crc);
+          if (use_crc)
+            tpdu[tpdulen++] = (edc >> 8);
+          tpdu[tpdulen++] = edc;
+        }
+
+      msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_XfrBlock;
+      msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+      msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+      msg[7] = 4; /* bBWI */
+      msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+      msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+      set_msg_len (msg, tpdulen);
+      msglen = 10 + tpdulen;
+      last_tpdulen = tpdulen;
+
+      DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+      for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+        DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+      DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+
+      if (debug_level > 1)
+          DEBUGOUT_3 ("T=1: put %c-block seq=%d%s\n",
+                      ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? 'R' :
+                                (msg[11] & 0x80)? 'S' : 'I',
+                      ((msg[11] & 0x80)? !!(msg[11]& 0x10)
+                                       : !!(msg[11] & 0x40)),
+                      (!(msg[11] & 0x80) && (msg[11] & 0x20)? " [more]":""));
+
+      rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+      if (rc)
+        return rc;
+
+      msg = recv_buffer;
+      rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof recv_buffer, &msglen,
+                    RDR_to_PC_DataBlock, seqno, 5000, 0);
+      if (rc)
+        return rc;
+      
+      tpdu = msg + 10;
+      tpdulen = msglen - 10;
+      
+      if (tpdulen < 4) 
+        {
+          usb_clear_halt (handle->idev, handle->ep_bulk_in);
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED; 
+        }
+
+      if (debug_level > 1)
+        DEBUGOUT_4 ("T=1: got %c-block seq=%d err=%d%s\n",
+                    ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? 'R' :
+                              (msg[11] & 0x80)? 'S' : 'I',
+                    ((msg[11] & 0x80)? !!(msg[11]& 0x10) : !!(msg[11] & 0x40)),
+                    ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? (msg[11] & 0x0f) : 0,
+                    (!(msg[11] & 0x80) && (msg[11] & 0x20)? " [more]":""));
+
+      if (!(tpdu[1] & 0x80))
+        { /* This is an I-block. */
+          retries = 0;
+          if (sending)
+            { /* last block sent was successful. */
+              handle->t1_ns ^= 1;
+              sending = 0;
+            }
+
+          if (!!(tpdu[1] & 0x40) != handle->t1_nr)
+            { /* Reponse does not match our sequence number. */
+              msg = send_buffer;
+              tpdu = msg+10;
+              /* NAD: DAD=1, SAD=0 */
+              tpdu[0] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+              tpdu[1] = (0x80 | (handle->t1_nr & 1) << 4 | 2); /* R-block */
+              tpdu[2] = 0;
+              tpdulen = 3;
+              edc = compute_edc (tpdu, tpdulen, use_crc);
+              if (use_crc)
+                tpdu[tpdulen++] = (edc >> 8);
+              tpdu[tpdulen++] = edc;
+
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          handle->t1_nr ^= 1;
+
+          p = tpdu + 3; /* Skip the prologue field. */
+          n = tpdulen - 3 - 1; /* Strip the epilogue field. */
+          /* fixme: verify the checksum. */
+          if (resp)
+            {
+              if (n > maxresplen)
+                {
+                  DEBUGOUT_2 ("provided buffer too short for received data "
+                              "(%u/%u)\n",
+                              (unsigned int)n, (unsigned int)maxresplen);
+                  return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+                }
+              
+              memcpy (resp, p, n); 
+              resp += n;
+              *nresp += n;
+              maxresplen -= n;
+            }
+          
+          if (!(tpdu[1] & 0x20))
+            return 0; /* No chaining requested - ready. */
+          
+          msg = send_buffer;
+          tpdu = msg+10;
+          /* NAD: DAD=1, SAD=0 */
+          tpdu[0] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+          tpdu[1] = (0x80 | (handle->t1_nr & 1) << 4); /* R-block */
+          tpdu[2] = 0;
+          tpdulen = 3;
+          edc = compute_edc (tpdu, tpdulen, use_crc);
+          if (use_crc)
+            tpdu[tpdulen++] = (edc >> 8);
+          tpdu[tpdulen++] = edc;
+        }
+      else if ((tpdu[1] & 0xc0) == 0x80)
+        { /* This is a R-block. */
+          if ( (tpdu[1] & 0x0f)) 
+            { /* Error: repeat last block */
+              if (++retries > 3)
+                {
+                  DEBUGOUT ("3 failed retries\n");
+                  return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+                }
+              msg = send_buffer;
+              tpdulen = last_tpdulen;
+            }
+          else if (sending && !!(tpdu[1] & 0x10) == handle->t1_ns)
+            { /* Response does not match our sequence number. */
+              DEBUGOUT ("R-block with wrong seqno received on more bit\n");
+              return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+            }
+          else if (sending)
+            { /* Send next chunk. */
+              retries = 0;
+              msg = send_buffer;
+              next_chunk = 1;
+              handle->t1_ns ^= 1;
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              DEBUGOUT ("unexpected ACK R-block received\n");
+              return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+            }
+        }
+      else 
+        { /* This is a S-block. */
+          retries = 0;
+          DEBUGOUT_2 ("T=1 S-block %s received cmd=%d\n",
+                      (tpdu[1] & 0x20)? "response": "request",
+                      (tpdu[1] & 0x1f));
+          if ( !(tpdu[1] & 0x20) && (tpdu[1] & 0x1f) == 3 && tpdu[2])
+            { /* Wait time extension request. */
+              unsigned char bwi = tpdu[3];
+              msg = send_buffer;
+              tpdu = msg+10;
+              /* NAD: DAD=1, SAD=0 */
+              tpdu[0] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+              tpdu[1] = (0xc0 | 0x20 | 3); /* S-block response */
+              tpdu[2] = 1;
+              tpdu[3] = bwi;
+              tpdulen = 4;
+              edc = compute_edc (tpdu, tpdulen, use_crc);
+              if (use_crc)
+                tpdu[tpdulen++] = (edc >> 8);
+              tpdu[tpdulen++] = edc;
+              DEBUGOUT_1 ("T=1 waittime extension of bwi=%d\n", bwi);
+            }
+          else
+            return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+    } /* end T=1 protocol loop. */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Send the CCID Secure command to the reader.  APDU_BUF should
+   contain the APDU template.  PIN_MODE defines how the pin gets
+   formatted:
+   
+     1 := The PIN is ASCII encoded and of variable length.  The
+          length of the PIN entered will be put into Lc by the reader.
+          The APDU should me made up of 4 bytes without Lc.
+
+   PINLEN_MIN and PINLEN_MAX define the limits for the pin length. 0
+   may be used t enable reasonable defaults.  PIN_PADLEN should be 0.
+   
+   When called with RESP and NRESP set to NULL, the function will
+   merely check whether the reader supports the secure command for the
+   given APDU and PIN_MODE. */
+int
+ccid_transceive_secure (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                        const unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t apdu_buflen,
+                        int pin_mode, int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max,
+                        int pin_padlen, 
+                        unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen, size_t *nresp)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char send_buffer[10+259], recv_buffer[10+259];
+  unsigned char *msg, *tpdu, *p;
+  size_t msglen, tpdulen, n;
+  unsigned char seqno;
+  int i;
+  size_t dummy_nresp;
+  int testmode;
+
+  testmode = !resp && !nresp;
+
+  if (!nresp)
+    nresp = &dummy_nresp;
+  *nresp = 0;
+
+  if (apdu_buflen >= 4 && apdu_buf[1] == 0x20 && (handle->has_pinpad & 1))
+    ;
+  else if (apdu_buflen >= 4 && apdu_buf[1] == 0x24 && (handle->has_pinpad & 2))
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; /* Not yet by our code. */
+  else
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_KEYPAD;
+    
+  if (pin_mode != 1)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+  if (pin_padlen != 0)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+  if (!pinlen_min)
+    pinlen_min = 1;
+  if (!pinlen_max)
+    pinlen_max = 25;
+
+  /* Note that the 25 is the maximum value the SPR532 allows.  */
+  if (pinlen_min < 1 || pinlen_min > 25
+      || pinlen_max < 1 || pinlen_max > 25 
+      || pinlen_min > pinlen_max)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+
+  /* We have only tested this with an SCM reader so better don't risk
+     anything and do not allow the use with other readers. */
+  if (handle->id_vendor != VENDOR_SCM)
+    return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+  if (testmode)
+    return 0; /* Success */
+    
+  msg = send_buffer;
+  if (handle->id_vendor == VENDOR_SCM)
+    {
+      DEBUGOUT ("sending escape sequence to switch to a case 1 APDU\n");
+      rc = send_escape_cmd (handle, (const unsigned char*)"\x80\x02\x00", 3,
+                            NULL, 0, NULL);
+      if (rc)
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+  msg[0] = PC_to_RDR_Secure;
+  msg[5] = 0; /* slot */
+  msg[6] = seqno = handle->seqno++;
+  msg[7] = 4; /* bBWI */
+  msg[8] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[9] = 0; /* RFU */
+  msg[10] = 0; /* Perform PIN verification. */
+  msg[11] = 0; /* Timeout in seconds. */
+  msg[12] = 0x82; /* bmFormatString: Byte, pos=0, left, ASCII. */
+  if (handle->id_vendor == VENDOR_SCM)
+    {
+      /* For the SPR532 the next 2 bytes need to be zero.  We do this
+         for all SCM product. Kudos to Martin Paljak for this
+         hint.  */
+      msg[13] = msg[14] = 0;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      msg[13] = 0x00; /* bmPINBlockString:
+                         0 bits of pin length to insert. 
+                         0 bytes of PIN block size.  */
+      msg[14] = 0x00; /* bmPINLengthFormat:
+                         Units are bytes, position is 0. */
+    }
+  msg[15] = pinlen_min;   /* wPINMaxExtraDigit-Minimum.  */
+  msg[16] = pinlen_max;   /* wPINMaxExtraDigit-Maximum.  */
+  msg[17] = 0x02; /* bEntryValidationCondition:
+                     Validation key pressed */
+  if (pinlen_min && pinlen_max && pinlen_min == pinlen_max)
+    msg[17] |= 0x01; /* Max size reached.  */
+  msg[18] = 0xff; /* bNumberMessage: Default. */
+  msg[19] = 0x04; /* wLangId-High. */
+  msg[20] = 0x09; /* wLangId-Low:  English FIXME: use the first entry. */
+  msg[21] = 0;    /* bMsgIndex. */
+  /* bTeoProlog follows: */
+  msg[22] = handle->nonnull_nad? ((1 << 4) | 0): 0;
+  msg[23] = ((handle->t1_ns & 1) << 6); /* I-block */
+  msg[24] = 4; /* apdulen.  */
+  /* APDU follows:  */
+  msg[25] = apdu_buf[0]; /* CLA */
+  msg[26] = apdu_buf[1]; /* INS */
+  msg[27] = apdu_buf[2]; /* P1 */
+  msg[28] = apdu_buf[3]; /* P2 */
+  msglen = 29;
+  set_msg_len (msg, msglen - 10);
+
+  DEBUGOUT ("sending");
+  for (i=0; i < msglen; i++)
+    DEBUGOUT_CONT_1 (" %02X", msg[i]);
+  DEBUGOUT_LF ();
+  
+  rc = bulk_out (handle, msg, msglen);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  
+  msg = recv_buffer;
+  rc = bulk_in (handle, msg, sizeof recv_buffer, &msglen,
+                RDR_to_PC_DataBlock, seqno, 5000, 0);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+  
+  tpdu = msg + 10;
+  tpdulen = msglen - 10;
+  
+  if (tpdulen < 4) 
+    {
+      usb_clear_halt (handle->idev, handle->ep_bulk_in);
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED; 
+    }
+  if (debug_level > 1)
+    DEBUGOUT_4 ("T=1: got %c-block seq=%d err=%d%s\n",
+                ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? 'R' :
+                          (msg[11] & 0x80)? 'S' : 'I',
+                ((msg[11] & 0x80)? !!(msg[11]& 0x10) : !!(msg[11] & 0x40)),
+                ((msg[11] & 0xc0) == 0x80)? (msg[11] & 0x0f) : 0,
+                (!(msg[11] & 0x80) && (msg[11] & 0x20)? " [more]":""));
+
+  if (!(tpdu[1] & 0x80))
+    { /* This is an I-block. */
+      /* Last block sent was successful. */
+      handle->t1_ns ^= 1;
+
+      if (!!(tpdu[1] & 0x40) != handle->t1_nr)
+        { /* Reponse does not match our sequence number. */
+          DEBUGOUT ("I-block with wrong seqno received\n");
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+
+      handle->t1_nr ^= 1;
+
+      p = tpdu + 3; /* Skip the prologue field. */
+      n = tpdulen - 3 - 1; /* Strip the epilogue field. */
+      /* fixme: verify the checksum. */
+      if (resp)
+        {
+          if (n > maxresplen)
+            {
+              DEBUGOUT_2 ("provided buffer too short for received data "
+                          "(%u/%u)\n",
+                          (unsigned int)n, (unsigned int)maxresplen);
+              return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE;
+            }
+              
+          memcpy (resp, p, n); 
+          resp += n;
+          *nresp += n;
+          maxresplen -= n;
+        }
+          
+      if (!(tpdu[1] & 0x20))
+        return 0; /* No chaining requested - ready. */
+      
+      DEBUGOUT ("chaining requested but not supported for Secure operation\n");
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+  else if ((tpdu[1] & 0xc0) == 0x80)
+    { /* This is a R-block. */
+      if ( (tpdu[1] & 0x0f)) 
+        { /* Error: repeat last block */
+          DEBUGOUT ("No retries supported for Secure operation\n");
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+      else if (!!(tpdu[1] & 0x10) == handle->t1_ns)
+        { /* Reponse does not match our sequence number. */
+          DEBUGOUT ("R-block with wrong seqno received on more bit\n");
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+      else
+        { /* Send next chunk. */
+          DEBUGOUT ("chaining not supported on Secure operation\n");
+          return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+  else 
+    { /* This is a S-block. */
+      DEBUGOUT_2 ("T=1 S-block %s received cmd=%d for Secure operation\n",
+                  (tpdu[1] & 0x20)? "response": "request",
+                  (tpdu[1] & 0x1f));
+      return CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR;
+    } 
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+
+static void
+print_error (int err)
+{
+  const char *p;
+  char buf[50];
+
+  switch (err)
+    {
+    case 0: p = "success";
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_OUT_OF_CORE: p = "out of core"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE: p = "invalid value"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_DRIVER: p = "no driver"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED: p = "not supported"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_LOCKING_FAILED: p = "locking failed"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_BUSY: p = "busy"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD: p = "no card"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_INACTIVE: p = "card inactive"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR: p = "card I/O error"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_GENERAL_ERROR: p = "general error"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER: p = "no reader"; break;
+    case CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED: p = "aborted"; break;
+    default: sprintf (buf, "0x%05x", err); p = buf; break;
+    }
+  fprintf (stderr, "operation failed: %s\n", p);
+}
+
+static void
+print_data (const unsigned char *data, size_t length)
+{
+  if (length >= 2)
+    {
+      fprintf (stderr, "operation status: %02X%02X\n",
+               data[length-2], data[length-1]);
+      length -= 2;
+    }
+  if (length)
+    {
+        fputs ("   returned data:", stderr);
+        for (; length; length--, data++)
+          fprintf (stderr, " %02X", *data);
+        putc ('\n', stderr);
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+print_result (int rc, const unsigned char *data, size_t length)
+{
+  if (rc)
+    print_error (rc);
+  else if (data)
+    print_data (data, length);
+}
+
+int
+main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+  int rc;
+  ccid_driver_t ccid;
+  unsigned int slotstat;
+  unsigned char result[512];
+  size_t resultlen;
+  int no_pinpad = 0;
+  int verify_123456 = 0;
+  int did_verify = 0;
+  int no_poll = 0;
+
+  if (argc)
+    {
+      argc--;
+      argv++;
+    }
+
+  while (argc)
+    {
+      if ( !strcmp (*argv, "--list"))
+        {
+          char *p;
+          p = ccid_get_reader_list ();
+          if (!p)
+            return 1;
+          fputs (p, stderr);
+          free (p);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      else if ( !strcmp (*argv, "--debug"))
+        {
+          ccid_set_debug_level (1);
+          argc--; argv++;
+        }
+      else if ( !strcmp (*argv, "--no-poll"))
+        {
+          no_poll = 1;
+          argc--; argv++;
+        }
+      else if ( !strcmp (*argv, "--no-pinpad"))
+        {
+          no_pinpad = 1;
+          argc--; argv++;
+        }
+      else if ( !strcmp (*argv, "--verify-123456"))
+        {
+          verify_123456 = 1;
+          argc--; argv++;
+        }
+      else
+        break;
+    }
+
+  rc = ccid_open_reader (&ccid, argc? *argv:NULL);
+  if (rc)
+    return 1;
+
+  if (!no_poll)
+    ccid_poll (ccid);
+  fputs ("getting ATR ...\n", stderr);
+  rc = ccid_get_atr (ccid, NULL, 0, NULL);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      print_error (rc);
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  if (!no_poll)
+    ccid_poll (ccid);
+  fputs ("getting slot status ...\n", stderr);
+  rc = ccid_slot_status (ccid, &slotstat);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      print_error (rc);
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  if (!no_poll)
+    ccid_poll (ccid);
+
+  fputs ("selecting application OpenPGP ....\n", stderr);
+  {
+    static unsigned char apdu[] = {
+      0, 0xA4, 4, 0, 6, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x00, 0x01, 0x24, 0x01};
+    rc = ccid_transceive (ccid,
+                          apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                          result, sizeof result, &resultlen);
+    print_result (rc, result, resultlen);
+  }
+  
+
+  if (!no_poll)
+    ccid_poll (ccid);
+
+  fputs ("getting OpenPGP DO 0x65 ....\n", stderr);
+  {
+    static unsigned char apdu[] = { 0, 0xCA, 0, 0x65, 254 };
+    rc = ccid_transceive (ccid, apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                          result, sizeof result, &resultlen);
+    print_result (rc, result, resultlen);
+  }
+
+  if (!no_pinpad)
+    {
+    }
+
+  if (!no_pinpad)
+    {
+      static unsigned char apdu[] = { 0, 0x20, 0, 0x81 };
+
+      
+      if (ccid_transceive_secure (ccid,
+                                  apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                                  1, 0, 0, 0,
+                                  NULL, 0, NULL))
+        fputs ("can't verify using a PIN-Pad reader\n", stderr);
+      else
+        {
+          fputs ("verifying CHV1 using the PINPad ....\n", stderr);
+          
+          rc = ccid_transceive_secure (ccid,
+                                       apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                                       1, 0, 0, 0,
+                                       result, sizeof result, &resultlen);
+          print_result (rc, result, resultlen);
+          did_verify = 1;
+        }
+    }
+  
+  if (verify_123456 && !did_verify)
+    {
+      fputs ("verifying that CHV1 is 123456....\n", stderr);
+      {
+        static unsigned char apdu[] = {0, 0x20, 0, 0x81,
+                                       6, '1','2','3','4','5','6'};
+        rc = ccid_transceive (ccid, apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                              result, sizeof result, &resultlen);
+        print_result (rc, result, resultlen);
+      }
+    }
+
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      fputs ("getting OpenPGP DO 0x5E ....\n", stderr);
+      {
+        static unsigned char apdu[] = { 0, 0xCA, 0, 0x5E, 254 };
+        rc = ccid_transceive (ccid, apdu, sizeof apdu,
+                              result, sizeof result, &resultlen);
+        print_result (rc, result, resultlen);
+      }
+    }
+
+  ccid_close_reader (ccid);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ *  compile-command: "gcc -DTEST -Wall -I/usr/local/include -lusb -g ccid-driver.c"
+ * End:
+ */
+#endif /*TEST*/
+#endif /*HAVE_LIBUSB*/
diff --git a/g10/ccid-driver.h b/g10/ccid-driver.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54adffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/ccid-driver.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* ccid-driver.c - USB ChipCardInterfaceDevices driver
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this file may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * following license, in which case the provisions of this license are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the GNU General Public License. If you wish to
+ * allow use of your version of this file only under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License, and not to allow others to use your
+ * version of this file under the terms of the following license,
+ * indicate your decision by deleting this paragraph and the license
+ * below.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
+ *    written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $Id: ccid-driver.h 3995 2006-02-06 16:34:20Z wk $
+ */
+
+#ifndef CCID_DRIVER_H
+#define CCID_DRIVER_H
+
+/* The CID driver returns the same error codes as the status words
+   used by GnuPG's apdu.h.  For ease of maintenance they should always
+   match.  */
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_OUT_OF_CORE    0x10001 
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INV_VALUE      0x10002
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE = 0x10003
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_DRIVER      0x10004
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED  0x10005
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_LOCKING_FAILED 0x10006
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_BUSY           0x10007
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_CARD        0x10008
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_INACTIVE  0x10009
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_CARD_IO_ERROR  0x1000a
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_GENERAL_ERROR  0x1000b
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_READER      0x1000c
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_ABORTED        0x1000d
+#define CCID_DRIVER_ERR_NO_KEYPAD      0x1000e
+
+struct ccid_driver_s;
+typedef struct ccid_driver_s *ccid_driver_t;
+
+int ccid_set_debug_level (int level);
+char *ccid_get_reader_list (void);
+int ccid_open_reader (ccid_driver_t *handle, const char *readerid);
+int ccid_shutdown_reader (ccid_driver_t handle);
+int ccid_close_reader (ccid_driver_t handle);
+int ccid_get_atr (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                  unsigned char *atr, size_t maxatrlen, size_t *atrlen);
+int ccid_slot_status (ccid_driver_t handle, int *statusbits);
+int ccid_transceive (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                     const unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+                     unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen, size_t *nresp);
+int ccid_transceive_secure (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                     const unsigned char *apdu, size_t apdulen,
+                     int pin_mode, 
+                     int pinlen_min, int pinlen_max, int pin_padlen, 
+                     unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen, size_t *nresp);
+int ccid_transceive_escape (ccid_driver_t handle,
+                            const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                            unsigned char *resp, size_t maxresplen,
+                            size_t *nresp);
+
+
+
+#endif /*CCID_DRIVER_H*/
+
+
+
diff --git a/g10/cipher.c b/g10/cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7332ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/* cipher.c - En-/De-ciphering filter
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+
+
+#define MIN_PARTIAL_SIZE 512
+
+
+static void
+write_header( cipher_filter_context_t *cfx, IOBUF a )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    PKT_encrypted ed;
+    byte temp[18];
+    unsigned blocksize;
+    unsigned nprefix;
+
+    blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize( cfx->dek->algo );
+    if( blocksize < 8 || blocksize > 16 )
+	log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
+
+    memset( &ed, 0, sizeof ed );
+    ed.len = cfx->datalen;
+    ed.extralen = blocksize+2;
+    ed.new_ctb = !ed.len && !RFC1991;
+    if( cfx->dek->use_mdc ) {
+	ed.mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+	cfx->mdc_hash = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 0 );
+	if ( DBG_HASHING )
+	    md_start_debug( cfx->mdc_hash, "creatmdc" );
+    }
+
+    {
+        char buf[20];
+        
+        sprintf (buf, "%d %d", ed.mdc_method, cfx->dek->algo);
+        write_status_text (STATUS_BEGIN_ENCRYPTION, buf);
+    }
+
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+    pkt.pkttype = cfx->dek->use_mdc? PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC : PKT_ENCRYPTED;
+    pkt.pkt.encrypted = &ed;
+    if( build_packet( a, &pkt ))
+	log_bug("build_packet(ENCR_DATA) failed\n");
+    nprefix = blocksize;
+    randomize_buffer( temp, nprefix, 1 );
+    temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2];
+    temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1];
+    print_cipher_algo_note( cfx->dek->algo );
+    cfx->cipher_hd = cipher_open( cfx->dek->algo,
+				  cfx->dek->use_mdc? CIPHER_MODE_CFB
+					 : CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
+/*   log_hexdump( "thekey", cfx->dek->key, cfx->dek->keylen );*/
+    cipher_setkey( cfx->cipher_hd, cfx->dek->key, cfx->dek->keylen );
+    cipher_setiv( cfx->cipher_hd, NULL, 0 );
+/*  log_hexdump( "prefix", temp, nprefix+2 ); */
+    if( cfx->mdc_hash ) /* hash the "IV" */
+	md_write( cfx->mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2 );
+    cipher_encrypt( cfx->cipher_hd, temp, temp, nprefix+2);
+    cipher_sync( cfx->cipher_hd );
+    iobuf_write(a, temp, nprefix+2);
+    cfx->header=1;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a conventional algorithm
+ */
+int
+cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	       IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    cipher_filter_context_t *cfx = opaque;
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypt */
+	rc = -1; /* not yet used */
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
+	assert(a);
+	if( !cfx->header ) {
+	    write_header( cfx, a );
+	}
+	if( cfx->mdc_hash )
+	    md_write( cfx->mdc_hash, buf, size );
+	cipher_encrypt( cfx->cipher_hd, buf, buf, size);
+	if( iobuf_write( a, buf, size ) )
+	    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+	if( cfx->mdc_hash ) {
+	    byte *hash;
+	    int hashlen = md_digest_length( md_get_algo( cfx->mdc_hash ) );
+	    byte temp[22];
+
+	    assert( hashlen == 20 );
+	    /* we must hash the prefix of the MDC packet here */
+	    temp[0] = 0xd3;
+	    temp[1] = 0x14;
+	    md_putc( cfx->mdc_hash, temp[0] );
+	    md_putc( cfx->mdc_hash, temp[1] );
+
+	    md_final( cfx->mdc_hash );
+	    hash = md_read( cfx->mdc_hash, 0 );
+	    memcpy(temp+2, hash, 20);
+	    cipher_encrypt( cfx->cipher_hd, temp, temp, 22 );
+	    md_close( cfx->mdc_hash ); cfx->mdc_hash = NULL;
+	    if( iobuf_write( a, temp, 22 ) )
+		log_error("writing MDC packet failed\n" );
+	}
+	cipher_close(cfx->cipher_hd);
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) {
+	*(char**)buf = "cipher_filter";
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/compress-bz2.c b/g10/compress-bz2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a8075a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/compress-bz2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/* compress.c - bzip2 compress filter
+ * Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* Early versions of bzlib (1.0) require stdio.h */
+#include <bzlib.h>
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+/* Note that the code in compress.c is nearly identical to the code
+   here, so if you fix a bug here, look there to see if a matching bug
+   needs to be fixed.  I tried to have one set of functions that could
+   do ZIP, ZLIB, and BZIP2, but it became dangerously unreadable with
+   #ifdefs and if(algo) -dshaw */
+
+static void
+init_compress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, bz_stream *bzs )
+{
+  int rc;
+  int level;
+
+  if( opt.bz2_compress_level >= 1 && opt.bz2_compress_level <= 9 )
+    level = opt.bz2_compress_level;
+  else if( opt.bz2_compress_level == -1 )
+    level = 6; /* no particular reason, but it seems reasonable */
+  else
+    {
+      log_error("invalid compression level; using default level\n");
+      level = 6;
+    }
+
+  if((rc=BZ2_bzCompressInit(bzs,level,0,0))!=BZ_OK)
+    log_fatal("bz2lib problem: %d\n",rc);
+
+  zfx->outbufsize = 8192;
+  zfx->outbuf = xmalloc( zfx->outbufsize );
+}
+
+static int
+do_compress(compress_filter_context_t *zfx, bz_stream *bzs, int flush, IOBUF a)
+{
+  int zrc;
+  unsigned n;
+
+  do
+    {
+      bzs->next_out = zfx->outbuf;
+      bzs->avail_out = zfx->outbufsize;
+      if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("enter bzCompress: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, flush=%d\n",
+		  (unsigned)bzs->avail_in, (unsigned)bzs->avail_out, flush );
+      zrc = BZ2_bzCompress( bzs, flush );
+      if( zrc == BZ_STREAM_END && flush == BZ_FINISH )
+	;
+      else if( zrc != BZ_RUN_OK && zrc != BZ_FINISH_OK )
+	log_fatal("bz2lib deflate problem: rc=%d\n", zrc );
+
+      n = zfx->outbufsize - bzs->avail_out;
+      if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("leave bzCompress:"
+		  " avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, n=%u, zrc=%d\n",
+		  (unsigned)bzs->avail_in, (unsigned)bzs->avail_out,
+		  (unsigned)n, zrc );
+
+      if( iobuf_write( a, zfx->outbuf, n ) )
+	{
+	  log_debug("bzCompress: iobuf_write failed\n");
+	  return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	}
+    }
+  while( bzs->avail_in || (flush == BZ_FINISH && zrc != BZ_STREAM_END) );
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+init_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, bz_stream *bzs )
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  if((rc=BZ2_bzDecompressInit(bzs,0,opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem))!=BZ_OK)
+    log_fatal("bz2lib problem: %d\n",rc);
+
+  zfx->inbufsize = 2048;
+  zfx->inbuf = xmalloc( zfx->inbufsize );
+  bzs->avail_in = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, bz_stream *bzs,
+	       IOBUF a, size_t *ret_len )
+{
+  int zrc;
+  int rc=0;
+  size_t n;
+  int nread, count;
+  int refill = !bzs->avail_in;
+
+  if( DBG_FILTER )
+    log_debug("begin bzDecompress: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, inbuf=%u\n",
+	      (unsigned)bzs->avail_in, (unsigned)bzs->avail_out,
+	      (unsigned)zfx->inbufsize );
+  do
+    {
+      if( bzs->avail_in < zfx->inbufsize && refill )
+	{
+	  n = bzs->avail_in;
+	  if( !n )
+	    bzs->next_in = zfx->inbuf;
+	  count = zfx->inbufsize - n;
+	  nread = iobuf_read( a, zfx->inbuf + n, count );
+	  if( nread == -1 ) nread = 0;
+	  n += nread;
+	  bzs->avail_in = n;
+	}
+
+      refill = 1;
+
+      if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("enter bzDecompress: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u\n",
+		  (unsigned)bzs->avail_in, (unsigned)bzs->avail_out);
+
+      zrc=BZ2_bzDecompress(bzs);
+      if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("leave bzDecompress: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, zrc=%d\n",
+		  (unsigned)bzs->avail_in, (unsigned)bzs->avail_out, zrc);
+      if( zrc == BZ_STREAM_END )
+	rc = -1; /* eof */
+      else if( zrc != BZ_OK && zrc != BZ_PARAM_ERROR )
+	log_fatal("bz2lib inflate problem: rc=%d\n", zrc );
+    }
+  while( bzs->avail_out && zrc != BZ_STREAM_END && zrc != BZ_PARAM_ERROR );
+
+  /* I'm not completely happy with the two uses of BZ_PARAM_ERROR
+     here.  The corresponding zlib function is Z_BUF_ERROR, which
+     covers a narrower scope than BZ_PARAM_ERROR. -dshaw */
+
+  *ret_len = zfx->outbufsize - bzs->avail_out;
+  if( DBG_FILTER )
+    log_debug("do_uncompress: returning %u bytes\n", (unsigned)*ret_len );
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int
+compress_filter_bz2( void *opaque, int control,
+		     IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+  size_t size = *ret_len;
+  compress_filter_context_t *zfx = opaque;
+  bz_stream *bzs = zfx->opaque;
+  int rc=0;
+
+  if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW )
+    {
+      if( !zfx->status )
+	{
+	  bzs = zfx->opaque = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *bzs );
+	  init_uncompress( zfx, bzs );
+	  zfx->status = 1;
+	}
+
+      bzs->next_out = buf;
+      bzs->avail_out = size;
+      zfx->outbufsize = size; /* needed only for calculation */
+      rc = do_uncompress( zfx, bzs, a, ret_len );
+    }
+  else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH )
+    {
+      if( !zfx->status )
+	{
+	  PACKET pkt;
+	  PKT_compressed cd;
+
+	  if( zfx->algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2 )
+	    BUG();
+	  memset( &cd, 0, sizeof cd );
+	  cd.len = 0;
+	  cd.algorithm = zfx->algo;
+	  init_packet( &pkt );
+	  pkt.pkttype = PKT_COMPRESSED;
+	  pkt.pkt.compressed = &cd;
+	  if( build_packet( a, &pkt ))
+	    log_bug("build_packet(PKT_COMPRESSED) failed\n");
+	  bzs = zfx->opaque = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *bzs );
+	  init_compress( zfx, bzs );
+	  zfx->status = 2;
+	}
+
+      bzs->next_in = buf;
+      bzs->avail_in = size;
+      rc = do_compress( zfx, bzs, BZ_RUN, a );
+    }
+  else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE )
+    {
+      if( zfx->status == 1 )
+	{
+	  BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(bzs);
+	  xfree(bzs);
+	  zfx->opaque = NULL;
+	  xfree(zfx->outbuf); zfx->outbuf = NULL;
+	}
+      else if( zfx->status == 2 )
+	{
+	  bzs->next_in = buf;
+	  bzs->avail_in = 0;
+	  do_compress( zfx, bzs, BZ_FINISH, a );
+	  BZ2_bzCompressEnd(bzs);
+	  xfree(bzs);
+	  zfx->opaque = NULL;
+	  xfree(zfx->outbuf); zfx->outbuf = NULL;
+	}
+      if (zfx->release)
+	zfx->release (zfx);
+    }
+  else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+    *(char**)buf = "compress_filter";
+  return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/compress.c b/g10/compress.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cee5ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/compress.c
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+/* compress.c - compress filter
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ *               2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+/* Note that the code in compress-bz2.c is nearly identical to the
+   code here, so if you fix a bug here, look there to see if a
+   matching bug needs to be fixed.  I tried to have one set of
+   functions that could do ZIP, ZLIB, and BZIP2, but it became
+   dangerously unreadable with #ifdefs and if(algo) -dshaw */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+#if defined(__riscos__) && defined(USE_ZLIBRISCOS)
+# include "zlib-riscos.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+int compress_filter_bz2( void *opaque, int control,
+			 IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+
+static void
+init_compress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs )
+{
+    int rc;
+    int level;
+
+#if defined(__riscos__) && defined(USE_ZLIBRISCOS)
+    static int zlib_initialized = 0;
+
+    if (!zlib_initialized)
+        zlib_initialized = riscos_load_module("ZLib", zlib_path, 1);
+#endif
+
+    if( opt.compress_level >= 1 && opt.compress_level <= 9 )
+	level = opt.compress_level;
+    else if( opt.compress_level == -1 )
+	level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
+    else {
+	log_error("invalid compression level; using default level\n");
+	level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
+    }
+
+    if( (rc = zfx->algo == 1? deflateInit2( zs, level, Z_DEFLATED,
+					    -13, 8, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY)
+			    : deflateInit( zs, level )
+			    ) != Z_OK ) {
+	log_fatal("zlib problem: %s\n", zs->msg? zs->msg :
+			       rc == Z_MEM_ERROR ? "out of core" :
+			       rc == Z_VERSION_ERROR ? "invalid lib version" :
+						       "unknown error" );
+    }
+
+    zfx->outbufsize = 8192;
+    zfx->outbuf = xmalloc( zfx->outbufsize );
+}
+
+static int
+do_compress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs, int flush, IOBUF a )
+{
+    int zrc;
+    unsigned n;
+
+    do {
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	zs->next_out = zfx->outbuf;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->next_out = (Bytef *) zfx->outbuf;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->avail_out = zfx->outbufsize;
+	if( DBG_FILTER )
+	    log_debug("enter deflate: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, flush=%d\n",
+		    (unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out, flush );
+	zrc = deflate( zs, flush );
+	if( zrc == Z_STREAM_END && flush == Z_FINISH )
+	    ;
+	else if( zrc != Z_OK ) {
+	    if( zs->msg )
+		log_fatal("zlib deflate problem: %s\n", zs->msg );
+	    else
+		log_fatal("zlib deflate problem: rc=%d\n", zrc );
+	}
+	n = zfx->outbufsize - zs->avail_out;
+	if( DBG_FILTER )
+	    log_debug("leave deflate: "
+		      "avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, n=%u, zrc=%d\n",
+		(unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out,
+					       (unsigned)n, zrc );
+
+	if( iobuf_write( a, zfx->outbuf, n ) ) {
+	    log_debug("deflate: iobuf_write failed\n");
+	    return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	}
+    } while( zs->avail_in || (flush == Z_FINISH && zrc != Z_STREAM_END) );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+init_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    /****************
+     * PGP uses a windowsize of 13 bits. Using a negative value for
+     * it forces zlib not to expect a zlib header.  This is a
+     * undocumented feature Peter Gutmann told me about.
+     *    
+     * We must use 15 bits for the inflator because CryptoEx uses 15
+     * bits thus the output would get scrambled w/o error indication
+     * if we would use 13 bits.  For the uncompressing this does not
+     * matter at all.
+     */
+    if( (rc = zfx->algo == 1? inflateInit2( zs, -15)
+			    : inflateInit( zs )) != Z_OK ) {
+	log_fatal("zlib problem: %s\n", zs->msg? zs->msg :
+			       rc == Z_MEM_ERROR ? "out of core" :
+			       rc == Z_VERSION_ERROR ? "invalid lib version" :
+						       "unknown error" );
+    }
+
+    zfx->inbufsize = 2048;
+    zfx->inbuf = xmalloc( zfx->inbufsize );
+    zs->avail_in = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs,
+	       IOBUF a, size_t *ret_len )
+{
+    int zrc;
+    int rc=0;
+    size_t n;
+    int nread, count;
+    int refill = !zs->avail_in;
+
+    if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("begin inflate: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, inbuf=%u\n",
+		(unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out,
+		(unsigned)zfx->inbufsize );
+    do {
+	if( zs->avail_in < zfx->inbufsize && refill ) {
+	    n = zs->avail_in;
+	    if( !n )
+#ifndef __riscos__
+		zs->next_in = zfx->inbuf;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+		zs->next_in = (Bytef *) zfx->inbuf;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	    count = zfx->inbufsize - n;
+	    nread = iobuf_read( a, zfx->inbuf + n, count );
+	    if( nread == -1 ) nread = 0;
+	    n += nread;
+	    /* If we use the undocumented feature to suppress
+	     * the zlib header, we have to give inflate an
+	     * extra dummy byte to read */
+	    if( nread < count && zfx->algo == 1 ) {
+		*(zfx->inbuf + n) = 0xFF; /* is it really needed ? */
+		zfx->algo1hack = 1;
+		n++;
+	    }
+	    zs->avail_in = n;
+	}
+	refill = 1;
+	if( DBG_FILTER )
+	    log_debug("enter inflate: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u\n",
+		    (unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out);
+#ifdef Z_SYNC_FLUSH
+	zrc = inflate( zs, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
+#else
+	zrc = inflate( zs, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH );
+#endif
+	if( DBG_FILTER )
+	    log_debug("leave inflate: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, zrc=%d\n",
+		   (unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out, zrc);
+	if( zrc == Z_STREAM_END )
+	    rc = -1; /* eof */
+	else if( zrc != Z_OK && zrc != Z_BUF_ERROR ) {
+	    if( zs->msg )
+		log_fatal("zlib inflate problem: %s\n", zs->msg );
+	    else
+		log_fatal("zlib inflate problem: rc=%d\n", zrc );
+	}
+    } while( zs->avail_out && zrc != Z_STREAM_END  && zrc != Z_BUF_ERROR );
+    *ret_len = zfx->outbufsize - zs->avail_out;
+    if( DBG_FILTER )
+	log_debug("do_uncompress: returning %u bytes\n", (unsigned)*ret_len );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+compress_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+		 IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    compress_filter_context_t *zfx = opaque;
+    z_stream *zs = zfx->opaque;
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+	if( !zfx->status ) {
+	    zs = zfx->opaque = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *zs );
+	    init_uncompress( zfx, zs );
+	    zfx->status = 1;
+	}
+
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	zs->next_out = buf;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->next_out = (Bytef *) buf;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->avail_out = size;
+	zfx->outbufsize = size; /* needed only for calculation */
+	rc = do_uncompress( zfx, zs, a, ret_len );
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) {
+	if( !zfx->status ) {
+	    PACKET pkt;
+	    PKT_compressed cd;
+	    if(zfx->algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP
+	       && zfx->algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB)
+	      BUG();
+	    memset( &cd, 0, sizeof cd );
+	    cd.len = 0;
+	    cd.algorithm = zfx->algo;
+	    init_packet( &pkt );
+	    pkt.pkttype = PKT_COMPRESSED;
+	    pkt.pkt.compressed = &cd;
+	    if( build_packet( a, &pkt ))
+		log_bug("build_packet(PKT_COMPRESSED) failed\n");
+	    zs = zfx->opaque = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *zs );
+	    init_compress( zfx, zs );
+	    zfx->status = 2;
+	}
+
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	zs->next_in = buf;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->next_in = (Bytef *) buf;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	zs->avail_in = size;
+	rc = do_compress( zfx, zs, Z_NO_FLUSH, a );
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+	if( zfx->status == 1 ) {
+	    inflateEnd(zs);
+	    xfree(zs);
+	    zfx->opaque = NULL;
+	    xfree(zfx->outbuf); zfx->outbuf = NULL;
+	}
+	else if( zfx->status == 2 ) {
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	    zs->next_in = buf;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+	    zs->next_in = (Bytef *) buf;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	    zs->avail_in = 0;
+	    do_compress( zfx, zs, Z_FINISH, a );
+	    deflateEnd(zs);
+	    xfree(zs);
+	    zfx->opaque = NULL;
+	    xfree(zfx->outbuf); zfx->outbuf = NULL;
+	}
+        if (zfx->release)
+          zfx->release (zfx);
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+	*(char**)buf = "compress_filter";
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_context (compress_filter_context_t *ctx)
+{
+  xfree (ctx);
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Handle a compressed packet
+ */
+int
+handle_compressed( void *procctx, PKT_compressed *cd,
+		   int (*callback)(IOBUF, void *), void *passthru )
+{
+    compress_filter_context_t *cfx;
+    int rc;
+
+    if(check_compress_algo(cd->algorithm))
+      return G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
+    cfx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *cfx);
+    cfx->release = release_context;
+    cfx->algo = cd->algorithm;
+    push_compress_filter(cd->buf,cfx,cd->algorithm);
+    if( callback )
+	rc = callback(cd->buf, passthru );
+    else
+	rc = proc_packets(procctx, cd->buf);
+    cd->buf = NULL;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+void
+push_compress_filter(IOBUF out,compress_filter_context_t *zfx,int algo)
+{
+  push_compress_filter2(out,zfx,algo,0);
+}
+
+void
+push_compress_filter2(IOBUF out,compress_filter_context_t *zfx,
+		      int algo,int rel)
+{
+  if(algo>=0)
+    zfx->algo=algo;
+  else
+    zfx->algo=DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO;
+
+  switch(zfx->algo)
+    {
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE:
+      break;
+
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP:
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB:
+      iobuf_push_filter2(out,compress_filter,zfx,rel);
+      break;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BZIP2
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2:
+      iobuf_push_filter2(out,compress_filter_bz2,zfx,rel);
+      break;
+#endif
+
+    default:
+      BUG();
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/dearmor.c b/g10/dearmor.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d7c60a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/dearmor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* dearmor.c - Armor utility
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+/****************
+ * Take an armor file and write it out without armor
+ */
+int
+dearmor_file( const char *fname )
+{
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int c;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if (!inp) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+					strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    iobuf_push_filter( inp, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, 0, &out )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+
+
+    while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
+	iobuf_put( out, c );
+
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Take file and write it out with armor
+ */
+int
+enarmor_file( const char *fname )
+{
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int c;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if (!inp) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+                  strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+
+    if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, 1, &out )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    afx.what = 4;
+    afx.hdrlines = "Comment: Use \"gpg --dearmor\" for unpacking\n";
+    iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    while( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
+	iobuf_put( out, c );
+
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/g10/decrypt.c b/g10/decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..171e265
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/* decrypt.c - verify signed data
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Assume that the input is an encrypted message and decrypt
+ * (and if signed, verify the signature on) it.
+ * This command differs from the default operation, as it never
+ * writes to the filename which is included in the file and it
+ * rejects files which don't begin with an encrypted message.
+ */
+
+int
+decrypt_message( const char *filename )
+{
+    IOBUF fp;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    int rc;
+    int no_out=0;
+
+    /* open the message file */
+    fp = iobuf_open(filename);
+    if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (fp);
+        fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !fp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(filename));
+	return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+    }
+
+    handle_progress (&pfx, fp, filename);
+
+    if( !opt.no_armor ) {
+	if( use_armor_filter( fp ) ) {
+	    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+	    iobuf_push_filter( fp, armor_filter, &afx );
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( !opt.outfile ) {
+	no_out = 1;
+	opt.outfile = "-";
+    }
+    rc = proc_encryption_packets( NULL, fp );
+    if( no_out )
+       opt.outfile = NULL;
+    iobuf_close(fp);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+void
+decrypt_messages(int nfiles, char *files[])
+{
+  IOBUF fp;
+  armor_filter_context_t afx;  
+  progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+  char *p, *output = NULL;
+  int rc=0,use_stdin=0;
+  unsigned int lno=0;
+  
+  if (opt.outfile)
+    {
+      log_error(_("--output doesn't work for this command\n"));
+      return;
+        
+    }
+
+  if(!nfiles)
+    use_stdin=1;
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      char line[2048];
+      char *filename=NULL;
+
+      if(use_stdin)
+	{
+	  if(fgets(line, DIM(line), stdin))
+	    {
+	      lno++;
+	      if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
+		log_error("input line %u too long or missing LF\n", lno);
+	      else
+		{
+		  line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
+		  filename=line;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  if(nfiles)
+	    {
+	      filename=*files;
+	      nfiles--;
+	      files++;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(filename==NULL)
+	break;
+
+      print_file_status(STATUS_FILE_START, filename, 3);      
+      output = make_outfile_name(filename);
+      if (!output)
+        goto next_file;
+      fp = iobuf_open(filename);
+      if (fp)
+        iobuf_ioctl (fp,3,1,NULL); /* disable fd caching */
+      if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+        {
+          iobuf_close (fp);
+          fp = NULL;
+          errno = EPERM;
+        }
+      if (!fp)
+        {
+          log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(filename));
+          goto next_file;
+        }
+
+      handle_progress (&pfx, fp, filename);
+
+      if (!opt.no_armor)
+        {
+          if (use_armor_filter(fp))
+            {
+              memset(&afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+              iobuf_push_filter(fp, armor_filter, &afx);
+            }
+        }
+      rc = proc_packets(NULL, fp);
+      iobuf_close(fp);
+      if (rc)
+        log_error("%s: decryption failed: %s\n", print_fname_stdin(filename),
+                  g10_errstr(rc));
+      p = get_last_passphrase();
+      set_next_passphrase(p);
+      xfree (p);
+
+    next_file:
+      /* Note that we emit file_done even after an error. */
+      write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
+      iobuf_ioctl( NULL, 2, 0, NULL); /* Invalidate entire cache. */
+      xfree(output);
+    }
+
+  set_next_passphrase(NULL);  
+}
diff --git a/g10/delkey.c b/g10/delkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..354851d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/delkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/* delkey.c - delete keys
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+/****************
+ * Delete a public or secret key from a keyring.
+ * r_sec_avail will be set if a secret key is available and the public
+ * key can't be deleted for that reason.
+ */
+static int
+do_delete_key( const char *username, int secret, int force, int *r_sec_avail )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    KBNODE node;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (secret);
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int okay=0;
+    int yes;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+    int exactmatch;
+
+    *r_sec_avail = 0;
+
+    /* search the userid */
+    classify_user_id (username, &desc);
+    exactmatch = (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
+                  || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                  || desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20);
+    rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1):G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+    if (rc) {
+	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, g10_errstr (rc));
+	write_status_text( STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM, "1" );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* read the keyblock */
+    rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
+    if (rc) {
+	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* get the keyid from the keyblock */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY:PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_error("Oops; key not found anymore!\n");
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if( secret )
+      {
+	sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	/* public */
+	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+
+	if(!force)
+	  {
+	    rc = seckey_available( keyid );
+	    if( !rc )
+	      {
+		*r_sec_avail = 1;
+		rc = -1;
+		goto leave;
+	      }
+	    else if( rc != G10ERR_NO_SECKEY )
+	      log_error("%s: get secret key: %s\n", username, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    else
+	      rc = 0;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if( rc )
+	rc = 0;
+    else if (opt.batch && exactmatch)
+        okay++;
+    else if( opt.batch && secret )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+        log_info (_("(unless you specify the key by fingerprint)\n"));
+      }
+    else if( opt.batch && opt.answer_yes )
+	okay++;
+    else if( opt.batch )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode without \"--yes\"\n"));
+        log_info (_("(unless you specify the key by fingerprint)\n"));
+      }
+    else {
+        if( secret )
+            print_seckey_info( sk );
+        else
+            print_pubkey_info(NULL, pk );
+	tty_printf( "\n" );
+
+	yes = cpr_get_answer_is_yes( secret? "delete_key.secret.okay"
+					   : "delete_key.okay",
+			      _("Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) "));
+	if( !cpr_enabled() && secret && yes ) {
+	    /* I think it is not required to check a passphrase; if
+	     * the user is so stupid as to let others access his secret keyring
+	     * (and has no backup) - it is up him to read some very
+	     * basic texts about security.
+	     */
+	    yes = cpr_get_answer_is_yes("delete_key.secret.okay",
+			 _("This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) "));
+	}
+	if( yes )
+	    okay++;
+    }
+
+
+    if( okay ) {
+	rc = keydb_delete_keyblock (hd);
+	if (rc) {
+	    log_error (_("deleting keyblock failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+	/* Note that the ownertrust being cleared will trigger a
+           revalidation_mark().  This makes sense - only deleting keys
+           that have ownertrust set should trigger this. */
+
+        if (!secret && pk && clear_ownertrusts (pk)) {
+          if (opt.verbose)
+            log_info (_("ownertrust information cleared\n"));
+        }
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    keydb_release (hd);
+    release_kbnode (keyblock);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Delete a public or secret key from a keyring.
+ */
+int
+delete_keys( STRLIST names, int secret, int allow_both )
+{
+    int rc, avail, force=(!allow_both && !secret && opt.expert);
+
+    /* Force allows us to delete a public key even if a secret key
+       exists. */
+
+    for(;names;names=names->next) {
+       rc = do_delete_key (names->d, secret, force, &avail );
+       if ( rc && avail ) { 
+	 if ( allow_both ) {
+	   rc = do_delete_key (names->d, 1, 0, &avail );
+	   if ( !rc )
+	     rc = do_delete_key (names->d, 0, 0, &avail );
+	 }
+	 else {
+	   log_error(_(
+	      "there is a secret key for public key \"%s\"!\n"),names->d);
+	   log_info(_(
+	      "use option \"--delete-secret-keys\" to delete it first.\n"));
+	   write_status_text( STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM, "2" );
+	   return rc;
+	 }
+       }
+
+       if(rc) {
+	 log_error("%s: delete key failed: %s\n", names->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	 return rc;
+       }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/g10/encode.c b/g10/encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..251ea3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,877 @@
+/* encode.c - encode data
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+
+static int encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey );
+static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PK_LIST pk_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out );
+
+/****************
+ * Encode FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher.  Take input from
+ * stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
+ */
+int
+encode_symmetric( const char *filename )
+{
+    return encode_simple( filename, 1, 0 );
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Encode FILENAME as a literal data packet only. Take input from
+ * stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
+ */
+int
+encode_store( const char *filename )
+{
+    return encode_simple( filename, 0, 0 );
+}
+
+static void
+encode_seskey( DEK *dek, DEK **seskey, byte *enckey )
+{
+    CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
+    byte buf[33];
+
+    assert ( dek->keylen <= 32 );
+    if(!*seskey)
+      {
+	*seskey=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(DEK));
+	(*seskey)->keylen=dek->keylen;
+	(*seskey)->algo=dek->algo;
+	make_session_key(*seskey);
+	/*log_hexdump( "thekey", c->key, c->keylen );*/
+      }
+
+    buf[0] = (*seskey)->algo;
+    memcpy( buf + 1, (*seskey)->key, (*seskey)->keylen );
+    
+    hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
+    cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+    cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
+    cipher_encrypt( hd, buf, buf, (*seskey)->keylen + 1 );
+    cipher_close( hd );
+
+    memcpy( enckey, buf, (*seskey)->keylen + 1 );
+    wipememory( buf, sizeof buf ); /* burn key */
+}
+
+/* We try very hard to use a MDC */
+static int
+use_mdc(PK_LIST pk_list,int algo)
+{
+  /* RFC-1991 and 2440 don't have MDC */
+  if(RFC1991 || RFC2440)
+    return 0;
+
+  /* --force-mdc overrides --disable-mdc */
+  if(opt.force_mdc)
+    return 1;
+
+  if(opt.disable_mdc)
+    return 0;
+
+  /* Do the keys really support MDC? */
+
+  if(select_mdc_from_pklist(pk_list))
+    return 1;
+  
+  /* The keys don't support MDC, so now we do a bit of a hack - if any
+     of the AESes or TWOFISH are in the prefs, we assume that the user
+     can handle a MDC.  This is valid for PGP 7, which can handle MDCs
+     though it will not generate them.  2440bis allows this, by the
+     way. */
+
+  if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+			    CIPHER_ALGO_AES,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES)
+    return 1;
+
+  if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+			    CIPHER_ALGO_AES192,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES192)
+    return 1;
+
+  if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+			    CIPHER_ALGO_AES256,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)
+    return 1;
+
+  if(select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+			    CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH,NULL)==CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
+    return 1;
+
+  /* Last try.  Use MDC for the modern ciphers. */
+
+  if(cipher_get_blocksize(algo)!=8)
+    return 1;
+
+  return 0; /* No MDC */
+}
+
+/* We don't want to use use_seskey yet because older gnupg versions
+   can't handle it, and there isn't really any point unless we're
+   making a message that can be decrypted by a public key or
+   passphrase. */
+static int
+encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode, int use_seskey )
+{
+    IOBUF inp, out;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
+    STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+    byte enckey[33];
+    int rc = 0;
+    int seskeylen = 0;
+    u32 filesize;
+    cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+    text_filter_context_t tfx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    int do_compress = !RFC1991 && default_compress_algo();
+
+    memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+    memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+    init_packet(&pkt);
+    
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(filename);
+    if (inp)
+      iobuf_ioctl (inp,3,1,NULL); /* disable fd caching */
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !inp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]",
+                  strerror(errno) );
+	return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+    }
+
+    handle_progress (&pfx, inp, filename);
+
+    if( opt.textmode )
+	iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+
+    /* Due the the fact that we use don't use an IV to encrypt the
+       session key we can't use the new mode with RFC1991 because
+       it has no S2K salt. RFC1991 always uses simple S2K. */
+    if ( RFC1991 && use_seskey )
+        use_seskey = 0;
+    
+    cfx.dek = NULL;
+    if( mode ) {
+	s2k = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
+	s2k->mode = RFC1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
+	s2k->hash_algo=S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+	cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0,
+				     default_cipher_algo(), s2k, 2,
+                                     NULL, NULL);
+	if( !cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen ) {
+	    rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
+	    xfree(cfx.dek);
+	    xfree(s2k);
+	    iobuf_close(inp);
+	    log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc;
+	}
+        if (use_seskey && s2k->mode != 1 && s2k->mode != 3) {
+            use_seskey = 0;
+            log_info (_("can't use a symmetric ESK packet "
+                        "due to the S2K mode\n"));
+        }
+
+        if ( use_seskey )
+	  {
+	    DEK *dek = NULL;
+            seskeylen = cipher_get_keylen( default_cipher_algo() ) / 8;
+            encode_seskey( cfx.dek, &dek, enckey );
+            xfree( cfx.dek ); cfx.dek = dek;
+	  }
+
+	if(opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("using cipher %s\n"),
+		   cipher_algo_to_string(cfx.dek->algo));
+
+	cfx.dek->use_mdc=use_mdc(NULL,cfx.dek->algo);
+    }
+
+    if (do_compress && cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc
+	&& is_file_compressed(filename, &rc))
+      {
+        if (opt.verbose)
+          log_info(_("`%s' already compressed\n"), filename);
+        do_compress = 0;        
+      }
+
+    if( rc || (rc = open_outfile( filename, opt.armor? 1:0, &out )) ) {
+	iobuf_cancel(inp);
+	xfree(cfx.dek);
+	xfree(s2k);
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    if( opt.armor )
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    if( s2k && !RFC1991 ) {
+	PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *enc + seskeylen + 1 );
+	enc->version = 4;
+	enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+	enc->s2k = *s2k;
+        if ( use_seskey && seskeylen ) {
+            enc->seskeylen = seskeylen + 1; /* algo id */
+            memcpy( enc->seskey, enckey, seskeylen + 1 );
+        }
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+	pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+	if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+	    log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	xfree(enc);
+    }
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal)
+      pt=setup_plaintext_name(filename,inp);
+
+    /* Note that PGP 5 has problems decrypting symmetrically encrypted
+       data if the file length is in the inner packet. It works when
+       only partial length headers are use.  In the past, we always
+       used partial body length here, but since PGP 2, PGP 6, and PGP
+       7 need the file length, and nobody should be using PGP 5
+       nowadays anyway, this is now set to the file length.  Note also
+       that this only applies to the RFC-1991 style symmetric
+       messages, and not the RFC-2440 style.  PGP 6 and 7 work with
+       either partial length or fixed length with the new style
+       messages. */
+
+    if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (filename) && *filename && !opt.textmode )
+      {
+        off_t tmpsize;
+        int overflow;
+
+	if ( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp, &overflow))
+             && !overflow )
+          log_info(_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), filename );
+        /* We can't encode the length of very large files because
+           OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes.  So if the the
+           size of a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for
+           packet headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
+        if ( tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536) )
+          filesize = tmpsize;
+        else
+          filesize = 0;
+      }
+    else
+      filesize = opt.set_filesize ? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+	pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+	pt->mode = opt.textmode? 't' : 'b';
+	pt->len = filesize;
+	pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
+	pt->buf = inp;
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+	pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
+	cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;
+    }
+    else
+      {
+        cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? filesize : 0;
+        pkt.pkttype = 0;
+        pkt.pkt.generic = NULL;
+      }
+
+    /* register the cipher filter */
+    if( mode )
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
+    /* register the compress filter */
+    if( do_compress )
+      {
+        if (cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc)
+          zfx.new_ctb = 1;
+	push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
+      }
+
+    /* do the work */
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+	if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+	    log_error("build_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+    }
+    else {
+	/* user requested not to create a literal packet,
+	 * so we copy the plain data */
+	byte copy_buffer[4096];
+	int  bytes_copied;
+	while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
+	    if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
+		rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+		break;
+	    }
+	wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */
+    }
+
+    /* finish the stuff */
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    if (rc)
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else {
+	iobuf_close(out); /* fixme: check returncode */
+        if (mode)
+            write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+    }
+    if (pt)
+	pt->buf = NULL;
+    free_packet(&pkt);
+    xfree(cfx.dek);
+    xfree(s2k);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+setup_symkey(STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek)
+{
+  *symkey_s2k=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(STRING2KEY));
+  (*symkey_s2k)->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
+  (*symkey_s2k)->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+
+  *symkey_dek=passphrase_to_dek(NULL,0,opt.s2k_cipher_algo,
+				*symkey_s2k,2,NULL,NULL);
+  if(!*symkey_dek || !(*symkey_dek)->keylen)
+    {
+      xfree(*symkey_dek);
+      xfree(*symkey_s2k);
+      return G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+write_symkey_enc(STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k,DEK *symkey_dek,DEK *dek,IOBUF out)
+{
+  int rc,seskeylen=cipher_get_keylen(dek->algo)/8;
+
+  PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+  byte enckey[33];
+  PACKET pkt;
+
+  enc=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_symkey_enc)+seskeylen+1);
+  encode_seskey(symkey_dek,&dek,enckey);
+
+  enc->version = 4;
+  enc->cipher_algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+  enc->s2k = *symkey_s2k;
+  enc->seskeylen = seskeylen + 1; /* algo id */
+  memcpy( enc->seskey, enckey, seskeylen + 1 );
+
+  pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+  pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+
+  if((rc=build_packet(out,&pkt)))
+    log_error("build symkey_enc packet failed: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+
+  xfree(enc);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Encrypt the file with the given userids (or ask if none
+ * is supplied).
+ */
+int
+encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr, int use_symkey )
+{
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
+    DEK *symkey_dek = NULL;
+    STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k = NULL;
+    int rc = 0, rc2 = 0;
+    u32 filesize;
+    cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+    text_filter_context_t tfx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    PK_LIST pk_list,work_list;
+    int do_compress = opt.compress_algo && !RFC1991;
+
+    memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+    memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+    init_packet(&pkt);
+
+    if(use_symkey
+       && (rc=setup_symkey(&symkey_s2k,&symkey_dek)))
+      return rc;
+
+    if( (rc=build_pk_list( remusr, &pk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
+	return rc;
+
+    if(PGP2) {
+      for(work_list=pk_list; work_list; work_list=work_list->next)
+	if(!(is_RSA(work_list->pk->pubkey_algo) &&
+	     nbits_from_pk(work_list->pk)<=2048))
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("you can only encrypt to RSA keys of 2048 bits or "
+		       "less in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+	    compliance_failure();
+	    break;
+	  }
+    }
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(filename);
+    if (inp)
+      iobuf_ioctl (inp,3,1,NULL); /* disable fd caching */
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !inp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]",
+					strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    else if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("reading from `%s'\n"), filename? filename: "[stdin]");
+
+    handle_progress (&pfx, inp, filename);
+
+    if( opt.textmode )
+	iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+
+    if( (rc = open_outfile( filename, opt.armor? 1:0, &out )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    if( opt.armor )
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    /* create a session key */
+    cfx.dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *cfx.dek);
+    if( !opt.def_cipher_algo ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
+	cfx.dek->algo = select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,-1,NULL);
+	/* The only way select_algo_from_prefs can fail here is when
+           mixing v3 and v4 keys, as v4 keys have an implicit
+           preference entry for 3DES, and the pk_list cannot be empty.
+           In this case, use 3DES anyway as it's the safest choice -
+           perhaps the v3 key is being used in an OpenPGP
+           implementation and we know that the implementation behind
+           any v4 key can handle 3DES. */
+	if( cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
+	    cfx.dek->algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
+
+	    if( PGP2 ) {
+	      log_info(_("unable to use the IDEA cipher for all of the keys "
+			 "you are encrypting to.\n"));
+	      compliance_failure();
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    else {
+      if(!opt.expert &&
+	 select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+				opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL)!=opt.def_cipher_algo)
+	log_info(_("WARNING: forcing symmetric cipher %s (%d)"
+		   " violates recipient preferences\n"),
+		 cipher_algo_to_string(opt.def_cipher_algo),
+		 opt.def_cipher_algo);
+
+      cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+    }
+
+    cfx.dek->use_mdc=use_mdc(pk_list,cfx.dek->algo);
+
+    /* Only do the is-file-already-compressed check if we are using a
+       MDC.  This forces compressed files to be re-compressed if we do
+       not have a MDC to give some protection against chosen
+       ciphertext attacks. */
+
+    if (do_compress && cfx.dek->use_mdc && is_file_compressed(filename, &rc2) )
+      {
+        if (opt.verbose)
+          log_info(_("`%s' already compressed\n"), filename);
+        do_compress = 0;        
+      }
+    if (rc2)
+      {
+        rc = rc2;
+        goto leave;
+      }
+
+    make_session_key( cfx.dek );
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_hexdump("DEK is: ", cfx.dek->key, cfx.dek->keylen );
+
+    rc = write_pubkey_enc_from_list( pk_list, cfx.dek, out );
+    if( rc  )
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* We put the passphrase (if any) after any public keys as this
+       seems to be the most useful on the recipient side - there is no
+       point in prompting a user for a passphrase if they have the
+       secret key needed to decrypt. */
+    if(use_symkey && (rc=write_symkey_enc(symkey_s2k,symkey_dek,cfx.dek,out)))
+      goto leave;
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+	/* setup the inner packet */
+	if( filename || opt.set_filename ) {
+	    char *s = make_basename( opt.set_filename ? opt.set_filename
+						      : filename,
+				     iobuf_get_real_fname( inp ) );
+	    pt = xmalloc( sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1 );
+	    pt->namelen = strlen(s);
+	    memcpy(pt->name, s, pt->namelen );
+	    xfree(s);
+	}
+	else { /* no filename */
+	    pt = xmalloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
+	    pt->namelen = 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (!iobuf_is_pipe_filename (filename) && *filename && !opt.textmode )
+      {
+        off_t tmpsize;
+        int overflow;
+
+	if ( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp, &overflow))
+             && !overflow )
+          log_info(_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), filename );
+        /* We can't encode the length of very large files because
+           OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes.  So if the the
+           size of a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for
+           packet headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
+        if (tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536) )
+          filesize = tmpsize;
+        else
+          filesize = 0;
+      }
+    else
+      filesize = opt.set_filesize ? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+	pt->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+	pt->mode = opt.textmode ? 't' : 'b';
+	pt->len = filesize;
+	pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
+	pt->buf = inp;
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+	pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
+	cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;
+    }
+    else
+	cfx.datalen = filesize && !do_compress ? filesize : 0;
+
+    /* register the cipher filter */
+    iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
+
+    /* register the compress filter */
+    if( do_compress ) {
+	int compr_algo = opt.compress_algo;
+
+	if(compr_algo==-1)
+	  {
+	    if((compr_algo=
+		select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1)
+	      compr_algo=DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO;
+	    /* Theoretically impossible to get here since uncompressed
+	       is implicit. */
+	  }
+	else if(!opt.expert &&
+		select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,
+				       compr_algo,NULL)!=compr_algo)
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)"
+		     " violates recipient preferences\n"),
+		   compress_algo_to_string(compr_algo),compr_algo);
+
+	/* algo 0 means no compression */
+	if( compr_algo )
+	  {
+            if (cfx.dek && cfx.dek->use_mdc)
+              zfx.new_ctb = 1;
+	    push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,compr_algo);
+	  }
+    }
+
+    /* do the work */
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+	if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+	    log_error("build_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+    }
+    else {
+	/* user requested not to create a literal packet, so we copy
+           the plain data */
+	byte copy_buffer[4096];
+	int  bytes_copied;
+	while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
+	    if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
+		rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		log_error("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
+                          g10_errstr(rc) );
+		break;
+	    }
+	wipememory(copy_buffer, 4096); /* burn buffer */
+    }
+
+    /* finish the stuff */
+  leave:
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else {
+	iobuf_close(out); /* fixme: check returncode */
+        write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+    }
+    if( pt )
+	pt->buf = NULL;
+    free_packet(&pkt);
+    xfree(cfx.dek);
+    xfree(symkey_dek);
+    xfree(symkey_s2k);
+    release_pk_list( pk_list );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Filter to do a complete public key encryption.
+ */
+int
+encrypt_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	       IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    encrypt_filter_context_t *efx = opaque;
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypt */
+	BUG(); /* not used */
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
+	if( !efx->header_okay ) {
+	    efx->cfx.dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *efx->cfx.dek );
+
+	    if( !opt.def_cipher_algo  ) { /* try to get it from the prefs */
+		efx->cfx.dek->algo =
+		  select_algo_from_prefs(efx->pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,-1,NULL);
+		if( efx->cfx.dek->algo == -1 ) {
+                    /* because 3DES is implicitly in the prefs, this can only
+                     * happen if we do not have any public keys in the list */
+		    efx->cfx.dek->algo = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO;
+                }
+	    }
+	    else {
+	      if(!opt.expert &&
+		 select_algo_from_prefs(efx->pk_list,PREFTYPE_SYM,
+					opt.def_cipher_algo,
+					NULL)!=opt.def_cipher_algo)
+		log_info(_("forcing symmetric cipher %s (%d) "
+			   "violates recipient preferences\n"),
+			 cipher_algo_to_string(opt.def_cipher_algo),
+			 opt.def_cipher_algo);
+
+	      efx->cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+	    }
+
+            efx->cfx.dek->use_mdc = use_mdc(efx->pk_list,efx->cfx.dek->algo);
+
+	    make_session_key( efx->cfx.dek );
+	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		log_hexdump("DEK is: ",
+			     efx->cfx.dek->key, efx->cfx.dek->keylen );
+
+	    rc = write_pubkey_enc_from_list( efx->pk_list, efx->cfx.dek, a );
+	    if( rc )
+		return rc;
+
+	    if(efx->symkey_s2k && efx->symkey_dek)
+	      {
+		rc=write_symkey_enc(efx->symkey_s2k,efx->symkey_dek,
+				    efx->cfx.dek,a);
+		if(rc)
+		  return rc;
+	      }
+
+	    iobuf_push_filter( a, cipher_filter, &efx->cfx );
+
+	    efx->header_okay = 1;
+	}
+	rc = iobuf_write( a, buf, size );
+
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE )
+      {
+	xfree(efx->symkey_dek);
+	xfree(efx->symkey_s2k);
+      }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) {
+	*(char**)buf = "encrypt_filter";
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Write pubkey-enc packets from the list of PKs to OUT.
+ */
+static int
+write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PK_LIST pk_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    PKT_pubkey_enc  *enc;
+    int rc;
+
+    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next ) {
+	MPI frame;
+
+	pk = pk_list->pk;
+
+	print_pubkey_algo_note( pk->pubkey_algo );
+	enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
+	enc->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, enc->keyid );
+	enc->throw_keyid = (opt.throw_keyid || (pk_list->flags&1));
+
+	if(opt.throw_keyid && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
+		     "--throw-keyid",compliance_option_string());
+	    compliance_failure();
+	  }
+
+	/* Okay, what's going on: We have the session key somewhere in
+	 * the structure DEK and want to encode this session key in
+	 * an integer value of n bits.	pubkey_nbits gives us the
+	 * number of bits we have to use.  We then encode the session
+	 * key in some way and we get it back in the big intger value
+	 * FRAME.  Then we use FRAME, the public key PK->PKEY and the
+	 * algorithm number PK->PUBKEY_ALGO and pass it to pubkey_encrypt
+	 * which returns the encrypted value in the array ENC->DATA.
+	 * This array has a size which depends on the used algorithm
+	 * (e.g. 2 for Elgamal).  We don't need frame anymore because we
+	 * have everything now in enc->data which is the passed to
+	 * build_packet()
+	 */
+	frame = encode_session_key( dek, pubkey_nbits( pk->pubkey_algo,
+							  pk->pkey ) );
+	rc = pubkey_encrypt( pk->pubkey_algo, enc->data, frame, pk->pkey );
+	mpi_free( frame );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_error("pubkey_encrypt failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	else {
+	    if( opt.verbose ) {
+		char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (enc->keyid);
+		log_info(_("%s/%s encrypted for: \"%s\"\n"),
+		    pubkey_algo_to_string(enc->pubkey_algo),
+		    cipher_algo_to_string(dek->algo), ustr );
+		xfree(ustr);
+	    }
+	    /* and write it */
+	    init_packet(&pkt);
+	    pkt.pkttype = PKT_PUBKEY_ENC;
+	    pkt.pkt.pubkey_enc = enc;
+	    rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
+	    if( rc )
+	       log_error("build_packet(pubkey_enc) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+	}
+	free_pubkey_enc(enc);
+	if( rc )
+	    return rc;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void
+encode_crypt_files(int nfiles, char **files, STRLIST remusr)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  if (opt.outfile)
+    {
+      log_error(_("--output doesn't work for this command\n"));
+      return;        
+    }
+    
+  if (!nfiles)
+    {
+      char line[2048];
+      unsigned int lno = 0;
+      while ( fgets(line, DIM(line), stdin) )
+        {
+          lno++;
+          if (!*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n')
+            {
+              log_error("input line %u too long or missing LF\n", lno);
+              return;
+            }
+          line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
+          print_file_status(STATUS_FILE_START, line, 2);
+          if ( (rc = encode_crypt(line, remusr, 0)) )
+            log_error("encryption of `%s' failed: %s\n",
+                      print_fname_stdin(line), g10_errstr(rc) );
+          write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
+          iobuf_ioctl( NULL, 2, 0, NULL); /* Invalidate entire cache. */
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      while (nfiles--)
+        {
+          print_file_status(STATUS_FILE_START, *files, 2);
+          if ( (rc = encode_crypt(*files, remusr, 0)) )
+            log_error("encryption of `%s' failed: %s\n",
+                      print_fname_stdin(*files), g10_errstr(rc) );
+          write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
+          iobuf_ioctl( NULL, 2, 0, NULL); /* Invalidate entire cache. */
+          files++;
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/encr-data.c b/g10/encr-data.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acb090a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/encr-data.c
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+/* encr-data.c -  process an encrypted data packet
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005,
+ *               2006  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+static int mdc_decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
+					      byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+static int decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
+					byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+
+typedef struct {
+    CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd;
+    MD_HANDLE mdc_hash;
+    char defer[22];
+    int  defer_filled;
+    int  eof_seen;
+    int  refcount;
+} *decode_filter_ctx_t;
+
+
+/* Helper to release the decode context.  */
+static void
+release_dfx_context (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx)
+{
+  if (!dfx)
+    return;
+
+  assert (dfx->refcount);
+  if ( !--dfx->refcount )
+    {
+      cipher_close (dfx->cipher_hd);
+      dfx->cipher_hd = NULL;
+      md_close (dfx->mdc_hash);
+      dfx->mdc_hash = NULL;
+      xfree (dfx);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Decrypt the data, specified by ED with the key DEK.
+ */
+int
+decrypt_data( void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
+{
+    decode_filter_ctx_t dfx;
+    byte *p;
+    int rc=0, c, i;
+    byte temp[32];
+    unsigned blocksize;
+    unsigned nprefix;
+
+
+    dfx = xcalloc (1, sizeof *dfx);
+    dfx->refcount = 1;
+
+    if( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed ) {
+	const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string( dek->algo );
+	if( s )
+	    log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+	else
+	    log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), dek->algo );
+        dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+    }
+    if( (rc=check_cipher_algo(dek->algo)) )
+	goto leave;
+    blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize(dek->algo);
+    if( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
+	log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
+    nprefix = blocksize;
+    if( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
+	BUG();
+
+    if( ed->mdc_method ) {
+	dfx->mdc_hash = md_open ( ed->mdc_method, 0 );
+	if ( DBG_HASHING )
+	    md_start_debug (dfx->mdc_hash, "checkmdc");
+    }
+    dfx->cipher_hd = cipher_open ( dek->algo,
+                                   ed->mdc_method? CIPHER_MODE_CFB
+                                                 : CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
+    /* log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+    rc = cipher_setkey ( dfx->cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_WEAK_KEY )
+      {
+	log_info(_("WARNING: message was encrypted with"
+		   " a weak key in the symmetric cipher.\n"));
+	rc=0;
+      }
+    else if( rc )
+      {
+	log_error("key setup failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+      
+      }
+    if (!ed->buf) {
+        log_error(_("problem handling encrypted packet\n"));
+        goto leave;
+    }
+
+    cipher_setiv ( dfx->cipher_hd, NULL, 0 );
+
+    if( ed->len ) {
+	for(i=0; i < (nprefix+2) && ed->len; i++, ed->len-- ) {
+	    if( (c=iobuf_get(ed->buf)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    else
+		temp[i] = c;
+	}
+    }
+    else {
+	for(i=0; i < (nprefix+2); i++ )
+	    if( (c=iobuf_get(ed->buf)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    else
+		temp[i] = c;
+    }
+    cipher_decrypt ( dfx->cipher_hd, temp, temp, nprefix+2);
+    cipher_sync ( dfx->cipher_hd );
+    p = temp;
+/* log_hexdump( "prefix", temp, nprefix+2 ); */
+    if(dek->symmetric
+       && (p[nprefix-2] != p[nprefix] || p[nprefix-1] != p[nprefix+1]) )
+      {
+	rc = G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    if ( dfx->mdc_hash )
+	md_write ( dfx->mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2 );
+
+    dfx->refcount++;
+    if ( ed->mdc_method )
+	iobuf_push_filter( ed->buf, mdc_decode_filter, dfx );
+    else
+	iobuf_push_filter( ed->buf, decode_filter, dfx );
+
+    proc_packets( procctx, ed->buf );
+    ed->buf = NULL;
+    if( ed->mdc_method && dfx->eof_seen == 2 )
+	rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+    else if( ed->mdc_method ) { /* check the mdc */
+        /* We used to let parse-packet.c handle the MDC packet but
+           this turned out to be a problem with compressed packets:
+           With old style packets there is no length information
+           available and the decompressor uses an implicit end.
+           However we can't know this implicit end beforehand (:-) and
+           thus may feed the decompressor with more bytes than
+           actually needed.  It would be possible to unread the extra
+           bytes but due to our weird iobuf system any unread is non
+           reliable due to filters already popped off.  The easy and
+           sane solution is to care about the MDC packet only here and
+           never pass it to the packet parser.  Fortunatley the
+           OpenPGP spec requires a strict format for the MDC packet so
+           that we know that 22 bytes are appended.  */
+	int datalen = md_digest_length( ed->mdc_method );
+
+        assert (dfx->cipher_hd);
+        assert (dfx->mdc_hash);
+	cipher_decrypt ( dfx->cipher_hd, dfx->defer, dfx->defer, 22);
+        md_write ( dfx->mdc_hash, dfx->defer, 2);
+	md_final ( dfx->mdc_hash );
+        if (dfx->defer[0] != '\xd3' || dfx->defer[1] != '\x14' ) {
+            log_error("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
+            rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+        }
+	else if ( datalen != 20
+	    || memcmp(md_read( dfx->mdc_hash, 0 ), dfx->defer+2, datalen) )
+	    rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+	/*log_hexdump("MDC calculated:",md_read( dfx->mdc_hash, 0), datalen);*/
+	/*log_hexdump("MDC message   :", dfx->defer, 20);*/
+    }
+    
+
+  leave:
+    release_dfx_context (dfx);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/* I think we should merge this with cipher_filter */
+static int
+mdc_decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
+					      byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    decode_filter_ctx_t dfx = opaque;
+    size_t n, size = *ret_len;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int c;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW && dfx->eof_seen ) {
+	*ret_len = 0;
+	rc = -1;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+	assert(a);
+	assert( size > 44 );
+
+	/* get at least 20 bytes and put it somewhere ahead in the buffer */
+	for(n=22; n < 44 ; n++ ) {
+	    if( (c = iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    buf[n] = c;
+	}
+	if( n == 44 ) {
+	    /* we have enough stuff - flush the deferred stuff */
+	    /* (we have asserted that the buffer is large enough) */
+	    if( !dfx->defer_filled ) { /* the first time */
+		memcpy(buf, buf+22, 22 );
+		n = 22;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		memcpy(buf, dfx->defer, 22 );
+	    }
+	    /* now fill up */
+	    for(; n < size; n++ ) {
+		if( (c = iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
+		    break;
+		buf[n] = c;
+	    }
+	    /* Move the last 22 bytes back to the defer buffer. */
+	    /* (okay, we are wasting 22 bytes of supplied buffer) */
+	    n -= 22;
+	    memcpy( dfx->defer, buf+n, 22 );
+	    dfx->defer_filled = 1;
+	}
+	else if( !dfx->defer_filled ) { /* eof seen buf empty defer */
+	    /* this is bad because there is an incomplete hash */
+	    n -= 22;
+	    memcpy(buf, buf+22, n );
+	    dfx->eof_seen = 2; /* eof with incomplete hash */
+	}
+	else { /* eof seen */
+	    memcpy (buf, dfx->defer, 22 );
+	    n -= 22;
+	    memcpy( dfx->defer, buf+n, 22 );
+	    dfx->eof_seen = 1; /* normal eof */
+	}
+
+	if( n ) {
+            if (dfx->cipher_hd)
+                cipher_decrypt( dfx->cipher_hd, buf, buf, n);
+            if (dfx->mdc_hash)
+                md_write( dfx->mdc_hash, buf, n );
+	}
+	else {
+	    assert( dfx->eof_seen );
+	    rc = -1; /* eof */
+	}
+	*ret_len = n;
+    }
+    else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+        release_dfx_context (dfx);
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) {
+	*(char**)buf = "mdc_decode_filter";
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    decode_filter_ctx_t fc = opaque;
+    size_t n, size = *ret_len;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+	assert(a);
+	n = iobuf_read( a, buf, size );
+	if( n == -1 ) n = 0;
+	if( n ) {
+            if (fc->cipher_hd)
+                cipher_decrypt( fc->cipher_hd, buf, buf, n);
+        }
+	else
+	    rc = -1; /* eof */
+	*ret_len = n;
+    }
+    else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+        release_dfx_context (fc);
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) {
+	*(char**)buf = "decode_filter";
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/exec.c b/g10/exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d99bb5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+/* exec.c - generic call-a-program code
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifndef EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "options.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "exec.h"
+
+#ifdef NO_EXEC
+int exec_write(struct exec_info **info,const char *program,
+	       const char *args_in,const char *name,int writeonly,int binary)
+{
+  log_error(_("no remote program execution supported\n"));
+  return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+int exec_read(struct exec_info *info) { return G10ERR_GENERAL; }
+int exec_finish(struct exec_info *info) { return G10ERR_GENERAL; }
+int set_exec_path(const char *path) { return G10ERR_GENERAL; }
+
+#else /* ! NO_EXEC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+char *mkdtemp(char *template);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_WIN32)
+/* This is a nicer system() for windows that waits for programs to
+   return before returning control to the caller.  I hate helpful
+   computers. */
+static int win_system(const char *command)
+{
+  PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
+  STARTUPINFO si;
+  char *string;
+
+  /* We must use a copy of the command as CreateProcess modifies this
+     argument. */
+  string=xstrdup(command);
+
+  memset(&pi,0,sizeof(pi));
+  memset(&si,0,sizeof(si));
+  si.cb=sizeof(si);
+
+  if(!CreateProcess(NULL,string,NULL,NULL,FALSE,0,NULL,NULL,&si,&pi))
+    return -1;
+
+  /* Wait for the child to exit */
+  WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess,INFINITE);
+
+  CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
+  CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
+  xfree(string);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Replaces current $PATH */
+int set_exec_path(const char *path)
+{
+  char *p;
+
+  p=xmalloc(5+strlen(path)+1);
+  strcpy(p,"PATH=");
+  strcat(p,path);
+
+  if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+    log_debug("set_exec_path: %s\n",p);
+
+  /* Notice that path is never freed.  That is intentional due to the
+     way putenv() works.  This leaks a few bytes if we call
+     set_exec_path multiple times. */
+
+  if(putenv(p)!=0)
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+  else
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Makes a temp directory and filenames */
+static int make_tempdir(struct exec_info *info)
+{
+  char *tmp=opt.temp_dir,*namein=info->name,*nameout;
+
+  if(!namein)
+    namein=info->flags.binary?"tempin" EXTSEP_S "bin":"tempin" EXTSEP_S "txt";
+
+  nameout=info->flags.binary?"tempout" EXTSEP_S "bin":"tempout" EXTSEP_S "txt";
+
+  /* Make up the temp dir and files in case we need them */
+
+  if(tmp==NULL)
+    {
+#if defined (_WIN32)
+      int err;
+
+      tmp=xmalloc(MAX_PATH);
+      err=GetTempPath(MAX_PATH,tmp);
+      if(err==0 || err>MAX_PATH)
+	strcpy(tmp,"c:\\windows\\temp");
+      else
+	{
+	  int len=strlen(tmp);
+
+	  /* GetTempPath may return with \ on the end */
+	  while(len>0 && tmp[len-1]=='\\')
+	    {
+	      tmp[len-1]='\0';
+	      len--;
+	    }
+	}
+#else /* More unixish systems */
+      tmp=getenv("TMPDIR");
+      if(tmp==NULL)
+	{
+	  tmp=getenv("TMP");
+	  if(tmp==NULL)
+	    {
+#ifdef __riscos__
+	      tmp="<Wimp$ScrapDir>.GnuPG";
+	      mkdir(tmp,0700); /* Error checks occur later on */
+#else
+	      tmp="/tmp";
+#endif
+	    }
+	}
+#endif
+    }
+
+  info->tempdir=xmalloc(strlen(tmp)+strlen(DIRSEP_S)+10+1);
+
+  sprintf(info->tempdir,"%s" DIRSEP_S "gpg-XXXXXX",tmp);
+
+#if defined (_WIN32)
+  xfree(tmp);
+#endif
+
+  if(mkdtemp(info->tempdir)==NULL)
+    log_error(_("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"),
+	      info->tempdir,strerror(errno));
+  else
+    {
+      info->flags.madedir=1;
+
+      info->tempfile_in=xmalloc(strlen(info->tempdir)+
+				strlen(DIRSEP_S)+strlen(namein)+1);
+      sprintf(info->tempfile_in,"%s" DIRSEP_S "%s",info->tempdir,namein);
+
+      if(!info->flags.writeonly)
+	{
+	  info->tempfile_out=xmalloc(strlen(info->tempdir)+
+				     strlen(DIRSEP_S)+strlen(nameout)+1);
+	  sprintf(info->tempfile_out,"%s" DIRSEP_S "%s",info->tempdir,nameout);
+	}
+    }
+
+  return info->flags.madedir?0:G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+/* Expands %i and %o in the args to the full temp files within the
+   temp directory. */
+static int expand_args(struct exec_info *info,const char *args_in)
+{
+  const char *ch=args_in;
+  unsigned int size,len;
+
+  info->flags.use_temp_files=0;
+  info->flags.keep_temp_files=0;
+
+  if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+    log_debug("expanding string \"%s\"\n",args_in);
+
+  size=100;
+  info->command=xmalloc(size);
+  len=0;
+  info->command[0]='\0';
+
+  while(*ch!='\0')
+    {
+      if(*ch=='%')
+	{
+	  char *append=NULL;
+
+	  ch++;
+
+	  switch(*ch)
+	    {
+	    case 'O':
+	      info->flags.keep_temp_files=1;
+	      /* fall through */
+
+	    case 'o': /* out */
+	      if(!info->flags.madedir)
+		{
+		  if(make_tempdir(info))
+		    goto fail;
+		}
+	      append=info->tempfile_out;
+	      info->flags.use_temp_files=1;
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'I':
+	      info->flags.keep_temp_files=1;
+	      /* fall through */
+
+	    case 'i': /* in */
+	      if(!info->flags.madedir)
+		{
+		  if(make_tempdir(info))
+		    goto fail;
+		}
+	      append=info->tempfile_in;
+	      info->flags.use_temp_files=1;
+	      break;
+
+	    case '%':
+	      append="%";
+	      break;
+	    }
+
+	  if(append)
+	    {
+	      size_t applen=strlen(append);
+
+	      if(applen+len>size-1)
+		{
+		  if(applen<100)
+		    applen=100;
+
+		  size+=applen;
+		  info->command=xrealloc(info->command,size);
+		}
+
+	      strcat(info->command,append);
+	      len+=strlen(append);
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  if(len==size-1) /* leave room for the \0 */
+	    {
+	      size+=100;
+	      info->command=xrealloc(info->command,size);
+	    }
+
+	  info->command[len++]=*ch;
+	  info->command[len]='\0';
+	}
+
+      ch++;
+    }
+
+  if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+    log_debug("args expanded to \"%s\", use %u, keep %u\n",info->command,
+	      info->flags.use_temp_files,info->flags.keep_temp_files);
+
+  return 0;
+
+ fail:
+
+  xfree(info->command);
+  info->command=NULL;
+
+  return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+/* Either handles the tempfile creation, or the fork/exec.  If it
+   returns ok, then info->tochild is a FILE * that can be written to.
+   The rules are: if there are no args, then it's a fork/exec/pipe.
+   If there are args, but no tempfiles, then it's a fork/exec/pipe via
+   shell -c.  If there are tempfiles, then it's a system. */
+
+int exec_write(struct exec_info **info,const char *program,
+	       const char *args_in,const char *name,int writeonly,int binary)
+{
+  int ret=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  if(opt.exec_disable && !opt.no_perm_warn)
+    {
+      log_info(_("external program calls are disabled due to unsafe "
+		 "options file permissions\n"));
+
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
+  /* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
+     setuid privs.  Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
+  if(getuid()!=geteuid())
+    BUG();
+#endif
+
+  if(program==NULL && args_in==NULL)
+    BUG();
+
+  *info=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(struct exec_info));
+
+  if(name)
+    (*info)->name=xstrdup(name);
+  (*info)->flags.binary=binary;
+  (*info)->flags.writeonly=writeonly;
+
+  /* Expand the args, if any */
+  if(args_in && expand_args(*info,args_in))
+    goto fail;
+
+#ifdef EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
+  if(!(*info)->flags.use_temp_files)
+    {
+      log_error(_("this platform requires temporary files when calling"
+		  " external programs\n"));
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+#else /* !EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY */
+
+  /* If there are no args, or there are args, but no temp files, we
+     can use fork/exec/pipe */
+  if(args_in==NULL || (*info)->flags.use_temp_files==0)
+    {
+      int to[2],from[2];
+
+      if(pipe(to)==-1)
+	goto fail;
+
+      if(pipe(from)==-1)
+	{
+	  close(to[0]);
+	  close(to[1]);
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      if(((*info)->child=fork())==-1)
+	{
+	  close(to[0]);
+	  close(to[1]);
+	  close(from[0]);
+	  close(from[1]);
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      if((*info)->child==0)
+	{
+	  char *shell=getenv("SHELL");
+
+	  if(shell==NULL)
+	    shell="/bin/sh";
+
+	  /* I'm the child */
+
+	  /* If the program isn't going to respond back, they get to
+             keep their stdout/stderr */
+	  if(!(*info)->flags.writeonly)
+	    {
+	      /* implied close of STDERR */
+	      if(dup2(STDOUT_FILENO,STDERR_FILENO)==-1)
+		_exit(1);
+
+	      /* implied close of STDOUT */
+	      close(from[0]);
+	      if(dup2(from[1],STDOUT_FILENO)==-1)
+		_exit(1);
+	    }
+
+	  /* implied close of STDIN */
+	  close(to[1]);
+	  if(dup2(to[0],STDIN_FILENO)==-1)
+	    _exit(1);
+
+	  if(args_in==NULL)
+	    {
+	      if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+		log_debug("execlp: %s\n",program);
+
+	      execlp(program,program,(void *)NULL);
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+		log_debug("execlp: %s -c %s\n",shell,(*info)->command);
+
+	      execlp(shell,shell,"-c",(*info)->command,(void *)NULL);
+	    }
+
+	  /* If we get this far the exec failed.  Clean up and return. */
+
+	  if(args_in==NULL)
+	    log_error(_("unable to execute program `%s': %s\n"),
+		      program,strerror(errno));
+	  else
+	    log_error(_("unable to execute shell `%s': %s\n"),
+		      shell,strerror(errno));
+
+	  /* This mimics the POSIX sh behavior - 127 means "not found"
+             from the shell. */
+	  if(errno==ENOENT)
+	    _exit(127);
+
+	  _exit(1);
+	}
+
+      /* I'm the parent */
+
+      close(to[0]);
+
+      (*info)->tochild=fdopen(to[1],binary?"wb":"w");
+      if((*info)->tochild==NULL)
+	{
+	  close(to[1]);
+	  ret=G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      close(from[1]);
+
+      (*info)->fromchild=iobuf_fdopen(from[0],"r");
+      if((*info)->fromchild==NULL)
+	{
+	  close(from[0]);
+	  ret=G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      /* fd iobufs are cached?! */
+      iobuf_ioctl((*info)->fromchild,3,1,NULL);
+
+      return 0;
+    }
+#endif /* !EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY */
+
+  if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+    log_debug("using temp file `%s'\n",(*info)->tempfile_in);
+
+  /* It's not fork/exec/pipe, so create a temp file */
+  if( is_secured_filename ((*info)->tempfile_in) )
+    {
+      (*info)->tochild = NULL;
+      errno = EPERM;
+    }
+  else
+    (*info)->tochild=fopen((*info)->tempfile_in,binary?"wb":"w");
+  if((*info)->tochild==NULL)
+    {
+      log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"),
+		(*info)->tempfile_in,strerror(errno));
+      ret=G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  ret=0;
+
+ fail:
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int exec_read(struct exec_info *info)
+{
+  int ret=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  fclose(info->tochild);
+  info->tochild=NULL;
+
+  if(info->flags.use_temp_files)
+    {
+      if(DBG_EXTPROG)
+	log_debug("system() command is %s\n",info->command);
+
+#if defined (_WIN32)
+      info->progreturn=win_system(info->command);
+#else
+      info->progreturn=system(info->command);
+#endif
+
+      if(info->progreturn==-1)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("system error while calling external program: %s\n"),
+		    strerror(errno));
+	  info->progreturn=127;
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+#if defined(WIFEXITED) && defined(WEXITSTATUS)
+      if(WIFEXITED(info->progreturn))
+	info->progreturn=WEXITSTATUS(info->progreturn);
+      else
+	{
+	  log_error(_("unnatural exit of external program\n"));
+	  info->progreturn=127;
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+#else
+      /* If we don't have the macros, do the best we can. */
+      info->progreturn = (info->progreturn & 0xff00) >> 8;
+#endif
+
+      /* 127 is the magic value returned from system() to indicate
+         that the shell could not be executed, or from /bin/sh to
+         indicate that the program could not be executed. */
+
+      if(info->progreturn==127)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("unable to execute external program\n"));
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      if(!info->flags.writeonly)
+	{
+	  info->fromchild=iobuf_open(info->tempfile_out);
+          if (info->fromchild
+              && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (info->fromchild)))
+            {
+              iobuf_close (info->fromchild);
+              info->fromchild = NULL;
+              errno = EPERM;
+            }
+	  if(info->fromchild==NULL)
+	    {
+	      log_error(_("unable to read external program response: %s\n"),
+			strerror(errno));
+	      ret=G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	      goto fail;
+	    }
+
+	  /* Do not cache this iobuf on close */
+	  iobuf_ioctl(info->fromchild,3,1,NULL);
+	}
+    }
+
+  ret=0;
+
+ fail:
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int exec_finish(struct exec_info *info)
+{
+  int ret=info->progreturn;
+
+  if(info->fromchild)
+    iobuf_close(info->fromchild);
+
+  if(info->tochild)
+    fclose(info->tochild);
+
+#ifndef EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
+  if(info->child>0)
+    {
+      if(waitpid(info->child,&info->progreturn,0)!=0 &&
+	 WIFEXITED(info->progreturn))
+	ret=WEXITSTATUS(info->progreturn);
+      else
+	{
+	  log_error(_("unnatural exit of external program\n"));
+	  ret=127;
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+
+  if(info->flags.madedir && !info->flags.keep_temp_files)
+    {
+      if(info->tempfile_in)
+	{
+	  if(unlink(info->tempfile_in)==-1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unable to remove tempfile (%s) `%s': %s\n"),
+		     "in",info->tempfile_in,strerror(errno));
+	}
+  
+      if(info->tempfile_out)
+	{
+	  if(unlink(info->tempfile_out)==-1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unable to remove tempfile (%s) `%s': %s\n"),
+		     "out",info->tempfile_out,strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+      if(rmdir(info->tempdir)==-1)
+	log_info(_("WARNING: unable to remove temp directory `%s': %s\n"),
+		 info->tempdir,strerror(errno));
+    }
+
+  xfree(info->command);
+  xfree(info->name);
+  xfree(info->tempdir);
+  xfree(info->tempfile_in);
+  xfree(info->tempfile_out);
+  xfree(info);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+#endif /* ! NO_EXEC */
diff --git a/g10/exec.h b/g10/exec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4a6f0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/exec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* exec.h
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _EXEC_H_
+#define _EXEC_H_
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "iobuf.h"
+
+struct exec_info
+{
+  int progreturn;
+  struct
+  {
+    unsigned int binary:1;
+    unsigned int writeonly:1;
+    unsigned int madedir:1;
+    unsigned int use_temp_files:1;
+    unsigned int keep_temp_files:1;
+  } flags;
+  pid_t child;
+  FILE *tochild;
+  IOBUF fromchild;
+  char *command,*name,*tempdir,*tempfile_in,*tempfile_out;
+};
+
+int exec_write(struct exec_info **info,const char *program,
+	       const char *args_in,const char *name,int writeonly,int binary);
+int exec_read(struct exec_info *info);
+int exec_finish(struct exec_info *info);
+int set_exec_path(const char *path);
+
+#endif /* !_EXEC_H_ */
diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..626b7d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/export.c
@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+/* export.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+
+
+/* An object to keep track of subkeys. */
+struct subkey_list_s
+{
+  struct subkey_list_s *next;
+  u32 kid[2];
+};
+typedef struct subkey_list_s *subkey_list_t;
+
+
+static int do_export( STRLIST users, int secret, unsigned int options );
+static int do_export_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int secret,
+			     KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options,
+			     int *any );
+
+int
+parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
+{
+  struct parse_options export_opts[]=
+    {
+      {"export-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
+       N_("export signatures that are marked as local-only")},
+      {"export-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,
+       N_("export attribute user IDs (generally photo IDs)")},
+      {"export-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,
+       N_("export revocation keys marked as \"sensitive\"")},
+      {"export-reset-subkey-passwd",EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD,NULL,
+       N_("remove the passphrase from exported subkeys")},
+      {"export-clean",EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
+       N_("remove unusable parts from key during export")},
+      {"export-minimal",EXPORT_MINIMAL|EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
+       N_("remove as much as possible from key during export")},
+      /* Aliases for backward compatibility */
+      {"include-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
+      {"include-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,NULL},
+      {"include-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,NULL},
+      /* dummy */
+      {"export-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {"export-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {"export-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
+      /* add tags for include revoked and disabled? */
+    };
+
+  return parse_options(str,options,export_opts,noisy);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Export the public keys (to standard out or --output).
+ * Depending on opt.armor the output is armored.
+ * options are defined in main.h.
+ * If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported.  */
+int
+export_pubkeys( STRLIST users, unsigned int options )
+{
+    return do_export( users, 0, options );
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Export to an already opened stream; return -1 if no keys have
+ * been exported
+ */
+int
+export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users,
+		       KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options )
+{
+    int any, rc;
+
+    rc = do_export_stream( out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any );
+    if( !rc && !any )
+	rc = -1;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+export_seckeys( STRLIST users )
+{
+    return do_export( users, 1, 0 );
+}
+
+int
+export_secsubkeys( STRLIST users )
+{
+    return do_export( users, 2, 0 );
+}
+
+static int
+do_export( STRLIST users, int secret, unsigned int options )
+{
+    IOBUF out = NULL;
+    int any, rc;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+
+    rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out );
+    if( rc )
+	return rc;
+
+    if( opt.armor ) {
+	afx.what = secret?5:1;
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+    }
+    if( opt.compress_keys )
+      push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
+
+    rc = do_export_stream( out, users, secret, NULL, options, &any );
+    if( rc || !any )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Release an entire subkey list. */
+static void
+release_subkey_list (subkey_list_t list)
+{
+  while (list)
+    {
+      subkey_list_t tmp = list->next;;
+      xfree (list);
+      list = tmp;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Returns true if NODE is a subkey and contained in LIST. */
+static int
+subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list_t list, KBNODE node)
+{
+  if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+    {
+      u32 kid[2];
+
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+      else
+        keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
+      
+      for (; list; list = list->next)
+        if (list->kid[0] == kid[0] && list->kid[1] == kid[1])
+          return 1;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Allocate a new subkey list item from NODE. */
+static subkey_list_t
+new_subkey_list_item (KBNODE node)
+{
+  subkey_list_t list = xcalloc (1, sizeof *list);
+
+  if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+    keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, list->kid);
+  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+    keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, list->kid);
+
+  return list;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper function to check whether the subkey at NODE actually
+   matches the description at DESC.  The function returns true if the
+   key under question has been specified by an exact specification
+   (keyID or fingerprint) and does match the one at NODE.  It is
+   assumed that the packet at NODE is either a public or secret
+   subkey. */
+static int
+exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node)
+{
+  u32 kid[2];
+  byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  size_t fprlen;
+  int result = 0;
+
+  switch(desc->mode)
+    {
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+      else
+        keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
+      break;
+      
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr,&fprlen);
+      else
+        fingerprint_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, fpr,&fprlen);
+      break;
+      
+    default:
+      break;
+    }
+  
+  switch(desc->mode)
+    {
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
+      if (desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
+        result = 1;
+      break;
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+      if (desc->u.kid[0] == kid[0] && desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
+        result = 1;
+      break;
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
+      if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 16))
+        result = 1;
+      break;
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
+      if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 20))
+        result = 1;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      break;
+    }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+
+/* If keyblock_out is non-NULL, AND the exit code is zero, then it
+   contains a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported.  No
+   other keyblocks are exported.  The caller must free it. */
+static int
+do_export_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int secret,
+		  KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, int *any )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    KBNODE kbctx, node;
+    size_t ndesc, descindex;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
+    subkey_list_t subkey_list = NULL;  /* Track alreay processed subkeys. */
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
+    STRLIST sl;
+
+    *any = 0;
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+    kdbhd = keydb_new (secret);
+
+    if (!users) {
+        ndesc = 1;
+        desc = xcalloc ( ndesc, sizeof *desc );
+        desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+    }
+    else {
+        for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++) 
+            ;
+        desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
+        
+        for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next) {
+	    if (classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc))
+                ndesc++;
+            else
+                log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
+                           sl->d, g10_errstr (G10ERR_INV_USER_ID));
+        }
+
+        /* It would be nice to see which of the given users did
+           actually match one in the keyring.  To implement this we
+           need to have a found flag for each entry in desc and to set
+           this we must check all those entries after a match to mark
+           all matched one - currently we stop at the first match.  To
+           do this we need an extra flag to enable this feature so */
+    }
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+    if (secret) {
+        log_error (_("exporting secret keys not allowed\n"));
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+        goto leave;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    while (!(rc = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex))) {
+        int sha1_warned=0,skip_until_subkey=0;
+	u32 sk_keyid[2];
+
+	if (!users) 
+            desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+
+        /* Read the keyblock. */
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
+	if( rc ) {
+            log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+	if((node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
+	  {
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk=node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+	    keyid_from_sk(sk,sk_keyid);
+
+	    /* We can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key. */
+	    if( secret == 2 && !sk->is_protected )
+	      {
+		log_info(_("key %s: not protected - skipped\n"),
+			 keystr(sk_keyid));
+		continue;
+	      }
+
+	    /* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */
+	    if( secret == 2 && sk->version == 3 )
+	      {
+		log_info(_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"),
+			 keystr(sk_keyid));
+		continue;
+	      }
+
+            /* It does not make sense to export a key with a primary
+               key on card using a non-key stub.  We simply skip those
+               keys when used with --export-secret-subkeys. */
+            if (secret == 2 && sk->is_protected
+                && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) 
+              {
+		log_info(_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"),
+			 keystr(sk_keyid));
+		continue;
+              }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* It's a public key export, so do the cleaning if
+	       requested.  Note that both export-clean and
+	       export-minimal only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11,
+	       0x12, and 0x13).  A designated revocation is never
+	       stripped, even with export-minimal set. */
+
+	    if(options&EXPORT_CLEAN)
+	      clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&EXPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
+	  }
+
+	/* And write it. */
+	for( kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0 )); ) {
+	    if( skip_until_subkey )
+	      {
+		if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		   || node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+		  skip_until_subkey=0;
+		else
+		  continue;
+	      }
+
+	    /* We used to use comment packets, but not any longer.  In
+	       case we still have comments on a key, strip them here
+	       before we call build_packet(). */
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT )
+	      continue;
+
+            /* Make sure that ring_trust packets never get exported. */
+            if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
+              continue;
+
+	    /* If exact is set, then we only export what was requested
+	       (plus the primary key, if the user didn't specifically
+	       request it). */
+	    if(desc[descindex].exact
+	       && (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		   || node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
+	      {
+                if (!exact_subkey_match_p (desc+descindex, node))
+                  {
+                    /* Before skipping this subkey, check whether any
+                       other description wants an exact match on a
+                       subkey and include that subkey into the output
+                       too.  Need to add this subkey to a list so that
+                       it won't get processed a second time.
+                   
+                       So the first step here is to check that list and
+                       skip in any case if the key is in that list.
+
+                       We need this whole mess because the import
+                       function is not able to merge secret keys and
+                       thus it is useless to output them as two
+                       separate keys and have import merge them.  */
+                    if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))  
+                      skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */
+                    else
+                      {
+                        size_t j;
+
+                        for (j=0; j < ndesc; j++)
+                          if (j != descindex && desc[j].exact
+                              && exact_subkey_match_p (desc+j, node))
+                            break;
+                        if (!(j < ndesc))
+                          skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */ 
+                      }
+                  }
+
+		if(skip_until_subkey)
+		  continue;
+
+                /* Mark this one as processed. */
+                {
+                  subkey_list_t tmp = new_subkey_list_item (node);
+                  tmp->next = subkey_list;
+                  subkey_list = tmp;
+                }
+	      }
+
+	    if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
+	      {
+		/* do not export packets which are marked as not
+		   exportable */
+		if(!(options&EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS)
+		   && !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable)
+		  continue; /* not exportable */
+
+		/* Do not export packets with a "sensitive" revocation
+		   key unless the user wants us to.  Note that we do
+		   export these when issuing the actual revocation
+		   (see revoke.c). */
+		if(!(options&EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS)
+		   && node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
+		  {
+		    int i;
+
+		    for(i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++)
+		      if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40)
+			break;
+
+		    if(i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys)
+		      continue;
+		  }
+	      }
+
+	    /* Don't export attribs? */
+	    if( !(options&EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES) &&
+		node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+		node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) {
+	      /* Skip until we get to something that is not an attrib
+		 or a signature on an attrib */
+	      while(kbctx->next && kbctx->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) {
+		kbctx=kbctx->next;
+	      }
+ 
+	      continue;
+	    }
+
+	    if( secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+	      {
+		/* We don't want to export the secret parts of the
+		 * primary key, this is done by using GNU protection mode 1001
+		 */
+		int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode;
+		node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;
+		rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt );
+		node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = save_mode;
+	      }
+	    else if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+                     && (opt.export_options&EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD))
+              {
+                /* If the subkey is protected reset the passphrase to
+                   export an unprotected subkey.  This feature is
+                   useful in cases of a subkey copied to an unattended
+                   machine where a passphrase is not required. */
+                PKT_secret_key *sk_save, *sk;
+
+                sk_save = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk_save);
+                node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+
+                log_info (_("about to export an unprotected subkey\n"));
+                switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk))
+                  {
+                  case -1:
+                    rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+                    break;
+                  case 0:
+                    break;
+                  default:
+                    if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
+                      ; /* No secret parts. */
+                    else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) 
+                      ; /* Card key stub. */
+                    else 
+                      {
+                        rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+                      }
+                    break;
+                  }
+                if (rc)
+                  {
+                    node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
+                    free_secret_key (sk);
+                    log_error (_("failed to unprotect the subkey: %s\n"),
+                               g10_errstr (rc));
+                    goto leave;
+                  }
+
+		rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
+
+                node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
+                free_secret_key (sk);
+              }
+	    else
+	      {
+		/* Warn the user if the secret key or any of the secret
+		   subkeys are protected with SHA1 and we have
+		   simple_sk_checksum set. */
+		if(!sha1_warned && opt.simple_sk_checksum &&
+		   (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY ||
+		    node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) &&
+		   node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.sha1chk)
+		  {
+		    /* I hope this warning doesn't confuse people. */
+		    log_info(_("WARNING: secret key %s does not have a "
+			       "simple SK checksum\n"),keystr(sk_keyid));
+
+		    sha1_warned=1;
+		  }
+
+		rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt );
+	      }
+
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
+			    node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+		rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	}
+	++*any;
+	if(keyblock_out)
+	  {
+	    *keyblock_out=keyblock;
+	    break;
+	  }
+    }
+    if( rc == -1 )
+	rc = 0;
+
+  leave:
+    release_subkey_list (subkey_list);
+    xfree(desc);
+    keydb_release (kdbhd);
+    if(rc || keyblock_out==NULL)
+      release_kbnode( keyblock );
+    if( !*any )
+	log_info(_("WARNING: nothing exported\n"));
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/filter.h b/g10/filter.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9fe872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/filter.h
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/* filter.h
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+#ifndef G10_FILTER_H
+#define G10_FILTER_H
+
+#include "types.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    MD_HANDLE md;      /* catch all */
+    MD_HANDLE md2;     /* if we want to calculate an alternate hash */
+    size_t maxbuf_size;
+} md_filter_context_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    int refcount;           /* Reference counter.  If 0 this structure
+                               is not allocated on the heap. */
+
+    /* these fields may be initialized */
+    int what;		    /* what kind of armor headers to write */
+    int only_keyblocks;     /* skip all headers but ".... key block" */
+    const char *hdrlines;   /* write these headerlines */
+
+    /* these fileds must be initialized to zero */
+    int no_openpgp_data;    /* output flag: "No valid OpenPGP data found" */
+
+    /* the following fields must be initialized to zero */
+    int inp_checked;	    /* set if the input has been checked */
+    int inp_bypass;	    /* set if the input is not armored */
+    int in_cleartext;	    /* clear text message */
+    int not_dash_escaped;   /* clear text is not dash escaped */
+    int hashes; 	    /* detected hash algorithms */
+    int faked;		    /* we are faking a literal data packet */
+    int truncated;	    /* number of truncated lines */
+    int qp_detected;
+    int pgp2mode;
+    byte eol[3];            /* The end of line characters as a
+			       zero-terminated string.  Defaults
+			       (eol[0]=='\0') to whatever the local
+			       platform uses. */
+
+    byte *buffer;	    /* malloced buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_size;   /* and size of this buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_len;    /* used length of the buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_pos;    /* read position */
+
+    byte radbuf[4];
+    int idx, idx2;
+    u32 crc;
+
+    int status; 	    /* an internal state flag */
+    int cancel;
+    int any_data;	    /* any valid armored data seen */
+    int pending_lf;	    /* used together with faked */
+} armor_filter_context_t;
+
+struct unarmor_pump_s;
+typedef struct unarmor_pump_s *UnarmorPump;
+
+
+struct compress_filter_context_s {
+    int status;
+    void *opaque;   /* (used for z_stream) */
+    byte *inbuf;
+    unsigned inbufsize;
+    byte *outbuf;
+    unsigned outbufsize;
+    int algo;	 /* compress algo */
+    int algo1hack;
+    int new_ctb;
+    void (*release)(struct compress_filter_context_s*);
+};
+typedef struct compress_filter_context_s compress_filter_context_t;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    DEK *dek;
+    u32 datalen;
+    CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd;
+    int header;
+    MD_HANDLE mdc_hash;
+    byte enchash[20];
+    int create_mdc; /* flag will be set by the cipher filter */
+} cipher_filter_context_t;
+
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    byte *buffer;	    /* malloced buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_size;   /* and size of this buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_len;    /* used length of the buffer */
+    unsigned buffer_pos;    /* read position */
+    int truncated;	    /* number of truncated lines */
+    int not_dash_escaped;
+    int escape_from;
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+    int pending_lf;
+    int pending_esc;
+} text_filter_context_t;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    char *what;		        /* description */
+    u32 last_time;		/* last time reported */
+    unsigned long last;		/* last amount reported */
+    unsigned long offset;	/* current amount */
+    unsigned long total;	/* total amount */
+} progress_filter_context_t;
+
+/* encrypt_filter_context_t defined in main.h */
+
+/*-- mdfilter.c --*/
+int md_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+void free_md_filter_context( md_filter_context_t *mfx );
+
+/*-- armor.c --*/
+armor_filter_context_t *new_armor_context (void);
+void release_armor_context (armor_filter_context_t *afx);
+int push_armor_filter (armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF iobuf);
+int use_armor_filter( IOBUF a );
+int armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+		  IOBUF chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+UnarmorPump unarmor_pump_new (void);
+void        unarmor_pump_release (UnarmorPump x);
+int         unarmor_pump (UnarmorPump x, int c);
+
+/*-- compress.c --*/
+void push_compress_filter(IOBUF out,compress_filter_context_t *zfx,int algo);
+void push_compress_filter2(IOBUF out,compress_filter_context_t *zfx,
+			   int algo,int rel);
+
+/*-- cipher.c --*/
+int cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+		   IOBUF chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+
+/*-- textfilter.c --*/
+int text_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+		 IOBUF chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+int copy_clearsig_text( IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, MD_HANDLE md,
+			  int escape_dash, int escape_from, int pgp2mode );
+
+/*-- progress.c --*/
+int progress_filter (void *opaque, int control,
+		     IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+void handle_progress (progress_filter_context_t *pfx,
+		      IOBUF inp, const char *name);
+
+#endif /*G10_FILTER_H*/
diff --git a/g10/free-packet.c b/g10/free-packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be49bb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/free-packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
+/* free-packet.c - cleanup stuff for packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2005  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+void
+free_symkey_enc( PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
+{
+    xfree(enc);
+}
+
+void
+free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc )
+{
+    int n, i;
+    n = pubkey_get_nenc( enc->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	mpi_free(enc->data[0]);
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	mpi_free( enc->data[i] );
+    xfree(enc);
+}
+
+void
+free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+  int n, i;
+
+  n = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
+  if( !n )
+    mpi_free(sig->data[0]);
+  for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+    mpi_free( sig->data[i] );
+
+  xfree(sig->revkey);
+  xfree(sig->hashed);
+  xfree(sig->unhashed);
+
+  if (sig->pka_info)
+    {
+      xfree (sig->pka_info->uri);
+      xfree (sig->pka_info);
+    }
+
+  xfree(sig);
+}
+
+
+void
+release_public_key_parts( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    int n, i;
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	mpi_free(pk->pkey[0]);
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	mpi_free( pk->pkey[i] );
+	pk->pkey[i] = NULL;
+    }
+    if (pk->prefs) {
+        xfree (pk->prefs);
+        pk->prefs = NULL;
+    }
+    if (pk->user_id) {
+        free_user_id (pk->user_id);
+        pk->user_id = NULL;
+    }
+    if (pk->revkey) {
+        xfree(pk->revkey);
+	pk->revkey=NULL;
+	pk->numrevkeys=0;
+    }
+}
+
+
+void
+free_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    release_public_key_parts( pk );
+    xfree(pk);
+}
+
+
+static subpktarea_t *
+cp_subpktarea (subpktarea_t *s )
+{
+    subpktarea_t *d;
+
+    if( !s )
+	return NULL;
+    d = xmalloc (sizeof (*d) + s->size - 1 );
+    d->size = s->size;
+    d->len = s->len;
+    memcpy (d->data, s->data, s->len);
+    return d;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a copy of the preferences 
+ */
+prefitem_t *
+copy_prefs (const prefitem_t *prefs)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    prefitem_t *new;
+
+    if (!prefs)
+        return NULL;
+    
+    for (n=0; prefs[n].type; n++)
+        ;
+    new = xmalloc ( sizeof (*new) * (n+1));
+    for (n=0; prefs[n].type; n++) {
+        new[n].type = prefs[n].type;
+        new[n].value = prefs[n].value;
+    }
+    new[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE;
+    new[n].value = 0;
+
+    return new;
+}
+
+
+PKT_public_key *
+copy_public_key ( PKT_public_key *d, PKT_public_key *s)
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( !d )
+	d = xmalloc(sizeof *d);
+    memcpy( d, s, sizeof *d );
+    d->user_id = scopy_user_id (s->user_id);
+    d->prefs = copy_prefs (s->prefs);
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( s->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	d->pkey[0] = mpi_copy(s->pkey[0]);
+    else {
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    d->pkey[i] = mpi_copy( s->pkey[i] );
+    }
+    if( !s->revkey && s->numrevkeys )
+        BUG();
+    if( s->numrevkeys ) {
+        d->revkey = xmalloc(sizeof(struct revocation_key)*s->numrevkeys);
+        memcpy(d->revkey,s->revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key)*s->numrevkeys);
+    }
+    else
+        d->revkey = NULL;
+    return d;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Replace all common parts of a sk by the one from the public key.
+ * This is a hack and a better solution will be to just store the real secret
+ * parts somewhere and don't duplicate all the other stuff.
+ */
+void
+copy_public_parts_to_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    sk->expiredate  = pk->expiredate;     
+    sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;    
+    sk->pubkey_usage= pk->pubkey_usage;
+    sk->req_usage   = pk->req_usage;
+    sk->req_algo    = pk->req_algo;
+    sk->has_expired = pk->has_expired;    
+    sk->is_revoked  = pk->is_revoked;     
+    sk->is_valid    = pk->is_valid;    
+    sk->main_keyid[0]= pk->main_keyid[0];
+    sk->main_keyid[1]= pk->main_keyid[1];
+    sk->keyid[0]    = pk->keyid[0];
+    sk->keyid[1]    = pk->keyid[1];
+}
+
+
+static pka_info_t *
+cp_pka_info (const pka_info_t *s)
+{
+  pka_info_t *d = xmalloc (sizeof *s + strlen (s->email));
+  
+  d->valid = s->valid;
+  d->checked = s->checked;
+  d->uri = s->uri? xstrdup (s->uri):NULL;
+  memcpy (d->fpr, s->fpr, sizeof s->fpr);
+  strcpy (d->email, s->email);
+  return d;
+}
+
+
+PKT_signature *
+copy_signature( PKT_signature *d, PKT_signature *s )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( !d )
+	d = xmalloc(sizeof *d);
+    memcpy( d, s, sizeof *d );
+    n = pubkey_get_nsig( s->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	d->data[0] = mpi_copy(s->data[0]);
+    else {
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    d->data[i] = mpi_copy( s->data[i] );
+    }
+    d->pka_info = s->pka_info? cp_pka_info (s->pka_info) : NULL;
+    d->hashed = cp_subpktarea (s->hashed);
+    d->unhashed = cp_subpktarea (s->unhashed);
+    if(s->numrevkeys)
+      {
+	d->revkey=NULL;
+	d->numrevkeys=0;
+	parse_revkeys(d);
+      }
+    return d;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * shallow copy of the user ID
+ */
+PKT_user_id *
+scopy_user_id (PKT_user_id *s)
+{
+    if (s)
+        s->ref++;
+    return s;
+}
+
+
+
+void
+release_secret_key_parts( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_nskey( sk->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	mpi_free(sk->skey[0]);
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
+	sk->skey[i] = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+free_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    release_secret_key_parts( sk );
+    xfree(sk);
+}
+
+PKT_secret_key *
+copy_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *d, PKT_secret_key *s )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( !d )
+	d = xmalloc_secure(sizeof *d);
+    else
+        release_secret_key_parts (d);
+    memcpy( d, s, sizeof *d );
+    n = pubkey_get_nskey( s->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+  	d->skey[0] = mpi_copy(s->skey[0]);
+    else {
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+  	    d->skey[i] = mpi_copy( s->skey[i] );
+    }
+
+    return d;
+}
+
+void
+free_comment( PKT_comment *rem )
+{
+    xfree(rem);
+}
+
+void
+free_attributes(PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  xfree(uid->attribs);
+  xfree(uid->attrib_data);
+
+  uid->attribs=NULL;
+  uid->attrib_data=NULL;
+  uid->attrib_len=0;
+}
+
+void
+free_user_id (PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+    assert (uid->ref > 0);
+    if (--uid->ref)
+        return;
+
+    free_attributes(uid);
+    xfree (uid->prefs);
+    xfree (uid->namehash);
+    xfree (uid);
+}
+
+void
+free_compressed( PKT_compressed *zd )
+{
+    if( zd->buf ) { /* have to skip some bytes */
+	/* don't have any information about the length, so
+	 * we assume this is the last packet */
+	while( iobuf_read( zd->buf, NULL, 1<<30 ) != -1 )
+	    ;
+    }
+    xfree(zd);
+}
+
+void
+free_encrypted( PKT_encrypted *ed )
+{
+    if( ed->buf ) { /* have to skip some bytes */
+	if( ed->is_partial ) {
+	    while( iobuf_read( ed->buf, NULL, 1<<30 ) != -1 )
+		;
+	}
+	else {
+	   while( ed->len ) { /* skip the packet */
+	       int n = iobuf_read( ed->buf, NULL, ed->len );
+	       if( n == -1 )
+		   ed->len = 0;
+	       else
+		   ed->len -= n;
+	   }
+	}
+    }
+    xfree(ed);
+}
+
+
+void
+free_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt )
+{
+    if( pt->buf ) { /* have to skip some bytes */
+	if( pt->is_partial ) {
+	    while( iobuf_read( pt->buf, NULL, 1<<30 ) != -1 )
+		;
+	}
+	else {
+	   while( pt->len ) { /* skip the packet */
+	       int n = iobuf_read( pt->buf, NULL, pt->len );
+	       if( n == -1 )
+		   pt->len = 0;
+	       else
+		   pt->len -= n;
+	   }
+	}
+    }
+    xfree(pt);
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Free the packet in pkt.
+ */
+void
+free_packet( PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !pkt || !pkt->pkt.generic )
+	return;
+
+    if( DBG_MEMORY )
+	log_debug("free_packet() type=%d\n", pkt->pkttype );
+
+    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+	free_seckey_enc( pkt->pkt.signature );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+	free_pubkey_enc( pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+	free_symkey_enc( pkt->pkt.symkey_enc );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+	free_public_key( pkt->pkt.public_key );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+      case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+	free_secret_key( pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+	break;
+      case PKT_COMMENT:
+	free_comment( pkt->pkt.comment );
+	break;
+      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	free_user_id( pkt->pkt.user_id );
+	break;
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+	free_compressed( pkt->pkt.compressed);
+	break;
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+	free_encrypted( pkt->pkt.encrypted );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
+	free_plaintext( pkt->pkt.plaintext );
+	break;
+      default:
+	xfree( pkt->pkt.generic );
+	break;
+    }
+    pkt->pkt.generic = NULL;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * returns 0 if they match.
+ */
+int
+cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( a->timestamp != b->timestamp )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->version < 4 && a->expiredate != b->expiredate )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( b->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( a->pkey[i], b->pkey[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Returns 0 if they match.
+ * We only compare the public parts.
+ */
+int
+cmp_secret_keys( PKT_secret_key *a, PKT_secret_key *b )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( a->timestamp != b->timestamp )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->version < 4 && a->expiredate != b->expiredate )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( b->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( a->skey[i], b->skey[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Returns 0 if they match.
+ */
+int
+cmp_public_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( pk->timestamp != sk->timestamp )
+	return -1;
+    if( pk->version < 4 && pk->expiredate != sk->expiredate )
+	return -1;
+    if( pk->pubkey_algo != sk->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( pk->pkey[i] , sk->skey[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( a->keyid[0] != b->keyid[0] )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->keyid[1] != b->keyid[1] )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_nsig( a->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( a->data[i] , b->data[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Returns: true if the user ids do not match
+ */
+int
+cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b )
+{
+    int res=1;
+
+    if( a == b )
+        return 0;
+
+    if( a->attrib_data && b->attrib_data )
+      {
+	res = a->attrib_len - b->attrib_len;
+	if( !res )
+	  res = memcmp( a->attrib_data, b->attrib_data, a->attrib_len );
+      }
+    else if( !a->attrib_data && !b->attrib_data )
+      {
+	res = a->len - b->len;
+	if( !res )
+	  res = memcmp( a->name, b->name, a->len );
+      }
+
+    return res;
+}
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74c0a74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3003 @@
+/* getkey.c -  Get a key from the database
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+
+#define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES   PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
+#define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES  PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES < 2
+#error We need the cache for key creation
+#endif
+
+struct getkey_ctx_s {
+    int exact;
+    KBNODE keyblock;
+    KBPOS  kbpos;
+    KBNODE found_key; /* pointer into some keyblock */
+    int last_rc;
+    int req_usage;
+    int req_algo;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kr_handle;
+    int not_allocated;
+    int nitems;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC items[1];
+};
+
+#if 0
+static struct {
+    int any;
+    int okay_count;
+    int nokey_count;
+    int error_count;
+} lkup_stats[21];
+#endif
+
+typedef struct keyid_list {
+    struct keyid_list *next;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+} *keyid_list_t;
+
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+  typedef struct pk_cache_entry {
+      struct pk_cache_entry *next;
+      u32 keyid[2];
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+  } *pk_cache_entry_t;
+  static pk_cache_entry_t pk_cache;
+  static int pk_cache_entries;	 /* number of entries in pk cache */
+  static int pk_cache_disabled;
+#endif
+
+#if MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES < 5
+#error we really need the userid cache
+#endif
+typedef struct user_id_db {
+    struct user_id_db *next;
+    keyid_list_t keyids;
+    int len;
+    char name[1];
+} *user_id_db_t;
+static user_id_db_t user_id_db;
+static int uid_cache_entries;	/* number of entries in uid cache */
+
+static void merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode );
+
+#if 0
+static void
+print_stats()
+{
+    int i;
+    for(i=0; i < DIM(lkup_stats); i++ ) {
+	if( lkup_stats[i].any )
+	    fprintf(stderr,
+		    "lookup stats: mode=%-2d  ok=%-6d  nokey=%-6d  err=%-6d\n",
+		    i,
+		    lkup_stats[i].okay_count,
+		    lkup_stats[i].nokey_count,
+		    lkup_stats[i].error_count );
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+
+void
+cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+
+    if( pk_cache_disabled )
+	return;
+
+    if( pk->dont_cache )
+        return;
+
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pk->pubkey_algo)
+	|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	|| is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) ) {
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+    }
+    else
+	return; /* don't know how to get the keyid */
+
+    for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
+	if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+	    if( DBG_CACHE )
+		log_debug("cache_public_key: already in cache\n");
+	    return;
+	}
+
+    if( pk_cache_entries >= MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
+	/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
+	pk_cache_disabled=1;
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    log_info(_("too many entries in pk cache - disabled\n"));
+	return;
+    }
+    pk_cache_entries++;
+    ce = xmalloc( sizeof *ce );
+    ce->next = pk_cache;
+    pk_cache = ce;
+    ce->pk = copy_public_key( NULL, pk );
+    ce->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ce->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/* Return a const utf-8 string with the text "[User ID not found]".
+   This fucntion is required so that we don't need to switch gettext's
+   encoding temporary. */
+static const char *
+user_id_not_found_utf8 (void)
+{
+  static char *text;
+
+  if (!text)
+    text = native_to_utf8 (_("[User ID not found]"));
+  return text;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the user ID from the given keyblock.
+ * We use the primary uid flag which has been set by the merge_selfsigs
+ * function.  The returned value is only valid as long as then given
+ * keyblock is not changed
+ */
+static const char *
+get_primary_uid ( KBNODE keyblock, size_t *uidlen )
+{
+    KBNODE k;
+    const char *s;
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k=k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+             && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
+             && k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
+            *uidlen = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
+            return k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name;
+        }
+    } 
+    s = user_id_not_found_utf8 ();
+    *uidlen = strlen (s);
+    return s;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_keyid_list ( keyid_list_t k )
+{
+    while (  k ) {
+        keyid_list_t k2 = k->next;
+        xfree (k);
+        k = k2;
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Store the association of keyid and userid
+ * Feed only public keys to this function.
+ */
+static void
+cache_user_id( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    const char *uid;
+    size_t uidlen;
+    keyid_list_t keyids = NULL;
+    KBNODE k;
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            keyid_list_t a = xmalloc_clear ( sizeof *a );
+            /* Hmmm: For a long list of keyids it might be an advantage
+             * to append the keys */
+            keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, a->keyid );
+            /* first check for duplicates */
+            for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+                keyid_list_t b = r->keyids;
+                for ( b = r->keyids; b; b = b->next ) {
+                    if( b->keyid[0] == a->keyid[0]
+                        && b->keyid[1] == a->keyid[1] ) {
+                        if( DBG_CACHE )
+                            log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
+                        release_keyid_list ( keyids );
+                        xfree ( a );
+                        return;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            /* now put it into the cache */
+            a->next = keyids;
+            keyids = a;
+        }
+    }
+    if ( !keyids )
+        BUG (); /* No key no fun */
+
+
+    uid = get_primary_uid ( keyblock, &uidlen );
+
+    if( uid_cache_entries >= MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
+	/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
+	r = user_id_db;
+	user_id_db = r->next;
+        release_keyid_list ( r->keyids );
+	xfree(r);
+	uid_cache_entries--;
+    }
+    r = xmalloc( sizeof *r + uidlen-1 );
+    r->keyids = keyids;
+    r->len = uidlen;
+    memcpy(r->name, uid, r->len);
+    r->next = user_id_db;
+    user_id_db = r;
+    uid_cache_entries++;
+}
+
+
+void
+getkey_disable_caches()
+{
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    {
+	pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;
+
+	for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce2 ) {
+	    ce2 = ce->next;
+	    free_public_key( ce->pk );
+	    xfree( ce );
+	}
+	pk_cache_disabled=1;
+	pk_cache_entries = 0;
+	pk_cache = NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    /* fixme: disable user id cache ? */
+}
+
+
+static void
+pk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
+
+    assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             ||  a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+     
+    copy_public_key ( pk, a->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+}
+
+static void
+sk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx,
+                PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
+
+    assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+             ||  a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+     
+    copy_secret_key( sk, a->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk
+ * can be called with PK set to NULL to just read it into some
+ * internal structures.
+ */
+int
+get_pubkey( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int internal = 0;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    if(pk)
+      {
+	/* Try to get it from the cache.  We don't do this when pk is
+	   NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are
+	   cached. */
+	pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+	for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
+	  {
+	    if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
+	      {
+		copy_public_key( pk, ce->pk );
+		return 0;
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+#endif
+    /* more init stuff */
+    if( !pk ) {
+	pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+	internal++;
+    }
+
+
+    /* do a lookup */
+    {	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+	ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+        ctx.req_algo  = pk->req_algo;
+        ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
+        if ( !rc ) {
+            pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
+        }
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+    }
+    if( !rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+    rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+
+  leave:
+    if( !rc )
+	cache_public_key( pk );
+    if( internal )
+	free_public_key(pk);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk.  This function
+   differs from get_pubkey() in that it does not do a check of the key
+   to avoid recursion.  It should be used only in very certain cases.
+   It will only retrieve primary keys. */
+int
+get_pubkey_fast (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+  u32 pkid[2];
+  
+  assert (pk);
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+  { /* Try to get it from the cache */
+    pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+
+    for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
+      {
+        if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
+          {
+            if (pk)
+              copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
+            return 0;
+          }
+      }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  hd = keydb_new (0);
+  rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keydb_release (hd);
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+  keydb_release (hd);
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+
+  assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+           ||  keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+
+  keyid_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,pkid);
+  if(keyid[0]==pkid[0] && keyid[1]==pkid[1])
+    copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+  else
+    rc=G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+
+  release_kbnode (keyblock);
+
+  /* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
+     properly set. */
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+KBNODE
+get_pubkeyblock( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+
+    memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+    /* no need to set exact here because we want the entire block */
+    ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+    ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+    ctx.nitems = 1;
+    ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+    rc = lookup( &ctx, &keyblock, 0 );
+    get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+
+    return rc ? NULL : keyblock;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a secret key and store it into sk
+ */
+int
+get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int rc;
+    struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+    KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+    memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+    ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
+    ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+    ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+    ctx.nitems = 1;
+    ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+    ctx.req_algo  = sk->req_algo;
+    ctx.req_usage = sk->req_usage;
+    rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
+    if ( !rc ) {
+        sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
+    }
+    get_seckey_end( &ctx );
+    release_kbnode ( kb );
+
+    if( !rc ) {
+	/* check the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
+	 * unlock the secret key
+	 */
+	rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether the secret key is available.  This is just a fast
+ * check and does not tell us whether the secret key is valid.  It
+ * merely tells other whether there is some secret key.
+ * Returns: 0 := key is available
+ * G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe
+ */
+int
+seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int rc;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
+
+    rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
+    if ( rc == -1 )
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    keydb_release (hd);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return the type of the user id:
+ *
+ * Please use the constants KEYDB_SERCH_MODE_xxx
+ *  0 = Invalid user ID
+ *  1 = exact match
+ *  2 = match a substring
+ *  3 = match an email address
+ *  4 = match a substring of an email address
+ *  5 = match an email address, but compare from end
+ *  6 = word match mode
+ * 10 = it is a short KEYID (don't care about keyid[0])
+ * 11 = it is a long  KEYID
+ * 12 = it is a trustdb index (keyid is looked up)
+ * 16 = it is a 16 byte fingerprint
+ * 20 = it is a 20 byte fingerprint
+ * 21 = Unified fingerprint :fpr:pk_algo:
+ *      (We don't use pk_algo yet)
+ *
+ * Rules used:
+ * - If the username starts with 8,9,16 or 17 hex-digits (the first one
+ *   must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a keyid; depending
+ *   on the length a short or complete one.
+ * - If the username starts with 32,33,40 or 41 hex-digits (the first one
+ *   must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a fingerprint.
+ * - If the username starts with a left angle, we assume it is a complete
+ *   email address and look only at this part.
+ * - If the username starts with a colon we assume it is a unified 
+ *   key specfification. 
+ * - If the username starts with a '.', we assume it is the ending
+ *   part of an email address
+ * - If the username starts with an '@', we assume it is a part of an
+ *   email address
+ * - If the userid start with an '=' an exact compare is done.
+ * - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
+ *   done (This is the default).
+ * - If the userid starts with a '+' we will compare individual words
+ *   and a match requires that all the words are in the userid.
+ *   Words are delimited by white space or "()<>[]{}.@-+_,;/&!"
+ *   (note that you can't search for these characters). Compare
+ *   is not case sensitive.
+ */
+
+int
+classify_user_id( const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc )
+{
+    const char *s;
+    int hexprefix = 0;
+    int hexlength;
+    int mode = 0;   
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC dummy_desc;
+
+    if (!desc)
+        desc = &dummy_desc;
+
+    /* clear the structure so that the mode field is set to zero unless
+     * we set it to the correct value right at the end of this function */
+    memset (desc, 0, sizeof *desc);
+
+    /* skip leading spaces.  Fixme: what is with trailing spaces? */
+    for(s = name; *s && spacep (s); s++ )
+	;
+
+    switch (*s) {
+	case 0:    /* empty string is an error */
+	    return 0;
+
+#if 0
+	case '.':  /* an email address, compare from end */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+#endif
+
+	case '<':  /* an email address */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '@':  /* part of an email address */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '=':  /* exact compare */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '*':  /* case insensitive substring search */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+#if 0
+	case '+':  /* compare individual words */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+#endif
+
+	case '#':  /* local user id */
+            return 0; /* This is now obsolete and van't not be used anymore*/
+        
+        case ':': /*Unified fingerprint */
+            {  
+                const char *se, *si;
+                int i;
+                
+                se = strchr( ++s,':');
+                if ( !se )
+                    return 0;
+                for (i=0,si=s; si < se; si++, i++ ) {
+                    if ( !strchr("01234567890abcdefABCDEF", *si ) )
+                        return 0; /* invalid digit */
+                }
+                if (i != 32 && i != 40)
+                    return 0; /* invalid length of fpr*/
+                for (i=0,si=s; si < se; i++, si +=2) 
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = hextobyte(si);
+                for ( ; i < 20; i++)
+                    desc->u.fpr[i]= 0;
+                s = se + 1;
+                mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
+            } 
+            break;
+           
+	default:
+	    if (s[0] == '0' && s[1] == 'x') {
+		hexprefix = 1;
+		s += 2;
+	    }
+
+	    hexlength = strspn(s, "0123456789abcdefABCDEF");
+            if (hexlength >= 8 && s[hexlength] =='!') {
+		desc->exact = 1;
+                hexlength++; /* just for the following check */
+            }
+
+	    /* check if a hexadecimal number is terminated by EOS or blank */
+	    if (hexlength && s[hexlength] && !spacep(s+hexlength)) {
+		if (hexprefix)	    /* a "0x" prefix without correct */
+		    return 0;	    /* termination is an error */
+		else		    /* The first chars looked like */
+		    hexlength = 0;  /* a hex number, but really were not. */
+	    }
+
+            if (desc->exact)
+                hexlength--;
+
+	    if (hexlength == 8
+                || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 9 && *s == '0')){
+		/* short keyid */
+		if (hexlength == 9)
+		    s++;
+                desc->u.kid[0] = 0;
+                desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s, NULL, 16 );
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 16
+                     || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 17 && *s == '0')) {
+		/* complete keyid */
+		char buf[9];
+		if (hexlength == 17)
+		    s++;
+		mem2str(buf, s, 9 );
+		desc->u.kid[0] = strtoul( buf, NULL, 16 );
+		desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s+8, NULL, 16 );
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 32 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 33
+							    && *s == '0')) {
+		/* md5 fingerprint */
+		int i;
+		if (hexlength == 33)
+		    s++;
+                memset(desc->u.fpr+16, 0, 4); 
+                for (i=0; i < 16; i++, s+=2) {
+                    int c = hextobyte(s);
+                    if (c == -1)
+                        return 0;
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
+                }
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 40 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 41
+							      && *s == '0')) {
+		/* sha1/rmd160 fingerprint */
+		int i;
+		if (hexlength == 41)
+		    s++;
+                for (i=0; i < 20; i++, s+=2) {
+                    int c = hextobyte(s);
+                    if (c == -1)
+                        return 0;
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
+                }
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		if (hexprefix)	/* This was a hex number with a prefix */
+		    return 0;	/* and a wrong length */
+
+		desc->exact = 0;
+                desc->u.name = s;
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;   /* default mode */
+	    }
+    }
+
+    desc->mode = mode;
+    return mode;
+}
+
+
+static int
+skip_unusable(void *dummy,u32 *keyid,PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  int unusable=0;
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+
+  keyblock=get_pubkeyblock(keyid);
+  if(!keyblock)
+    {
+      log_error("error checking usability status of %s\n",keystr(keyid));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Is the user ID in question revoked/expired? */
+  if(uid)
+    {
+      KBNODE node;
+
+      for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
+	{
+	  if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
+	    {
+	      if(cmp_user_ids(uid,node->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0
+		 && (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+		     || node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired))
+		{
+		  unusable=1;
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(!unusable)
+    unusable=pk_is_disabled(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+
+ leave:
+  release_kbnode(keyblock);
+  return unusable;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the
+ * first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id.  if
+ * pk/sk has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return a
+ * pubkey with that algo.  If namelist is NULL, the first key is
+ * returned.  The caller should provide storage for either the pk or
+ * the sk.  If ret_kb is not NULL the function will return the
+ * keyblock there.
+ */
+
+static int
+key_byname( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, STRLIST namelist,
+	    PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+	    int secmode, int include_unusable,
+            KBNODE *ret_kb, KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n;
+    STRLIST r;
+    GETKEY_CTX ctx;
+    KBNODE help_kb = NULL;
+    
+    if( retctx ) {/* reset the returned context in case of error */
+        assert (!ret_kdbhd);  /* not allowed because the handle is
+                                 stored in the context */
+	*retctx = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ret_kdbhd)
+        *ret_kdbhd = NULL;
+
+    if(!namelist)
+      {
+	ctx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ctx);
+	ctx->nitems = 1;
+	ctx->items[0].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+	if(!include_unusable)
+	  ctx->items[0].skipfnc=skip_unusable;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	/* build the search context */
+	for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next )
+	  n++;
+
+	ctx = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ctx + (n-1)*sizeof ctx->items );
+	ctx->nitems = n;
+
+	for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next, n++ )
+	  {
+	    classify_user_id (r->d, &ctx->items[n]);
+        
+	    if (ctx->items[n].exact)
+	      ctx->exact = 1;
+	    if (!ctx->items[n].mode)
+	      {
+		xfree (ctx);
+		return G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+	      }
+	    if(!include_unusable
+	       && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
+	       && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
+	       && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+	       && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
+	       && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
+	      ctx->items[n].skipfnc=skip_unusable;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (secmode);
+    if ( !ret_kb ) 
+        ret_kb = &help_kb;
+
+    if( secmode ) {
+        if (sk) {
+            ctx->req_algo  = sk->req_algo;
+            ctx->req_usage = sk->req_usage;
+        }
+	rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 1 );
+        if ( !rc && sk ) {
+            sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_kb );
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        if (pk) {
+            ctx->req_algo  = pk->req_algo;
+            ctx->req_usage = pk->req_usage;
+        }
+	rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 0 );
+        if ( !rc && pk ) {
+            pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_kb );
+        }
+    }
+
+    release_kbnode ( help_kb );
+
+    if (retctx) /* caller wants the context */
+	*retctx = ctx;
+    else {
+        if (ret_kdbhd) {
+            *ret_kdbhd = ctx->kr_handle;
+            ctx->kr_handle = NULL;
+        }
+        get_pubkey_end (ctx);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Find a public key from NAME and return the keyblock or the key.  If
+   ret_kdb is not NULL, the KEYDB handle used to locate this keyblock
+   is returned and the caller is responsible for closing it.  If a key
+   was not found and NAME is a valid RFC822 mailbox and PKA retrieval
+   has been enabled, we try to import the pkea via the PKA
+   mechanism. */
+int
+get_pubkey_byname (PKT_public_key *pk,
+		   const char *name, KBNODE *ret_keyblock,
+                   KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd, int include_unusable )
+{
+  int rc;
+  STRLIST namelist = NULL;
+
+  add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
+
+  rc = key_byname( NULL, namelist, pk, NULL, 0,
+                   include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
+
+  /* If the requested name resembles a valid mailbox and automatic
+     retrieval has been enabled, we try to import the key. */
+
+  if (rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && is_valid_mailbox(name))
+    {
+      struct akl *akl;
+
+      for(akl=opt.auto_key_locate;akl;akl=akl->next)
+	{
+	  unsigned char *fpr=NULL;
+	  size_t fpr_len;
+
+	  switch(akl->type)
+	    {
+	    case AKL_CERT:
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+	      rc=keyserver_import_cert(name,&fpr,&fpr_len);
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+
+	      if(rc==0)
+		log_info(_("automatically retrieved `%s' via %s\n"),
+			 name,"DNS CERT");
+	      break;
+
+	    case AKL_PKA:
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+	      rc=keyserver_import_pka(name,&fpr,&fpr_len);
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+
+	      if(rc==0)
+		log_info(_("automatically retrieved `%s' via %s\n"),
+			 name,"PKA");
+	      break;
+
+	    case AKL_LDAP:
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+	      rc=keyserver_import_ldap(name,&fpr,&fpr_len);
+	      glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+
+	      if(rc==0)
+		log_info(_("automatically retrieved `%s' via %s\n"),
+			 name,"LDAP");
+	      break;
+
+	    case AKL_KEYSERVER:
+	      /* Strictly speaking, we don't need to only use a valid
+		 mailbox for the getname search, but it helps cut down
+		 on the problem of searching for something like "john"
+		 and getting a whole lot of keys back. */
+	      if(opt.keyserver)
+		{
+		  glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+		  rc=keyserver_import_name(name,&fpr,&fpr_len,opt.keyserver);
+		  glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+
+		  if(rc==0)
+		    log_info(_("automatically retrieved `%s' via %s\n"),
+			     name,opt.keyserver->uri);
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case AKL_SPEC:
+	      {
+		struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
+
+		keyserver=keyserver_match(akl->spec);
+		glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+		rc=keyserver_import_name(name,&fpr,&fpr_len,keyserver);
+		glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+
+		if(rc==0)
+		  log_info(_("automatically retrieved `%s' via %s\n"),
+			   name,akl->spec->uri);
+	      }
+	      break;
+	    }
+
+	  /* Use the fingerprint of the key that we actually fetched.
+	     This helps prevent problems where the key that we fetched
+	     doesn't have the same name that we used to fetch it.  In
+	     the case of CERT and PKA, this is an actual security
+	     requirement as the URL might point to a key put in by an
+	     attacker.  By forcing the use of the fingerprint, we
+	     won't use the attacker's key here. */
+	  if(rc==0 && fpr)
+	    {
+	      int i;
+	      char fpr_string[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+
+	      assert(fpr_len<=MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+
+	      free_strlist(namelist);
+	      namelist=NULL;
+
+	      for(i=0;i<fpr_len;i++)
+		sprintf(fpr_string+2*i,"%02X",fpr[i]);
+
+	      if(opt.verbose)
+		log_info("auto-key-locate found fingerprint %s\n",fpr_string);
+
+	      add_to_strlist( &namelist, fpr_string );
+
+	      xfree(fpr);
+	    }
+
+	  rc = key_byname( NULL, namelist, pk, NULL, 0,
+			   include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
+	  if(rc!=G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_strlist( namelist );
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int
+get_pubkey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_public_key *pk,
+		    STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    return key_byname( retctx, names, pk, NULL, 0, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL);
+}
+
+int
+get_pubkey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
+    if ( !rc && pk && ret_keyblock )
+        pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_keyblock );
+    
+    return rc;
+}
+
+void
+get_pubkey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
+{
+    if( ctx ) {
+        memset (&ctx->kbpos, 0, sizeof ctx->kbpos);
+        keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);
+	if( !ctx->not_allocated )
+	    xfree( ctx );
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
+ * FIXME:
+ * We should replace this with the _byname function.  Thiscsan be done
+ * by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style. 
+ */
+int
+get_pubkey_byfprint( PKT_public_key *pk,
+                     const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1 ;
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
+        if (!rc && pk )
+            pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk.  This function
+   differs from get_pubkey_byfprint() in that it does not do a check
+   of the key to avoid recursion.  It should be used only in very
+   certain cases.  PK may be NULL to check just for the existance of
+   the key. */
+int
+get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key *pk,
+                          const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+  byte fprbuf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  int i;
+  
+  for (i=0; i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN && i < fprint_len; i++)
+    fprbuf[i] = fprint[i];
+  while (i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN) 
+    fprbuf[i++] = 0;
+
+  hd = keydb_new (0);
+  rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fprbuf);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keydb_release (hd);
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+  keydb_release (hd);
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  
+  assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+           ||  keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+  if (pk)
+    copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+  release_kbnode (keyblock);
+
+  /* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
+     properly set. */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint and return the
+ * complete keyblock which may have more than only this key.
+ */
+int
+get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
+						size_t fprint_len )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a secret key by name and store it into sk
+ * If NAME is NULL use the default key
+ */
+static int
+get_seckey_byname2( GETKEY_CTX *retctx,
+		    PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unprotect,
+		    KBNODE *retblock )
+{
+  STRLIST namelist = NULL;
+  int rc,include_unusable=1;
+
+  /* If we have no name, try to use the default secret key.  If we
+     have no default, we'll use the first usable one. */
+
+  if( !name && opt.def_secret_key && *opt.def_secret_key )
+    add_to_strlist( &namelist, opt.def_secret_key );
+  else if(name)
+    add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
+  else
+    include_unusable=0;
+
+  rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, include_unusable,
+		   retblock, NULL );
+
+  free_strlist( namelist );
+
+  if( !rc && unprotect )
+    rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int 
+get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unlock )
+{
+    return get_seckey_byname2 ( NULL, sk, name, unlock, NULL );
+}
+
+
+int
+get_seckey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		    STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    return key_byname( retctx, names, NULL, sk, 1, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL );
+}
+
+
+int
+get_seckey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 1 );
+    if ( !rc && sk && ret_keyblock )
+        sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_keyblock );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+get_seckey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
+{
+    get_pubkey_end( ctx );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
+ * FIXME:
+ * We should replace this with the _byname function.  Thiscsan be done
+ * by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style. 
+ */
+int
+get_seckey_byfprint( PKT_secret_key *sk,
+                     const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1 ;
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
+        if (!rc && sk )
+            sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+	get_seckey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Search for a secret key with the given fingerprint and return the
+   complete keyblock which may have more than only this key. */
+int
+get_seckeyblock_byfprint (KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
+                          size_t fprint_len )
+{
+  int rc;
+  struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+  
+  if (fprint_len != 20 && fprint_len == 16)
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+    
+  memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
+  ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+  ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+  ctx.nitems = 1;
+  ctx.items[0].mode = (fprint_len==16
+                       ? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                       : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20);
+  memcpy (ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len);
+  rc = lookup (&ctx, ret_keyblock, 1);
+  get_seckey_end (&ctx);
+  
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/************************************************
+ ************* Merging stuff ********************
+ ************************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * merge all selfsignatures with the keys.
+ * FIXME: replace this at least for the public key parts
+ *        by merge_selfsigs.
+ *        It is still used in keyedit.c and
+ *        at 2 or 3 other places - check whether it is really needed.
+ *        It might be needed by the key edit and import stuff because
+ *        the keylock is changed.
+ */
+void
+merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 kid[2] = { 0, 0 };
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
+
+    if (keyblock && keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+        /* divert to our new function */
+        merge_selfsigs (keyblock);
+        return;
+    }
+    /* still need the old one because the new one can't handle secret keys */
+
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+	if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	    || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; sk = NULL;
+	    if( pk->version < 4 )
+		pk = NULL; /* not needed for old keys */
+	    else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
+	    else if( !pk->expiredate ) { /* and subkey */
+		/* insert the expiration date here */
+		/*FIXME!!! pk->expiredate = subkeys_expiretime( k, kid );*/
+	    }
+	    sigdate = 0;
+	}
+	else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+	    || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    pk = NULL; sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	    if( sk->version < 4 )
+		sk = NULL;
+	    else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+		keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
+	    sigdate = 0;
+	}
+	else if( (pk || sk ) && k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
+		 && sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
+		 && !(sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x28)
+		 && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
+	    /* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
+	     * This is not used for subkey binding signature, becuase this
+	     * is done above.
+	     * FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
+	     *	      but this is time consuming - we must provide another
+	     *	      way to handle this
+	     */
+	    const byte *p;
+	    u32 ed;
+
+	    p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
+	    if( pk ) {
+		ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		    pk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else {
+		ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		    sk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if(pk && (pk->expiredate==0 ||
+		  (pk->max_expiredate && pk->expiredate>pk->max_expiredate)))
+	  pk->expiredate=pk->max_expiredate;
+
+	if(sk && (sk->expiredate==0 ||
+		  (sk->max_expiredate && sk->expiredate>sk->max_expiredate)))
+	  sk->expiredate=sk->max_expiredate;
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+parse_key_usage(PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  int key_usage=0;
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t n;
+  byte flags;
+
+  p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS,&n);
+  if(p && n)
+    {
+      /* first octet of the keyflags */
+      flags=*p;
+
+      if(flags & 1)
+	{
+	  key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
+	  flags&=~1;
+	}
+
+      if(flags & 2)
+	{
+	  key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+	  flags&=~2;
+	}
+
+      /* We do not distinguish between encrypting communications and
+	 encrypting storage. */
+      if(flags & (0x04|0x08))
+	{
+	  key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	  flags&=~(0x04|0x08);
+	}
+
+      if(flags & 0x20)
+	{
+	  key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+	  flags&=~0x20;
+	}
+
+      if(flags)
+	key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+
+  /* We set PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN to indicate that this key has a
+     capability that we do not handle.  This serves to distinguish
+     between a zero key usage which we handle as the default
+     capabilities for that algorithm, and a usage that we do not
+     handle. */
+
+  return key_usage;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature
+ * associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE:
+ * - wether the UID has been revoked
+ * - assumed creation date of the UID
+ * - temporary store the keyflags here
+ * - temporary store the key expiration time here
+ * - mark whether the primary user ID flag hat been set.
+ * - store the preferences
+ */
+static void
+fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
+{
+    PKT_user_id   *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+    PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    const byte *p, *sym, *hash, *zip;
+    size_t n, nsym, nhash, nzip;
+
+    sig->flags.chosen_selfsig = 1; /* we chose this one */
+    uid->created = 0; /* not created == invalid */
+    if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) ) {
+        uid->is_revoked = 1;
+        return; /* has been revoked */
+    }
+
+    uid->expiredate = sig->expiredate;
+
+    if(sig->flags.expired)
+      {
+	uid->is_expired = 1;
+	return; /* has expired */
+      }
+
+    uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* this one is okay */
+    uid->selfsigversion = sig->version;
+    /* If we got this far, it's not expired :) */
+    uid->is_expired = 0;
+
+    /* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
+    uid->help_key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
+
+    /* ditto for the key expiration */
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+    if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
+      uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
+    else
+      uid->help_key_expire = 0;
+
+    /* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
+     * of them to only have one in our keyblock */
+    uid->is_primary = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
+    if ( p && *p )
+        uid->is_primary = 2;
+    /* We could also query this from the unhashed area if it is not in
+     * the hased area and then later try to decide which is the better
+     * there should be no security problem with this.
+     * For now we only look at the hashed one. 
+     */
+
+    /* Now build the preferences list.  These must come from the
+       hashed section so nobody can modify the ciphers a key is
+       willing to accept. */
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
+    sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
+    hash = p; nhash = p?n:0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
+    zip = p; nzip = p?n:0;
+    if (uid->prefs) 
+        xfree (uid->prefs);
+    n = nsym + nhash + nzip;
+    if (!n)
+        uid->prefs = NULL;
+    else {
+        uid->prefs = xmalloc (sizeof (*uid->prefs) * (n+1));
+        n = 0;
+        for (; nsym; nsym--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *sym++;
+        }
+        for (; nhash; nhash--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *hash++;
+        }
+        for (; nzip; nzip--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *zip++;
+        }
+        uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE; /* end of list marker */
+        uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* see whether we have the MDC feature */
+    uid->flags.mdc = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
+    if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x01))
+        uid->flags.mdc = 1;
+
+    /* and the keyserver modify flag */
+    uid->flags.ks_modify = 1;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n);
+    if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x80))
+        uid->flags.ks_modify = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+sig_to_revoke_info(PKT_signature *sig,struct revoke_info *rinfo)
+{
+  rinfo->date = sig->timestamp;
+  rinfo->algo = sig->pubkey_algo;
+  rinfo->keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
+  rinfo->keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
+}
+
+static void
+merge_selfsigs_main(KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked, struct revoke_info *rinfo)
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 kid[2];
+    u32 sigdate, uiddate, uiddate2;
+    KBNODE signode, uidnode, uidnode2;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+    unsigned int key_usage = 0;
+    u32 keytimestamp = 0;
+    u32 key_expire = 0;
+    int key_expire_seen = 0;
+    byte sigversion = 0;
+
+    *r_revoked = 0;
+    memset(rinfo,0,sizeof(*rinfo));
+
+    if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+        BUG ();
+    pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    keytimestamp = pk->timestamp;
+
+    keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
+    pk->main_keyid[0] = kid[0];
+    pk->main_keyid[1] = kid[1];
+
+    if ( pk->version < 4 ) {
+        /* before v4 the key packet itself contains the expiration
+         * date and there was no way to change it, so we start with
+         * the one from the key packet */
+        key_expire = pk->max_expiredate;
+        key_expire_seen = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* first pass: find the latest direct key self-signature.
+     * We assume that the newest one overrides all others
+     */
+
+    /* In case this key was already merged */
+    xfree(pk->revkey);
+    pk->revkey=NULL;
+    pk->numrevkeys=0;
+
+    signode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+            PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) { 
+           	if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( IS_KEY_REV (sig) ){
+                    /* key has been revoked - there is no way to override
+                     * such a revocation, so we theoretically can stop now.
+                     * We should not cope with expiration times for revocations
+                     * here because we have to assume that an attacker can
+                     * generate all kinds of signatures.  However due to the
+                     * fact that the key has been revoked it does not harm
+                     * either and by continuing we gather some more info on 
+                     * that key.
+                     */ 
+                    *r_revoked = 1;
+		    sig_to_revoke_info(sig,rinfo);
+                }
+                else if ( IS_KEY_SIG (sig) ) {
+		  /* Add any revocation keys onto the pk.  This is
+		     particularly interesting since we normally only
+		     get data from the most recent 1F signature, but
+		     you need multiple 1F sigs to properly handle
+		     revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and a
+		     revocation key could be sensitive and hence in a
+		     different signature). */
+		  if(sig->revkey) {
+		    int i;
+
+		    pk->revkey=
+		      xrealloc(pk->revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key)*
+				(pk->numrevkeys+sig->numrevkeys));
+
+		    for(i=0;i<sig->numrevkeys;i++)
+		      memcpy(&pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys++],
+			     sig->revkey[i],
+			     sizeof(struct revocation_key));
+		  }
+
+		  if( sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
+		    if(sig->flags.expired)
+                        ; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
+                    else {
+                        sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+                        signode = k;
+			if( sig->version > sigversion )
+			  sigversion = sig->version;
+
+		    }
+		  }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Remove dupes from the revocation keys */
+
+    if(pk->revkey)
+      {
+	int i,j,x,changed=0;
+
+	for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+	  {
+	    for(j=i+1;j<pk->numrevkeys;j++)
+	      {
+		if(memcmp(&pk->revkey[i],&pk->revkey[j],
+			  sizeof(struct revocation_key))==0)
+		  {
+		    /* remove j */
+
+		    for(x=j;x<pk->numrevkeys-1;x++)
+		      pk->revkey[x]=pk->revkey[x+1];
+
+		    pk->numrevkeys--;
+		    j--;
+		    changed=1;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if(changed)
+	  pk->revkey=xrealloc(pk->revkey,
+			       pk->numrevkeys*sizeof(struct revocation_key));
+      }
+
+    if ( signode )
+      {
+        /* some information from a direct key signature take precedence
+         * over the same information given in UID sigs.
+         */
+        PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+        const byte *p;
+
+	key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
+
+	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+	if( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
+	  {
+	    key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
+	    key_expire_seen = 1;
+	  }
+
+        /* mark that key as valid: one direct key signature should 
+         * render a key as valid */
+        pk->is_valid = 1;
+      }
+
+    /* pass 1.5: look for key revocation signatures that were not made
+       by the key (i.e. did a revocation key issue a revocation for
+       us?).  Only bother to do this if there is a revocation key in
+       the first place and we're not revoked already. */
+
+    if(!*r_revoked && pk->revkey)
+      for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next )
+	{
+	  if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    {
+	      PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+	      if(IS_KEY_REV(sig) &&
+		 (sig->keyid[0]!=kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1]))
+		{ 
+		  int rc=check_revocation_keys(pk,sig);
+		  if(rc==0)
+		    {
+		      *r_revoked=2;
+		      sig_to_revoke_info(sig,rinfo);
+		      /* don't continue checking since we can't be any
+			 more revoked than this */
+		      break;
+		    }
+		  else if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+		    pk->maybe_revoked=1;
+
+		  /* A failure here means the sig did not verify, was
+		     not issued by a revocation key, or a revocation
+		     key loop was broken.  If a revocation key isn't
+		     findable, however, the key might be revoked and
+		     we don't know it. */
+
+		  /* TODO: In the future handle subkey and cert
+                     revocations?  PGP doesn't, but it's in 2440. */
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+    /* second pass: look at the self-signature of all user IDs */
+    signode = uidnode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature in one user ID */
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
+	if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+            if ( uidnode && signode ) 
+	      {
+                fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
+		pk->is_valid=1;
+	      }
+            uidnode = k;
+            signode = NULL;
+            sigdate = 0;
+      	}
+        else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode ) {
+            PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) { 
+                if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
+                          && sig->timestamp >= sigdate )
+		  {
+                    /* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
+                     * by a newer signature.  An attacker can't use this
+                     * because a key should be revoced with a key revocation.
+                     * The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
+                     * one time an email address may become invalid but later
+                     * the same email address may become valid again (hired,
+                     * fired, hired again).
+                     */
+
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		    signode = k;
+		    signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig=0;
+		    if( sig->version > sigversion )
+		      sigversion = sig->version;
+		  }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if ( uidnode && signode ) {
+        fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
+        pk->is_valid = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* If the key isn't valid yet, and we have
+       --allow-non-selfsigned-uid set, then force it valid. */
+    if(!pk->is_valid && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
+      {
+	if(opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("Invalid key %s made valid by"
+		     " --allow-non-selfsigned-uid\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	pk->is_valid = 1;
+      }
+
+    /* The key STILL isn't valid, so try and find an ultimately
+       trusted signature. */
+    if(!pk->is_valid)
+      {
+	uidnode=NULL;
+
+	for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k=k->next)
+	  {
+	    if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	      uidnode = k;
+	    else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode )
+	      {
+		PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+		if(sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1])
+		  {
+		    PKT_public_key *ultimate_pk;
+
+		    ultimate_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*ultimate_pk));
+
+                    /* We don't want to use the full get_pubkey to
+                       avoid infinite recursion in certain cases.
+                       There is no reason to check that an ultimately
+                       trusted key is still valid - if it has been
+                       revoked or the user should also renmove the
+                       ultimate trust flag.  */
+		    if(get_pubkey_fast(ultimate_pk,sig->keyid)==0
+		       && check_key_signature2(keyblock,k,ultimate_pk,
+					       NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==0
+		       && get_ownertrust(ultimate_pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+		      {
+			free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
+			pk->is_valid=1;
+			break;
+		      }
+
+		    free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* Record the highest selfsig version so we know if this is a v3
+       key through and through, or a v3 key with a v4 selfsig
+       somewhere.  This is useful in a few places to know if the key
+       must be treated as PGP2-style or OpenPGP-style.  Note that a
+       selfsig revocation with a higher version number will also raise
+       this value.  This is okay since such a revocation must be
+       issued by the user (i.e. it cannot be issued by someone else to
+       modify the key behavior.) */
+
+    pk->selfsigversion=sigversion;
+
+    /* Now that we had a look at all user IDs we can now get some information
+     * from those user IDs.
+     */
+    
+    if ( !key_usage ) {
+        /* find the latest user ID with key flags set */
+        uiddate = 0; /* helper to find the latest user ID */
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( uid->help_key_usage && uid->created > uiddate ) {
+                    key_usage = uid->help_key_usage;
+                    uiddate = uid->created;
+                }
+            }
+      	}
+    }
+    if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
+        key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+    }
+    else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
+        int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+        if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
+            key_usage &= x; 
+    }
+
+    /* Whatever happens, it's a primary key, so it can certify. */
+    pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
+
+    if ( !key_expire_seen ) {
+        /* find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set 
+         * Note, that this may be a different one from the above because
+         * some user IDs may have no expiration date set */
+        uiddate = 0; 
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( uid->help_key_expire && uid->created > uiddate ) {
+                    key_expire = uid->help_key_expire;
+                    uiddate = uid->created;
+                }
+            }
+      	}
+    }
+
+    /* Currently only v3 keys have a maximum expiration date, but I'll
+       bet v5 keys get this feature again. */
+    if(key_expire==0 || (pk->max_expiredate && key_expire>pk->max_expiredate))
+      key_expire=pk->max_expiredate;
+
+    pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
+    pk->expiredate = key_expire;
+
+    /* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields  but
+     * this needs changes at other places too. */
+
+    /* and now find the real primary user ID and delete all others */
+    uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
+    uidnode = uidnode2 = NULL;
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+	     !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
+            PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            if (uid->is_primary)
+	      {
+		if(uid->created > uiddate)
+		  {
+		    uiddate = uid->created;
+		    uidnode = k;
+		  }
+		else if(uid->created==uiddate && uidnode)
+		  {
+		    /* The dates are equal, so we need to do a
+		       different (and arbitrary) comparison.  This
+		       should rarely, if ever, happen.  It's good to
+		       try and guarantee that two different GnuPG
+		       users with two different keyrings at least pick
+		       the same primary. */
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      uidnode=k;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		if(uid->created > uiddate2)
+		  {
+		    uiddate2 = uid->created;
+		    uidnode2 = k;
+		  }
+		else if(uid->created==uiddate2 && uidnode2)
+		  {
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      uidnode2=k;
+		  }
+	      }
+        }
+    }
+    if ( uidnode ) {
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+		 !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( k != uidnode ) 
+                    uid->is_primary = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    else if( uidnode2 ) {
+        /* none is flagged primary - use the latest user ID we have,
+	   and disambiguate with the arbitrary packet comparison. */
+        uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 1;
+    }
+    else
+      {
+	/* None of our uids were self-signed, so pick the one that
+	   sorts first to be the primary.  This is the best we can do
+	   here since there are no self sigs to date the uids. */
+
+	uidnode = NULL;
+
+	for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+	    k = k->next )
+	  {
+	    if(k->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+	       && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+	      {
+		if(!uidnode)
+		  {
+		    uidnode=k;
+		    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
+		    continue;
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(k->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+				    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      {
+			uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0;
+			uidnode=k;
+			uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
+		      }
+		    else
+		      k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0; /* just to be
+							    safe */
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+}
+
+
+static void
+merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL, *subpk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 mainkid[2];
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
+    KBNODE signode;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+    unsigned int key_usage = 0;
+    u32 keytimestamp = 0;
+    u32 key_expire = 0;
+    const byte *p;
+
+    if ( subnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+        BUG ();
+    mainpk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    if ( mainpk->version < 4 )
+        return; /* (actually this should never happen) */
+    keyid_from_pk( mainpk, mainkid );
+    subpk = subnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    keytimestamp = subpk->timestamp;
+
+    subpk->is_valid = 0;
+    subpk->main_keyid[0] = mainpk->main_keyid[0];
+    subpk->main_keyid[1] = mainpk->main_keyid[1];
+
+    /* find the latest key binding self-signature. */
+    signode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
+    for(k=subnode->next; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+                                                        k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+            sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == mainkid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==mainkid[1] ) { 
+           	if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) ) {
+		  /* Note that this means that the date on a
+                     revocation sig does not matter - even if the
+                     binding sig is dated after the revocation sig,
+                     the subkey is still marked as revoked.  This
+                     seems ok, as it is just as easy to make new
+                     subkeys rather than re-sign old ones as the
+                     problem is in the distribution.  Plus, PGP (7)
+                     does this the same way.  */
+                    subpk->is_revoked = 1;
+		    sig_to_revoke_info(sig,&subpk->revoked);
+                    /* although we could stop now, we continue to 
+                     * figure out other information like the old expiration
+                     * time */
+                }
+                else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate )
+		  {
+		    if(sig->flags.expired)
+		      ; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
+                    else
+		      {
+                        sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+                        signode = k;
+			signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig=0;
+		      }
+		  }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* no valid key binding */
+    if ( !signode )
+      return;
+
+    sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    sig->flags.chosen_selfsig=1; /* so we know which selfsig we chose later */
+
+    key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
+    if ( !key_usage )
+      {
+	/* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
+        key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	/* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
+        int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
+        if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
+	  key_usage &= x; 
+      }
+
+    subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
+    
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+    if ( p && buffer_to_u32(p) )
+        key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
+    else
+        key_expire = 0;
+    subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
+    subpk->expiredate = key_expire;
+
+    /* algo doesn't exist */
+    if(check_pubkey_algo(subpk->pubkey_algo))
+      return;
+
+    subpk->is_valid = 1;
+
+    /* Find the first 0x19 embedded signature on our self-sig. */
+    if(subpk->backsig==0)
+      {
+	int seq=0;
+	size_t n;
+
+	/* We do this while() since there may be other embedded
+	   signatures in the future.  We only want 0x19 here. */
+	while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,
+				 SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+	  if(n>3 && ((p[0]==3 && p[2]==0x19) || (p[0]==4 && p[1]==0x19)))
+	    break;
+
+	if(p==NULL)
+	  {
+	    seq=0;
+	    /* It is safe to have this in the unhashed area since the
+	       0x19 is located on the selfsig for convenience, not
+	       security. */
+	    while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,
+				     &n,&seq,NULL)))
+	      if(n>3 && ((p[0]==3 && p[2]==0x19) || (p[0]==4 && p[1]==0x19)))
+		break;
+	  }
+
+	if(p)
+	  {
+	    PKT_signature *backsig=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_signature));
+	    IOBUF backsig_buf=iobuf_temp_with_content(p,n);
+
+	    if(parse_signature(backsig_buf,PKT_SIGNATURE,n,backsig)==0)
+	      {
+		if(check_backsig(mainpk,subpk,backsig)==0)
+		  subpk->backsig=2;
+		else
+		  subpk->backsig=1;
+	      }
+
+	    iobuf_close(backsig_buf);
+	    free_seckey_enc(backsig);
+	  }
+      }
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Merge information from the self-signatures with the key, so that
+ * we can later use them more easy.
+ * The function works by first applying the self signatures to the
+ * primary key and the to each subkey.
+ * Here are the rules we use to decide which inormation from which
+ * self-signature is used:
+ * We check all self signatures or validity and ignore all invalid signatures.
+ * All signatures are then ordered by their creation date ....
+ * For the primary key:
+ *   FIXME the docs    
+ */
+static void
+merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE k;
+    int revoked;
+    struct revoke_info rinfo;
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+    prefitem_t *prefs;
+    int mdc_feature;
+
+    if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+        if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+            log_error ("expected public key but found secret key "
+                       "- must stop\n");
+            /* we better exit here becuase a public key is expected at
+               other places too.  FIXME: Figure this out earlier and
+               don't get to here at all */
+            g10_exit (1);
+        }
+        BUG ();
+    }
+
+    merge_selfsigs_main ( keyblock, &revoked, &rinfo );
+
+    /* now merge in the data from each of the subkeys */
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+	if (  k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            merge_selfsigs_subkey ( keyblock, k );
+        }
+    }
+
+    main_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    if ( revoked || main_pk->has_expired || !main_pk->is_valid ) {
+        /* if the primary key is revoked, expired, or invalid we
+         * better set the appropriate flags on that key and all
+         * subkeys */
+        for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+                PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+		if(!main_pk->is_valid)
+		  pk->is_valid = 0;
+		if(revoked && !pk->is_revoked)
+		  {
+		    pk->is_revoked = revoked;
+		    memcpy(&pk->revoked,&rinfo,sizeof(rinfo));
+		  }
+                if(main_pk->has_expired)
+		  pk->has_expired = main_pk->has_expired;
+            }
+	}
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* set the preference list of all keys to those of the primary real
+     * user ID.  Note: we use these preferences when we don't know by
+     * which user ID the key has been selected.
+     * fixme: we should keep atoms of commonly used preferences or
+     * use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
+     * FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of 
+     * all preferences.
+     * Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag.
+     */
+    prefs = NULL;
+    mdc_feature = 0;
+    for (k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next) {
+        if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	    && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
+            && k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) {
+            prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
+            mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.mdc;
+            break;
+        }
+    }    
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+            if (pk->prefs)
+                xfree (pk->prefs);
+            pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
+            pk->mdc_feature = mdc_feature;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Merge the secret keys from secblock into the pubblock thereby
+ * replacing the public (sub)keys with their secret counterparts Hmmm:
+ * It might be better to get away from the concept of entire secret
+ * keys at all and have a way to store just the real secret parts
+ * from the key.
+ */
+static void
+merge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
+{
+    KBNODE pub;
+
+    assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    
+    for (pub=pubblock; pub; pub = pub->next ) {
+        if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+             PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+             PKT_secret_key *sk = secblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+             assert ( pub == pubblock ); /* only in the first node */
+             /* there is nothing to compare in this case, so just replace
+              * some information */
+             copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
+             free_public_key ( pk );
+             pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+             pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+        }
+        else if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            KBNODE sec;
+            PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+            /* this is more complicated: it may happen that the sequence
+             * of the subkeys dosn't match, so we have to find the
+             * appropriate secret key */
+            for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
+                if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                    PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                    if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
+                        copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
+                        free_public_key ( pk );
+                        pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+                        pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if ( !sec ) 
+                BUG(); /* already checked in premerge */
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/* This function checks that for every public subkey a corresponding
+ * secret subkey is available and deletes the public subkey otherwise.
+ * We need this function because we can't delete it later when we
+ * actually merge the secret parts into the pubring.
+ * The function also plays some games with the node flags.
+ */
+static void
+premerge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
+{
+    KBNODE last, pub;
+
+    assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    
+    for (pub=pubblock,last=NULL; pub; last = pub, pub = pub->next ) {
+        pub->flag &= ~3; /* reset bits 0 and 1 */
+        if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            KBNODE sec;
+            PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+            for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
+                if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                    PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                    if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
+                        if ( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+                            /* The secret parts are not available so
+                               we can't use that key for signing etc.
+                               Fix the pubkey usage */
+                            pk->pubkey_usage &= ~(PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG
+                                                  |PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
+                        }
+                        /* transfer flag bits 0 and 1 to the pubblock */
+                        pub->flag |= (sec->flag &3);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if ( !sec ) {
+                KBNODE next, ll;
+
+                if (opt.verbose)
+                  log_info (_("no secret subkey"
+			      " for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"),  
+			    keystr_from_pk (pk));
+                /* we have to remove the subkey in this case */
+                assert ( last );
+                /* find the next subkey */
+                for (next=pub->next,ll=pub;
+                     next && next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+                     ll = next, next = next->next ) 
+                    ;
+                /* make new link */
+                last->next = next;
+                /* release this public subkey with all sigs */
+                ll->next = NULL;
+                release_kbnode( pub );
+                /* let the loop continue */
+                pub = last;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* We need to copy the found bits (0 and 1) from the secret key to
+       the public key.  This has already been done for the subkeys but
+       got lost on the primary key - fix it here *. */
+    pubblock->flag |= (secblock->flag & 3);
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* See see whether the key fits
+ * our requirements and in case we do not
+ * request the primary key, we should select
+ * a suitable subkey.
+ * FIXME: Check against PGP 7 whether we still need a kludge
+ *        to favor type 16 keys over type 20 keys when type 20
+ *        has not been explitely requested.
+ * Returns: True when a suitable key has been found.
+ *
+ * We have to distinguish four cases:  FIXME!
+ *  1. No usage and no primary key requested
+ *     Examples for this case are that we have a keyID to be used
+ *     for decrytion or verification.
+ *  2. No usage but primary key requested
+ *     This is the case for all functions which work on an
+ *     entire keyblock, e.g. for editing or listing
+ *  3. Usage and primary key requested
+ *     FXME
+ *  4. Usage but no primary key requested
+ *     FIXME
+ * FIXME: Tell what is going to happen here and something about the rationale
+ * Note: We don't use this function if no specific usage is requested;
+ *       This way the getkey functions can be used for plain key listings.
+ *
+ * CTX ist the keyblock we are investigating, if FOUNDK is not NULL this
+ * is the key we actually found by looking at the keyid or a fingerprint and
+ * may eitehr point to the primary or one of the subkeys.
+ */
+
+static int
+finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
+{
+    KBNODE keyblock = ctx->keyblock;
+    KBNODE k;
+    KBNODE foundk = NULL;
+    PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;
+#define USAGE_MASK  (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
+    unsigned int req_usage = ( ctx->req_usage & USAGE_MASK );
+    /* Request the primary if we're certifying another key, and also
+       if signing data while --pgp6 or --pgp7 is on since pgp 6 and 7
+       do not understand signatures made by a signing subkey.  PGP 8
+       does. */
+    int req_prim = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) ||
+      ((PGP6 || PGP7) && (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG));
+    u32 latest_date;
+    KBNODE latest_key;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+
+    assert( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+   
+    ctx->found_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx->exact) {
+        for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
+            if ( (k->flag & 1) ) {
+                assert ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                         || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+                foundk = k;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
+        if ( (k->flag & 2) ) {
+            assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
+            foundu = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( DBG_CACHE )
+        log_debug( "finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
+                   (ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
+                   foundk? "one":"all", req_usage);
+
+    if (!req_usage) {
+        latest_key = foundk? foundk:keyblock;
+        goto found;
+    }
+    
+    if (!req_usage) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk = foundk->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if (pk->user_id)
+            free_user_id (pk->user_id);
+        pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
+        ctx->found_key = foundk;
+        cache_user_id( keyblock );
+        return 1; /* found */
+    }
+    
+    latest_date = 0;
+    latest_key  = NULL;
+    /* do not look at subkeys if a certification key is requested */
+    if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_prim) {
+        KBNODE nextk;
+        /* either start a loop or check just this one subkey */
+        for (k=foundk?foundk:keyblock; k; k = nextk ) {
+            PKT_public_key *pk;
+            nextk = k->next;
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+                continue;
+            if ( foundk )
+                nextk = NULL;  /* what a hack */
+            pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tchecking subkey %08lX\n",
+                           (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL));
+            if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey not valid\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->has_expired ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey has expired\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            
+            if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tusage does not match: want=%x have=%x\n",
+                               req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tsubkey looks fine\n");
+            if ( pk->timestamp > latest_date ) {
+                latest_date = pk->timestamp;
+                latest_key  = k;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Okay now try the primary key unless we want an exact 
+     * key ID match on a subkey */
+    if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_prim) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk;
+        if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_prim )
+            log_debug( "\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
+        pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key not valid\n");
+        }
+        else if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
+        }
+        else if ( pk->has_expired ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key has expired\n");
+        }
+        else  if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key usage does not match: "
+                           "want=%x have=%x\n",
+                           req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
+        }
+        else { /* okay */
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key may be used\n");
+            latest_key = keyblock;
+            latest_date = pk->timestamp;
+        }
+    }
+    
+    if ( !latest_key ) {
+        if (DBG_CACHE)
+            log_debug("\tno suitable key found -  giving up\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+ found:
+    if (DBG_CACHE)
+        log_debug( "\tusing key %08lX\n",
+                (ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
+
+    if (latest_key) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk = latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if (pk->user_id)
+            free_user_id (pk->user_id);
+        pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
+    }    
+        
+    ctx->found_key = latest_key;
+
+    if (latest_key != keyblock && opt.verbose)
+      {
+	char *tempkeystr=
+	  xstrdup(keystr_from_pk(latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key));
+        log_info(_("using subkey %s instead of primary key %s\n"),
+                 tempkeystr, keystr_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
+	xfree(tempkeystr);
+      }
+
+    cache_user_id( keyblock );
+    
+    return 1; /* found */
+}
+
+
+static int
+lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode )
+{
+    int rc;
+    KBNODE secblock = NULL; /* helper */
+    int no_suitable_key = 0;
+    
+    rc = 0;
+    while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctx->kr_handle, ctx->items, ctx->nitems))) {
+        /* If we are searching for the first key we have to make sure
+           that the next interation does not no an implicit reset.
+           This can be triggered by an empty key ring. */
+        if (ctx->nitems && ctx->items->mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST)
+            ctx->items->mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (ctx->kr_handle, &ctx->keyblock);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+            rc = 0;
+            goto skip;
+        }
+                       
+        if ( secmode ) {
+            /* find the correspondig public key and use this 
+             * this one for the selection process */
+            u32 aki[2];
+            KBNODE k = ctx->keyblock;
+            
+            if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+                BUG();
+
+            keyid_from_sk (k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki);
+            k = get_pubkeyblock (aki);
+            if( !k )
+	      {
+                if (!opt.quiet)
+		  log_info(_("key %s: secret key without public key"
+			     " - skipped\n"), keystr(aki));
+                goto skip;
+	      }
+            secblock = ctx->keyblock;
+            ctx->keyblock = k;
+
+            premerge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock, secblock );
+        }
+
+        /* warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
+         * merge_selfsigs.  For secret keys, premerge did tranfer the
+         * keys to the keyblock */
+        merge_selfsigs ( ctx->keyblock );
+        if ( finish_lookup (ctx) ) {
+            no_suitable_key = 0;
+            if ( secmode ) {
+                merge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock,
+                                           secblock);
+                release_kbnode (secblock);
+                secblock = NULL;
+            }
+            goto found;
+        }
+        else
+            no_suitable_key = 1;
+        
+      skip:
+        /* release resources and continue search */
+        if ( secmode ) {
+            release_kbnode( secblock );
+            secblock = NULL;
+        }
+        release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
+        ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+    }
+
+  found:
+    if( rc && rc != -1 )
+	log_error("keydb_search failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+
+    if( !rc ) {
+        *ret_keyblock = ctx->keyblock; /* return the keyblock */
+        ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+    }
+    else if (rc == -1 && no_suitable_key)
+        rc = secmode ? G10ERR_UNU_SECKEY : G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+    else if( rc == -1 )
+	rc = secmode ? G10ERR_NO_SECKEY : G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+
+    if ( secmode ) {
+        release_kbnode( secblock );
+        secblock = NULL;
+    }
+    release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
+    ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+
+    ctx->last_rc = rc;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * FIXME: Replace by the generic function 
+ *        It does not work as it is right now - it is used at 
+ *        2 places:  a) to get the key for an anonyous recipient
+ *                   b) to get the ultimately trusted keys.
+ *        The a) usage might have some problems.
+ *
+ * set with_subkeys true to include subkeys
+ * set with_spm true to include secret-parts-missing keys
+ *
+ * Enumerate all primary secret keys.  Caller must use these procedure:
+ *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
+ *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function
+ *     and provide space for the secret key (pass a buffer for sk)
+ *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
+ *     to indicate EOF.
+ *  4) Always call this function a last time with SK set to NULL,
+ *     so that can free it's context.
+ */
+int
+enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		  int with_subkeys, int with_spm )
+{
+    int rc=0;
+    struct {
+	int eof;
+        int first;
+	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+        KBNODE keyblock;
+        KBNODE node;
+    } *c = *context;
+
+
+    if( !c ) { /* make a new context */
+	c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+	*context = c;
+	c->hd = keydb_new (1);
+        c->first = 1;
+        c->keyblock = NULL;
+        c->node = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if( !sk ) { /* free the context */
+        keydb_release (c->hd);
+        release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
+	xfree( c );
+	*context = NULL;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    if( c->eof )
+	return -1;
+
+    do {
+        /* get the next secret key from the current keyblock */
+        for (; c->node; c->node = c->node->next) {
+            if ((c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+                || (with_subkeys
+                    && c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
+		&& !(c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode==1001
+		     && !with_spm)) {
+                copy_secret_key (sk, c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+                c->node = c->node->next;
+                return 0; /* found */
+            }
+        }
+        release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
+        c->keyblock = c->node = NULL;
+        
+        rc = c->first? keydb_search_first (c->hd) : keydb_search_next (c->hd);
+        c->first = 0;
+        if (rc) {
+            keydb_release (c->hd); c->hd = NULL;
+            c->eof = 1;
+            return -1; /* eof */
+        }
+        
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (c->hd, &c->keyblock);
+        c->node = c->keyblock;
+    } while (!rc);
+
+    return rc; /* error */
+}
+
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ ***********  user ID printing helpers *******
+ *********************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * Return a string with a printable representation of the user_id.
+ * this string must be freed by xfree.
+ */
+char*
+get_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
+{
+  user_id_db_t r;
+  char *p;
+  int pass=0;
+  /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+  do
+    {
+      for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next )
+	{
+	  keyid_list_t a;
+	  for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next )
+	    {
+	      if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
+		{
+		  p = xmalloc( keystrlen() + 1 + r->len + 1 );
+		  sprintf(p, "%s %.*s", keystr(keyid), r->len, r->name );
+		  return p;
+		}
+	    }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+  p = xmalloc( keystrlen() + 5 );
+  sprintf(p, "%s [?]", keystr(keyid));
+  return p;
+}
+
+
+char*
+get_user_id_string_native ( u32 *keyid )
+{
+  char *p = get_user_id_string( keyid );
+  char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, strlen(p), 0 );
+  xfree(p);
+  return p2;
+}
+
+
+char*
+get_long_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    char *p;
+    int pass=0;
+    /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+    do {
+	for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+            keyid_list_t a;
+            for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
+                if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+                    p = xmalloc( r->len + 20 );
+                    sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX %.*s",
+                            (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+                            r->len, r->name );
+                    return p;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+    p = xmalloc( 25 );
+    sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1] );
+    return p;
+}
+
+char*
+get_user_id( u32 *keyid, size_t *rn )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    char *p;
+    int pass=0;
+
+    /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+    do {
+	for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+            keyid_list_t a;
+            for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
+                if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+                    p = xmalloc( r->len );
+                    memcpy(p, r->name, r->len );
+                    *rn = r->len;
+                    return p;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+    p = xstrdup( user_id_not_found_utf8 () );
+    *rn = strlen(p);
+    return p;
+}
+
+char*
+get_user_id_native( u32 *keyid )
+{
+  size_t rn;
+  char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &rn );
+  char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, rn, 0 );
+  xfree(p);
+  return p2;
+}
+
+KEYDB_HANDLE
+get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx)
+{
+  return ctx->kr_handle;
+}
+
+static void
+free_akl(struct akl *akl)
+{
+  if(akl->spec)
+    free_keyserver_spec(akl->spec);
+
+  xfree(akl);
+}
+
+void
+release_akl(void)
+{
+  while(opt.auto_key_locate)
+    {
+      struct akl *akl2=opt.auto_key_locate;
+      opt.auto_key_locate=opt.auto_key_locate->next;
+      free_akl(akl2);
+    }
+}
+
+int
+parse_auto_key_locate(char *options)
+{
+  char *tok;
+
+  while((tok=optsep(&options)))
+    {
+      struct akl *akl,*check,*last=NULL;
+      int dupe=0;
+
+      if(tok[0]=='\0')
+	continue;
+
+      akl=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*akl));
+
+      if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"ldap")==0)
+	akl->type=AKL_LDAP;
+      else if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"keyserver")==0)
+	akl->type=AKL_KEYSERVER;
+#ifdef USE_DNS_CERT
+      else if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"cert")==0)
+	akl->type=AKL_CERT;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_DNS_PKA
+      else if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"pka")==0)
+	akl->type=AKL_PKA;
+#endif
+      else if((akl->spec=parse_keyserver_uri(tok,1,NULL,0)))
+	akl->type=AKL_SPEC;
+      else
+	{
+	  free_akl(akl);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+
+      /* We must maintain the order the user gave us */
+      for(check=opt.auto_key_locate;check;last=check,check=check->next)
+	{
+	  /* Check for duplicates */
+	  if(check->type==akl->type
+	     && (akl->type!=AKL_SPEC
+		 || (akl->type==AKL_SPEC
+		     && strcmp(check->spec->uri,akl->spec->uri)==0)))
+	    {
+	      dupe=1;
+	      free_akl(akl);
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(!dupe)
+	{
+	  if(last)
+	    last->next=akl;
+	  else
+	    opt.auto_key_locate=akl;
+	}
+    }
+
+  return 1;
+}
diff --git a/g10/global.h b/g10/global.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b2f872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/global.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* global.h - Local typedefs and constants
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GPG_GLOBAL_H
+#define GPG_GLOBAL_H
+
+#define MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN 20
+
+typedef struct kbnode_struct *KBNODE;
+typedef struct keydb_search_desc KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC;
+
+#endif /*GPG_GLOBAL_H*/
diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..691cfff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/gpg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4207 @@
+/* gpg.c - The GnuPG utility (main for gpg)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STAT
+#include <sys/stat.h> /* for stat() */
+#endif
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "g10defs.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "exec.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+#include "ccid-driver.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define MY_O_BINARY  O_BINARY
+#ifndef S_IRGRP
+# define S_IRGRP 0
+# define S_IWGRP 0
+#endif
+#else
+#define MY_O_BINARY  0
+#endif
+
+
+enum cmd_and_opt_values
+  {
+    aNull = 0,
+    oArmor	  = 'a',
+    aDetachedSign = 'b',
+    aSym	  = 'c',
+    aDecrypt	  = 'd',
+    aEncr	  = 'e',
+    oInteractive  = 'i',
+    oKOption	  = 'k',
+    oDryRun	  = 'n',
+    oOutput	  = 'o',
+    oQuiet	  = 'q',
+    oRecipient	  = 'r',
+    oHiddenRecipient = 'R',
+    aSign	  = 's',
+    oTextmodeShort= 't',
+    oLocalUser	  = 'u',
+    oVerbose	  = 'v',
+    oCompress	  = 'z',
+    oSetNotation  = 'N',
+    aListSecretKeys = 'K',
+    oBatch	  = 500,
+    oMaxOutput,
+    oSigNotation,
+    oCertNotation,
+    oShowNotation,
+    oNoShowNotation,
+    aEncrFiles,
+    aEncrSym,
+    aDecryptFiles,
+    aClearsign,
+    aStore,
+    aKeygen,
+    aSignEncr,
+    aSignEncrSym,
+    aSignSym,
+    aSignKey,
+    aLSignKey,
+    aListConfig,
+    aGPGConfList,
+    aGPGConfTest,
+    aListPackets,
+    aEditKey,
+    aDeleteKeys,
+    aDeleteSecretKeys,
+    aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys,
+    aKMode,
+    aKModeC,
+    aImport,
+    aFastImport,
+    aVerify,
+    aVerifyFiles,
+    aListKeys,
+    aListSigs,
+    aSendKeys,
+    aRecvKeys,
+    aSearchKeys,
+    aRefreshKeys,
+    aFetchKeys,
+    aExport,
+    aExportSecret,
+    aExportSecretSub,
+    aCheckKeys,
+    aGenRevoke,
+    aDesigRevoke,
+    aPrimegen,
+    aPrintMD,
+    aPrintMDs,
+    aCheckTrustDB,
+    aUpdateTrustDB,
+    aFixTrustDB,
+    aListTrustDB,
+    aListTrustPath,
+    aExportOwnerTrust,
+    aListOwnerTrust,
+    aImportOwnerTrust,
+    aDeArmor,
+    aEnArmor,
+    aGenRandom,
+    aPipeMode,
+    aRebuildKeydbCaches,
+    aCardStatus,
+    aCardEdit,
+    aChangePIN,
+
+    oTextmode,
+    oNoTextmode,
+    oExpert,
+    oNoExpert,
+    oDefSigExpire,
+    oAskSigExpire,
+    oNoAskSigExpire,
+    oDefCertExpire,
+    oAskCertExpire,
+    oNoAskCertExpire,
+    oDefCertLevel,
+    oMinCertLevel,
+    oAskCertLevel,
+    oNoAskCertLevel,
+    oFingerprint,
+    oWithFingerprint,
+    oAnswerYes,
+    oAnswerNo,
+    oKeyring,
+    oPrimaryKeyring,
+    oSecretKeyring,
+    oShowKeyring,
+    oDefaultKey,
+    oDefRecipient,
+    oDefRecipientSelf,
+    oNoDefRecipient,
+    oOptions,
+    oDebug,
+    oDebugAll,
+    oDebugCCIDDriver,
+    oStatusFD,
+    oStatusFile,
+    oAttributeFD,
+    oAttributeFile,
+    oEmitVersion,
+    oNoEmitVersion,
+    oCompletesNeeded,
+    oMarginalsNeeded,
+    oMaxCertDepth,
+    oLoadExtension,
+    oGnuPG,
+    oRFC1991,
+    oRFC2440,
+    oOpenPGP,
+    oPGP2,
+    oPGP6,
+    oPGP7,
+    oPGP8,
+    oRFC2440Text,
+    oNoRFC2440Text,
+    oCipherAlgo,
+    oDigestAlgo,
+    oCertDigestAlgo,
+    oCompressAlgo,
+    oCompressLevel,
+    oBZ2CompressLevel,
+    oBZ2DecompressLowmem,
+    oPasswd,
+    oPasswdFD,
+    oPasswdFile,
+    oPasswdRepeat,
+    oCommandFD,
+    oCommandFile,
+    oQuickRandom,
+    oNoVerbose,
+    oTrustDBName,
+    oNoSecmemWarn,
+    oRequireSecmem,
+    oNoRequireSecmem,
+    oNoPermissionWarn,
+    oNoMDCWarn,
+    oNoArmor,
+    oNoDefKeyring,
+    oNoGreeting,
+    oNoTTY,
+    oNoOptions,
+    oNoBatch,
+    oHomedir,
+    oWithColons,
+    oWithKeyData,
+    oSkipVerify,
+    oCompressKeys,
+    oCompressSigs,
+    oAlwaysTrust,
+    oTrustModel,
+    oForceOwnertrust,
+    oRunAsShmCP,
+    oSetFilename,
+    oForYourEyesOnly,
+    oNoForYourEyesOnly,
+    oSetPolicyURL,
+    oSigPolicyURL,
+    oCertPolicyURL,
+    oShowPolicyURL,
+    oNoShowPolicyURL,
+    oSigKeyserverURL,
+    oUseEmbeddedFilename,
+    oNoUseEmbeddedFilename,
+    oComment,
+    oDefaultComment,
+    oNoComments,
+    oThrowKeyids,
+    oNoThrowKeyids,
+    oShowPhotos,
+    oNoShowPhotos,
+    oPhotoViewer,
+    oForceV3Sigs,
+    oNoForceV3Sigs,
+    oForceV4Certs,
+    oNoForceV4Certs,
+    oForceMDC,
+    oNoForceMDC,
+    oDisableMDC,
+    oNoDisableMDC,
+    oS2KMode,
+    oS2KDigest,
+    oS2KCipher,
+    oS2KCount,
+    oSimpleSKChecksum,                          
+    oDisplayCharset,
+    oNotDashEscaped,
+    oEscapeFrom,
+    oNoEscapeFrom,
+    oLockOnce,
+    oLockMultiple,
+    oLockNever,
+    oKeyServer,
+    oKeyServerOptions,
+    oImportOptions,
+    oExportOptions,
+    oListOptions,
+    oVerifyOptions,
+    oTempDir,
+    oExecPath,
+    oEncryptTo,
+    oHiddenEncryptTo,
+    oNoEncryptTo,
+    oLoggerFD,
+    oLoggerFile,
+    oUtf8Strings,
+    oNoUtf8Strings,
+    oDisableCipherAlgo,
+    oDisablePubkeyAlgo,
+    oAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
+    oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID,
+    oAllowFreeformUID,
+    oNoAllowFreeformUID,
+    oAllowSecretKeyImport,                      
+    oEnableSpecialFilenames,
+    oNoLiteral,
+    oSetFilesize,
+    oHonorHttpProxy,
+    oFastListMode,
+    oListOnly,
+    oIgnoreTimeConflict,
+    oIgnoreValidFrom,
+    oIgnoreCrcError,
+    oIgnoreMDCError,
+    oShowSessionKey,
+    oOverrideSessionKey,
+    oNoRandomSeedFile,
+    oAutoKeyRetrieve,
+    oNoAutoKeyRetrieve,
+    oUseAgent,
+    oNoUseAgent,
+    oGpgAgentInfo,
+    oMergeOnly,
+    oTryAllSecrets,
+    oTrustedKey,
+    oNoExpensiveTrustChecks,
+    oFixedListMode,
+    oNoSigCache,
+    oNoSigCreateCheck,
+    oAutoCheckTrustDB,
+    oNoAutoCheckTrustDB,
+    oPreservePermissions,
+    oDefaultPreferenceList,
+    oDefaultKeyserverURL,
+    oPersonalCipherPreferences,
+    oPersonalDigestPreferences,
+    oPersonalCompressPreferences,
+    oDisplay,
+    oTTYname,
+    oTTYtype,
+    oLCctype,
+    oLCmessages,
+    oGroup,
+    oUnGroup,
+    oNoGroups,
+    oStrict,
+    oNoStrict,
+    oMangleDosFilenames,
+    oNoMangleDosFilenames,
+    oEnableProgressFilter,
+    oMultifile,
+    oKeyidFormat,
+    oExitOnStatusWriteError,
+    oLimitCardInsertTries,
+    oReaderPort,
+    octapiDriver,
+    opcscDriver,
+    oDisableCCID,
+    oRequireCrossCert,
+    oNoRequireCrossCert,
+    oAutoKeyLocate,
+    oNoAutoKeyLocate,
+    oAllowMultisigVerification,
+    oEnableDSA2,
+    oDisableDSA2,
+
+    oNoop
+  };
+
+
+static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
+
+    { 300, NULL, 0, N_("@Commands:\n ") },
+
+    { aSign, "sign",      256, N_("|[file]|make a signature")},
+    { aClearsign, "clearsign", 256, N_("|[file]|make a clear text signature")},
+    { aDetachedSign, "detach-sign", 256, N_("make a detached signature")},
+    { aEncr, "encrypt",   256, N_("encrypt data")},
+    { aEncrFiles, "encrypt-files", 256, "@"},
+    { aSym, "symmetric", 256, N_("encryption only with symmetric cipher")},
+    { aStore, "store",     256, "@"},
+    { aDecrypt, "decrypt",   256, N_("decrypt data (default)")},
+    { aDecryptFiles, "decrypt-files", 256, "@"},
+    { aVerify, "verify"   , 256, N_("verify a signature")},
+    { aVerifyFiles, "verify-files" , 256, "@" },
+    { aListKeys, "list-keys", 256, N_("list keys")},
+    { aListKeys, "list-public-keys", 256, "@" },
+    { aListSigs, "list-sigs", 256, N_("list keys and signatures")},
+    { aCheckKeys, "check-sigs",256, N_("list and check key signatures")},
+    { oFingerprint, "fingerprint", 256, N_("list keys and fingerprints")},
+    { aListSecretKeys, "list-secret-keys", 256, N_("list secret keys")},
+    { aKeygen,	   "gen-key",  256, N_("generate a new key pair")},
+    { aDeleteKeys,"delete-keys",256,N_("remove keys from the public keyring")},
+    { aDeleteSecretKeys, "delete-secret-keys",256,
+				    N_("remove keys from the secret keyring")},
+    { aSignKey,  "sign-key"   ,256, N_("sign a key")},
+    { aLSignKey, "lsign-key"  ,256, N_("sign a key locally")},
+    { aEditKey,  "edit-key"   ,256, N_("sign or edit a key")},
+    { aGenRevoke, "gen-revoke",256, N_("generate a revocation certificate")},
+    { aDesigRevoke, "desig-revoke",256, "@" },
+    { aExport, "export"           , 256, N_("export keys") },
+    { aSendKeys, "send-keys"     , 256, N_("export keys to a key server") },
+    { aRecvKeys, "recv-keys"     , 256, N_("import keys from a key server") },
+    { aSearchKeys, "search-keys" , 256,
+                                    N_("search for keys on a key server") },
+    { aRefreshKeys, "refresh-keys", 256,
+                                    N_("update all keys from a keyserver")},
+    { aFetchKeys, "fetch-keys" , 256, "@" },
+    { aExportSecret, "export-secret-keys" , 256, "@" },
+    { aExportSecretSub, "export-secret-subkeys" , 256, "@" },
+    { aImport, "import",      256     , N_("import/merge keys")},
+    { aFastImport, "fast-import",  256 , "@"},
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+    { aCardStatus,  "card-status", 256, N_("print the card status")},
+    { aCardEdit,   "card-edit",  256, N_("change data on a card")},
+    { aChangePIN,  "change-pin", 256, N_("change a card's PIN")},
+#endif
+    { aListConfig, "list-config", 256, "@"},
+    { aGPGConfList, "gpgconf-list", 256, "@" },
+    { aGPGConfTest, "gpgconf-test", 256, "@" },
+    { aListPackets, "list-packets",256, "@"},
+    { aExportOwnerTrust, "export-ownertrust", 256, "@"},
+    { aImportOwnerTrust, "import-ownertrust", 256, "@"},
+    { aUpdateTrustDB,
+	      "update-trustdb",0 , N_("update the trust database")},
+    { aCheckTrustDB, "check-trustdb", 0, "@"},
+    { aFixTrustDB, "fix-trustdb", 0, "@"},
+    { aDeArmor, "dearmor", 256, "@"},
+    { aDeArmor, "dearmour", 256, "@"},
+    { aEnArmor, "enarmor", 256, "@"},
+    { aEnArmor, "enarmour", 256, "@"},
+    { aPrintMD,  "print-md" , 256, N_("|algo [files]|print message digests")},
+    { aPrimegen, "gen-prime" , 256, "@" },
+    { aGenRandom, "gen-random" , 256, "@" },
+
+    { 301, NULL, 0, N_("@\nOptions:\n ") },
+
+    { oArmor, "armor",     0, N_("create ascii armored output")},
+    { oArmor, "armour",     0, "@" },
+    { oRecipient, "recipient", 2, N_("|NAME|encrypt for NAME")},
+    { oHiddenRecipient, "hidden-recipient", 2, "@" },
+    { oRecipient, "remote-user", 2, "@"},  /* old option name */
+    { oDefRecipient, "default-recipient", 2, "@"},
+    { oDefRecipientSelf, "default-recipient-self", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoDefRecipient, "no-default-recipient", 0, "@" },
+    { oTempDir, "temp-directory", 2, "@" },
+    { oExecPath, "exec-path", 2, "@" },
+    { oEncryptTo, "encrypt-to", 2, "@" },
+    { oHiddenEncryptTo, "hidden-encrypt-to", 2, "@" },
+    { oNoEncryptTo, "no-encrypt-to", 0, "@" },
+    { oLocalUser, "local-user",2, N_("use this user-id to sign or decrypt")},
+    { oCompress, NULL, 1, N_("|N|set compress level N (0 disables)") },
+    { oCompressLevel, "compress-level", 1, "@" },
+    { oBZ2CompressLevel, "bzip2-compress-level", 1, "@" },
+    { oBZ2DecompressLowmem, "bzip2-decompress-lowmem", 0, "@" },
+    { oTextmodeShort, NULL,   0, "@"},
+    { oTextmode, "textmode",  0, N_("use canonical text mode")},
+    { oNoTextmode, "no-textmode",  0, "@"},
+    { oExpert, "expert",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoExpert, "no-expert",   0, "@"},
+    { oDefSigExpire, "default-sig-expire", 2, "@"},
+    { oAskSigExpire, "ask-sig-expire",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoAskSigExpire, "no-ask-sig-expire",   0, "@"},
+    { oDefCertExpire, "default-cert-expire", 2, "@"},
+    { oAskCertExpire, "ask-cert-expire",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoAskCertExpire, "no-ask-cert-expire",   0, "@"},
+    { oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-level", 1, "@"},
+    { oMinCertLevel, "min-cert-level", 1, "@"},
+    { oAskCertLevel, "ask-cert-level",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoAskCertLevel, "no-ask-cert-level",   0, "@"},
+    { oOutput, "output",    2, N_("use as output file")},
+    { oMaxOutput, "max-output", 16|4, "@" },
+    { oVerbose, "verbose",   0, N_("verbose") },
+    { oQuiet,	"quiet",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoTTY, "no-tty", 0, "@"},
+    { oForceV3Sigs, "force-v3-sigs", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoForceV3Sigs, "no-force-v3-sigs", 0, "@"},
+    { oForceV4Certs, "force-v4-certs", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoForceV4Certs, "no-force-v4-certs", 0, "@"},
+    { oForceMDC, "force-mdc", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", 0, "@" },
+    { oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoDisableMDC, "no-disable-mdc", 0, "@" },
+    { oDryRun, "dry-run",   0, N_("do not make any changes") },
+    { oInteractive, "interactive", 0, N_("prompt before overwriting") },
+    { oUseAgent, "use-agent",0, "@"},
+    { oNoUseAgent, "no-use-agent",0, "@"},
+    { oGpgAgentInfo, "gpg-agent-info",2, "@"},
+    { oBatch, "batch", 0, "@"},
+    { oAnswerYes, "yes", 0, "@"},
+    { oAnswerNo, "no", 0, "@"},
+    { oKeyring, "keyring", 2, "@"},
+    { oPrimaryKeyring, "primary-keyring",2, "@" },
+    { oSecretKeyring, "secret-keyring", 2, "@"},
+    { oShowKeyring, "show-keyring", 0, "@"},
+    { oDefaultKey, "default-key", 2, "@"},
+    { oKeyServer, "keyserver", 2, "@"},
+    { oKeyServerOptions, "keyserver-options",2,"@"},
+    { oImportOptions, "import-options",2,"@"},
+    { oExportOptions, "export-options",2,"@"},
+    { oListOptions, "list-options",2,"@"},
+    { oVerifyOptions, "verify-options",2,"@"},
+    { oDisplayCharset, "display-charset", 2, "@"},
+    { oDisplayCharset, "charset", 2, "@"},
+    { oOptions, "options", 2, "@"},
+    { oDebug, "debug"     ,4|16, "@"},
+    { oDebugAll, "debug-all" ,0, "@"},
+    { oStatusFD, "status-fd" ,1, "@"},
+    { oStatusFile, "status-file" ,2, "@"},
+    { oAttributeFD, "attribute-fd" ,1, "@" },
+    { oAttributeFile, "attribute-file" ,2, "@" },
+    { oNoop, "sk-comments", 0,   "@"},
+    { oNoop, "no-sk-comments", 0,   "@"},
+    { oCompletesNeeded, "completes-needed", 1, "@"},
+    { oMarginalsNeeded, "marginals-needed", 1, "@"},
+    { oMaxCertDepth,	"max-cert-depth", 1, "@" },
+    { oTrustedKey, "trusted-key", 2, "@"},
+    { oLoadExtension, "load-extension", 2, "@"},
+    { oGnuPG, "gnupg",   0, "@"},
+    { oGnuPG, "no-pgp2", 0, "@"},
+    { oGnuPG, "no-pgp6", 0, "@"},
+    { oGnuPG, "no-pgp7", 0, "@"},
+    { oGnuPG, "no-pgp8", 0, "@"},
+    { oRFC1991, "rfc1991",   0, "@"},
+    { oRFC2440, "rfc2440", 0, "@" },
+    { oOpenPGP, "openpgp", 0, N_("use strict OpenPGP behavior")},
+    { oPGP2, "pgp2", 0, N_("generate PGP 2.x compatible messages")},
+    { oPGP6, "pgp6", 0, "@"},
+    { oPGP7, "pgp7", 0, "@"},
+    { oPGP8, "pgp8", 0, "@"},
+    { oRFC2440Text, "rfc2440-text", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoRFC2440Text, "no-rfc2440-text", 0, "@"},
+    { oS2KMode, "s2k-mode", 1, "@"},
+    { oS2KDigest, "s2k-digest-algo", 2, "@"},
+    { oS2KCipher, "s2k-cipher-algo", 2, "@"},
+    { oS2KCount, "s2k-count", 1, "@"},
+    { oSimpleSKChecksum, "simple-sk-checksum", 0, "@"},
+    { oCipherAlgo, "cipher-algo", 2, "@"},
+    { oDigestAlgo, "digest-algo", 2, "@"},
+    { oCertDigestAlgo, "cert-digest-algo", 2 , "@" },
+    { oCompressAlgo,"compress-algo", 2, "@"},
+    { oCompressAlgo, "compression-algo", 2, "@"}, /* Alias */
+    { oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyid", 0, "@"},
+    { oThrowKeyids, "throw-keyids", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyid", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoThrowKeyids, "no-throw-keyids", 0, "@" },
+    { oShowPhotos,   "show-photos", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoShowPhotos, "no-show-photos", 0, "@" },
+    { oPhotoViewer,  "photo-viewer", 2, "@" },
+    { oSetNotation,  "set-notation", 2, "@" },
+    { oSetNotation,  "notation-data", 2, "@" }, /* Alias */
+    { oSigNotation,  "sig-notation", 2, "@" },
+    { oCertNotation, "cert-notation", 2, "@" },
+
+    { 302, NULL, 0, N_(
+  "@\n(See the man page for a complete listing of all commands and options)\n"
+		      )},
+
+    { 303, NULL, 0, N_("@\nExamples:\n\n"
+    " -se -r Bob [file]          sign and encrypt for user Bob\n"
+    " --clearsign [file]         make a clear text signature\n"
+    " --detach-sign [file]       make a detached signature\n"
+    " --list-keys [names]        show keys\n"
+    " --fingerprint [names]      show fingerprints\n"  ) },
+
+  /* hidden options */
+    { aListOwnerTrust, "list-ownertrust", 256, "@"}, /* deprecated */
+    { aPrintMDs, "print-mds" , 256, "@"}, /* old */
+    { aListTrustDB, "list-trustdb",0 , "@"},
+    /* Not yet used */
+    /* { aListTrustPath, "list-trust-path",0, "@"}, */
+    { aPipeMode,  "pipemode", 0, "@" },
+    { oKOption, NULL,	 0, "@"},
+    { oPasswd, "passphrase",2, "@" },
+    { oPasswdFD, "passphrase-fd",1, "@" },
+    { oPasswdFile, "passphrase-file",2, "@" },
+    { oPasswdRepeat, "passphrase-repeat", 1, "@"},
+    { oCommandFD, "command-fd",1, "@" },
+    { oCommandFile, "command-file",2, "@" },
+    { oQuickRandom, "quick-random", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoVerbose, "no-verbose", 0, "@"},
+    { oTrustDBName, "trustdb-name", 2, "@" },
+    { oNoSecmemWarn, "no-secmem-warning", 0, "@" },
+    { oRequireSecmem,"require-secmem", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoRequireSecmem,"no-require-secmem", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoPermissionWarn, "no-permission-warning", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoMDCWarn, "no-mdc-warning", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoArmor, "no-armor",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoArmor, "no-armour",   0, "@"},
+    { oNoDefKeyring, "no-default-keyring", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoOptions, "no-options", 0, "@" }, /* shortcut for --options /dev/null */
+    { oHomedir, "homedir", 2, "@" },   /* defaults to "~/.gnupg" */
+    { oNoBatch, "no-batch", 0, "@" },
+    { oWithColons, "with-colons", 0, "@"},
+    { oWithKeyData,"with-key-data", 0, "@"},
+    { aListKeys, "list-key", 0, "@" }, /* alias */
+    { aListSigs, "list-sig", 0, "@" }, /* alias */
+    { aCheckKeys, "check-sig",0, "@" }, /* alias */
+    { oSkipVerify, "skip-verify",0, "@" },
+    { oCompressKeys, "compress-keys",0, "@"},
+    { oCompressSigs, "compress-sigs",0, "@"},
+    { oDefCertLevel, "default-cert-check-level", 1, "@"}, /* Old option */
+    { oAlwaysTrust, "always-trust", 0, "@"},
+    { oTrustModel, "trust-model", 2, "@"},
+    { oForceOwnertrust, "force-ownertrust", 2, "@"},
+    { oRunAsShmCP, "run-as-shm-coprocess", 4, "@" },
+    { oSetFilename, "set-filename", 2, "@" },
+    { oForYourEyesOnly, "for-your-eyes-only", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoForYourEyesOnly, "no-for-your-eyes-only", 0, "@" },
+    { oSetPolicyURL, "set-policy-url", 2, "@" },
+    { oSigPolicyURL, "sig-policy-url", 2, "@" },
+    { oCertPolicyURL, "cert-policy-url", 2, "@" },
+    { oShowPolicyURL, "show-policy-url", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoShowPolicyURL, "no-show-policy-url", 0, "@" },
+    { oSigKeyserverURL, "sig-keyserver-url", 2, "@" },
+    { oShowNotation, "show-notation", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoShowNotation, "no-show-notation", 0, "@" },
+    { oComment, "comment", 2, "@" },
+    { oDefaultComment, "default-comment", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoComments, "no-comments", 0, "@" },
+    { oEmitVersion, "emit-version", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoEmitVersion, "no-emit-version", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoEmitVersion, "no-version", 0, "@"}, /* alias */
+    { oNotDashEscaped, "not-dash-escaped", 0, "@" },
+    { oEscapeFrom, "escape-from-lines", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoEscapeFrom, "no-escape-from-lines", 0, "@" },
+    { oLockOnce, "lock-once", 0, "@" },
+    { oLockMultiple, "lock-multiple", 0, "@" },
+    { oLockNever, "lock-never", 0, "@" },
+    { oLoggerFD, "logger-fd",1, "@" },
+    { oLoggerFile, "logger-file",2, "@" },
+    { oUseEmbeddedFilename, "use-embedded-filename", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoUseEmbeddedFilename, "no-use-embedded-filename", 0, "@" },
+    { oUtf8Strings, "utf8-strings", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoUtf8Strings, "no-utf8-strings", 0, "@" },
+    { oWithFingerprint, "with-fingerprint", 0, "@" },
+    { oDisableCipherAlgo,  "disable-cipher-algo", 2, "@" },
+    { oDisablePubkeyAlgo,  "disable-pubkey-algo", 2, "@" },
+    { oAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "allow-non-selfsigned-uid", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID, "no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid", 0, "@" },
+    { oAllowFreeformUID, "allow-freeform-uid", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoAllowFreeformUID, "no-allow-freeform-uid", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoLiteral, "no-literal", 0, "@" },
+    { oSetFilesize, "set-filesize", 20, "@" },
+    { oHonorHttpProxy,"honor-http-proxy", 0, "@" },
+    { oFastListMode,"fast-list-mode", 0, "@" },
+    { oFixedListMode,"fixed-list-mode", 0, "@" },
+    { oListOnly, "list-only", 0, "@"},
+    { oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", 0, "@" },
+    { oIgnoreValidFrom,    "ignore-valid-from",    0, "@" },
+    { oIgnoreCrcError, "ignore-crc-error", 0,"@" },
+    { oIgnoreMDCError, "ignore-mdc-error", 0,"@" },
+    { oShowSessionKey, "show-session-key", 0, "@" },
+    { oOverrideSessionKey, "override-session-key", 2, "@" },
+    { oNoRandomSeedFile,  "no-random-seed-file", 0, "@" },
+    { oAutoKeyRetrieve, "auto-key-retrieve", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoAutoKeyRetrieve, "no-auto-key-retrieve", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoSigCache,         "no-sig-cache", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoSigCreateCheck,   "no-sig-create-check", 0, "@" },
+    { oAutoCheckTrustDB, "auto-check-trustdb", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoAutoCheckTrustDB, "no-auto-check-trustdb", 0, "@"},
+    { oMergeOnly,	  "merge-only", 0, "@" },
+    { oAllowSecretKeyImport, "allow-secret-key-import", 0, "@" },
+    { oTryAllSecrets,  "try-all-secrets", 0, "@" },
+    { oEnableSpecialFilenames, "enable-special-filenames", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoExpensiveTrustChecks, "no-expensive-trust-checks", 0, "@" },
+    { aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys, "delete-secret-and-public-keys",256, "@" },
+    { aRebuildKeydbCaches, "rebuild-keydb-caches", 256, "@"},
+    { oPreservePermissions, "preserve-permissions", 0, "@"},
+    { oDefaultPreferenceList,  "default-preference-list", 2, "@"},
+    { oDefaultKeyserverURL,  "default-keyserver-url", 2, "@"},
+    { oPersonalCipherPreferences,  "personal-cipher-preferences", 2, "@"},
+    { oPersonalDigestPreferences,  "personal-digest-preferences", 2, "@"},
+    { oPersonalCompressPreferences,  "personal-compress-preferences", 2, "@"},
+    /* Aliases.  I constantly mistype these, and assume other people
+       do as well. */
+    { oPersonalCipherPreferences, "personal-cipher-prefs", 2, "@"},
+    { oPersonalDigestPreferences, "personal-digest-prefs", 2, "@"},
+    { oPersonalCompressPreferences, "personal-compress-prefs", 2, "@"},
+    { oDisplay,    "display",     2, "@" },
+    { oTTYname,    "ttyname",     2, "@" },
+    { oTTYtype,    "ttytype",     2, "@" },
+    { oLCctype,    "lc-ctype",    2, "@" },
+    { oLCmessages, "lc-messages", 2, "@" },
+    { oGroup,      "group",       2, "@" },
+    { oUnGroup,    "ungroup",     2, "@" },
+    { oNoGroups,   "no-groups",    0, "@" },
+    { oStrict,     "strict",      0, "@" },
+    { oNoStrict,   "no-strict",   0, "@" },
+    { oMangleDosFilenames, "mangle-dos-filenames", 0, "@" },
+    { oNoMangleDosFilenames, "no-mangle-dos-filenames", 0, "@" },
+    { oEnableProgressFilter, "enable-progress-filter", 0, "@" },
+    { oMultifile, "multifile", 0, "@" },
+    { oKeyidFormat, "keyid-format", 2, "@" },
+    { oExitOnStatusWriteError, "exit-on-status-write-error", 0, "@" },
+    { oLimitCardInsertTries, "limit-card-insert-tries", 1, "@"},
+
+    { oReaderPort, "reader-port",    2, "@"},
+    { octapiDriver, "ctapi-driver",  2, "@"},
+    { opcscDriver, "pcsc-driver",    2, "@"},
+    { oDisableCCID, "disable-ccid", 0, "@"},
+#if defined(ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT) && defined(HAVE_LIBUSB)
+    { oDebugCCIDDriver, "debug-ccid-driver", 0, "@"},
+#endif
+    { oAllowMultisigVerification, "allow-multisig-verification", 0, "@"},
+    { oEnableDSA2, "enable-dsa2", 0, "@"},
+    { oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", 0, "@"},
+
+    /* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
+       product use gpg with minimal pain.  Many commands are common
+       already as they seem to have borrowed commands from us.  Now
+       I'm returning the favor. */
+    { oLocalUser, "sign-with", 2, "@" },
+    { oRecipient, "user", 2, "@" },
+    { oRequireCrossCert, "require-backsigs", 0, "@"},
+    { oRequireCrossCert, "require-cross-certification", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-backsigs", 0, "@"},
+    { oNoRequireCrossCert, "no-require-cross-certification", 0, "@"},
+    { oAutoKeyLocate, "auto-key-locate", 2, "@"},
+    { oNoAutoKeyLocate, "no-auto-key-locate", 0, "@"},
+    {0,NULL,0,NULL}
+};
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 1
+#else
+#define ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 0
+#endif
+
+
+int g10_errors_seen = 0;
+
+static int utf8_strings = 0;
+static int maybe_setuid = 1;
+
+static char *build_list( const char *text, char letter,
+			 const char *(*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) );
+static void set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd,
+			enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd );
+static void print_mds( const char *fname, int algo );
+static void add_notation_data( const char *string, int which );
+static void add_policy_url( const char *string, int which );
+static void add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which );
+
+const char *
+strusage( int level )
+{
+  static char *digests, *pubkeys, *ciphers, *zips;
+    const char *p;
+    switch( level ) {
+      case 11: p = "gpg (GnuPG)";
+	break;
+      case 13: p = VERSION; break;
+      case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
+      case 19: p =
+	    _("Please report bugs to <gnupg-bugs@gnu.org>.\n");
+	break;
+
+#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
+      case 20:
+	p="NOTE: THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT VERSION!";
+	break;
+      case 21:
+	p="It is only intended for test purposes and should NOT be";
+	break;
+      case 22:
+	p="used in a production environment or with production keys!";
+	break;
+#endif
+
+      case 1:
+      case 40:	p =
+	    _("Usage: gpg [options] [files] (-h for help)");
+	break;
+      case 41:	p =
+	    _("Syntax: gpg [options] [files]\n"
+	      "sign, check, encrypt or decrypt\n"
+	      "default operation depends on the input data\n");
+	break;
+
+      case 31: p = "\nHome: "; break;
+#ifndef __riscos__
+      case 32: p = opt.homedir; break;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+      case 32: p = make_filename(opt.homedir, NULL); break;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+      case 33: p = _("\nSupported algorithms:\n"); break;
+      case 34:
+	if( !pubkeys )
+	    pubkeys = build_list(_("Pubkey: "), 0, pubkey_algo_to_string,
+							check_pubkey_algo );
+	p = pubkeys;
+	break;
+      case 35:
+	if( !ciphers )
+	    ciphers = build_list(_("Cipher: "), 'S', cipher_algo_to_string,
+							check_cipher_algo );
+	p = ciphers;
+	break;
+      case 36:
+	if( !digests )
+	    digests = build_list(_("Hash: "), 'H', digest_algo_to_string,
+							check_digest_algo );
+	p = digests;
+	break;
+      case 37:
+	if( !zips )
+	    zips = build_list(_("Compression: "),'Z',compress_algo_to_string,
+			                                check_compress_algo);
+	p = zips;
+	break;
+
+      default:	p = default_strusage(level);
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+static char *
+build_list( const char *text, char letter,
+	    const char * (*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) )
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *s;
+    size_t n=strlen(text)+2;
+    char *list, *p, *line=NULL;
+
+    if( maybe_setuid )
+	secmem_init( 0 );    /* drop setuid */
+
+    for(i=0; i <= 110; i++ )
+	if( !chkf(i) && (s=mapf(i)) )
+	    n += strlen(s) + 7 + 2;
+    list = xmalloc( 21 + n ); *list = 0;
+    for(p=NULL, i=0; i <= 110; i++ ) {
+	if( !chkf(i) && (s=mapf(i)) ) {
+	    if( !p ) {
+		p = stpcpy( list, text );
+		line=p;
+	    }
+	    else
+		p = stpcpy( p, ", ");
+
+	    if(strlen(line)>60) {
+	      int spaces=strlen(text);
+
+	      list=xrealloc(list,n+spaces+1);
+	      /* realloc could move the block, so find the end again */
+	      p=list;
+	      while(*p)
+		p++;
+
+	      p=stpcpy(p, "\n");
+	      line=p;
+	      for(;spaces;spaces--)
+		p=stpcpy(p, " ");
+	    }
+
+	    p = stpcpy(p, s );
+	    if(opt.verbose && letter)
+	      {
+		char num[8];
+		sprintf(num," (%c%d)",letter,i);
+		p = stpcpy(p,num);
+	      }
+	}
+    }
+    if( p )
+	p = stpcpy(p, "\n" );
+    return list;
+}
+
+
+static void
+i18n_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT
+    set_gettext_file (PACKAGE, "Software\\GNU\\GnuPG");
+#else
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+    setlocale( LC_ALL, "" );
+    bindtextdomain( PACKAGE, G10_LOCALEDIR );
+    textdomain( PACKAGE );
+#endif
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+wrong_args( const char *text)
+{
+    fputs(_("usage: gpg [options] "),stderr);
+    fputs(text,stderr);
+    putc('\n',stderr);
+    g10_exit(2);
+}
+
+
+static char *
+make_username( const char *string )
+{
+    char *p;
+    if( utf8_strings )
+	p = xstrdup(string);
+    else
+	p = native_to_utf8( string );
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_debug(void)
+{
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_MEMORY_VALUE )
+	memory_debug_mode = 1;
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE )
+	memory_stat_debug_mode = 1;
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_MPI_VALUE )
+	mpi_debug_mode = 1;
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_CIPHER_VALUE )
+	g10c_debug_mode = 1;
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_IOBUF_VALUE )
+	iobuf_debug_mode = 1;
+
+}
+
+
+/* We need the home directory also in some other directories, so make
+   sure that both variables are always in sync. */
+static void
+set_homedir (char *dir)
+{
+  if (!dir)
+    dir = "";
+  g10_opt_homedir = opt.homedir = dir;
+}
+
+
+/* We set the screen dimensions for UI purposes.  Do not allow screens
+   smaller than 80x24 for the sake of simplicity. */
+static void
+set_screen_dimensions(void)
+{
+#ifndef _WIN32
+  char *str;
+
+  str=getenv("COLUMNS");
+  if(str)
+    opt.screen_columns=atoi(str);
+
+  str=getenv("LINES");
+  if(str)
+    opt.screen_lines=atoi(str);
+#endif
+
+  if(opt.screen_columns<80 || opt.screen_columns>255)
+    opt.screen_columns=80;
+
+  if(opt.screen_lines<24 || opt.screen_lines>255)
+    opt.screen_lines=24;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper to open a file FNAME either for reading or writing to be
+   used with --status-file etc functions.  Not generally useful but it
+   avoids the riscos specific functions and well some Windows people
+   might like it too.  Prints an error message and returns -1 on
+   error. On success the file descriptor is returned.  */
+static int
+open_info_file (const char *fname, int for_write)
+{
+#ifdef __riscos__
+  return riscos_fdopenfile (fname, for_write);
+#elif defined (ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS)
+  /* We can't allow these even when testing for a secured filename
+     because files to be secured might not yet been secured.  This is
+     similar to the option file but in that case it is unlikely that
+     sensitive information may be retrieved by means of error
+     messages.  */
+  return -1;
+#else 
+  int fd;
+
+/*   if (is_secured_filename (fname)) */
+/*     { */
+/*       fd = -1; */
+/*       errno = EPERM; */
+/*     } */
+/*   else */
+/*     { */
+      do
+        {
+          if (for_write)
+            fd = open (fname, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY,
+                        S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
+          else
+            fd = open (fname, O_RDONLY | MY_O_BINARY);
+        }
+      while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+/*     } */
+  if ( fd == -1)
+    log_error ( for_write? _("can't create `%s': %s\n")
+                         : _("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));
+  
+  return fd;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+set_cmd( enum cmd_and_opt_values *ret_cmd, enum cmd_and_opt_values new_cmd )
+{
+    enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = *ret_cmd;
+
+    if( !cmd || cmd == new_cmd )
+	cmd = new_cmd;
+    else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aEncr )
+	cmd = aSignEncr;
+    else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSign )
+	cmd = aSignEncr;
+    else if( cmd == aSign && new_cmd == aSym )
+	cmd = aSignSym;
+    else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aSign )
+	cmd = aSignSym;
+    else if( cmd == aSym && new_cmd == aEncr )
+	cmd = aEncrSym;
+    else if( cmd == aEncr && new_cmd == aSym )
+	cmd = aEncrSym;
+    else if( cmd == aKMode && new_cmd == aSym )
+	cmd = aKModeC;
+    else if (cmd == aSignEncr && new_cmd == aSym)
+        cmd = aSignEncrSym;
+    else if (cmd == aSignSym && new_cmd == aEncr)
+        cmd = aSignEncrSym;
+    else if (cmd == aEncrSym && new_cmd == aSign)
+        cmd = aSignEncrSym;
+    else if(	( cmd == aSign	   && new_cmd == aClearsign )
+	     || ( cmd == aClearsign && new_cmd == aSign )  )
+	cmd = aClearsign;
+    else {
+	log_error(_("conflicting commands\n"));
+	g10_exit(2);
+    }
+
+    *ret_cmd = cmd;
+}
+
+
+static void
+add_group(char *string)
+{
+  char *name,*value;
+  struct groupitem *item;
+
+  /* Break off the group name */
+  name=strsep(&string,"=");
+  if(string==NULL)
+    {
+      log_error(_("no = sign found in group definition `%s'\n"),name);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));
+
+  /* Does this group already exist? */
+  for(item=opt.grouplist;item;item=item->next)
+    if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
+      break;
+
+  if(!item)
+    {
+      item=xmalloc(sizeof(struct groupitem));
+      item->name=name;
+      item->next=opt.grouplist;
+      item->values=NULL;
+      opt.grouplist=item;
+    }
+
+  /* Break apart the values */
+  while ((value= strsep(&string," \t")))
+    {
+      if (*value)
+        add_to_strlist2(&item->values,value,utf8_strings);
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+rm_group(char *name)
+{
+  struct groupitem *item,*last=NULL;
+
+  trim_trailing_ws(name,strlen(name));
+
+  for(item=opt.grouplist;item;last=item,item=item->next)
+    {
+      if(strcasecmp(item->name,name)==0)
+	{
+	  if(last)
+	    last->next=item->next;
+	  else
+	    opt.grouplist=item->next;
+
+	  free_strlist(item->values);
+	  xfree(item);
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* We need to check three things.
+
+   0) The homedir.  It must be x00, a directory, and owned by the
+   user.
+
+   1) The options/gpg.conf file.  Okay unless it or its containing
+   directory is group or other writable or not owned by us.  Disable
+   exec in this case.
+
+   2) Extensions.  Same as #1.
+
+   Returns true if the item is unsafe. */
+static int
+check_permissions(const char *path,int item)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
+  static int homedir_cache=-1;
+  char *tmppath,*dir;
+  struct stat statbuf,dirbuf;
+  int homedir=0,ret=0,checkonly=0;
+  int perm=0,own=0,enc_dir_perm=0,enc_dir_own=0;
+
+  if(opt.no_perm_warn)
+    return 0;
+
+  assert(item==0 || item==1 || item==2);
+
+  /* extensions may attach a path */
+  if(item==2 && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C)
+    {
+      if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C))
+	tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL);
+      else
+	tmppath=make_filename(GNUPG_LIBDIR,path,NULL);
+    }
+  else
+    tmppath=xstrdup(path);
+
+  /* If the item is located in the homedir, but isn't the homedir,
+     don't continue if we already checked the homedir itself.  This is
+     to avoid user confusion with an extra options file warning which
+     could be rectified if the homedir itself had proper
+     permissions. */
+  if(item!=0 && homedir_cache>-1
+     && ascii_strncasecmp(opt.homedir,tmppath,strlen(opt.homedir))==0)
+    {
+      ret=homedir_cache;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+  /* It's okay if the file or directory doesn't exist */
+  if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0)
+    {
+      ret=0;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+  /* Now check the enclosing directory.  Theoretically, we could walk
+     this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity,
+     I'm stopping at one level down. */
+  dir=make_dirname(tmppath);
+
+  if(stat(dir,&dirbuf)!=0 || !S_ISDIR(dirbuf.st_mode))
+    {
+      /* Weird error */
+      ret=1;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+  xfree(dir);
+
+  /* Assume failure */
+  ret=1;
+
+  if(item==0)
+    {
+      /* The homedir must be x00, a directory, and owned by the user. */
+
+      if(S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
+	{
+	  if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid())
+	    {
+	      if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0)
+		ret=0;
+	      else
+		perm=1;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    own=1;
+
+	  homedir_cache=ret;
+	}
+    }
+  else if(item==1 || item==2)
+    {
+      /* The options or extension file.  Okay unless it or its
+	 containing directory is group or other writable or not owned
+	 by us or root. */
+
+      if(S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
+	{
+	  if(statbuf.st_uid==getuid() || statbuf.st_uid==0)
+	    {
+	      if((statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0)
+		{
+		  /* it's not writable, so make sure the enclosing
+                     directory is also not writable */
+		  if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0)
+		    {
+		      if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH))==0)
+			ret=0;
+		      else
+			enc_dir_perm=1;
+		    }
+		  else
+		    enc_dir_own=1;
+		}
+	      else
+		{
+		  /* it's writable, so the enclosing directory had
+                     better not let people get to it. */
+		  if(dirbuf.st_uid==getuid() || dirbuf.st_uid==0)
+		    {
+		      if((dirbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0)
+			ret=0;
+		      else
+			perm=enc_dir_perm=1; /* unclear which one to fix! */
+		    }
+		  else
+		    enc_dir_own=1;
+		}
+	    }
+	  else
+	    own=1;
+	}
+    }
+  else
+    BUG();
+
+  if(!checkonly)
+    {
+      if(own)
+	{
+	  if(item==0)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
+		       " homedir `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else if(item==1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
+		       " configuration file `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe ownership on"
+		       " extension `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	}
+      if(perm)
+	{
+	  if(item==0)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
+		       " homedir `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else if(item==1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
+		       " configuration file `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe permissions on"
+		       " extension `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	}
+      if(enc_dir_own)
+	{
+	  if(item==0)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
+		       " homedir `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else if(item==1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
+		       " configuration file `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory ownership on"
+		       " extension `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	}
+      if(enc_dir_perm)
+	{
+	  if(item==0)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
+		       " homedir `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else if(item==1)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
+		       " configuration file `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	  else
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: unsafe enclosing directory permissions on"
+		       " extension `%s'\n"),tmppath);
+	}
+    }
+
+ end:
+  xfree(tmppath);
+
+  if(homedir)
+    homedir_cache=ret;
+
+  return ret;
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_algo_numbers(int (*checker)(int))
+{
+  int i,first=1;
+
+  for(i=0;i<=110;i++)
+    {
+      if(!checker(i))
+	{
+	  if(first)
+	    first=0;
+	  else
+	    printf(";");
+	  printf("%d",i);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* In the future, we can do all sorts of interesting configuration
+   output here.  For now, just give "group" as the Enigmail folks need
+   it, and pubkey, cipher, hash, and compress as they may be useful
+   for frontends. */
+static void
+list_config(char *items)
+{
+  int show_all=(items==NULL);
+  char *name=NULL;
+
+  if(!opt.with_colons)
+    return;
+
+  while(show_all || (name=strsep(&items," ")))
+    {
+      int any=0;
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"group")==0)
+	{
+	  struct groupitem *iter;
+
+	  for(iter=opt.grouplist;iter;iter=iter->next)
+	    {
+	      STRLIST sl;
+
+	      printf("cfg:group:");
+	      print_string(stdout,iter->name,strlen(iter->name),':');
+	      printf(":");
+
+	      for(sl=iter->values;sl;sl=sl->next)
+		{
+		  print_string2(stdout,sl->d,strlen(sl->d),':',';');
+		  if(sl->next)
+		    printf(";");
+		}
+
+	      printf("\n");
+	    }
+
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"version")==0)
+	{
+	  printf("cfg:version:");
+	  print_string(stdout,VERSION,strlen(VERSION),':');
+	  printf("\n");
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"pubkey")==0)
+	{
+	  printf("cfg:pubkey:");
+	  print_algo_numbers(check_pubkey_algo);
+	  printf("\n");
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"cipher")==0)
+	{
+	  printf("cfg:cipher:");
+	  print_algo_numbers(check_cipher_algo);
+	  printf("\n");
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all
+	 || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"digest")==0
+	 || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"hash")==0)
+	{
+	  printf("cfg:digest:");
+	  print_algo_numbers(check_digest_algo);
+	  printf("\n");
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"compress")==0)
+	{
+	  printf("cfg:compress:");
+	  print_algo_numbers(check_compress_algo);
+	  printf("\n");
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all || ascii_strcasecmp(name,"ccid-reader-id")==0)
+	{
+#if defined(ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT) && defined(HAVE_LIBUSB)
+          char *p, *p2, *list = ccid_get_reader_list ();
+
+          for (p=list; p && (p2 = strchr (p, '\n')); p = p2+1)
+            {
+              *p2 = 0;
+              printf("cfg:ccid-reader-id:%s\n", p);
+            }
+          free (list);
+#endif
+	  any=1;
+	}
+
+      if(show_all)
+	break;
+
+      if(!any)
+	log_error(_("unknown configuration item `%s'\n"),name);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* List options and default values in the GPG Conf format.  This is a
+   new tool distributed with gnupg 1.9.x but we also want some limited
+   support in older gpg versions.  The output is the name of the
+   configuration file and a list of options available for editing by
+   gpgconf.  */
+static void
+gpgconf_list (const char *configfile)
+{
+  /* The following definitions are taken from gnupg/tools/gpgconf-comp.c.  */
+#define GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE	0UL
+#define GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT	(1UL << 4)
+
+  printf ("gpgconf-gpg.conf:%lu:\"%s\n",
+          GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT,configfile?configfile:"/dev/null");
+  printf ("verbose:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
+  printf ("quiet:%lu:\n",   GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
+  printf ("keyserver:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
+  printf ("reader-port:%lu:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_NONE);
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_subpacket_list(char *list)
+{
+  char *tok;
+  byte subpackets[128],i;
+  int count=0;
+
+  if(!list)
+    {
+      /* No arguments means all subpackets */
+      memset(subpackets+1,1,sizeof(subpackets)-1);
+      count=127;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      memset(subpackets,0,sizeof(subpackets));
+
+      /* Merge with earlier copy */
+      if(opt.show_subpackets)
+	{
+	  byte *in;
+
+	  for(in=opt.show_subpackets;*in;in++)
+	    {
+	      if(*in>127 || *in<1)
+		BUG();
+
+	      if(!subpackets[*in])
+		count++;
+	      subpackets[*in]=1;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      while((tok=strsep(&list," ,")))
+	{
+	  if(!*tok)
+	    continue;
+
+	  i=atoi(tok);
+	  if(i>127 || i<1)
+	    return 0;
+
+	  if(!subpackets[i])
+	    count++;
+	  subpackets[i]=1;
+	}
+    }
+
+  xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
+  opt.show_subpackets=xmalloc(count+1);
+  opt.show_subpackets[count--]=0;
+
+  for(i=1;i<128 && count>=0;i++)
+    if(subpackets[i])
+      opt.show_subpackets[count--]=i;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_list_options(char *str)
+{
+  char *subpackets=""; /* something that isn't NULL */
+  struct parse_options lopts[]=
+    {
+      {"show-photos",LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
+       N_("display photo IDs during key listings")},
+      {"show-policy-urls",LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
+       N_("show policy URLs during signature listings")},
+      {"show-notations",LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+       N_("show all notations during signature listings")},
+      {"show-std-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+       N_("show IETF standard notations during signature listings")},
+      {"show-standard-notations",LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+       NULL},
+      {"show-user-notations",LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+       N_("show user-supplied notations during signature listings")},
+      {"show-keyserver-urls",LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
+       N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature listings")},
+      {"show-uid-validity",LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
+       N_("show user ID validity during key listings")},
+      {"show-unusable-uids",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
+       N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in key listings")},
+      {"show-unusable-subkeys",LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS,NULL,
+       N_("show revoked and expired subkeys in key listings")},
+      {"show-keyring",LIST_SHOW_KEYRING,NULL,
+       N_("show the keyring name in key listings")},
+      {"show-sig-expire",LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL,
+       N_("show expiration dates during signature listings")},
+      {"show-sig-subpackets",LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS,NULL,
+       NULL},
+      {NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
+    };
+
+  /* C99 allows for non-constant initializers, but we'd like to
+     compile everywhere, so fill in the show-sig-subpackets argument
+     here.  Note that if the parse_options array changes, we'll have
+     to change the subscript here. */
+  lopts[12].value=&subpackets;
+
+  if(parse_options(str,&opt.list_options,lopts,1))
+    {
+      if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS)
+	{
+	  /* Unset so users can pass multiple lists in. */
+	  opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS;
+	  if(!parse_subpacket_list(subpackets))
+	    return 0;
+	}
+      else if(subpackets==NULL && opt.show_subpackets)
+	{
+	  /* User did 'no-show-subpackets' */
+	  xfree(opt.show_subpackets);
+	  opt.show_subpackets=NULL;
+	}
+
+      return 1;
+    }
+  else
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Collapses argc/argv into a single string that must be freed */
+static char *
+collapse_args(int argc,char *argv[])
+{
+  char *str=NULL;
+  int i,first=1,len=0;
+
+  for(i=0;i<argc;i++)
+    {
+      len+=strlen(argv[i])+2;
+      str=xrealloc(str,len);
+      if(first)
+	{
+	  str[0]='\0';
+	  first=0;
+	}
+      else
+	strcat(str," ");
+
+      strcat(str,argv[i]);
+    }
+
+  return str;
+}
+
+static void
+parse_trust_model(const char *model)
+{
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"pgp")==0)
+    opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"classic")==0)
+    opt.trust_model=TM_CLASSIC;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"always")==0)
+    opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"direct")==0)
+    opt.trust_model=TM_DIRECT;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(model,"auto")==0)
+    opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
+  else
+    log_error("unknown trust model `%s'\n",model);
+}
+
+/* Must be called before we open any files. */
+static void
+reopen_std(void)
+{  
+#if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM)
+  struct stat statbuf;
+  int did_stdin=0,did_stdout=0,did_stderr=0;
+  FILE *complain;
+
+  if(fstat(STDIN_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
+    {
+      if(open("/dev/null",O_RDONLY)==STDIN_FILENO)
+	did_stdin=1;
+      else
+	did_stdin=2;
+    }
+
+  if(fstat(STDOUT_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
+    {
+      if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDOUT_FILENO)
+	did_stdout=1;
+      else
+	did_stdout=2;
+    }
+
+  if(fstat(STDERR_FILENO,&statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF)
+    {
+      if(open("/dev/null",O_WRONLY)==STDERR_FILENO)
+	did_stderr=1;
+      else
+	did_stderr=2;
+    }
+
+  /* It's hard to log this sort of thing since the filehandle we would
+     complain to may be closed... */
+  if(did_stderr==0)
+    complain=stderr;
+  else if(did_stdout==0)
+    complain=stdout;
+  else
+    complain=NULL;
+
+  if(complain)
+    {
+      if(did_stdin==1)
+	fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard input reopened\n");
+      if(did_stdout==1)
+	fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard output reopened\n");
+      if(did_stderr==1)
+	fprintf(complain,"gpg: WARNING: standard error reopened\n");
+
+      if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
+	fprintf(complain,"gpg: fatal: unable to reopen standard input,"
+		" output, or error\n");
+    }
+
+  if(did_stdin==2 || did_stdout==2 || did_stderr==2)
+    exit(3);
+#endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_W32_SYSTEM */
+}
+
+/* Pack an s2k iteration count into the form specified in 2440.  If
+   we're in between valid values, round up. */
+static unsigned char
+encode_s2k_iterations(int iterations)
+{
+  unsigned char c=0,result;
+  unsigned int count;
+
+  if(iterations<=1024)
+    return 0;
+
+  if(iterations>=65011712)
+    return 255;
+
+  /* Need count to be in the range 16-31 */
+  for(count=iterations>>6;count>=32;count>>=1)
+    c++;
+
+  result=(c<<4)|(count-16);
+
+  if(S2K_DECODE_COUNT(result)<iterations)
+    result++;
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+int
+main (int argc, char **argv )
+{
+    ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
+    IOBUF a;
+    int rc=0;
+    int orig_argc;
+    char **orig_argv;
+    const char *fname;
+    char *username;
+    int may_coredump;
+    STRLIST sl, remusr= NULL, locusr=NULL;
+    STRLIST nrings=NULL, sec_nrings=NULL;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    int detached_sig = 0;
+    FILE *configfp = NULL;
+    char *configname = NULL;
+    char *save_configname = NULL;
+    unsigned configlineno;
+    int parse_debug = 0;
+    int default_config = 1;
+    int default_keyring = 1;
+    int greeting = 0;
+    int nogreeting = 0;
+    int use_random_seed = 1;
+    enum cmd_and_opt_values cmd = 0;
+    const char *trustdb_name = NULL;
+    char *def_cipher_string = NULL;
+    char *def_digest_string = NULL;
+    char *compress_algo_string = NULL;
+    char *cert_digest_string = NULL;
+    char *s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
+    char *s2k_digest_string = NULL;
+    char *pers_cipher_list = NULL;
+    char *pers_digest_list = NULL;
+    char *pers_compress_list = NULL;
+    int eyes_only=0;
+    int multifile=0;
+    int pwfd = -1;
+    int with_fpr = 0; /* make an option out of --fingerprint */
+    int any_explicit_recipient = 0;
+    int require_secmem=0,got_secmem=0;
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    ulong requested_shm_size=0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __riscos__
+    opt.lock_once = 1;
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+
+    reopen_std();
+    trap_unaligned();
+    secmem_set_flags( secmem_get_flags() | 2 ); /* suspend warnings */
+    /* Please note that we may running SUID(ROOT), so be very CAREFUL
+     * when adding any stuff between here and the call to
+     * secmem_init()  somewhere after the option parsing
+     */
+    log_set_name("gpg");
+    secure_randoxmalloc(); /* put random number into secure memory */
+    may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();
+    init_signals();
+    create_dotlock(NULL); /* register locking cleanup */
+    i18n_init();
+    opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
+    opt.compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
+    opt.bz2_compress_level = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
+    /* note: if you change these lines, look at oOpenPGP */
+    opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
+    opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
+    opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
+    opt.compress_algo = -1; /* defaults to DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO */
+    opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
+    opt.s2k_count = 96; /* 65536 iterations */
+#ifdef USE_CAST5
+    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5;
+#else
+    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
+#endif
+    opt.completes_needed = 1;
+    opt.marginals_needed = 3;
+    opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
+    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 1;
+    opt.force_v3_sigs = 1;
+    opt.escape_from = 1;
+    opt.import_options=IMPORT_SK2PK;
+    opt.export_options=EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
+    opt.keyserver_options.import_options=IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG;
+    opt.keyserver_options.export_options=EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES;
+    opt.keyserver_options.options=
+      KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL|KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD;
+    opt.verify_options=
+      VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS|VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS|VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS;
+    opt.trust_model=TM_AUTO;
+    opt.mangle_dos_filenames=0;
+    opt.min_cert_level=2;
+    set_screen_dimensions();
+    opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
+    opt.rfc2440_text=1;
+    opt.def_sig_expire="0";
+    opt.def_cert_expire="0";
+    set_homedir ( default_homedir () );
+    opt.passwd_repeat=1;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+    opt.pcsc_driver = "winscard.dll";
+#elif defined(__APPLE__)
+    opt.pcsc_driver = "/System/Library/Frameworks/PCSC.framework/PCSC";
+#elif defined(__GLIBC__)
+    opt.pcsc_driver = "libpcsclite.so.1"; 
+#else
+    opt.pcsc_driver = "libpcsclite.so"; 
+#endif
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+
+    /* check whether we have a config file on the commandline */
+    orig_argc = argc;
+    orig_argv = argv;
+    pargs.argc = &argc;
+    pargs.argv = &argv;
+    pargs.flags= 1|(1<<6);  /* do not remove the args, ignore version */
+    while( arg_parse( &pargs, opts) ) {
+	if( pargs.r_opt == oDebug || pargs.r_opt == oDebugAll )
+	    parse_debug++;
+	else if( pargs.r_opt == oOptions ) {
+	    /* yes there is one, so we do not try the default one, but
+	     * read the option file when it is encountered at the commandline
+	     */
+	    default_config = 0;
+	}
+	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoOptions )
+	    default_config = 0; /* --no-options */
+	else if( pargs.r_opt == oHomedir )
+	    set_homedir ( pargs.r.ret_str );
+	else if( pargs.r_opt == oNoPermissionWarn )
+	    opt.no_perm_warn=1;
+	else if (pargs.r_opt == oStrict )
+	  {
+	    opt.strict=1;
+	    log_set_strict(1);
+	  }
+	else if (pargs.r_opt == oNoStrict )
+	  {
+	    opt.strict=0;
+	    log_set_strict(0);
+	  }
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+	else if( pargs.r_opt == oRunAsShmCP ) {
+	    /* does not make sense in a options file, we do it here,
+	     * so that we are the able to drop setuid as soon as possible */
+	    opt.shm_coprocess = 1;
+	    requested_shm_size = pargs.r.ret_ulong;
+	}
+	else if ( pargs.r_opt == oStatusFD ) {
+	    /* this is needed to ensure that the status-fd filedescriptor is
+	     * initialized when init_shm_coprocessing() is called */
+	    set_status_fd( iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
+	}
+#endif
+    }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+    if ( strchr (opt.homedir,'\\') ) {
+        char *d, *buf = xmalloc (strlen (opt.homedir)+1);
+        const char *s = opt.homedir;
+        for (d=buf,s=opt.homedir; *s; s++)
+          {
+            *d++ = *s == '\\'? '/': *s;
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+            if (s[1] && IsDBCSLeadByte (*s))
+              *d++ = *++s;
+#endif
+          }
+        *d = 0;
+        set_homedir (buf);
+    }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess ) {
+	init_shm_coprocessing(requested_shm_size, 1 );
+    }
+#endif
+    /* initialize the secure memory. */
+    got_secmem=secmem_init( 32768 );
+    maybe_setuid = 0;
+    /* Okay, we are now working under our real uid */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID)
+    /* There should be no way to get to this spot while still carrying
+       setuid privs.  Just in case, bomb out if we are. */
+    if(getuid()!=geteuid())
+      BUG();
+#endif
+
+    set_native_charset (NULL); /* Try to auto set the character set */
+
+    /* Try for a version specific config file first */
+    if( default_config )
+      {
+	char *name=xstrdup("gpg" EXTSEP_S "conf-" SAFE_VERSION);
+	char *ver=&name[strlen("gpg" EXTSEP_S "conf-")];
+
+	do
+	  {
+	    if(configname)
+	      {
+		char *tok;
+
+		xfree(configname);
+		configname=NULL;
+
+		if((tok=strrchr(ver,SAFE_VERSION_DASH)))
+		  *tok='\0';
+		else if((tok=strrchr(ver,SAFE_VERSION_DOT)))
+		  *tok='\0';
+		else
+		  break;
+	      }
+
+	    configname = make_filename(opt.homedir,name,NULL);
+	  }
+	while(access(configname,R_OK));
+
+	xfree(name);
+
+	if(!configname)
+	  configname=make_filename(opt.homedir, "gpg" EXTSEP_S "conf", NULL );
+        if (!access (configname, R_OK))
+          { /* Print a warning when both config files are present. */
+            char *p = make_filename(opt.homedir, "options", NULL );
+            if (!access (p, R_OK))
+              log_info (_("NOTE: old default options file `%s' ignored\n"), p);
+            xfree (p);
+          }
+        else
+          { /* Keep on using the old default one. */
+            xfree (configname);
+            configname = make_filename(opt.homedir, "options", NULL );
+          }
+      }
+    argc = orig_argc;
+    argv = orig_argv;
+    pargs.argc = &argc;
+    pargs.argv = &argv;
+    pargs.flags=  1;  /* do not remove the args */
+
+    /* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */
+    check_permissions(opt.homedir,0);
+
+  next_pass:
+    if( configname ) {
+      if(check_permissions(configname,1))
+	{
+	  /* If any options file is unsafe, then disable any external
+	     programs for keyserver calls or photo IDs.  Since the
+	     external program to call is set in the options file, a
+	     unsafe options file can lead to an arbitrary program
+	     being run. */
+
+	  opt.exec_disable=1;
+	}
+
+	configlineno = 0;
+	configfp = fopen( configname, "r" );
+        if (configfp && is_secured_file (fileno (configfp)))
+          {
+            fclose (configfp);
+            configfp = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+          }
+	if( !configfp ) {
+	    if( default_config ) {
+		if( parse_debug )
+		    log_info(_("NOTE: no default option file `%s'\n"),
+							    configname );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		log_error(_("option file `%s': %s\n"),
+				    configname, strerror(errno) );
+		g10_exit(2);
+	    }
+	    xfree(configname); configname = NULL;
+	}
+	if( parse_debug && configname )
+	    log_info(_("reading options from `%s'\n"), configname );
+	default_config = 0;
+    }
+
+    while( optfile_parse( configfp, configname, &configlineno,
+						&pargs, opts) )
+      {
+	switch( pargs.r_opt )
+	  {
+	  case aCheckKeys: 
+	  case aListConfig:
+          case aGPGConfList:
+          case aGPGConfTest:
+	  case aListPackets:
+	  case aImport: 
+	  case aFastImport: 
+	  case aSendKeys: 
+	  case aRecvKeys: 
+	  case aSearchKeys:
+	  case aRefreshKeys:
+	  case aFetchKeys:
+	  case aExport: 
+            set_cmd (&cmd, pargs.r_opt);
+            break;
+	  case aListKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListKeys); break;
+	  case aListSigs: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSigs); break;
+	  case aExportSecret: set_cmd( &cmd, aExportSecret); break;
+	  case aExportSecretSub: set_cmd( &cmd, aExportSecretSub); break;
+	  case aDeleteSecretKeys:
+	    set_cmd( &cmd, aDeleteSecretKeys);
+	    greeting=1;
+	    break;
+	  case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
+            set_cmd( &cmd, aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
+            greeting=1; 
+            break;
+	  case aDeleteKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aDeleteKeys); greeting=1; break;
+
+	  case aDetachedSign: detached_sig = 1; set_cmd( &cmd, aSign ); break;
+	  case aSym: set_cmd( &cmd, aSym); break;
+
+	  case aDecryptFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
+	  case aDecrypt: set_cmd( &cmd, aDecrypt); break;
+
+	  case aEncrFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
+	  case aEncr: set_cmd( &cmd, aEncr); break;
+
+	  case aVerifyFiles: multifile=1; /* fall through */
+	  case aVerify: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;
+
+	  case aSign: set_cmd( &cmd, aSign );  break;
+	  case aKeygen: set_cmd( &cmd, aKeygen); greeting=1; break;
+	  case aSignKey: set_cmd( &cmd, aSignKey); break;
+	  case aLSignKey: set_cmd( &cmd, aLSignKey); break;
+	  case aStore: set_cmd( &cmd, aStore); break;
+	  case aEditKey: set_cmd( &cmd, aEditKey); greeting=1; break;
+	  case aClearsign: set_cmd( &cmd, aClearsign); break;
+	  case aGenRevoke: set_cmd( &cmd, aGenRevoke); break;
+	  case aDesigRevoke: set_cmd( &cmd, aDesigRevoke); break;
+	  case aPrimegen: set_cmd( &cmd, aPrimegen); break;
+	  case aGenRandom: set_cmd( &cmd, aGenRandom); break;
+	  case aPrintMD: set_cmd( &cmd, aPrintMD); break;
+	  case aPrintMDs: set_cmd( &cmd, aPrintMDs); break;
+	  case aListTrustDB: set_cmd( &cmd, aListTrustDB); break;
+	  case aCheckTrustDB: set_cmd( &cmd, aCheckTrustDB); break;
+	  case aUpdateTrustDB: set_cmd( &cmd, aUpdateTrustDB); break;
+	  case aFixTrustDB: set_cmd( &cmd, aFixTrustDB); break;
+	  case aListTrustPath: set_cmd( &cmd, aListTrustPath); break;
+	  case aDeArmor: set_cmd( &cmd, aDeArmor); break;
+	  case aEnArmor: set_cmd( &cmd, aEnArmor); break;
+	  case aListOwnerTrust:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
+			       "--list-ownertrust","--export-ownertrust","");
+	  case aExportOwnerTrust: set_cmd( &cmd, aExportOwnerTrust); break;
+	  case aImportOwnerTrust: set_cmd( &cmd, aImportOwnerTrust); break;
+          case aPipeMode:
+	    deprecated_command ("--pipemode");
+            set_cmd( &cmd, aPipeMode);
+            break;
+
+          case aRebuildKeydbCaches: set_cmd( &cmd, aRebuildKeydbCaches); break;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+          case aCardStatus: set_cmd (&cmd, aCardStatus); break;
+          case aCardEdit: set_cmd (&cmd, aCardEdit); break;
+          case aChangePIN: set_cmd (&cmd, aChangePIN); break;
+          case oReaderPort:
+            card_set_reader_port (pargs.r.ret_str);
+            break;
+          case octapiDriver: opt.ctapi_driver = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case opcscDriver: opt.pcsc_driver = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case oDisableCCID: opt.disable_ccid = 1; break;
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+
+	  case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
+	  case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oMaxOutput: opt.max_output = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
+	  case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
+	  case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
+	  case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
+	  case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
+	  case oVerbose:
+	    g10_opt_verbose++;
+	    opt.verbose++;
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS;
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS;
+	    break;
+	  case oKOption: set_cmd( &cmd, aKMode ); break;
+
+	  case oBatch: opt.batch = 1; nogreeting = 1; break;
+          case oUseAgent:
+#ifndef __riscos__
+            opt.use_agent = 1;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+            opt.use_agent = 0;
+            riscos_not_implemented("use-agent");
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+            break;
+          case oNoUseAgent: opt.use_agent = 0; break;
+	  case oGpgAgentInfo: opt.gpg_agent_info = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oAnswerYes: opt.answer_yes = 1; break;
+	  case oAnswerNo: opt.answer_no = 1; break;
+	  case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oPrimaryKeyring:
+	    sl=append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    sl->flags=2;
+	    break;
+	  case oShowKeyring:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-keyring",
+			       "--list-options ","show-keyring");
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_KEYRING;
+	    break;
+	  case oDebug: opt.debug |= pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
+	  case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
+          case oDebugCCIDDriver: 
+#if defined(ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT) && defined(HAVE_LIBUSB)
+            ccid_set_debug_level (ccid_set_debug_level (1)+1);
+#endif
+            break;
+	  case oStatusFD:
+            set_status_fd( iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 1) );
+            break;
+	  case oStatusFile:
+            set_status_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1) );
+            break;
+	  case oAttributeFD:
+            set_attrib_fd(iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
+            break;
+	  case oAttributeFile:
+            set_attrib_fd ( open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1) );
+            break;
+	  case oLoggerFD:
+            log_set_logfile( NULL,
+                             iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 1));
+            break;
+	  case oLoggerFile:
+            log_set_logfile( NULL, open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 1) );
+            break;
+
+	  case oWithFingerprint:
+            opt.with_fingerprint = 1;
+            with_fpr=1; /*fall thru*/
+	  case oFingerprint: opt.fingerprint++; break;
+	  case oSecretKeyring:
+            append_to_strlist( &sec_nrings, pargs.r.ret_str);
+            break;
+	  case oOptions:
+	    /* config files may not be nested (silently ignore them) */
+	    if( !configfp ) {
+		xfree(configname);
+		configname = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
+		goto next_pass;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	  case oNoArmor: opt.no_armor=1; opt.armor=0; break;
+	  case oNoDefKeyring: default_keyring = 0; break;
+	  case oNoGreeting: nogreeting = 1; break;
+	  case oNoVerbose: g10_opt_verbose = 0;
+			   opt.verbose = 0; opt.list_sigs=0; break;
+	  case oQuickRandom: quick_random_gen(1); break;
+	  case oEmitVersion: opt.no_version=0; break;
+	  case oNoEmitVersion: opt.no_version=1; break;
+	  case oCompletesNeeded: opt.completes_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oMarginalsNeeded: opt.marginals_needed = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oMaxCertDepth: opt.max_cert_depth = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oTrustDBName: trustdb_name = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oDefaultKey: opt.def_secret_key = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oDefRecipient:
+		    if( *pargs.r.ret_str )
+			opt.def_recipient = make_username(pargs.r.ret_str);
+		    break;
+	  case oDefRecipientSelf:
+		    xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
+		    opt.def_recipient_self = 1;
+		    break;
+	  case oNoDefRecipient:
+		    xfree(opt.def_recipient); opt.def_recipient = NULL;
+		    opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
+		    break;
+	  case oNoOptions: opt.no_homedir_creation = 1; break; /* no-options */
+	  case oHomedir: break;
+	  case oNoBatch: opt.batch = 0; break;
+	  case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /* fall thru */
+	  case oWithColons: opt.with_colons=':'; break;
+
+	  case oSkipVerify: opt.skip_verify=1; break;
+	  case oCompressKeys: opt.compress_keys = 1; break;
+	  case aListSecretKeys: set_cmd( &cmd, aListSecretKeys); break;
+	    /* There are many programs (like mutt) that call gpg with
+	       --always-trust so keep this option around for a long
+	       time. */
+	  case oAlwaysTrust: opt.trust_model=TM_ALWAYS; break;
+	  case oTrustModel:
+	    parse_trust_model(pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+	  case oForceOwnertrust:
+	    log_info(_("NOTE: %s is not for normal use!\n"),
+		     "--force-ownertrust");
+	    opt.force_ownertrust=string_to_trust_value(pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    if(opt.force_ownertrust==-1)
+	      {
+		log_error("invalid ownertrust `%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
+		opt.force_ownertrust=0;
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oLoadExtension:
+#ifndef __riscos__
+#if defined(USE_DYNAMIC_LINKING) || defined(_WIN32)
+	    if(check_permissions(pargs.r.ret_str,2))
+	      log_info(_("cipher extension `%s' not loaded due to"
+			 " unsafe permissions\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    else
+	      register_cipher_extension(orig_argc? *orig_argv:NULL,
+					pargs.r.ret_str);
+#endif
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+            riscos_not_implemented("load-extension");
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	    break;
+	  case oRFC1991:
+	    opt.compliance = CO_RFC1991;
+	    opt.force_v4_certs = 0;
+	    opt.escape_from = 1;
+	    break;
+	  case oOpenPGP:
+	  case oRFC2440:
+	    /* TODO: When 2440bis becomes a RFC, set new values for
+	       oOpenPGP. */
+	    opt.rfc2440_text=1;
+	    opt.compliance = CO_RFC2440;
+	    opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1;
+	    opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
+	    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 0;
+	    opt.escape_from = 0;
+	    opt.force_v3_sigs = 0;
+	    opt.compress_keys = 0;	    /* not mandated, but we do it */
+	    opt.compress_sigs = 0;	    /* ditto. */
+	    opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
+	    opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
+	    opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
+	    opt.cert_digest_algo = 0;
+	    opt.compress_algo = -1;
+            opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
+	    opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+	    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
+	    break;
+	  case oPGP2:  opt.compliance = CO_PGP2;  break;
+	  case oPGP6:  opt.compliance = CO_PGP6;  break;
+	  case oPGP7:  opt.compliance = CO_PGP7;  break;
+	  case oPGP8:  opt.compliance = CO_PGP8;  break;
+	  case oGnuPG: opt.compliance = CO_GNUPG; break;
+	  case oCompressSigs: opt.compress_sigs = 1; break;
+	  case oRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=1; break;
+	  case oNoRFC2440Text: opt.rfc2440_text=0; break;
+	  case oRunAsShmCP:
+#ifndef __riscos__
+# ifndef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+	    /* not possible in the option file,
+	     * but we print the warning here anyway */
+	    log_error("shared memory coprocessing is not available\n");
+# endif
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+            riscos_not_implemented("run-as-shm-coprocess");
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	    break;
+	  case oSetFilename:
+	    if(utf8_strings)
+	      opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    else
+	      opt.set_filename = native_to_utf8(pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+	  case oForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 1; break;
+	  case oNoForYourEyesOnly: eyes_only = 0; break;
+	  case oSetPolicyURL:
+	    add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0);
+	    add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1);
+	    break;
+	  case oSigPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
+	  case oCertPolicyURL: add_policy_url(pargs.r.ret_str,1); break;
+          case oShowPolicyURL:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
+			       "--list-options ","show-policy-urls");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-policy-url",
+			       "--verify-options ","show-policy-urls");
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
+	    opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
+	    break;
+	  case oNoShowPolicyURL:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
+			       "--list-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-policy-url",
+			       "--verify-options ","no-show-policy-urls");
+	    opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
+	    opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS;
+	    break;
+	  case oSigKeyserverURL: add_keyserver_url(pargs.r.ret_str,0); break;
+	  case oUseEmbeddedFilename:
+	    opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=1;
+	    break;
+	  case oNoUseEmbeddedFilename:
+	    opt.flags.use_embedded_filename=0;
+	    break;
+	  case oComment:
+	    if(pargs.r.ret_str[0])
+	      append_to_strlist(&opt.comments,pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+	  case oDefaultComment:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
+			       "--default-comment","--no-comments","");
+	    /* fall through */
+	  case oNoComments:
+	    free_strlist(opt.comments);
+	    opt.comments=NULL;
+	    break;
+	  case oThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyid = 1; break;
+	  case oNoThrowKeyids: opt.throw_keyid = 0; break;
+	  case oShowPhotos:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
+			       "--list-options ","show-photos");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-photos",
+			       "--verify-options ","show-photos");
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
+	    opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
+	    break;
+	  case oNoShowPhotos:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
+			       "--list-options ","no-show-photos");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-photos",
+			       "--verify-options ","no-show-photos");
+	    opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS;
+	    opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
+	    break;
+	  case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 1; break;
+	  case oNoForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 0; break;
+          case oForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 1; break;
+          case oNoForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 0; break;
+	  case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
+	  case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break;
+	  case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break;
+	  case oNoDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 0; break;
+	  case oS2KMode:   opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oS2KCount:
+	    opt.s2k_count=encode_s2k_iterations(pargs.r.ret_int);
+	    break;
+          case oSimpleSKChecksum: opt.simple_sk_checksum = 1; break;
+	  case oNoEncryptTo: opt.no_encrypt_to = 1; break;
+	  case oEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */
+	    sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+	    sl->flags = 1;
+	    break;
+	  case oHiddenEncryptTo: /* store the recipient in the second list */
+	    sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+	    sl->flags = 1|2;
+	    break;
+	  case oRecipient: /* store the recipient */
+	    add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+            any_explicit_recipient = 1;
+	    break;
+	  case oHiddenRecipient: /* store the recipient with a flag */
+	    sl = add_to_strlist2( &remusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+	    sl->flags = 2;
+            any_explicit_recipient = 1;
+	    break;
+	  case oTextmodeShort: opt.textmode = 2; break;
+	  case oTextmode: opt.textmode=1;  break;
+	  case oNoTextmode: opt.textmode=0;  break;
+	  case oExpert: opt.expert = 1; break;
+	  case oNoExpert: opt.expert = 0; break;
+	  case oDefSigExpire:
+	    if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
+	      {
+		if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
+		  log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
+			    pargs.r.ret_str);
+		else
+		  opt.def_sig_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 1; break;
+	  case oNoAskSigExpire: opt.ask_sig_expire = 0; break;
+	  case oDefCertExpire:
+	    if(*pargs.r.ret_str!='\0')
+	      {
+		if(parse_expire_string(pargs.r.ret_str)==(u32)-1)
+		  log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid signature expiration\n"),
+			    pargs.r.ret_str);
+		else
+		  opt.def_cert_expire=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 1; break;
+	  case oNoAskCertExpire: opt.ask_cert_expire = 0; break;
+          case oDefCertLevel: opt.def_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+          case oMinCertLevel: opt.min_cert_level=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 1; break;
+	  case oNoAskCertLevel: opt.ask_cert_level = 0; break;
+	  case oLocalUser: /* store the local users */
+	    add_to_strlist2( &locusr, pargs.r.ret_str, utf8_strings );
+	    break;
+	  case oCompress:
+	    /* this is the -z command line option */
+	    opt.compress_level = opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int;
+	    break;
+	  case oCompressLevel: opt.compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oBZ2CompressLevel: opt.bz2_compress_level = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oBZ2DecompressLowmem: opt.bz2_decompress_lowmem=1; break;
+	  case oPasswd:
+	    set_passphrase_from_string(pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+	  case oPasswdFD:
+            pwfd = iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
+            opt.use_agent = 0;
+            break;
+	  case oPasswdFile:
+            pwfd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
+            break;
+	  case oPasswdRepeat: opt.passwd_repeat=pargs.r.ret_int; break;
+	  case oCommandFD:
+            opt.command_fd = iobuf_translate_file_handle (pargs.r.ret_int, 0);
+            break;
+	  case oCommandFile:
+            opt.command_fd = open_info_file (pargs.r.ret_str, 0);
+            break;
+	  case oCipherAlgo: 
+            def_cipher_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
+            break;
+	  case oDigestAlgo:
+            def_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
+            break;
+	  case oCompressAlgo:
+	    /* If it is all digits, stick a Z in front of it for
+	       later.  This is for backwards compatibility with
+	       versions that took the compress algorithm number. */
+	    {
+	      char *pt=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	      while(*pt)
+		{
+		  if (!isascii (*pt) || !isdigit (*pt))
+		    break;
+
+		  pt++;
+		}
+
+	      if(*pt=='\0')
+		{
+		  compress_algo_string=xmalloc(strlen(pargs.r.ret_str)+2);
+		  strcpy(compress_algo_string,"Z");
+		  strcat(compress_algo_string,pargs.r.ret_str);
+		}
+	      else
+		compress_algo_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    }
+	    break;
+	  case oCertDigestAlgo: cert_digest_string = xstrdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oNoSecmemWarn: secmem_set_flags( secmem_get_flags() | 1 ); break;
+	  case oRequireSecmem: require_secmem=1; break;
+	  case oNoRequireSecmem: require_secmem=0; break;
+	  case oNoPermissionWarn: opt.no_perm_warn=1; break;
+	  case oNoMDCWarn: opt.no_mdc_warn=1; break;
+          case oDisplayCharset:
+	    if( set_native_charset( pargs.r.ret_str ) )
+		log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid character set\n"),
+			  pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+	  case oNotDashEscaped: opt.not_dash_escaped = 1; break;
+	  case oEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 1; break;
+	  case oNoEscapeFrom: opt.escape_from = 0; break;
+	  case oLockOnce: opt.lock_once = 1; break;
+	  case oLockNever:
+            disable_dotlock ();
+            random_disable_locking ();
+            break;
+	  case oLockMultiple:
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	    opt.lock_once = 0;
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+            riscos_not_implemented("lock-multiple");
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+            break;
+	  case oKeyServer:
+	    {
+	      struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
+	      keyserver=parse_keyserver_uri(pargs.r.ret_str,0,
+					    configname,configlineno);
+	      if(!keyserver)
+		log_error(_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
+	      else
+		{
+		  keyserver->next=opt.keyserver;
+		  opt.keyserver=keyserver;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	  case oKeyServerOptions:
+	    if(!parse_keyserver_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
+	      {
+		if(configname)
+		  log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid keyserver options\n"),
+			    configname,configlineno);
+		else
+		  log_error(_("invalid keyserver options\n"));
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oImportOptions:
+	    if(!parse_import_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.import_options,1))
+	      {
+		if(configname)
+		  log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid import options\n"),
+			    configname,configlineno);
+		else
+		  log_error(_("invalid import options\n"));
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oExportOptions:
+	    if(!parse_export_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.export_options,1))
+	      {
+		if(configname)
+		  log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid export options\n"),
+			    configname,configlineno);
+		else
+		  log_error(_("invalid export options\n"));
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oListOptions:
+	    if(!parse_list_options(pargs.r.ret_str))
+	      {
+		if(configname)
+		  log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid list options\n"),
+			    configname,configlineno);
+		else
+		  log_error(_("invalid list options\n"));
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oVerifyOptions:
+	    {
+	      struct parse_options vopts[]=
+		{
+		  {"show-photos",VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS,NULL,
+		   N_("display photo IDs during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-policy-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS,NULL,
+		   N_("show policy URLs during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+		   N_("show all notations during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-std-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+		   N_("show IETF standard notations during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-standard-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+		   NULL},
+		  {"show-user-notations",VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS,NULL,
+		   N_("show user-supplied notations during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-keyserver-urls",VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS,NULL,
+		   N_("show preferred keyserver URLs during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-uid-validity",VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY,NULL,
+		   N_("show user ID validity during signature verification")},
+		  {"show-unusable-uids",VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS,NULL,
+		   N_("show revoked and expired user IDs in signature verification")},
+		  {"pka-lookups",VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS,NULL,
+		   N_("validate signatures with PKA data")},
+		  {"pka-trust-increase",VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE,NULL,
+		   N_("elevate the trust of signatures with valid PKA data")},
+		  {NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
+		};
+
+	      if(!parse_options(pargs.r.ret_str,&opt.verify_options,vopts,1))
+		{
+		  if(configname)
+		    log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid verify options\n"),
+			      configname,configlineno);
+		  else
+		    log_error(_("invalid verify options\n"));
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	  case oTempDir: opt.temp_dir=pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oExecPath:
+	    if(set_exec_path(pargs.r.ret_str))
+	      log_error(_("unable to set exec-path to %s\n"),pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    else
+	      opt.exec_path_set=1;
+	    break;
+	  case oSetNotation:
+	    add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 );
+	    add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 );
+	    break;
+	  case oSigNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 0 ); break;
+	  case oCertNotation: add_notation_data( pargs.r.ret_str, 1 ); break;
+	  case oShowNotation:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
+			       "--list-options ","show-notations");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--show-notation",
+			       "--verify-options ","show-notations");
+	    opt.list_options|=LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
+	    opt.verify_options|=VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
+	    break;
+	  case oNoShowNotation:
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
+			       "--list-options ","no-show-notations");
+	    deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--no-show-notation",
+			       "--verify-options ","no-show-notations");
+	    opt.list_options&=~LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
+	    opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS;
+	    break;
+	  case oUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 1; break;
+	  case oNoUtf8Strings: utf8_strings = 0; break;
+	  case oDisableCipherAlgo:
+		disable_cipher_algo( string_to_cipher_algo(pargs.r.ret_str) );
+		break;
+	  case oDisablePubkeyAlgo:
+		disable_pubkey_algo( string_to_pubkey_algo(pargs.r.ret_str) );
+		break;
+          case oNoSigCache: opt.no_sig_cache = 1; break;
+          case oNoSigCreateCheck: opt.no_sig_create_check = 1; break;
+	  case oAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid = 1; break;
+	  case oNoAllowNonSelfsignedUID: opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid=0; break;
+	  case oAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1; break;
+	  case oNoAllowFreeformUID: opt.allow_freeform_uid = 0; break;
+	  case oNoLiteral: opt.no_literal = 1; break;
+	  case oSetFilesize: opt.set_filesize = pargs.r.ret_ulong; break;
+	  case oHonorHttpProxy:
+	        add_to_strlist(&opt.keyserver_options.other,"http-proxy");
+		deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
+				   "--honor-http-proxy",
+				   "--keyserver-options ","http-proxy");
+		break;
+	  case oFastListMode: opt.fast_list_mode = 1; break;
+	  case oFixedListMode: opt.fixed_list_mode = 1; break;
+	  case oListOnly: opt.list_only=1; break;
+	  case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
+	  case oIgnoreValidFrom: opt.ignore_valid_from = 1; break;
+	  case oIgnoreCrcError: opt.ignore_crc_error = 1; break;
+	  case oIgnoreMDCError: opt.ignore_mdc_error = 1; break;
+	  case oNoRandomSeedFile: use_random_seed = 0; break;
+	  case oAutoKeyRetrieve:
+	  case oNoAutoKeyRetrieve:
+	        if(pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve)
+		  opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
+		else
+		  opt.keyserver_options.options&=~KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
+
+		deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,
+			   pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"--auto-key-retrieve":
+			       "--no-auto-key-retrieve","--keyserver-options ",
+			   pargs.r_opt==oAutoKeyRetrieve?"auto-key-retrieve":
+			       "no-auto-key-retrieve");
+		break;
+	  case oShowSessionKey: opt.show_session_key = 1; break;
+	  case oOverrideSessionKey:
+		opt.override_session_key = pargs.r.ret_str;
+		break;
+	  case oMergeOnly:
+	        deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"--merge-only",
+				   "--import-options ","merge-only");
+		opt.import_options|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
+	    break;
+          case oAllowSecretKeyImport: /* obsolete */ break;
+	  case oTryAllSecrets: opt.try_all_secrets = 1; break;
+          case oTrustedKey: register_trusted_key( pargs.r.ret_str ); break;
+          case oEnableSpecialFilenames:
+            iobuf_enable_special_filenames (1);
+            break;
+          case oNoExpensiveTrustChecks: opt.no_expensive_trust_checks=1; break;
+          case oAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=0; break;
+          case oNoAutoCheckTrustDB: opt.no_auto_check_trustdb=1; break;
+          case oPreservePermissions: opt.preserve_permissions=1; break;
+          case oDefaultPreferenceList:
+	    opt.def_preference_list = pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    break;
+	  case oDefaultKeyserverURL:
+	    {
+	      struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
+	      keyserver=parse_keyserver_uri(pargs.r.ret_str,1,
+					    configname,configlineno);
+	      if(!keyserver)
+		log_error(_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
+	      else
+		free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
+
+	      opt.def_keyserver_url = pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    }
+	    break;
+          case oPersonalCipherPreferences:
+	    pers_cipher_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    break;
+          case oPersonalDigestPreferences:
+	    pers_digest_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    break;
+          case oPersonalCompressPreferences:
+	    pers_compress_list=pargs.r.ret_str;
+	    break;
+          case oDisplay: opt.display = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case oTTYname: opt.ttyname = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case oTTYtype: opt.ttytype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case oLCctype: opt.lc_ctype = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+          case oLCmessages: opt.lc_messages = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oGroup: add_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oUnGroup: rm_group(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oNoGroups:
+	    while(opt.grouplist)
+	      {
+		struct groupitem *iter=opt.grouplist;
+		free_strlist(iter->values);
+		opt.grouplist=opt.grouplist->next;
+		xfree(iter);
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oStrict: opt.strict=1; log_set_strict(1); break;
+	  case oNoStrict: opt.strict=0; log_set_strict(0); break;
+          case oMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 1; break;
+          case oNoMangleDosFilenames: opt.mangle_dos_filenames = 0; break;
+          case oEnableProgressFilter: opt.enable_progress_filter = 1; break;
+	  case oMultifile: multifile=1; break;
+	  case oKeyidFormat:
+	    if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"short")==0)
+	      opt.keyid_format=KF_SHORT;
+	    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"long")==0)
+	      opt.keyid_format=KF_LONG;
+	    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xshort")==0)
+	      opt.keyid_format=KF_0xSHORT;
+	    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(pargs.r.ret_str,"0xlong")==0)
+	      opt.keyid_format=KF_0xLONG;
+	    else
+	      log_error("unknown keyid-format `%s'\n",pargs.r.ret_str);
+	    break;
+
+          case oExitOnStatusWriteError:
+            opt.exit_on_status_write_error = 1;
+            break;
+
+	  case oLimitCardInsertTries: 
+            opt.limit_card_insert_tries = pargs.r.ret_int; 
+            break;
+
+	  case oRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=1; break;
+	  case oNoRequireCrossCert: opt.flags.require_cross_cert=0; break;
+
+	  case oAutoKeyLocate:
+	    if(!parse_auto_key_locate(pargs.r.ret_str))
+	      {
+		if(configname)
+		  log_error(_("%s:%d: invalid auto-key-locate list\n"),
+			    configname,configlineno);
+		else
+		  log_error(_("invalid auto-key-locate list\n"));
+	      }
+	    break;
+	  case oNoAutoKeyLocate:
+	    release_akl();
+	    break;
+
+          case oAllowMultisigVerification:
+            opt.allow_multisig_verification = 1;
+            break;
+
+	  case oEnableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=1; break;
+	  case oDisableDSA2: opt.flags.dsa2=0; break;
+
+	  case oNoop: break;
+
+	  default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break;
+	  }
+      }
+
+
+    if( configfp ) {
+	fclose( configfp );
+	configfp = NULL;
+        /* Remember the first config file name. */
+        if (!save_configname)
+          save_configname = configname;
+        else
+          xfree(configname);
+        configname = NULL;
+	goto next_pass;
+    }
+    xfree( configname ); configname = NULL;
+    if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
+	g10_exit(2);
+
+    /* The command --gpgconf-list is pretty simple and may be called
+       directly after the option parsing. */
+    if (cmd == aGPGConfList)
+      {
+        gpgconf_list (save_configname);
+        g10_exit (0);
+      }
+    xfree (save_configname);
+
+    if( nogreeting )
+	greeting = 0;
+
+    if( greeting ) {
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s %s; %s\n",
+			strusage(11), strusage(13), strusage(14) );
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", strusage(15) );
+    }
+#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
+    if( !opt.batch )
+      {
+	const char *s;
+
+	if((s=strusage(20)))
+	  log_info("%s\n",s);
+	if((s=strusage(21)))
+	  log_info("%s\n",s);
+	if((s=strusage(22)))
+	  log_info("%s\n",s);
+      }
+#endif
+
+    if (opt.verbose > 2)
+        log_info ("using character set `%s'\n", get_native_charset ());
+
+    if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
+	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
+
+    if (eyes_only) {
+      if (opt.set_filename)
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: %s overrides %s\n"),
+		   "--for-your-eyes-only","--set-filename");
+
+      opt.set_filename="_CONSOLE";
+    }
+
+    if (opt.no_literal) {
+	log_info(_("NOTE: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
+	if (opt.textmode)
+	    log_error(_("%s not allowed with %s!\n"),
+		       "--textmode", "--no-literal" );
+	if (opt.set_filename)
+	    log_error(_("%s makes no sense with %s!\n"),
+			eyes_only?"--for-your-eyes-only":"--set-filename",
+		        "--no-literal" );
+    }
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT   
+    if (opt.use_agent) {
+      log_info(_("NOTE: %s is not available in this version\n"),
+               "--use-agent");
+      opt.use_agent = 0;
+    }
+#endif /*!ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+    if (opt.set_filesize)
+	log_info(_("NOTE: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--set-filesize");
+    if( opt.batch )
+	tty_batchmode( 1 );
+
+    secmem_set_flags( secmem_get_flags() & ~2 ); /* resume warnings */
+
+    if(require_secmem && !got_secmem)
+      {
+	log_info(_("will not run with insecure memory due to %s\n"),
+		 "--require-secmem");
+	g10_exit(2);
+      }
+
+    set_debug();
+
+    /* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
+    if(PGP2)
+      {
+	int unusable=0;
+
+	if(cmd==aSign && !detached_sig)
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("you can only make detached or clear signatures "
+		       "while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+	    unusable=1;
+	  }
+	else if(cmd==aSignEncr || cmd==aSignSym)
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("you can't sign and encrypt at the "
+		       "same time while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+	    unusable=1;
+	  }
+	else if(argc==0 && (cmd==aSign || cmd==aEncr || cmd==aSym))
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("you must use files (and not a pipe) when "
+		       "working with --pgp2 enabled.\n"));
+	    unusable=1;
+	  }
+	else if(cmd==aEncr || cmd==aSym)
+	  {
+	    /* Everything else should work without IDEA (except using
+	       a secret key encrypted with IDEA and setting an IDEA
+	       preference, but those have their own error
+	       messages). */
+
+	    if(check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
+	      {
+		log_info(_("encrypting a message in --pgp2 mode requires "
+			   "the IDEA cipher\n"));
+		idea_cipher_warn(1);
+		unusable=1;
+	      }
+	    else if(cmd==aSym)
+	      {
+		/* This only sets IDEA for symmetric encryption
+		   since it is set via select_algo_from_prefs for
+		   pk encryption. */
+		xfree(def_cipher_string);
+		def_cipher_string = xstrdup("idea");
+	      }
+
+	    /* PGP2 can't handle the output from the textmode
+	       filter, so we disable it for anything that could
+	       create a literal packet (only encryption and
+	       symmetric encryption, since we disable signing
+	       above). */
+	    if(!unusable)
+	      opt.textmode=0;
+	  }
+
+	if(unusable)
+	  compliance_failure();
+	else
+	  {
+	    opt.force_v4_certs = 0;
+	    opt.escape_from = 1;
+	    opt.force_v3_sigs = 1;
+	    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 1;
+	    opt.ask_sig_expire = 0;
+	    opt.ask_cert_expire = 0;
+	    xfree(def_digest_string);
+	    def_digest_string = xstrdup("md5");
+	    xfree(s2k_digest_string);
+	    s2k_digest_string = xstrdup("md5");
+	    opt.compress_algo = COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP;
+	  }
+      }
+    else if(PGP6)
+      {
+	opt.escape_from=1;
+	opt.force_v3_sigs=1;
+	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
+      }
+    else if(PGP7)
+      {
+	opt.escape_from=1;
+	opt.force_v3_sigs=1;
+	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
+      }
+    else if(PGP8)
+      {
+	opt.escape_from=1;
+      }
+
+    /* must do this after dropping setuid, because string_to...
+     * may try to load an module */
+    if( def_cipher_string ) {
+	opt.def_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo(def_cipher_string);
+	if(opt.def_cipher_algo==0 &&
+	   (ascii_strcasecmp(def_cipher_string,"idea")==0
+	    || ascii_strcasecmp(def_cipher_string,"s1")==0))
+	  idea_cipher_warn(1);
+	xfree(def_cipher_string); def_cipher_string = NULL;
+	if( check_cipher_algo(opt.def_cipher_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( def_digest_string ) {
+	opt.def_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo(def_digest_string);
+	xfree(def_digest_string); def_digest_string = NULL;
+	if( check_digest_algo(opt.def_digest_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( compress_algo_string ) {
+	opt.compress_algo = string_to_compress_algo(compress_algo_string);
+	xfree(compress_algo_string); compress_algo_string = NULL;
+	if( check_compress_algo(opt.compress_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected compression algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( cert_digest_string ) {
+	opt.cert_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo(cert_digest_string);
+	xfree(cert_digest_string); cert_digest_string = NULL;
+	if( check_digest_algo(opt.cert_digest_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected certification digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( s2k_cipher_string ) {
+	opt.s2k_cipher_algo = string_to_cipher_algo(s2k_cipher_string);
+	xfree(s2k_cipher_string); s2k_cipher_string = NULL;
+	if( check_cipher_algo(opt.s2k_cipher_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected cipher algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( s2k_digest_string ) {
+	opt.s2k_digest_algo = string_to_digest_algo(s2k_digest_string);
+	xfree(s2k_digest_string); s2k_digest_string = NULL;
+	if( check_digest_algo(opt.s2k_digest_algo) )
+	    log_error(_("selected digest algorithm is invalid\n"));
+    }
+    if( opt.completes_needed < 1 )
+      log_error(_("completes-needed must be greater than 0\n"));
+    if( opt.marginals_needed < 2 )
+      log_error(_("marginals-needed must be greater than 1\n"));
+    if( opt.max_cert_depth < 1 || opt.max_cert_depth > 255 )
+      log_error(_("max-cert-depth must be in the range from 1 to 255\n"));
+    if(opt.def_cert_level<0 || opt.def_cert_level>3)
+      log_error(_("invalid default-cert-level; must be 0, 1, 2, or 3\n"));
+    if( opt.min_cert_level < 1 || opt.min_cert_level > 3 )
+      log_error(_("invalid min-cert-level; must be 1, 2, or 3\n"));
+    switch( opt.s2k_mode ) {
+      case 0:
+	log_info(_("NOTE: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"));
+	break;
+      case 1: case 3: break;
+      default:
+	log_error(_("invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"));
+    }
+
+    /* This isn't actually needed, but does serve to error out if the
+       string is invalid. */
+    if(opt.def_preference_list &&
+	keygen_set_std_prefs(opt.def_preference_list,0))
+      log_error(_("invalid default preferences\n"));
+
+    /* We provide defaults for the personal digest list.  This is
+       SHA-1. */
+    if(!pers_digest_list)
+      pers_digest_list="h2";
+
+    if(pers_cipher_list &&
+       keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_cipher_list,PREFTYPE_SYM))
+      log_error(_("invalid personal cipher preferences\n"));
+
+    if(pers_digest_list &&
+       keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_digest_list,PREFTYPE_HASH))
+      log_error(_("invalid personal digest preferences\n"));
+
+    if(pers_compress_list &&
+       keygen_set_std_prefs(pers_compress_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP))
+      log_error(_("invalid personal compress preferences\n"));
+
+    /* We don't support all possible commands with multifile yet */
+    if(multifile)
+      {
+	char *cmdname;
+
+	switch(cmd)
+	  {
+	  case aSign:
+	    cmdname="--sign";
+	    break;
+	  case aClearsign:
+	    cmdname="--clearsign";
+	    break;
+	  case aDetachedSign:
+	    cmdname="--detach-sign";
+	    break;
+	  case aSym:
+	    cmdname="--symmetric";
+	    break;
+	  case aEncrSym:
+	    cmdname="--symmetric --encrypt";
+	    break;
+	  case aStore:
+	    cmdname="--store";
+	    break;
+	  default:
+	    cmdname=NULL;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+	if(cmdname)
+	  log_error(_("%s does not yet work with %s\n"),cmdname,"--multifile");
+      }
+
+    if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
+	g10_exit(2);
+
+    if(opt.compress_level==0)
+      opt.compress_algo=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;
+
+    /* Check our chosen algorithms against the list of legal
+       algorithms. */
+
+    if(!GNUPG)
+      {
+	const char *badalg=NULL;
+	preftype_t badtype=PREFTYPE_NONE;
+
+	if(opt.def_cipher_algo
+	   && !algo_available(PREFTYPE_SYM,opt.def_cipher_algo,NULL))
+	  {
+	    badalg=cipher_algo_to_string(opt.def_cipher_algo);
+	    badtype=PREFTYPE_SYM;
+	  }
+	else if(opt.def_digest_algo
+		&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.def_digest_algo,NULL))
+	  {
+	    badalg=digest_algo_to_string(opt.def_digest_algo);
+	    badtype=PREFTYPE_HASH;
+	  }
+	else if(opt.cert_digest_algo
+		&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_HASH,opt.cert_digest_algo,NULL))
+	  {
+	    badalg=digest_algo_to_string(opt.cert_digest_algo);
+	    badtype=PREFTYPE_HASH;
+	  }
+	else if(opt.compress_algo!=-1
+		&& !algo_available(PREFTYPE_ZIP,opt.compress_algo,NULL))
+	  {
+	    badalg=compress_algo_to_string(opt.compress_algo);
+	    badtype=PREFTYPE_ZIP;
+	  }
+
+	if(badalg)
+	  {
+	    switch(badtype)
+	      {
+	      case PREFTYPE_SYM:
+		log_info(_("you may not use cipher algorithm `%s'"
+			   " while in %s mode\n"),
+			 badalg,compliance_option_string());
+		break;
+	      case PREFTYPE_HASH:
+		log_info(_("you may not use digest algorithm `%s'"
+			   " while in %s mode\n"),
+			 badalg,compliance_option_string());
+		break;
+	      case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
+		log_info(_("you may not use compression algorithm `%s'"
+			   " while in %s mode\n"),
+			 badalg,compliance_option_string());
+		break;
+	      default:
+		BUG();
+	      }
+
+	    compliance_failure();
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* set the random seed file */
+    if( use_random_seed ) {
+	char *p = make_filename(opt.homedir, "random_seed", NULL );
+	set_random_seed_file(p);
+        if (!access (p, F_OK))
+          register_secured_file (p);
+	xfree(p);
+    }
+
+    if( !cmd && opt.fingerprint && !with_fpr ) {
+	set_cmd( &cmd, aListKeys);
+    }
+
+    if( cmd == aKMode || cmd == aKModeC ) { /* kludge to be compatible to pgp */
+	if( cmd == aKModeC ) {
+	    opt.fingerprint = 1;
+	    cmd = aKMode;
+	}
+	opt.list_sigs = 0;
+	if( opt.verbose > 2 )
+	    opt.check_sigs++;
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    opt.list_sigs++;
+
+	opt.verbose = opt.verbose > 1;
+	g10_opt_verbose = opt.verbose;
+    }
+
+    /* kludge to let -sat generate a clear text signature */
+    if( opt.textmode == 2 && !detached_sig && opt.armor && cmd == aSign )
+	cmd = aClearsign;
+
+    if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	set_packet_list_mode(1);
+
+    if (cmd == aGPGConfTest)
+      g10_exit(0);
+
+    /* Add the keyrings, but not for some special commands and not in
+       case of "-kvv userid keyring".  Also avoid adding the secret
+       keyring for a couple of commands to avoid unneeded access in
+       case the secrings are stored on a floppy.
+       
+       We always need to add the keyrings if we are running under
+       SELinux, this is so that the rings are added to the list of
+       secured files. */
+    if( ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS 
+        || (cmd != aDeArmor && cmd != aEnArmor
+            && !(cmd == aKMode && argc == 2 )) ) 
+      {
+        if (ALWAYS_ADD_KEYRINGS
+            || (cmd != aCheckKeys && cmd != aListSigs && cmd != aListKeys
+                && cmd != aVerify && cmd != aSym))
+          {
+            if (!sec_nrings || default_keyring) /* add default secret rings */
+              keydb_add_resource ("secring" EXTSEP_S "gpg", 4, 1);
+            for (sl = sec_nrings; sl; sl = sl->next)
+              keydb_add_resource ( sl->d, 0, 1 );
+          }
+	if( !nrings || default_keyring )  /* add default ring */
+	    keydb_add_resource ("pubring" EXTSEP_S "gpg", 4, 0);
+	for(sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
+	    keydb_add_resource ( sl->d, sl->flags, 0 );
+      }
+    FREE_STRLIST(nrings);
+    FREE_STRLIST(sec_nrings);
+
+
+    if( pwfd != -1 )  /* read the passphrase now. */
+	read_passphrase_from_fd( pwfd );
+
+    fname = argc? *argv : NULL;
+
+    if(fname && utf8_strings)
+      opt.flags.utf8_filename=1;
+
+    switch( cmd ) {
+      case aPrimegen:
+      case aPrintMD:
+      case aPrintMDs:
+      case aGenRandom:
+      case aDeArmor:
+      case aEnArmor:
+      case aFixTrustDB:
+	break;
+      case aExportOwnerTrust: rc = setup_trustdb( 0, trustdb_name ); break;
+      case aListTrustDB: rc = setup_trustdb( argc? 1:0, trustdb_name ); break;
+      default: rc = setup_trustdb(1, trustdb_name ); break;
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	log_error(_("failed to initialize the TrustDB: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+
+
+    switch (cmd)
+      {
+      case aStore: 
+      case aSym:  
+      case aSign: 
+      case aSignSym: 
+      case aClearsign: 
+        if (!opt.quiet && any_explicit_recipient)
+          log_info (_("WARNING: recipients (-r) given "
+                      "without using public key encryption\n"));
+	break;
+      default:
+        break;
+      }
+
+    switch( cmd )
+      {
+      case aStore: /* only store the file */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("--store [filename]"));
+	if( (rc = encode_store(fname)) )
+	    log_error ("storing `%s' failed: %s\n",
+                       print_fname_stdin(fname),g10_errstr(rc) );
+	break;
+      case aSym: /* encrypt the given file only with the symmetric cipher */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("--symmetric [filename]"));
+	if( (rc = encode_symmetric(fname)) )
+            log_error (_("symmetric encryption of `%s' failed: %s\n"),
+                        print_fname_stdin(fname),g10_errstr(rc) );
+	break;
+
+      case aEncr: /* encrypt the given file */
+	if(multifile)
+	  encode_crypt_files(argc, argv, remusr);
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( argc > 1 )
+	      wrong_args(_("--encrypt [filename]"));
+	    if( (rc = encode_crypt(fname,remusr,0)) )
+	      log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
+			print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+	break;
+
+      case aEncrSym:
+	/* This works with PGP 8 in the sense that it acts just like a
+	   symmetric message.  It doesn't work at all with 2 or 6.  It
+	   might work with 7, but alas, I don't have a copy to test
+	   with right now. */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	  wrong_args(_("--symmetric --encrypt [filename]"));
+	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
+	  log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
+		      " with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
+	else if(PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || RFC1991)
+	  log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --encrypt"
+		      " while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( (rc = encode_crypt(fname,remusr,1)) )
+	      log_error("%s: encryption failed: %s\n",
+			print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+	break;
+
+      case aSign: /* sign the given file */
+	sl = NULL;
+	if( detached_sig ) { /* sign all files */
+	    for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+		add_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
+	}
+	else {
+	    if( argc > 1 )
+		wrong_args(_("--sign [filename]"));
+	    if( argc ) {
+		sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
+		strcpy(sl->d, fname);
+	    }
+	}
+	if( (rc = sign_file( sl, detached_sig, locusr, 0, NULL, NULL)) )
+	    log_error("signing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aSignEncr: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("--sign --encrypt [filename]"));
+	if( argc ) {
+	    sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
+	    strcpy(sl->d, fname);
+	}
+	else
+	    sl = NULL;
+	if( (rc = sign_file(sl, detached_sig, locusr, 1, remusr, NULL)) )
+	    log_error("%s: sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
+		      print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aSignEncrSym: /* sign and encrypt the given file */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("--symmetric --sign --encrypt [filename]"));
+	else if(opt.s2k_mode==0)
+	  log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
+		      " with --s2k-mode 0\n"));
+	else if(PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || RFC1991)
+	  log_error(_("you cannot use --symmetric --sign --encrypt"
+		      " while in %s mode\n"),compliance_option_string());
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( argc )
+	      {
+		sl = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sl + strlen(fname));
+		strcpy(sl->d, fname);
+	      }
+	    else
+	      sl = NULL;
+	    if( (rc = sign_file(sl, detached_sig, locusr, 2, remusr, NULL)) )
+	      log_error("%s: symmetric+sign+encrypt failed: %s\n",
+			print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    free_strlist(sl);
+	  }
+	break;
+
+      case aSignSym: /* sign and conventionally encrypt the given file */
+	if (argc > 1)
+	    wrong_args(_("--sign --symmetric [filename]"));
+	rc = sign_symencrypt_file (fname, locusr);
+        if (rc)
+	    log_error("%s: sign+symmetric failed: %s\n",
+                      print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	break;
+
+      case aClearsign: /* make a clearsig */
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("--clearsign [filename]"));
+	if( (rc = clearsign_file(fname, locusr, NULL)) )
+	    log_error("%s: clearsign failed: %s\n",
+                      print_fname_stdin(fname), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	break;
+
+      case aVerify:
+	if(multifile)
+	  {
+	    if( (rc = verify_files( argc, argv ) ))
+	      log_error("verify files failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( (rc = verify_signatures( argc, argv ) ))
+	      log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+	break;
+
+      case aDecrypt:
+        if(multifile)
+	  decrypt_messages(argc, argv);
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( argc > 1 )
+	      wrong_args(_("--decrypt [filename]"));
+	    if( (rc = decrypt_message( fname ) ))
+	      log_error("decrypt_message failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+	break;
+            
+      case aSignKey:
+	if( argc != 1 )
+	  wrong_args(_("--sign-key user-id"));
+	/* fall through */
+      case aLSignKey:
+	if( argc != 1 )
+	  wrong_args(_("--lsign-key user-id"));
+	/* fall through */
+
+	sl=NULL;
+
+	if(cmd==aSignKey)
+	  append_to_strlist(&sl,"sign");
+	else if(cmd==aLSignKey)
+	  append_to_strlist(&sl,"lsign");
+	else
+	  BUG();
+
+	append_to_strlist( &sl, "save" );
+	username = make_username( fname );
+	keyedit_menu(fname, locusr, sl, 0, 0 );
+	xfree(username);
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aEditKey: /* Edit a key signature */
+	if( !argc )
+	    wrong_args(_("--edit-key user-id [commands]"));
+	username = make_username( fname );
+	if( argc > 1 ) {
+	    sl = NULL;
+	    for( argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+		append_to_strlist( &sl, *argv );
+	    keyedit_menu( username, locusr, sl, 0, 1 );
+	    free_strlist(sl);
+	}
+	else
+	    keyedit_menu(username, locusr, NULL, 0, 1 );
+	xfree(username);
+	break;
+
+      case aDeleteKeys:
+      case aDeleteSecretKeys:
+      case aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	/* I'm adding these in reverse order as add_to_strlist2
+           reverses them again, and it's easier to understand in the
+           proper order :) */
+	for( ; argc; argc-- )
+	  add_to_strlist2( &sl, argv[argc-1], utf8_strings );
+	delete_keys(sl,cmd==aDeleteSecretKeys,cmd==aDeleteSecretAndPublicKeys);
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aCheckKeys:
+	opt.check_sigs = 1;
+      case aListSigs:
+	opt.list_sigs = 1;
+      case aListKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	public_key_list( sl );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+      case aListSecretKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	secret_key_list( sl );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aKMode: /* list keyring -- NOTE: This will be removed soon */
+	if( argc < 2 ) { /* -kv [userid] */
+	    sl = NULL;
+	    if (argc && **argv)
+		add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	    public_key_list( sl );
+	    free_strlist(sl);
+	}
+	else if( argc == 2 ) { /* -kv userid keyring */
+	    if( access( argv[1], R_OK ) ) {
+		log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"),
+			       print_fname_stdin(argv[1]), strerror(errno));
+	    }
+	    else {
+		/* add keyring (default keyrings are not registered in this
+		 * special case */
+		keydb_add_resource( argv[1], 0, 0 );
+		sl = NULL;
+		if (**argv)
+		    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+		public_key_list( sl );
+		free_strlist(sl);
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    wrong_args(_("-k[v][v][v][c] [user-id] [keyring]") );
+	break;
+
+      case aKeygen: /* generate a key */
+	if( opt.batch ) {
+	    if( argc > 1 )
+		wrong_args("--gen-key [parameterfile]");
+	    generate_keypair( argc? *argv : NULL, NULL, NULL );
+	}
+	else {
+	    if( argc )
+		wrong_args("--gen-key");
+	    generate_keypair(NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aFastImport:
+        opt.import_options |= IMPORT_FAST;
+      case aImport:
+	import_keys( argc? argv:NULL, argc, NULL, opt.import_options );
+	break;
+
+	/* TODO: There are a number of command that use this same
+	   "make strlist, call function, report error, free strlist"
+	   pattern.  Join them together here and avoid all that
+	   duplicated code. */
+
+      case aExport:
+      case aSendKeys:
+      case aRecvKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	if( cmd == aSendKeys )
+	    rc=keyserver_export( sl );
+	else if( cmd == aRecvKeys )
+	    rc=keyserver_import( sl );
+	else
+	    rc=export_pubkeys( sl, opt.export_options );
+	if(rc)
+	  {
+	    if(cmd==aSendKeys)
+	      log_error(_("keyserver send failed: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+	    else if(cmd==aRecvKeys)
+	      log_error(_("keyserver receive failed: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+	    else
+	      log_error(_("key export failed: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+	  }
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+     case aSearchKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	  append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	rc=keyserver_search( sl );
+	if(rc)
+	  log_error(_("keyserver search failed: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aRefreshKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	rc=keyserver_refresh(sl);
+	if(rc)
+	  log_error(_("keyserver refresh failed: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aFetchKeys:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    append_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	rc=keyserver_fetch(sl);
+	if(rc)
+	  log_error("key fetch failed: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aExportSecret:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	export_seckeys( sl );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aExportSecretSub:
+	sl = NULL;
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+	    add_to_strlist2( &sl, *argv, utf8_strings );
+	export_secsubkeys( sl );
+	free_strlist(sl);
+	break;
+
+      case aGenRevoke:
+	if( argc != 1 )
+	    wrong_args("--gen-revoke user-id");
+	username =  make_username(*argv);
+	gen_revoke( username );
+	xfree( username );
+	break;
+
+      case aDesigRevoke:
+	if( argc != 1 )
+	    wrong_args("--desig-revoke user-id");
+	username =  make_username(*argv);
+	gen_desig_revoke( username, locusr );
+	xfree( username );
+	break;
+
+      case aDeArmor:
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args("--dearmor [file]");
+	rc = dearmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_error(_("dearmoring failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	break;
+
+      case aEnArmor:
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args("--enarmor [file]");
+	rc = enarmor_file( argc? *argv: NULL );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_error(_("enarmoring failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	break;
+
+
+      case aPrimegen:
+	{   int mode = argc < 2 ? 0 : atoi(*argv);
+
+	    if( mode == 1 && argc == 2 ) {
+		mpi_print( stdout, generate_public_prime( atoi(argv[1]) ), 1);
+	    }
+	    else if( mode == 2 && argc == 3 ) {
+		mpi_print( stdout, generate_elg_prime(
+					     0, atoi(argv[1]),
+					     atoi(argv[2]), NULL,NULL ), 1);
+	    }
+	    else if( mode == 3 && argc == 3 ) {
+		MPI *factors;
+		mpi_print( stdout, generate_elg_prime(
+					     1, atoi(argv[1]),
+					     atoi(argv[2]), NULL,&factors ), 1);
+		putchar('\n');
+		mpi_print( stdout, factors[0], 1 ); /* print q */
+	    }
+	    else if( mode == 4 && argc == 3 ) {
+		MPI g = mpi_alloc(1);
+		mpi_print( stdout, generate_elg_prime(
+						 0, atoi(argv[1]),
+						 atoi(argv[2]), g, NULL ), 1);
+		putchar('\n');
+		mpi_print( stdout, g, 1 );
+		mpi_free(g);
+	    }
+	    else
+		wrong_args("--gen-prime mode bits [qbits] ");
+	    putchar('\n');
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aGenRandom:
+	{
+	    int level = argc ? atoi(*argv):0;
+	    int count = argc > 1 ? atoi(argv[1]): 0;
+	    int endless = !count;
+
+	    if( argc < 1 || argc > 2 || level < 0 || level > 2 || count < 0 )
+		wrong_args("--gen-random 0|1|2 [count]");
+
+	    while( endless || count ) {
+		byte *p;
+                /* Wee need a multiple of 3, so that in case of
+                   armored output we get a correct string.  No
+                   linefolding is done, as it is best to levae this to
+                   other tools */
+		size_t n = !endless && count < 99? count : 99;
+
+		p = get_random_bits( n*8, level, 0);
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+		setmode ( fileno(stdout), O_BINARY );
+#endif
+                if (opt.armor) {
+                    char *tmp = make_radix64_string (p, n);
+                    fputs (tmp, stdout);
+                    xfree (tmp);
+                    if (n%3 == 1)
+                      putchar ('=');
+                    if (n%3)
+                      putchar ('=');
+                } else {
+                    fwrite( p, n, 1, stdout );
+                }
+		xfree(p);
+		if( !endless )
+		    count -= n;
+	    }
+            if (opt.armor)
+                putchar ('\n');
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aPrintMD:
+	if( argc < 1)
+	    wrong_args("--print-md algo [files]");
+	{
+	    int all_algos = (**argv=='*' && !(*argv)[1]);
+	    int algo = all_algos? 0 : string_to_digest_algo(*argv);
+
+	    if( !algo && !all_algos )
+		log_error(_("invalid hash algorithm `%s'\n"), *argv );
+	    else {
+		argc--; argv++;
+		if( !argc )
+		    print_mds(NULL, algo);
+		else {
+		    for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+			print_mds(*argv, algo);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aPrintMDs: /* old option */
+	if( !argc )
+	    print_mds(NULL,0);
+	else {
+	    for(; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+		print_mds(*argv,0);
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aListTrustDB:
+	if( !argc )
+	    list_trustdb(NULL);
+	else {
+	    for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ )
+		list_trustdb( *argv );
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aUpdateTrustDB:
+	if( argc )
+	    wrong_args("--update-trustdb");
+	update_trustdb();
+	break;
+
+      case aCheckTrustDB:
+        /* Old versions allowed for arguments - ignore them */
+        check_trustdb();
+	break;
+
+      case aFixTrustDB:
+	log_error("this command is not yet implemented.\n");
+	log_error("A workaround is to use \"--export-ownertrust\", remove\n");
+	log_error("the trustdb file and do an \"--import-ownertrust\".\n" );
+	break;
+
+      case aListTrustPath:
+	if( !argc )
+	    wrong_args("--list-trust-path <user-ids>");
+	for( ; argc; argc--, argv++ ) {
+	    username = make_username( *argv );
+	    list_trust_path( username );
+	    xfree(username);
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aExportOwnerTrust:
+	if( argc )
+	    wrong_args("--export-ownertrust");
+	export_ownertrust();
+	break;
+
+      case aImportOwnerTrust:
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args("--import-ownertrust [file]");
+	import_ownertrust( argc? *argv:NULL );
+	break;
+      
+      case aPipeMode:
+        if ( argc )
+            wrong_args ("--pipemode");
+        run_in_pipemode ();
+        break;
+
+      case aRebuildKeydbCaches:
+        if (argc)
+            wrong_args ("--rebuild-keydb-caches");
+        keydb_rebuild_caches (1);
+        break;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+      case aCardStatus:
+        if (argc)
+            wrong_args ("--card-status");
+        card_status (stdout, NULL, 0);
+        break;
+
+      case aCardEdit:
+        if (argc) {
+            sl = NULL;
+            for (argc--, argv++ ; argc; argc--, argv++)
+                append_to_strlist (&sl, *argv);
+            card_edit (sl);
+            free_strlist (sl);
+	}
+        else
+            card_edit (NULL);
+        break;
+
+      case aChangePIN:
+        if (!argc)
+            change_pin (0,1);
+        else if (argc == 1)
+            change_pin (atoi (*argv),1);
+        else
+        wrong_args ("--change-pin [no]");
+        break;
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+
+      case aListConfig:
+	{
+	  char *str=collapse_args(argc,argv);
+	  list_config(str);
+	  xfree(str);
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case aListPackets:
+	opt.list_packets=2;
+      default:
+	if( argc > 1 )
+	    wrong_args(_("[filename]"));
+	/* Issue some output for the unix newbie */
+	if( !fname && !opt.outfile && isatty( fileno(stdin) )
+		&& isatty( fileno(stdout) ) && isatty( fileno(stderr) ) )
+	    log_info(_("Go ahead and type your message ...\n"));
+
+	a = iobuf_open(fname);
+        if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
+          {
+            iobuf_close (a);
+            a = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+          }
+	if( !a )
+	    log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(fname));
+	else {
+
+	    if( !opt.no_armor ) {
+		if( use_armor_filter( a ) ) {
+		    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+		    iobuf_push_filter( a, armor_filter, &afx );
+		}
+	    }
+	    if( cmd == aListPackets ) {
+		set_packet_list_mode(1);
+		opt.list_packets=1;
+	    }
+	    rc = proc_packets(NULL, a );
+	    if( rc )
+		log_error("processing message failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    iobuf_close(a);
+	}
+	break;
+      }
+
+    /* cleanup */
+    FREE_STRLIST(remusr);
+    FREE_STRLIST(locusr);
+    g10_exit(0);
+    return 8; /*NEVER REACHED*/
+}
+
+
+void
+g10_exit( int rc )
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+    card_close ();
+#endif
+    update_random_seed_file();
+    if( opt.debug & DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE ) {
+	m_print_stats("on exit");
+	random_dump_stats();
+    }
+    if( opt.debug )
+	secmem_dump_stats();
+    secmem_term();
+    rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 :
+			g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
+    exit(rc );
+}
+
+
+/* Pretty-print hex hashes.  This assumes at least an 80-character
+   display, but there are a few other similar assumptions in the
+   display code. */
+static void
+print_hex( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, const char *fname )
+{
+  int i,n,count,indent=0;
+  const byte *p;
+
+  if(fname)
+    indent=printf("%s: ",fname);
+
+  if(indent>40)
+    {
+      printf("\n");
+      indent=0;
+    }
+
+  if(algo==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
+    indent+=printf("RMD160 = ");
+  else if(algo>0)
+    indent+=printf("%6s = ",digest_algo_to_string(algo));
+  else
+    algo=abs(algo);
+
+  count=indent;
+
+  p = md_read( md, algo );
+  n = md_digest_length(algo);
+
+  count+=printf("%02X",*p++);
+
+  for(i=1;i<n;i++,p++)
+    {
+      if(n==16)
+	{
+	  if(count+2>79)
+	    {
+	      printf("\n%*s",indent," ");
+	      count=indent;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    count+=printf(" ");
+
+	  if(!(i%8))
+	    count+=printf(" ");
+	}
+      else if (n==20)
+	{
+	  if(!(i%2))
+	    {
+	      if(count+4>79)
+		{
+		  printf("\n%*s",indent," ");
+		  count=indent;
+		}
+	      else
+		count+=printf(" ");
+	    }
+
+	  if(!(i%10))
+	    count+=printf(" ");
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  if(!(i%4))
+	    {
+	      if(count+8>79)
+		{
+		  printf("\n%*s",indent," ");
+		  count=indent;
+		}
+	      else
+		count+=printf(" ");
+	    }
+	}
+
+      count+=printf("%02X",*p);
+    }
+
+  printf("\n");
+}
+
+static void
+print_hashline( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, const char *fname )
+{
+    int i, n;
+    const byte *p;
+    
+    if ( fname ) {
+        for (p = fname; *p; p++ ) {
+            if ( *p <= 32 || *p > 127 || *p == ':' || *p == '%' )
+                printf("%%%02X", *p );
+            else 
+                putchar( *p );
+        }
+    }
+    putchar(':');
+    printf("%d:", algo );
+    p = md_read( md, algo );
+    n = md_digest_length(algo);
+    for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) 
+        printf("%02X", *p );
+    putchar(':');
+    putchar('\n');
+}
+
+static void
+print_mds( const char *fname, int algo )
+{
+    FILE *fp;
+    char buf[1024];
+    size_t n;
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+
+    if( !fname ) {
+	fp = stdin;
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+	setmode ( fileno(fp) , O_BINARY );
+#endif
+    }
+    else {
+	fp = fopen( fname, "rb" );
+        if (fp && is_secured_file (fileno (fp)))
+          {
+            fclose (fp);
+            fp = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+          }
+    }
+    if( !fp ) {
+	log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
+	return;
+    }
+
+    md = md_open( 0, 0 );
+    if( algo )
+	md_enable( md, algo );
+    else {
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+#ifdef USE_SHA256
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224 );
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256 );
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHA512
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384 );
+	md_enable( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512 );
+#endif
+    }
+
+    while( (n=fread( buf, 1, DIM(buf), fp )) )
+	md_write( md, buf, n );
+    if( ferror(fp) )
+	log_error("%s: %s\n", fname?fname:"[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
+    else {
+	md_final(md);
+        if ( opt.with_colons ) {
+            if ( algo ) 
+                print_hashline( md, algo, fname );
+            else {
+                print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, fname );
+                print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, fname );
+                print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, fname );
+#ifdef USE_SHA256
+                print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224, fname );
+                print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, fname );
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHA512
+		print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384, fname );
+		print_hashline( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512, fname );
+#endif
+            }
+        }
+        else {
+            if( algo )
+	       print_hex(md,-algo,fname);
+            else {
+                print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, fname );
+                print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, fname );
+                print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, fname );
+#ifdef USE_SHA256
+                print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224, fname );
+                print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, fname );
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHA512
+		print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384, fname );
+		print_hex( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512, fname );
+#endif
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    md_close(md);
+
+    if( fp != stdin )
+	fclose(fp);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check the supplied name,value string and add it to the notation
+ * data to be used for signatures.  which==0 for sig notations, and 1
+ * for cert notations.
+*/
+static void
+add_notation_data( const char *string, int which )
+{
+  struct notation *notation;
+
+  notation=string_to_notation(string,utf8_strings);
+  if(notation)
+    {
+      if(which)
+	{
+	  notation->next=opt.cert_notations;
+	  opt.cert_notations=notation;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  notation->next=opt.sig_notations;
+	  opt.sig_notations=notation;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+add_policy_url( const char *string, int which )
+{
+  unsigned int i,critical=0;
+  STRLIST sl;
+
+  if(*string=='!')
+    {
+      string++;
+      critical=1;
+    }
+
+  for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
+    if( !isascii (string[i]) || iscntrl(string[i]))
+      break;
+
+  if(i==0 || i<strlen(string))
+    {
+      if(which)
+	log_error(_("the given certification policy URL is invalid\n"));
+      else
+	log_error(_("the given signature policy URL is invalid\n"));
+    }
+
+  if(which)
+    sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.cert_policy_url, string );
+  else
+    sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_policy_url, string );
+
+  if(critical)
+    sl->flags |= 1;    
+}
+
+static void
+add_keyserver_url( const char *string, int which )
+{
+  unsigned int i,critical=0;
+  STRLIST sl;
+
+  if(*string=='!')
+    {
+      string++;
+      critical=1;
+    }
+
+  for(i=0;i<strlen(string);i++)
+    if( !isascii (string[i]) || iscntrl(string[i]))
+      break;
+
+  if(i==0 || i<strlen(string))
+    {
+      if(which)
+	BUG();
+      else
+	log_error(_("the given preferred keyserver URL is invalid\n"));
+    }
+
+  if(which)
+    BUG();
+  else
+    sl=add_to_strlist( &opt.sig_keyserver_url, string );
+
+  if(critical)
+    sl->flags |= 1;    
+}
diff --git a/g10/gpgv.c b/g10/gpgv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5192c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/gpgv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+/* gpgv.c - The GnuPG signature verify utility
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <readline/readline.h>
+#endif
+
+#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "g10defs.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+
+
+enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
+    oQuiet	  = 'q',
+    oVerbose	  = 'v',
+    oBatch	  = 500,
+    oKeyring,
+    oIgnoreTimeConflict,                      
+    oStatusFD,
+    oLoggerFD,
+    oHomedir,
+aTest };
+
+
+static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
+
+    { 301, NULL, 0, N_("@\nOptions:\n ") },
+
+    { oVerbose, "verbose",   0, N_("verbose") },
+    { oQuiet,	"quiet",     0, N_("be somewhat more quiet") },
+    { oKeyring, "keyring"   ,2, N_("take the keys from this keyring")},
+    { oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", 0, 
+                           N_("make timestamp conflicts only a warning") },
+    { oStatusFD, "status-fd" ,1, N_("|FD|write status info to this FD") },
+    { oLoggerFD, "logger-fd",1, "@" },
+    { oHomedir, "homedir", 2, "@" },   /* defaults to "~/.gnupg" */
+
+{0} };
+
+
+
+int g10_errors_seen = 0;
+
+const char *
+strusage( int level )
+{
+    const char *p;
+    switch( level ) {
+      case 11: p = "gpgv (GnuPG)";
+	break;
+      case 13: p = VERSION; break;
+      case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
+      case 19: p =
+	    _("Please report bugs to <gnupg-bugs@gnu.org>.\n");
+	break;
+      case 1:
+      case 40:	p =
+	    _("Usage: gpgv [options] [files] (-h for help)");
+	break;
+      case 41:	p =
+	    _("Syntax: gpg [options] [files]\n"
+	      "Check signatures against known trusted keys\n");
+	break;
+
+      default:	p = default_strusage(level);
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+
+
+static void
+i18n_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SIMPLE_GETTEXT
+    set_gettext_file (PACKAGE, "Software\\GNU\\GnuPG");
+#else
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+    setlocale( LC_ALL, "" );
+    bindtextdomain( PACKAGE, G10_LOCALEDIR );
+    textdomain( PACKAGE );
+#endif
+#endif
+}
+
+
+int
+main( int argc, char **argv )
+{
+    ARGPARSE_ARGS pargs;
+    int rc=0;
+    STRLIST sl;
+    STRLIST nrings=NULL;
+    unsigned configlineno;
+
+    log_set_name("gpgv");
+    init_signals();
+    i18n_init();
+    opt.command_fd = -1; /* no command fd */
+    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 1;
+    opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE;
+    opt.trust_model = TM_ALWAYS;
+    opt.batch = 1;
+
+    opt.homedir = default_homedir ();
+
+    tty_no_terminal(1);
+    tty_batchmode(1);
+    disable_dotlock();
+
+    set_native_charset (NULL); /* Try to auto set the character set */
+    
+    pargs.argc = &argc;
+    pargs.argv = &argv;
+    pargs.flags=  1;  /* do not remove the args */
+    while( optfile_parse( NULL, NULL, &configlineno, &pargs, opts) ) {
+	switch( pargs.r_opt ) {
+	  case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
+          case oVerbose: g10_opt_verbose++;
+		  opt.verbose++; opt.list_sigs=1; break;
+          case oKeyring: append_to_strlist( &nrings, pargs.r.ret_str); break;
+	  case oStatusFD: set_status_fd( pargs.r.ret_int ); break;
+	  case oLoggerFD: log_set_logfile( NULL, pargs.r.ret_int ); break;
+	  case oHomedir: opt.homedir = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
+	  case oIgnoreTimeConflict: opt.ignore_time_conflict = 1; break;
+	  default : pargs.err = 2; break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( log_get_errorcount(0) )
+	g10_exit(2);
+
+    g10_opt_homedir = opt.homedir;
+
+    if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	set_packet_list_mode(1);
+
+    if( !nrings )  /* no keyring given: use default one */
+        keydb_add_resource ("trustedkeys" EXTSEP_S "gpg", 0, 0);
+    for(sl = nrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
+        keydb_add_resource (sl->d, 0, 0 );
+    
+    FREE_STRLIST(nrings);
+    
+    if( (rc = verify_signatures( argc, argv ) ))
+        log_error("verify signatures failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+
+    /* cleanup */
+    g10_exit(0);
+    return 8; /*NEVER REACHED*/
+}
+
+
+void
+g10_exit( int rc )
+{
+    rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 :
+			g10_errors_seen? 1 : 0;
+    exit(rc );
+}
+
+
+/* Stub:
+ * We have to override the trustcheck from pkclist.c becuase 
+ * this utility assumes that all keys in the keyring are trustworthy
+ */
+int
+check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void
+read_trust_options(byte *trust_model,ulong *created,ulong *nextcheck,
+		   byte *marginals,byte *completes,byte *cert_depth) {}
+
+/* Stub: 
+ * We don't have the trustdb , so we have to provide some stub functions
+ * instead
+ */
+
+int
+cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void
+check_trustdb_stale(void) {}
+
+int
+get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+    return '?';
+}
+
+unsigned int
+get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  return 0;
+}
+
+const char *
+trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value)
+{
+  return "err";
+}
+
+const char *
+uid_trust_string_fixed(PKT_public_key *key,PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  return "err";
+}
+
+int
+get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+    return '?';
+}
+
+unsigned int
+get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+
+/* Stubs:
+ * Because we only work with trusted keys, it does not make sense to
+ * get them from a keyserver
+ */
+
+struct keyserver_spec *
+keyserver_match(struct keyserver_spec *spec) { return NULL; }
+
+int
+keyserver_import_keyid( u32 *keyid, void *dummy )
+{
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int
+keyserver_import_cert(const char *name) { return -1; }
+
+int
+keyserver_import_pka(const char *name,unsigned char *fpr) { return -1; }
+
+int
+keyserver_import_name(const char *name,struct keyserver_spec *spec)
+{
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int
+keyserver_import_ldap(const char *name) { return -1; }
+
+/* Stub:
+ * No encryption here but mainproc links to these functions.
+ */
+int
+get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
+{
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+/* Stub: */
+int
+get_override_session_key( DEK *dek, const char *string )
+{
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+/* Stub: */
+int
+decrypt_data( void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
+{
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+
+/* Stub:
+ * No interactive commnds, so we don't need the helptexts
+ */
+void
+display_online_help( const char *keyword )
+{
+}
+
+/* Stub:
+ * We don't use secret keys, but getkey.c links to this
+ */
+int
+check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
+{
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+}
+
+/* Stub:
+ * No secret key, so no passphrase needed 
+ */
+DEK *
+passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
+		   int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
+                   const char *tmp, int *canceled)
+{
+  if (canceled)
+    *canceled = 0;
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+struct keyserver_spec *parse_preferred_keyserver(PKT_signature *sig) {return NULL;}
+struct keyserver_spec *parse_keyserver_uri(const char *uri,int require_scheme,
+                                           const char *configname,
+                                           unsigned int configlineno)
+{
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void free_keyserver_spec(struct keyserver_spec *keyserver) {}
+
+/* Stubs to avoid linking to photoid.c */
+void show_photos(const struct user_attribute *attrs,int count,PKT_public_key *pk) {}
+int parse_image_header(const struct user_attribute *attr,byte *type,u32 *len) {return 0;}
+char *image_type_to_string(byte type,int string) {return NULL;}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+int agent_scd_getattr (const char *name, struct agent_card_info_s *info) {return 0;}
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+
+/* Stubs to void linking to ../cipher/cipher.c */
+int string_to_cipher_algo( const char *string ) { return 0; }
+const char *cipher_algo_to_string( int algo ) { return "?";}
+void disable_cipher_algo( int algo ) {}
+int check_cipher_algo( int algo ) { return -1;}
+unsigned int cipher_get_keylen( int algo ) { return 0; }
+unsigned int cipher_get_blocksize( int algo ) {return 0;}
+CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_open( int algo, int mode, int secure ) { return NULL;}
+void cipher_close( CIPHER_HANDLE c ) {}
+int cipher_setkey( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *key, unsigned keylen ) { return -1;}
+void cipher_setiv( CIPHER_HANDLE c, const byte *iv, unsigned ivlen ){}
+void cipher_encrypt( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *outbuf,
+                     byte *inbuf, unsigned nbytes ) {}
+void cipher_decrypt( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *outbuf,
+                     byte *inbuf, unsigned nbytes ) {}
+void cipher_sync( CIPHER_HANDLE c ) {}
+
+/* Stubs to avoid linking to ../cipher/random.c */
+void random_dump_stats(void) {}
+int quick_random_gen( int onoff ) { return -1;}
+void randomize_buffer( byte *buffer, size_t length, int level ) {}
+int random_is_faked() { return -1;}
+byte *get_random_bits( size_t nbits, int level, int secure ) { return NULL;}
+void set_random_seed_file( const char *name ) {}
+void update_random_seed_file() {}
+void fast_random_poll() {}
+
+/* Stubs to avoid linking of ../cipher/primegen.c */
+void register_primegen_progress ( void (*cb)( void *, int), void *cb_data ) {}
+MPI generate_secret_prime( unsigned  nbits ) { return NULL;}
+MPI generate_public_prime( unsigned  nbits ) { return NULL;}
+MPI generate_elg_prime( int mode, unsigned pbits, unsigned qbits,
+                        MPI g, MPI **ret_factors ) { return NULL;}
+
+/* Do not link to ../cipher/rndlinux.c */
+void rndlinux_constructor(void) {}
+
+
+/* Stubs to avoid linking to ../util/ttyio.c */
+int tty_batchmode( int onoff ) { return 0; }
+void tty_printf( const char *fmt, ... ) { }
+void tty_fprintf (FILE *fp, const char *fmt, ... ) { }
+void tty_print_string( const byte *p, size_t n ) { }
+void tty_print_utf8_string( const byte *p, size_t n ) {}
+void tty_print_utf8_string2( const byte *p, size_t n, size_t max_n ) {}
+char *tty_get( const char *prompt ) { return NULL;}
+char *tty_get_hidden( const char *prompt ) {return NULL; }
+void tty_kill_prompt(void) {}
+int tty_get_answer_is_yes( const char *prompt ) {return 0;}
+int tty_no_terminal(int onoff) {return 0;}
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+void tty_enable_completion(rl_completion_func_t *completer) {}
+void tty_disable_completion(void) {}
+#endif
+
+/* We do not do any locking, so use these stubs here */
+void disable_dotlock(void) {}
+DOTLOCK create_dotlock( const char *file_to_lock ) { return NULL; }
+void destroy_dotlock (DOTLOCK h) {}
+int make_dotlock( DOTLOCK h, long timeout ) { return 0;}
+int release_dotlock( DOTLOCK h ) {return 0;}
+void remove_lockfiles(void) {}
diff --git a/g10/helptext.c b/g10/helptext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1f7851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/helptext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/* helptext.c  - English help texts
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+/****************
+ * These helptexts are used for the "online" help feature. We use
+ * a key consisting of words and dots.	Because the lookup is only
+ * done in an interactive mode on a user request (when she enters a "?"
+ * as response to a prompt) we can use a simple search through the list.
+ *
+ * Mini glossary:
+ *
+ * "user ID", "trustdb", "NOTE" and "WARNING".
+ */
+
+static struct helptexts { const char *key; const char *help; } helptexts[] = {
+
+/* begin of list */
+
+{ "edit_ownertrust.value", N_(
+"It's up to you to assign a value here; this value will never be exported\n"
+"to any 3rd party.  We need it to implement the web-of-trust; it has nothing\n"
+"to do with the (implicitly created) web-of-certificates."
+)},
+
+{ "edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay", N_(
+ "To build the Web-of-Trust, GnuPG needs to know which keys are\n"
+ "ultimately trusted - those are usually the keys for which you have\n"
+ "access to the secret key.  Answer \"yes\" to set this key to\n"
+ "ultimately trusted\n"
+)},
+
+{ "untrusted_key.override", N_(
+"If you want to use this untrusted key anyway, answer \"yes\"."
+)},
+
+{ "pklist.user_id.enter", N_(
+"Enter the user ID of the addressee to whom you want to send the message."
+)},
+
+{ "keygen.algo", N_(
+"Select the algorithm to use.\n"
+"\n"
+"DSA (aka DSS) is the Digital Signature Algorithm and can only be used\n"
+"for signatures.\n"
+"\n"
+"Elgamal is an encrypt-only algorithm.\n"
+"\n"
+"RSA may be used for signatures or encryption.\n"
+"\n"
+"The first (primary) key must always be a key which is capable of signing."
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.algo.rsa_se", N_(
+"In general it is not a good idea to use the same key for signing and\n"
+"encryption.  This algorithm should only be used in certain domains.\n"
+"Please consult your security expert first."
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.size", N_(
+ "Enter the size of the key"
+)},
+
+{ "keygen.size.huge.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.size.large.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.valid", N_(
+ "Enter the required value as shown in the prompt.\n"
+ "It is possible to enter a ISO date (YYYY-MM-DD) but you won't\n"
+ "get a good error response - instead the system tries to interpret\n"
+ "the given value as an interval."
+)},
+
+{ "keygen.valid.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.name", N_(
+ "Enter the name of the key holder"
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.email", N_(
+ "please enter an optional but highly suggested email address"
+)},
+
+{ "keygen.comment", N_(
+ "Please enter an optional comment"
+)},
+
+
+{ "keygen.userid.cmd", N_(
+ ""
+"N  to change the name.\n"
+"C  to change the comment.\n"
+"E  to change the email address.\n"
+"O  to continue with key generation.\n"
+"Q  to to quit the key generation."
+)},
+
+{ "keygen.sub.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" (or just \"y\") if it is okay to generate the sub key."
+)},
+
+{ "sign_uid.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+{ "sign_uid.class", N_(
+"When you sign a user ID on a key, you should first verify that the key\n"
+"belongs to the person named in the user ID.  It is useful for others to\n"
+"know how carefully you verified this.\n\n"
+"\"0\" means you make no particular claim as to how carefully you verified the\n"
+"    key.\n\n"
+"\"1\" means you believe the key is owned by the person who claims to own it\n"
+"    but you could not, or did not verify the key at all.  This is useful for\n"
+"    a \"persona\" verification, where you sign the key of a pseudonymous user.\n\n"
+"\"2\" means you did casual verification of the key.  For example, this could\n"
+"    mean that you verified the key fingerprint and checked the user ID on the\n"
+"    key against a photo ID.\n\n"
+"\"3\" means you did extensive verification of the key.  For example, this could\n"
+"    mean that you verified the key fingerprint with the owner of the key in\n"
+"    person, and that you checked, by means of a hard to forge document with a\n"
+"    photo ID (such as a passport) that the name of the key owner matches the\n"
+"    name in the user ID on the key, and finally that you verified (by exchange\n"
+"    of email) that the email address on the key belongs to the key owner.\n\n"
+"Note that the examples given above for levels 2 and 3 are *only* examples.\n"
+"In the end, it is up to you to decide just what \"casual\" and \"extensive\"\n"
+"mean to you when you sign other keys.\n\n"
+"If you don't know what the right answer is, answer \"0\"."
+)},
+
+{ "change_passwd.empty.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+
+{ "keyedit.save.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+
+{ "keyedit.cancel.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" or \"no\""
+)},
+
+{ "keyedit.sign_all.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" if you want to sign ALL the user IDs"
+)},
+
+{ "keyedit.remove.uid.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" if you really want to delete this user ID.\n"
+ "All certificates are then also lost!"
+)},
+
+{ "keyedit.remove.subkey.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" if it is okay to delete the subkey"
+)},
+
+
+{ "keyedit.delsig.valid", N_(
+ "This is a valid signature on the key; you normally don't want\n"
+ "to delete this signature because it may be important to establish a\n"
+ "trust connection to the key or another key certified by this key."
+)},
+{ "keyedit.delsig.unknown", N_(
+ "This signature can't be checked because you don't have the\n"
+ "corresponding key.  You should postpone its deletion until you\n"
+ "know which key was used because this signing key might establish\n"
+ "a trust connection through another already certified key."
+)},
+{ "keyedit.delsig.invalid", N_(
+ "The signature is not valid.  It does make sense to remove it from\n"
+ "your keyring."
+)},
+{ "keyedit.delsig.selfsig", N_(
+ "This is a signature which binds the user ID to the key. It is\n"
+ "usually not a good idea to remove such a signature.  Actually\n"
+ "GnuPG might not be able to use this key anymore.  So do this\n"
+ "only if this self-signature is for some reason not valid and\n"
+ "a second one is available."
+)},
+
+{ "keyedit.updpref.okay", N_(
+ "Change the preferences of all user IDs (or just of the selected ones)\n"
+ "to the current list of preferences.  The timestamp of all affected\n"
+ "self-signatures will be advanced by one second.\n"
+)},
+
+
+{ "passphrase.enter", N_(
+ ""
+"Please enter the passhrase; this is a secret sentence \n"
+)},
+
+
+{ "passphrase.repeat", N_(
+ "Please repeat the last passphrase, so you are sure what you typed in."
+)},
+
+{ "detached_signature.filename", N_(
+ "Give the name of the file to which the signature applies"
+)},
+
+/* openfile.c (overwrite_filep) */
+{ "openfile.overwrite.okay", N_(
+ "Answer \"yes\" if it is okay to overwrite the file"
+)},
+
+/* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name) */
+{ "openfile.askoutname", N_(
+ "Please enter a new filename. If you just hit RETURN the default\n"
+ "file (which is shown in brackets) will be used."
+)},
+
+/* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason) */
+{ "ask_revocation_reason.code", N_(
+ "You should specify a reason for the certification.  Depending on the\n"
+ "context you have the ability to choose from this list:\n"
+ "  \"Key has been compromised\"\n"
+ "      Use this if you have a reason to believe that unauthorized persons\n"
+ "      got access to your secret key.\n"
+ "  \"Key is superseded\"\n"
+ "      Use this if you have replaced this key with a newer one.\n"
+ "  \"Key is no longer used\"\n"
+ "      Use this if you have retired this key.\n"
+ "  \"User ID is no longer valid\"\n"
+ "      Use this to state that the user ID should not longer be used;\n"
+ "      this is normally used to mark an email address invalid.\n"
+)},
+
+/* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason) */
+{ "ask_revocation_reason.text", N_(
+ "If you like, you can enter a text describing why you issue this\n"
+ "revocation certificate.  Please keep this text concise.\n"
+ "An empty line ends the text.\n"
+)},
+
+/* end of list */
+{ NULL, NULL } };
+
+
+void
+display_online_help( const char *keyword )
+{
+
+    tty_kill_prompt();
+    if( !keyword )
+	tty_printf(_("No help available") );
+    else {
+	const char *p;
+	int i;
+
+	for(i=0; (p=helptexts[i].key) && strcmp( p, keyword ); i++ )
+	    ;
+	if( !p || !*helptexts[i].help )
+	    tty_printf(_("No help available for `%s'"), keyword );
+	else
+	    tty_printf("%s", _(helptexts[i].help) );
+    }
+    tty_printf("\n");
+}
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7260301
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2396 @@
+/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+
+struct stats_s {
+    ulong count;
+    ulong no_user_id;
+    ulong imported;
+    ulong imported_rsa;
+    ulong n_uids;
+    ulong n_sigs;
+    ulong n_subk;
+    ulong unchanged;
+    ulong n_revoc;
+    ulong secret_read;
+    ulong secret_imported;
+    ulong secret_dups;
+    ulong skipped_new_keys;
+    ulong not_imported;
+    ulong n_sigs_cleaned;
+    ulong n_uids_cleaned;
+};
+
+
+static int import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
+		   unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options );
+static int read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root );
+static void revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock);
+static int import_one(const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,struct stats_s *stats,
+		      unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+		      unsigned int options,int from_sk);
+static int import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
+                              struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options);
+static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node,
+                               struct stats_s *stats);
+static int chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
+			  PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self );
+static int delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
+			     u32 *keyid, unsigned int options );
+static int merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig,
+			 KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid,
+			 int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk );
+static int append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+static int append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+static int merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+			     const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
+
+int
+parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
+{
+  struct parse_options import_opts[]=
+    {
+      {"import-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
+       N_("import signatures that are marked as local-only")},
+      {"repair-pks-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,
+       N_("repair damage from the pks keyserver during import")},
+      {"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST,NULL,
+       N_("do not update the trustdb after import")},
+      {"convert-sk-to-pk",IMPORT_SK2PK,NULL,
+       N_("create a public key when importing a secret key")},
+      {"merge-only",IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY,NULL,
+       N_("only accept updates to existing keys")},
+      {"import-clean",IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
+       N_("remove unusable parts from key after import")},
+      {"import-minimal",IMPORT_MINIMAL|IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
+       N_("remove as much as possible from key after import")},
+      /* Aliases for backward compatibility */
+      {"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
+      {"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,NULL},
+      /* dummy */
+      {"import-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {"import-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {"import-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
+      {NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
+    };
+
+  return parse_options(str,options,import_opts,noisy);
+}
+
+void *
+import_new_stats_handle (void)
+{
+    return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
+}
+
+void
+import_release_stats_handle (void *p)
+{
+    xfree (p);
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
+ * This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
+ * least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
+ * Other signatures are not checked.
+ *
+ * Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
+ *
+ *  - get the keyblock
+ *  - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
+ *    without/invalid self-signatures.
+ *  - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
+ *  - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
+ *    If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
+ *  - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
+ *    our keyring.  If they are different something weird is going on;
+ *    ask what to do.
+ *  - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
+ *    ask the user what to do.
+ *  - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
+ *    that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
+ *    (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
+ *  - Simply add the signature.  Can't verify here because we may not have
+ *    the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
+ *    into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
+ *    is used.
+ *  - Proceed with next signature.
+ *
+ *  Key revocation certificates have special handling.
+ *
+ */
+static int
+import_keys_internal( IOBUF inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
+		      void *stats_handle, unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
+		      unsigned int options )
+{
+    int i, rc = 0;
+    struct stats_s *stats = stats_handle;
+
+    if (!stats)
+        stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
+
+    if (inp) {
+        rc = import( inp, "[stream]", stats, fpr, fpr_len, options);
+    }
+    else {
+        if( !fnames && !nnames )
+	    nnames = 1;  /* Ohh what a ugly hack to jump into the loop */
+
+	for(i=0; i < nnames; i++ ) {
+	    const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
+	    IOBUF inp2 = iobuf_open(fname);
+	    if( !fname )
+	        fname = "[stdin]";
+            if (inp2 && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp2)))
+              {
+                iobuf_close (inp2);
+                inp2 = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+              }
+	    if( !inp2 )
+	        log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	    else
+	      {
+	        rc = import( inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options );
+	        iobuf_close(inp2);
+                /* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
+                iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)fname);
+	        if( rc )
+		  log_error("import from `%s' failed: %s\n", fname,
+			    g10_errstr(rc) );
+	      }
+	    if( !fname )
+	        break;
+	}
+    }
+    if (!stats_handle) {
+        import_print_stats (stats);
+        import_release_stats_handle (stats);
+    }
+
+    /* If no fast import and the trustdb is dirty (i.e. we added a key
+       or userID that had something other than a selfsig, a signature
+       that was other than a selfsig, or any revocation), then
+       update/check the trustdb if the user specified by setting
+       interactive or by not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */
+
+    if(!(options&IMPORT_FAST))
+      trustdb_check_or_update();
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+void
+import_keys( char **fnames, int nnames,
+	     void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
+{
+  import_keys_internal(NULL,fnames,nnames,stats_handle,NULL,NULL,options);
+}
+
+int
+import_keys_stream( IOBUF inp, void *stats_handle,
+		    unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options )
+{
+  return import_keys_internal(inp,NULL,0,stats_handle,fpr,fpr_len,options);
+}
+
+static int
+import( IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
+	unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options )
+{
+    PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    getkey_disable_caches();
+
+    if( !opt.no_armor ) { /* armored reading is not disabled */
+	armor_filter_context_t *afx = new_armor_context ();
+	afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
+	push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
+        release_armor_context (afx);
+    }
+
+    while( !(rc = read_block( inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock) )) {
+	if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	    rc = import_one( fname, keyblock, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0);
+	else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) 
+                rc = import_secret_one( fname, keyblock, stats, options );
+	else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
+	    rc = import_revoke_cert( fname, keyblock, stats );
+	else {
+	    log_info( _("skipping block of type %d\n"),
+					    keyblock->pkt->pkttype );
+	}
+	release_kbnode(keyblock);
+        /* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but this
+           does only make sense if we keep on going despite of errors. */
+	if( rc )
+	    break;
+	if( !(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
+	    log_info(_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );
+    }
+    if( rc == -1 )
+	rc = 0;
+    else if( rc && rc != G10ERR_INV_KEYRING )
+	log_error( _("error reading `%s': %s\n"), fname, g10_errstr(rc));
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+import_print_stats (void *hd)
+{
+    struct stats_s *stats = hd;
+
+    if( !opt.quiet ) {
+	log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"), stats->count );
+	if( stats->skipped_new_keys )
+	    log_info(_("      skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
+						stats->skipped_new_keys );
+	if( stats->no_user_id )
+	    log_info(_("          w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
+	if( stats->imported || stats->imported_rsa ) {
+	    log_info(_("              imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
+	    if( stats->imported_rsa )
+		fprintf(stderr, "  (RSA: %lu)", stats->imported_rsa );
+	    putc('\n', stderr);
+	}
+	if( stats->unchanged )
+	    log_info(_("             unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
+	if( stats->n_uids )
+	    log_info(_("          new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
+	if( stats->n_subk )
+	    log_info(_("           new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
+	if( stats->n_sigs )
+	    log_info(_("        new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
+	if( stats->n_revoc )
+	    log_info(_("   new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
+	if( stats->secret_read )
+	    log_info(_("      secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
+	if( stats->secret_imported )
+	    log_info(_("  secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
+	if( stats->secret_dups )
+	    log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
+	if( stats->not_imported )
+	    log_info(_("          not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
+	if( stats->n_sigs_cleaned)
+	    log_info(_("    signatures cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_sigs_cleaned);
+	if( stats->n_uids_cleaned)
+	    log_info(_("      user IDs cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_uids_cleaned);
+    }
+
+    if( is_status_enabled() ) {
+	char buf[14*20];
+	sprintf(buf, "%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
+		stats->count,
+		stats->no_user_id,
+		stats->imported,
+		stats->imported_rsa,
+		stats->unchanged,
+		stats->n_uids,
+		stats->n_subk,
+		stats->n_sigs,
+		stats->n_revoc,
+		stats->secret_read,
+		stats->secret_imported,
+		stats->secret_dups,
+		stats->skipped_new_keys,
+                stats->not_imported );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf );
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Read the next keyblock from stream A.
+ * PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
+ * and not chnaged form the caller.
+ * Retunr: 0 = okay, -1 no more blocks or another errorcode.
+ */
+static int
+read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root )
+{
+    int rc;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    KBNODE root = NULL;
+    int in_cert;
+
+    if( *pending_pkt ) {
+	root = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
+	*pending_pkt = NULL;
+	in_cert = 1;
+    }
+    else
+	in_cert = 0;
+    pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+    init_packet(pkt);
+    while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
+	if( rc ) {  /* ignore errors */
+	    if( rc != G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET ) {
+		log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+		rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
+		goto ready;
+	    }
+	    free_packet( pkt );
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	if( !root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		  && pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
+	    /* this is a revocation certificate which is handled
+	     * in a special way */
+	    root = new_kbnode( pkt );
+	    pkt = NULL;
+	    goto ready;
+	}
+
+	/* make a linked list of all packets */
+	switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	  case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+	    if(check_compress_algo(pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm))
+	      {
+		rc = G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
+		goto ready;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		compress_filter_context_t *cfx = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *cfx );
+		pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
+		push_compress_filter2(a,cfx,pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm,1);
+	      }
+	    free_packet( pkt );
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	    break;
+
+          case PKT_RING_TRUST:
+            /* skip those packets */
+	    free_packet( pkt );
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+            break;
+
+	  case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	  case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	    if( in_cert ) { /* store this packet */
+		*pending_pkt = pkt;
+		pkt = NULL;
+		goto ready;
+	    }
+	    in_cert = 1;
+	  default:
+	    if( in_cert ) {
+		if( !root )
+		    root = new_kbnode( pkt );
+		else
+		    add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+		pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+	    }
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+  ready:
+    if( rc == -1 && root )
+	rc = 0;
+
+    if( rc )
+	release_kbnode( root );
+    else
+	*ret_root = root;
+    free_packet( pkt );
+    xfree( pkt );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the PKS
+   disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
+   sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey.  That is,
+   instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
+   "pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1".  We can't do anything about sub2
+   and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
+   by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
+   sub2 sub3".  Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */
+
+static int
+fix_pks_corruption(KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  int changed=0,keycount=0;
+  KBNODE node,last=NULL,sknode=NULL;
+
+  /* First determine if we have the problem at all.  Look for 2 or
+     more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
+  for(node=keyblock;node;last=node,node=node->next)
+    {
+      if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+	{
+	  keycount++;
+	  if(!sknode)
+	    sknode=node;
+	}
+      else if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+	      node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x18 &&
+	      keycount>=2 && node->next==NULL)
+	{
+	  /* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
+	     a row without any intervening packets. */
+
+	  /* Sanity check */
+	  if(last==NULL)
+	    break;
+
+	  /* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
+	  node->next=sknode->next;
+	  sknode->next=node;
+	  last->next=NULL;
+
+	  /* Note we aren't checking whether this binding sig is a
+	     selfsig.  This is not necessary here as the subkey and
+	     binding sig will be rejected later if that is the
+	     case. */
+	  if(check_key_signature(keyblock,node,NULL))
+	    {
+	      /* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
+	      sknode->next=node->next;
+	      last->next=node;
+	      node->next=NULL;
+	      break;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      sknode->flag |= 1; /* Mark it good so we don't need to
+                                    check it again */
+	      changed=1;
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	keycount=0;
+    }
+
+  return changed;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_import_ok (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, unsigned int reason)
+{
+  byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
+  char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+30], *p;
+  size_t i, n;
+
+  sprintf (buf, "%u ", reason);
+  p = buf + strlen (buf);
+
+  if (pk)
+    fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
+  else
+    fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
+  s = array;
+  for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
+    sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);
+
+  write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
+}
+
+static void
+print_import_check (PKT_public_key * pk, PKT_user_id * id)
+{
+    char * buf;
+    byte fpr[24];
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    size_t i, pos = 0, n;
+
+    buf = xmalloc (17+41+id->len+32);
+    keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+    sprintf (buf, "%08X%08X ", keyid[0], keyid[1]);
+    pos = 17;
+    fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &n);
+    for (i = 0; i < n; i++, pos += 2)
+        sprintf (buf+pos, "%02X", fpr[i]);
+    strcat (buf, " ");
+    pos += 1;
+    strcat (buf, id->name);
+    write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK, buf);
+    xfree (buf);
+}
+
+static void
+check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"),
+            keystr_from_pk(pk));
+  /* TRANSLATORS: This string is belongs to the previous one.  They are
+     only split up to allow printing of a common prefix. */
+  log_info(_("         algorithms on these user IDs:\n"));
+}
+
+static void
+check_prefs(KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  int problem=0;
+  
+  merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
+  pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+  for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
+    {
+      if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+	 && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created
+	 && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs)
+	{
+	  PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  prefitem_t *prefs=uid->prefs;
+	  char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
+
+	  for(;prefs->type;prefs++)
+	    {
+	      char num[10]; /* prefs->value is a byte, so we're over
+			       safe here */
+
+	      sprintf(num,"%u",prefs->value);
+
+	      if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_SYM)
+		{
+		  if(check_cipher_algo(prefs->value))
+		    {
+		      const char *algo=cipher_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
+		      if(!problem)
+			check_prefs_warning(pk);
+		      log_info(_("         \"%s\": preference for cipher"
+				 " algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
+		      problem=1;
+		    }
+		}
+	      else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
+		{
+		  if(check_digest_algo(prefs->value))
+		    {
+		      const char *algo=digest_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
+		      if(!problem)
+			check_prefs_warning(pk);
+		      log_info(_("         \"%s\": preference for digest"
+				 " algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
+		      problem=1;
+		    }
+		}
+	      else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
+		{
+		  if(check_compress_algo(prefs->value))
+		    {
+		      const char *algo=compress_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
+		      if(!problem)
+			check_prefs_warning(pk);
+		      log_info(_("         \"%s\": preference for compression"
+				 " algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
+		      problem=1;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  xfree(user);
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(problem)
+    {
+      log_info(_("it is strongly suggested that you update"
+		 " your preferences and\n"));
+      log_info(_("re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm"
+		 " mismatch problems\n"));
+
+      if(!opt.batch)
+	{
+	  STRLIST sl=NULL,locusr=NULL;
+	  size_t fprlen=0;
+	  byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],*p;
+	  char username[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+1];
+	  unsigned int i;
+
+	  p=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,fpr,&fprlen);
+	  for(i=0;i<fprlen;i++,p++)
+	    sprintf(username+2*i,"%02X",*p);
+	  add_to_strlist(&locusr,username);
+
+	  append_to_strlist(&sl,"updpref");
+	  append_to_strlist(&sl,"save");
+
+	  keyedit_menu( username, locusr, sl, 1, 1 );
+	  free_strlist(sl);
+	  free_strlist(locusr);
+	}
+      else if(!opt.quiet)
+	log_info(_("you can update your preferences with:"
+		   " gpg --edit-key %s updpref save\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Try to import one keyblock.	Return an error only in serious cases, but
+ * never for an invalid keyblock.  It uses log_error to increase the
+ * internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by programs
+ * which called g10.
+ */
+static int
+import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
+	    unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options,
+	    int from_sk )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
+    KBNODE node, uidnode;
+    KBNODE keyblock_orig = NULL;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int rc = 0;
+    int new_key = 0;
+    int mod_key = 0;
+    int non_self = 0;
+
+    /* get the key and print some info about it */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG();
+
+    pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+    uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
+
+    if( opt.verbose && !opt.interactive )
+      {
+	log_info( "pub  %4u%c/%s %s  ",
+		  nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		  pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+		  keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
+	if( uidnode )
+	  print_utf8_string( stderr, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			     uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+	putc('\n', stderr);
+      }
+
+    if( !uidnode )
+      {
+	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	return 0;
+      }
+    
+    if (opt.interactive) {
+        if(is_status_enabled())
+	  print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+	merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
+        tty_printf ("\n");
+        show_basic_key_info (keyblock);
+        tty_printf ("\n");
+        if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
+                                    "Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    collapse_uids(&keyblock);
+
+    /* Clean the key that we're about to import, to cut down on things
+       that we have to clean later.  This has no practical impact on
+       the end result, but does result in less logging which might
+       confuse the user. */
+    if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
+      clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
+
+    clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
+
+    if((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG) && fix_pks_corruption(keyblock)
+       && opt.verbose)
+      log_info(_("key %s: PKS subkey corruption repaired\n"),
+	       keystr_from_pk(pk));
+
+    rc = chk_self_sigs( fname, keyblock , pk, keyid, &non_self );
+    if( rc )
+	return rc== -1? 0:rc;
+
+    /* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
+    if( opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid )
+      for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 1) )
+	  {
+	    char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				      node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+	    node->flag |= 1;
+	    log_info( _("key %s: accepted non self-signed user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+		      keystr_from_pk(pk),user);
+	    xfree(user);
+	  }
+
+    if( !delete_inv_parts( fname, keyblock, keyid, options ) ) {
+        log_error( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	if( !opt.quiet )
+	  log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
+	stats->no_user_id++;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
+    pk_orig = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk_orig );
+    rc = get_pubkey_fast ( pk_orig, keyid );
+    if( rc && rc != G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && rc != G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY )
+      {
+	log_error( _("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
+		   keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+      }
+    else if ( rc && (opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
+      {
+	if( opt.verbose )
+	  log_info( _("key %s: new key - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
+	rc = 0;
+	stats->skipped_new_keys++;
+      }
+    else if( rc ) { /* insert this key */
+        KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (0);
+
+        rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+	    log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
+            keydb_release (hd);
+	    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	}
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    log_info (_("writing to `%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );
+
+	rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
+        if (rc)
+	   log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+		       keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc));
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* This should not be possible since we delete the
+	       ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
+	       the keyring and trustdb are out of sync.  It can also
+	       be made to happen with the trusted-key command. */
+
+	    clear_ownertrusts (pk);
+	    if(non_self)
+	      revalidation_mark ();
+	  }
+        keydb_release (hd);
+
+	/* we are ready */
+	if( !opt.quiet )
+	  {
+	    char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
+	    log_info( _("key %s: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
+		      keystr(keyid),p);
+	    xfree(p);
+	  }
+	if( is_status_enabled() )
+	  {
+	    char *us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
+	    xfree(us);
+            print_import_ok (pk,NULL, 1);
+	  }
+	stats->imported++;
+	if( is_RSA( pk->pubkey_algo ) )
+	    stats->imported_rsa++;
+	new_key = 1;
+    }
+    else { /* merge */
+        KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+	int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk, n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;
+
+	/* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
+	 * weird is going on */
+	if( cmp_public_keys( pk_orig, pk ) )
+	  {
+	    log_error( _("key %s: doesn't match our copy\n"),keystr(keyid));
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+
+	/* now read the original keyblock */
+        hd = keydb_new (0);
+        {
+            byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+            size_t an;
+
+            fingerprint_from_pk (pk_orig, afp, &an);
+            while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN) 
+                afp[an++] = 0;
+            rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
+        }
+	if( rc )
+	  {
+	    log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
+		       keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+            keydb_release (hd);
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+	rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock_orig );
+	if (rc)
+	  {
+	    log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
+		       keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+            keydb_release (hd);
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+
+	/* and try to merge the block */
+	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
+	clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
+	n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = n_sigs_cleaned = n_uids_cleaned = 0;
+	rc = merge_blocks( fname, keyblock_orig, keyblock,
+			   keyid, &n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
+	if( rc )
+	  {
+            keydb_release (hd);
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+
+	if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
+	  clean_key(keyblock_orig,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,
+		    &n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);
+
+	if( n_uids || n_sigs || n_subk || n_sigs_cleaned || n_uids_cleaned) {
+	    mod_key = 1;
+	    /* keyblock_orig has been updated; write */
+	    rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock_orig);
+            if (rc)
+		log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+			     keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    else if(non_self)
+	      revalidation_mark ();
+
+	    /* we are ready */
+	    if( !opt.quiet )
+	      {
+	        char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+		if( n_uids == 1 )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
+			   keystr(keyid),p);
+		else if( n_uids )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid),p,n_uids);
+		if( n_sigs == 1 )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid), p);
+		else if( n_sigs )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid), p, n_sigs );
+		if( n_subk == 1 )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid), p);
+		else if( n_subk )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid), p, n_subk );
+		if(n_sigs_cleaned==1)
+		  log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signature cleaned\n"),
+			   keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
+		else if(n_sigs_cleaned)
+		  log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signatures cleaned\n"),
+			   keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
+		if(n_uids_cleaned==1)
+		  log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user ID cleaned\n"),
+			   keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
+		else if(n_uids_cleaned)
+		  log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user IDs cleaned\n"),
+			   keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
+		xfree(p);
+	      }
+
+	    stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
+	    stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
+	    stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
+	    stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
+	    stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;
+
+            if (is_status_enabled ()) 
+                 print_import_ok (pk, NULL,
+                                  ((n_uids?2:0)|(n_sigs?4:0)|(n_subk?8:0)));
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+	    if (is_status_enabled ()) 
+	      print_import_ok (pk, NULL, 0);
+
+	    if( !opt.quiet )
+	      {
+		char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+		log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" not changed\n"),keystr(keyid),p);
+		xfree(p);
+	      }
+
+	    stats->unchanged++;
+	  }
+
+        keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
+    }
+
+  leave:
+
+    /* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb, we
+       need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
+       prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */
+
+    if(mod_key)
+      {
+	revocation_present(keyblock_orig);
+	if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
+	  check_prefs(keyblock_orig);
+      }
+    else if(new_key)
+      {
+	/* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
+	   when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
+	   fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
+	   asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
+	   name).  However, in cases where we're importing more than
+	   one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
+	   In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not fingerpring
+	   at all, and we must hope the user ID on the keys are
+	   useful. */
+	if(fpr)
+	  {
+	    xfree(*fpr);
+	    if(stats->imported==1)
+	      *fpr=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,NULL,fpr_len);
+	    else
+	      *fpr=NULL;
+	  }
+
+	revocation_present(keyblock);
+	if(!from_sk && seckey_available(keyid)==0)
+	  check_prefs(keyblock);
+      }
+
+    release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
+    free_public_key( pk_orig );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it. */
+static KBNODE
+sec_to_pub_keyblock(KBNODE sec_keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE secnode,pub_keyblock=NULL,ctx=NULL;
+
+  while((secnode=walk_kbnode(sec_keyblock,&ctx,0)))
+    {
+      KBNODE pubnode;
+
+      if(secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY ||
+	 secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+	{
+	  /* Make a public key.  We only need to convert enough to
+	     write the keyblock out. */
+
+	  PKT_secret_key *sk=secnode->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	  PACKET *pkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PACKET));
+	  PKT_public_key *pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
+	  int n;
+
+	  if(secnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+	    pkt->pkttype=PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	  else
+	    pkt->pkttype=PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+
+	  pkt->pkt.public_key=pk;
+
+	  pk->version=sk->version;
+	  pk->timestamp=sk->timestamp;
+	  pk->expiredate=sk->expiredate;
+	  pk->pubkey_algo=sk->pubkey_algo;
+
+	  n=pubkey_get_npkey(pk->pubkey_algo);
+	  if(n==0)
+	    {
+	      /* we can't properly extract the pubkey without knowing
+		 the number of MPIs */
+	      release_kbnode(pub_keyblock);
+	      return NULL;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      int i;
+
+	      for(i=0;i<n;i++)
+		pk->pkey[i]=mpi_copy(sk->skey[i]);
+	    }
+
+	  pubnode=new_kbnode(pkt);
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  pubnode=clone_kbnode(secnode);
+	}
+
+      if(pub_keyblock==NULL)
+	pub_keyblock=pubnode;
+      else
+	add_kbnode(pub_keyblock,pubnode);
+    }
+
+  return pub_keyblock;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Ditto for secret keys.  Handling is simpler than for public keys.
+ * We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
+ * that a secret key can not be imported accidently and thereby tampering
+ * with the trust calculation.
+ */
+static int
+import_secret_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, 
+                   struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options)
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    KBNODE node, uidnode;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    /* get the key and print some info about it */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG();
+
+    sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+    keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+    uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
+
+    if( opt.verbose )
+      {
+	log_info( "sec  %4u%c/%s %s   ",
+		  nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+		  pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+		  keystr_from_sk(sk), datestr_from_sk(sk) );
+	if( uidnode )
+	  print_utf8_string( stderr, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			     uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+	putc('\n', stderr);
+      }
+    stats->secret_read++;
+
+    if( !uidnode )
+      {
+	log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	return 0;
+      }
+
+    if(sk->protect.algo>110)
+      {
+	log_error(_("key %s: secret key with invalid cipher %d"
+		    " - skipped\n"),keystr_from_sk(sk),sk->protect.algo);
+	return 0;
+      }
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+    if (1)
+      {
+        /* We don't allow to import secret keys because that may be used
+           to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
+           be tricked into signing stuff with that key.  */
+        log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
+        return 0;
+      }
+#endif 
+    
+    clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
+
+    /* do we have this key already in one of our secrings ? */
+    rc = seckey_available( keyid );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY && !(opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
+      {
+	/* simply insert this key */
+        KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
+
+	/* get default resource */
+        rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
+	if (rc) {
+	  log_error (_("no default secret keyring: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
+	  keydb_release (hd);
+	  return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	}
+	rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
+        if (rc)
+	  log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+		     keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        keydb_release (hd);
+	/* we are ready */
+	if( !opt.quiet )
+	  log_info( _("key %s: secret key imported\n"), keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	stats->secret_imported++;
+        if (is_status_enabled ()) 
+	  print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 1|16);
+
+	if(options&IMPORT_SK2PK)
+	  {
+	    /* Try and make a public key out of this. */
+
+	    KBNODE pub_keyblock=sec_to_pub_keyblock(keyblock);
+	    if(pub_keyblock)
+	      {
+		import_one(fname,pub_keyblock,stats,
+			   NULL,NULL,opt.import_options,1);
+		release_kbnode(pub_keyblock);
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	/* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb,
+	   if we have the public part of this key, we need to check if
+	   the prefs are rational. */
+	node=get_pubkeyblock(keyid);
+	if(node)
+	  {
+	    check_prefs(node);
+	    release_kbnode(node);
+	  }
+      }
+    else if( !rc )
+      { /* we can't merge secret keys */
+	log_error( _("key %s: already in secret keyring\n"),
+		   keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	stats->secret_dups++;
+        if (is_status_enabled ()) 
+	  print_import_ok (NULL, sk, 16);
+
+	/* TODO: if we ever do merge secret keys, make sure to handle
+	   the sec_to_pub_keyblock feature as well. */
+      }
+    else
+      log_error( _("key %s: secret key not found: %s\n"),
+		 keystr_from_sk(sk), g10_errstr(rc));
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
+ */
+static int
+import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s *stats )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+    KBNODE onode, keyblock = NULL;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    assert( !node->next );
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
+    assert( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 );
+
+    keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
+    keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];
+
+    pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+    rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY )
+      {
+	log_error(_("key %s: no public key -"
+		    " can't apply revocation certificate\n"), keystr(keyid));
+	rc = 0;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+    else if( rc )
+      {
+	log_error(_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
+		  keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    /* read the original keyblock */
+    hd = keydb_new (0);
+    {
+        byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+        size_t an;
+        
+        fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
+        while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN) 
+            afp[an++] = 0;
+        rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
+    }
+    if (rc)
+      {
+	log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
+                   keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+    rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
+    if (rc)
+      {
+	log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
+                   keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    /* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
+     * check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 in this
+     * special case. */
+    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
+    if( rc )
+      {
+	log_error( _("key %s: invalid revocation certificate"
+		     ": %s - rejected\n"), keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    /* check whether we already have this */
+    for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+	if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    break;
+	else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && !cmp_signatures(node->pkt->pkt.signature,
+				    onode->pkt->pkt.signature))
+	  {
+	    rc = 0;
+	    goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
+	  }
+    }
+
+
+    /* insert it */
+    insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );
+
+    /* and write the keyblock back */
+    rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
+    if (rc)
+	log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                   keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
+    keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
+    /* we are ready */
+    if( !opt.quiet )
+      {
+        char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
+	log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
+		  keystr(keyid),p);
+	xfree(p);
+      }
+    stats->n_revoc++;
+
+    /* If the key we just revoked was ultimately trusted, remove its
+       ultimate trust.  This doesn't stop the user from putting the
+       ultimate trust back, but is a reasonable solution for now. */
+    if(get_ownertrust(pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+      clear_ownertrusts(pk);
+
+    revalidation_mark ();
+
+  leave:
+    keydb_release (hd);
+    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+    free_public_key( pk );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
+ * Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
+ * Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
+ * This works also for subkeys, here the subkey is marked.  Invalid or
+ * extra subkey sigs (binding or revocation) are marked for deletion.
+ * non_self is set to true if there are any sigs other than self-sigs
+ * in this keyblock.
+ */
+static int
+chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
+	       PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self )
+{
+    KBNODE n,knode=NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int rc;
+    u32 bsdate=0,rsdate=0;
+    KBNODE bsnode=NULL,rsnode=NULL;
+
+    for( n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode(n, 0)); ) {
+      if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+	{
+	  knode=n;
+	  bsdate=0;
+	  rsdate=0;
+	  bsnode=NULL;
+	  rsnode=NULL;
+	  continue;
+	}
+      else if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    continue;
+	sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) {
+
+	    /* This just caches the sigs for later use.  That way we
+	       import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
+	    if(!opt.no_sig_cache)
+	      check_key_signature(keyblock,n,NULL);
+
+	    if( IS_UID_SIG(sig) || IS_UID_REV(sig) )
+	      {
+		KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
+		if( !unode )
+		  {
+		    log_error( _("key %s: no user ID for signature\n"),
+			       keystr(keyid));
+		    return -1;	/* the complete keyblock is invalid */
+		  }
+
+		/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying */
+		if(!(unode->flag&1)) {
+		  rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
+		  if( rc )
+		    {
+		      if( opt.verbose )
+			{
+			  char *p=utf8_to_native(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				      strlen(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
+			  log_info( rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
+				    _("key %s: unsupported public key "
+				      "algorithm on user ID \"%s\"\n"):
+				    _("key %s: invalid self-signature "
+				      "on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+				    keystr(keyid),p);
+			  xfree(p);
+			}
+		    }
+		  else
+		    unode->flag |= 1; /* mark that signature checked */
+		}
+	      }
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) {
+	      /* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps
+		 like the rest of gpg.  If the standard gets
+		 revocation targets, this may need to be revised. */
+
+		if( !knode )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.verbose)
+		      log_info( _("key %s: no subkey for key binding\n"),
+				keystr(keyid));
+		    n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
+		    if( rc )
+		      {
+			if(opt.verbose)
+			  log_info(rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
+				   _("key %s: unsupported public key"
+				     " algorithm\n"):
+				   _("key %s: invalid subkey binding\n"),
+				   keystr(keyid));
+			n->flag|=4;
+		      }
+		    else
+		      {
+			/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
+			if(sig->timestamp>=bsdate) {
+			  knode->flag |= 1;  /* the subkey is valid */
+			  if(bsnode)
+			    {
+			      bsnode->flag|=4; /* Delete the last binding
+						  sig since this one is
+						  newer */
+			      if(opt.verbose)
+				log_info(_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
+					   " binding\n"),keystr(keyid));
+			    }
+
+			  bsnode=n;
+			  bsdate=sig->timestamp;
+			}
+			else
+			  n->flag|=4; /* older */
+		      }
+		  }
+	    }
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) {
+	      /* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right
+                 now, so just check that the revocation sig is the
+                 most recent valid one.  Note that we don't care if
+                 the binding sig is newer than the revocation sig.
+                 See the comment in getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for
+                 more */
+		if( !knode )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.verbose)
+		      log_info( _("key %s: no subkey for key revocation\n"),
+				keystr(keyid));
+		    n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, n, NULL);
+		    if( rc )
+		      {
+			if(opt.verbose)
+			  log_info(rc == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
+				   _("key %s: unsupported public"
+				     " key algorithm\n"):
+				   _("key %s: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
+				   keystr(keyid));
+			n->flag|=4;
+		      }
+		    else
+		      {
+			/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
+			if(sig->timestamp>=rsdate)
+			  {
+			    if(rsnode)
+			      {
+				rsnode->flag|=4; /* Delete the last revocation
+						    sig since this one is
+						    newer */
+				if(opt.verbose)
+				  log_info(_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
+					     " revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
+			      }
+
+			    rsnode=n;
+			    rsdate=sig->timestamp;
+			  }
+			else
+			  n->flag|=4; /* older */
+		      }
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	  *non_self=1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
+ * public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
+ * but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
+ * about it.
+ * returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
+ */
+static int
+delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
+		  u32 *keyid, unsigned int options)
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;
+
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    uid_seen = 1;
+	    if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
+		if( opt.verbose )
+		  {
+		    char *p=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+					   node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+		    log_info( _("key %s: skipped user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+			      keystr(keyid),p);
+		    xfree(p);
+		  }
+		delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
+		/* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
+		while( node->next
+		       && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
+		       && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		       && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
+		    delete_kbnode( node->next );
+		    node = node->next;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+		nvalid++;
+	}
+	else if(    node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
+		if( opt.verbose )
+		  log_info( _("key %s: skipped subkey\n"),keystr(keyid));
+
+		delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
+		/* and all following signature packets */
+		while( node->next
+		       && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+		    delete_kbnode( node->next );
+		    node = node->next;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	      subkey_seen = 1;
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && check_pubkey_algo( node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
+		 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+	    delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+		 !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable &&
+		 !(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS) &&
+		 seckey_available( node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) )
+	  {
+	    /* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
+	     * to import non-exportable signature when we have the
+	     * the secret key used to create this signature - it
+	     * seems that this makes sense */
+	    if(opt.verbose)
+	      log_info( _("key %s: non exportable signature"
+			  " (class 0x%02X) - skipped\n"),
+			keystr(keyid), node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
+	    delete_kbnode( node );
+	  }
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )  {
+	    if( uid_seen )
+	      {
+	        if(opt.verbose)
+		  log_info( _("key %s: revocation certificate"
+			      " at wrong place - skipped\n"),keystr(keyid));
+		delete_kbnode( node );
+	      }
+	    else {
+	      /* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
+                 the one we're working on don't check it - it's
+                 probably from a revocation key and won't be
+                 verifiable with this key anyway. */
+
+	      if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
+		 node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
+		{
+		  int rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
+		  if( rc )
+		    {
+		      if(opt.verbose)
+			log_info( _("key %s: invalid revocation"
+				    " certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
+				  keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
+		      delete_kbnode( node );
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+		 (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18 ||
+		  node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28) &&
+		 !subkey_seen )
+	  {
+	    if(opt.verbose)
+	      log_info( _("key %s: subkey signature"
+			  " in wrong place - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
+	    delete_kbnode( node );
+	  }
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && !IS_CERT(node->pkt->pkt.signature))
+	  {
+	    if(opt.verbose)
+	      log_info(_("key %s: unexpected signature class (0x%02X) -"
+			 " skipped\n"),keystr(keyid),
+		       node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class);
+	    delete_kbnode(node);
+	  }
+	else if( (node->flag & 4) ) /* marked for deletion */
+	  delete_kbnode( node );
+    }
+
+    /* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
+     * for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
+    commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
+    return nvalid;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
+ * We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
+ * sigs into one.
+ * Returns: True if the keyblock hash changed.
+ */
+int
+collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE n, n2;
+    int in_uid;
+    int any=0;
+
+  restart:
+    for( n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+	    continue;
+	for( n2 = n->next; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
+	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		&& !cmp_user_ids( n->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+				  n2->pkt->pkt.user_id ) ) {
+		/* found a duplicate */
+		any = 1;
+		if( !n2->next
+		    || n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		    || n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		    || n2->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY  ) {
+		    /* no more signatures: delete the user ID
+		     * and start over */
+		    remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
+		}
+		else {
+		    /* The simple approach: Move one signature and
+		     * then start over to delete the next one :-( */
+		    move_kbnode( keyblock, n2->next, n->next );
+		}
+		goto restart;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if( !any )
+	return 0;
+
+  restart_sig:
+    /* now we may have duplicate signatures on one user ID: fix this */
+    for( in_uid = 0, n = *keyblock; n; n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    in_uid = 1;
+	else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+	    in_uid = 0;
+	else if( in_uid ) {
+	    n2 = n;
+	    do {
+		KBNODE ncmp = NULL;
+		for( ; n2; n2 = n2->next ) {
+		    if(    n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+			|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+			|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+			break;
+		    if( n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+			;
+		    else if( !ncmp )
+			ncmp = n2;
+		    else if( !cmp_signatures( ncmp->pkt->pkt.signature,
+						n2->pkt->pkt.signature )) {
+			remove_kbnode( keyblock, n2 );
+			goto restart_sig;
+		    }
+		}
+		n2 = ncmp? ncmp->next : NULL;
+	    } while( n2 );
+	}
+    }
+
+    if(!opt.quiet)
+      {
+	const char *key="???";
+
+	if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )) )
+	  key=keystr_from_pk(n->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+	else if( (n = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY )) )
+	  key=keystr_from_sk(n->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+	log_info(_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"),key);
+      }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
+   present.  This may be called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so
+   you can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
+static void
+revocation_present(KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE onode,inode;
+  PKT_public_key *pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+  for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
+    {
+      /* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
+      if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
+	break;
+
+      if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+	 onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x1F &&
+	 onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
+	{
+	  int idx;
+	  PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+	  for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
+	    {
+	      u32 keyid[2];
+
+	      keyid_from_fingerprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
+				     MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
+
+	      for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
+		{
+		  /* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
+		  if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
+		    break;
+
+		  if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+		     inode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x20 &&
+		     inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
+		     inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
+		    {
+		      /* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
+                         revocation issued by it.  Do we have the key
+                         itself? */
+		      int rc;
+
+		      rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
+                                                   MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+		      if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
+			{
+			  char *tempkeystr=xstrdup(keystr_from_pk(pk));
+
+			  /* No, so try and get it */
+			  if(opt.keyserver
+			     && (opt.keyserver_options.options
+				 & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
+			    {
+			      log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
+					 " fetching revocation key %s\n"),
+				       tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
+			      keyserver_import_fprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
+						      MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,
+						      opt.keyserver);
+
+			      /* Do we have it now? */
+			      rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,
+						     sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
+						     MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+			    }
+
+			  if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
+			    log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
+				       " revocation key %s not present.\n"),
+				     tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
+
+			  xfree(tempkeystr);
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * compare and merge the blocks
+ *
+ * o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
+ *   that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
+ * o Simply add the signature.	Can't verify here because we may not have
+ *   the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
+ *   into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
+ *   is used.
+ * Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
+ */
+static int
+merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
+	      u32 *keyid, int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk )
+{
+    KBNODE onode, node;
+    int rc, found;
+
+    /* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    break;
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )  {
+	    /* check whether we already have this */
+	    found = 0;
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+		    break;
+		else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+			 && onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
+			 && !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
+					    node->pkt->pkt.signature))
+		  {
+		    found = 1;
+		    break;
+		  }
+	    }
+	    if( !found ) {
+		KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
+		insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
+		n2->flag |= 1;
+                ++*n_sigs;
+		if(!opt.quiet)
+		  {
+		    char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
+		    log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" revocation"
+			       " certificate added\n"), keystr(keyid),p);
+		    xfree(p);
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    break;
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F )  {
+	    /* check whether we already have this */
+	    found = 0;
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+		    break;
+		else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+			 && onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F
+			 && !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
+					    node->pkt->pkt.signature)) {
+		    found = 1;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    if( !found )
+	      {
+		KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
+		insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
+		n2->flag |= 1;
+                ++*n_sigs;
+		if(!opt.quiet)
+		  log_info( _("key %s: direct key signature added\n"),
+			    keystr(keyid));
+	      }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
+    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+	if( !(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
+	    /* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
+	    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		    && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+					  node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( node ) { /* found: merge */
+		rc = merge_sigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* 4th: add new user-ids */
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
+	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock */
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		    && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+				      node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
+		rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		++*n_uids;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* 5th: add new subkeys */
+    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+	onode = NULL;
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+					 node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
+		rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		++*n_subk;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
+	    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
+		if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
+					 node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
+		rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		++*n_subk;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
+    for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
+	if( !(onode->flag & 1)
+	    &&	(   onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 || onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
+	    /* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
+	    for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+					  node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
+		    break;
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+		    && !cmp_secret_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.secret_key,
+					  node->pkt->pkt.secret_key ) )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( node ) { /* found: merge */
+		rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
+ */
+static int
+append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+					  const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n, n_where=NULL;
+
+    assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
+
+    /* find the position */
+    for( n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+	    break;
+    }
+    if( !n )
+	n_where = NULL;
+
+    /* and append/insert */
+    while( node ) {
+	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	 * one is released first */
+	n = clone_kbnode(node);
+	if( n_where ) {
+	    insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
+	    n_where = n;
+	}
+	else
+	    add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
+	n->flag |= 1;
+	node->flag |= 1;
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+
+	node = node->next;
+	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
+ * (how should we handle comment packets here?)
+ */
+static int
+merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+				    const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n, n2;
+    int found=0;
+
+    assert(dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
+    assert(src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
+
+    for(n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    continue;
+	if( n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
+	    || n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 )
+	    continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */
+	found = 0;
+	for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
+	  if(!cmp_signatures(n->pkt->pkt.signature,n2->pkt->pkt.signature))
+	    {
+	      found++;
+	      break;
+	    }
+	if( !found ) {
+	    /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
+	     * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	     * one is released first */
+	    n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
+	    insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
+	    n2->flag |= 1;
+	    n->flag |= 1;
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
+ */
+static int
+merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
+				    const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n, n2;
+    int found=0;
+
+    assert(   dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	   || dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+
+    for(n=src->next; n ; n = n->next ) {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	    break;
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    continue;
+	found = 0;
+	for(n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next){
+	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		break;
+	    if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		   <= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
+		&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
+		   == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
+		found++;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !found ) {
+	    /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
+	     * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	     * one is released first */
+	    n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
+	    insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
+	    n2->flag |= 1;
+	    n->flag |= 1;
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
+ * Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
+ */
+static int
+append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
+					  const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	   || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+
+    while(  node ) {
+	/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
+	 * one is released first */
+	n = clone_kbnode(node);
+	add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
+	n->flag |= 1;
+	node->flag |= 1;
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    ++*n_sigs;
+
+	node = node->next;
+	if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Walk a public keyblock and produce a secret keyblock out of it.
+   Instead of inserting the secret key parameters (which we don't
+   have), we insert a stub.  */
+static KBNODE
+pub_to_sec_keyblock (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE pubnode, secnode;
+  KBNODE sec_keyblock = NULL;
+  KBNODE walkctx = NULL;
+
+  while((pubnode = walk_kbnode (pub_keyblock,&walkctx,0)))
+    {
+      if (pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+          || pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+	{
+	  /* Make a secret key.  We only need to convert enough to
+	     write the keyblock out. */
+	  PKT_public_key *pk = pubnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	  PACKET *pkt = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pkt);
+	  PKT_secret_key *sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sk);
+          int i, n;
+          
+          if (pubnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+	    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+	  else
+	    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+          
+	  pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+
+          copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
+	  sk->version     = pk->version;
+	  sk->timestamp   = pk->timestamp;
+        
+          n = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo);
+          if (!n)
+            n = 1; /* Unknown number of parameters, however the data
+                      is stored in the first mpi. */
+          for (i=0; i < n; i++ )
+            sk->skey[i] = mpi_copy (pk->pkey[i]);
+  
+          sk->is_protected = 1;
+          sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;
+  
+  	  secnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
+        }
+      else
+	{
+	  secnode = clone_kbnode (pubnode);
+	}
+      
+      if(!sec_keyblock)
+	sec_keyblock = secnode;
+      else
+	add_kbnode (sec_keyblock, secnode);
+    }
+
+  return sec_keyblock;
+}
+
+
+/* Walk over the secret keyring SEC_KEYBLOCK and update any simple
+   stub keys with the serial number SNNUM of the card if one of the
+   fingerprints FPR1, FPR2 or FPR3 match.  Print a note if the key is
+   a duplicate (may happen in case of backed uped keys). 
+   
+   Returns: True if anything changed.
+*/
+static int
+update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (KBNODE sec_keyblock, 
+                                   const unsigned char *fpr1,
+                                   const unsigned char *fpr2,
+                                   const unsigned char *fpr3,
+                                   const char *serialnostr)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  KBNODE walkctx = NULL;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  size_t n;
+  int result = 0;
+  const char *s;
+
+  while((node = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &walkctx, 0)))
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
+          && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+        continue;
+      sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+      
+      fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
+      if (n != 20)
+        continue; /* Can't be a card key.  */
+      if ( !((fpr1 && !memcmp (array, fpr1, 20))
+             || (fpr2 && !memcmp (array, fpr2, 20))
+             || (fpr3 && !memcmp (array, fpr3, 20))) )
+        continue;  /* No match.  */
+
+      if (sk->is_protected == 1 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
+        {
+          /* Standard case: migrate that stub to a key stub.  */
+          sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
+          s = serialnostr;
+          for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
+               sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
+            sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
+          result = 1;
+        }
+      else if (sk->is_protected == 1 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+        {
+          s = serialnostr;
+          for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
+               sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
+            if (sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] != xtoi_2 (s))
+              {
+                log_info (_("NOTE: a key's S/N does not "
+                            "match the card's one\n"));
+                break;
+              }
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+            log_info (_("NOTE: primary key is online and stored on card\n"));
+          else
+            log_info (_("NOTE: secondary key is online and stored on card\n"));
+        }
+    }
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Check whether a secret key stub exists for the public key PK.  If
+   not create such a stub key and store it into the secring.  If it
+   exists, add appropriate subkey stubs and update the secring.
+   Return 0 if the key could be created. */
+int
+auto_create_card_key_stub ( const char *serialnostr, 
+                            const unsigned char *fpr1,
+                            const unsigned char *fpr2,
+                            const unsigned char *fpr3)
+{
+  KBNODE pub_keyblock;
+  KBNODE sec_keyblock;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  int rc;
+
+  /* We only want to do this for an OpenPGP card.  */
+  if (!serialnostr || strncmp (serialnostr, "D27600012401", 12) 
+      || strlen (serialnostr) != 32 )
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  /* First get the public keyring from any of the provided fingerprints. */
+  if ( (fpr1 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr1, 20))
+       || (fpr2 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr2, 20))
+       || (fpr3 && !get_keyblock_byfprint (&pub_keyblock, fpr3, 20)))
+    ;
+  else
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+ 
+  hd = keydb_new (1);
+
+  /* Now check whether there is a secret keyring.  */
+  {
+    PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+    size_t an;
+
+    fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
+    memset (afp, 0, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+    rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
+  }
+
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &sec_keyblock);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+          rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          merge_keys_and_selfsig (sec_keyblock);
+          
+          /* FIXME: We need to add new subkeys first.  */
+          if (update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (sec_keyblock,
+                                                 fpr1, fpr2, fpr3,
+                                                 serialnostr))
+            {
+              rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, sec_keyblock );
+              if (rc)
+                log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                           keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  else  /* A secret key does not exists - create it.  */
+    {
+      sec_keyblock = pub_to_sec_keyblock (pub_keyblock);
+      update_sec_keyblock_with_cardinfo (sec_keyblock,
+                                         fpr1, fpr2, fpr3,
+                                         serialnostr);
+
+      rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("no default secret keyring: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
+          rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, sec_keyblock );
+          if (rc)
+            log_error (_("error writing keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                       keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        }
+    }
+    
+  release_kbnode (sec_keyblock);
+  release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
+  keydb_release (hd);
+  return rc;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/iso7816.c b/g10/iso7816.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35d0aa9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/iso7816.c
@@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
+/* iso7816.c - ISO 7816 commands
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: iso7816.c 3886 2005-09-07 17:05:42Z wk $
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER)
+#include GNUPG_SCD_MAIN_HEADER
+#elif GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+/* This is used with GnuPG version < 1.9.  The code has been source
+   copied from the current GnuPG >= 1.9  and is maintained over
+   there. */
+#include "options.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#else /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+#include "scdaemon.h"
+#endif /* GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION != 1 */
+
+#include "iso7816.h"
+#include "apdu.h"
+
+
+#define CMD_SELECT_FILE 0xA4
+#define CMD_VERIFY      0x20
+#define CMD_CHANGE_REFERENCE_DATA 0x24
+#define CMD_RESET_RETRY_COUNTER   0x2C
+#define CMD_GET_DATA    0xCA
+#define CMD_PUT_DATA    0xDA
+#define CMD_MSE         0x22
+#define CMD_PSO         0x2A
+#define CMD_INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE 0x88
+#define CMD_GENERATE_KEYPAIR      0x47
+#define CMD_GET_CHALLENGE         0x84
+#define CMD_READ_BINARY 0xB0
+#define CMD_READ_RECORD 0xB2
+
+static gpg_error_t
+map_sw (int sw)
+{
+  gpg_err_code_t ec;
+
+  switch (sw)
+    {
+    case SW_EEPROM_FAILURE: ec = GPG_ERR_HARDWARE; break;
+    case SW_WRONG_LENGTH:   ec = GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE; break;
+    case SW_CHV_WRONG:      ec = GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN; break;
+    case SW_CHV_BLOCKED:    ec = GPG_ERR_PIN_BLOCKED; break;
+    case SW_USE_CONDITIONS: ec = GPG_ERR_USE_CONDITIONS; break;
+    case SW_NOT_SUPPORTED:  ec = GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break;
+    case SW_BAD_PARAMETER:  ec = GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE; break;
+    case SW_FILE_NOT_FOUND: ec = GPG_ERR_ENOENT; break;
+    case SW_RECORD_NOT_FOUND:ec= GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND; break;
+    case SW_REF_NOT_FOUND:  ec = GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ; break;
+    case SW_BAD_P0_P1:      ec = GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE; break;
+    case SW_EXACT_LENGTH:   ec = GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE; break;
+    case SW_INS_NOT_SUP:    ec = GPG_ERR_CARD; break;
+    case SW_CLA_NOT_SUP:    ec = GPG_ERR_CARD; break;
+    case SW_SUCCESS:        ec = 0; break;
+
+    case SW_HOST_OUT_OF_CORE: ec = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM; break;
+    case SW_HOST_INV_VALUE:   ec = GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE; break;
+    case SW_HOST_INCOMPLETE_CARD_RESPONSE: ec = GPG_ERR_CARD; break;
+    case SW_HOST_NOT_SUPPORTED: ec = GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; break;
+    case SW_HOST_LOCKING_FAILED: ec = GPG_ERR_BUG; break;
+    case SW_HOST_BUSY:           ec = GPG_ERR_EBUSY; break;
+    case SW_HOST_NO_CARD:        ec = GPG_ERR_CARD_NOT_PRESENT; break;
+    case SW_HOST_CARD_INACTIVE:  ec = GPG_ERR_CARD_RESET; break;
+    case SW_HOST_CARD_IO_ERROR:  ec = GPG_ERR_EIO; break;
+    case SW_HOST_GENERAL_ERROR:  ec = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; break;
+    case SW_HOST_NO_READER:      ec = GPG_ERR_ENODEV; break;
+    case SW_HOST_ABORTED:        ec = GPG_ERR_CANCELED; break;
+
+    default:
+      if ((sw & 0x010000))
+        ec = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Should not happen. */
+      else if ((sw & 0xff00) == SW_MORE_DATA)
+        ec = 0; /* This should actually never been seen here. */
+      else
+        ec = GPG_ERR_CARD;
+    }
+  return gpg_error (ec);
+}
+
+/* Map a status word from the APDU layer to a gpg-error code.  */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_map_sw (int sw)
+{
+  /* All APDU functions should return 0x9000 on success but for
+     historical reasons of the implementation some return 0 to
+     indicate success.  We allow for that here. */
+  return sw? map_sw (sw) : 0;
+}
+
+
+/* This function is specialized version of the SELECT FILE command.
+   SLOT is the card and reader as created for example by
+   apdu_open_reader (), AID is a buffer of size AIDLEN holding the
+   requested application ID.  The function can't be used to enumerate
+   AIDs and won't return the AID on success.  The return value is 0
+   for okay or a GPG error code.  Note that ISO error codes are
+   internally mapped. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_select_application (int slot, const char *aid, size_t aidlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_SELECT_FILE, 4, 0, aidlen, aid);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_select_file (int slot, int tag, int is_dir,
+                     unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw, p0, p1;
+  unsigned char tagbuf[2];
+
+  tagbuf[0] = (tag >> 8) & 0xff;
+  tagbuf[1] = tag & 0xff;
+
+  if (result || resultlen)
+    {
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      p0 = (tag == 0x3F00)? 0: is_dir? 1:2;
+      p1 = 0x0c; /* No FC return. */
+      sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_SELECT_FILE,
+                             p0, p1, 2, (char*)tagbuf );
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Do a select file command with a direct path. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_select_path (int slot, const unsigned short *path, size_t pathlen,
+                     unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw, p0, p1;
+  unsigned char buffer[100];
+  int buflen;
+  
+  if (result || resultlen)
+    {
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    }
+  
+  if (pathlen/2 >= sizeof buffer)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+  
+  for (buflen = 0; pathlen; pathlen--, path++)
+    {
+      buffer[buflen++] = (*path >> 8);
+      buffer[buflen++] = *path;
+    }
+
+  p0 = 0x08;
+  p1 = 0x0c; /* No FC return. */
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_SELECT_FILE,
+                         p0, p1, buflen, (char*)buffer );
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+
+/* This is a private command currently only working for TCOS cards. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_list_directory (int slot, int list_dirs,
+                        unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x80, 0xAA, list_dirs? 1:2, 0, -1, NULL,
+                  result, resultlen);
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+    }
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+
+
+/* Perform a VERIFY command on SLOT using the card holder verification
+   vector CHVNO with a CHV of lenght CHVLEN.  Returns 0 on success. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_verify (int slot, int chvno, const char *chv, size_t chvlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_VERIFY, 0, chvno, chvlen, chv);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+/* Perform a CHANGE_REFERENCE_DATA command on SLOT for the card holder
+   verification vector CHVNO.  If the OLDCHV is NULL (and OLDCHVLEN
+   0), a "change reference data" is done, otherwise an "exchange
+   reference data".  The new reference data is expected in NEWCHV of
+   length NEWCHVLEN.  */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_change_reference_data (int slot, int chvno,
+                               const char *oldchv, size_t oldchvlen,
+                               const char *newchv, size_t newchvlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+  char *buf;
+
+  if ((!oldchv && oldchvlen)
+      || (oldchv && !oldchvlen)
+      || !newchv || !newchvlen )
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  buf = xtrymalloc (oldchvlen + newchvlen);
+  if (!buf)
+    return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+  if (oldchvlen)
+    memcpy (buf, oldchv, oldchvlen);
+  memcpy (buf+oldchvlen, newchv, newchvlen);
+
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_CHANGE_REFERENCE_DATA,
+                         oldchvlen? 0 : 1, chvno, oldchvlen+newchvlen, buf);
+  xfree (buf);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+
+}
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_reset_retry_counter (int slot, int chvno,
+                             const char *newchv, size_t newchvlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!newchv || !newchvlen )
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_RESET_RETRY_COUNTER,
+                         2, chvno, newchvlen, newchv);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+
+/* Perform a GET DATA command requesting TAG and storing the result in
+   a newly allocated buffer at the address passed by RESULT.  Return
+   the length of this data at the address of RESULTLEN. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_get_data (int slot, int tag,
+                  unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_GET_DATA,
+                  ((tag >> 8) & 0xff), (tag & 0xff), -1, NULL,
+                  result, resultlen);
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Perform a PUT DATA command on card in SLOT.  Write DATA of length
+   DATALEN to TAG. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_put_data (int slot, int tag,
+                  const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_PUT_DATA,
+                         ((tag >> 8) & 0xff), (tag & 0xff),
+                         datalen, (const char*)data);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+/* Manage Security Environment.  This is a weird operation and there
+   is no easy abstraction for it.  Furthermore, some card seem to have
+   a different interpreation of 7816-8 and thus we resort to let the
+   caller decide what to do. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_manage_security_env (int slot, int p1, int p2,
+                             const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (p1 < 0 || p1 > 255 || p2 < 0 || p2 > 255 )
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  sw = apdu_send_simple (slot, 0x00, CMD_MSE, p1, p2, 
+                         data? datalen : -1, (const char*)data);
+  return map_sw (sw);
+}
+
+
+/* Perform the security operation COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGANTURE.  On
+   success 0 is returned and the data is availavle in a newly
+   allocated buffer stored at RESULT with its length stored at
+   RESULTLEN. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_compute_ds (int slot, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                    unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!data || !datalen || !result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_PSO, 0x9E, 0x9A, datalen, (const char*)data,
+                  result, resultlen);
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Perform the security operation DECIPHER.  PADIND is the padding
+   indicator to be used.  It should be 0 if no padding is required, a
+   value of -1 suppresses the padding byte.  On success 0 is returned
+   and the plaintext is available in a newly allocated buffer stored
+   at RESULT with its length stored at RESULTLEN. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_decipher (int slot, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                  int padind, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned char *buf;
+
+  if (!data || !datalen || !result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  if (padind >= 0)
+    {
+      /* We need to prepend the padding indicator. */
+      buf = xtrymalloc (datalen + 1);
+      if (!buf)
+        return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+
+      *buf = padind; /* Padding indicator. */
+      memcpy (buf+1, data, datalen);
+      sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_PSO, 0x80, 0x86,
+                      datalen+1, (char*)buf,
+                      result, resultlen);
+      xfree (buf);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_PSO, 0x80, 0x86,
+                      datalen, (const char *)data,
+                      result, resultlen);
+    }
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_internal_authenticate (int slot,
+                               const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                               unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!data || !datalen || !result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE, 0, 0,
+                  datalen, (const char*)data,  result, resultlen);
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_error_t
+do_generate_keypair (int slot, int readonly,
+                  const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                  unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+
+  if (!data || !datalen || !result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  sw = apdu_send (slot, 0x00, CMD_GENERATE_KEYPAIR, readonly? 0x81:0x80, 0,
+                  datalen, (const char*)data,  result, resultlen);
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_generate_keypair (int slot,
+                          const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                          unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  return do_generate_keypair (slot, 0, data, datalen, result, resultlen);
+}
+
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_read_public_key (int slot,
+                          const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                          unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  return do_generate_keypair (slot, 1, data, datalen, result, resultlen);
+}
+
+
+
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_get_challenge (int slot, int length, unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned char *result;
+  size_t resultlen, n;
+
+  if (!buffer || length < 1)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  do
+    {
+      result = NULL;
+      n = length > 254? 254 : length;
+      sw = apdu_send_le (slot, 0x00, CMD_GET_CHALLENGE, 0, 0, -1, NULL,
+                         n,
+                         &result, &resultlen);
+      if (sw != SW_SUCCESS)
+        {
+          /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+          xfree (result);
+          return map_sw (sw);
+        }
+      if (resultlen > n)
+        resultlen = n;
+      memcpy (buffer, result, resultlen);
+      buffer += resultlen;
+      length -= resultlen;
+      xfree (result);
+    }
+  while (length > 0);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Perform a READ BINARY command requesting a maximum of NMAX bytes
+   from OFFSET.  With NMAX = 0 the entire file is read. The result is
+   stored in a newly allocated buffer at the address passed by RESULT.
+   Returns the length of this data at the address of RESULTLEN. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_read_binary (int slot, size_t offset, size_t nmax,
+                     unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t bufferlen;
+  int read_all = !nmax;
+  size_t n;
+
+  if (!result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  /* We can only encode 15 bits in p0,p1 to indicate an offset. Thus
+     we check for this limit. */
+  if (offset > 32767)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  do
+    {
+      buffer = NULL;
+      bufferlen = 0;
+      /* Note, that we to set N to 254 due to problems either with the
+         ccid driver or some TCOS cards.  It actually should be 0
+         which is the official ISO value to read a variable length
+         object. */
+      if (read_all || nmax > 254)
+        n = 254;
+      else
+        n = nmax;
+      sw = apdu_send_le (slot, 0x00, CMD_READ_BINARY,
+                         ((offset>>8) & 0xff), (offset & 0xff) , -1, NULL,
+                         n, &buffer, &bufferlen);
+      if ( SW_EXACT_LENGTH_P(sw) )
+        {
+          n = (sw & 0x00ff);
+          sw = apdu_send_le (slot, 0x00, CMD_READ_BINARY,
+                             ((offset>>8) & 0xff), (offset & 0xff) , -1, NULL,
+                             n, &buffer, &bufferlen);
+        }
+
+      if (*result && sw == SW_BAD_P0_P1)
+        {
+          /* Bad Parameter means that the offset is outside of the
+             EF. When reading all data we take this as an indication
+             for EOF.  */
+          break;
+        }
+
+      if (sw != SW_SUCCESS && sw != SW_EOF_REACHED)
+        {
+          /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+          xfree (buffer);
+          xfree (*result);
+          *result = NULL;
+          *resultlen = 0;
+          return map_sw (sw);
+        }
+      if (*result) /* Need to extend the buffer. */
+        {
+          unsigned char *p = xtryrealloc (*result, *resultlen + bufferlen);
+          if (!p)
+            {
+              gpg_error_t err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+              xfree (buffer);
+              xfree (*result);
+              *result = NULL;
+              *resultlen = 0;
+              return err;
+            }
+          *result = p;
+          memcpy (*result + *resultlen, buffer, bufferlen);
+          *resultlen += bufferlen;
+          xfree (buffer);
+          buffer = NULL;
+        }
+      else /* Transfer the buffer into our result. */
+        {
+          *result = buffer;
+          *resultlen = bufferlen;
+        }
+      offset += bufferlen;
+      if (offset > 32767)
+        break; /* We simply truncate the result for too large
+                  files. */
+      if (nmax > bufferlen)
+        nmax -= bufferlen;
+      else
+        nmax = 0;
+    }
+  while ((read_all && sw != SW_EOF_REACHED) || (!read_all && nmax));
+  
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Perform a READ RECORD command. RECNO gives the record number to
+   read with 0 indicating the current record.  RECCOUNT must be 1 (not
+   all cards support reading of more than one record).  SHORT_EF
+   should be 0 to read the current EF or contain a short EF. The
+   result is stored in a newly allocated buffer at the address passed
+   by RESULT.  Returns the length of this data at the address of
+   RESULTLEN. */
+gpg_error_t
+iso7816_read_record (int slot, int recno, int reccount, int short_ef,
+                     unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
+{
+  int sw;
+  unsigned char *buffer;
+  size_t bufferlen;
+
+  if (!result || !resultlen)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+  *result = NULL;
+  *resultlen = 0;
+
+  /* We can only encode 15 bits in p0,p1 to indicate an offset. Thus
+     we check for this limit. */
+  if (recno < 0 || recno > 255 || reccount != 1
+      || short_ef < 0 || short_ef > 254 )
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+  buffer = NULL;
+  bufferlen = 0;
+  /* Fixme: Either the ccid driver or the TCOS cards have problems
+     with an Le of 0. */
+  sw = apdu_send_le (slot, 0x00, CMD_READ_RECORD,
+                     recno, 
+                     short_ef? short_ef : 0x04,
+                     -1, NULL,
+                     254, &buffer, &bufferlen);
+
+  if (sw != SW_SUCCESS && sw != SW_EOF_REACHED)
+    {
+      /* Make sure that pending buffers are released. */
+      xfree (buffer);
+      xfree (*result);
+      *result = NULL;
+      *resultlen = 0;
+      return map_sw (sw);
+    }
+  *result = buffer;
+  *resultlen = bufferlen;
+  
+  return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/iso7816.h b/g10/iso7816.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2e742a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/iso7816.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/* iso7816.h - ISO 7816 commands
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ *
+ * $Id: iso7816.h 3886 2005-09-07 17:05:42Z wk $
+ */
+
+#ifndef ISO7816_H
+#define ISO7816_H
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#endif
+
+gpg_error_t iso7816_map_sw (int sw);
+
+gpg_error_t iso7816_select_application (int slot,
+                                        const char *aid, size_t aidlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_select_file (int slot, int tag, int is_dir,
+                                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_select_path (int slot,
+                                 const unsigned short *path, size_t pathlen,
+                                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_list_directory (int slot, int list_dirs,
+                                    unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_verify (int slot,
+                            int chvno, const char *chv, size_t chvlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_change_reference_data (int slot, int chvno,
+                               const char *oldchv, size_t oldchvlen,
+                               const char *newchv, size_t newchvlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_reset_retry_counter (int slot, int chvno,
+                                         const char *newchv, size_t newchvlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_get_data (int slot, int tag,
+                              unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_put_data (int slot, int tag,
+                              const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_manage_security_env (int slot, int p1, int p2,
+                                         const unsigned char *data,
+                                         size_t datalen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_compute_ds (int slot,
+                                const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_decipher (int slot,
+                              const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                              int padind,
+                              unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_internal_authenticate (int slot,
+                                   const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                   unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_generate_keypair (int slot,
+                                   const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                   unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_read_public_key (int slot,
+                                   const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                                   unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_get_challenge (int slot,
+                                   int length, unsigned char *buffer);
+
+gpg_error_t iso7816_read_binary (int slot, size_t offset, size_t nmax,
+                                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+gpg_error_t iso7816_read_record (int slot, int recno, int reccount,
+                                 int short_ef,
+                                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen);
+
+#endif /*ISO7816_H*/
diff --git a/g10/kbnode.c b/g10/kbnode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9038f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/kbnode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/* kbnode.c -  keyblock node utility functions
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+
+#define USE_UNUSED_NODES 1
+
+static KBNODE unused_nodes;
+
+static KBNODE
+alloc_node(void)
+{
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    n = unused_nodes;
+    if( n )
+	unused_nodes = n->next;
+    else
+	n = xmalloc( sizeof *n );
+    n->next = NULL;
+    n->pkt = NULL;
+    n->flag = 0;
+    n->private_flag=0;
+    n->recno = 0;
+    return n;
+}
+
+static void
+free_node( KBNODE n )
+{
+    if( n ) {
+#if USE_UNUSED_NODES
+	n->next = unused_nodes;
+	unused_nodes = n;
+#else
+	xfree( n );
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+KBNODE
+new_kbnode( PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    KBNODE n = alloc_node();
+    n->pkt = pkt;
+    return n;
+}
+
+
+KBNODE
+clone_kbnode( KBNODE node )
+{
+    KBNODE n = alloc_node();
+
+    n->pkt = node->pkt;
+    n->private_flag = node->private_flag | 2; /* mark cloned */
+    return n;
+}
+
+
+void
+release_kbnode( KBNODE n )
+{
+    KBNODE n2;
+
+    while( n ) {
+	n2 = n->next;
+	if( !is_cloned_kbnode(n) ) {
+	    free_packet( n->pkt );
+	    xfree( n->pkt );
+	}
+	free_node( n );
+	n = n2;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Delete NODE.
+ * Note: This only works with walk_kbnode!!
+ */
+void
+delete_kbnode( KBNODE node )
+{
+    node->private_flag |= 1;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Append NODE to ROOT.  ROOT must exist!
+ */
+void
+add_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node )
+{
+    KBNODE n1;
+
+    for(n1=root; n1->next; n1 = n1->next)
+	;
+    n1->next = node;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Insert NODE into the list after root but before a packet which is not of
+ * type PKTTYPE
+ * (only if PKTTYPE != 0)
+ */
+void
+insert_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype )
+{
+    if( !pkttype ) {
+	node->next = root->next;
+	root->next = node;
+    }
+    else {
+	KBNODE n1;
+
+	for(n1=root; n1->next;	n1 = n1->next)
+	    if( pkttype != n1->next->pkt->pkttype ) {
+		node->next = n1->next;
+		n1->next = node;
+		return;
+	    }
+	/* no such packet, append */
+	node->next = NULL;
+	n1->next = node;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Find the previous node (if PKTTYPE = 0) or the previous node
+ * with pkttype PKTTYPE in the list starting with ROOT of NODE.
+ */
+KBNODE
+find_prev_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype )
+{
+    KBNODE n1;
+
+    for (n1=NULL; root && root != node; root = root->next ) {
+        if (!pkttype ||root->pkt->pkttype == pkttype)
+            n1 = root;
+    }
+    return n1;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Ditto, but find the next packet.  The behaviour is trivial if
+ * PKTTYPE is 0 but if it is specified, the next node with a packet
+ * of this type is returned.  The function has some knowledge about
+ * the valid ordering of packets: e.g. if the next signature packet
+ * is requested, the function will not return one if it encounters
+ * a user-id.
+ */
+KBNODE
+find_next_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype )
+{
+    for( node=node->next ; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( !pkttype )
+	    return node;
+	else if( pkttype == PKT_USER_ID 
+		 && (	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) )
+	    return NULL;
+	else if( pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && (	node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) )
+	    return NULL;
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == pkttype )
+	    return node;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+KBNODE
+find_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype )
+{
+    for( ; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == pkttype )
+	    return node;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Walk through a list of kbnodes. This function returns
+ * the next kbnode for each call; before using the function the first
+ * time, the caller must set CONTEXT to NULL (This has simply the effect
+ * to start with ROOT).
+ */
+KBNODE
+walk_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE *context, int all )
+{
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    do {
+	if( !*context ) {
+	    *context = root;
+	    n = root;
+	}
+	else {
+	    n = (*context)->next;
+	    *context = n;
+	}
+    } while( !all && n && is_deleted_kbnode(n) );
+
+    return n;
+}
+
+void
+clear_kbnode_flags( KBNODE n )
+{
+    for( ; n; n = n->next ) {
+	n->flag = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Commit changes made to the kblist at ROOT. Note that ROOT my change,
+ * and it is therefore passed by reference.
+ * The function has the effect of removing all nodes marked as deleted.
+ * returns true if any node has been changed
+ */
+int
+commit_kbnode( KBNODE *root )
+{
+    KBNODE n, nl;
+    int changed = 0;
+
+    for( n = *root, nl=NULL; n; n = nl->next ) {
+	if( is_deleted_kbnode(n) ) {
+	    if( n == *root )
+		*root = nl = n->next;
+	    else
+		nl->next = n->next;
+	    if( !is_cloned_kbnode(n) ) {
+		free_packet( n->pkt );
+		xfree( n->pkt );
+	    }
+	    free_node( n );
+	    changed = 1;
+	}
+	else
+	    nl = n;
+    }
+    return changed;
+}
+
+void
+remove_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node )
+{
+    KBNODE n, nl;
+
+    for( n = *root, nl=NULL; n; n = nl->next ) {
+	if( n == node ) {
+	    if( n == *root )
+		*root = nl = n->next;
+	    else
+		nl->next = n->next;
+	    if( !is_cloned_kbnode(n) ) {
+		free_packet( n->pkt );
+		xfree( n->pkt );
+	    }
+	    free_node( n );
+	}
+	else
+	    nl = n;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Move NODE behind right after WHERE or to the beginning if WHERE is NULL.
+ */
+void
+move_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node, KBNODE where )
+{
+    KBNODE tmp, prev;
+
+    if( !root || !*root || !node )
+	return;  /* sanity check */
+    for( prev = *root; prev && prev->next != node; prev = prev->next )
+	;
+    if( !prev )
+	return; /* node is not in the list */
+
+    if( !where ) {  /* move node before root */
+	if( node == *root ) /* move to itself */
+	    return;
+	prev->next = node->next;
+	node->next = *root;
+	*root = node;
+	return;
+    }
+    /* move it after where */
+    if( node == where )
+	return;
+    tmp = node->next;
+    node->next = where->next;
+    where->next = node;
+    prev->next = tmp;
+}
+
+
+
+
+void
+dump_kbnode( KBNODE node )
+{
+    for(; node; node = node->next ) {
+	const char *s;
+	switch( node->pkt->pkttype ) {
+	  case 0:		s="empty"; break;
+	  case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:	s="public-key"; break;
+	  case PKT_SECRET_KEY:	s="secret-key"; break;
+	  case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: s= "secret-subkey"; break;
+	  case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:	s="public-enc"; break;
+	  case PKT_SIGNATURE:	s="signature"; break;
+	  case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: s="onepass-sig"; break;
+	  case PKT_USER_ID:	s="user-id"; break;
+	  case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: s="public-subkey"; break;
+	  case PKT_COMMENT:	s="comment"; break;
+	  case PKT_RING_TRUST:	s="trust"; break;
+	  case PKT_PLAINTEXT:	s="plaintext"; break;
+	  case PKT_COMPRESSED:	s="compressed"; break;
+	  case PKT_ENCRYPTED:	s="encrypted"; break;
+          case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: s="gpg-control"; break;
+	  default:		s="unknown"; break;
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "node %p %02x/%02x type=%s",
+		node, node->flag, node->private_flag, s);
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+            PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	    fputs("  \"", stderr);
+	    print_string( stderr, uid->name, uid->len, 0 );
+	    fprintf (stderr, "\" %c%c%c%c\n",
+                     uid->is_expired? 'e':'.',
+                     uid->is_revoked? 'r':'.',
+                     uid->created?    'v':'.',
+                     uid->is_primary? 'p':'.' );
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, "  class=%02x keyid=%08lX ts=%lu\n",
+		   node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class,
+		   (ulong)node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1],
+                   (ulong)node->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp);
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL ) {
+	    fprintf(stderr, " ctrl=%d len=%u\n",
+                    node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control,
+                    (unsigned int)node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen);
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    fprintf(stderr, "  keyid=%08lX a=%d u=%d %c%c%c%c\n",
+                    (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL ),
+                    pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pubkey_usage,
+                    pk->has_expired? 'e':'.',  
+                    pk->is_revoked?  'r':'.',  
+                    pk->is_valid?    'v':'.',
+                    pk->mdc_feature? 'm':'.');
+	}
+	else
+	    fputs("\n", stderr);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/keydb.c b/g10/keydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1a7268
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,807 @@
+/* keydb.c - key database dispatcher
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h" /*try_make_homedir ()*/
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "keyring.h"
+#include "keydb.h" 
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+static int active_handles;
+
+typedef enum {
+    KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE = 0,
+    KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING
+} KeydbResourceType;
+#define MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES 40
+
+struct resource_item {
+  KeydbResourceType type;
+  union {
+    KEYRING_HANDLE kr;
+  } u;
+  void *token;
+  int secret;
+};
+
+static struct resource_item all_resources[MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES];
+static int used_resources;
+static void *primary_keyring=NULL;
+
+struct keydb_handle {
+  int locked;
+  int found;
+  int current;
+  int used; /* items in active */
+  struct resource_item active[MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES];
+};
+
+
+static int lock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+static void unlock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+
+
+/* Handle the creation of a keyring if it does not yet exist.  Take
+   into acount that other processes might have the keyring already
+   locked.  This lock check does not work if the directory itself is
+   not yet available. */
+static int
+maybe_create_keyring (char *filename, int force)
+{
+  DOTLOCK lockhd = NULL;
+  IOBUF iobuf;
+  int rc;
+  mode_t oldmask;
+  char *last_slash_in_filename;
+
+  /* A quick test whether the filename already exists. */
+  if (!access (filename, F_OK))
+    return 0;
+
+  /* If we don't want to create a new file at all, there is no need to
+     go any further - bail out right here.  */
+  if (!force) 
+    return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+
+  /* First of all we try to create the home directory.  Note, that we
+     don't do any locking here because any sane application of gpg
+     would create the home directory by itself and not rely on gpg's
+     tricky auto-creation which is anyway only done for some home
+     directory name patterns. */
+  last_slash_in_filename = strrchr (filename, DIRSEP_C);
+  *last_slash_in_filename = 0;
+  if (access(filename, F_OK))
+    { 
+      static int tried;
+      
+      if (!tried)
+        {
+          tried = 1;
+          try_make_homedir (filename);
+        }
+      if (access (filename, F_OK))
+        {
+          rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+          *last_slash_in_filename = DIRSEP_C;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+    }
+  *last_slash_in_filename = DIRSEP_C;
+
+
+  /* To avoid races with other instances of gpg trying to create or
+     update the keyring (it is removed during an update for a short
+     time), we do the next stuff in a locked state. */
+  lockhd = create_dotlock (filename);
+  if (!lockhd)
+    {
+      /* A reason for this to fail is that the directory is not
+         writable. However, this whole locking stuff does not make
+         sense if this is the case. An empty non-writable directory
+         with no keyring is not really useful at all. */
+      if (opt.verbose)
+        log_info ("can't allocate lock for `%s'\n", filename );
+
+      if (!force) 
+        return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE; 
+      else
+        return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+    }
+
+  if ( make_dotlock (lockhd, -1) )
+    {
+      /* This is something bad.  Probably a stale lockfile.  */
+      log_info ("can't lock `%s'\n", filename );
+      rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Now the real test while we are locked. */
+  if (!access(filename, F_OK))
+    {
+      rc = 0;  /* Okay, we may access the file now.  */
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* The file does not yet exist, create it now. */
+  oldmask = umask (077);
+  if (is_secured_filename (filename))
+    {
+      iobuf = NULL;
+      errno = EPERM;
+    }
+  else
+    iobuf = iobuf_create (filename);
+  umask (oldmask);
+  if (!iobuf) 
+    {
+      log_error ( _("error creating keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                  filename, strerror(errno));
+      rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if (!opt.quiet)
+    log_info (_("keyring `%s' created\n"), filename);
+
+  iobuf_close (iobuf);
+  /* Must invalidate that ugly cache */
+  iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, filename);
+  rc = 0;
+
+ leave:
+  if (lockhd)
+    {
+      release_dotlock (lockhd);
+      destroy_dotlock (lockhd);
+    }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Register a resource (which currently may only be a keyring file).
+ * The first keyring which is added by this function is
+ * created if it does not exist.
+ * Note: this function may be called before secure memory is
+ * available.
+ * Flag 1 == force
+ * Flag 2 == mark resource as primary
+ * Flag 4 == This is a default resources
+ */
+int
+keydb_add_resource (const char *url, int flags, int secret)
+{
+    static int any_secret, any_public;
+    const char *resname = url;
+    char *filename = NULL;
+    int force=(flags&1);
+    int rc = 0;
+    KeydbResourceType rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE;
+    void *token;
+
+    /* Do we have an URL?
+     *	gnupg-ring:filename  := this is a plain keyring
+     *	filename := See what is is, but create as plain keyring.
+     */
+    if (strlen (resname) > 11) {
+	if (!strncmp( resname, "gnupg-ring:", 11) ) {
+	    rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING;
+	    resname += 11;
+	}
+#if !defined(HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS) && !defined(__riscos__)
+	else if (strchr (resname, ':')) {
+	    log_error ("invalid key resource URL `%s'\n", url );
+	    rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+#endif /* !HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS && !__riscos__ */
+    }
+
+    if (*resname != DIRSEP_C ) { /* do tilde expansion etc */
+	if (strchr(resname, DIRSEP_C) )
+	    filename = make_filename (resname, NULL);
+	else
+	    filename = make_filename (opt.homedir, resname, NULL);
+    }
+    else
+	filename = xstrdup (resname);
+
+    if (!force)
+	force = secret? !any_secret : !any_public;
+
+    /* see whether we can determine the filetype */
+    if (rt == KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE) {
+	FILE *fp = fopen( filename, "rb" );
+
+	if (fp) {
+	    u32 magic;
+
+	    if (fread( &magic, 4, 1, fp) == 1 ) {
+		if (magic == 0x13579ace || magic == 0xce9a5713)
+		    ; /* GDBM magic - no more support */
+		else
+		    rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING;
+	    }
+	    else /* maybe empty: assume ring */
+		rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING;
+	    fclose( fp );
+	}
+	else /* no file yet: create ring */
+	    rt = KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING;
+    }
+
+    switch (rt) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+	log_error ("unknown type of key resource `%s'\n", url );
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	goto leave;
+
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        rc = maybe_create_keyring (filename, force);
+        if (rc)
+          goto leave;
+
+        if(keyring_register_filename (filename, secret, &token))
+	  {
+	    if (used_resources >= MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES)
+	      rc = G10ERR_RESOURCE_LIMIT;
+	    else 
+	      {
+		if(flags&2)
+		  primary_keyring=token;
+		all_resources[used_resources].type = rt;
+		all_resources[used_resources].u.kr = NULL; /* Not used here */
+		all_resources[used_resources].token = token;
+		all_resources[used_resources].secret = secret;
+		used_resources++;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* This keyring was already registered, so ignore it.
+	       However, we can still mark it as primary even if it was
+	       already registered. */
+	    if(flags&2)
+	      primary_keyring=token;
+	  }
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	log_error ("resource type of `%s' not supported\n", url);
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* fixme: check directory permissions and print a warning */
+
+  leave:
+    if (rc)
+      {
+        /* Secret keyrings are not required in all cases.  To avoid
+           having gpg return failure we use log_info here if the
+           rewsource is a secret one and marked as default
+           resource.  */
+        if ((flags&4) && secret)
+          log_info (_("keyblock resource `%s': %s\n"),
+                    filename, g10_errstr(rc));
+        else
+          log_error (_("keyblock resource `%s': %s\n"),
+                     filename, g10_errstr(rc));
+      }
+    else if (secret)
+	any_secret = 1;
+    else
+	any_public = 1;
+    xfree (filename);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+KEYDB_HANDLE
+keydb_new (int secret)
+{
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  int i, j;
+  
+  hd = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *hd);
+  hd->found = -1;
+  
+  assert (used_resources <= MAX_KEYDB_RESOURCES);
+  for (i=j=0; i < used_resources; i++)
+    {
+      if (!all_resources[i].secret != !secret)
+        continue;
+      switch (all_resources[i].type)
+        {
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE: /* ignore */
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+          hd->active[j].type   = all_resources[i].type;
+          hd->active[j].token  = all_resources[i].token;
+          hd->active[j].secret = all_resources[i].secret;
+          hd->active[j].u.kr = keyring_new (all_resources[i].token, secret);
+          if (!hd->active[j].u.kr) {
+            xfree (hd);
+            return NULL; /* fixme: release all previously allocated handles*/
+          }
+          j++;
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+  hd->used = j;
+  
+  active_handles++;
+  return hd;
+}
+
+void 
+keydb_release (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return;
+    assert (active_handles > 0);
+    active_handles--;
+
+    unlock_all (hd);
+    for (i=0; i < hd->used; i++) {
+        switch (hd->active[i].type) {
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+            keyring_release (hd->active[i].u.kr);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    xfree (hd);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the name of the current resource.  This is function first
+ * looks for the last found found, then for the current search
+ * position, and last returns the first available resource.  The
+ * returned string is only valid as long as the handle exists.  This
+ * function does only return NULL if no handle is specified, in all
+ * other error cases an empty string is returned.
+ */
+const char *
+keydb_get_resource_name (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int idx;
+    const char *s = NULL;
+
+    if (!hd) 
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ( hd->found >= 0 && hd->found < hd->used) 
+        idx = hd->found;
+    else if ( hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used) 
+        idx = hd->current;
+    else
+        idx = 0;
+
+    switch (hd->active[idx].type) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+        s = NULL; 
+        break;
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        s = keyring_get_resource_name (hd->active[idx].u.kr);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return s? s: "";
+}
+
+
+
+static int 
+lock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int i, rc = 0;
+
+    for (i=0; !rc && i < hd->used; i++) {
+        switch (hd->active[i].type) {
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+            rc = keyring_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 1);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rc) {
+        /* revert the already set locks */
+        for (i--; i >= 0; i--) {
+            switch (hd->active[i].type) {
+              case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+                break;
+              case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+                keyring_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 0);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    else
+        hd->locked = 1;
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+unlock_all (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (!hd->locked)
+        return;
+
+    for (i=hd->used-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        switch (hd->active[i].type) {
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+            keyring_lock (hd->active[i].u.kr, 0);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    hd->locked = 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the last found keyring.  Caller must free it.
+ * The returned keyblock has the kbode flag bit 0 set for the node with
+ * the public key used to locate the keyblock or flag bit 1 set for 
+ * the user ID node.
+ */
+int
+keydb_get_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb)
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used) 
+        return -1; /* nothing found */
+
+    switch (hd->active[hd->found].type) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* oops */
+        break;
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        rc = keyring_get_keyblock (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, ret_kb);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * update the current keyblock with KB
+ */
+int
+keydb_update_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb)
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used) 
+        return -1; /* nothing found */
+
+    if( opt.dry_run )
+	return 0;
+
+    rc = lock_all (hd);
+    if (rc)
+        return rc;
+
+    switch (hd->active[hd->found].type) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* oops */
+        break;
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        rc = keyring_update_keyblock (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr, kb);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    unlock_all (hd);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Insert a new KB into one of the resources. 
+ */
+int
+keydb_insert_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb)
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+    int idx;
+
+    if (!hd) 
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    if( opt.dry_run )
+	return 0;
+
+    if ( hd->found >= 0 && hd->found < hd->used) 
+        idx = hd->found;
+    else if ( hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used) 
+        idx = hd->current;
+    else
+        return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+    rc = lock_all (hd);
+    if (rc)
+        return rc;
+
+    switch (hd->active[idx].type) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* oops */
+        break;
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        rc = keyring_insert_keyblock (hd->active[idx].u.kr, kb);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    unlock_all (hd);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * The current keyblock will be deleted.
+ */
+int
+keydb_delete_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    if ( hd->found < 0 || hd->found >= hd->used) 
+        return -1; /* nothing found */
+
+    if( opt.dry_run )
+	return 0;
+
+    rc = lock_all (hd);
+    if (rc)
+        return rc;
+
+    switch (hd->active[hd->found].type) {
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* oops */
+        break;
+      case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+        rc = keyring_delete_keyblock (hd->active[hd->found].u.kr);
+        break;
+    }
+
+    unlock_all (hd);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Locate the default writable key resource, so that the next
+ * operation (which is only relevant for inserts) will be done on this
+ * resource.  
+ */
+int
+keydb_locate_writable (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *reserved)
+{
+  int rc;
+  
+  if (!hd)
+    return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+  
+  rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); /* this does reset hd->current */
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  /* If we have a primary set, try that one first */
+  if(primary_keyring)
+    {
+      for ( ; hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used; hd->current++)
+	{
+	  if(hd->active[hd->current].token==primary_keyring)
+	    {
+	      if(keyring_is_writable (hd->active[hd->current].token))
+		return 0;
+	      else
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      rc = keydb_search_reset (hd); /* this does reset hd->current */
+      if (rc)
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+  for ( ; hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used; hd->current++) 
+    {
+      switch (hd->active[hd->current].type) 
+        {
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+          BUG();
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+          if (keyring_is_writable (hd->active[hd->current].token))
+            return 0; /* found (hd->current is set to it) */
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+  
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rebuild the caches of all key resources.
+ */
+void
+keydb_rebuild_caches (int noisy)
+{
+  int i, rc;
+  
+  for (i=0; i < used_resources; i++)
+    {
+      if (all_resources[i].secret)
+        continue;
+      switch (all_resources[i].type)
+        {
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE: /* ignore */
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+          rc = keyring_rebuild_cache (all_resources[i].token,noisy);
+          if (rc)
+            log_error (_("failed to rebuild keyring cache: %s\n"),
+                       g10_errstr (rc));
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+/* 
+ * Start the next search on this handle right at the beginning
+ */
+int 
+keydb_search_reset (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int i, rc = 0;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    hd->current = 0; 
+    hd->found = -1;
+    /* and reset all resources */
+    for (i=0; !rc && i < hd->used; i++) {
+        switch (hd->active[i].type) {
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+            rc = keyring_search_reset (hd->active[i].u.kr);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return rc; 
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Search through all keydb resources, starting at the current position,
+ * for a keyblock which contains one of the keys described in the DESC array.
+ */
+int 
+keydb_search2 (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+	       size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex)
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        return G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+
+    while (rc == -1 && hd->current >= 0 && hd->current < hd->used) {
+        switch (hd->active[hd->current].type) {
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_NONE:
+            BUG(); /* we should never see it here */
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_RESOURCE_TYPE_KEYRING:
+            rc = keyring_search (hd->active[hd->current].u.kr, desc,
+				 ndesc, descindex);
+            break;
+        }
+        if (rc == -1) /* EOF -> switch to next resource */
+            hd->current++; 
+        else if (!rc)
+            hd->found = hd->current;
+    }
+
+    return rc; 
+}
+
+int
+keydb_search_first (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+    memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+    desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+    return keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+}
+
+int
+keydb_search_next (KEYDB_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+    memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+    desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+    return keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+}
+
+int
+keydb_search_kid (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, u32 *kid)
+{
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+    memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+    desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+    desc.u.kid[0] = kid[0];
+    desc.u.kid[1] = kid[1];
+    return keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+}
+
+int
+keydb_search_fpr (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const byte *fpr)
+{
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+    memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+    desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
+    memcpy (desc.u.fpr, fpr, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+    return keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+}
diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b588381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/* keydb.h - Key database
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef G10_KEYDB_H
+#define G10_KEYDB_H
+
+#include "types.h"
+#include "global.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+#include "assuan.h"
+#endif
+
+/* What qualifies as a certification (rather than a signature?) */
+#define IS_CERT(s)       (IS_KEY_SIG(s) || IS_UID_SIG(s) || IS_SUBKEY_SIG(s) \
+                         || IS_KEY_REV(s) || IS_UID_REV(s) || IS_SUBKEY_REV(s))
+#define IS_SIG(s)        (!IS_CERT(s))
+#define IS_KEY_SIG(s)    ((s)->sig_class == 0x1f)
+#define IS_UID_SIG(s)    (((s)->sig_class & ~3) == 0x10)
+#define IS_SUBKEY_SIG(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x18)
+#define IS_KEY_REV(s)    ((s)->sig_class == 0x20)
+#define IS_UID_REV(s)    ((s)->sig_class == 0x30)
+#define IS_SUBKEY_REV(s) ((s)->sig_class == 0x28)
+
+struct getkey_ctx_s;
+typedef struct getkey_ctx_s *GETKEY_CTX;
+
+/****************
+ * A Keyblock is all packets which form an entire certificate;
+ * i.e. the public key, certificate, trust packets, user ids,
+ * signatures, and subkey.
+ *
+ * This structure is also used to bind arbitrary packets together.
+ */
+
+struct kbnode_struct {
+    KBNODE next;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    int flag;
+    int private_flag;
+    ulong recno;  /* used while updating the trustdb */
+};
+
+#define is_deleted_kbnode(a)  ((a)->private_flag & 1)
+#define is_cloned_kbnode(a)   ((a)->private_flag & 2)
+
+
+enum resource_type {
+    rt_UNKNOWN = 0,
+    rt_RING = 1
+};
+
+
+/****************
+ * A data structre to hold information about the external position
+ * of a keyblock.
+ */
+struct keyblock_pos_struct {
+    int   resno;     /* resource number */
+    enum resource_type rt;
+    off_t offset;    /* position information */
+    unsigned count;  /* length of the keyblock in packets */
+    IOBUF  fp;	     /* used by enum_keyblocks */
+    int secret;      /* working on a secret keyring */
+    PACKET *pkt;     /* ditto */
+    int valid;
+};
+typedef struct keyblock_pos_struct KBPOS;
+
+/* structure to hold a couple of public key certificates */
+typedef struct pk_list *PK_LIST;
+struct pk_list {
+    PK_LIST next;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    int flags; /* flag bit 1==throw_keyid */
+};
+
+/* structure to hold a couple of secret key certificates */
+typedef struct sk_list *SK_LIST;
+struct sk_list {
+    SK_LIST next;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    int mark; /* not used */
+};
+
+/* structure to collect all information which can be used to
+ * identify a public key */
+typedef struct pubkey_find_info *PUBKEY_FIND_INFO;
+struct pubkey_find_info {
+    u32  keyid[2];
+    unsigned nbits;
+    byte pubkey_algo;
+    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+    char userid[1];
+};
+
+
+typedef struct keydb_handle *KEYDB_HANDLE;
+
+typedef enum {
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST,
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT
+} KeydbSearchMode;
+
+struct keydb_search_desc {
+    KeydbSearchMode mode;
+    int (*skipfnc)(void *,u32*,PKT_user_id*);
+    void *skipfncvalue;
+    union {
+        const char *name;
+        byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+        u32  kid[2];
+    } u;
+    int exact;
+};
+
+/*-- keydb.c --*/
+
+/*
+  Flag 1 == force
+  Flag 2 == default
+*/
+int keydb_add_resource (const char *url, int flags, int secret);
+KEYDB_HANDLE keydb_new (int secret);
+void keydb_release (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+const char *keydb_get_resource_name (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+int keydb_get_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb);
+int keydb_update_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb);
+int keydb_insert_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb);
+int keydb_delete_keyblock (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+int keydb_locate_writable (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *reserved);
+void keydb_rebuild_caches (int noisy);
+int keydb_search_reset (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+#define keydb_search(a,b,c) keydb_search2((a),(b),(c),NULL)
+int keydb_search2 (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+		   size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex);
+int keydb_search_first (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+int keydb_search_next (KEYDB_HANDLE hd);
+int keydb_search_kid (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, u32 *kid);
+int keydb_search_fpr (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const byte *fpr);
+
+
+/*-- pkclist.c --*/
+void show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode );
+int  check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig );
+void release_pk_list( PK_LIST pk_list );
+int  build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use );
+union pref_hint
+{
+  int digest_length;
+};
+int  algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo,
+		     const union pref_hint *hint );
+int  select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
+			     int request, const union pref_hint *hint );
+int  select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list);
+
+/*-- skclist.c --*/
+void release_sk_list( SK_LIST sk_list );
+int  build_sk_list( STRLIST locusr, SK_LIST *ret_sk_list,
+					    int unlock, unsigned use );
+
+/*-- passphrase.h --*/
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+assuan_context_t agent_open (int try, const char *orig_codeset);
+void agent_close (assuan_context_t ctx);
+#else
+/* If we build w/o agent support, assuan.h won't get included and thus
+   we need to define a replacement for some Assuan types. */
+typedef int assuan_error_t;
+typedef void *assuan_context_t;
+#endif
+int  have_static_passphrase(void);
+void set_passphrase_from_string(const char *pass);
+void read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd );
+void passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo );
+char *ask_passphrase (const char *description,
+                      const char *tryagain_text,
+                      const char *promptid,
+                      const char *prompt, 
+                      const char *cacheid, int *canceled);
+DEK *passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
+			int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
+                        const char *tryagain_text, int *canceled);
+void set_next_passphrase( const char *s );
+char *get_last_passphrase(void);
+void next_to_last_passphrase(void);
+
+/*-- getkey.c --*/
+int classify_user_id( const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc);
+void cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk );
+void getkey_disable_caches(void);
+int get_pubkey( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid );
+int get_pubkey_fast ( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid );
+KBNODE get_pubkeyblock( u32 *keyid );
+int get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_key *pk,  const char *name,
+                       KBNODE *ret_keyblock, KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd,
+		       int include_unusable );
+int get_pubkey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *rx, PKT_public_key *pk,
+			STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock );
+int get_pubkey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock );
+void get_pubkey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx );
+int get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid );
+int get_primary_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid );
+int get_pubkey_byfprint( PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *fprint,
+						 size_t fprint_len );
+int get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key *pk,
+                              const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len);
+int get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
+						 size_t fprint_len );
+int get_keyblock_bylid( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, ulong lid );
+int seckey_available( u32 *keyid );
+int get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unlock );
+int get_seckey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *rx, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+			STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock );
+int get_seckey_next (GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock);
+void get_seckey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx );
+
+int get_seckey_byfprint( PKT_secret_key *sk,
+			 const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len);
+int get_seckeyblock_byfprint (KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
+                              size_t fprint_len );
+
+
+int enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		      int with_subkeys, int with_spm );
+void merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock );
+char*get_user_id_string( u32 *keyid );
+char*get_user_id_string_native( u32 *keyid );
+char*get_long_user_id_string( u32 *keyid );
+char*get_user_id( u32 *keyid, size_t *rn );
+char*get_user_id_native( u32 *keyid );
+KEYDB_HANDLE get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx);
+void release_akl(void);
+int parse_auto_key_locate(char *options);
+
+/*-- keyid.c --*/
+int pubkey_letter( int algo );
+void hash_public_key( MD_HANDLE md, PKT_public_key *pk );
+size_t keystrlen(void);
+const char *keystr(u32 *keyid);
+const char *keystr_from_pk(PKT_public_key *pk);
+const char *keystr_from_sk(PKT_secret_key *sk);
+const char *keystr_from_desc(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc);
+u32 keyid_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid );
+u32 keyid_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid );
+u32 keyid_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig, u32 *keyid );
+u32 keyid_from_fingerprint(const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid);
+byte *namehash_from_uid(PKT_user_id *uid);
+unsigned nbits_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );
+unsigned nbits_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+const char *datestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );
+const char *datestr_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+const char *datestr_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
+const char *expirestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );
+const char *expirestr_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+const char *expirestr_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
+const char *revokestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );
+const char *usagestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk );
+const char *colon_strtime (u32 t);
+const char *colon_datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk);
+const char *colon_datestr_from_sk (PKT_secret_key *sk);
+const char *colon_datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig);
+const char *colon_expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig);
+byte *fingerprint_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len );
+byte *fingerprint_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len );
+
+/*-- kbnode.c --*/
+KBNODE new_kbnode( PACKET *pkt );
+KBNODE clone_kbnode( KBNODE node );
+void release_kbnode( KBNODE n );
+void delete_kbnode( KBNODE node );
+void add_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node );
+void insert_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype );
+void move_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node, KBNODE where );
+void remove_kbnode( KBNODE *root, KBNODE node );
+KBNODE find_prev_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int pkttype );
+KBNODE find_next_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype );
+KBNODE find_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype );
+KBNODE walk_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE *context, int all );
+void clear_kbnode_flags( KBNODE n );
+int  commit_kbnode( KBNODE *root );
+void dump_kbnode( KBNODE node );
+
+#endif /*G10_KEYDB_H*/
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1e0ec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5094 @@
+/* keyedit.c - keyedit stuff
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <readline/readline.h>
+#endif
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+
+static void show_prefs( PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_signature *selfsig, int verbose);
+static void show_names(KBNODE keyblock,PKT_public_key *pk,
+		       unsigned int flag,int with_prefs);
+static void show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
+	    int with_revoker, int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs );
+static void show_key_and_fingerprint( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int menu_adduid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
+			int photo, const char *photo_name );
+static void menu_deluid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_delsig( KBNODE pub_keyblock );
+static int menu_clean(KBNODE keyblock,int self_only);
+static void menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_addrevoker( KBNODE pub_keyblock,
+			    KBNODE sec_keyblock, int sensitive );
+static int menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_backsign(KBNODE pub_keyblock,KBNODE sec_keyblock);
+static int menu_set_primary_uid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_set_preferences( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url,
+				   KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_set_notation(const char *string,
+			     KBNODE pub_keyblock,KBNODE sec_keyblock);
+static int menu_select_uid( KBNODE keyblock, int idx );
+static int menu_select_uid_namehash( KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash );
+static int menu_select_key( KBNODE keyblock, int idx );
+static int count_uids( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int count_uids_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag );
+static int count_keys_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag );
+static int count_selected_uids( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int real_uids_left( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int count_selected_keys( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int menu_revsig( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int menu_revuid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_revsubkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int enable_disable_key( KBNODE keyblock, int disable );
+static void menu_showphoto( KBNODE keyblock );
+
+static int update_trust=0;
+
+#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
+
+#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0)  /* bad signature */
+#define NODFLG_NOKEY  (1<<1)  /* no public key */
+#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2)  /* other sig error */
+
+#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4)  /* temporary mark */
+#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5)  /* to be deleted */
+
+#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8)  /* indicate the selected userid */
+#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9)  /* indicate the selected key */
+#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* indicate a selected signature */
+
+struct sign_attrib {
+    int non_exportable,non_revocable;
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
+    byte trust_depth,trust_value;
+    char *trust_regexp;
+};
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+/* Given a node SEC_NODE with a secret key or subkey, locate the
+   corresponding public key from pub_keyblock. */
+static PKT_public_key *
+find_pk_from_sknode (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_node)
+{
+  KBNODE node = pub_keyblock;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  
+  if (sec_node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+      && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+    return node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  if (sec_node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+    return NULL;
+  sk = sec_node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+  for (; node; node = node->next)
+    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+      {
+        pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if (pk->keyid[0] == sk->keyid[0] && pk->keyid[1] == sk->keyid[1])
+          return pk;
+      }
+      
+  return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+
+
+/* TODO: Fix duplicated code between here and the check-sigs/list-sigs
+   code in keylist.c. */
+static int
+print_and_check_one_sig_colon( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
+			       int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
+			       int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key )
+{
+  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+  int rc, sigrc;
+
+  /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
+     issued it.  See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
+
+  switch((rc=check_key_signature(keyblock,node,is_selfsig)))
+    {
+    case 0:
+      node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG|NODFLG_NOKEY|NODFLG_SIGERR);
+      sigrc = '!';
+      break;
+    case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:
+      node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
+      sigrc = '-';
+      if( inv_sigs )
+	++*inv_sigs;
+      break;
+    case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
+    case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:
+      node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
+      sigrc = '?';
+      if( no_key )
+	++*no_key;
+      break;
+    default:
+      node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
+      sigrc = '%';
+      if( oth_err )
+	++*oth_err;
+      break;
+    }
+
+  if( sigrc != '?' || print_without_key )
+    {
+      printf("sig:%c::%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
+	     sigrc,sig->pubkey_algo,(ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+	     (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate);
+
+      if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+	printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+
+      printf(":");
+
+      if(sig->trust_regexp)
+	print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
+
+      printf("::%02x%c\n",sig->sig_class,sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+
+      if(opt.show_subpackets)
+      	print_subpackets_colon(sig);
+    }
+
+  return (sigrc == '!');
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print information about a signature, check it and return true
+ * if the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature packet.
+ */
+static int
+print_and_check_one_sig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
+			 int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
+			int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    int rc, sigrc;
+    int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;
+
+    /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
+       issued it.  See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
+
+    switch( (rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, is_selfsig)) ) {
+      case 0:
+	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG|NODFLG_NOKEY|NODFLG_SIGERR);
+	sigrc = '!';
+	break;
+      case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:
+	node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
+	sigrc = '-';
+	if( inv_sigs )
+	    ++*inv_sigs;
+	break;
+      case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
+      case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:
+	node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
+	sigrc = '?';
+	if( no_key )
+	    ++*no_key;
+	break;
+      default:
+	node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
+	sigrc = '%';
+	if( oth_err )
+	    ++*oth_err;
+	break;
+    }
+    if( sigrc != '?' || print_without_key ) {
+        tty_printf("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
+		   is_rev? "rev":"sig",sigrc,
+		   (sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
+		    sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
+		   sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
+		   sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
+		   sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
+		   sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
+                   sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
+		   (sig->trust_depth>9)?'T':
+		   (sig->trust_depth>0)?'0'+sig->trust_depth:' ',
+		   keystr(sig->keyid),datestr_from_sig(sig));
+	if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
+	  tty_printf(" %s",expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+	tty_printf("  ");
+	if( sigrc == '%' )
+	    tty_printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	else if( sigrc == '?' )
+	    ;
+	else if( *is_selfsig ) {
+	    tty_printf( is_rev? _("[revocation]")
+			      : _("[self-signature]") );
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+	    size_t n;
+	    char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
+	    tty_print_utf8_string2(p, n, opt.screen_columns-keystrlen()-26-
+			       ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)?11:0));
+	    xfree(p);
+	  }
+	tty_printf("\n");
+
+	if(sig->flags.policy_url && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
+	  show_policy_url(sig,3,0);
+
+	if(sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
+	  show_notation(sig,3,0,
+			((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
+			((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
+
+	if(sig->flags.pref_ks && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
+	  show_keyserver_url(sig,3,0);
+    }
+
+    return (sigrc == '!');
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check the keysigs and set the flags to indicate errors.
+ * Returns true if error found.
+ */
+static int
+check_all_keysigs( KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected )
+{
+    KBNODE kbctx;
+    KBNODE node;
+    int inv_sigs = 0;
+    int no_key = 0;
+    int oth_err = 0;
+    int has_selfsig = 0;
+    int mis_selfsig = 0;
+    int selected = !only_selected;
+    int anyuid = 0;
+
+    for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	    if( only_selected )
+		selected = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
+	    if( selected ) {
+		tty_printf("uid  ");
+		tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+		tty_printf("\n");
+		if( anyuid && !has_selfsig )
+		    mis_selfsig++;
+		has_selfsig = 0;
+		anyuid = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && ( (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+		     || node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30 )  ) {
+	    int selfsig;
+
+	    if( print_and_check_one_sig( keyblock, node, &inv_sigs,
+					&no_key, &oth_err, &selfsig, 0 ) ) {
+		if( selfsig )
+		    has_selfsig = 1;
+	    }
+	    /* Hmmm: should we update the trustdb here? */
+	}
+    }
+    if( !has_selfsig )
+	mis_selfsig++;
+    if( inv_sigs == 1 )
+	tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
+    else if( inv_sigs )
+	tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), inv_sigs );
+    if( no_key == 1 )
+	tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
+    else if( no_key )
+	tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"), no_key );
+    if( oth_err == 1 )
+	tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
+    else if( oth_err )
+	tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), oth_err );
+    if( mis_selfsig == 1 )
+	tty_printf(_("1 user ID without valid self-signature detected\n"));
+    else if( mis_selfsig  )
+	tty_printf(_("%d user IDs without valid self-signatures detected\n"),
+								    mis_selfsig);
+
+    return inv_sigs || no_key || oth_err || mis_selfsig;
+}
+
+
+static int
+sign_mk_attrib( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
+    byte buf[8];
+
+    if( attrib->non_exportable ) {
+	buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
+	build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1 );
+    }
+
+    if( attrib->non_revocable ) {
+	buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
+	build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1 );
+    }
+
+    if( attrib->reason )
+	revocation_reason_build_cb( sig, attrib->reason );
+
+    if(attrib->trust_depth)
+      {
+	/* Not critical.  If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
+	   this can still be a valid regular signature. */
+        buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
+	buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
+	build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_TRUST,buf,2);
+
+	/* Critical.  If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
+	   whole sig should be invalid.  Note the +1 for the length -
+	   regexps are null terminated. */
+	if(attrib->trust_regexp)
+	  build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL|SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
+			   attrib->trust_regexp,
+			   strlen(attrib->trust_regexp)+1);
+      }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+trustsig_prompt(byte *trust_value,byte *trust_depth,char **regexp)
+{
+  char *p;
+
+  *trust_value=0;
+  *trust_depth=0;
+  *regexp=NULL;
+
+  /* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
+  tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify"
+	       " other users' keys\n(by looking at passports, checking"
+	       " fingerprints from different sources, etc.)\n"));
+  tty_printf("\n");
+  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust marginally\n"), 1);
+  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust fully\n"), 2);
+  tty_printf("\n");
+
+  while(*trust_value==0)
+    {
+      p = cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_value",_("Your selection? "));
+      trim_spaces(p);
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+      /* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
+      if(p[0]=='1' && !p[1])
+	*trust_value=60;
+      else if(p[0]=='2' && !p[1])
+	*trust_value=120;
+      xfree(p);
+    }
+
+  tty_printf("\n");
+
+  tty_printf(_(
+	      "Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
+	      "A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are signing to make\n"
+	      "trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
+  tty_printf("\n");
+
+  while(*trust_depth==0)
+    {
+      p = cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth",_("Your selection? "));
+      trim_spaces(p);
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+      *trust_depth=atoi(p);
+      xfree(p);
+    }
+
+  tty_printf("\n");
+
+  tty_printf(_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
+	       "or enter for none.\n"));
+
+  tty_printf("\n");
+
+  p=cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp",_("Your selection? "));
+  trim_spaces(p);
+  cpr_kill_prompt();
+
+  if(strlen(p)>0)
+    {
+      char *q=p;
+      int regexplen=100,ind;
+
+      *regexp=xmalloc(regexplen);
+
+      /* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp.  To do
+	 this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
+	 "<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */
+
+      strcpy(*regexp,"<[^>]+[@.]");
+      ind=strlen(*regexp);
+
+      while(*q)
+	{
+	  if(!((*q>='A' && *q<='Z')
+	       || (*q>='a' && *q<='z') || (*q>='0' && *q<='9')))
+	    (*regexp)[ind++]='\\';
+
+	  (*regexp)[ind++]=*q;
+
+	  if((regexplen-ind)<3)
+	    {
+	      regexplen+=100;
+	      *regexp=xrealloc(*regexp,regexplen);
+	    }
+
+	  q++;
+	}
+
+      (*regexp)[ind]='\0';
+      strcat(*regexp,">$");
+    }
+
+  xfree(p);
+  tty_printf("\n");
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Loop over all locusr and and sign the uids after asking.
+ * If no user id is marked, all user ids will be signed;
+ * if some user_ids are marked those will be signed.
+ */
+static int
+sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
+	   int local, int nonrevocable, int trust, int interactive )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+    SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    KBNODE node, uidnode;
+    PKT_public_key *primary_pk=NULL;
+    int select_all = !count_selected_uids(keyblock) || interactive;
+    int all_v3=1;
+
+    /* Are there any non-v3 sigs on this key already? */
+    if(PGP2)
+      for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
+	if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
+	   node->pkt->pkt.signature->version>3)
+	  {
+	    all_v3=0;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+    /* build a list of all signators.
+     *    
+     * We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
+     * be one which is capable of signing keys.  I can't see a reason
+     * why to sign keys using a subkey.  Implementation of USAGE_CERT
+     * is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
+     * marked as certification capable will be used. */
+    rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 0, PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
+    if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* loop over all signators */
+    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+        u32 sk_keyid[2],pk_keyid[2];
+	char *p,*trust_regexp=NULL;
+	int force_v4=0,class=0,selfsig=0;
+	u32 duration=0,timestamp=0;
+	byte trust_depth=0,trust_value=0;
+
+	if(local || nonrevocable || trust ||
+	   opt.cert_policy_url || opt.cert_notations)
+	  force_v4=1;
+
+	/* we have to use a copy of the sk, because make_keysig_packet
+	 * may remove the protection from sk and if we did other
+	 * changes to the secret key, we would save the unprotected
+	 * version */
+	if( sk )
+	    free_secret_key(sk);
+	sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk_rover->sk );
+	keyid_from_sk( sk, sk_keyid );
+	/* set mark A for all selected user ids */
+	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) )
+		node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
+	    else
+		node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+	}
+	/* reset mark for uids which are already signed */
+	uidnode = NULL;
+	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+  	        primary_pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+		keyid_from_pk( primary_pk, pk_keyid );
+
+		/* Is this a self-sig? */
+		if(pk_keyid[0]==sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1]==sk_keyid[1])
+		  {
+		    selfsig=1;
+		    /* Do not force a v4 sig here, otherwise it would
+                       be difficult to remake a v3 selfsig.  If this
+                       is a v3->v4 promotion case, then we set
+                       force_v4 later anyway. */
+		    force_v4=0;
+		  }
+	    }
+	    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	      {
+		uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)? node : NULL;
+		if(uidnode)
+		  {
+		    int yesreally=0;
+		    char *user=utf8_to_native(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+					      uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
+					      0);
+
+		    if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."),user);
+
+			if(selfsig)
+			  tty_printf("\n");
+			else if(opt.expert)
+			  {
+			    tty_printf("\n");
+			    /* No, so remove the mark and continue */
+			    if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
+						      _("Are you sure you "
+							"still want to sign "
+							"it? (y/N) ")))
+			      {
+				uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+				uidnode=NULL;
+			      }
+			    else if(interactive)
+			      yesreally=1;
+			  }
+			else
+			  {
+			    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			    uidnode=NULL;
+			    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+			  }
+		      }
+		    else if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is expired."),user);
+
+			if(selfsig)
+			  tty_printf("\n");
+			else if(opt.expert)
+			  {
+			    tty_printf("\n");
+			    /* No, so remove the mark and continue */
+			    if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.expire_okay",
+						      _("Are you sure you "
+							"still want to sign "
+							"it? (y/N) ")))
+			      {
+				uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+				uidnode=NULL;
+			      }
+			    else if(interactive)
+			      yesreally=1;
+			  }
+			else
+			  {
+			    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			    uidnode=NULL;
+			    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+			  }
+		      }
+		    else if(!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
+				   user);
+
+			if(opt.expert)
+			  {
+			    tty_printf("\n");
+			    /* No, so remove the mark and continue */
+			    if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
+						      _("Are you sure you "
+							"still want to sign "
+							"it? (y/N) ")))
+			      {
+				uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+				uidnode=NULL;
+			      }
+			    else if(interactive)
+			      yesreally=1;
+			  }
+			else
+			  {
+			    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			    uidnode=NULL;
+			    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+			  }
+		      }
+
+		    if(uidnode && interactive && !yesreally)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is signable.  "),user);
+			if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.sign_okay",
+						  _("Sign it? (y/N) ")))
+			  {
+			    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+			    uidnode=NULL;
+			  }
+		      }
+
+		    xfree(user);
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else if( uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
+		if( sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+		    && sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] ) {
+                    char buf[50];
+		    char *user=utf8_to_native(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+					      uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
+					      0);
+
+		    /* It's a v3 self-sig.  Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
+		    if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->version<4 && selfsig)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
+				     "is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"),user);
+ 
+			/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
+			   still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
+			   this key at all. */
+
+			if(opt.expert)
+			  if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
+						   _("Do you want to promote "
+						     "it to an OpenPGP self-"
+						     "signature? (y/N) ")))
+			    {
+			      force_v4=1;
+			      node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
+			      xfree(user);
+			      continue;
+			    }
+		      }
+
+		    /* Is the current signature expired? */
+		    if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
+		      {
+			tty_printf(_("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
+				     "has expired.\n"),user);
+
+			if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
+						 _("Do you want to issue a "
+						   "new signature to replace "
+						   "the expired one? (y/N) ")))
+			  {
+			    /* Mark these for later deletion.  We
+                               don't want to delete them here, just in
+                               case the replacement signature doesn't
+                               happen for some reason.  We only delete
+                               these after the replacement is already
+                               in place. */
+
+			    node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
+			    xfree(user);
+			    continue;
+			  }
+		      }
+
+		    if(!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
+		      {
+			/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
+                           exportable sig. */
+			tty_printf(_("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
+				     "is a local signature.\n"),user);
+
+			if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
+						 _("Do you want to promote "
+						   "it to a full exportable "
+						   "signature? (y/N) ")))
+			  {
+			    /* Mark these for later deletion.  We
+                               don't want to delete them here, just in
+                               case the replacement signature doesn't
+                               happen for some reason.  We only delete
+                               these after the replacement is already
+                               in place. */
+
+			    node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
+			    xfree(user);
+			    continue;
+			  }
+		      }
+
+		    /* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
+		     * case we should allow to sign it again. */
+                    if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
+                      tty_printf(_(
+			      "\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),
+				 user,keystr_from_sk(sk));
+                    else
+                      tty_printf(_("\"%s\" was already signed by key %s\n"),
+                                 user,keystr_from_sk(sk));
+
+		    if(opt.expert
+		       && cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
+						_("Do you want to sign it "
+						  "again anyway? (y/N) ")))
+		      {
+			/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
+			   an --expert thing. */
+			xfree(user);
+			continue;
+		      }
+
+                    sprintf (buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+                             (ulong)sk->keyid[0], (ulong)sk->keyid[1] );
+                    write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
+		    uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */
+
+		    xfree(user);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* check whether any uids are left for signing */
+	if( !count_uids_with_flag(keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A) )
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_("Nothing to sign with key %s\n"),keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	    continue;
+	  }
+
+	/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s) */
+	tty_printf("\n");
+	show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 );
+	tty_printf("\n");
+
+	if(primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
+	  {
+	    u32 now=make_timestamp();
+
+	    if(primary_pk->expiredate<=now)
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("This key has expired!"));
+
+		if(opt.expert)
+		  {
+		    tty_printf("  ");
+		    if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.expired_okay",
+					      _("Are you sure you still "
+						"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
+		      continue;
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+		    continue;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
+			   expirestr_from_pk(primary_pk));
+
+		if(opt.ask_cert_expire)
+		  {
+		    char *answer=cpr_get("sign_uid.expire",
+					 _("Do you want your signature to "
+					   "expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
+		    if(answer_is_yes_no_default(answer,1))
+		      {
+			/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're
+			   going to make as now.  This is so the
+			   expiration date is exactly correct, and not
+			   a few seconds off (due to the time it takes
+			   to answer the questions, enter the
+			   passphrase, etc). */
+			timestamp=now;
+			duration=primary_pk->expiredate-now;
+			force_v4=1;
+		      }
+
+		    cpr_kill_prompt();
+		    xfree(answer);
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
+           the expiration of the pk */
+	if(!duration && !selfsig)
+	  {
+	    if(opt.ask_cert_expire)
+	      duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_cert_expire);
+	    else
+	      duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_cert_expire);
+	  }
+
+	if(duration)
+	  force_v4=1;
+
+	/* Is --pgp2 on, it's a v3 key, all the sigs on the key are
+	   currently v3 and we're about to sign it with a v4 sig?  If
+	   so, danger! */
+	if(PGP2 && all_v3 &&
+	   (sk->version>3 || force_v4) && primary_pk->version<=3)
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_("You may not make an OpenPGP signature on a "
+			 "PGP 2.x key while in --pgp2 mode.\n"));
+	    tty_printf(_("This would make the key unusable in PGP 2.x.\n"));
+
+	    if(opt.expert)
+	      {
+		if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.v4_on_v3_okay",
+					  _("Are you sure you still "
+					    "want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
+		  continue;
+
+		all_v3=0;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      continue;
+	  }
+
+	if(selfsig)
+	  ;
+	else
+	  {
+	    if(opt.batch || !opt.ask_cert_level)
+	      class=0x10+opt.def_cert_level;
+	    else
+	      {
+		char *answer;
+
+		tty_printf(_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
+			     "about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
+			     "named above?  If you don't know what to "
+			     "answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
+		tty_printf("\n");
+		tty_printf(_("   (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
+			   opt.def_cert_level==0?" (default)":"");
+		tty_printf(_("   (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
+			   opt.def_cert_level==1?" (default)":"");
+		tty_printf(_("   (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
+			   opt.def_cert_level==2?" (default)":"");
+		tty_printf(_("   (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
+			   opt.def_cert_level==3?" (default)":"");
+		tty_printf("\n");
+
+		while(class==0)
+		  {
+		    answer = cpr_get("sign_uid.class",_("Your selection? "
+					"(enter `?' for more information): "));
+		    if(answer[0]=='\0')
+		      class=0x10+opt.def_cert_level; /* Default */
+		    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"0")==0)
+		      class=0x10; /* Generic */
+		    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"1")==0)
+		      class=0x11; /* Persona */
+		    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"2")==0)
+		      class=0x12; /* Casual */
+		    else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"3")==0)
+		      class=0x13; /* Positive */
+		    else
+		      tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+
+		    xfree(answer);
+		  }
+	      }
+
+	    if(trust)
+	      trustsig_prompt(&trust_value,&trust_depth,&trust_regexp);
+	  }
+
+	p=get_user_id_native(sk_keyid);
+	tty_printf(_("Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your\n"
+		     "key \"%s\" (%s)\n"),p,keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if(selfsig)
+	  {
+            tty_printf("\n");
+	    tty_printf(_("This will be a self-signature.\n"));
+
+	    if( local )
+              {
+                tty_printf("\n");
+                tty_printf(
+			 _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
+			   "as non-exportable.\n"));
+              }
+
+	    if( nonrevocable )
+              {
+                tty_printf("\n");
+                tty_printf(
+			 _("WARNING: the signature will not be marked "
+			   "as non-revocable.\n"));
+              }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    if( local )
+              {
+                tty_printf("\n");
+                tty_printf(
+		     _("The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
+              }
+
+	    if( nonrevocable )
+              {
+                tty_printf("\n");
+                tty_printf(
+		      _("The signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
+              }
+
+	    switch(class)
+	      {
+	      case 0x11:
+                tty_printf("\n");
+		tty_printf(_("I have not checked this key at all.\n"));
+		break;
+
+	      case 0x12:
+                tty_printf("\n");
+		tty_printf(_("I have checked this key casually.\n"));
+		break;
+
+	      case 0x13:
+                tty_printf("\n");
+		tty_printf(_("I have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
+		break;
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	tty_printf("\n");
+
+	if( opt.batch && opt.answer_yes )
+	  ;
+	else if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.okay",
+					_("Really sign? (y/N) ")) )
+	    continue;
+
+	/* now we can sign the user ids */
+      reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
+	primary_pk = NULL;
+	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+		     && (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ) {
+		PACKET *pkt;
+		PKT_signature *sig;
+		struct sign_attrib attrib;
+
+		assert( primary_pk );
+		memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
+		attrib.non_exportable = local;
+		attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
+		attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
+		attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
+		attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
+		node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+
+                /* we force creation of a v4 signature for local
+                 * signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
+                 * subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
+                 * exportable */
+
+		if(selfsig)
+		  rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
+					   node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+					   NULL,
+					   sk,
+					   0x13, 0, force_v4?4:0, 0, 0,
+					   keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk);
+		else
+		  rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
+					   node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+					   NULL,
+					   sk,
+					   class, 0, force_v4?4:0,
+					   timestamp, duration,
+					   sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+		    goto leave;
+		}
+
+		*ret_modified = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
+		update_trust = 1;
+
+		pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+		pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+		insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
+		goto reloop;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
+	for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	  if( node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
+	    delete_kbnode(node);
+    } /* end loop over signators */
+
+  leave:
+    release_sk_list( sk_list );
+    if( sk )
+	free_secret_key(sk);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys.
+ * We use only one passphrase for all keys.
+ */
+static int
+change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int changed=0;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    char *passphrase = NULL;
+    int no_primary_secrets = 0;
+    int any;
+
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_error("Oops; secret key not found anymore!\n");
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+    for (any = 0, node=keyblock; node; node = node->next) {
+	if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY 
+            || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) {
+	    PKT_secret_key *tmpsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+            if (!(tmpsk->is_protected
+                  && (tmpsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 
+                      || tmpsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002))) {
+                any = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (!any) {
+        tty_printf (_("Key has only stub or on-card key items - "
+                      "no passphrase to change.\n"));
+        goto leave;
+    }
+        
+    /* See how to handle this key.  */
+    switch( is_secret_key_protected( sk ) ) {
+      case -1:
+	rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+	break;
+      case 0:
+	tty_printf(_("This key is not protected.\n"));
+	break;
+      default:
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n"));
+	    no_primary_secrets = 1;
+	}
+	else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are stored on-card.\n"));
+	    no_primary_secrets = 1;
+	}
+	else {
+	    tty_printf(_("Key is protected.\n"));
+	    rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+	    if( !rc )
+		passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+
+    /* Unprotect all subkeys (use the supplied passphrase or ask)*/
+    for(node=keyblock; !rc && node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+            if ( !(subsk->is_protected
+                   && (subsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 
+                       || subsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002))) {
+                set_next_passphrase( passphrase );
+                rc = check_secret_key( subsk, 0 );
+                if( !rc && !passphrase )
+                    passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
+            }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( rc )
+	tty_printf(_("Can't edit this key: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+    else {
+	DEK *dek = NULL;
+	STRING2KEY *s2k = xmalloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
+        const char *errtext = NULL;
+
+	tty_printf(_("Enter the new passphrase for this secret key.\n\n") );
+
+	set_next_passphrase( NULL );
+	for(;;) {
+	    s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
+	    s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+	    dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.s2k_cipher_algo,
+                                     s2k, 2, errtext, NULL);
+	    if( !dek ) {
+		errtext = N_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again");
+		tty_printf ("%s.\n", _(errtext));
+	    }
+	    else if( !dek->keylen ) {
+		rc = 0;
+		tty_printf(_( "You don't want a passphrase -"
+			    " this is probably a *bad* idea!\n\n"));
+		if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("change_passwd.empty.okay",
+			       _("Do you really want to do this? (y/N) ")))
+		  {
+		    changed++;
+		    break;
+		  }
+	    }
+	    else { /* okay */
+		rc = 0;
+		if( !no_primary_secrets ) {
+		    sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+		    sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+		    rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
+		}
+		for(node=keyblock; !rc && node; node = node->next ) {
+		    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+			PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                        if ( !(subsk->is_protected
+                               && (subsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 
+                                   || subsk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002))) {
+                            subsk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+                            subsk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+                            rc = protect_secret_key( subsk, dek );
+                        }
+		    }
+		}
+		if( rc )
+		    log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n",
+                              g10_errstr(rc) );
+		else
+		    changed++;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	xfree(s2k);
+	xfree(dek);
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    xfree( passphrase );
+    set_next_passphrase( NULL );
+    return changed && !rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * There are some keys out (due to a bug in gnupg), where the sequence
+ * of the packets is wrong.  This function fixes that.
+ * Returns: true if the keyblock has been fixed.
+ *
+ * Note:  This function does not work if there is more than one user ID.
+ */
+static int
+fix_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE node, last, subkey;
+    int fixed=0;
+
+    /* locate key signatures of class 0x10..0x13 behind sub key packets */
+    for( subkey=last=NULL, node = keyblock; node;
+					    last=node, node = node->next ) {
+	switch( node->pkt->pkttype ) {
+	  case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+	  case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+	    if( !subkey )
+		subkey = last; /* actually it is the one before the subkey */
+	    break;
+	  case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+	    if( subkey ) {
+		PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+		if( sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && sig->sig_class <= 0x13 ) {
+		    log_info(_(
+			"moving a key signature to the correct place\n"));
+		    last->next = node->next;
+		    node->next = subkey->next;
+		    subkey->next = node;
+		    node = last;
+		    fixed=1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	  default: break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return fixed;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_sign_type(const char *str,int *localsig,int *nonrevokesig,int *trustsig)
+{
+  const char *p=str;
+
+  while(*p)
+    {
+      if(ascii_strncasecmp(p,"l",1)==0)
+	{
+	  *localsig=1;
+	  p++;
+	}
+      else if(ascii_strncasecmp(p,"nr",2)==0)
+	{
+	  *nonrevokesig=1;
+	  p+=2;
+	}
+      else if(ascii_strncasecmp(p,"t",1)==0)
+	{
+	  *trustsig=1;
+	  p++;
+	}
+      else
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Menu driven key editor.  If seckey_check is true, then a secret key
+ * that matches username will be looked for.  If it is false, not all
+ * commands will be available.
+ *
+ * Note: to keep track of some selection we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
+ */
+
+/* Need an SK for this command */
+#define KEYEDIT_NEED_SK 1
+/* Cannot be viewing the SK for this command */
+#define KEYEDIT_NOT_SK  2
+/* Must be viewing the SK for this command */
+#define KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK 4
+/* Match the tail of the string */
+#define KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH 8
+
+enum cmdids
+  {
+    cmdNONE = 0,
+    cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
+    cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY, cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG,
+    cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
+    cmdADDREVOKER, cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
+    cmdEXPIRE, cmdBACKSIGN, cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY, cmdSHOWPREF,
+    cmdSETPREF, cmdPREFKS, cmdNOTATION, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST,
+    cmdCHKTRUST, cmdADDCARDKEY, cmdKEYTOCARD, cmdBKUPTOCARD, cmdCLEAN,
+    cmdMINIMIZE, cmdNOP
+  };
+
+static struct
+{
+  const char *name;
+  enum cmdids id;
+  int flags;
+  const char *desc;
+} cmds[] =
+  { 
+    { "quit"    , cmdQUIT      , 0, N_("quit this menu") },
+    { "q"       , cmdQUIT      , 0, NULL   },
+    { "save"    , cmdSAVE      , 0, N_("save and quit") },
+    { "help"    , cmdHELP      , 0, N_("show this help") },
+    { "?"       , cmdHELP      , 0, NULL   },
+    { "fpr"     , cmdFPR       , 0, N_("show key fingerprint") },
+    { "list"    , cmdLIST      , 0, N_("list key and user IDs") },
+    { "l"       , cmdLIST      , 0, NULL   },
+    { "uid"     , cmdSELUID    , 0, N_("select user ID N") },
+    { "key"     , cmdSELKEY    , 0, N_("select subkey N") },
+    { "check"   , cmdCHECK     , 0, N_("check signatures") },
+    { "c"       , cmdCHECK     , 0, NULL },
+    { "cross-certify", cmdBACKSIGN  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+    { "backsign", cmdBACKSIGN  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+    { "sign"    , cmdSIGN      , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH,
+      N_("sign selected user IDs [* see below for related commands]") },
+    { "s"       , cmdSIGN      , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL },
+    /* "lsign" and friends will never match since "sign" comes first
+       and it is a tail match.  They are just here so they show up in
+       the help menu. */
+    { "lsign"   , cmdNOP       , 0, N_("sign selected user IDs locally") },
+    { "tsign"   , cmdNOP       , 0,
+      N_("sign selected user IDs with a trust signature") },
+    { "nrsign"  , cmdNOP       , 0,
+      N_("sign selected user IDs with a non-revocable signature") },
+
+    { "debug"   , cmdDEBUG     , 0, NULL },
+    { "adduid"  , cmdADDUID    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("add a user ID") },
+    { "addphoto", cmdADDPHOTO  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("add a photo ID") },
+    { "deluid"  , cmdDELUID    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("delete selected user IDs") },
+    /* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
+    { "delphoto", cmdDELUID    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, NULL },
+
+    { "addkey"  , cmdADDKEY    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("add a subkey") },
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+    { "addcardkey", cmdADDCARDKEY , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("add a key to a smartcard") },
+    { "keytocard", cmdKEYTOCARD , KEYEDIT_NEED_SK|KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK, 
+      N_("move a key to a smartcard")},
+    { "bkuptocard", cmdBKUPTOCARD , KEYEDIT_NEED_SK|KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK, 
+      N_("move a backup key to a smartcard")},
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+
+    { "delkey"  , cmdDELKEY    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("delete selected subkeys") },
+    { "addrevoker",cmdADDREVOKER,KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("add a revocation key") },
+    { "delsig"  , cmdDELSIG    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("delete signatures from the selected user IDs") },
+    { "expire"  , cmdEXPIRE    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("change the expiration date for the key or selected subkeys") },
+    { "primary" , cmdPRIMARY   , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("flag the selected user ID as primary")},
+    { "toggle"  , cmdTOGGLE    , KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("toggle between the secret and public key listings") },
+    { "t"       , cmdTOGGLE    , KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+    { "pref"    , cmdPREF      , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("list preferences (expert)")},
+    { "showpref", cmdSHOWPREF  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("list preferences (verbose)") },
+    { "setpref" , cmdSETPREF   , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("set preference list for the selected user IDs") },
+    /* Alias */
+    { "updpref" , cmdSETPREF   , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+
+    { "keyserver",cmdPREFKS    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("set the preferred keyserver URL for the selected user IDs")},
+    { "notation", cmdNOTATION  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("set a notation for the selected user IDs")},
+    { "passwd"  , cmdPASSWD    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("change the passphrase") },
+    /* Alias */
+    { "password", cmdPASSWD    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+
+    { "trust"   , cmdTRUST     , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("change the ownertrust") },
+    { "revsig"  , cmdREVSIG    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("revoke signatures on the selected user IDs") },
+    { "revuid"  , cmdREVUID    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("revoke selected user IDs") },
+    /* Alias */
+    { "revphoto", cmdREVUID    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK, NULL },
+
+    { "revkey"  , cmdREVKEY    , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK|KEYEDIT_NEED_SK,
+      N_("revoke key or selected subkeys") },
+    { "enable"  , cmdENABLEKEY , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("enable key") },
+    { "disable" , cmdDISABLEKEY, KEYEDIT_NOT_SK, N_("disable key") },
+    { "showphoto",cmdSHOWPHOTO , 0, N_("show selected photo IDs") },
+    { "clean",    cmdCLEAN     , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove unusable signatures from key")},
+    { "minimize", cmdMINIMIZE  , KEYEDIT_NOT_SK,
+      N_("compact unusable user IDs and remove all signatures from key") },
+    { NULL, cmdNONE, 0, NULL }
+  };
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+
+/* These two functions are used by readline for command completion. */
+
+static char *
+command_generator(const char *text,int state)
+{
+  static int list_index,len;
+  const char *name;
+
+  /* If this is a new word to complete, initialize now.  This includes
+     saving the length of TEXT for efficiency, and initializing the
+     index variable to 0. */
+  if(!state)
+    {
+      list_index=0;
+      len=strlen(text);
+    }
+
+  /* Return the next partial match */
+  while((name=cmds[list_index].name))
+    {
+      /* Only complete commands that have help text */
+      if(cmds[list_index++].desc && strncmp(name,text,len)==0)
+	return strdup(name);
+    }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static char **
+keyedit_completion(const char *text, int start, int end)
+{
+  /* If we are at the start of a line, we try and command-complete.
+     If not, just do nothing for now. */
+
+  if(start==0)
+    return rl_completion_matches(text,command_generator);
+
+  rl_attempted_completion_over=1;
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBREADLINE */
+
+
+void
+keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr,
+	      STRLIST commands, int quiet, int seckey_check )
+{
+    enum cmdids cmd = 0;
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
+    KBNODE sec_keyblock = NULL;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE sec_kdbhd = NULL;
+    KBNODE cur_keyblock;
+    char *answer = NULL;
+    int redisplay = 1;
+    int modified = 0;
+    int sec_modified = 0;
+    int toggle;
+    int have_commands = !!commands;
+
+    if ( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+        ;
+    else if( opt.batch && !have_commands )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+    /* Due to Windows peculiarities we need to make sure that the
+       trustdb stale check is done before we open another file
+       (i.e. by searching for a key).  In theory we could make sure
+       that the files are closed after use but the open/close caches
+       inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale
+       check is not easy to implement.  Thus we take the easy way out
+       and run the stale check as early as possible.  Note, that for
+       non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to
+       get_validity ().  */
+    check_trustdb_stale ();
+#endif
+
+    /* Get the public key */
+    rc = get_pubkey_byname (NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1);
+    if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+    if( fix_keyblock( keyblock ) )
+	modified++;
+    if( collapse_uids( &keyblock ) )
+	modified++;
+    reorder_keyblock(keyblock);
+
+    if(seckey_check)
+      {/* see whether we have a matching secret key */
+        PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+        sec_kdbhd = keydb_new (1);
+        {
+            byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+            size_t an;
+
+            fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
+            while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN) 
+                afp[an++] = 0;
+            rc = keydb_search_fpr (sec_kdbhd, afp);
+        }
+	if (!rc)
+	  {
+	    rc = keydb_get_keyblock (sec_kdbhd, &sec_keyblock);
+	    if (rc)
+	      {
+		log_error (_("error reading secret keyblock \"%s\": %s\n"),
+			   username, g10_errstr(rc));
+	      }
+            else
+	      {
+                merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+                if( fix_keyblock( sec_keyblock ) )
+		  sec_modified++;
+	      }
+	  }
+
+        if (rc) {
+            sec_keyblock = NULL;
+            keydb_release (sec_kdbhd); sec_kdbhd = NULL;
+            rc = 0;
+        }
+
+	if( sec_keyblock && !quiet )
+	  tty_printf(_("Secret key is available.\n"));
+    }
+
+    toggle = 0;
+    cur_keyblock = keyblock;
+    for(;;) { /* main loop */
+	int i, arg_number, photo;
+        const char *arg_string = "";
+	char *p;
+	PKT_public_key *pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	tty_printf("\n");
+
+	if( redisplay && !quiet )
+	  {
+	    show_key_with_all_names( cur_keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 );
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	    redisplay = 0;
+	  }
+	do {
+	    xfree(answer);
+	    if( have_commands ) {
+		if( commands ) {
+		    answer = xstrdup( commands->d );
+		    commands = commands->next;
+		}
+		else if( opt.batch ) {
+		    answer = xstrdup("quit");
+		}
+		else
+		    have_commands = 0;
+	    }
+	    if( !have_commands )
+	      {
+		tty_enable_completion(keyedit_completion);
+		answer = cpr_get_no_help("keyedit.prompt", _("Command> "));
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+		tty_disable_completion();
+	      }
+	    trim_spaces(answer);
+	} while( *answer == '#' );
+
+	arg_number = 0; /* Yes, here is the init which egcc complains about */
+	photo = 0; /* This too */
+	if( !*answer )
+	    cmd = cmdLIST;
+	else if( *answer == CONTROL_D )
+	    cmd = cmdQUIT;
+	else if( digitp(answer ) ) {
+	    cmd = cmdSELUID;
+	    arg_number = atoi(answer);
+	}
+	else {
+	    if( (p=strchr(answer,' ')) ) {
+		*p++ = 0;
+		trim_spaces(answer);
+		trim_spaces(p);
+		arg_number = atoi(p);
+                arg_string = p;
+	    }
+
+	    for(i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ )
+	      {
+		if(cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_TAIL_MATCH)
+		  {
+		    size_t l=strlen(cmds[i].name);
+		    size_t a=strlen(answer);
+		    if(a>=l)
+		      {
+			if(ascii_strcasecmp(&answer[a-l],cmds[i].name)==0)
+			  {
+			    answer[a-l]='\0';
+			    break;
+			  }
+		      }
+		  }
+		else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( answer, cmds[i].name ) )
+		  break;
+	      }
+	    if((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !sec_keyblock )
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
+		cmd = cmdNOP;
+	      }
+	    else if(((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NOT_SK) && sec_keyblock
+		     && toggle)
+                    ||((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_ONLY_SK) && sec_keyblock
+		       && !toggle))
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("Please use the command \"toggle\" first.\n"));
+		cmd = cmdNOP;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      cmd = cmds[i].id;
+	}
+	switch( cmd )
+	  {
+	  case cmdHELP:
+	    for(i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ )
+	      {
+		if((cmds[i].flags & KEYEDIT_NEED_SK) && !sec_keyblock )
+		  ; /* skip if we do not have the secret key */
+		else if( cmds[i].desc )
+		  tty_printf("%-11s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc) );
+	      }
+
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	    tty_printf(_(
+"* The `sign' command may be prefixed with an `l' for local "
+"signatures (lsign),\n"
+"  a `t' for trust signatures (tsign), an `nr' for non-revocable signatures\n"
+"  (nrsign), or any combination thereof (ltsign, tnrsign, etc.).\n"));
+
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdLIST:
+	    redisplay = 1;
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdFPR:
+	    show_key_and_fingerprint( keyblock );
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdSELUID:
+	    if(strlen(arg_string)==NAMEHASH_LEN*2)
+	      redisplay=menu_select_uid_namehash(cur_keyblock,arg_string);
+	    else
+	      redisplay=menu_select_uid(cur_keyblock,arg_number);
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdSELKEY:
+	    if( menu_select_key( cur_keyblock, arg_number ) )
+		redisplay = 1;
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdCHECK:
+	    /* we can only do this with the public key becuase the
+	     * check functions can't cope with secret keys and it
+	     * is questionable whether this would make sense at all */
+	    check_all_keysigs( keyblock, count_selected_uids(keyblock) );
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdSIGN: /* sign (only the public key) */
+	    {
+	      int localsig=0,nonrevokesig=0,trustsig=0,interactive=0;
+
+	      if( pk->is_revoked )
+		{
+		  tty_printf(_("Key is revoked."));
+
+		  if(opt.expert)
+		    {
+		      tty_printf("  ");
+		      if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
+						_("Are you sure you still want"
+						  " to sign it? (y/N) ")))
+			break;
+		    }
+		  else
+		    {
+		      tty_printf(_("  Unable to sign.\n"));
+		      break;
+		    }
+		}
+
+	      if(count_uids(keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids(keyblock)
+		 && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
+					   _("Really sign all user IDs?"
+					     " (y/N) ")))
+                {
+                  if(opt.interactive)
+		    interactive=1;
+		  else
+                    {
+		      tty_printf(_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
+                      have_commands = 0;
+                      break;
+                    }
+
+                }
+	      /* What sort of signing are we doing? */
+	      if(!parse_sign_type(answer,&localsig,&nonrevokesig,&trustsig))
+		{
+		  tty_printf(_("Unknown signature type `%s'\n"),answer);
+		  break;
+		}
+
+	      sign_uids(keyblock, locusr, &modified,
+			localsig, nonrevokesig, trustsig, interactive);
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdDEBUG:
+	    dump_kbnode( cur_keyblock );
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdTOGGLE:
+	    toggle = !toggle;
+	    cur_keyblock = toggle? sec_keyblock : keyblock;
+	    redisplay = 1;
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdADDPHOTO:
+            if (RFC2440 || RFC1991 || PGP2)
+              {
+                tty_printf(
+                   _("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
+		   RFC2440?"OpenPGP":PGP2?"PGP2":"RFC-1991");
+                break;
+              }
+	    photo=1;
+	    /* fall through */
+
+	  case cmdADDUID:
+	    if( menu_adduid( keyblock, sec_keyblock, photo, arg_string ) )
+	      {
+	        update_trust = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+		sec_modified = modified = 1;
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	      }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdDELUID: {
+		int n1;
+
+		if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
+		    tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
+		else if( real_uids_left(keyblock) < 1 )
+		    tty_printf(_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
+		else if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
+	       	n1 > 1? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
+			    : _("Really remove this user ID? (y/N) ")
+		       ) ) {
+		    menu_deluid( keyblock, sec_keyblock );
+		    redisplay = 1;
+		    modified = 1;
+		    if( sec_keyblock )
+		       sec_modified = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdDELSIG: {
+		int n1;
+
+		if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
+		    tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
+		else if( menu_delsig( keyblock ) ) {
+		    /* no redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
+		     * status output of delsig */
+		    modified = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdADDKEY:
+	    if( generate_subkeypair( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		sec_modified = modified = 1;
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+	  case cmdADDCARDKEY:
+	    if (card_generate_subkey (keyblock, sec_keyblock)) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		sec_modified = modified = 1;
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+        case cmdKEYTOCARD:
+	  {
+	    KBNODE node=NULL;
+	    switch ( count_selected_keys (sec_keyblock) )
+	      {
+	      case 0:
+		if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.keytocard.use_primary",
+				     _("Really move the primary key? (y/N) ")))
+		  node = sec_keyblock;
+		break;
+	      case 1:
+		for (node = sec_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+		  {
+		    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY 
+			&& node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)
+		      break;
+		  }
+		break;
+	      default:
+		tty_printf(_("You must select exactly one key.\n"));
+		break;
+	      }
+	    if (node)
+	      {
+		PKT_public_key *xxpk = find_pk_from_sknode (keyblock, node);
+		if (card_store_subkey (node, xxpk?xxpk->pubkey_usage:0))
+		  {
+		    redisplay = 1;
+		    sec_modified = 1;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+          break;
+
+        case cmdBKUPTOCARD:
+	  {
+            /* Ask for a filename, check whether this is really a
+               backup key as generated by the card generation, parse
+               that key and store it on card. */
+	    KBNODE node;
+            const char *fname;
+            PACKET *pkt;
+            IOBUF a;
+
+            fname = arg_string;
+            if (!*fname)
+              {
+                tty_printf (_("Command expects a filename argument\n"));
+                break;
+              }
+
+            /* Open that file.  */
+            a = iobuf_open (fname);
+            if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
+              {
+                iobuf_close (a);
+                a = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+              }
+            if (!a)
+              {
+	        tty_printf (_("Can't open `%s': %s\n"),
+                            fname, strerror(errno));
+                break;
+              }
+            
+            /* Parse and check that file.  */
+            pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+            init_packet (pkt);
+            rc = parse_packet (a, pkt);
+            iobuf_close (a);
+            iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)fname); /* (invalidate cache).  */
+            if (!rc 
+                && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY 
+                && pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+              rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+            if (rc)
+              {
+                tty_printf(_("Error reading backup key from `%s': %s\n"),
+                           fname, g10_errstr (rc));
+                free_packet (pkt);
+                xfree (pkt);
+                break;
+              }
+            node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+
+            /* Store it.  */
+            if (card_store_subkey (node, 0))
+              {
+                redisplay = 1;
+                sec_modified = 1;
+              }
+            release_kbnode (node);
+	  }
+          break;
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+
+	  case cmdDELKEY: {
+		int n1;
+
+		if( !(n1=count_selected_keys( keyblock )) )
+		    tty_printf(_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
+		else if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes( "keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
+		       n1 > 1?
+		   _("Do you really want to delete the selected keys? (y/N) "):
+			_("Do you really want to delete this key? (y/N) ")
+		       ))
+		    ;
+		else {
+		    menu_delkey( keyblock, sec_keyblock );
+		    redisplay = 1;
+		    modified = 1;
+		    if( sec_keyblock )
+		       sec_modified = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdADDREVOKER:
+	    {
+	      int sensitive=0;
+
+	      if(ascii_strcasecmp(arg_string,"sensitive")==0)
+		sensitive=1;
+	      if( menu_addrevoker( keyblock, sec_keyblock, sensitive ) ) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		sec_modified = modified = 1;
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	      }
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdREVUID: {
+		int n1;
+
+		if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
+		    tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
+		else if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
+			    "keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
+		       n1 > 1? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? (y/N) ")
+		             : _("Really revoke this user ID? (y/N) ")
+		       ) ) {
+		  if(menu_revuid(keyblock,sec_keyblock))
+		    {
+		      modified=1;
+		      redisplay=1;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdREVKEY:
+	    {
+	      int n1;
+
+	      if( !(n1=count_selected_keys( keyblock )) )
+		{
+		  if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
+					   _("Do you really want to revoke"
+					     " the entire key? (y/N) ")))
+		    {
+		      if(menu_revkey(keyblock,sec_keyblock))
+			modified=1;
+
+		      redisplay=1;
+		    }
+		}
+	      else if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
+					    n1 > 1?
+					    _("Do you really want to revoke"
+					      " the selected subkeys? (y/N) "):
+					    _("Do you really want to revoke"
+					      " this subkey? (y/N) ")))
+		{
+		  if( menu_revsubkey( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) )
+		    modified = 1;
+
+		  redisplay = 1;
+		}
+
+	      if(modified)
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdEXPIRE:
+	    if( menu_expire( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) )
+	      {
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+		sec_modified = 1;
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	      }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdBACKSIGN:
+	    if(menu_backsign(keyblock,sec_keyblock))
+	      {
+		sec_modified = 1;
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	      }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdPRIMARY:
+	    if( menu_set_primary_uid ( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdPASSWD:
+	    if( change_passphrase( sec_keyblock ) )
+		sec_modified = 1;
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdTRUST:
+	    if(opt.trust_model==TM_EXTERNAL)
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("Owner trust may not be set while "
+			     "using an user provided trust database\n"));
+		break;
+	      }
+
+	    show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0 );
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	    if( edit_ownertrust( find_kbnode( keyblock,
+                                 PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key, 1 ) ) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		/* No real need to set update_trust here as
+		   edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
+		   anyway. */
+		update_trust=1;
+            }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdPREF:
+	    {
+	      int count=count_selected_uids(keyblock);
+	      assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	      show_names(keyblock,keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+			 count?NODFLG_SELUID:0,1);
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdSHOWPREF:
+	    {
+	      int count=count_selected_uids(keyblock);
+	      assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	      show_names(keyblock,keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+			 count?NODFLG_SELUID:0,2);
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+          case cmdSETPREF:
+	    {
+	      PKT_user_id *tempuid;
+
+	      keygen_set_std_prefs(!*arg_string?"default" : arg_string, 0);
+
+	      tempuid=keygen_get_std_prefs();
+	      tty_printf(_("Set preference list to:\n"));
+	      show_prefs(tempuid,NULL,1);
+	      free_user_id(tempuid);
+
+	      if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.setpref.okay",
+				       count_selected_uids (keyblock)?
+				       _("Really update the preferences"
+					 " for the selected user IDs? (y/N) "):
+				       _("Really update the preferences? (y/N) ")))
+		{
+		  if ( menu_set_preferences (keyblock, sec_keyblock) )
+		    {
+		      merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
+		      modified = 1;
+		      redisplay = 1;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdPREFKS:
+	    if( menu_set_keyserver_url ( *arg_string?arg_string:NULL,
+					 keyblock, sec_keyblock ) )
+	      {
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	      }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdNOTATION:
+	    if( menu_set_notation ( *arg_string?arg_string:NULL,
+				    keyblock, sec_keyblock ) )
+	      {
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	      }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdNOP:
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdREVSIG:
+	    if( menu_revsig( keyblock ) ) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		modified = 1;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdENABLEKEY:
+	  case cmdDISABLEKEY:
+	    if( enable_disable_key( keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY ) ) {
+		redisplay = 1;
+		modified = 1;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
+	    menu_showphoto(keyblock);
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdCLEAN:
+	    redisplay=modified=menu_clean(keyblock,0);
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdMINIMIZE:
+	    redisplay=modified=menu_clean(keyblock,1);
+	    break;
+
+	  case cmdQUIT:
+	    if( have_commands )
+		goto leave;
+	    if( !modified && !sec_modified )
+		goto leave;
+	    if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.save.okay",
+					_("Save changes? (y/N) ")) ) {
+		if( cpr_enabled()
+		    || cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.cancel.okay",
+					     _("Quit without saving? (y/N) ")))
+		    goto leave;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    /* fall thru */
+	  case cmdSAVE:
+	    if( modified || sec_modified  ) {
+		if( modified ) {
+		    rc = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error(_("update failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+		if( sec_modified ) {
+		    rc = keydb_update_keyblock (sec_kdbhd, sec_keyblock );
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error( _("update secret failed: %s\n"),
+                                   g10_errstr(rc) );
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+		tty_printf(_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
+
+	    if( update_trust )
+	      {
+		revalidation_mark ();
+		update_trust=0;
+	      }
+	    goto leave;
+
+	  case cmdINVCMD:
+	  default:
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	    tty_printf(_("Invalid command  (try \"help\")\n"));
+	    break;
+	}
+    } /* end main loop */
+
+  leave:
+    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+    release_kbnode( sec_keyblock );
+    keydb_release (kdbhd);
+    xfree(answer);
+}
+
+static void
+tty_print_notations(int indent,PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  int first=1;
+  struct notation *notation,*nd;
+
+  if(indent<0)
+    {
+      first=0;
+      indent=-indent;
+    }
+
+  notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+  for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
+    {
+      if(!first)
+	tty_printf("%*s",indent,"");
+      else
+	first=0;
+
+      tty_print_utf8_string(nd->name,strlen(nd->name));
+      tty_printf("=");
+      tty_print_utf8_string(nd->value,strlen(nd->value));
+      tty_printf("\n");
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notation);
+}
+
+/****************
+ * show preferences of a public keyblock.
+ */
+static void
+show_prefs (PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_signature *selfsig, int verbose)
+{
+    const prefitem_t fake={0,0};
+    const prefitem_t *prefs;
+    int i;
+
+    if( !uid )
+        return;
+
+    if( uid->prefs )
+        prefs=uid->prefs;
+    else if(verbose)
+        prefs=&fake;
+    else
+      return;
+
+    if (verbose) {
+        int any, des_seen=0, sha1_seen=0, uncomp_seen=0;
+
+        tty_printf ("     ");
+	tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
+        for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+            if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
+                const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
+                
+                if (any)
+                    tty_printf (", ");
+                any = 1;
+                /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
+                if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
+                    tty_printf ("%s", s );
+                else
+                    tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
+                if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES )
+                    des_seen = 1;
+            }    
+        }
+        if (!des_seen) {
+            if (any)
+                tty_printf (", ");
+            tty_printf ("%s",cipher_algo_to_string(CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
+        }
+        tty_printf ("\n     ");
+	tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
+        for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+            if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
+                const char *s = digest_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
+                
+                if (any)
+                    tty_printf (", ");
+                any = 1;
+                /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
+                if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
+                    tty_printf ("%s", s );
+                else
+                    tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
+                if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 )
+                    sha1_seen = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!sha1_seen) {
+            if (any)
+                tty_printf (", ");
+            tty_printf ("%s",digest_algo_to_string(DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
+        }
+        tty_printf ("\n     ");
+	tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
+        for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+            if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
+                const char *s=compress_algo_to_string(prefs[i].value);
+                
+                if (any)
+                    tty_printf (", ");
+                any = 1;
+                /* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
+                if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
+                    tty_printf ("%s", s );
+                else
+                    tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
+                if (prefs[i].value == COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE )
+                    uncomp_seen = 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!uncomp_seen) {
+            if (any)
+                tty_printf (", ");
+	    else {
+	      tty_printf ("%s",compress_algo_to_string(COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP));
+	      tty_printf (", ");
+	    }
+	    tty_printf ("%s",compress_algo_to_string(COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE));
+        }
+	if(uid->flags.mdc || !uid->flags.ks_modify)
+	  {
+	    tty_printf ("\n     ");
+	    tty_printf (_("Features: "));
+	    any=0;
+	    if(uid->flags.mdc)
+	      {
+		tty_printf ("MDC");
+		any=1;
+	      }
+	    if(!uid->flags.ks_modify)
+	      {
+		if(any)
+		  tty_printf (", ");
+		tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
+	      }
+	  }
+	tty_printf("\n");
+
+	if(selfsig)
+	  {
+	    const byte *pref_ks;
+	    size_t pref_ks_len;
+
+	    pref_ks=parse_sig_subpkt(selfsig->hashed,
+				     SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&pref_ks_len);
+	    if(pref_ks && pref_ks_len)
+	      {
+		tty_printf ("     ");
+		tty_printf(_("Preferred keyserver: "));
+		tty_print_utf8_string(pref_ks,pref_ks_len);
+		tty_printf("\n");
+	      }
+
+	    if(selfsig->flags.notation)
+	      {
+		tty_printf ("     ");
+		tty_printf(_("Notations: "));
+		tty_print_notations(5+strlen(_("Notations: ")),selfsig);
+	      }
+	  }
+    }
+    else {
+        tty_printf("    ");
+        for(i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+            tty_printf( " %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM   ? 'S' :
+                                 prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH  ? 'H' :
+                                 prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z':'?',
+                                 prefs[i].value);
+        }
+        if (uid->flags.mdc)
+            tty_printf (" [mdc]");
+        if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
+            tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
+        tty_printf("\n");
+    }
+}
+
+/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
+   opt.with_colons is used.  It prints all available data in a easy to
+   parse format and does not translate utf8 */
+static void
+show_key_with_all_names_colon (KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int i, j, ulti_hack=0;
+  byte pk_version=0;
+  PKT_public_key *primary=NULL;
+
+  /* the keys */
+  for ( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+          || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) )
+        {
+          PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+          u32 keyid[2];
+
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+            {
+              pk_version = pk->version;
+	      primary=pk;
+	    }
+
+          keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+
+          fputs (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY?"pub:":"sub:", stdout);
+          if (!pk->is_valid)
+            putchar ('i');
+          else if (pk->is_revoked)
+            putchar ('r');
+          else if (pk->has_expired)
+            putchar ('e');
+          else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ))
+	    {
+	      int trust = get_validity_info (pk, NULL);
+	      if(trust=='u')
+		ulti_hack=1;
+	      putchar (trust);
+	    }
+
+          printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu::",
+                  nbits_from_pk (pk),
+                  pk->pubkey_algo,
+                  (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+                  (ulong)pk->timestamp,
+                  (ulong)pk->expiredate );
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	      && !(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ))
+	    putchar(get_ownertrust_info (pk));
+          putchar(':');
+          putchar('\n');
+          
+          print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
+	  print_revokers(pk);
+        }
+    }
+  
+    /* the user ids */
+    i = 0;
+    for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next) 
+      {
+	if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+          {
+            PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	    ++i;
+
+	    if(uid->attrib_data)
+	      printf("uat:");
+	    else
+	      printf("uid:");
+
+	    if ( uid->is_revoked )
+	      printf("r::::::::");
+	    else if ( uid->is_expired )
+	      printf("e::::::::");
+	    else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
+	      printf("::::::::");
+	    else
+	      {
+		int uid_validity;
+
+		if( primary && !ulti_hack )
+		  uid_validity = get_validity_info( primary, uid );
+		else
+		  uid_validity = 'u';
+		printf("%c::::::::",uid_validity);
+	      }
+
+	    if(uid->attrib_data)
+	      printf ("%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
+	    else
+	      print_string (stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ':');
+
+            putchar (':');
+            /* signature class */
+            putchar (':');
+            /* capabilities */
+            putchar (':');
+            /* preferences */
+            if (pk_version>3 || uid->selfsigversion>3)
+              {
+                const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
+                
+                for (j=0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
+                  {
+                    if (j)
+                      putchar (' ');
+                    printf ("%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM   ? 'S' :
+                            prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH  ? 'H' :
+                            prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z':'?',
+                            prefs[j].value);
+                  } 
+                if (uid->flags.mdc)
+                  printf (",mdc");
+                if (!uid->flags.ks_modify)
+                  printf (",no-ks-modify");
+              } 
+            putchar (':');
+            /* flags */
+            printf ("%d,", i);
+            if (uid->is_primary)
+              putchar ('p');
+            if (uid->is_revoked)
+              putchar ('r');
+            if (uid->is_expired)
+              putchar ('e');
+            if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
+              putchar ('s');
+            if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
+              putchar ('m');
+            putchar (':');
+            putchar('\n');
+          }
+      }
+}
+
+static void
+show_names(KBNODE keyblock,PKT_public_key *pk,unsigned int flag,int with_prefs)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int i=0;
+
+  for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	  && !is_deleted_kbnode(node))
+	{
+	  PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  ++i;
+	  if(!flag || (flag && (node->flag & flag)))
+	    {
+	      if(!(flag&NODFLG_MARK_A) && pk)
+		tty_printf("%s ",uid_trust_string_fixed(pk,uid));
+
+	      if( flag & NODFLG_MARK_A )
+		tty_printf("     ");
+	      else if( node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID )
+		tty_printf("(%d)* ", i);
+	      else if( uid->is_primary )
+		tty_printf("(%d). ", i);
+	      else
+		tty_printf("(%d)  ", i);
+	      tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+	      tty_printf("\n");
+	      if(with_prefs && pk)
+		{
+		  if(pk->version>3 || uid->selfsigversion>3)
+		    {
+		      PKT_signature *selfsig=NULL;
+		      KBNODE signode;
+
+		      for(signode=node->next;
+			  signode && signode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
+			  signode=signode->next)
+			{
+			  if(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->
+			     flags.chosen_selfsig)
+			    {
+			      selfsig=signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+			      break;
+			    }
+			}
+
+		      show_prefs (uid, selfsig, with_prefs == 2);
+		    }
+		  else
+		    tty_printf(_("There are no preferences on a"
+				 " PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only
+ * so for user ids with mark A flag set and dont display the index number
+ */
+static void
+show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
+			 int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i;
+    int do_warn = 0;
+    byte pk_version=0;
+    PKT_public_key *primary=NULL;
+
+    if (opt.with_colons)
+      {
+        show_key_with_all_names_colon (keyblock);
+        return;
+      }
+
+    /* the keys */
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	    || (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		&& !is_deleted_kbnode(node)) ) {
+	    PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    const char *otrust="err",*trust="err";
+
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+		/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
+		 * output */
+                static int did_warn = 0;
+
+                trust = get_validity_string (pk, NULL);
+		otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);
+
+                /* Show a warning once */
+                if (!did_warn
+                    && (get_validity (pk, NULL) & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK)) {
+                    did_warn = 1;
+                    do_warn = 1;
+                }
+
+		pk_version=pk->version;
+		primary=pk;
+	    }
+
+	    if(pk->is_revoked)
+	      {
+		char *user=get_user_id_string_native(pk->revoked.keyid);
+		const char *algo=pubkey_algo_to_string(pk->revoked.algo);
+		tty_printf(_("This key was revoked on %s by %s key %s\n"),
+			   revokestr_from_pk(pk),algo?algo:"?",user);
+		xfree(user);
+	      }
+
+	    if(with_revoker)
+	      {
+	        if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
+		  BUG();
+	        else
+		  for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+		    {
+		      u32 r_keyid[2];
+		      char *user;
+		      const char *algo=
+			pubkey_algo_to_string(pk->revkey[i].algid);
+
+		      keyid_from_fingerprint(pk->revkey[i].fpr,
+					     MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,r_keyid);
+
+		      user=get_user_id_string_native(r_keyid);
+		      tty_printf(_("This key may be revoked by %s key %s"),
+				 algo?algo:"?",user);
+
+		      if(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)
+			{
+			  tty_printf(" ");
+			  tty_printf(_("(sensitive)"));
+			}
+
+		      tty_printf ("\n");
+		      xfree(user);
+		    }
+	      }
+
+	    keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
+	    tty_printf("%s%c %4u%c/%s  ",
+		       node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
+		       (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)? '*':' ',
+		       nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		       pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+		       keystr(pk->keyid));
+
+	    tty_printf(_("created: %s"),datestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    tty_printf("  ");
+	    if(pk->is_revoked)
+	      tty_printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    else if(pk->has_expired)
+	      tty_printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    else
+	      tty_printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    tty_printf("  ");
+            tty_printf(_("usage: %s"),usagestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	      {
+		if(opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS)
+		  {
+		    tty_printf("%*s", (int)keystrlen()+13,"");
+		    /* Ownertrust is only meaningful for the PGP or
+		       classic trust models */
+		    if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+		      {
+			int width=14-strlen(otrust);
+			if(width<=0)
+			  width=1;
+			tty_printf(_("trust: %s"), otrust);
+			tty_printf("%*s",width,"");
+		      }
+		    
+		    tty_printf(_("validity: %s"), trust );
+		    tty_printf("\n");
+		  }
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		    && (get_ownertrust (pk)&TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
+		  {
+		    tty_printf("*** ");
+		    tty_printf(_("This key has been disabled"));
+		    tty_printf("\n");
+		  }
+	      }
+
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && with_fpr )
+	      {
+		print_fingerprint ( pk, NULL, 2 );
+		tty_printf("\n");
+	      }
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+	    || (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
+	  {
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	    tty_printf("%s%c %4u%c/%s  ",
+		       node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
+		       (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)? '*':' ',
+		       nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+		       pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+		       keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	    tty_printf(_("created: %s"),datestr_from_sk(sk));
+	    tty_printf("  ");
+	    tty_printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+            if (sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+              {
+		tty_printf("                     ");
+                tty_printf(_("card-no: ")); 
+                if (sk->protect.ivlen == 16
+                    && !memcmp (sk->protect.iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
+                  { /* This is an OpenPGP card. */
+                    for (i=8; i < 14; i++)
+                      {
+                        if (i == 10)
+                          tty_printf (" ");
+                        tty_printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+                      }
+                  }
+                else
+                  { /* Something is wrong: Print all. */
+                    for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
+                      tty_printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+                  }
+                tty_printf ("\n");
+              }
+	  }
+    }
+
+    show_names(keyblock,primary,only_marked?NODFLG_MARK_A:0,with_prefs);
+
+    if (do_warn)
+        tty_printf (_("Please note that the shown key validity"
+                      " is not necessarily correct\n"
+                      "unless you restart the program.\n")); 
+}
+
+
+/* Display basic key information.  This function is suitable to show
+   information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
+   any other internal GnuPG stuff.  KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
+   a secret key.*/
+void
+show_basic_key_info ( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int i;
+
+  /* The primary key */
+  for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+        {
+          PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+          
+          /* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
+             functions to make the translation job easier. */
+          tty_printf ("%s  %4u%c/%s  ",
+                      node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
+                      nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+                      pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+                      keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	  tty_printf(_("created: %s"),datestr_from_pk(pk));
+	  tty_printf("  ");
+	  tty_printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+          tty_printf("\n");
+          print_fingerprint ( pk, NULL, 3 );
+          tty_printf("\n");
+	}
+      else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+        {
+          PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+          tty_printf("%s  %4u%c/%s",
+                     node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
+                     nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+                     pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+                     keystr_from_sk(sk));
+	  tty_printf(_("created: %s"),datestr_from_sk(sk));
+	  tty_printf("  ");
+	  tty_printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
+          tty_printf("\n");
+          print_fingerprint (NULL, sk, 3 );
+          tty_printf("\n");
+	}
+    }
+
+  /* The user IDs. */
+  for (i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        {
+          PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+          ++i;
+     
+          tty_printf ("     ");
+          if (uid->is_revoked)
+            tty_printf("[%s] ",_("revoked"));
+          else if ( uid->is_expired )
+            tty_printf("[%s] ",_("expired"));
+          tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
+          tty_printf ("\n");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+show_key_and_fingerprint( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+
+  for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	{
+	  pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	  tty_printf("pub   %4u%c/%s %s ",
+		     nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		     pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+		     keystr_from_pk(pk),
+		     datestr_from_pk(pk) );
+	}
+      else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	{
+	  PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+  tty_printf("\n");
+  if( pk )
+    print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 2 );
+}
+
+
+/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
+   set. */
+static void
+no_primary_warning(KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int have_primary=0,uid_count=0;
+
+  /* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
+     non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
+     here as well. */
+
+  for(node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+	 && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data==NULL)
+	{
+	  uid_count++;
+
+	  if(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary==2)
+	    {
+	      have_primary=1;
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(uid_count>1 && !have_primary)
+    log_info(_("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary.  This command"
+	       " may\n              cause a different user ID to become"
+	       " the assumed primary.\n"));
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Ask for a new user id, do the selfsignature and put it into
+ * both keyblocks.
+ * Return true if there is a new user id
+ */
+static int
+menu_adduid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
+	     int photo, const char *photo_name)
+{
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk=NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig=NULL;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    KBNODE node;
+    KBNODE pub_where=NULL, sec_where=NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    for( node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	    pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    break;
+    }
+    if( !node ) /* no subkey */
+	pub_where = NULL;
+    for( node = sec_keyblock; node; sec_where = node, node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+	    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+	    break;
+    }
+    if( !node ) /* no subkey */
+	sec_where = NULL;
+    assert(pk && sk);
+
+    if(photo) {
+      int hasattrib=0;
+
+      for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+	    node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
+	  {
+	    hasattrib=1;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      /* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
+         v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
+         anymore.  Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
+         Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
+         damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
+      if(pk->version==3 && !hasattrib)
+	{
+	  if(opt.expert)
+	    {
+	      tty_printf(_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key.  "
+			   "Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
+			   "         of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
+
+	      if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
+					_("Are you sure you still want "
+					  "to add it? (y/N) ")))
+		return 0;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      tty_printf(_("You may not add a photo ID to "
+			   "a PGP2-style key.\n"));
+	      return 0;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      uid = generate_photo_id(pk,photo_name);
+    } else
+      uid = generate_user_id();
+    if( !uid )
+	return 0;
+
+    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, uid, NULL, sk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			     keygen_add_std_prefs, pk );
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("signing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	free_user_id(uid);
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* insert/append to secret keyblock */
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
+    pkt->pkt.user_id = scopy_user_id(uid);
+    node = new_kbnode(pkt);
+    if( sec_where )
+	insert_kbnode( sec_where, node, 0 );
+    else
+	add_kbnode( sec_keyblock, node );
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
+    if( sec_where )
+	insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+    else
+	add_kbnode( sec_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt) );
+    /* insert/append to public keyblock */
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
+    pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
+    node = new_kbnode(pkt);
+    if( pub_where )
+	insert_kbnode( pub_where, node, 0 );
+    else
+	add_kbnode( pub_keyblock, node );
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
+    if( pub_where )
+	insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+    else
+	add_kbnode( pub_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Remove all selected userids from the keyrings
+ */
+static void
+menu_deluid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int selected=0;
+
+    for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
+	    if( selected ) {
+		/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
+                   non-revoked user id */
+		if(!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+		  update_trust=1;
+		delete_kbnode( node );
+		if( sec_keyblock ) {
+		    KBNODE snode;
+		    int s_selected = 0;
+		    PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+		    for( snode = sec_keyblock; snode; snode = snode->next ) {
+			if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+			    PKT_user_id *suid = snode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+			    s_selected =
+				(uid->len == suid->len
+				 && !memcmp( uid->name, suid->name, uid->len));
+			    if( s_selected )
+				delete_kbnode( snode );
+			}
+			else if( s_selected
+				 && snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+			    delete_kbnode( snode );
+			else if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+			    s_selected = 0;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    delete_kbnode( node );
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    selected = 0;
+    }
+    commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+    if( sec_keyblock )
+	commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );
+}
+
+
+static int
+menu_delsig( KBNODE pub_keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
+    int changed=0;
+
+    for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
+	}
+	else if( uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	   int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;
+
+	    tty_printf("uid  ");
+	    tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+
+	    okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
+	    if(opt.with_colons)
+	      valid = print_and_check_one_sig_colon( pub_keyblock, node,
+					       &inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
+					       &selfsig, 1 );
+	    else
+	      valid = print_and_check_one_sig( pub_keyblock, node,
+					       &inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
+					       &selfsig, 1 );
+
+	   if( valid ) {
+	       okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
+		   "keyedit.delsig.valid",
+		   _("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));
+
+	       /* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
+                  The other two cases do not affect trust. */
+	       if(okay)
+		 update_trust=1;
+	   }
+	   else if( inv_sig || other_err )
+	       okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
+		   "keyedit.delsig.invalid",
+		   _("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
+	   else if( no_key )
+	       okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
+		   "keyedit.delsig.unknown",
+		   _("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));
+
+	    if( okay == -1 )
+		break;
+	   if( okay && selfsig && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
+			       "keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
+			      _("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)") ))
+		okay = 0;
+	    if( okay ) {
+		delete_kbnode( node );
+		changed++;
+	    }
+
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    uid = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if( changed ) {
+	commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+	tty_printf( changed == 1? _("Deleted %d signature.\n")
+				: _("Deleted %d signatures.\n"), changed );
+    }
+    else
+	tty_printf( _("Nothing deleted.\n") );
+
+    return changed;
+}
+
+static int
+menu_clean(KBNODE keyblock,int self_only)
+{
+  KBNODE uidnode;
+  int modified=0,select_all=!count_selected_uids(keyblock);
+
+  for(uidnode=keyblock->next;
+      uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+      uidnode=uidnode->next)
+    {
+      if(uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+	 && (uidnode->flag&NODFLG_SELUID || select_all))
+	{
+	  int uids=0,sigs=0;
+	  char *user=utf8_to_native(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
+				    0);
+
+	  clean_one_uid(keyblock,uidnode,opt.verbose,self_only,&uids,&sigs);
+	  if(uids)
+	    {
+	      const char *reason;
+
+	      if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+		reason=_("revoked");
+	      else if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		reason=_("expired");
+	      else
+		reason=_("invalid");
+
+	      tty_printf (_("User ID \"%s\" compacted: %s\n"), user, reason);
+
+	      modified=1;
+	    }
+	  else if(sigs)
+	    {
+	      tty_printf (sigs==1?
+			  _("User ID \"%s\": %d signature removed\n"):
+                          _("User ID \"%s\": %d signatures removed\n"),
+                          user,sigs);
+
+	      modified=1;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      tty_printf (self_only==1?
+                          _("User ID \"%s\": already minimized\n"):
+                          _("User ID \"%s\": already clean\n"),
+                          user);
+	    }
+
+	  xfree(user);
+	}
+    }
+
+  return modified;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Remove some of the secondary keys
+ */
+static void
+menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int selected=0;
+
+    for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
+	    if( selected ) {
+		delete_kbnode( node );
+		if( sec_keyblock ) {
+		    KBNODE snode;
+		    int s_selected = 0;
+		    u32 ki[2];
+
+		    keyid_from_pk( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, ki );
+		    for( snode = sec_keyblock; snode; snode = snode->next ) {
+			if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+			    u32 ki2[2];
+
+			    keyid_from_sk( snode->pkt->pkt.secret_key, ki2 );
+			    s_selected = (ki[0] == ki2[0] && ki[1] == ki2[1]);
+			    if( s_selected )
+				delete_kbnode( snode );
+			}
+			else if( s_selected
+				 && snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+			    delete_kbnode( snode );
+			else
+			    s_selected = 0;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    delete_kbnode( node );
+	else
+	    selected = 0;
+    }
+    commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+    if( sec_keyblock )
+	commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );
+
+    /* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
+       longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
+       trust when revoking/removing them */
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Ask for a new revoker, do the selfsignature and put it into
+ * both keyblocks.
+ * Return true if there is a new revoker
+ */
+static int
+menu_addrevoker( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock, int sensitive )
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk=NULL,*revoker_pk=NULL;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk=NULL;
+  PKT_signature *sig=NULL;
+  PACKET *pkt;
+  struct revocation_key revkey;
+  size_t fprlen;
+  int rc;
+
+  assert(pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+  assert(sec_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY);
+
+  pk=pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+  if(pk->numrevkeys==0 && pk->version==3)
+    {
+      /* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
+         v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
+         anymore.  Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
+         Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
+         any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
+      if(opt.expert)
+	{
+	  tty_printf(_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key.  "
+		       "Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
+		       "         some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
+
+	  if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
+				    _("Are you sure you still want "
+				      "to add it? (y/N) ")))
+	    return 0;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  tty_printf(_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
+		       "a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+  sk=copy_secret_key(NULL,sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      char *answer;
+
+      if(revoker_pk)
+	free_public_key(revoker_pk);
+
+      revoker_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*revoker_pk));
+
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      answer=cpr_get_utf8("keyedit.add_revoker",
+			  _("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
+      if(answer[0]=='\0' || answer[0]=='\004')
+	{
+	  xfree(answer);
+	  goto fail;
+	}
+
+      /* Note that I'm requesting CERT here, which usually implies
+	 primary keys only, but some casual testing shows that PGP and
+	 GnuPG both can handle a designated revokation from a
+	 subkey. */
+      revoker_pk->req_usage=PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
+      rc=get_pubkey_byname(revoker_pk,answer,NULL,NULL,1);
+      if(rc)
+	{
+	  log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),answer,g10_errstr(rc));
+	  xfree(answer);
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      xfree(answer);
+
+      fingerprint_from_pk(revoker_pk,revkey.fpr,&fprlen);
+      if(fprlen!=20)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
+		      "designated revoker\n"));
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      revkey.class=0x80;
+      if(sensitive)
+	revkey.class|=0x40;
+      revkey.algid=revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;
+
+      if(cmp_public_keys(revoker_pk,pk)==0)
+	{
+	  /* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
+	     designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
+	     regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
+	  log_error(_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
+		      "designated revoker\n"));
+
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
+
+      /* Does this revkey already exist? */
+      if(!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
+	BUG();
+      else
+	{
+	  int i;
+
+	  for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+	    {
+	      if(memcmp(&pk->revkey[i],&revkey,
+			sizeof(struct revocation_key))==0)
+		{
+		  char buf[50];
+
+		  log_error(_("this key has already been designated "
+			      "as a revoker\n"));
+
+		  sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX",
+			  (ulong)pk->keyid[0],(ulong)pk->keyid[1]);
+		  write_status_text(STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED,buf);
+
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  if(i<pk->numrevkeys)
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+      print_pubkey_info(NULL,revoker_pk);
+      print_fingerprint(revoker_pk,NULL,2);
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      tty_printf(_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
+		   "cannot be undone!\n"));
+
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
+				_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
+				  "key as a designated revoker? (y/N) ")))
+	continue;
+
+      free_public_key(revoker_pk);
+      revoker_pk=NULL;
+      break;
+    }
+
+  /* The 1F signature must be at least v4 to carry the revocation key
+     subpacket. */
+  rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x1F, 0, 4, 0, 0,
+			   keygen_add_revkey,&revkey );
+  if( rc )
+    {
+      log_error("signing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  free_secret_key(sk);
+  sk=NULL;
+
+  /* insert into secret keyblock */
+  pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+  pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+  pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
+  insert_kbnode( sec_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
+
+  /* insert into public keyblock */
+  pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+  pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+  pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+  insert_kbnode( pub_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
+
+  return 1;
+
+ fail:
+  if(sk)
+    free_secret_key(sk);
+  if(sig)
+    free_seckey_enc(sig);
+  if(revoker_pk)
+    free_public_key(revoker_pk);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    int n1, signumber, rc;
+    u32 expiredate;
+    int mainkey=0;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    KBNODE node;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+
+    if( count_selected_keys( sec_keyblock ) ) {
+	tty_printf(_("Please remove selections from the secret keys.\n"));
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    n1 = count_selected_keys( pub_keyblock );
+    if( n1 > 1 ) {
+	tty_printf(_("Please select at most one subkey.\n"));
+	return 0;
+    }
+    else if( n1 )
+	tty_printf(_("Changing expiration time for a subkey.\n"));
+    else
+      {
+	tty_printf(_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
+	mainkey=1;
+	no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock);
+      }
+
+    expiredate = ask_expiredate();
+    node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+    /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+    main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
+    uid = NULL;
+    signumber = 0;
+    for( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+	    main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	    main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY ) ) {
+	    sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	else if( main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && ( mainkey || sub_pk ) ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+		&& ( (mainkey && uid
+		      && uid->created && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+		     || (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18)  )
+		&& sig->flags.chosen_selfsig )
+	      {
+		/* this is a selfsignature which is to be replaced */
+		PKT_signature *newsig;
+		PACKET *newpkt;
+		KBNODE sn;
+		int signumber2 = 0;
+
+		signumber++;
+
+		if( (mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
+		    || (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4 ) ) {
+		    log_info(_(
+			"You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
+		    free_secret_key( sk );
+		    return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* find the corresponding secret self-signature */
+		for( sn=sec_keyblock; sn; sn = sn->next ) {
+		    if( sn->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+			PKT_signature *b = sn->pkt->pkt.signature;
+			if( keyid[0] == b->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == b->keyid[1]
+			    && sig->sig_class == b->sig_class
+			    && ++signumber2 == signumber )
+			    break;
+		    }
+		}
+		if( !sn )
+		    log_info(_("No corresponding signature in secret ring\n"));
+
+		if( mainkey )
+		  rc = update_keysig_packet(&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
+					    sk, keygen_add_key_expire, main_pk);
+		else
+		  rc = update_keysig_packet(&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
+					    sk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk );
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+						    g10_errstr(rc));
+		    free_secret_key( sk );
+		    return 0;
+		}
+		/* replace the packet */
+		newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+		free_packet( node->pkt );
+		xfree( node->pkt );
+		node->pkt = newpkt;
+		if( sn ) {
+		    newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		    newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		    newpkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature( NULL, newsig );
+		    free_packet( sn->pkt );
+		    xfree( sn->pkt );
+		    sn->pkt = newpkt;
+		}
+		sub_pk = NULL;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    update_trust=1;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+menu_backsign(KBNODE pub_keyblock,KBNODE sec_keyblock)
+{
+  int rc,modified=0;
+  PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+  PKT_secret_key *main_sk,*sub_sk=NULL;
+  KBNODE node;
+
+  assert(pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+  assert(sec_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY);
+
+  merge_keys_and_selfsig(pub_keyblock);
+  main_pk=pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  main_sk=copy_secret_key(NULL,sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+  keyid_from_pk(main_pk,NULL);
+
+  for(node=pub_keyblock;node;node=node->next)
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *sub_pk=NULL;
+      KBNODE node2,sig_pk=NULL,sig_sk=NULL;
+      char *passphrase;
+
+      if(sub_sk)
+	{
+	  free_secret_key(sub_sk);
+	  sub_sk=NULL;
+	}
+
+      /* Find a signing subkey with no backsig */
+      if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+	{
+	  if(node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_usage&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+	    {
+	      if(node->pkt->pkt.public_key->backsig)
+		tty_printf(_("signing subkey %s is already cross-certified\n"),
+			   keystr_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
+	      else
+		sub_pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    tty_printf(_("subkey %s does not sign and so does"
+			 " not need to be cross-certified\n"),
+		       keystr_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key));
+	}
+
+      if(!sub_pk)
+	continue;
+
+      /* Find the selected selfsig on this subkey */
+      for(node2=node->next;
+	  node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	  node2=node2->next)
+	if(node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version>=4
+	   && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
+	  {
+	    sig_pk=node2;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      if(!sig_pk)
+	continue;
+
+      /* Find the secret subkey that matches the public subkey */
+      for(node2=sec_keyblock;node2;node2=node2->next)
+	if(node2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+	   && !cmp_public_secret_key(sub_pk,node2->pkt->pkt.secret_key))
+	  {
+	    sub_sk=copy_secret_key(NULL,node2->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      if(!sub_sk)
+	{
+	  tty_printf(_("no secret subkey for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"),
+		     keystr_from_pk(sub_pk));
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      /* Now finally find the matching selfsig on the secret subkey.
+	 We can't use chosen_selfsig here (it's not set for secret
+	 keys), so we just pick the selfsig with the right class.
+	 This is what menu_expire does as well. */
+      for(node2=node2->next;
+	  node2 && node2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+	  node2=node2->next)
+	if(node2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE
+	   && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->version>=4
+	   && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
+	   && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
+	   && node2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class)
+	  {
+	    sig_sk=node2;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      /* Now we can get to work.  We have a main key and secret part,
+	 a signing subkey with signature and secret part possibly with
+	 signature. */
+
+      passphrase=get_last_passphrase();
+      set_next_passphrase(passphrase);
+      xfree(passphrase);
+
+      rc=make_backsig(sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,main_pk,sub_pk,sub_sk);
+      if(rc==0)
+	{
+	  PKT_signature *newsig;
+	  PACKET *newpkt;
+
+	  passphrase=get_last_passphrase();
+	  set_next_passphrase(passphrase);
+	  xfree(passphrase);
+
+	  rc=update_keysig_packet(&newsig,sig_pk->pkt->pkt.signature,main_pk,
+				  NULL,sub_pk,main_sk,NULL,NULL);
+	  if(rc==0)
+	    {
+	      /* Put the new sig into place on the pubkey */
+	      newpkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*newpkt));
+	      newpkt->pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	      newpkt->pkt.signature=newsig;
+	      free_packet(sig_pk->pkt);
+	      xfree(sig_pk->pkt);
+	      sig_pk->pkt=newpkt;
+
+	      if(sig_sk)
+		{
+		  /* Put the new sig into place on the seckey */
+		  newpkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*newpkt));
+		  newpkt->pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		  newpkt->pkt.signature=copy_signature(NULL,newsig);
+		  free_packet(sig_sk->pkt);
+		  xfree(sig_sk->pkt);
+		  sig_sk->pkt=newpkt;
+		}
+
+	      modified=1;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      log_error("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  log_error("make_backsig failed: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  set_next_passphrase(NULL);
+
+  free_secret_key(main_sk);
+  if(sub_sk)
+    free_secret_key(sub_sk);
+
+  return modified;
+}
+
+
+static int
+change_primary_uid_cb ( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    byte buf[1];
+
+    /* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
+     * lingering around */
+    delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,   SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
+    delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
+
+    /* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
+    if (opaque) { 
+        buf[0] = 1;
+        build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1 );
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID.  We will also reset
+ * all other primary uid flags.  For this to work with have to update
+ * all the signature timestamps.  If we would do this with the current
+ * time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
+ * do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
+ * sufficient to updated a signature during import.
+ */
+static int
+menu_set_primary_uid ( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    KBNODE node;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int selected;
+    int attribute = 0;
+    int modified = 0;
+
+    if ( count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1 ) {
+	tty_printf(_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+    /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+    main_pk = NULL;
+    uid = NULL;
+    selected = 0;
+
+    /* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
+    for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
+	attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL);
+
+    for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+            break; /* ready */
+
+	if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+	    main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	}
+	else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+       	    selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
+        }
+	else if ( main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+		 && (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+		 && attribute == (uid->attrib_data!=NULL)
+		 && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig )
+	      {
+	      if(sig->version < 4) {
+		char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
+
+		log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+			 user);
+		xfree(user);
+	      }
+	      else {
+	        /* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
+		   We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
+		   not able to carry the primary ID flag.  We also
+		   ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
+		   same type that we are making primary.  That is, if
+		   we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
+		   If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
+		   alter attribute packets. */
+
+                /* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
+                   self-signature per user ID here (not counting
+                   revocations) */
+		PKT_signature *newsig;
+		PACKET *newpkt;
+                const byte *p;
+                int action;
+
+                /* see whether this signature has the primary UID flag */
+                p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
+                                      SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
+                if ( !p )
+                    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
+                                          SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
+                if ( p && *p ) /* yes */
+                    action = selected? 0 : -1;
+                else /* no */
+                    action = selected? 1 : 0;
+
+                if (action) {
+                    int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
+					       main_pk, uid, NULL,
+                                               sk,
+                                               change_primary_uid_cb,
+                                               action > 0? "x":NULL );
+                    if( rc ) {
+                        log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+                                   g10_errstr(rc));
+                        free_secret_key( sk );
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    /* replace the packet */
+                    newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+                    newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+                    newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+                    free_packet( node->pkt );
+                    xfree( node->pkt );
+                    node->pkt = newpkt;
+                    modified = 1;
+		}
+	      }
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    return modified;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
+ */
+static int
+menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    KBNODE node;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int selected, select_all;
+    int modified = 0;
+
+    no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock);
+
+    select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
+
+    node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+    /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+    main_pk = NULL;
+    uid = NULL;
+    selected = 0;
+    for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+            break; /* ready */
+
+	if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+	    main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	}
+	else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+       	    selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
+        }
+	else if ( main_pk && uid && selected
+                  && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+		 && (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+		 && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig ) {
+	      if( sig->version < 4 ) {
+		char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
+
+		log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+			 user);
+		xfree(user);
+	      }
+	      else {
+		/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced 
+                 * We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
+                 * not able to carry the preferences */
+		PKT_signature *newsig;
+		PACKET *newpkt;
+                int rc;
+
+                rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
+                                           main_pk, uid, NULL,
+                                           sk,
+                                           keygen_upd_std_prefs,
+                                           NULL );
+                if( rc ) {
+                    log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+                               g10_errstr(rc));
+                    free_secret_key( sk );
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                /* replace the packet */
+                newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+                newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+                newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+                free_packet( node->pkt );
+                xfree( node->pkt );
+                node->pkt = newpkt;
+                modified = 1;
+	      }
+            }
+	}
+    }
+    
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    return modified;
+}
+
+
+static int
+menu_set_keyserver_url (const char *url,
+			KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+  PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+  PKT_user_id *uid;
+  KBNODE node;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  int selected, select_all;
+  int modified = 0;
+  char *answer,*uri;
+
+  no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock);
+
+  if(url)
+    answer=xstrdup(url);
+  else
+    {
+      answer=cpr_get_utf8("keyedit.add_keyserver",
+			  _("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
+      if(answer[0]=='\0' || answer[0]=='\004')
+	{
+	  xfree(answer);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"none")==0)
+    uri=NULL;
+  else
+    {
+      struct keyserver_spec *keyserver=NULL;
+      /* Sanity check the format */
+      keyserver=parse_keyserver_uri(answer,1,NULL,0);
+      xfree(answer);
+      if(!keyserver)
+	{
+	  log_info(_("could not parse keyserver URL\n"));
+	  return 0;
+	}
+      uri=xstrdup(keyserver->uri);
+      free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
+    }
+
+  select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
+
+  node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+  sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+  /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+  main_pk = NULL;
+  uid = NULL;
+  selected = 0;
+  for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	break; /* ready */
+
+      if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	{
+	  main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	  keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	}
+      else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	{
+	  uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
+	}
+      else if ( main_pk && uid && selected
+		&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	{
+	  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	  if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+	       && (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+	       && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
+	    {
+	      char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
+	      if( sig->version < 4 )
+		log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+			 user);
+	      else
+		{
+		  /* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
+		   * We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
+		   * not able to carry the subpacket. */
+		  PKT_signature *newsig;
+		  PACKET *newpkt;
+		  int rc;
+		  const byte *p;
+		  size_t plen;
+
+		  p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&plen);
+		  if(p && plen)
+		    {
+		      tty_printf("Current preferred keyserver for user"
+				 " ID \"%s\": ",user);
+		      tty_print_utf8_string(p,plen);
+		      tty_printf("\n");
+		      if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.confirm_keyserver",
+			 uri?_("Are you sure you want to replace it? (y/N) "):
+			     _("Are you sure you want to delete it? (y/N) ")))
+			continue;
+		    }
+		  else if(uri==NULL)
+		    {
+		      /* There is no current keyserver URL, so there
+			 is no point in trying to un-set it. */
+		      continue;
+		    }
+
+		  rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
+					     main_pk, uid, NULL,
+					     sk,
+					     keygen_add_keyserver_url, uri );
+		  if( rc )
+		    {
+		      log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+				 g10_errstr(rc));
+		      free_secret_key( sk );
+		      xfree(uri);
+		      return 0;
+		    }
+		  /* replace the packet */
+		  newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		  newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		  newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+		  free_packet( node->pkt );
+		  xfree( node->pkt );
+		  node->pkt = newpkt;
+		  modified = 1;
+		}
+
+	      xfree(user);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  xfree(uri);
+  free_secret_key( sk );
+  return modified;
+}
+
+static int
+menu_set_notation(const char *string,KBNODE pub_keyblock,KBNODE sec_keyblock)
+{
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+  PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+  PKT_user_id *uid;
+  KBNODE node;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  int selected, select_all;
+  int modified = 0;
+  char *answer;
+  struct notation *notation;
+
+  no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock);
+
+  if(string)
+    answer=xstrdup(string);
+  else
+    {
+      answer=cpr_get_utf8("keyedit.add_notation",
+			  _("Enter the notation: "));
+      if(answer[0]=='\0' || answer[0]=='\004')
+	{
+	  xfree(answer);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"none")==0
+     || ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"-")==0)
+    notation=NULL; /* delete them all */
+  else
+    {
+      notation=string_to_notation(answer,0);
+      if(!notation)
+	{
+	  xfree(answer);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+  xfree(answer);
+
+  select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
+
+  node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+  sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+  /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+  main_pk = NULL;
+  uid = NULL;
+  selected = 0;
+  for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	break; /* ready */
+
+      if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	{
+	  main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	  keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	}
+      else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	{
+	  uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
+	}
+      else if ( main_pk && uid && selected
+		&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	{
+	  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	  if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+	       && (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+	       && sig->flags.chosen_selfsig)
+	    {
+	      char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
+	      if( sig->version < 4 )
+		log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
+			 user);
+	      else
+		{
+		  PKT_signature *newsig;
+		  PACKET *newpkt;
+		  int rc,skip=0,addonly=1;
+
+		  if(sig->flags.notation)
+		    {
+		      tty_printf("Current notations for user ID \"%s\":\n",
+				 user);
+		      tty_print_notations(-9,sig);
+		    }
+		  else
+		    {
+		      tty_printf("No notations on user ID \"%s\"\n",user);
+		      if(notation==NULL)
+			{
+			  /* There are no current notations, so there
+			     is no point in trying to un-set them. */
+			  continue;
+			}
+		    }
+
+		  if(notation)
+		    {
+		      struct notation *n;
+		      int deleting=0;
+
+		      notation->next=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+		      for(n=notation->next;n;n=n->next)
+			if(strcmp(n->name,notation->name)==0)
+			  {
+			    if(notation->value)
+			      {
+				if(strcmp(n->value,notation->value)==0)
+				  {
+				    if(notation->flags.ignore)
+				      {
+					/* Value match with a delete
+					   flag. */
+					n->flags.ignore=1;
+					deleting=1;
+				      }
+				    else
+				      {
+					/* Adding the same notation
+					   twice, so don't add it at
+					   all. */
+					skip=1;
+					tty_printf("Skipping notation:"
+						   " %s=%s\n",
+						   notation->name,
+						   notation->value);
+					break;
+				      }
+				  }
+			      }
+			    else
+			      {
+				/* No value, so it means delete. */
+				n->flags.ignore=1;
+				deleting=1;
+			      }
+
+			    if(n->flags.ignore)
+			      {
+				tty_printf("Removing notation: %s=%s\n",
+					   n->name,n->value);
+				addonly=0;
+			      }
+			  }
+
+		      if(!notation->flags.ignore && !skip)
+			tty_printf("Adding notation: %s=%s\n",
+				   notation->name,notation->value);
+
+		      /* We tried to delete, but had no matches */
+		      if(notation->flags.ignore && !deleting)
+			continue;
+		    }
+		  else
+		    {
+		      tty_printf("Removing all notations\n");
+		      addonly=0;
+		    }
+
+		  if(skip
+		     || (!addonly
+			 && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.confirm_notation",
+						   _("Proceed? (y/N) "))))
+		    continue;
+
+		  rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
+					     main_pk, uid, NULL,
+					     sk,
+					     keygen_add_notations, notation );
+		  if( rc )
+		    {
+		      log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+				 g10_errstr(rc));
+		      free_secret_key( sk );
+		      free_notation(notation);
+		      xfree(user);
+		      return 0;
+		    }
+
+		  /* replace the packet */
+		  newpkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		  newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		  newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+		  free_packet( node->pkt );
+		  xfree( node->pkt );
+		  node->pkt = newpkt;
+		  modified = 1;
+
+		  if(notation)
+		    {
+		      /* Snip off the notation list from the sig */
+		      free_notation(notation->next);
+		      notation->next=NULL;
+		    }
+
+		  xfree(user);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notation);
+  free_secret_key( sk );
+  return modified;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Select one user id or remove all selection if index is 0.
+ * Returns: True if the selection changed;
+ */
+static int
+menu_select_uid( KBNODE keyblock, int idx )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i;
+
+    /* first check that the index is valid */
+    if( idx ) {
+	for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+		if( ++i == idx )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !node ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx );
+	    return 0;
+	}
+    }
+    else { /* reset all */
+	for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+		node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
+	}
+	return 1;
+    }
+    /* and toggle the new index */
+    for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    if( ++i == idx ) {
+		if( (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) )
+		    node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
+		else
+		    node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Search in the keyblock for a uid that matches namehash */
+static int
+menu_select_uid_namehash( KBNODE keyblock, const char *namehash )
+{
+  byte hash[NAMEHASH_LEN];
+  KBNODE node;
+  int i;
+
+  assert(strlen(namehash)==NAMEHASH_LEN*2);
+
+  for(i=0;i<NAMEHASH_LEN;i++)
+    hash[i]=hextobyte(&namehash[i*2]);
+
+  for(node=keyblock->next;node;node=node->next)
+    {
+      if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
+	{
+	  namehash_from_uid(node->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+	  if(memcmp(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->namehash,hash,NAMEHASH_LEN)==0)
+	    {
+	      if(node->flag&NODFLG_SELUID)
+		node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
+	      else
+		node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
+
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if(!node)
+      {
+	tty_printf(_("No user ID with hash %s\n"),namehash);
+	return 0;
+      }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Select secondary keys
+ * Returns: True if the selection changed;
+ */
+static int
+menu_select_key( KBNODE keyblock, int idx )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i;
+
+    /* first check that the index is valid */
+    if( idx ) {
+	for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+		if( ++i == idx )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !node ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("No subkey with index %d\n"), idx );
+	    return 0;
+	}
+    }
+    else { /* reset all */
+	for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+		node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
+	}
+	return 1;
+    }
+    /* and set the new index */
+    for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    if( ++i == idx ) {
+		if( (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) )
+		    node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
+		else
+		    node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+count_uids_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i=0;
+
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag) )
+	    i++;
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int
+count_keys_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i=0;
+
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	if( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+	    && (node->flag & flag) )
+	    i++;
+    return i;
+}
+
+static int
+count_uids( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+    int i=0;
+
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    i++;
+    return i;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
+ */
+static int
+count_selected_uids( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    return count_uids_with_flag( keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
+}
+
+static int
+count_selected_keys( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    return count_keys_with_flag( keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
+}
+
+/* returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked */
+static int
+real_uids_left( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int real=0;
+
+  for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
+    if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag&NODFLG_SELUID) &&
+       !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+      real++;
+
+  return real;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ask whether the signature should be revoked.  If the user commits this,
+ * flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
+ */
+static void
+ask_revoke_sig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node )
+{
+    int doit=0;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID );
+
+    if( !unode ) {
+	log_error("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    uid=unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+    if(opt.with_colons)
+      {
+	if(uid->attrib_data)
+	  printf("uat:::::::::%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
+	else
+	  {
+	    printf("uid:::::::::");
+	    print_string (stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ':');
+	  }
+
+	printf("\n");
+
+	print_and_check_one_sig_colon(keyblock,node,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,1);
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	char *p=utf8_to_native(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			 unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+	tty_printf(_("user ID: \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	tty_printf(_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
+		   keystr(sig->keyid),datestr_from_sig(sig),
+		   sig->flags.exportable?"":_(" (non-exportable)"),"");
+      }
+    if(sig->flags.expired)
+      {
+	tty_printf(_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
+		   expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+	/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
+	doit=cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
+			_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
+      }
+    else
+      doit=cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.one",
+	      _("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));
+
+    if(doit) {
+      node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
+      unode->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
+ * done by one of our keys.  Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
+ * whether he wants to revoke this signature.
+ * Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
+ */
+static int
+menu_revsig( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
+    KBNODE node;
+    int changed = 0;
+    int rc, any, skip=1, all=!count_selected_uids(keyblock);
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
+
+    assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+    /* FIXME: detect duplicates here  */
+    tty_printf(_("You have signed these user IDs on key %s:\n"),
+	       keystr_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    if( node->flag&NODFLG_SELUID || all ) {
+	      PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	      /* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
+	      tty_printf("     ");
+	      tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+	      tty_printf("\n");
+	      skip=0;
+	    }
+	    else
+	      skip=1;
+	}
+	else if( !skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
+                     !seckey_available(sig->keyid)  ) )
+	  {
+	    if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
+	      {
+		tty_printf("   ");
+		tty_printf(_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
+			   keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig),
+			   sig->flags.exportable?"":_(" (non-exportable)"),
+			   sig->flags.revocable?"":_(" (non-revocable)"));
+		if(sig->flags.revocable)
+		  node->flag |= NODFLG_SELSIG;
+	      }
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
+	      {
+		tty_printf("   ");
+		tty_printf(_("revoked by your key %s on %s\n"),
+			   keystr(sig->keyid),datestr_from_sig(sig));
+	      }
+	  }
+    }
+
+    tty_printf("\n");
+
+    /* ask */
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG) )
+	    continue;
+	ask_revoke_sig( keyblock, node );
+    }
+
+    /* present selected */
+    any = 0;
+    for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) )
+	    continue;
+	if( !any ) {
+	    any = 1;
+	    tty_printf(_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
+	}
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	    PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	    tty_printf("     ");
+	    tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    tty_printf("   ");
+	    tty_printf(_("signed by your key %s on %s%s%s\n"),
+ 		       keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig),"",
+		       sig->flags.exportable?"":_(" (non-exportable)") );
+	}
+    }
+    if( !any )
+	return 0; /* none selected */
+
+    if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
+	 _("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")) )
+	return 0; /* forget it */
+
+    reason = ask_revocation_reason( 0, 1, 0 );
+    if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* now we can sign the user ids */
+  reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
+    primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	KBNODE unode;
+	PACKET *pkt;
+	struct sign_attrib attrib;
+	PKT_secret_key *sk;
+
+	if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
+	    || node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    continue;
+	unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID );
+	assert( unode ); /* we already checked this */
+
+	memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
+	attrib.reason = reason;
+	attrib.non_exportable=!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;
+
+	node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
+	sk = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *sk );
+	if( get_seckey( sk, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) ) {
+	    log_info(_("no secret key\n"));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
+				       unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+				       NULL,
+				       sk,
+				       0x30, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+				       sign_mk_attrib,
+				       &attrib );
+	free_secret_key(sk);
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	    release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+	    return changed;
+	}
+	changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
+	update_trust = 1;
+	/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
+	if(primary_pk->keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] &&
+	   primary_pk->keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1])
+	  unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked=1;
+	pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+	insert_kbnode( unode, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+	goto reloop;
+    }
+
+    release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+    return changed;
+}
+
+/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig).  Return true if
+   keyblock changed. */
+static int
+menu_revuid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk = copy_secret_key( NULL,
+					sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+  KBNODE node;
+  int changed = 0;
+  int rc;
+  struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
+
+  /* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
+     somewhat meaningless in the real world.  1991 did define the 0x30
+     sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
+     probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */
+
+  for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    if(pk->version>3 || (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID &&
+			 node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion>3))
+      {
+	if((reason = ask_revocation_reason( 0, 1, 4 )))
+	  break;
+	else
+	  goto leave;
+      }
+
+ reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
+  for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    if(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
+      {
+	PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	if(uid->is_revoked)
+	  {
+	    char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,uid->len,0);
+	    log_info(_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"),user);
+	    xfree(user);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    PACKET *pkt;
+	    PKT_signature *sig;
+	    struct sign_attrib attrib;
+	    u32 timestamp=make_timestamp();
+
+	    if(uid->created>=timestamp)
+	      {
+		/* Okay, this is a problem.  The user ID selfsig was
+		   created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
+		   set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
+		   everything comes out clean. */
+
+		log_info(_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
+			   " seconds in the future\n"),uid->created-timestamp);
+
+		timestamp=uid->created+1;
+	      }
+
+	    memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
+	    attrib.reason = reason;
+
+	    node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
+
+	    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, uid, NULL, sk, 0x30, 0,
+				     (reason==NULL)?3:0, timestamp, 0,
+				     sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
+	    if( rc )
+	      {
+		log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+		goto leave;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+		pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+		insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+
+		/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
+		   trustdb needs an update. */
+		if(!update_trust
+		   && (get_validity(pk,uid)&TRUST_MASK)>=TRUST_UNDEFINED)
+		  update_trust=1;
+
+		changed = 1;
+		node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked=1;
+
+		goto reloop;
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+  if(changed)
+    commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+
+ leave:
+  free_secret_key(sk);
+  release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+  return changed;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Revoke the whole key.
+ */
+static int
+menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk=pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  int rc,changed = 0;
+  struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
+  PACKET *pkt;
+  PKT_signature *sig;
+
+  if(pk->is_revoked)
+    {
+      tty_printf(_("Key %s is already revoked.\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 0 );
+  /* user decided to cancel */
+  if( !reason )
+    return 0;
+
+  sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+  rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk,
+			   0x20, 0, opt.force_v4_certs?4:0, 0, 0,
+			   revocation_reason_build_cb, reason );
+  free_secret_key(sk);
+  if( rc )
+    {
+      log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+      goto scram;
+    }
+
+  changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
+
+  pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+  pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+  pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+  insert_kbnode( pub_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+  commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+
+  update_trust=1;
+
+ scram:
+  release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+  return changed;
+}
+
+static int
+menu_revsubkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *mainpk;
+    KBNODE node;
+    int changed = 0;
+    int rc;
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
+
+    reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 0 );
+    if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+  reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
+    mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+	    && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ) {
+	    PACKET *pkt;
+	    PKT_signature *sig;
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+	    PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    struct sign_attrib attrib;
+
+	    if(subpk->is_revoked)
+	      {
+		tty_printf(_("Subkey %s is already revoked.\n"),
+			   keystr_from_pk(subpk));
+		continue;
+	      }
+
+	    memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
+	    attrib.reason = reason;
+
+	    node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
+	    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+	    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, sk,
+                                     0x28, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+				     sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
+	    free_secret_key(sk);
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+		release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+		return changed;
+	    }
+	    changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
+
+	    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+	    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	    pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+	    insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
+	    goto reloop;
+	}
+    }
+    commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
+    /*commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );*/
+
+    /* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
+       are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
+       when revoking/removing them */
+
+    release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+    return changed;
+}
+
+/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
+   enabling or disabling a key.  This is arguably sub-optimal as
+   disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
+   not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
+static int
+enable_disable_key( KBNODE keyblock, int disable )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+			    ->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    unsigned int trust, newtrust;
+
+    trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
+    newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+    if( disable )
+	newtrust |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+    if( trust == newtrust )
+	return 0; /* already in that state */
+    update_ownertrust(pk, newtrust );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+menu_showphoto( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int select_all = !count_selected_uids(keyblock);
+  int count=0;
+  PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+
+  /* Look for the public key first.  We have to be really, really,
+     explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
+     since people may want to sign it. */
+
+  for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	{
+	  PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	  count++;
+
+	  if((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
+	     uid->attribs!=NULL)
+	    {
+	      int i;
+
+	      for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
+		{
+		  byte type;
+		  u32 size;
+
+		  if(uid->attribs[i].type==ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
+		     parse_image_header(&uid->attribs[i],&type,&size))
+		    {
+		      tty_printf(_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
+				   "key %s (uid %d)\n"),
+				 image_type_to_string(type,1),
+				 (ulong)size,keystr_from_pk(pk),count);
+		      show_photos(&uid->attribs[i],1,pk,NULL);
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..620274a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3707 @@
+/* keygen.c - generate a key pair
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+
+#define MAX_PREFS 30 
+
+enum para_name {
+  pKEYTYPE,
+  pKEYLENGTH,
+  pKEYUSAGE,
+  pSUBKEYTYPE,
+  pSUBKEYLENGTH,
+  pSUBKEYUSAGE,
+  pAUTHKEYTYPE,
+  pNAMEREAL,
+  pNAMEEMAIL,
+  pNAMECOMMENT,
+  pPREFERENCES,
+  pREVOKER,
+  pUSERID,
+  pEXPIREDATE,
+  pKEYEXPIRE, /* in n seconds */
+  pSUBKEYEXPIRE, /* in n seconds */
+  pPASSPHRASE,
+  pPASSPHRASE_DEK,
+  pPASSPHRASE_S2K,
+  pSERIALNO,
+  pBACKUPENCDIR,
+  pHANDLE,
+  pKEYSERVER
+};
+
+struct para_data_s {
+    struct para_data_s *next;
+    int lnr;
+    enum para_name key;
+    union {
+        DEK *dek;
+        STRING2KEY *s2k;
+        u32 expire;
+        unsigned int usage;
+        struct revocation_key revkey;
+        char value[1];
+    } u;
+};
+
+struct output_control_s {
+    int lnr;
+    int dryrun;
+    int use_files;
+    struct {
+	char  *fname;
+	char  *newfname;
+	IOBUF stream;
+	armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    } pub;
+    struct {
+	char  *fname;
+	char  *newfname;
+	IOBUF stream;
+	armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    } sec;
+};
+
+
+struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk {
+    unsigned int usage;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+};
+
+
+static int prefs_initialized = 0;
+static byte sym_prefs[MAX_PREFS];
+static int nsym_prefs;
+static byte hash_prefs[MAX_PREFS];
+static int nhash_prefs;
+static byte zip_prefs[MAX_PREFS];
+static int nzip_prefs;
+static int mdc_available,ks_modify;
+
+static void do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
+				 struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card );
+static int  write_keyblock( IOBUF out, KBNODE node );
+static int gen_card_key (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
+                         KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
+			 PKT_secret_key **ret_sk,
+                         u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para);
+static int gen_card_key_with_backup (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
+                                     KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
+                                     u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para,
+                                     const char *backup_dir);
+
+
+static void
+print_status_key_created (int letter, PKT_public_key *pk, const char *handle)
+{
+  byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
+  char *buf, *p;
+  size_t i, n;
+  
+  if (!handle)
+    handle = "";
+
+  buf = xmalloc (MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+31 + strlen (handle) + 1);
+
+  p = buf;
+  if (letter || pk)
+    {
+      *p++ = letter;
+      *p++ = ' ';
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
+      s = array;
+      for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
+        sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);
+    }
+  if (*handle)
+    {
+      *p++ = ' ';
+      for (i=0; handle[i] && i < 100; i++)
+        *p++ = isspace ((unsigned int)handle[i])? '_':handle[i];
+    }
+  *p = 0;
+  write_status_text ((letter || pk)?STATUS_KEY_CREATED:STATUS_KEY_NOT_CREATED,
+                     buf);
+  xfree (buf);
+}
+
+static void
+print_status_key_not_created (const char *handle)
+{
+  print_status_key_created (0, NULL, handle);
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+write_uid( KBNODE root, const char *s )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt );
+    size_t n = strlen(s);
+
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
+    pkt->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt->pkt.user_id + n - 1 );
+    pkt->pkt.user_id->len = n;
+    pkt->pkt.user_id->ref = 1;
+    strcpy(pkt->pkt.user_id->name, s);
+    add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+}
+
+static void
+do_add_key_flags (PKT_signature *sig, unsigned int use)
+{
+    byte buf[1];
+
+    buf[0] = 0;
+
+    /* The spec says that all primary keys MUST be able to certify. */
+    if(sig->sig_class!=0x18)
+      buf[0] |= 0x01;
+
+    if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+      buf[0] |= 0x02;
+    if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+        buf[0] |= 0x04 | 0x08;
+    if (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
+        buf[0] |= 0x20;
+
+    if (!buf[0]) 
+        return;
+
+    build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, buf, 1);
+}
+
+
+int
+keygen_add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = opaque;
+    byte buf[8];
+    u32  u;
+
+    if( pk->expiredate ) {
+        if(pk->expiredate > pk->timestamp)
+	  u= pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp;
+	else
+	  u= 1;
+
+	buf[0] = (u >> 24) & 0xff;
+	buf[1] = (u >> 16) & 0xff;
+	buf[2] = (u >>	8) & 0xff;
+	buf[3] = u & 0xff;
+	build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, buf, 4 );
+    }
+    else
+      {
+	/* Make sure we don't leave a key expiration subpacket lying
+	   around */
+	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE);
+      }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire (PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque)
+{
+    struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk *oduap = opaque;
+
+    do_add_key_flags (sig, oduap->usage);
+    return keygen_add_key_expire (sig, oduap->pk);
+}
+
+static int
+set_one_pref (int val, int type, const char *item, byte *buf, int *nbuf)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i=0; i < *nbuf; i++ )
+      if (buf[i] == val)
+	{
+	  log_info (_("preference `%s' duplicated\n"), item);
+	  return -1;
+        }
+
+    if (*nbuf >= MAX_PREFS)
+      {
+	if(type==1)
+	  log_info(_("too many cipher preferences\n"));
+	else if(type==2)
+	  log_info(_("too many digest preferences\n"));
+	else if(type==3)
+	  log_info(_("too many compression preferences\n"));
+	else
+	  BUG();
+
+        return -1;
+      }
+
+    buf[(*nbuf)++] = val;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the supplied string and use it to set the standard
+ * preferences.  The string may be in a form like the one printed by
+ * "pref" (something like: "S10 S3 H3 H2 Z2 Z1") or the actual
+ * cipher/hash/compress names.  Use NULL to set the default
+ * preferences.  Returns: 0 = okay
+ */
+int
+keygen_set_std_prefs (const char *string,int personal)
+{
+    byte sym[MAX_PREFS], hash[MAX_PREFS], zip[MAX_PREFS];
+    int nsym=0, nhash=0, nzip=0, val, rc=0;
+    int mdc=1, modify=0; /* mdc defaults on, modify defaults off. */
+    char dummy_string[45+1]; /* Enough for 15 items. */
+
+    if (!string || !ascii_strcasecmp (string, "default"))
+      {
+	if (opt.def_preference_list)
+	  string=opt.def_preference_list;
+	else
+	  {
+	    dummy_string[0]='\0';
+
+            /* The rationale why we use the order AES256,192,128 is
+               for compatibility reasons with PGP.  If gpg would
+               define AES128 first, we would get the somewhat
+               confusing situation:
+
+                 gpg -r pgpkey -r gpgkey  ---gives--> AES256
+                 gpg -r gpgkey -r pgpkey  ---gives--> AES
+                 
+               Note that by using --personal-cipher-preferences it is
+               possible to prefer AES128.
+            */
+
+	    /* Make sure we do not add more than 15 items here, as we
+	       could overflow the size of dummy_string.  We currently
+	       have at most 12. */
+	    if(!check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_AES256))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"S9 ");
+	    if(!check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_AES192))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"S8 ");
+	    if(!check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_AES))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"S7 ");
+	    if(!check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"S3 ");
+	    strcat(dummy_string,"S2 "); /* 3DES */
+	    /* If we have it, IDEA goes *after* 3DES so it won't be
+	       used unless we're encrypting along with a V3 key.
+	       Ideally, we would only put the S1 preference in if the
+	       key was RSA and <=2048 bits, as that is what won't
+	       break PGP2, but that is difficult with the current
+	       code, and not really worth checking as a non-RSA <=2048
+	       bit key wouldn't be usable by PGP2 anyway. -dms */
+	    if(!check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"S1 ");
+
+	    /* SHA-1 */
+	    strcat(dummy_string,"H2 ");
+
+	    if(!check_digest_algo(DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"H8 ");
+
+	    /* RIPEMD160 */
+	    strcat(dummy_string,"H3 ");
+
+	    /* ZLIB */
+	    strcat(dummy_string,"Z2 ");
+
+	    if(!check_compress_algo(COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2))
+	      strcat(dummy_string,"Z3 ");
+
+	    /* ZIP */
+	    strcat(dummy_string,"Z1");
+
+	    string=dummy_string;
+	  }
+      }
+    else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (string, "none"))
+        string = "";
+
+    if(strlen(string))
+      {
+	char *tok,*prefstring;
+
+	prefstring=xstrdup(string); /* need a writable string! */
+
+	while((tok=strsep(&prefstring," ,")))
+	  {
+	    if((val=string_to_cipher_algo(tok)))
+	      {
+		if(set_one_pref(val,1,tok,sym,&nsym))
+		  rc=-1;
+	      }
+	    else if((val=string_to_digest_algo(tok)))
+	      {
+		if(set_one_pref(val,2,tok,hash,&nhash))
+		  rc=-1;
+	      }
+	    else if((val=string_to_compress_algo(tok))>-1)
+	      {
+		if(set_one_pref(val,3,tok,zip,&nzip))
+		  rc=-1;
+	      }
+	    else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"mdc")==0)
+	      mdc=1;
+	    else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"no-mdc")==0)
+	      mdc=0;
+	    else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"ks-modify")==0)
+	      modify=1;
+	    else if (ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"no-ks-modify")==0)
+	      modify=0;
+	    else
+	      {
+		log_info (_("invalid item `%s' in preference string\n"),tok);
+
+		/* Complain if IDEA is not available. */
+		if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"s1")==0
+		   || ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"idea")==0)
+		  idea_cipher_warn(1);
+
+		rc=-1;
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	xfree(prefstring);
+      }
+
+    if(!rc)
+      {
+	if(personal)
+	  {
+	    if(personal==PREFTYPE_SYM)
+	      {
+		xfree(opt.personal_cipher_prefs);
+
+		if(nsym==0)
+		  opt.personal_cipher_prefs=NULL;
+		else
+		  {
+		    int i;
+
+		    opt.personal_cipher_prefs=
+		      xmalloc(sizeof(prefitem_t *)*(nsym+1));
+
+		    for (i=0; i<nsym; i++)
+		      {
+			opt.personal_cipher_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
+			opt.personal_cipher_prefs[i].value = sym[i];
+		      }
+
+		    opt.personal_cipher_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_NONE;
+		    opt.personal_cipher_prefs[i].value = 0;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else if(personal==PREFTYPE_HASH)
+	      {
+		xfree(opt.personal_digest_prefs);
+
+		if(nhash==0)
+		  opt.personal_digest_prefs=NULL;
+		else
+		  {
+		    int i;
+
+		    opt.personal_digest_prefs=
+		      xmalloc(sizeof(prefitem_t *)*(nhash+1));
+
+		    for (i=0; i<nhash; i++)
+		      {
+			opt.personal_digest_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
+			opt.personal_digest_prefs[i].value = hash[i];
+		      }
+
+		    opt.personal_digest_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_NONE;
+		    opt.personal_digest_prefs[i].value = 0;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else if(personal==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
+	      {
+		xfree(opt.personal_compress_prefs);
+
+		if(nzip==0)
+		  opt.personal_compress_prefs=NULL;
+		else
+		  {
+		    int i;
+
+		    opt.personal_compress_prefs=
+		      xmalloc(sizeof(prefitem_t *)*(nzip+1));
+
+		    for (i=0; i<nzip; i++)
+		      {
+			opt.personal_compress_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
+			opt.personal_compress_prefs[i].value = zip[i];
+		      }
+
+		    opt.personal_compress_prefs[i].type = PREFTYPE_NONE;
+		    opt.personal_compress_prefs[i].value = 0;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    memcpy (sym_prefs,  sym,  (nsym_prefs=nsym));
+	    memcpy (hash_prefs, hash, (nhash_prefs=nhash));
+	    memcpy (zip_prefs,  zip,  (nzip_prefs=nzip));
+	    mdc_available = mdc;
+	    ks_modify = modify;
+	    prefs_initialized = 1;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Return a fake user ID containing the preferences.  Caller must
+   free. */
+PKT_user_id *keygen_get_std_prefs(void)
+{
+  int i,j=0;
+  PKT_user_id *uid=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_user_id));
+
+  if(!prefs_initialized)
+    keygen_set_std_prefs(NULL,0);
+
+  uid->ref=1;
+
+  uid->prefs=xmalloc((sizeof(prefitem_t *)*
+		      (nsym_prefs+nhash_prefs+nzip_prefs+1)));
+
+  for(i=0;i<nsym_prefs;i++,j++)
+    {
+      uid->prefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_SYM;
+      uid->prefs[j].value=sym_prefs[i];
+    }
+
+  for(i=0;i<nhash_prefs;i++,j++)
+    {
+      uid->prefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_HASH;
+      uid->prefs[j].value=hash_prefs[i];
+    }
+
+  for(i=0;i<nzip_prefs;i++,j++)
+    {
+      uid->prefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_ZIP;
+      uid->prefs[j].value=zip_prefs[i];
+    }
+
+  uid->prefs[j].type=PREFTYPE_NONE;
+  uid->prefs[j].value=0;
+
+  uid->flags.mdc=mdc_available;
+  uid->flags.ks_modify=ks_modify;
+
+  return uid;
+}
+
+static void
+add_feature_mdc (PKT_signature *sig,int enabled)
+{
+    const byte *s;
+    size_t n;
+    int i;
+    char *buf;
+
+    s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n );
+    /* Already set or cleared */
+    if (s && n &&
+	((enabled && (s[0] & 0x01)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x01))))
+      return;
+
+    if (!s || !n) { /* create a new one */
+        n = 1;
+        buf = xmalloc_clear (n);
+    }
+    else {
+        buf = xmalloc (n);
+        memcpy (buf, s, n);
+    }
+
+    if(enabled)
+      buf[0] |= 0x01; /* MDC feature */
+    else
+      buf[0] &= ~0x01;
+
+    /* Are there any bits set? */
+    for(i=0;i<n;i++)
+      if(buf[i]!=0)
+	break;
+
+    if(i==n)
+      delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES);
+    else
+      build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, buf, n);
+
+    xfree (buf);
+}
+
+static void
+add_keyserver_modify (PKT_signature *sig,int enabled)
+{
+  const byte *s;
+  size_t n;
+  int i;
+  char *buf;
+
+  /* The keyserver modify flag is a negative flag (i.e. no-modify) */
+  enabled=!enabled;
+
+  s = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n );
+  /* Already set or cleared */
+  if (s && n &&
+      ((enabled && (s[0] & 0x80)) || (!enabled && !(s[0] & 0x80))))
+    return;
+
+  if (!s || !n) { /* create a new one */
+    n = 1;
+    buf = xmalloc_clear (n);
+  }
+  else {
+    buf = xmalloc (n);
+    memcpy (buf, s, n);
+  }
+
+  if(enabled)
+    buf[0] |= 0x80; /* no-modify flag */
+  else
+    buf[0] &= ~0x80;
+
+  /* Are there any bits set? */
+  for(i=0;i<n;i++)
+    if(buf[i]!=0)
+      break;
+
+  if(i==n)
+    delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS);
+  else
+    build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, buf, n);
+
+  xfree (buf);
+}
+
+int
+keygen_upd_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    if (!prefs_initialized)
+        keygen_set_std_prefs (NULL, 0);
+
+    if (nsym_prefs) 
+        build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, sym_prefs, nsym_prefs);
+    else
+      {
+        delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM);
+        delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM);
+      }
+
+    if (nhash_prefs)
+        build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, hash_prefs, nhash_prefs);
+    else
+      {
+	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH);
+	delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH);
+      }
+
+    if (nzip_prefs)
+        build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, zip_prefs, nzip_prefs);
+    else
+      {
+        delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR);
+        delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR);
+      }
+
+    /* Make sure that the MDC feature flag is set if needed */
+    add_feature_mdc (sig,mdc_available);
+    add_keyserver_modify (sig,ks_modify);
+    keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Add preference to the self signature packet.
+ * This is only called for packets with version > 3.
+
+ */
+int
+keygen_add_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = opaque;
+
+    do_add_key_flags (sig, pk->pubkey_usage);
+    keygen_add_key_expire( sig, opaque );
+    keygen_upd_std_prefs (sig, opaque);
+    keygen_add_keyserver_url(sig,NULL);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+keygen_add_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque)
+{
+  const char *url=opaque;
+
+  if(!url)
+    url=opt.def_keyserver_url;
+
+  if(url)
+    build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,url,strlen(url));
+  else
+    delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int
+keygen_add_notations(PKT_signature *sig,void *opaque)
+{
+  struct notation *notation;
+
+  /* We always start clean */
+  delete_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION);
+  delete_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION);
+  sig->flags.notation=0;
+
+  for(notation=opaque;notation;notation=notation->next)
+    if(!notation->flags.ignore)
+      {
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	unsigned int n1,n2;
+
+	n1=strlen(notation->name);
+	if(notation->altvalue)
+	  n2=strlen(notation->altvalue);
+	else if(notation->bdat)
+	  n2=notation->blen;
+	else
+	  n2=strlen(notation->value);
+
+	buf = xmalloc( 8 + n1 + n2 );
+
+	/* human readable or not */
+	buf[0] = notation->bdat?0:0x80;
+	buf[1] = buf[2] = buf[3] = 0;
+	buf[4] = n1 >> 8;
+	buf[5] = n1;
+	buf[6] = n2 >> 8;
+	buf[7] = n2;
+	memcpy(buf+8, notation->name, n1 );
+	if(notation->altvalue)
+	  memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->altvalue, n2 );
+	else if(notation->bdat)
+	  memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->bdat, n2 );
+	else
+	  memcpy(buf+8+n1, notation->value, n2 );
+	build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION |
+			  (notation->flags.critical?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0),
+			  buf, 8+n1+n2 );
+	xfree(buf);
+      }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int
+keygen_add_revkey(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque)
+{
+  struct revocation_key *revkey=opaque;
+  byte buf[2+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+
+  buf[0]=revkey->class;
+  buf[1]=revkey->algid;
+  memcpy(&buf[2],revkey->fpr,MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+
+  build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,buf,2+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+
+  /* All sigs with revocation keys set are nonrevocable */
+  sig->flags.revocable=0;
+  buf[0] = 0;
+  build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1 );
+
+  parse_revkeys(sig);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int
+make_backsig(PKT_signature *sig,PKT_public_key *pk,
+ 	     PKT_public_key *sub_pk,PKT_secret_key *sub_sk)
+{
+  PKT_signature *backsig;
+  int rc;
+
+  cache_public_key(sub_pk);
+
+  rc=make_keysig_packet(&backsig,pk,NULL,sub_pk,sub_sk,0x19,0,0,0,0,NULL,NULL);
+  if(rc)
+    log_error("make_keysig_packet failed for backsig: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+  else
+    {
+      /* get it into a binary packed form. */
+      IOBUF backsig_out=iobuf_temp();
+      PACKET backsig_pkt;
+ 
+      init_packet(&backsig_pkt);
+      backsig_pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+      backsig_pkt.pkt.signature=backsig;
+      rc=build_packet(backsig_out,&backsig_pkt);
+      free_packet(&backsig_pkt);
+      if(rc)
+	log_error("build_packet failed for backsig: %s\n",g10_errstr(rc));
+      else
+	{
+	  size_t pktlen=0;
+	  byte *buf=iobuf_get_temp_buffer(backsig_out);
+ 
+	  /* Remove the packet header */
+	  if(buf[0]&0x40)
+	    {
+	      if(buf[1]<192)
+		{
+		  pktlen=buf[1];
+		  buf+=2;
+		}
+	      else if(buf[1]<224)
+		{
+		  pktlen=(buf[1]-192)*256;
+		  pktlen+=buf[2]+192;
+		  buf+=3;
+		}
+	      else if(buf[1]==255)
+		{
+		  pktlen =buf[2] << 24;
+		  pktlen|=buf[3] << 16;
+		  pktlen|=buf[4] << 8;
+		  pktlen|=buf[5];
+		  buf+=6;
+		}
+	      else
+		BUG();
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      int mark=1;
+ 
+	      switch(buf[0]&3)
+		{
+		case 3:
+		  BUG();
+		  break;
+ 
+		case 2:
+		  pktlen =buf[mark++] << 24;
+		  pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 16;
+ 
+		case 1:
+		  pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 8;
+ 
+		case 0:
+		  pktlen|=buf[mark++];
+		}
+ 
+	      buf+=mark;
+	    }
+ 
+	  /* now make the binary blob into a subpacket */
+	  build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,buf,pktlen);
+
+	  iobuf_close(backsig_out);
+	}
+    }
+ 
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_direct_sig( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		  struct revocation_key *revkey )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int rc=0;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+    if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("writing direct signature\n"));
+
+    /* get the pk packet from the pub_tree */
+    node = find_kbnode( pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG();
+    pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+    /* we have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature
+     * creation is able to retrieve the public key */
+    cache_public_key (pk);
+
+    /* and make the signature */
+    rc = make_keysig_packet(&sig,pk,NULL,NULL,sk,0x1F,0,0,0,0,
+			    keygen_add_revkey,revkey);
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+    add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+write_selfsigs( KBNODE sec_root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		unsigned int use )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    int rc=0;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+    if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("writing self signature\n"));
+
+    /* get the uid packet from the list */
+    node = find_kbnode( pub_root, PKT_USER_ID );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG(); /* no user id packet in tree */
+    uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+    /* get the pk packet from the pub_tree */
+    node = find_kbnode( pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG();
+    pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    pk->pubkey_usage = use;
+    /* we have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature
+     * creation is able to retrieve the public key */
+    cache_public_key (pk);
+
+    /* and make the signature */
+    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, uid, NULL, sk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+        		     keygen_add_std_prefs, pk );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+    add_kbnode( sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL,sig);
+    add_kbnode( pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root,
+		  PKT_secret_key *pri_sk, PKT_secret_key *sub_sk,
+                  unsigned int use )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int rc=0;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_public_key *pri_pk, *sub_pk;
+    struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk oduap;
+
+    if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("writing key binding signature\n"));
+
+    /* get the pk packet from the pub_tree */
+    node = find_kbnode( pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node )
+	BUG();
+    pri_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    /* we have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature
+     * creation is able to retrieve the public key */
+    cache_public_key (pri_pk);
+ 
+    /* find the last subkey */
+    sub_pk = NULL;
+    for(node=pub_root; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    }
+    if( !sub_pk )
+	BUG();
+
+    /* and make the signature */
+    oduap.usage = use;
+    oduap.pk = sub_pk;
+    rc=make_keysig_packet(&sig, pri_pk, NULL, sub_pk, pri_sk, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			  keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire, &oduap );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    /* make a backsig */
+    if(use&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+      {
+	rc=make_backsig(sig,pri_pk,sub_pk,sub_sk);
+	if(rc)
+	  return rc;
+      }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+    pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
+    add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+gen_elg(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
+	STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
+{
+    int rc;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    MPI skey[4];
+    MPI *factors;
+
+    assert( is_ELGAMAL(algo) );
+
+    if( nbits < 512 ) {
+	nbits = 1024;
+	log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+    if( (nbits % 32) ) {
+	nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32;
+	log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+    rc = pubkey_generate( algo, nbits, skey, &factors );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("pubkey_generate failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+    pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+    sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+    sk->version = pk->version = 4;
+    if( expireval ) {
+	sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
+    }
+    sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo = algo;
+		       pk->pkey[0] = mpi_copy( skey[0] );
+		       pk->pkey[1] = mpi_copy( skey[1] );
+		       pk->pkey[2] = mpi_copy( skey[2] );
+    sk->skey[0] = skey[0];
+    sk->skey[1] = skey[1];
+    sk->skey[2] = skey[2];
+    sk->skey[3] = skey[3];
+    sk->is_protected = 0;
+    sk->protect.algo = 0;
+
+    sk->csum = checksum_mpi( sk->skey[3] );
+    if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
+	*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
+
+    if( dek ) {
+	sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+	sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+	rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    free_public_key(pk);
+	    free_secret_key(sk);
+	    return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
+    add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    /* don't know whether it makes sense to have the factors, so for now
+     * we store them in the secret keyring (but they are not secret) */
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+    add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a DSA key
+ */
+static int
+gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
+	STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
+{
+    int rc;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    MPI skey[5];
+    MPI *factors;
+    unsigned int qbits;
+
+    if( nbits < 512 || (!opt.flags.dsa2 && nbits > 1024))
+      {
+	nbits = 1024;
+	log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
+      }
+    else if(nbits>3072)
+      {
+	nbits = 3072;
+	log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
+      }
+
+    if(nbits % 64)
+      {
+	nbits = ((nbits + 63) / 64) * 64;
+	log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+      }
+
+    /*
+      Figure out a q size based on the key size.  FIPS 180-3 says:
+
+      L = 1024, N = 160
+      L = 2048, N = 224
+      L = 2048, N = 256
+      L = 3072, N = 256
+
+      2048/256 is an odd pair since there is also a 2048/224 and
+      3072/256.  Matching sizes is not a very exact science.
+      
+      We'll do 256 qbits for nbits over 2048, 224 for nbits over 1024
+      but less than 2048, and 160 for 1024 (DSA1).
+    */
+
+    if(nbits>2048)
+      qbits=256;
+    else if(nbits>1024)
+      qbits=224;
+    else
+      qbits=160;
+
+    if(qbits!=160)
+      log_info("WARNING: some OpenPGP programs can't"
+	       " handle a DSA key with this digest size\n");
+
+    rc = dsa2_generate( PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA, nbits, qbits, skey, &factors );
+    if( rc )
+      {
+	log_error("dsa2_generate failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+      }
+
+    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+    pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+    sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+    sk->version = pk->version = 4;
+    if( expireval )
+      sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
+
+    sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA;
+		       pk->pkey[0] = mpi_copy( skey[0] );
+		       pk->pkey[1] = mpi_copy( skey[1] );
+		       pk->pkey[2] = mpi_copy( skey[2] );
+		       pk->pkey[3] = mpi_copy( skey[3] );
+    sk->skey[0] = skey[0];
+    sk->skey[1] = skey[1];
+    sk->skey[2] = skey[2];
+    sk->skey[3] = skey[3];
+    sk->skey[4] = skey[4];
+    sk->is_protected = 0;
+    sk->protect.algo = 0;
+
+    sk->csum = checksum_mpi ( sk->skey[4] );
+    if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
+	*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
+
+    if( dek ) {
+	sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+	sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+	rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    free_public_key(pk);
+	    free_secret_key(sk);
+	    return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
+    add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    /* don't know whether it makes sense to have the factors, so for now
+     * we store them in the secret keyring (but they are not secret)
+     * p = 2 * q * f1 * f2 * ... * fn
+     * We store only f1 to f_n-1;  fn can be calculated because p and q
+     * are known.
+     */
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+    add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Generate an RSA key.
+ */
+static int
+gen_rsa(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
+	STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
+{
+    int rc;
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    MPI skey[6];
+    MPI *factors;
+
+    assert( is_RSA(algo) );
+
+    if( nbits < 1024 ) {
+	nbits = 1024;
+	log_info(_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+    if( (nbits % 32) ) {
+	nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32;
+	log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+    rc = pubkey_generate( algo, nbits, skey, &factors );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("pubkey_generate failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+    pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+    sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+    sk->version = pk->version = 4;
+    if( expireval ) {
+	sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
+    }
+    sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo = algo;
+		       pk->pkey[0] = mpi_copy( skey[0] );
+		       pk->pkey[1] = mpi_copy( skey[1] );
+    sk->skey[0] = skey[0];
+    sk->skey[1] = skey[1];
+    sk->skey[2] = skey[2];
+    sk->skey[3] = skey[3];
+    sk->skey[4] = skey[4];
+    sk->skey[5] = skey[5];
+    sk->is_protected = 0;
+    sk->protect.algo = 0;
+
+    sk->csum  = checksum_mpi (sk->skey[2] );
+    sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[3] );
+    sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[4] );
+    sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[5] );
+    if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
+	*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
+
+    if( dek ) {
+	sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+	sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+	rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    free_public_key(pk);
+	    free_secret_key(sk);
+	    return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
+    add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    pkt = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+    add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * check valid days:
+ * return 0 on error or the multiplier
+ */
+static int
+check_valid_days( const char *s )
+{
+    if( !digitp(s) )
+	return 0;
+    for( s++; *s; s++)
+	if( !digitp(s) )
+	    break;
+    if( !*s )
+	return 1;
+    if( s[1] )
+	return 0; /* e.g. "2323wc" */
+    if( *s == 'd' || *s == 'D' )
+	return 1;
+    if( *s == 'w' || *s == 'W' )
+	return 7;
+    if( *s == 'm' || *s == 'M' )
+	return 30;
+    if( *s == 'y' || *s == 'Y' )
+	return 365;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_key_flags(int flags)
+{
+  if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+    tty_printf("%s ",_("Sign"));
+
+  if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)
+    tty_printf("%s ",_("Certify"));
+
+  if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+    tty_printf("%s ",_("Encrypt"));
+
+  if(flags&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
+    tty_printf("%s ",_("Authenticate"));
+}
+
+
+/* Returns the key flags */
+static unsigned int
+ask_key_flags(int algo,int subkey)
+{
+  const char *togglers=_("SsEeAaQq");
+  char *answer=NULL;
+  unsigned int current=0;
+  unsigned int possible=openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
+
+  if(strlen(togglers)!=8)
+    BUG();
+
+  /* Only primary keys may certify. */
+  if(subkey)
+    possible&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT;
+
+  /* Preload the current set with the possible set, minus
+     authentication, since nobody really uses auth yet. */
+  current=possible&~PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      tty_printf("\n");
+      tty_printf(_("Possible actions for a %s key: "),
+		 pubkey_algo_to_string(algo));
+      print_key_flags(possible);
+      tty_printf("\n");
+      tty_printf(_("Current allowed actions: "));
+      print_key_flags(current);
+      tty_printf("\n\n");
+
+      if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+	tty_printf(_("   (%c) Toggle the sign capability\n"),
+		   togglers[0]);
+      if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+	tty_printf(_("   (%c) Toggle the encrypt capability\n"),
+		   togglers[2]);
+      if(possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
+	tty_printf(_("   (%c) Toggle the authenticate capability\n"),
+		   togglers[4]);
+
+      tty_printf(_("   (%c) Finished\n"),togglers[6]);
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      xfree(answer);
+      answer = cpr_get("keygen.flags",_("Your selection? "));
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+
+      if(strlen(answer)>1)
+	tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+      else if(*answer=='\0' || *answer==togglers[6] || *answer==togglers[7])
+	break;
+      else if((*answer==togglers[0] || *answer==togglers[1])
+	      && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+	{
+	  if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+	    current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+	  else
+	    current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+	}
+      else if((*answer==togglers[2] || *answer==togglers[3])
+	      && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+	{
+	  if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+	    current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	  else
+	    current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	}
+      else if((*answer==togglers[4] || *answer==togglers[5])
+	      && possible&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
+	{
+	  if(current&PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)
+	    current&=~PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+	  else
+	    current|=PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+	}
+      else
+	tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+    }
+
+  xfree(answer);
+
+  return current;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Returns: 0 to create both a DSA and a Elgamal key.
+ *          and only if key flags are to be written the desired usage.
+ */
+static int
+ask_algo (int addmode, unsigned int *r_usage)
+{
+    char *answer;
+    int algo;
+
+    *r_usage = 0;
+    tty_printf(_("Please select what kind of key you want:\n"));
+    if( !addmode )
+	tty_printf(_("   (%d) DSA and Elgamal (default)\n"), 1 );
+    tty_printf(    _("   (%d) DSA (sign only)\n"), 2 );
+    if (opt.expert)
+      tty_printf(  _("   (%d) DSA (set your own capabilities)\n"), 3 );
+    if( addmode )
+	tty_printf(_("   (%d) Elgamal (encrypt only)\n"), 4 );
+    tty_printf(    _("   (%d) RSA (sign only)\n"), 5 );
+    if (addmode)
+        tty_printf(_("   (%d) RSA (encrypt only)\n"), 6 );
+    if (opt.expert)
+      tty_printf(  _("   (%d) RSA (set your own capabilities)\n"), 7 );
+
+    for(;;) {
+	answer = cpr_get("keygen.algo",_("Your selection? "));
+	cpr_kill_prompt();
+	algo = *answer? atoi(answer): 1;
+	xfree(answer);
+	if( algo == 1 && !addmode ) {
+	    algo = 0;	/* create both keys */
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 7 && opt.expert ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+	    *r_usage=ask_key_flags(algo,addmode);
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 6 && addmode ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+            *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 5 ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+            *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 4 && addmode ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E;
+            *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 3 && opt.expert ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA;
+	    *r_usage=ask_key_flags(algo,addmode);
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if( algo == 2 ) {
+	    algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA;
+            *r_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+	    break;
+	}
+	else
+	    tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+    }
+
+    return algo;
+}
+
+
+static unsigned
+ask_keysize( int algo )
+{
+  unsigned nbits,min,def=2048,max=4096;
+
+  if(opt.expert)
+    min=512;
+  else
+    min=1024;
+
+  switch(algo)
+    {
+    case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
+      if(opt.flags.dsa2)
+	{
+	  def=1024;
+	  max=3072;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  tty_printf(_("DSA keypair will have %u bits.\n"),1024);
+	  return 1024;
+	}
+      break;
+
+    case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
+      min=1024;
+      break;
+    }
+
+  tty_printf(_("%s keys may be between %u and %u bits long.\n"),
+	     pubkey_algo_to_string(algo),min,max);
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      char *prompt,*answer;
+
+#define PROMPTSTRING _("What keysize do you want? (%u) ")
+
+      prompt=xmalloc(strlen(PROMPTSTRING)+20);
+      sprintf(prompt,PROMPTSTRING,def);
+
+#undef PROMPTSTRING
+
+      answer = cpr_get("keygen.size",prompt);
+      cpr_kill_prompt();
+      nbits = *answer? atoi(answer): def;
+      xfree(prompt);
+      xfree(answer);
+      
+      if(nbits<min || nbits>max)
+	tty_printf(_("%s keysizes must be in the range %u-%u\n"),
+		   pubkey_algo_to_string(algo),min,max);
+      else
+	break;
+    }
+
+  tty_printf(_("Requested keysize is %u bits\n"), nbits );
+
+  if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && (nbits % 64) )
+    {
+      nbits = ((nbits + 63) / 64) * 64;
+      tty_printf(_("rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+  else if( (nbits % 32) )
+    {
+      nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32;
+      tty_printf(_("rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+  return nbits;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Parse an expire string and return its value in seconds.
+ * Returns (u32)-1 on error.
+ * This isn't perfect since scan_isodatestr returns unix time, and
+ * OpenPGP actually allows a 32-bit time *plus* a 32-bit offset.
+ * Because of this, we only permit setting expirations up to 2106, but
+ * OpenPGP could theoretically allow up to 2242.  I think we'll all
+ * just cope for the next few years until we get a 64-bit time_t or
+ * similar.
+ */
+u32
+parse_expire_string( const char *string )
+{
+    int mult;
+    u32 seconds,abs_date=0,curtime = make_timestamp();
+
+    if( !*string )
+      seconds = 0;
+    else if ( !strncmp (string, "seconds=", 8) )
+      seconds = atoi (string+8);
+    else if( (abs_date = scan_isodatestr(string)) && abs_date > curtime )
+      seconds = abs_date - curtime;
+    else if( (mult=check_valid_days(string)) )
+      seconds = atoi(string) * 86400L * mult;
+    else
+      seconds=(u32)-1;
+
+    return seconds;
+}
+
+/* object == 0 for a key, and 1 for a sig */
+u32
+ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire)
+{
+    u32 interval;
+    char *answer;
+
+    switch(object)
+      {
+      case 0:
+	if(def_expire)
+	  BUG();
+	tty_printf(_("Please specify how long the key should be valid.\n"
+		     "         0 = key does not expire\n"
+		     "      <n>  = key expires in n days\n"
+		     "      <n>w = key expires in n weeks\n"
+		     "      <n>m = key expires in n months\n"
+		     "      <n>y = key expires in n years\n"));
+	break;
+
+      case 1:
+	if(!def_expire)
+	  BUG();
+	tty_printf(_("Please specify how long the signature should be valid.\n"
+		     "         0 = signature does not expire\n"
+		     "      <n>  = signature expires in n days\n"
+		     "      <n>w = signature expires in n weeks\n"
+		     "      <n>m = signature expires in n months\n"
+		     "      <n>y = signature expires in n years\n"));
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	BUG();
+      }
+
+    /* Note: The elgamal subkey for DSA has no expiration date because
+     * it must be signed with the DSA key and this one has the expiration
+     * date */
+
+    answer = NULL;
+    for(;;)
+      {
+	u32 curtime=make_timestamp();
+
+	xfree(answer);
+	if(object==0)
+	  answer = cpr_get("keygen.valid",_("Key is valid for? (0) "));
+	else
+	  {
+	    char *prompt;
+
+#define PROMPTSTRING _("Signature is valid for? (%s) ")
+	    /* This will actually end up larger than necessary because
+	       of the 2 bytes for '%s' */
+	    prompt=xmalloc(strlen(PROMPTSTRING)+strlen(def_expire)+1);
+	    sprintf(prompt,PROMPTSTRING,def_expire);
+#undef PROMPTSTRING
+
+	    answer = cpr_get("siggen.valid",prompt);
+	    xfree(prompt);
+
+	    if(*answer=='\0')
+	      answer=xstrdup(def_expire);
+	  }
+	cpr_kill_prompt();
+	trim_spaces(answer);
+	interval = parse_expire_string( answer );
+	if( interval == (u32)-1 )
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_("invalid value\n"));
+	    continue;
+	  }
+
+	if( !interval )
+	  {
+            tty_printf((object==0)
+                       ? _("Key does not expire at all\n")
+                       : _("Signature does not expire at all\n"));
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(object==0
+		       ? _("Key expires at %s\n")
+		       : _("Signature expires at %s\n"),
+		       asctimestamp((ulong)(curtime + interval) ) );
+	    /* FIXME: This check yields warning on alhas: Write a
+	       configure check and to this check here only for 32 bit
+	       machines */
+	    if( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 )
+	      tty_printf(_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n"
+			   "However, it will be correctly handled up to 2106.\n"));
+	  }
+
+	if( cpr_enabled() || cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.valid.okay",
+						   _("Is this correct? (y/N) ")) )
+	  break;
+      }
+
+    xfree(answer);
+    return interval;
+}
+
+u32
+ask_expiredate()
+{
+    u32 x = ask_expire_interval(0,NULL);
+    return x? make_timestamp() + x : 0;
+}
+
+
+static char *
+ask_user_id( int mode )
+{
+    char *answer;
+    char *aname, *acomment, *amail, *uid;
+
+    if( !mode )
+	tty_printf( _("\n"
+"You need a user ID to identify your key; "
+                                        "the software constructs the user ID\n"
+"from the Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:\n"
+"    \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh@duesseldorf.de>\"\n\n") );
+    uid = aname = acomment = amail = NULL;
+    for(;;) {
+	char *p;
+	int fail=0;
+
+	if( !aname ) {
+	    for(;;) {
+		xfree(aname);
+		aname = cpr_get("keygen.name",_("Real name: "));
+		trim_spaces(aname);
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+
+		if( opt.allow_freeform_uid )
+		    break;
+
+		if( strpbrk( aname, "<>" ) )
+		    tty_printf(_("Invalid character in name\n"));
+		else if( digitp(aname) )
+		    tty_printf(_("Name may not start with a digit\n"));
+		else if( strlen(aname) < 5 )
+		    tty_printf(_("Name must be at least 5 characters long\n"));
+		else
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !amail ) {
+	    for(;;) {
+		xfree(amail);
+		amail = cpr_get("keygen.email",_("Email address: "));
+		trim_spaces(amail);
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+		if( !*amail || opt.allow_freeform_uid )
+		    break;   /* no email address is okay */
+		else if ( !is_valid_mailbox (amail) )
+                    tty_printf(_("Not a valid email address\n"));
+		else
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !acomment ) {
+	    for(;;) {
+		xfree(acomment);
+		acomment = cpr_get("keygen.comment",_("Comment: "));
+		trim_spaces(acomment);
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+		if( !*acomment )
+		    break;   /* no comment is okay */
+		else if( strpbrk( acomment, "()" ) )
+		    tty_printf(_("Invalid character in comment\n"));
+		else
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+
+	xfree(uid);
+	uid = p = xmalloc(strlen(aname)+strlen(amail)+strlen(acomment)+12+10);
+	p = stpcpy(p, aname );
+	if( *acomment )
+	    p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," ("), acomment),")");
+	if( *amail )
+	    p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," <"), amail),">");
+
+	/* append a warning if we do not have dev/random
+	 * or it is switched into  quick testmode */
+	if( quick_random_gen(-1) )
+	    strcpy(p, " (INSECURE!)" );
+
+	/* print a note in case that UTF8 mapping has to be done */
+	for(p=uid; *p; p++ ) {
+	    if( *p & 0x80 ) {
+		tty_printf(_("You are using the `%s' character set.\n"),
+			   get_native_charset() );
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	tty_printf(_("You selected this USER-ID:\n    \"%s\"\n\n"), uid);
+	/* fixme: add a warning if this user-id already exists */
+	if( !*amail && !opt.allow_freeform_uid
+	    && (strchr( aname, '@' ) || strchr( acomment, '@'))) {
+	    fail = 1;
+	    tty_printf(_("Please don't put the email address "
+			  "into the real name or the comment\n") );
+	}
+
+	for(;;) {
+            /* TRANSLATORS: These are the allowed answers in
+               lower and uppercase.  Below you will find the matching
+               string which should be translated accordingly and the
+               letter changed to match the one in the answer string.
+               
+                 n = Change name
+                 c = Change comment
+                 e = Change email
+                 o = Okay (ready, continue)
+                 q = Quit
+             */
+	    const char *ansstr = _("NnCcEeOoQq");
+
+	    if( strlen(ansstr) != 10 )
+		BUG();
+	    if( cpr_enabled() ) {
+		answer = xstrdup(ansstr+6);
+		answer[1] = 0;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		answer = cpr_get("keygen.userid.cmd", fail?
+		  _("Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (Q)uit? ") :
+		  _("Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? "));
+		cpr_kill_prompt();
+	    }
+	    if( strlen(answer) > 1 )
+		;
+	    else if( *answer == ansstr[0] || *answer == ansstr[1] ) {
+		xfree(aname); aname = NULL;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    else if( *answer == ansstr[2] || *answer == ansstr[3] ) {
+		xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    else if( *answer == ansstr[4] || *answer == ansstr[5] ) {
+		xfree(amail); amail = NULL;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    else if( *answer == ansstr[6] || *answer == ansstr[7] ) {
+		if( fail ) {
+		    tty_printf(_("Please correct the error first\n"));
+		}
+		else {
+		    xfree(aname); aname = NULL;
+		    xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL;
+		    xfree(amail); amail = NULL;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if( *answer == ansstr[8] || *answer == ansstr[9] ) {
+		xfree(aname); aname = NULL;
+		xfree(acomment); acomment = NULL;
+		xfree(amail); amail = NULL;
+		xfree(uid); uid = NULL;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    xfree(answer);
+	}
+	xfree(answer);
+	if( !amail && !acomment && !amail )
+	    break;
+	xfree(uid); uid = NULL;
+    }
+    if( uid ) {
+	char *p = native_to_utf8( uid );
+	xfree( uid );
+	uid = p;
+    }
+    return uid;
+}
+
+
+/* FIXME: We need a way to cancel this prompt. */
+static DEK *
+do_ask_passphrase( STRING2KEY **ret_s2k )
+{
+    DEK *dek = NULL;
+    STRING2KEY *s2k;
+    const char *errtext = NULL;
+
+    tty_printf(_("You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key.\n\n") );
+
+    s2k = xmalloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
+    for(;;) {
+	s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
+	s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+	dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.s2k_cipher_algo, s2k,2,
+                                 errtext, NULL);
+	if( !dek ) {
+	    errtext = N_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again");
+	    tty_printf(_("%s.\n"), _(errtext));
+	}
+	else if( !dek->keylen ) {
+	    xfree(dek); dek = NULL;
+	    xfree(s2k); s2k = NULL;
+	    tty_printf(_(
+	    "You don't want a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
+	    "I will do it anyway.  You can change your passphrase at any time,\n"
+	    "using this program with the option \"--edit-key\".\n\n"));
+	    break;
+	}
+	else
+	    break; /* okay */
+    }
+    *ret_s2k = s2k;
+    return dek;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_create( int algo, unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
+	   DEK *dek, STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **sk, u32 expiredate,
+	   int is_subkey )
+{
+  int rc=0;
+
+  if( !opt.batch )
+    tty_printf(_(
+"We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\n"
+"some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the\n"
+"disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number\n"
+"generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\n") );
+
+  if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E )
+    rc = gen_elg(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+		 is_subkey);
+  else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+    rc = gen_dsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+		 is_subkey);
+  else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+    rc = gen_rsa(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+		 is_subkey);
+  else
+    BUG();
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a new user id packet, or return NULL if canceled
+ */
+PKT_user_id *
+generate_user_id()
+{
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    char *p;
+    size_t n;
+
+    p = ask_user_id( 1 );
+    if( !p )
+	return NULL;
+    n = strlen(p);
+    uid = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *uid + n - 1 );
+    uid->len = n;
+    strcpy(uid->name, p);
+    uid->ref = 1;
+    return uid;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_parameter_list( struct para_data_s *r )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r2;
+
+    for( ; r ; r = r2 ) {
+	r2 = r->next;
+	if( r->key == pPASSPHRASE_DEK )
+	    xfree( r->u.dek );
+	else if( r->key == pPASSPHRASE_S2K )
+	    xfree( r->u.s2k );
+
+	xfree(r);
+    }
+}
+
+static struct para_data_s *
+get_parameter( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r;
+
+    for( r = para; r && r->key != key; r = r->next )
+	;
+    return r;
+}
+
+static const char *
+get_parameter_value( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    return (r && *r->u.value)? r->u.value : NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+get_parameter_algo( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    int i;
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    if( !r )
+	return -1;
+    if( digitp( r->u.value ) )
+	i = atoi( r->u.value );
+    else
+        i = string_to_pubkey_algo( r->u.value );
+    if (i == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E || i == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S)
+      i = 0; /* we don't want to allow generation of these algorithms */
+    return i;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * parse the usage parameter and set the keyflags.  Return true on error.
+ */
+static int
+parse_parameter_usage (const char *fname,
+                       struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key)
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    char *p, *pn;
+    unsigned int use;
+
+    if( !r )
+	return 0; /* none (this is an optional parameter)*/
+    
+    use = 0;
+    pn = r->u.value;
+    while ( (p = strsep (&pn, " \t,")) ) {
+        if ( !*p)
+            ;
+        else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "sign") )
+            use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+        else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "encrypt") )
+            use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+        else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "auth") )
+            use |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+        else {
+            log_error("%s:%d: invalid usage list\n", fname, r->lnr );
+            return -1; /* error */
+        }
+    }
+    r->u.usage = use;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_revocation_key (const char *fname,
+		      struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key)
+{
+  struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+  struct revocation_key revkey;
+  char *pn;
+  int i;
+
+  if( !r )
+    return 0; /* none (this is an optional parameter) */
+
+  pn = r->u.value;
+
+  revkey.class=0x80;
+  revkey.algid=atoi(pn);
+  if(!revkey.algid)
+    goto fail;
+
+  /* Skip to the fpr */
+  while(*pn && *pn!=':')
+    pn++;
+
+  if(*pn!=':')
+    goto fail;
+
+  pn++;
+
+  for(i=0;i<MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN && *pn;i++,pn+=2)
+    {
+      int c=hextobyte(pn);
+      if(c==-1)
+	goto fail;
+
+      revkey.fpr[i]=c;
+    }
+
+  /* skip to the tag */
+  while(*pn && *pn!='s' && *pn!='S')
+    pn++;
+
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(pn,"sensitive")==0)
+    revkey.class|=0x40;
+
+  memcpy(&r->u.revkey,&revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key));
+
+  return 0;
+
+  fail:
+  log_error("%s:%d: invalid revocation key\n", fname, r->lnr );
+  return -1; /* error */
+}
+
+
+static u32
+get_parameter_u32( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+
+    if( !r )
+	return 0;
+    if( r->key == pKEYEXPIRE || r->key == pSUBKEYEXPIRE )
+	return r->u.expire;
+    if( r->key == pKEYUSAGE || r->key == pSUBKEYUSAGE )
+	return r->u.usage;
+
+    return (unsigned int)strtoul( r->u.value, NULL, 10 );
+}
+
+static unsigned int
+get_parameter_uint( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    return get_parameter_u32( para, key );
+}
+
+static DEK *
+get_parameter_dek( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    return r? r->u.dek : NULL;
+}
+
+static STRING2KEY *
+get_parameter_s2k( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    return r? r->u.s2k : NULL;
+}
+
+static struct revocation_key *
+get_parameter_revkey( struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key )
+{
+    struct para_data_s *r = get_parameter( para, key );
+    return r? &r->u.revkey : NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+proc_parameter_file( struct para_data_s *para, const char *fname,
+                     struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card )
+{
+  struct para_data_s *r;
+  const char *s1, *s2, *s3;
+  size_t n;
+  char *p;
+  int have_user_id=0,err,algo;
+
+  /* Check that we have all required parameters. */
+  r = get_parameter( para, pKEYTYPE );
+  if(r)
+    {
+      algo=get_parameter_algo(para,pKEYTYPE);
+      if(check_pubkey_algo2(algo,PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG))
+	{
+	  log_error("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
+	  return -1;
+	}
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      log_error("%s: no Key-Type specified\n",fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  err=parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pKEYUSAGE);
+  if(err==0)
+    {
+      /* Default to algo capabilities if key-usage is not provided */
+      r=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r));
+      r->key=pKEYUSAGE;
+      r->u.usage=openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
+      r->next=para;
+      para=r;
+    }
+  else if(err==-1)
+    return -1;
+
+  r = get_parameter( para, pSUBKEYTYPE );
+  if(r)
+    {
+      algo=get_parameter_algo( para, pSUBKEYTYPE);
+      if(check_pubkey_algo(algo))
+	{
+	  log_error("%s:%d: invalid algorithm\n", fname, r->lnr );
+	  return -1;
+	}
+
+      err=parse_parameter_usage (fname, para, pSUBKEYUSAGE);
+      if(err==0)
+	{
+	  /* Default to algo capabilities if subkey-usage is not
+	     provided */
+	  r=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*r));
+	  r->key=pSUBKEYUSAGE;
+	  r->u.usage=openpgp_pk_algo_usage(algo);
+	  r->next=para;
+	  para=r;
+	}
+      else if(err==-1)
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+  if( get_parameter_value( para, pUSERID ) )
+    have_user_id=1;
+  else
+    {
+      /* create the formatted user ID */
+      s1 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMEREAL );
+      s2 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMECOMMENT );
+      s3 = get_parameter_value( para, pNAMEEMAIL );
+      if( s1 || s2 || s3 )
+	{
+	  n = (s1?strlen(s1):0) + (s2?strlen(s2):0) + (s3?strlen(s3):0);
+	  r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + n + 20 );
+	  r->key = pUSERID;
+	  p = r->u.value;
+	  if( s1 )
+	    p = stpcpy(p, s1 );
+	  if( s2 )
+	    p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," ("), s2 ),")");
+	  if( s3 )
+	    p = stpcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy(p," <"), s3 ),">");
+	  r->next = para;
+	  para = r;
+	  have_user_id=1;
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(!have_user_id)
+    {
+      log_error("%s: no User-ID specified\n",fname);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+  /* Set preferences, if any. */
+  keygen_set_std_prefs(get_parameter_value( para, pPREFERENCES ), 0);
+
+  /* Set keyserver, if any. */
+  s1=get_parameter_value( para, pKEYSERVER );
+  if(s1)
+    {
+      struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+      spec=parse_keyserver_uri(s1,1,NULL,0);
+      if(spec)
+	{
+	  free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+	  opt.def_keyserver_url=s1;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  log_error("%s:%d: invalid keyserver url\n", fname, r->lnr );
+	  return -1;
+	}
+    }
+
+  /* Set revoker, if any. */
+  if (parse_revocation_key (fname, para, pREVOKER))
+    return -1;
+
+  /* make DEK and S2K from the Passphrase */
+  r = get_parameter( para, pPASSPHRASE );
+  if( r && *r->u.value ) {
+    /* we have a plain text passphrase - create a DEK from it.
+     * It is a little bit ridiculous to keep it ih secure memory
+     * but becuase we do this alwasy, why not here */
+    STRING2KEY *s2k;
+    DEK *dek;
+
+    s2k = xmalloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
+    s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
+    s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+    set_next_passphrase( r->u.value );
+    dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.s2k_cipher_algo, s2k, 2,
+			     NULL, NULL);
+    set_next_passphrase( NULL );
+    assert( dek );
+    memset( r->u.value, 0, strlen(r->u.value) );
+
+    r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r );
+    r->key = pPASSPHRASE_S2K;
+    r->u.s2k = s2k;
+    r->next = para;
+    para = r;
+    r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r );
+    r->key = pPASSPHRASE_DEK;
+    r->u.dek = dek;
+    r->next = para;
+    para = r;
+  }
+
+  /* make KEYEXPIRE from Expire-Date */
+  r = get_parameter( para, pEXPIREDATE );
+  if( r && *r->u.value )
+    {
+      u32 seconds;
+
+      seconds = parse_expire_string( r->u.value );
+      if( seconds == (u32)-1 )
+	{
+	  log_error("%s:%d: invalid expire date\n", fname, r->lnr );
+	  return -1;
+	}
+      r->u.expire = seconds;
+      r->key = pKEYEXPIRE;  /* change hat entry */
+      /* also set it for the subkey */
+      r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pSUBKEYEXPIRE;
+      r->u.expire = seconds;
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+    }
+
+  if( !!outctrl->pub.newfname ^ !!outctrl->sec.newfname ) {
+    log_error("%s:%d: only one ring name is set\n", fname, outctrl->lnr );
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  do_generate_keypair( para, outctrl, card );
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Kludge to allow non interactive key generation controlled
+ * by a parameter file.
+ * Note, that string parameters are expected to be in UTF-8
+ */
+static void
+read_parameter_file( const char *fname )
+{
+    static struct { const char *name;
+		    enum para_name key;
+    } keywords[] = {
+	{ "Key-Type",       pKEYTYPE},
+	{ "Key-Length",     pKEYLENGTH },
+	{ "Key-Usage",      pKEYUSAGE },
+	{ "Subkey-Type",    pSUBKEYTYPE },
+	{ "Subkey-Length",  pSUBKEYLENGTH },
+	{ "Subkey-Usage",   pSUBKEYUSAGE },
+	{ "Name-Real",      pNAMEREAL },
+	{ "Name-Email",     pNAMEEMAIL },
+	{ "Name-Comment",   pNAMECOMMENT },
+	{ "Expire-Date",    pEXPIREDATE },
+	{ "Passphrase",     pPASSPHRASE },
+	{ "Preferences",    pPREFERENCES },
+	{ "Revoker",        pREVOKER },
+        { "Handle",         pHANDLE },
+	{ "Keyserver",      pKEYSERVER },
+	{ NULL, 0 }
+    };
+    IOBUF fp;
+    byte *line;
+    unsigned int maxlen, nline;
+    char *p;
+    int lnr;
+    const char *err = NULL;
+    struct para_data_s *para, *r;
+    int i;
+    struct output_control_s outctrl;
+
+    memset( &outctrl, 0, sizeof( outctrl ) );
+
+    if( !fname || !*fname)
+      fname = "-";
+
+    fp = iobuf_open (fname);
+    if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (fp);
+        fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if (!fp) {
+      log_error (_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+      return;
+    }
+    iobuf_ioctl (fp, 3, 1, NULL); /* No file caching. */
+
+    lnr = 0;
+    err = NULL;
+    para = NULL;
+    maxlen = 1024;
+    line = NULL;
+    while ( iobuf_read_line (fp, &line, &nline, &maxlen) ) {
+	char *keyword, *value;
+
+	lnr++;
+	if( !maxlen ) {
+	    err = "line too long";
+	    break;
+	}
+	for( p = line; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ )
+	    ;
+	if( !*p || *p == '#' )
+	    continue;
+	keyword = p;
+	if( *keyword == '%' ) {
+	    for( ; !isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ )
+		;
+	    if( *p )
+		*p++ = 0;
+	    for( ; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ )
+		;
+	    value = p;
+	    trim_trailing_ws( value, strlen(value) );
+	    if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%echo" ) )
+		log_info("%s\n", value );
+	    else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%dry-run" ) )
+		outctrl.dryrun = 1;
+	    else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%commit" ) ) {
+		outctrl.lnr = lnr;
+		if (proc_parameter_file( para, fname, &outctrl, 0 ))
+                  print_status_key_not_created 
+                    (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE));
+		release_parameter_list( para );
+		para = NULL;
+	    }
+	    else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%pubring" ) ) {
+		if( outctrl.pub.fname && !strcmp( outctrl.pub.fname, value ) )
+		    ; /* still the same file - ignore it */
+		else {
+		    xfree( outctrl.pub.newfname );
+		    outctrl.pub.newfname = xstrdup( value );
+		    outctrl.use_files = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keyword, "%secring" ) ) {
+		if( outctrl.sec.fname && !strcmp( outctrl.sec.fname, value ) )
+		    ; /* still the same file - ignore it */
+		else {
+		   xfree( outctrl.sec.newfname );
+		   outctrl.sec.newfname = xstrdup( value );
+		   outctrl.use_files = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+		log_info("skipping control `%s' (%s)\n", keyword, value );
+
+
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+
+	if( !(p = strchr( p, ':' )) || p == keyword ) {
+	    err = "missing colon";
+	    break;
+	}
+	if( *p )
+	    *p++ = 0;
+	for( ; isspace(*(byte*)p); p++ )
+	    ;
+	if( !*p ) {
+	    err = "missing argument";
+	    break;
+	}
+	value = p;
+	trim_trailing_ws( value, strlen(value) );
+
+	for(i=0; keywords[i].name; i++ ) {
+	    if( !ascii_strcasecmp( keywords[i].name, keyword ) )
+		break;
+	}
+	if( !keywords[i].name ) {
+	    err = "unknown keyword";
+	    break;
+	}
+	if( keywords[i].key != pKEYTYPE && !para ) {
+	    err = "parameter block does not start with \"Key-Type\"";
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	if( keywords[i].key == pKEYTYPE && para ) {
+	    outctrl.lnr = lnr;
+	    if (proc_parameter_file( para, fname, &outctrl, 0 ))
+              print_status_key_not_created
+                (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE));
+	    release_parameter_list( para );
+	    para = NULL;
+	}
+	else {
+	    for( r = para; r; r = r->next ) {
+		if( r->key == keywords[i].key )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( r ) {
+		err = "duplicate keyword";
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + strlen( value ) );
+	r->lnr = lnr;
+	r->key = keywords[i].key;
+	strcpy( r->u.value, value );
+	r->next = para;
+	para = r;
+    }
+    if( err )
+	log_error("%s:%d: %s\n", fname, lnr, err );
+    else if( iobuf_error (fp) ) {
+	log_error("%s:%d: read error\n", fname, lnr);
+    }
+    else if( para ) {
+	outctrl.lnr = lnr;
+	if (proc_parameter_file( para, fname, &outctrl, 0 ))
+          print_status_key_not_created (get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE));
+    }
+
+    if( outctrl.use_files ) { /* close open streams */
+	iobuf_close( outctrl.pub.stream );
+	iobuf_close( outctrl.sec.stream );
+
+        /* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it.  */
+        if (outctrl.pub.fname)
+          iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)outctrl.pub.fname);
+        if (outctrl.sec.fname)
+          iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)outctrl.sec.fname);
+
+	xfree( outctrl.pub.fname );
+	xfree( outctrl.pub.newfname );
+	xfree( outctrl.sec.fname );
+	xfree( outctrl.sec.newfname );
+    }
+
+    release_parameter_list( para );
+    iobuf_close (fp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair (fname is only used in batch mode) If
+ * CARD_SERIALNO is not NULL the fucntion will create the keys on an
+ * OpenPGP Card.  If BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_DIR has been set and
+ * CARD_SERIALNO is NOT NULL, the encryption key for the card gets
+ * generate in software, imported to the card and a backup file
+ * written to directory given by this argument .
+ */
+void
+generate_keypair (const char *fname, const char *card_serialno, 
+                  const char *backup_encryption_dir)
+{
+  unsigned int nbits;
+  char *uid = NULL;
+  DEK *dek;
+  STRING2KEY *s2k;
+  int algo;
+  unsigned int use;
+  int both = 0;
+  u32 expire;
+  struct para_data_s *para = NULL;
+  struct para_data_s *r;
+  struct output_control_s outctrl;
+  
+  memset( &outctrl, 0, sizeof( outctrl ) );
+  
+  if (opt.batch && card_serialno)
+    {
+      /* We don't yet support unattended key generation. */
+      log_error (_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+      return;
+    }
+  
+  if (opt.batch)
+    {
+      read_parameter_file( fname );
+      return;
+    }
+
+  if (card_serialno)
+    {
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (card_serialno) );
+      r->key = pSERIALNO;
+      strcpy( r->u.value, card_serialno);
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+       
+      algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+       
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pKEYTYPE;
+      sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo );
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pKEYUSAGE;
+      strcpy (r->u.value, "sign");
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+       
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pSUBKEYTYPE;
+      sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo );
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE;
+      strcpy (r->u.value, "encrypt");
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+       
+      r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = pAUTHKEYTYPE;
+      sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo );
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+
+      if (backup_encryption_dir)
+        {
+          r = xcalloc (1, sizeof *r + strlen (backup_encryption_dir) );
+          r->key = pBACKUPENCDIR;
+          strcpy (r->u.value, backup_encryption_dir);
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+        }
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      algo = ask_algo( 0, &use );
+      if( !algo )
+        { /* default: DSA with ElG subkey of the specified size */
+          both = 1;
+          r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+          r->key = pKEYTYPE;
+          sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA );
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+	  nbits = ask_keysize( PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA );
+	  r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+	  r->key = pKEYLENGTH;
+	  sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", nbits);
+	  r->next = para;
+	  para = r;
+          r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+          r->key = pKEYUSAGE;
+          strcpy( r->u.value, "sign" );
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+           
+          algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E;
+          r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+          r->key = pSUBKEYTYPE;
+          sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo );
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+          r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+          r->key = pSUBKEYUSAGE;
+          strcpy( r->u.value, "encrypt" );
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+        }
+      else 
+        {
+          r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+          r->key = pKEYTYPE;
+          sprintf( r->u.value, "%d", algo );
+          r->next = para;
+          para = r;
+           
+          if (use)
+            {
+              r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 25 );
+              r->key = pKEYUSAGE;
+              sprintf( r->u.value, "%s%s%s",
+                       (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)? "sign ":"",
+                       (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? "encrypt ":"",
+                       (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)? "auth":"" );
+              r->next = para;
+              para = r;
+            }
+           
+        }
+
+      nbits = ask_keysize( algo );
+      r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+      r->key = both? pSUBKEYLENGTH : pKEYLENGTH;
+      sprintf( r->u.value, "%u", nbits);
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+    }
+   
+  expire = ask_expire_interval(0,NULL);
+  r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+  r->key = pKEYEXPIRE;
+  r->u.expire = expire;
+  r->next = para;
+  para = r;
+  r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + 20 );
+  r->key = pSUBKEYEXPIRE;
+  r->u.expire = expire;
+  r->next = para;
+  para = r;
+
+  uid = ask_user_id(0);
+  if( !uid ) 
+    {
+      log_error(_("Key generation canceled.\n"));
+      release_parameter_list( para );
+      return;
+    }
+  r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r + strlen(uid) );
+  r->key = pUSERID;
+  strcpy( r->u.value, uid );
+  r->next = para;
+  para = r;
+    
+  dek = card_serialno? NULL : do_ask_passphrase( &s2k );
+  if( dek )
+    {
+      r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r );
+      r->key = pPASSPHRASE_DEK;
+      r->u.dek = dek;
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+      r = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *r );
+      r->key = pPASSPHRASE_S2K;
+      r->u.s2k = s2k;
+      r->next = para;
+      para = r;
+    }
+    
+  proc_parameter_file( para, "[internal]", &outctrl, !!card_serialno);
+  release_parameter_list( para );
+}
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+/* Generate a raw key and return it as a secret key packet.  The
+   function will ask for the passphrase and return a protected as well
+   as an unprotected copy of a new secret key packet.  0 is returned
+   on success and the caller must then free the returned values.  */
+static int
+generate_raw_key (int algo, unsigned int nbits, u32 created_at,
+                  PKT_secret_key **r_sk_unprotected,
+                  PKT_secret_key **r_sk_protected)
+{
+  int rc;
+  DEK *dek = NULL;
+  STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+  int i;
+  size_t nskey, npkey;
+
+  npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (algo);
+  nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (algo);
+  assert (nskey <= PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && npkey < nskey);
+
+  if (nbits < 512)
+    {
+      nbits = 512;
+      log_info (_("keysize invalid; using %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+  if ((nbits % 32)) 
+    {
+      nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32;
+      log_info(_("keysize rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
+    }
+
+  dek = do_ask_passphrase (&s2k);
+
+  sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sk);
+  sk->timestamp = created_at;
+  sk->version = 4;
+  sk->pubkey_algo = algo;
+
+  rc = pubkey_generate (algo, nbits, sk->skey, NULL);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error("pubkey_generate failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  for (i=npkey; i < nskey; i++)
+    sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]);
+
+  if (r_sk_unprotected) 
+    *r_sk_unprotected = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+
+  if (dek)
+    {
+      sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
+      sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
+      rc = protect_secret_key (sk, dek);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error ("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+          goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+  if (r_sk_protected)
+    {
+      *r_sk_protected = sk;
+      sk = NULL;
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  if (sk)
+    free_secret_key (sk);
+  xfree (dek);
+  xfree (s2k);
+  return rc;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+
+/* Create and delete a dummy packet to start off a list of kbnodes. */
+static void
+start_tree(KBNODE *tree)
+{
+  PACKET *pkt;
+
+  pkt=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*pkt));
+  pkt->pkttype=PKT_NONE;
+  *tree=new_kbnode(pkt);
+  delete_kbnode(*tree);
+}
+
+static void
+do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
+		     struct output_control_s *outctrl, int card )
+{
+    KBNODE pub_root = NULL;
+    KBNODE sec_root = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk = NULL;
+    const char *s;
+    struct revocation_key *revkey;
+    int rc;
+    int did_sub = 0;
+
+    if( outctrl->dryrun )
+      {
+	log_info("dry-run mode - key generation skipped\n");
+	return;
+      }
+
+    if( outctrl->use_files ) {
+	if( outctrl->pub.newfname ) {
+	    iobuf_close(outctrl->pub.stream);
+	    outctrl->pub.stream = NULL;
+            if (outctrl->pub.fname)
+              iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)outctrl->pub.fname);
+	    xfree( outctrl->pub.fname );
+	    outctrl->pub.fname =  outctrl->pub.newfname;
+	    outctrl->pub.newfname = NULL;
+
+            if (is_secured_filename (outctrl->pub.fname) ) {
+                outctrl->pub.stream = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+            }
+            else
+                outctrl->pub.stream = iobuf_create( outctrl->pub.fname );
+	    if( !outctrl->pub.stream ) {
+		log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), outctrl->pub.newfname,
+						     strerror(errno) );
+		return;
+	    }
+	    if( opt.armor ) {
+		outctrl->pub.afx.what = 1;
+		iobuf_push_filter( outctrl->pub.stream, armor_filter,
+						    &outctrl->pub.afx );
+	    }
+	}
+	if( outctrl->sec.newfname ) {
+            mode_t oldmask;
+
+	    iobuf_close(outctrl->sec.stream);
+	    outctrl->sec.stream = NULL;
+            if (outctrl->sec.fname)
+              iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)outctrl->sec.fname);
+	    xfree( outctrl->sec.fname );
+	    outctrl->sec.fname =  outctrl->sec.newfname;
+	    outctrl->sec.newfname = NULL;
+
+	    oldmask = umask (077);
+            if (is_secured_filename (outctrl->sec.fname) ) {
+                outctrl->sec.stream = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+            }
+            else
+                outctrl->sec.stream = iobuf_create( outctrl->sec.fname );
+            umask (oldmask);
+	    if( !outctrl->sec.stream ) {
+		log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), outctrl->sec.newfname,
+						     strerror(errno) );
+		return;
+	    }
+	    if( opt.armor ) {
+		outctrl->sec.afx.what = 5;
+		iobuf_push_filter( outctrl->sec.stream, armor_filter,
+						    &outctrl->sec.afx );
+	    }
+	}
+	assert( outctrl->pub.stream );
+	assert( outctrl->sec.stream );
+        if( opt.verbose ) {
+            log_info(_("writing public key to `%s'\n"), outctrl->pub.fname );
+            if (card)
+              log_info (_("writing secret key stub to `%s'\n"),
+                        outctrl->sec.fname);
+            else
+              log_info(_("writing secret key to `%s'\n"), outctrl->sec.fname );
+        }
+    }
+
+
+    /* we create the packets as a tree of kbnodes. Because the
+     * structure we create is known in advance we simply generate a
+     * linked list.  The first packet is a dummy packet which we flag
+     * as deleted.  The very first packet must always be a KEY packet.
+     */
+    
+    start_tree(&pub_root);
+    start_tree(&sec_root);
+
+    if (!card)
+      {
+        rc = do_create( get_parameter_algo( para, pKEYTYPE ),
+                        get_parameter_uint( para, pKEYLENGTH ),
+                        pub_root, sec_root,
+                        get_parameter_dek( para, pPASSPHRASE_DEK ),
+                        get_parameter_s2k( para, pPASSPHRASE_S2K ),
+                        &pri_sk,
+                        get_parameter_u32( para, pKEYEXPIRE ), 0 );
+      }
+    else
+      {
+        rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 1, 1, pub_root, sec_root, NULL,
+                           get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
+        if (!rc)
+          {
+            pri_sk = sec_root->next->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+            assert (pri_sk);
+          }
+      }
+
+    if(!rc && (revkey=get_parameter_revkey(para,pREVOKER)))
+      {
+	rc=write_direct_sig(pub_root,pub_root,pri_sk,revkey);
+	if(!rc)
+	  write_direct_sig(sec_root,pub_root,pri_sk,revkey);
+      }
+
+    if( !rc && (s=get_parameter_value(para, pUSERID)) )
+      {
+	write_uid(pub_root, s );
+	if( !rc )
+	  write_uid(sec_root, s );
+
+	if( !rc )
+	  rc = write_selfsigs(sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk,
+			      get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE));
+      }
+
+    /* Write the auth key to the card before the encryption key.  This
+       is a partial workaround for a PGP bug (as of this writing, all
+       versions including 8.1), that causes it to try and encrypt to
+       the most recent subkey regardless of whether that subkey is
+       actually an encryption type.  In this case, the auth key is an
+       RSA key so it succeeds. */
+
+    if (!rc && card && get_parameter (para, pAUTHKEYTYPE))
+      {
+        rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 3, 0, pub_root, sec_root, NULL,
+                           get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
+        
+        if (!rc)
+          rc = write_keybinding (pub_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
+        if (!rc)
+          rc = write_keybinding (sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
+      }
+
+    if( !rc && get_parameter( para, pSUBKEYTYPE ) )
+      {
+        if (!card)
+          {
+            rc = do_create( get_parameter_algo( para, pSUBKEYTYPE ),
+                            get_parameter_uint( para, pSUBKEYLENGTH ),
+                            pub_root, sec_root,
+                            get_parameter_dek( para, pPASSPHRASE_DEK ),
+                            get_parameter_s2k( para, pPASSPHRASE_S2K ),
+                            &sub_sk,
+                            get_parameter_u32( para, pSUBKEYEXPIRE ), 1 );
+          }
+        else
+          {
+            if ((s = get_parameter_value (para, pBACKUPENCDIR)))
+              {
+                /* A backup of the encryption key has been requested.
+                   Generate the key i software and import it then to
+                   the card.  Write a backup file. */
+                rc = gen_card_key_with_backup (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 2, 0,
+                                               pub_root, sec_root,
+                                               get_parameter_u32 (para,
+                                                                  pKEYEXPIRE),
+                                               para, s);
+              }
+            else
+              rc = gen_card_key (PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, 2, 0, pub_root, sec_root,
+				 NULL,
+                                 get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
+          }
+
+        if( !rc )
+          rc = write_keybinding(pub_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk,
+                                get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE));
+        if( !rc )
+          rc = write_keybinding(sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk,
+                                get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE));
+        did_sub = 1;
+      }
+
+    if( !rc && outctrl->use_files ) { /* direct write to specified files */
+	rc = write_keyblock( outctrl->pub.stream, pub_root );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_error("can't write public key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	if( !rc ) {
+	    rc = write_keyblock( outctrl->sec.stream, sec_root );
+	    if( rc )
+		log_error("can't write secret key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	}
+
+    }
+    else if( !rc ) { /* write to the standard keyrings */
+	KEYDB_HANDLE pub_hd = keydb_new (0);
+	KEYDB_HANDLE sec_hd = keydb_new (1);
+
+        /* FIXME: we may have to create the keyring first */
+        rc = keydb_locate_writable (pub_hd, NULL);
+        if (rc) 
+    	    log_error (_("no writable public keyring found: %s\n"),
+                       g10_errstr (rc));
+
+        if (!rc) {  
+            rc = keydb_locate_writable (sec_hd, NULL);
+            if (rc) 
+                log_error (_("no writable secret keyring found: %s\n"),
+                           g10_errstr (rc));
+        }
+
+        if (!rc && opt.verbose) {
+            log_info(_("writing public key to `%s'\n"),
+                     keydb_get_resource_name (pub_hd));
+            if (card)
+              log_info (_("writing secret key stub to `%s'\n"),
+                        keydb_get_resource_name (sec_hd));
+            else
+              log_info(_("writing secret key to `%s'\n"),
+                       keydb_get_resource_name (sec_hd));
+        }
+
+        if (!rc) {
+	    rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (pub_hd, pub_root);
+            if (rc)
+                log_error (_("error writing public keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                           keydb_get_resource_name (pub_hd), g10_errstr(rc));
+        }
+
+        if (!rc) {
+	    rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (sec_hd, sec_root);
+            if (rc)
+                log_error (_("error writing secret keyring `%s': %s\n"),
+                           keydb_get_resource_name (pub_hd), g10_errstr(rc));
+        }
+
+        keydb_release (pub_hd);
+        keydb_release (sec_hd);
+
+	if (!rc) {
+            int no_enc_rsa =
+                get_parameter_algo(para, pKEYTYPE) == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+                && get_parameter_uint( para, pKEYUSAGE )
+                && !(get_parameter_uint( para,pKEYUSAGE) & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC);
+            PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode (pub_root, 
+                                    PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	    keyid_from_pk(pk,pk->main_keyid);
+	    register_trusted_keyid(pk->main_keyid);
+
+	    update_ownertrust (pk,
+			       ((get_ownertrust (pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
+				| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
+
+	    if (!opt.batch) {
+                tty_printf(_("public and secret key created and signed.\n") );
+		tty_printf("\n");
+		list_keyblock(pub_root,0,1,NULL);
+            }
+            
+
+	    if( !opt.batch
+		&& ( get_parameter_algo( para, pKEYTYPE ) == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+                     || no_enc_rsa )
+		&& !get_parameter( para, pSUBKEYTYPE ) )
+	    {
+		tty_printf(_("Note that this key cannot be used for "
+			     "encryption.  You may want to use\n"
+			     "the command \"--edit-key\" to generate a "
+			     "subkey for this purpose.\n") );
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( rc ) {
+	if( opt.batch )
+	    log_error("key generation failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	else
+	    tty_printf(_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        print_status_key_not_created ( get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE) );
+    }
+    else {
+        PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode (pub_root, 
+                                    PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        print_status_key_created (did_sub? 'B':'P', pk,
+                                  get_parameter_value (para, pHANDLE));
+    }
+    release_kbnode( pub_root );
+    release_kbnode( sec_root );
+
+    if( pri_sk && !card) /* the unprotected  secret key unless we have a */
+      free_secret_key(pri_sk); /* shallow copy in card mode. */
+    if( sub_sk )
+	free_secret_key(sub_sk);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * add a new subkey to an existing key.
+ * Returns true if a new key has been generated and put into the keyblocks.
+ */
+int
+generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    int okay=0, rc=0;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk = NULL;
+    int algo;
+    unsigned int use;
+    u32 expire;
+    unsigned nbits;
+    char *passphrase = NULL;
+    DEK *dek = NULL;
+    STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+    u32 cur_time;
+    int ask_pass = 0;
+
+    /* break out the primary secret key */
+    node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_error("Oops; secret key not found anymore!\n");
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* make a copy of the sk to keep the protected one in the keyblock */
+    pri_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+
+    cur_time = make_timestamp();
+    if( pri_sk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
+	ulong d = pri_sk->timestamp - cur_time;
+	log_info( d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second "
+			   "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
+		       : _("key has been created %lu seconds "
+			   "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d );
+	if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict ) {
+	    rc = G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (pri_sk->version < 4) {
+        log_info (_("NOTE: creating subkeys for v3 keys "
+                    "is not OpenPGP compliant\n"));
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if (pri_sk->is_protected && pri_sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001) {
+        tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n"));
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+        goto leave;
+    }
+
+
+    /* Unprotect to get the passphrase.  */
+    switch( is_secret_key_protected( pri_sk ) ) {
+      case -1:
+	rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+	break;
+      case 0:
+	tty_printf(_("This key is not protected.\n"));
+	break;
+      case -2:
+        tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are stored on-card.\n"));
+        ask_pass = 1;
+        break;
+      default:
+        tty_printf(_("Key is protected.\n"));
+        rc = check_secret_key( pri_sk, 0 );
+        if( !rc )
+            passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
+        break;
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+    algo = ask_algo( 1, &use );
+    assert(algo);
+    nbits = ask_keysize( algo );
+    expire = ask_expire_interval(0,NULL);
+    if( !cpr_enabled() && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.sub.okay",
+						  _("Really create? (y/N) ")))
+	goto leave;
+
+    if (ask_pass)
+        dek = do_ask_passphrase (&s2k);
+    else if (passphrase) {
+	s2k = xmalloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
+	s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
+	s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+	set_next_passphrase( passphrase );
+	dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.s2k_cipher_algo, s2k, 2,
+                                 NULL, NULL );
+    }
+
+    rc = do_create( algo, nbits, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
+		    dek, s2k, &sub_sk, expire, 1 );
+    if( !rc )
+	rc = write_keybinding(pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
+    if( !rc )
+	rc = write_keybinding(sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
+    if( !rc ) {
+	okay = 1;
+        write_status_text (STATUS_KEY_CREATED, "S");
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	log_error(_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+    xfree( passphrase );
+    xfree( dek );
+    xfree( s2k );
+    /* release the copy of the (now unprotected) secret keys */
+    if( pri_sk )
+	free_secret_key(pri_sk);
+    if( sub_sk )
+	free_secret_key(sub_sk);
+    set_next_passphrase( NULL );
+    return okay;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+/* Generate a subkey on a card. */
+int
+generate_card_subkeypair (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
+                          int keyno, const char *serialno)
+{
+  int okay=0, rc=0;
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk;
+  int algo;
+  unsigned int use;
+  u32 expire;
+  char *passphrase = NULL;
+  u32 cur_time;
+  struct para_data_s *para = NULL;
+
+  assert (keyno >= 1 && keyno <= 3);
+
+  para = xcalloc (1, sizeof *para + strlen (serialno) );
+  para->key = pSERIALNO;
+  strcpy (para->u.value, serialno);
+
+  /* Break out the primary secret key */
+  node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+  if(!node)
+    {
+      log_error("Oops; secret key not found anymore!\n");
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Make a copy of the sk to keep the protected one in the keyblock */
+  pri_sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+
+  cur_time = make_timestamp();
+  if (pri_sk->timestamp > cur_time)
+    {
+      ulong d = pri_sk->timestamp - cur_time;
+      log_info (d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second "
+                         "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
+                     : _("key has been created %lu seconds "
+                         "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d );
+	if (!opt.ignore_time_conflict)
+          {
+	    rc = G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+	    goto leave;
+          }
+    }
+
+  if (pri_sk->version < 4)
+    {
+      log_info (_("NOTE: creating subkeys for v3 keys "
+                  "is not OpenPGP compliant\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Unprotect to get the passphrase. */
+  switch( is_secret_key_protected (pri_sk) )
+    {
+    case -1:
+      rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+      break;
+    case 0:
+      tty_printf("This key is not protected.\n");
+      break;
+    default:
+      tty_printf("Key is protected.\n");
+      rc = check_secret_key( pri_sk, 0 );
+      if (!rc)
+        passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
+      break;
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    goto leave;
+
+  algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
+  expire = ask_expire_interval (0,NULL);
+  if (keyno == 1)
+    use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+  else if (keyno == 2)
+    use = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+  else
+    use = PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+  if (!cpr_enabled() && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.cardsub.okay",
+                                               _("Really create? (y/N) ")))
+    goto leave;
+
+  if (passphrase)
+    set_next_passphrase (passphrase);
+  rc = gen_card_key (algo, keyno, 0, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
+		     &sub_sk, expire, para);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = write_keybinding (pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
+  if (!rc)
+    rc = write_keybinding (sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      okay = 1;
+      write_status_text (STATUS_KEY_CREATED, "S");
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  if (rc)
+    log_error (_("Key generation failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+  xfree (passphrase);
+  /* Release the copy of the (now unprotected) secret keys. */
+  if (pri_sk)
+    free_secret_key (pri_sk);
+  set_next_passphrase( NULL );
+  release_parameter_list (para);
+  return okay;
+}
+#endif /* !ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+
+
+/****************
+ * Write a keyblock to an output stream
+ */
+static int
+write_keyblock( IOBUF out, KBNODE node )
+{
+  for( ; node ; node = node->next )
+    {
+      if(!is_deleted_kbnode(node))
+	{
+	  int rc = build_packet( out, node->pkt );
+	  if( rc )
+	    {
+	      log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
+			node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	      return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+gen_card_key (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
+              KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk,
+              u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+  int rc;
+  const char *s;
+  struct agent_card_genkey_s info;
+  PACKET *pkt;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+  assert (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA);
+  
+  /* Fixme: We don't have the serialnumber available, thus passing NULL. */
+  rc = agent_scd_genkey (&info, keyno, 1, NULL);
+/*    if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST) */
+/*      { */
+/*        tty_printf ("\n"); */
+/*        log_error ("WARNING: key does already exists!\n"); */
+/*        tty_printf ("\n"); */
+/*        if ( cpr_get_answer_is_yes( "keygen.card.replace_key", */
+/*                                    _("Replace existing key? "))) */
+/*          rc = agent_scd_genkey (&info, keyno, 1); */
+/*      } */
+
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("key generation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+      return rc;
+    }
+  if ( !info.n || !info.e )
+    {
+      log_error ("communication error with SCD\n");
+      mpi_free (info.n);
+      mpi_free (info.e);
+      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+    }
+  
+
+  pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk );
+  sk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *sk );
+  sk->timestamp = pk->timestamp = info.created_at;
+  sk->version = pk->version = 4;
+  if (expireval)
+      sk->expiredate = pk->expiredate = pk->timestamp + expireval;
+  sk->pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo = algo;
+  pk->pkey[0] = info.n;
+  pk->pkey[1] = info.e; 
+  sk->skey[0] = mpi_copy (pk->pkey[0]);
+  sk->skey[1] = mpi_copy (pk->pkey[1]);
+  sk->skey[2] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10);
+  sk->is_protected = 1;
+  sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
+  s = get_parameter_value (para, pSERIALNO);
+  if (s)
+    {
+      for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
+           sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
+        sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
+    }
+
+  if( ret_sk )
+    *ret_sk = sk;
+
+  pkt = xcalloc (1,sizeof *pkt);
+  pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+  pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
+  add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+  pkt = xcalloc (1,sizeof *pkt);
+  pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+  pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+  add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+  return 0;
+#else
+  return -1;
+#endif /*!ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+gen_card_key_with_backup (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
+                          KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
+                          u32 expireval, struct para_data_s *para,
+                          const char *backup_dir)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+  int rc;
+  const char *s;
+  PACKET *pkt;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk, *sk_unprotected, *sk_protected;
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  size_t n;
+  int i;
+
+  sk_unprotected = NULL;
+  sk_protected = NULL;
+  rc = generate_raw_key (algo, 1024, make_timestamp (),
+                         &sk_unprotected, &sk_protected);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  /* First, store the key to the card. */
+  rc = save_unprotected_key_to_card (sk_unprotected, keyno);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("storing key onto card failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
+      free_secret_key (sk_unprotected);
+      free_secret_key (sk_protected);
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  /* Get rid of the secret key parameters and store the serial numer. */
+  sk = sk_unprotected;
+  n = pubkey_get_nskey (sk->pubkey_algo);
+  for (i=pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo); i < n; i++)
+    {
+      mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
+      sk->skey[i] = NULL;
+    }
+  i = pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo);
+  sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10);
+  sk->is_protected = 1;
+  sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
+  s = get_parameter_value (para, pSERIALNO);
+  assert (s);
+  for (sk->protect.ivlen=0; sk->protect.ivlen < 16 && *s && s[1];
+       sk->protect.ivlen++, s += 2)
+    sk->protect.iv[sk->protect.ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
+
+  /* Now write the *protected* secret key to the file.  */
+  {
+    char name_buffer[50];
+    char *fname;
+    IOBUF fp;
+    mode_t oldmask;
+
+    keyid_from_sk (sk, NULL);
+    sprintf (name_buffer,"sk_%08lX%08lX.gpg",
+             (ulong)sk->keyid[0], (ulong)sk->keyid[1]);
+
+    fname = make_filename (backup_dir, name_buffer, NULL);
+    oldmask = umask (077);
+    if (is_secured_filename (fname))
+      {
+        fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    else
+      fp = iobuf_create (fname);
+    umask (oldmask);
+    if (!fp) 
+      {
+	log_error (_("can't create backup file `%s': %s\n"),
+                   fname, strerror(errno) );
+        xfree (fname);
+        free_secret_key (sk_unprotected);
+        free_secret_key (sk_protected);
+        return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+      }
+
+    pkt = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
+    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+    pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_protected;
+    sk_protected = NULL;
+
+    rc = build_packet (fp, pkt);
+    if (rc)
+      {
+        log_error("build packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+        iobuf_cancel (fp);
+      }
+    else
+      {
+        byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+        char *fprbuf, *p;
+       
+        iobuf_close (fp);
+        iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)fname);
+        log_info (_("NOTE: backup of card key saved to `%s'\n"), fname);
+
+        fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
+        p = fprbuf = xmalloc (MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2 + 1 + 1);
+        for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p += 2)
+          sprintf (p, "%02X", array[i]);
+        *p++ = ' ';
+        *p = 0;
+
+        write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_BACKUP_KEY_CREATED,
+                                      fprbuf,
+                                      fname, strlen (fname),
+                                      0);
+        xfree (fprbuf);
+      }
+    free_packet (pkt);
+    xfree (pkt);
+    xfree (fname);
+    if (rc)
+      {
+        free_secret_key (sk_unprotected);
+        return rc;
+      }
+  }
+
+  /* Create the public key from the secret key. */
+  pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk );
+  pk->timestamp = sk->timestamp;
+  pk->version = sk->version;
+  if (expireval)
+      pk->expiredate = sk->expiredate = sk->timestamp + expireval;
+  pk->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+  n = pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo);
+  for (i=0; i < n; i++)
+    pk->pkey[i] = mpi_copy (sk->skey[i]);
+
+  /* Build packets and add them to the node lists.  */
+  pkt = xcalloc (1,sizeof *pkt);
+  pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+  pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
+  add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+  pkt = xcalloc (1,sizeof *pkt);
+  pkt->pkttype = is_primary ? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+  pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
+  add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+
+  return 0;
+#else
+  return -1;
+#endif /*!ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+}
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+int
+save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno)
+{
+  int rc;
+  unsigned char *rsa_n = NULL;
+  unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL;
+  unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL;
+  unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL;
+  unsigned int rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
+  unsigned char *sexp = NULL;
+  unsigned char *p;
+  char numbuf[55], numbuf2[50];
+
+  assert (is_RSA (sk->pubkey_algo));
+  assert (!sk->is_protected);
+
+  /* Copy the parameters into straight buffers. */
+  rsa_n = mpi_get_secure_buffer (sk->skey[0], &rsa_n_len, NULL);
+  rsa_e = mpi_get_secure_buffer (sk->skey[1], &rsa_e_len, NULL);
+  rsa_p = mpi_get_secure_buffer (sk->skey[3], &rsa_p_len, NULL);
+  rsa_q = mpi_get_secure_buffer (sk->skey[4], &rsa_q_len, NULL);
+  if (!rsa_n || !rsa_e || !rsa_p || !rsa_q)
+    {
+      rc = G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* Put the key into an S-expression. */
+  sexp = p = xmalloc_secure (30
+                             + rsa_n_len + rsa_e_len + rsa_p_len + rsa_q_len
+                             + 4*sizeof (numbuf) + 25 + sizeof(numbuf) + 20);
+
+  p = stpcpy (p,"(11:private-key(3:rsa(1:n");
+  sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", rsa_n_len);
+  p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
+  memcpy (p, rsa_n, rsa_n_len);
+  p += rsa_n_len;
+
+  sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:e%u:", rsa_e_len);
+  p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
+  memcpy (p, rsa_e, rsa_e_len);
+  p += rsa_e_len;
+
+  sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:p%u:", rsa_p_len);
+  p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
+  memcpy (p, rsa_p, rsa_p_len);
+  p += rsa_p_len;
+
+  sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:q%u:", rsa_q_len);
+  p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
+  memcpy (p, rsa_q, rsa_q_len);
+  p += rsa_q_len;
+
+  p = stpcpy (p,"))(10:created-at");
+  sprintf (numbuf2, "%lu", (unsigned long)sk->timestamp);
+  sprintf (numbuf, "%lu:", (unsigned long)strlen (numbuf2));
+  p = stpcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (p, numbuf), numbuf2), "))");
+
+  /* Fixme: Unfortunately we don't have the serialnumber available -
+     thus we can't pass it down to the agent. */ 
+  rc = agent_scd_writekey (keyno, NULL, sexp, p - sexp);
+
+ leave:
+  xfree (sexp);
+  xfree (rsa_n);
+  xfree (rsa_e);
+  xfree (rsa_p);
+  xfree (rsa_q);
+  return rc;
+}
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86a204f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
+/* keyid.c - key ID and fingerprint handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+int
+pubkey_letter( int algo )
+{
+    switch( algo ) {
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:	return 'R' ;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:	return 'r' ;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:	return 's' ;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E: return 'g';
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL: return 'G' ;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:	return 'D' ;
+      default: return '?';
+    }
+}
+
+/* This function is useful for v4 fingerprints and v3 or v4 key
+   signing. */
+void
+hash_public_key( MD_HANDLE md, PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+  unsigned n=6;
+  unsigned nb[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
+  unsigned nn[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
+  byte *pp[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
+  int i;
+  int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo );
+
+  /* Two extra bytes for the expiration date in v3 */
+  if(pk->version<4)
+    n+=2;
+
+  if(npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0] && mpi_is_opaque(pk->pkey[0]))
+    {
+      pp[0]=mpi_get_opaque(pk->pkey[0],&nn[0]);
+      n+=nn[0];
+    }
+  else
+    for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
+      {
+	nb[i] = mpi_get_nbits(pk->pkey[i]);
+	pp[i] = mpi_get_buffer( pk->pkey[i], nn+i, NULL );
+	n += 2 + nn[i];
+      }
+
+  md_putc( md, 0x99 );     /* ctb */
+  /* What does it mean if n is greater than than 0xFFFF ? */
+  md_putc( md, n >> 8 );   /* 2 byte length header */
+  md_putc( md, n );
+  md_putc( md, pk->version );
+
+  md_putc( md, pk->timestamp >> 24 );
+  md_putc( md, pk->timestamp >> 16 );
+  md_putc( md, pk->timestamp >>  8 );
+  md_putc( md, pk->timestamp       );
+
+  if(pk->version<4)
+    {
+      u16 days=0;
+      if(pk->expiredate)
+	days=(u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
+ 
+      md_putc( md, days >> 8 );
+      md_putc( md, days );
+    }
+
+  md_putc( md, pk->pubkey_algo );
+
+  if(npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0] && mpi_is_opaque(pk->pkey[0]))
+    md_write(md,pp[0],nn[0]);
+  else
+    for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
+      {
+	md_putc( md, nb[i]>>8);
+	md_putc( md, nb[i] );
+	md_write( md, pp[i], nn[i] );
+	xfree(pp[i]);
+      }
+}
+
+static MD_HANDLE
+do_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+  MD_HANDLE md;
+
+  md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 0);
+  hash_public_key(md,pk);
+  md_final( md );
+
+  return md;
+}
+
+static MD_HANDLE
+do_fingerprint_md_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    PKT_public_key pk;
+    int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( sk->pubkey_algo ); /* npkey is correct! */
+    int i;
+
+    if(npkey==0)
+      return NULL;
+
+    pk.pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+    pk.version	   = sk->version;
+    pk.timestamp = sk->timestamp;
+    pk.expiredate = sk->expiredate;
+    pk.pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+    for( i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
+      pk.pkey[i] = sk->skey[i];
+    return do_fingerprint_md( &pk );
+}
+
+size_t
+keystrlen(void)
+{
+  switch(opt.keyid_format)
+    {
+    case KF_SHORT:
+      return 8;
+
+    case KF_LONG:
+      return 16;
+
+    case KF_0xSHORT:
+      return 10;
+
+    case KF_0xLONG:
+      return 18;
+
+    default:
+      BUG();
+    }
+}
+
+const char *
+keystr(u32 *keyid)
+{  
+  static char keyid_str[19];
+
+  switch(opt.keyid_format)
+    {
+    case KF_SHORT:
+      sprintf(keyid_str,"%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      break;
+
+    case KF_LONG:
+      if(keyid[0])
+	sprintf(keyid_str,"%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      else
+	sprintf(keyid_str,"%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      break;
+
+    case KF_0xSHORT:
+      sprintf(keyid_str,"0x%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      break;
+
+    case KF_0xLONG:
+      if(keyid[0])
+	sprintf(keyid_str,"0x%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      else
+	sprintf(keyid_str,"0x%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      BUG();
+    }
+
+  return keyid_str;
+}
+
+const char *
+keystr_from_pk(PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
+
+  return keystr(pk->keyid);
+}
+
+const char *
+keystr_from_sk(PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  keyid_from_sk(sk,NULL);
+
+  return keystr(sk->keyid);
+}
+
+const char *
+keystr_from_desc(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc)
+{
+  switch(desc->mode)
+    {
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
+      return keystr(desc->u.kid);
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+      {
+	u32 keyid[2];
+
+	keyid[0] = (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[12] << 24
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[13] << 16
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[14] << 8
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[15] ;
+	keyid[1] = (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[16] << 24
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[17] << 16
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[18] << 8
+	  | (unsigned char)desc->u.fpr[19] ;
+
+	return keystr(keyid);
+      }
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
+      return "?v3 fpr?";
+
+    default:
+      BUG();
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Get the keyid from the secret key and put it into keyid
+ * if this is not NULL. Return the 32 low bits of the keyid.
+ */
+u32
+keyid_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+  u32 lowbits;
+  u32 dummy_keyid[2];
+
+  if( !keyid )
+    keyid = dummy_keyid;
+
+  if( sk->keyid[0] || sk->keyid[1] )
+    {
+      keyid[0] = sk->keyid[0];
+      keyid[1] = sk->keyid[1];
+      lowbits = keyid[1];
+    }
+  else if( sk->version < 4 )
+    {
+      if( is_RSA(sk->pubkey_algo) )
+	{
+	  lowbits = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo) ?
+	    mpi_get_keyid( sk->skey[0], keyid ) : 0; /* take n */
+	  sk->keyid[0]=keyid[0];
+	  sk->keyid[1]=keyid[1];
+	}
+      else
+	sk->keyid[0]=sk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      const byte *dp;
+      MD_HANDLE md;
+      md = do_fingerprint_md_sk(sk);
+      if(md)
+	{
+	  dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+	  keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+	  keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
+	  lowbits = keyid[1];
+	  md_close(md);
+	  sk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+	  sk->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+	}
+      else
+	sk->keyid[0]=sk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF;
+    }
+
+  return lowbits;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get the keyid from the public key and put it into keyid
+ * if this is not NULL. Return the 32 low bits of the keyid.
+ */
+u32
+keyid_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+  u32 lowbits;
+  u32 dummy_keyid[2];
+
+  if( !keyid )
+    keyid = dummy_keyid;
+
+  if( pk->keyid[0] || pk->keyid[1] )
+    {
+      keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0];
+      keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
+      lowbits = keyid[1];
+    }
+  else if( pk->version < 4 )
+    {
+      if( is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) )
+	{
+	  lowbits = pubkey_get_npkey(pk->pubkey_algo) ?
+	    mpi_get_keyid( pk->pkey[0], keyid ) : 0 ; /* from n */
+	  pk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+	  pk->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+	}
+      else
+	pk->keyid[0]=pk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      const byte *dp;
+      MD_HANDLE md;
+      md = do_fingerprint_md(pk);
+      if(md)
+	{
+	  dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+	  keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+	  keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
+	  lowbits = keyid[1];
+	  md_close(md);
+	  pk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+	  pk->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+	}
+      else
+	pk->keyid[0]=pk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF;
+    }
+
+  return lowbits;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get the keyid from the fingerprint.	This function is simple for most
+ * keys, but has to do a keylookup for old stayle keys.
+ */
+u32
+keyid_from_fingerprint( const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    u32 dummy_keyid[2];
+
+    if( !keyid )
+	keyid = dummy_keyid;
+
+    if( fprint_len != 20 ) {
+	/* This is special as we have to lookup the key first */
+	PKT_public_key pk;
+	int rc;
+
+	memset( &pk, 0, sizeof pk );
+	rc = get_pubkey_byfprint( &pk, fprint, fprint_len );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("Oops: keyid_from_fingerprint: no pubkey\n");
+	    keyid[0] = 0;
+	    keyid[1] = 0;
+	}
+	else
+	    keyid_from_pk( &pk, keyid );
+    }
+    else {
+	const byte *dp = fprint;
+	keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+	keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
+    }
+
+    return keyid[1];
+}
+
+
+u32
+keyid_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    if( keyid ) {
+	keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
+	keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
+    }
+    return sig->keyid[1];
+}
+
+byte *
+namehash_from_uid(PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  if(uid->namehash==NULL)
+    {
+      uid->namehash=xmalloc(20);
+
+      if(uid->attrib_data)
+	rmd160_hash_buffer(uid->namehash,uid->attrib_data,uid->attrib_len);
+      else
+	rmd160_hash_buffer(uid->namehash,uid->name,uid->len);
+    }
+
+  return uid->namehash;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * return the number of bits used in the pk
+ */
+unsigned
+nbits_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    return pubkey_nbits( pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey );
+}
+
+/****************
+ * return the number of bits used in the sk
+ */
+unsigned
+nbits_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    return pubkey_nbits( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
+}
+
+static const char *
+mk_datestr (char *buffer, time_t atime)
+{
+    struct tm *tp;
+
+    if ( atime < 0 ) /* 32 bit time_t and after 2038-01-19 */
+        strcpy (buffer, "????" "-??" "-??"); /* mark this as invalid */
+    else {
+        tp = gmtime (&atime);
+        sprintf (buffer,"%04d-%02d-%02d",
+                 1900+tp->tm_year, tp->tm_mon+1, tp->tm_mday );
+    }
+    return buffer;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * return a string with the creation date of the pk
+ * Note: this is alloced in a static buffer.
+ *    Format is: yyyy-mm-dd
+ */
+const char *
+datestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime = pk->timestamp;
+
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+datestr_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime = sk->timestamp;
+
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+datestr_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime = sig->timestamp;
+
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+expirestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime;
+
+    if( !pk->expiredate )
+	return _("never     ");
+    atime = pk->expiredate;
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+expirestr_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime;
+
+    if( !sk->expiredate )
+	return _("never     ");
+    atime = sk->expiredate;
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+expirestr_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime;
+
+    if(!sig->expiredate)
+      return _("never     ");
+    atime=sig->expiredate;
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+const char *
+revokestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    static char buffer[11+5];
+    time_t atime;
+
+    if(!pk->revoked.date)
+      return _("never     ");
+    atime=pk->revoked.date;
+    return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
+}
+
+
+const char *
+usagestr_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+  static char buffer[10];
+  int i = 0;
+  unsigned int use = pk->pubkey_usage;
+
+  if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
+    buffer[i++] = 'S';
+
+  if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT )
+    buffer[i++] = 'C';
+
+  if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
+    buffer[i++] = 'E';
+
+  if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
+    buffer[i++] = 'A';
+
+  while (i < 4)
+    buffer[i++] = ' ';
+
+  buffer[i] = 0;
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+
+const char *
+colon_strtime (u32 t)
+{
+    if (!t)
+        return "";
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        static char buf[15];
+        sprintf (buf, "%lu", (ulong)t);
+        return buf;
+    }
+    return strtimestamp(t);
+}
+
+const char *
+colon_datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        static char buf[15];
+        sprintf (buf, "%lu", (ulong)pk->timestamp);
+        return buf;
+    }
+    return datestr_from_pk (pk);
+}
+
+const char *
+colon_datestr_from_sk (PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        static char buf[15];
+        sprintf (buf, "%lu", (ulong)sk->timestamp);
+        return buf;
+    }
+    return datestr_from_sk (sk);
+}
+
+const char *
+colon_datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        static char buf[15];
+        sprintf (buf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->timestamp);
+        return buf;
+    }
+    return datestr_from_sig (sig);
+}
+
+const char *
+colon_expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+    if(!sig->expiredate)
+        return "";
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        static char buf[15];
+        sprintf (buf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->expiredate);
+        return buf;
+    }
+    return expirestr_from_sig (sig);
+}
+
+
+/**************** .
+ * Return a byte array with the fingerprint for the given PK/SK
+ * The length of the array is returned in ret_len. Caller must free
+ * the array or provide an array of length MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN.
+ */
+
+byte *
+fingerprint_from_pk( PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len )
+{
+    byte *p, *buf;
+    const byte *dp;
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned int n;
+
+    if( pk->version < 4 )
+      {
+	if( is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) )
+	  {
+	    /* RSA in version 3 packets is special */
+	    MD_HANDLE md;
+
+	    md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
+	    if( pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) > 1 ) {
+	      p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pk->pkey[0], &n, NULL );
+	      md_write( md, p, n );
+	      xfree(buf);
+	      p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pk->pkey[1], &n, NULL );
+	      md_write( md, p, n );
+	      xfree(buf);
+	    }
+	    md_final(md);
+	    if( !array )
+	      array = xmalloc( 16 );
+	    len = 16;
+	    memcpy(array, md_read(md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5), 16 );
+	    md_close(md);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    if(!array)
+	      array=xmalloc(16);
+	    len=16;
+	    memset(array,0,16);
+	  }
+      }
+    else {
+	MD_HANDLE md;
+	md = do_fingerprint_md(pk);
+	dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+	len = md_digest_length( md_get_algo( md ) );
+	assert( len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
+	if( !array )
+	    array = xmalloc( len );
+	memcpy(array, dp, len );
+	pk->keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+	pk->keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
+	md_close(md);
+    }
+
+    *ret_len = len;
+    return array;
+}
+
+byte *
+fingerprint_from_sk( PKT_secret_key *sk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len )
+{
+    byte *p, *buf;
+    const char *dp;
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned n;
+
+    if( sk->version < 4 )
+      {
+	if( is_RSA(sk->pubkey_algo) )
+	  {
+	    /* RSA in version 3 packets is special */
+	    MD_HANDLE md;
+
+	    md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
+	    if( pubkey_get_npkey( sk->pubkey_algo ) > 1 ) {
+	      p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[0], &n, NULL );
+	      md_write( md, p, n );
+	      xfree(buf);
+	      p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[1], &n, NULL );
+	      md_write( md, p, n );
+	      xfree(buf);
+	    }
+	    md_final(md);
+	    if( !array )
+	      array = xmalloc( 16 );
+	    len = 16;
+	    memcpy(array, md_read(md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5), 16 );
+	    md_close(md);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    if(!array)
+	      array=xmalloc(16);
+	    len=16;
+	    memset(array,0,16);
+	  }
+      }
+    else {
+	MD_HANDLE md;
+	md = do_fingerprint_md_sk(sk);
+	if(md)
+	  {
+	    dp = md_read( md, 0 );
+	    len = md_digest_length( md_get_algo( md ) );
+	    assert( len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
+	    if( !array )
+	      array = xmalloc( len );
+	    memcpy(array, dp, len );
+	    md_close(md);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    len=MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
+	    if(!array)
+	      array=xmalloc(len);
+	    memset(array,0,len);
+	  }
+    }
+
+    *ret_len = len;
+    return array;
+}
diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19f3d3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keylist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1638 @@
+/* keylist.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+
+static void list_all(int);
+static void list_one( STRLIST names, int secret);
+static void print_card_serialno (PKT_secret_key *sk);
+
+struct sig_stats
+{
+  int inv_sigs;
+  int no_key;
+  int oth_err;
+};
+
+static FILE *attrib_fp=NULL;
+
+/****************
+ * List the keys
+ * If list is NULL, all available keys are listed
+ */
+void
+public_key_list( STRLIST list )
+{
+  if(opt.with_colons)
+    {
+      byte trust_model,marginals,completes,cert_depth;
+      ulong created,nextcheck;
+
+      read_trust_options(&trust_model,&created,&nextcheck,
+			 &marginals,&completes,&cert_depth);
+
+      printf("tru:");
+
+      if(nextcheck && nextcheck <= make_timestamp())
+	printf("o");
+      if(trust_model!=opt.trust_model)
+	printf("t");
+      if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+	{
+	  if(marginals!=opt.marginals_needed)
+	    printf("m");
+	  if(completes!=opt.completes_needed)
+	    printf("c");
+	  if(cert_depth!=opt.max_cert_depth)
+	    printf("d");
+	}
+
+      printf(":%d:%lu:%lu",trust_model,created,nextcheck);
+
+      /* Only show marginals, completes, and cert_depth in the classic
+	 or PGP trust models since they are not meaningful
+	 otherwise. */
+
+      if(trust_model==TM_PGP || trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+	printf(":%d:%d:%d",marginals,completes,cert_depth);
+
+      printf("\n");
+    }
+
+  /* We need to do the stale check right here because it might need to
+     update the keyring while we already have the keyring open.  This
+     is very bad for W32 because of a sharing violation. For real OSes
+     it might lead to false results if we are later listing a keyring
+     which is associated with the inode of a deleted file.  */
+  check_trustdb_stale ();
+
+  if( !list )
+    list_all(0);
+  else
+    list_one( list, 0 );
+}
+
+void
+secret_key_list( STRLIST list )
+{
+    check_trustdb_stale ();
+
+    if( !list )
+	list_all(1);
+    else  /* List by user id */
+	list_one( list, 1 );
+}
+
+void
+print_seckey_info (PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  char *p;
+
+  keyid_from_sk (sk, keyid);
+  p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+
+  tty_printf ("\nsec  %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
+	      nbits_from_sk (sk),
+	      pubkey_letter (sk->pubkey_algo),
+	      keystr(keyid), datestr_from_sk (sk), p);
+    
+  xfree (p);
+}
+
+/* Print information about the public key.  With FP passed as NULL,
+   the tty output interface is used, otherwise output is directted to
+   the given stream. */
+void
+print_pubkey_info (FILE *fp, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  char *p;
+
+  keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+
+  /* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, that is the one to
+     print. */
+  if(pk->user_id)
+    p=utf8_to_native(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len,0);
+  else
+    p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+
+  if (fp)
+    fprintf (fp, "pub  %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
+             nbits_from_pk (pk),
+             pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
+             keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);
+  else
+    tty_printf ("\npub  %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
+                nbits_from_pk (pk), pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
+                keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);
+
+  xfree (p);
+}
+
+
+/* Print basic information of a secret key including the card serial
+   number information. */
+void
+print_card_key_info (FILE *fp, KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int i;
+
+  for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) 
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+          || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
+        {
+          PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+          
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c  %4u%c/%s  ",
+		       node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
+                       (sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
+                       (sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
+		       nbits_from_sk (sk),
+		       pubkey_letter (sk->pubkey_algo),
+		       keystr_from_sk(sk));
+          tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_sk (sk));
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "  ");
+          tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_sk (sk));
+          if (sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+            {
+              tty_fprintf (fp, "\n                      ");
+              tty_fprintf (fp, _("card-no: ")); 
+              if (sk->protect.ivlen == 16
+                  && !memcmp (sk->protect.iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
+                { 
+                  /* This is an OpenPGP card. */
+                  for (i=8; i < 14; i++)
+                    {
+                      if (i == 10)
+                        tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
+                      tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+                    }
+                }
+              else
+                { /* Something is wrong: Print all. */
+                  for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
+                    tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+                }
+            }
+          tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+/* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical */
+static void
+status_one_subpacket(sigsubpkttype_t type,size_t len,int flags,const byte *buf)
+{
+  char status[40];
+
+  /* Don't print these. */
+  if(len>256)
+    return;
+
+  sprintf(status,"%d %u %u ",type,flags,(unsigned int)len);
+
+  write_status_text_and_buffer(STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET,status,buf,len,0);
+}
+
+/*
+  mode=0 for stdout.
+  mode=1 for log_info + status messages
+  mode=2 for status messages only
+*/
+
+void
+show_policy_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
+{
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t len;
+  int seq=0,crit;
+  FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
+
+  while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,&len,&seq,&crit)))
+    {
+      if(mode!=2)
+	{
+	  int i;
+	  const char *str;
+
+	  for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
+	    putchar(' ');
+
+	  if(crit)
+	    str=_("Critical signature policy: ");
+	  else
+	    str=_("Signature policy: ");
+	  if(mode)
+	    log_info("%s",str);
+	  else
+	    printf("%s",str);
+	  print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
+	  fprintf(fp,"\n");
+	}
+
+      if(mode)
+	write_status_buffer ( STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, len, 0 );
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+  mode=0 for stdout.
+  mode=1 for log_info + status messages
+  mode=2 for status messages only
+*/
+/* TODO: use this */
+void
+show_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
+{
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t len;
+  int seq=0,crit;
+  FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
+
+  while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&len,&seq,&crit)))
+    {
+      if(mode!=2)
+	{
+	  int i;
+	  const char *str;
+
+	  for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
+	    putchar(' ');
+
+	  if(crit)
+	    str=_("Critical preferred keyserver: ");
+	  else
+	    str=_("Preferred keyserver: ");
+	  if(mode)
+	    log_info("%s",str);
+	  else
+	    printf("%s",str);
+	  print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
+	  fprintf(fp,"\n");
+	}
+
+      if(mode)
+	status_one_subpacket(SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,len,(crit?0x02:0)|0x01,p);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+  mode=0 for stdout.
+  mode=1 for log_info + status messages
+  mode=2 for status messages only
+
+  which bits:
+  1 == standard notations
+  2 == user notations
+*/
+
+void
+show_notation(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode,int which)
+{
+  FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
+  struct notation *nd,*notations;
+
+  if(which==0)
+    which=3;
+
+  notations=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+  /* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */
+  for(nd=notations;nd;nd=nd->next)
+    {
+      if(mode!=2)
+	{
+	  int has_at=!!strchr(nd->name,'@');
+
+	  if((which&1 && !has_at) || (which&2 && has_at))
+	    {
+	      int i;
+	      const char *str;
+
+	      for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
+		putchar(' ');
+
+	      if(nd->flags.critical)
+		str=_("Critical signature notation: ");
+	      else
+		str=_("Signature notation: ");
+	      if(mode)
+		log_info("%s",str);
+	      else
+		printf("%s",str);
+	      /* This is all UTF8 */
+	      print_utf8_string(fp,nd->name,strlen(nd->name));
+	      fprintf(fp,"=");
+	      print_utf8_string(fp,nd->value,strlen(nd->value));
+	      fprintf(fp,"\n");
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(mode)
+	{
+	  write_status_buffer(STATUS_NOTATION_NAME,
+			      nd->name,strlen(nd->name),0);
+	  write_status_buffer(STATUS_NOTATION_DATA,
+			      nd->value,strlen(nd->value),50);
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notations);
+}
+
+static void
+print_signature_stats(struct sig_stats *s)
+{
+  if( s->inv_sigs == 1 )
+    tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
+  else if( s->inv_sigs )
+    tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), s->inv_sigs );
+  if( s->no_key == 1 )
+    tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
+  else if( s->no_key )
+    tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"),s->no_key);
+  if( s->oth_err == 1 )
+    tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
+  else if( s->oth_err )
+    tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), s->oth_err );
+}
+
+static void
+list_all( int secret )
+{
+    KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    int rc=0;
+    const char *lastresname, *resname;
+    struct sig_stats stats;
+
+    memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
+
+    hd = keydb_new (secret);
+    if (!hd)
+        rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+    else
+        rc = keydb_search_first (hd);
+    if( rc ) {
+	if( rc != -1 )
+	    log_error("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    lastresname = NULL;
+    do {
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+            goto leave;
+        }
+	if(!opt.with_colons)
+	  {
+	    resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
+	    if (lastresname != resname )
+	      {
+		int i;
+
+		printf("%s\n", resname );
+		for(i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
+		  putchar('-');
+		putchar('\n');
+		lastresname = resname;
+	      }
+	  }
+        merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+	list_keyblock( keyblock, secret, opt.fingerprint,
+		       opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL);
+	release_kbnode( keyblock ); 
+        keyblock = NULL;
+    } while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd)));
+    if( rc && rc != -1 )
+	log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+
+    if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
+      print_signature_stats(&stats);
+
+  leave:
+    release_kbnode (keyblock);
+    keydb_release (hd);
+}
+
+
+static void
+list_one( STRLIST names, int secret )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+    GETKEY_CTX ctx;
+    const char *resname;
+    const char *keyring_str = _("Keyring");
+    int i;
+    struct sig_stats stats;
+
+    memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
+
+    /* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we
+     * don't know wether one of the names given was not found.  OTOH,
+     * this function has the advantage to list the names in the
+     * sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate
+     * outputs.  A solution could be do test whether all given have
+     * been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search
+     * functions) or to have the search function return indicators for
+     * found names.  Yet another way is to use the keydb search
+     * facilities directly. */
+    if( secret ) {
+	rc = get_seckey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("error reading key: %s\n",  g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    get_seckey_end( ctx );
+	    return;
+	}
+	do {
+	    if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
+		resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
+		printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
+		for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
+		    putchar('-');
+		putchar('\n');
+	    }
+	    list_keyblock( keyblock, 1, opt.fingerprint, NULL );
+	    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+	} while( !get_seckey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
+	get_seckey_end( ctx );
+    }
+    else {
+	rc = get_pubkey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    get_pubkey_end( ctx );
+	    return;
+	}
+	do {
+	  if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
+		resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
+		printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
+		for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
+		    putchar('-');
+		putchar('\n');
+	    }
+	    list_keyblock( keyblock, 0, opt.fingerprint,
+			   opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL );
+	    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+	} while( !get_pubkey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
+	get_pubkey_end( ctx );
+    }
+
+    if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
+      print_signature_stats(&stats);
+}
+
+static void
+print_key_data( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+    int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
+    int i;
+
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	printf("pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
+	mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
+	putchar(':');
+	putchar('\n');
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  if(pk || (sk && sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001))
+    {
+      unsigned int use = pk? pk->pubkey_usage : sk->pubkey_usage;
+    
+      if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
+        putchar ('e');
+
+      if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
+	{
+	  putchar ('s');
+	  if( pk? pk->is_primary : sk->is_primary )
+	    putchar ('c');
+	}
+
+      if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
+        putchar ('a');
+    }
+
+    if ( keyblock ) { /* figure out the usable capabilities */
+        KBNODE k;
+        int enc=0, sign=0, cert=0, auth=0, disabled=0;
+
+        for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY 
+                 || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+                pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+		if(pk->is_primary)
+		  disabled=pk_is_disabled(pk);
+
+                if ( pk->is_valid && !pk->is_revoked && !pk->has_expired ) {
+                    if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
+                        enc = 1;
+                    if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
+		      {
+			sign = 1;
+			if(pk->is_primary)
+			  cert = 1;
+		      }
+                    if ( (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
+                      auth = 1;
+                }
+            }
+            else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY 
+                      || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                if ( sk->is_valid && !sk->is_revoked && !sk->has_expired
+		     && sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001 ) {
+                    if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
+                        enc = 1;
+                    if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
+		      {
+			sign = 1;
+			if(sk->is_primary)
+			  cert = 1;
+		      }
+                    if ( (sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
+                        auth = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (enc)
+            putchar ('E');
+        if (sign)
+            putchar ('S');
+        if (cert)
+            putchar ('C');
+        if (auth)
+            putchar ('A');
+        if (disabled)
+            putchar ('D');
+    }
+
+    putchar(':');
+}
+
+/* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical */
+static void
+print_one_subpacket(sigsubpkttype_t type,size_t len,int flags,const byte *buf)
+{
+  size_t i;
+
+  printf("spk:%d:%u:%u:",type,flags,(unsigned int)len);
+
+  for(i=0;i<len;i++)
+    {
+      /* printable ascii other than : and % */
+      if(buf[i]>=32 && buf[i]<=126 && buf[i]!=':' && buf[i]!='%')
+	printf("%c",buf[i]);
+      else
+	printf("%%%02X",buf[i]);
+    }
+
+  printf("\n");
+}
+
+void
+print_subpackets_colon(PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  byte *i;
+
+  assert(opt.show_subpackets);
+
+  for(i=opt.show_subpackets;*i;i++)
+    {
+      const byte *p;
+      size_t len;
+      int seq,crit;
+
+      seq=0;
+
+      while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,*i,&len,&seq,&crit)))
+	print_one_subpacket(*i,len,0x01|(crit?0x02:0),p);
+
+      seq=0;
+
+      while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,*i,&len,&seq,&crit)))
+	print_one_subpacket(*i,len,0x00|(crit?0x02:0),p);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+dump_attribs(const PKT_user_id *uid,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if(!attrib_fp)
+    return;
+
+  for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
+    {
+      if(is_status_enabled())
+	{
+	  byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+	  char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+90];
+	  size_t j,n;
+
+	  if(pk)
+	    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
+	  else if(sk)
+	    fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
+	  else
+	    BUG();
+
+	  p = array;
+	  for(j=0; j < n ; j++, p++ )
+	    sprintf(buf+2*j, "%02X", *p );
+
+	  sprintf(buf+strlen(buf)," %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u",
+		  (ulong)uid->attribs[i].len,uid->attribs[i].type,i+1,
+		  uid->numattribs,(ulong)uid->created,(ulong)uid->expiredate,
+		  ((uid->is_primary?0x01:0)|
+		   (uid->is_revoked?0x02:0)|
+		   (uid->is_expired?0x04:0)));
+	  write_status_text(STATUS_ATTRIBUTE,buf);
+	}
+
+      fwrite(uid->attribs[i].data,uid->attribs[i].len,1,attrib_fp);
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE kbctx;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    struct sig_stats *stats=opaque;
+    int skip_sigs=0;
+
+    /* get the keyid from the keyblock */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
+	dump_kbnode( keyblock );
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if( secret )
+      {
+	pk = NULL;
+	sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+        printf("sec%c  %4u%c/%s %s",(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
+	       (sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
+	       nbits_from_sk( sk ),pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+	       keystr_from_sk(sk),datestr_from_sk( sk ));
+
+	if(sk->has_expired)
+	  {
+	    printf(" [");
+	    printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
+	    printf("]");
+	  }
+	else if(sk->expiredate )
+	  {
+	    printf(" [");
+	    printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
+	    printf("]");
+	  }
+
+	printf("\n");
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	sk = NULL;
+
+	check_trustdb_stale();
+
+	printf("pub   %4u%c/%s %s",
+	       nbits_from_pk(pk),pubkey_letter(pk->pubkey_algo),
+	       keystr_from_pk(pk),datestr_from_pk( pk ));
+
+	/* We didn't include this before in the key listing, but there
+	   is room in the new format, so why not? */
+
+	if(pk->is_revoked)
+	  {
+	    printf(" [");
+	    printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    printf("]");
+	  }
+	else if(pk->has_expired)
+	  {
+	    printf(" [");
+	    printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    printf("]");
+	  }
+	else if(pk->expiredate)
+	  {
+	    printf(" [");
+	    printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+	    printf("]");
+	  }
+
+#if 0
+	/* I need to think about this some more.  It's easy enough to
+	   include, but it looks sort of confusing in the
+	   listing... */
+	if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY)
+	  {
+	    int validity=get_validity(pk,NULL);
+	    printf(" [%s]",trust_value_to_string(validity));
+	  }
+#endif
+
+	printf("\n");
+      }
+
+    if( fpr )
+      print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
+    print_card_serialno (sk);
+    if( opt.with_key_data )
+      print_key_data( pk );
+
+    for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+	    PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	    if(pk && (uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked)
+	       && !(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+	      {
+		skip_sigs=1;
+		continue;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      skip_sigs=0;
+
+	    if(attrib_fp && uid->attrib_data!=NULL)
+	      dump_attribs(uid,pk,sk);
+
+	    if((uid->is_revoked || uid->is_expired)
+	       || ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY) && pk))
+	      {
+		const char *validity;
+		int indent;
+
+		validity=uid_trust_string_fixed(pk,uid);
+		indent=(keystrlen()+9)-atoi(uid_trust_string_fixed(NULL,NULL));
+
+		if(indent<0 || indent>40)
+		  indent=0;
+
+		printf("uid%*s%s ",indent,"",validity);
+	      }
+	    else
+	      printf("uid%*s", (int)keystrlen()+10,"");
+
+            print_utf8_string( stdout, uid->name, uid->len );
+	    putchar('\n');
+
+	    if((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS) && uid->attribs!=NULL)
+	      show_photos(uid->attribs,uid->numattribs,pk,sk);
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	  {
+	    PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	    if((pk2->is_revoked || pk2->has_expired)
+	       && !(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS))
+	      {
+		skip_sigs=1;
+		continue;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      skip_sigs=0;
+
+            printf("sub   %4u%c/%s %s",
+		   nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),pubkey_letter( pk2->pubkey_algo ),
+		   keystr_from_pk(pk2),datestr_from_pk(pk2));
+	    if( pk2->is_revoked )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk2));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	    else if( pk2->has_expired )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk2));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	    else if( pk2->expiredate )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk2));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+            putchar('\n');
+	    if( fpr > 1 )
+	      print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
+	    if( opt.with_key_data )
+	      print_key_data( pk2 );
+	  }
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
+	  {
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+            printf("ssb%c  %4u%c/%s %s",
+                   (sk2->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
+                   (sk2->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
+		   nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),pubkey_letter( sk2->pubkey_algo ),
+		   keystr_from_sk(sk2),datestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
+            if( sk2->expiredate )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk2));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	    putchar('\n');
+	    if( fpr > 1 )
+              {
+                print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
+                print_card_serialno (sk2);
+              }
+	  }
+	else if( opt.list_sigs
+		 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && !skip_sigs ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    int sigrc;
+            char *sigstr;
+
+	    if( stats ) {
+                /*fflush(stdout);*/
+		rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
+		switch( rc ) {
+		 case 0:		 sigrc = '!'; break;
+		 case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:   stats->inv_sigs++; sigrc = '-'; break;
+		 case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: 
+		 case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: stats->no_key++; continue;
+		 default:		 stats->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break;
+		}
+
+		/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has
+                   the pk that issued it.  See also
+                   keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = 0;
+		sigrc = ' ';
+	    }
+
+	    if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+				       || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
+	       sigstr = "rev";
+	    else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else {
+                printf("sig                             "
+		       "[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
+		continue;
+	    }
+
+            fputs( sigstr, stdout );
+	    printf("%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
+                   sigrc,(sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
+                          sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
+                   sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
+                   sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
+                   sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
+                   sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
+                   sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
+		   (sig->trust_depth>9)?'T':
+		   (sig->trust_depth>0)?'0'+sig->trust_depth:' ',
+		   keystr(sig->keyid),datestr_from_sig(sig));
+	    if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
+	      printf(" %s", expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+	    printf("  ");
+	    if( sigrc == '%' )
+		printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    else if( sigrc == '?' )
+		;
+	    else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+		size_t n;
+		char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
+                print_utf8_string( stdout, p, n );
+		xfree(p);
+	    }
+	    putchar('\n');
+
+	    if(sig->flags.policy_url
+	       && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
+	      show_policy_url(sig,3,0);
+
+	    if(sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
+	      show_notation(sig,3,0,
+			    ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
+			    ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
+
+	    if(sig->flags.pref_ks
+	       && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
+	      show_keyserver_url(sig,3,0);
+
+	    /* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
+	}
+    }
+    putchar('\n');
+}
+
+void
+print_revokers(PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  /* print the revoker record */
+  if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
+    BUG();
+  else
+    {
+      int i,j;
+
+      for (i=0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
+	{
+	  byte *p;
+
+	  printf ("rvk:::%d::::::", pk->revkey[i].algid);
+	  p = pk->revkey[i].fpr;
+	  for (j=0; j < 20; j++, p++ )
+	    printf ("%02X", *p);
+	  printf (":%02x%s:\n", pk->revkey[i].class,
+		  (pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)?"s":"");
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+list_keyblock_colon( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE kbctx;
+    KBNODE node;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int any=0;
+    int trustletter = 0;
+    int ulti_hack = 0;
+    int i;
+
+    /* get the keyid from the keyblock */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
+	dump_kbnode( keyblock );
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if( secret ) {
+	pk = NULL;
+	sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+        printf("sec::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
+		    nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+		    sk->pubkey_algo,
+		    (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		    colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
+		    colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
+		    /* fixme: add LID here */ );
+    }
+    else {
+	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	sk = NULL;
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+        fputs( "pub:", stdout );
+        if ( !pk->is_valid )
+            putchar ('i');
+        else if ( pk->is_revoked )
+            putchar ('r');
+        else if ( pk->has_expired )
+            putchar ('e');
+        else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ) 
+            ;
+        else {
+            trustletter = get_validity_info ( pk, NULL );
+            if( trustletter == 'u' )
+                ulti_hack = 1;
+            putchar(trustletter);
+        }
+        printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+		    nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		    pk->pubkey_algo,
+		    (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		    colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+		    colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+        if( !opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks  )
+            putchar( get_ownertrust_info(pk) );
+	    putchar(':');
+    }
+
+    if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+        /* do not merge the first uid with the primary key */
+        putchar(':');
+        putchar(':');
+        print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+        if (secret) {
+          putchar(':'); /* End of field 13. */
+          putchar(':'); /* End of field 14. */
+          if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
+            putchar('#'); /* Key is just a stub. */
+          else if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) {
+            /* Key is stored on an external token (card) or handled by
+               the gpg-agent.  Print the serial number of that token
+               here. */
+            for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
+              printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+          }
+          putchar(':'); /* End of field 15. */
+        }
+        putchar('\n');
+	if(pk)
+	  print_revokers(pk);
+        if( fpr )
+            print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
+        if( opt.with_key_data )
+            print_key_data( pk );
+        any = 1;
+    }
+
+    for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+	    PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	    if(attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
+	      dump_attribs(node->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,sk);
+            /*
+             * Fixme: We need a is_valid flag here too 
+             */
+	    if( any ) {
+	        char *str=uid->attrib_data?"uat":"uid";
+		/* If we're listing a secret key, leave out the
+		   validity values for now.  This is handled better in
+		   1.9. */
+		if ( sk )
+        	    printf("%s:::::",str);
+                else if ( uid->is_revoked )
+        	    printf("%s:r::::",str);
+                else if ( uid->is_expired )
+        	    printf("%s:e::::",str);
+		else if ( opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
+        	    printf("%s:::::",str);
+                else {
+		    int uid_validity;
+
+		    if( pk && !ulti_hack )
+		      uid_validity=get_validity_info (pk, uid);
+		    else
+			uid_validity = 'u';
+		    printf("%s:%c::::",str,uid_validity);
+                }
+
+		printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->created));
+		printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->expiredate));
+
+		namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+		for(i=0; i < 20; i++ )
+		  printf("%02X",uid->namehash[i]);
+
+		printf("::");
+	    }
+	    if(uid->attrib_data)
+	      printf("%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
+            else
+	      print_string(stdout,uid->name,uid->len, ':' );
+            putchar(':');
+	    if (any)
+                putchar('\n');
+            else {
+                putchar(':');
+                print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+                putchar('\n');
+		if( fpr )
+		    print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
+		if( opt.with_key_data )
+		    print_key_data( pk );
+		any = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    u32 keyid2[2];
+	    PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	    if( !any ) {
+                putchar(':');
+                putchar(':');
+                print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+                putchar('\n');
+		if( fpr )
+		    print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
+		any = 1;
+	    }
+
+	    keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
+            fputs ("sub:", stdout );
+            if ( !pk2->is_valid )
+                putchar ('i');
+            else if ( pk2->is_revoked )
+                putchar ('r');
+            else if ( pk2->has_expired )
+                putchar ('e');
+            else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
+                ;
+            else {
+	        /* trustletter should always be defined here */
+	        if(trustletter)
+		  printf("%c", trustletter );
+            }
+            printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
+			nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
+			pk2->pubkey_algo,
+			(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
+			colon_datestr_from_pk( pk2 ),
+			colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
+			/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
+						);
+            print_capabilities (pk2, NULL, NULL);
+            putchar('\n');
+	    if( fpr > 1 )
+		print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
+	    if( opt.with_key_data )
+		print_key_data( pk2 );
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    u32 keyid2[2];
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+	    if( !any ) {
+                putchar(':');
+                putchar(':');
+                print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+		putchar('\n');
+		if( fpr )
+		    print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
+		any = 1;
+	    }
+
+	    keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
+            printf("ssb::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
+			nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
+			sk2->pubkey_algo,
+			(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
+			colon_datestr_from_sk( sk2 ),
+			colon_strtime (sk2->expiredate)
+                   /* fixme: add LID */ );
+            print_capabilities (NULL, sk2, NULL);
+            if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
+              /* We print the serial number only in fixed list mode
+                 for the primary key so, so avoid questions we print
+                 it for subkeys also only in this mode.  There is no
+                 technical reason, though. */
+              putchar(':'); /* End of field 13. */
+              putchar(':'); /* End of field 14. */
+              if (sk2->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
+                putchar('#'); /* Key is just a stub. */
+              else if (sk2->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) {
+                /* Key is stored on an external token (card) or handled by
+                   the gpg-agent.  Print the serial number of that token
+                   here. */
+                for (i=0; i < sk2->protect.ivlen; i++)
+                  printf ("%02X", sk2->protect.iv[i]);
+              }
+              putchar(':'); /* End of field 15. */
+            }
+            putchar ('\n');
+	    if( fpr > 1 )
+              print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
+	}
+	else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    int sigrc,fprokay=0;
+            char *sigstr;
+	    size_t fplen;
+	    byte fparray[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+
+	    if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
+		if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
+		    fputs("[revoked]:", stdout);
+		else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+		    fputs("[key binding]:", stdout);
+		else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
+		    fputs("[subkey revoked]:", stdout);
+                else
+                    putchar (':');
+                putchar(':');
+                print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+                putchar('\n');
+		if( fpr )
+		    print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
+		any=1;
+	    }
+
+	    if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+				       || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
+	       sigstr = "rev";
+	    else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
+	       sigstr = "sig";
+	    else {
+                printf ("sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n",
+                        sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    if( opt.check_sigs ) {
+	        PKT_public_key *signer_pk=NULL;
+
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if(opt.no_sig_cache)
+		  signer_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
+
+		rc = check_key_signature2( keyblock, node, NULL, signer_pk,
+					   NULL, NULL, NULL );
+		switch( rc ) {
+		  case 0:		   sigrc = '!'; break;
+		  case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:    sigrc = '-'; break;
+		  case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: 
+		  case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:  sigrc = '?'; break;
+		  default:		   sigrc = '%'; break;
+		}
+
+		if(opt.no_sig_cache)
+		  {
+		    if(rc==0)
+		      {
+			fingerprint_from_pk (signer_pk, fparray, &fplen);
+			fprokay=1;
+		      }
+		    free_public_key(signer_pk);
+		  }
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = 0;
+		sigrc = ' ';
+	    }
+            fputs( sigstr, stdout );
+            putchar(':');
+            if( sigrc != ' ' )
+                putchar(sigrc);
+            printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
+		   colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+
+	    if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+	      printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+	    printf(":");
+
+	    if(sig->trust_regexp)
+	      print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
+			   strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
+	    printf(":");
+
+	    if( sigrc == '%' )
+		printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    else if( sigrc == '?' )
+		;
+	    else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+		size_t n;
+		char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
+                print_string( stdout, p, n, ':' );
+		xfree(p);
+	    }
+            printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class,sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+
+	    if(opt.no_sig_cache && opt.check_sigs && fprokay)
+	      {
+		printf(":");
+
+		for (i=0; i < fplen ; i++ )
+		  printf ("%02X", fparray[i] );
+
+		printf(":");
+	      }
+
+	    printf("\n");
+
+	    if(opt.show_subpackets)
+	      print_subpackets_colon(sig);
+
+	    /* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
+	}
+    }
+    if( !any ) {/* oops, no user id */
+        putchar(':');
+        putchar(':');
+        print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
+	putchar('\n');
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute
+ * packet) comes first.  Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort
+ * function.  */
+static void
+do_reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock,int attr)
+{
+    KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL;
+    KBNODE last, node;
+
+    for (node=keyblock; node; primary0=node, node = node->next) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+	    ((attr && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) ||
+	     (!attr && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)) &&
+            node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
+            primary = primary2 = node;
+            for (node=node->next; node; primary2=node, node = node->next ) {
+                if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID 
+                    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY 
+                    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if ( !primary )
+        return;  /* no primary key flag found (should not happen) */
+
+    for (last=NULL, node=keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+            break;
+    }
+    assert (node);
+    assert (last); /* the user ID is never the first packet */
+    assert (primary0);  /* ditto (this is the node before primary) */
+    if ( node == primary )
+        return; /* already the first one */
+
+    last->next = primary;
+    primary0->next = primary2->next;
+    primary2->next = node;
+}
+
+void
+reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  do_reorder_keyblock(keyblock,1);
+  do_reorder_keyblock(keyblock,0);
+}
+
+void
+list_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
+{
+    reorder_keyblock (keyblock);
+    if (opt.with_colons)
+        list_keyblock_colon (keyblock, secret, fpr );
+    else
+        list_keyblock_print (keyblock, secret, fpr, opaque );
+}
+
+/*
+ * standard function to print the finperprint.
+ * mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored
+ *      1: print using log_info ()
+ *      2: direct use of tty
+ *      3: direct use of tty but only primary key.
+ * modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key fingerprints
+ */
+void
+print_fingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int mode )
+{
+    byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+    size_t i, n;
+    FILE *fp;
+    const char *text;
+    int primary=0;
+
+    if(sk)
+      {
+	if(sk->main_keyid[0]==sk->keyid[0] && sk->main_keyid[1]==sk->keyid[1])
+	  primary=1;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	if(pk->main_keyid[0]==pk->keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]==pk->keyid[1])
+	  primary=1;
+      }
+
+    /* Just to be safe */
+    if(mode&0x80 && !primary)
+      {
+	log_error("primary key is not really primary!\n");
+	return;
+      }
+
+    mode&=~0x80;
+
+    if(!primary && (mode==1 || mode==2))
+      {
+	if(sk)
+	  {
+	    PKT_secret_key *primary_sk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_sk));
+	    get_seckey(primary_sk,sk->main_keyid);
+	    print_fingerprint(NULL,primary_sk,mode|0x80);
+	    free_secret_key(primary_sk);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    PKT_public_key *primary_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_pk));
+	    get_pubkey(primary_pk,pk->main_keyid);
+	    print_fingerprint(primary_pk,NULL,mode|0x80);
+	    free_public_key(primary_pk);
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if (mode == 1) {
+        fp = log_stream ();
+	if(primary)
+	  text = _("Primary key fingerprint:");
+	else
+	  text = _("     Subkey fingerprint:");
+    }
+    else if (mode == 2) {
+        fp = NULL; /* use tty */
+	if(primary)
+          /* TRANSLATORS: this should fit into 24 bytes to that the
+           * fingerprint data is properly aligned with the user ID */
+	  text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:");
+	else
+	  text = _("      Subkey fingerprint:");
+    }
+    else if (mode == 3) {
+        fp = NULL; /* use tty */
+	text = _("      Key fingerprint =");
+    }
+    else {
+        fp = stdout;
+	text = _("      Key fingerprint =");
+    }
+  
+    if (sk)
+	fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
+    else
+	fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
+    p = array;
+    if (opt.with_colons && !mode) {
+	fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::");
+	for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
+	    fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p );
+	putc(':', fp);
+    }
+    else {
+        if (fp)
+            fputs (text, fp);
+        else
+            tty_printf ("%s", text);
+	if (n == 20) {
+	    for (i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) {
+                if (fp) {
+                    if (i == 10 )
+                        putc(' ', fp);
+                    fprintf (fp, " %02X%02X", *p, p[1] );
+                }
+                else {
+                    if (i == 10 )
+                        tty_printf (" ");
+                    tty_printf (" %02X%02X", *p, p[1]);
+                }
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) {
+                if (fp) {
+                    if (i && !(i%8) )
+                        putc (' ', fp);
+                    fprintf (fp, " %02X", *p );
+                }
+                else {
+                    if (i && !(i%8) )
+                        tty_printf (" ");
+                    tty_printf (" %02X", *p );
+                }
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if (fp)
+        putc ('\n', fp);
+    else
+        tty_printf ("\n");
+}
+
+/* Print the serial number of an OpenPGP card if available. */
+static void
+print_card_serialno (PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (!sk)
+    return;
+  if (!sk->is_protected || sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1002) 
+    return; /* Not a card. */
+  if (opt.with_colons)
+    return; /* Handled elsewhere. */
+
+  fputs (_("      Card serial no. ="), stdout);
+  putchar (' ');
+  if (sk->protect.ivlen == 16
+      && !memcmp (sk->protect.iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6) )
+    { /* This is an OpenPGP card. Just print the relevant part. */
+      for (i=8; i < 14; i++)
+        {
+          if (i == 10)
+            putchar (' ');
+          printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+        }
+    }
+  else
+    { /* Something is wrong: Print all. */
+      for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
+        printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
+    }
+  putchar ('\n');
+}
+
+
+
+void set_attrib_fd(int fd)
+{
+  static int last_fd=-1;
+
+  if ( fd != -1 && last_fd == fd )
+    return;
+
+  if ( attrib_fp && attrib_fp != stdout && attrib_fp != stderr )
+    fclose (attrib_fp);
+  attrib_fp = NULL;
+  if ( fd == -1 ) 
+    return;
+
+  if( fd == 1 )
+    attrib_fp = stdout;
+  else if( fd == 2 )
+    attrib_fp = stderr;
+  else
+    attrib_fp = fdopen( fd, "wb" );
+  if( !attrib_fp ) {
+    log_fatal("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n",
+	      fd, strerror(errno));
+  }
+
+  last_fd = fd;
+}
diff --git a/g10/keyring.c b/g10/keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ef5b1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1624 @@
+/* keyring.c - keyring file handling
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "keyring.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "keydb.h" 
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h" /*for check_key_signature()*/
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+/* off_item is a funny named for an object used to keep track of known
+ * keys.  The idea was to use the offset to seek to the known keyblock, but
+ * this is not possible if more than one process is using the keyring.
+ */
+struct off_item {
+  struct off_item *next;
+  u32 kid[2];
+  /*off_t off;*/
+};
+
+typedef struct off_item **OffsetHashTable; 
+
+
+typedef struct keyring_name *KR_NAME;
+struct keyring_name {
+  struct keyring_name *next;
+  int secret;
+  DOTLOCK lockhd;
+  int is_locked;
+  int did_full_scan;
+  char fname[1];
+};
+typedef struct keyring_name const * CONST_KR_NAME;
+
+static KR_NAME kr_names;
+static int active_handles;
+
+static OffsetHashTable kr_offtbl;
+static int kr_offtbl_ready;
+
+
+struct keyring_handle {
+  CONST_KR_NAME resource;
+  int secret;             /* this is for a secret keyring */
+  struct {
+    CONST_KR_NAME kr;
+    IOBUF iobuf;
+    int eof;
+    int error;
+  } current;
+  struct {
+    CONST_KR_NAME kr; 
+    off_t offset;
+    size_t pk_no;
+    size_t uid_no;
+    unsigned int n_packets; /*used for delete and update*/
+  } found;
+  struct {
+    char *name;
+    char *pattern;
+  } word_match;
+};
+
+
+
+static int do_copy (int mode, const char *fname, KBNODE root, int secret,
+                    off_t start_offset, unsigned int n_packets );
+
+
+
+static struct off_item *
+new_offset_item (void)
+{
+  struct off_item *k;
+  
+  k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
+  return k;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+release_offset_items (struct off_item *k)
+{
+  struct off_item *k2;
+
+  for (; k; k = k2)
+    {
+      k2 = k->next;
+      xfree (k);
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+static OffsetHashTable 
+new_offset_hash_table (void)
+{
+  struct off_item **tbl;
+
+  tbl = xmalloc_clear (2048 * sizeof *tbl);
+  return tbl;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+release_offset_hash_table (OffsetHashTable tbl)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (!tbl)
+    return;
+  for (i=0; i < 2048; i++)
+    release_offset_items (tbl[i]);
+  xfree (tbl);
+}
+#endif
+
+static struct off_item *
+lookup_offset_hash_table (OffsetHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct off_item *k;
+
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x07ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return k;
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+update_offset_hash_table (OffsetHashTable tbl, u32 *kid, off_t off)
+{
+  struct off_item *k;
+
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x07ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1]) 
+        {
+          /*k->off = off;*/
+          return;
+        }
+    }
+
+  k = new_offset_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  /*k->off = off;*/
+  k->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x07ff)];
+  tbl[(kid[1] & 0x07ff)] = k;
+}
+
+static void
+update_offset_hash_table_from_kb (OffsetHashTable tbl, KBNODE node, off_t off)
+{
+  for (; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+          || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        {
+          u32 aki[2];
+          keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+          update_offset_hash_table (tbl, aki, off);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Register a filename for plain keyring files.  ptr is set to a
+ * pointer to be used to create a handles etc, or the already-issued
+ * pointer if it has already been registered.  The function returns 1
+ * if a new keyring was registered.
+*/
+int
+keyring_register_filename (const char *fname, int secret, void **ptr)
+{
+    KR_NAME kr;
+
+    if (active_handles)
+        BUG (); /* We don't allow that */
+
+    for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
+      {
+        if ( !compare_filenames (kr->fname, fname) )
+	  {
+            *ptr=kr;
+	    return 0; /* already registered */
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if (secret)
+      register_secured_file (fname);
+
+    kr = xmalloc (sizeof *kr + strlen (fname));
+    strcpy (kr->fname, fname);
+    kr->secret = !!secret;
+    kr->lockhd = NULL;
+    kr->is_locked = 0;
+    kr->did_full_scan = 0;
+    /* keep a list of all issued pointers */
+    kr->next = kr_names;
+    kr_names = kr;
+
+    /* create the offset table the first time a function here is used */
+    if (!kr_offtbl)
+      kr_offtbl = new_offset_hash_table ();
+
+    *ptr=kr;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int
+keyring_is_writable (void *token)
+{
+  KR_NAME r = token;
+
+  return r? !access (r->fname, W_OK) : 0;
+}
+    
+
+
+/* Create a new handle for the resource associated with TOKEN.  SECRET
+   is just just as a cross-check.
+   
+   The returned handle must be released using keyring_release (). */
+KEYRING_HANDLE
+keyring_new (void *token, int secret)
+{
+  KEYRING_HANDLE hd;
+  KR_NAME resource = token;
+
+  assert (resource && !resource->secret == !secret);
+  
+  hd = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *hd);
+  hd->resource = resource;
+  hd->secret = !!secret;
+  active_handles++;
+  return hd;
+}
+
+void 
+keyring_release (KEYRING_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    if (!hd)
+        return;
+    assert (active_handles > 0);
+    active_handles--;
+    xfree (hd->word_match.name);
+    xfree (hd->word_match.pattern);
+    iobuf_close (hd->current.iobuf);
+    xfree (hd);
+}
+
+
+const char *
+keyring_get_resource_name (KEYRING_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    if (!hd || !hd->resource)
+      return NULL;
+    return hd->resource->fname;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Lock the keyring with the given handle, or unlok if yes is false.
+ * We ignore the handle and lock all registered files.
+ */
+int 
+keyring_lock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, int yes)
+{
+    KR_NAME kr;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if (yes) {
+        /* first make sure the lock handles are created */
+        for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next) {
+            if (!keyring_is_writable(kr))
+                continue;
+            if (!kr->lockhd) {
+                kr->lockhd = create_dotlock( kr->fname );
+                if (!kr->lockhd) {
+                    log_info ("can't allocate lock for `%s'\n", kr->fname );
+                    rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (rc)
+            return rc;
+        
+        /* and now set the locks */
+        for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next) {
+            if (!keyring_is_writable(kr))
+                continue;
+            if (kr->is_locked)
+                ;
+            else if (make_dotlock (kr->lockhd, -1) ) {
+                log_info ("can't lock `%s'\n", kr->fname );
+                rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+            }
+            else 
+                kr->is_locked = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (rc || !yes) {
+        for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next) {
+            if (!keyring_is_writable(kr))
+                continue;
+            if (!kr->is_locked)
+                ;
+            else if (release_dotlock (kr->lockhd))
+                log_info ("can't unlock `%s'\n", kr->fname );
+            else 
+                kr->is_locked = 0;
+        }
+    } 
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the last found keyring.  Caller must free it.
+ * The returned keyblock has the kbode flag bit 0 set for the node with
+ * the public key used to locate the keyblock or flag bit 1 set for 
+ * the user ID node.
+ */
+int
+keyring_get_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb)
+{
+    PACKET *pkt;
+    int rc;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL, node, lastnode;
+    IOBUF a;
+    int in_cert = 0;
+    int pk_no = 0;
+    int uid_no = 0;
+    int save_mode;
+
+    if (ret_kb)
+        *ret_kb = NULL;
+
+    if (!hd->found.kr)
+        return -1; /* no successful search */
+
+    a = iobuf_open (hd->found.kr->fname);
+    if (!a)
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), hd->found.kr->fname);
+	return G10ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
+      }
+
+    if (iobuf_seek (a, hd->found.offset) ) {
+        log_error ("can't seek `%s'\n", hd->found.kr->fname);
+	iobuf_close(a);
+	return G10ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
+    }
+
+    pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+    init_packet (pkt);
+    hd->found.n_packets = 0;;
+    lastnode = NULL;
+    save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
+    while ((rc=parse_packet (a, pkt)) != -1) {
+        hd->found.n_packets++;
+        if (rc == G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET) {
+	    free_packet (pkt);
+	    init_packet (pkt);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if (rc) {  
+            log_error ("keyring_get_keyblock: read error: %s\n",
+                       g10_errstr(rc) );
+            rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
+            break;
+        }
+	if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) {
+	    log_error ("skipped compressed packet in keyring\n");
+	    free_packet(pkt);
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	    continue;
+        }
+
+        if (in_cert && (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                        || pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)) {
+            hd->found.n_packets--; /* fix counter */
+            break; /* ready */
+        }
+
+        in_cert = 1;
+        if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
+            /*(this code is duplicated after the loop)*/
+            if ( lastnode 
+                 && lastnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+                 && (pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 1) ) {
+                /* this is a ring trust packet with a checked signature 
+                 * status cache following directly a signature paket.
+                 * Set the cache status into that signature packet */
+                PKT_signature *sig = lastnode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+                
+                sig->flags.checked = 1;
+                sig->flags.valid = !!(pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 2);
+            }
+            /* reset lastnode, so that we set the cache status only from
+             * the ring trust packet immediately folling a signature */
+            lastnode = NULL;
+        }
+        else {
+            node = lastnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
+            if (!keyblock)
+                keyblock = node;
+            else
+                add_kbnode (keyblock, node);
+
+            if ( pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                 || pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+                 || pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+                 || pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) {
+                if (++pk_no == hd->found.pk_no)
+                    node->flag |= 1;
+            }
+            else if ( pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
+                if (++uid_no == hd->found.uid_no)
+                    node->flag |= 2;
+            }
+        }
+
+        pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+        init_packet(pkt);
+    }
+    set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
+
+    if (rc == -1 && keyblock) 
+	rc = 0; /* got the entire keyblock */
+
+    if (rc || !ret_kb)
+	release_kbnode (keyblock);
+    else {
+        /*(duplicated form the loop body)*/
+        if ( pkt && pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST
+             && lastnode 
+             && lastnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+             && (pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 1) ) {
+            PKT_signature *sig = lastnode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            sig->flags.checked = 1;
+            sig->flags.valid = !!(pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 2);
+        }
+	*ret_kb = keyblock;
+    }
+    free_packet (pkt);
+    xfree (pkt);
+    iobuf_close(a);
+
+    /* Make sure that future search operations fail immediately when
+     * we know that we are working on a invalid keyring 
+     */
+    if (rc == G10ERR_INV_KEYRING)
+        hd->current.error = rc;
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+keyring_update_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if (!hd->found.kr)
+        return -1; /* no successful prior search */
+
+    if (!hd->found.n_packets) {
+        /* need to know the number of packets - do a dummy get_keyblock*/
+        rc = keyring_get_keyblock (hd, NULL);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("re-reading keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr (rc));
+            return rc;
+        }
+        if (!hd->found.n_packets)
+            BUG ();
+    }
+
+    /* The open iobuf isn't needed anymore and in fact is a problem when
+       it comes to renaming the keyring files on some operating systems,
+       so close it here */
+    iobuf_close(hd->current.iobuf);
+    hd->current.iobuf = NULL;
+
+    /* do the update */
+    rc = do_copy (3, hd->found.kr->fname, kb, hd->secret,
+                  hd->found.offset, hd->found.n_packets );
+    if (!rc) {
+      if (!hd->secret && kr_offtbl)
+        {
+          update_offset_hash_table_from_kb (kr_offtbl, kb, 0);
+        }
+      /* better reset the found info */
+      hd->found.kr = NULL;
+      hd->found.offset = 0;
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+keyring_insert_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb)
+{
+    int rc;
+    const char *fname;
+
+    if (!hd)
+        fname = NULL;
+    else if (hd->found.kr)
+        fname = hd->found.kr->fname;
+    else if (hd->current.kr)
+        fname = hd->current.kr->fname;
+    else 
+        fname = hd->resource? hd->resource->fname:NULL;
+
+    if (!fname)
+        return G10ERR_GENERAL; 
+
+    /* close this one otherwise we will lose the position for
+     * a next search.  Fixme: it would be better to adjust the position
+     * after the write opertions.
+     */
+    iobuf_close (hd->current.iobuf);
+    hd->current.iobuf = NULL;
+
+    /* do the insert */
+    rc = do_copy (1, fname, kb, hd->secret, 0, 0 );
+    if (!rc && !hd->secret && kr_offtbl)
+      {
+        update_offset_hash_table_from_kb (kr_offtbl, kb, 0);
+      }
+      
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+keyring_delete_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if (!hd->found.kr)
+        return -1; /* no successful prior search */
+
+    if (!hd->found.n_packets) {
+        /* need to know the number of packets - do a dummy get_keyblock*/
+        rc = keyring_get_keyblock (hd, NULL);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("re-reading keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr (rc));
+            return rc;
+        }
+        if (!hd->found.n_packets)
+            BUG ();
+    }
+
+    /* close this one otherwise we will lose the position for
+     * a next search.  Fixme: it would be better to adjust the position
+     * after the write opertions.
+     */
+    iobuf_close (hd->current.iobuf);
+    hd->current.iobuf = NULL;
+
+    /* do the delete */
+    rc = do_copy (2, hd->found.kr->fname, NULL, hd->secret,
+                  hd->found.offset, hd->found.n_packets );
+    if (!rc) {
+        /* better reset the found info */
+        hd->found.kr = NULL;
+        hd->found.offset = 0;
+        /* Delete is a rare operations, so we don't remove the keys
+         * from the offset table */
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/* 
+ * Start the next search on this handle right at the beginning
+ */
+int 
+keyring_search_reset (KEYRING_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    assert (hd);
+
+    hd->current.kr = NULL;
+    iobuf_close (hd->current.iobuf);
+    hd->current.iobuf = NULL;
+    hd->current.eof = 0;
+    hd->current.error = 0;
+    
+    hd->found.kr = NULL;
+    hd->found.offset = 0;
+    return 0; 
+}
+
+
+static int
+prepare_search (KEYRING_HANDLE hd)
+{
+    if (hd->current.error)  
+        return hd->current.error; /* still in error state */
+
+    if (hd->current.kr && !hd->current.eof) {
+        if ( !hd->current.iobuf )
+            return G10ERR_GENERAL; /* position invalid after a modify */
+        return 0; /* okay */
+    }
+
+    if (!hd->current.kr && hd->current.eof)  
+        return -1; /* still EOF */
+
+    if (!hd->current.kr) { /* start search with first keyring */
+        hd->current.kr = hd->resource;
+        if (!hd->current.kr) {
+            hd->current.eof = 1;
+            return -1; /* keyring not available */
+        }
+        assert (!hd->current.iobuf);
+    }
+    else { /* EOF */
+        iobuf_close (hd->current.iobuf); 
+        hd->current.iobuf = NULL;
+        hd->current.kr = NULL;
+        hd->current.eof = 1;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    hd->current.eof = 0;
+    hd->current.iobuf = iobuf_open (hd->current.kr->fname);
+    if (!hd->current.iobuf)
+      {
+        log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), hd->current.kr->fname );
+        return (hd->current.error = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE);
+      }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* A map of the all characters valid used for word_match()
+ * Valid characters are in in this table converted to uppercase.
+ * because the upper 128 bytes have special meaning, we assume
+ * that they are all valid.
+ * Note: We must use numerical values here in case that this program
+ * will be converted to those little blue HAL9000s with their strange
+ * EBCDIC character set (user ids are UTF-8).
+ * wk 2000-04-13: Hmmm, does this really make sense, given the fact that
+ * we can run gpg now on a S/390 running GNU/Linux, where the code
+ * translation is done by the device drivers?
+ */
+static const byte word_match_chars[256] = {
+  /* 00 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 08 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 10 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 18 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 20 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 28 */  0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 30 */  0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+  /* 38 */  0x38, 0x39, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 40 */  0x00, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+  /* 48 */  0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f,
+  /* 50 */  0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57,
+  /* 58 */  0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 60 */  0x00, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+  /* 68 */  0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f,
+  /* 70 */  0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57,
+  /* 78 */  0x58, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  /* 80 */  0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87,
+  /* 88 */  0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f,
+  /* 90 */  0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97,
+  /* 98 */  0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f,
+  /* a0 */  0xa0, 0xa1, 0xa2, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0xa5, 0xa6, 0xa7,
+  /* a8 */  0xa8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0xab, 0xac, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf,
+  /* b0 */  0xb0, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xb3, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xb7,
+  /* b8 */  0xb8, 0xb9, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf,
+  /* c0 */  0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7,
+  /* c8 */  0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf,
+  /* d0 */  0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7,
+  /* d8 */  0xd8, 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf,
+  /* e0 */  0xe0, 0xe1, 0xe2, 0xe3, 0xe4, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xe7,
+  /* e8 */  0xe8, 0xe9, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef,
+  /* f0 */  0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7,
+  /* f8 */  0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff
+};
+
+/****************
+ * Do a word match (original user id starts with a '+').
+ * The pattern is already tokenized to a more suitable format:
+ * There are only the real words in it delimited by one space
+ * and all converted to uppercase.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if all words match.
+ *
+ * Note: This algorithm is a straightforward one and not very
+ *	 fast.	It works for UTF-8 strings.  The uidlen should
+ *	 be removed but due to the fact that old versions of
+ *	 pgp don't use UTF-8 we still use the length; this should
+ *	 be fixed in parse-packet (and replace \0 by some special
+ *	 UTF-8 encoding)
+ */
+static int
+word_match( const byte *uid, size_t uidlen, const byte *pattern )
+{
+    size_t wlen, n;
+    const byte *p;
+    const byte *s;
+
+    for( s=pattern; *s; ) {
+	do {
+	    /* skip leading delimiters */
+	    while( uidlen && !word_match_chars[*uid] )
+		uid++, uidlen--;
+	    /* get length of the word */
+	    n = uidlen; p = uid;
+	    while( n && word_match_chars[*p] )
+		p++, n--;
+	    wlen = p - uid;
+	    /* and compare against the current word from pattern */
+	    for(n=0, p=uid; n < wlen && s[n] != ' ' && s[n] ; n++, p++ ) {
+		if( word_match_chars[*p] != s[n] )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( n == wlen && (s[n] == ' ' || !s[n]) )
+		break; /* found */
+	    uid += wlen;
+	    uidlen -= wlen;
+	} while( uidlen );
+	if( !uidlen )
+	    return -1; /* not found */
+
+	/* advance to next word in pattern */
+	for(; *s != ' ' && *s ; s++ )
+	    ;
+	if( *s )
+	    s++ ;
+    }
+    return 0; /* found */
+}
+
+/****************
+ * prepare word word_match; that is parse the name and
+ * build the pattern.
+ * caller has to free the returned pattern
+ */
+static char*
+prepare_word_match (const byte *name)
+{
+    byte *pattern, *p;
+    int c;
+
+    /* the original length is always enough for the pattern */
+    p = pattern = xmalloc(strlen(name)+1);
+    do {
+	/* skip leading delimiters */
+	while( *name && !word_match_chars[*name] )
+	    name++;
+	/* copy as long as we don't have a delimiter and convert
+	 * to uppercase.
+	 * fixme: how can we handle utf8 uppercasing */
+	for( ; *name &&  (c=word_match_chars[*name]); name++ )
+	    *p++ = c;
+	*p++ = ' '; /* append pattern delimiter */
+    } while( *name );
+    p[-1] = 0; /* replace last pattern delimiter by EOS */
+
+    return pattern;
+}
+
+
+
+
+static int
+compare_name (int mode, const char *name, const char *uid, size_t uidlen)
+{
+    int i;
+    const char *s, *se;
+
+    if (mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT) { 
+	for (i=0; name[i] && uidlen; i++, uidlen--)
+	    if (uid[i] != name[i])
+		break;
+	if (!uidlen && !name[i])
+	    return 0; /* found */
+    }
+    else if (mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR) {
+	if (ascii_memistr( uid, uidlen, name ))
+	    return 0;
+    }
+    else if (   mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL 
+             || mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB
+             || mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND) {
+	for (i=0, s= uid; i < uidlen && *s != '<'; s++, i++)
+	    ;
+	if (i < uidlen)  {
+	    /* skip opening delim and one char and look for the closing one*/
+	    s++; i++;
+	    for (se=s+1, i++; i < uidlen && *se != '>'; se++, i++)
+		;
+	    if (i < uidlen) {
+		i = se - s;
+		if (mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL) { 
+		    if( strlen(name)-2 == i
+                        && !ascii_memcasecmp( s, name+1, i) )
+			return 0;
+		}
+		else if (mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB) {
+		    if( ascii_memistr( s, i, name ) )
+			return 0;
+		}
+		else { /* email from end */
+		    /* nyi */
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    else if (mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS)
+	return word_match (uid, uidlen, name);
+    else
+	BUG();
+
+    return -1; /* not found */
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Search through the keyring(s), starting at the current position,
+ * for a keyblock which contains one of the keys described in the DESC array.
+ */
+int 
+keyring_search (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+		size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex)
+{
+  int rc;
+  PACKET pkt;
+  int save_mode;
+  off_t offset, main_offset;
+  size_t n;
+  int need_uid, need_words, need_keyid, need_fpr, any_skip;
+  int pk_no, uid_no;
+  int initial_skip;
+  int use_offtbl;
+  PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+  u32 aki[2];
+
+  /* figure out what information we need */
+  need_uid = need_words = need_keyid = need_fpr = any_skip = 0;
+  for (n=0; n < ndesc; n++) 
+    {
+      switch (desc[n].mode) 
+        {
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT: 
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
+          need_uid = 1;
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS: 
+          need_uid = 1;
+          need_words = 1;
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID: 
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+          need_keyid = 1;
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16: 
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR: 
+          need_fpr = 1;
+          break;
+        case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST:
+          /* always restart the search in this mode */
+          keyring_search_reset (hd);
+          break;
+        default: break;
+	}
+      if (desc[n].skipfnc) 
+        {
+          any_skip = 1;
+          need_keyid = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+  rc = prepare_search (hd);
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  use_offtbl = !hd->secret && kr_offtbl;
+  if (!use_offtbl)
+    ;
+  else if (!kr_offtbl_ready)
+    need_keyid = 1;
+  else if (ndesc == 1 && desc[0].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
+    {
+      struct off_item *oi;
+            
+      oi = lookup_offset_hash_table (kr_offtbl, desc[0].u.kid);
+      if (!oi)
+        { /* We know that we don't have this key */
+          hd->found.kr = NULL;
+          hd->current.eof = 1;
+          return -1;
+        }
+      /* We could now create a positive search status and return.
+       * However the problem is that another instance of gpg may 
+       * have changed the keyring so that the offsets are not valid
+       * anymore - therefore we don't do it 
+       */
+    }
+
+  if (need_words)
+    {
+      const char *name = NULL;
+
+      log_debug ("word search mode does not yet work\n");
+      /* FIXME: here is a long standing bug in our function and in addition we
+         just use the first search description */
+      for (n=0; n < ndesc && !name; n++) 
+        {
+          if (desc[n].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS) 
+            name = desc[n].u.name;
+        }
+      assert (name);
+      if ( !hd->word_match.name || strcmp (hd->word_match.name, name) ) 
+        {
+          /* name changed */
+          xfree (hd->word_match.name);
+          xfree (hd->word_match.pattern);
+          hd->word_match.name = xstrdup (name);
+          hd->word_match.pattern = prepare_word_match (name);
+        }
+      name = hd->word_match.pattern;
+    }
+
+  init_packet(&pkt);
+  save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
+
+  hd->found.kr = NULL;
+  main_offset = 0;
+  pk_no = uid_no = 0;
+  initial_skip = 1; /* skip until we see the start of a keyblock */
+  while (!(rc=search_packet (hd->current.iobuf, &pkt, &offset, need_uid))) 
+    {
+      byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+      size_t an;
+
+      if (pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY  || pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) 
+        {
+          main_offset = offset;
+          pk_no = uid_no = 0;
+          initial_skip = 0;
+        }
+      if (initial_skip) 
+        {
+          free_packet (&pkt);
+          continue;
+        }
+	
+      pk = NULL;
+      sk = NULL;
+      uid = NULL;
+      if (   pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        {
+          pk = pkt.pkt.public_key;
+          ++pk_no;
+
+          if (need_fpr) {
+            fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
+            while (an < 20) /* fill up to 20 bytes */
+              afp[an++] = 0;
+          }
+          if (need_keyid)
+            keyid_from_pk (pk, aki);
+
+          if (use_offtbl && !kr_offtbl_ready)
+            update_offset_hash_table (kr_offtbl, aki, main_offset);
+        }
+      else if (pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) 
+        {
+          uid = pkt.pkt.user_id;
+          ++uid_no;
+        }
+      else if (    pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+                   || pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) 
+        {
+          sk = pkt.pkt.secret_key;
+          ++pk_no;
+
+          if (need_fpr) {
+            fingerprint_from_sk (sk, afp, &an);
+            while (an < 20) /* fill up to 20 bytes */
+              afp[an++] = 0;
+          }
+          if (need_keyid)
+            keyid_from_sk (sk, aki);
+            
+        }
+
+      for (n=0; n < ndesc; n++) 
+        {
+          switch (desc[n].mode) {
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE: 
+            BUG ();
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT: 
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS: 
+            if ( uid && !compare_name (desc[n].mode,
+                                       desc[n].u.name,
+                                       uid->name, uid->len)) 
+              goto found;
+            break;
+                
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID: 
+            if ((pk||sk) && desc[n].u.kid[1] == aki[1])
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+            if ((pk||sk) && desc[n].u.kid[0] == aki[0]
+                && desc[n].u.kid[1] == aki[1])
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
+            if ((pk||sk) && !memcmp (desc[n].u.fpr, afp, 16))
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR: 
+            if ((pk||sk) && !memcmp (desc[n].u.fpr, afp, 20))
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST: 
+            if (pk||sk)
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT: 
+            if (pk||sk)
+              goto found;
+            break;
+          default: 
+            rc = G10ERR_INV_ARG;
+            goto found;
+          }
+	}
+      free_packet (&pkt);
+      continue;
+    found:
+      /* Record which desc we matched on.  Note this value is only
+	 meaningful if this function returns with no errors. */
+      if(descindex)
+	*descindex=n;
+      for (n=any_skip?0:ndesc; n < ndesc; n++) 
+        {
+          if (desc[n].skipfnc
+              && desc[n].skipfnc (desc[n].skipfncvalue, aki, uid))
+            break;
+        }
+      if (n == ndesc)
+        goto real_found;
+      free_packet (&pkt);
+    }
+ real_found:
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      hd->found.offset = main_offset;
+      hd->found.kr = hd->current.kr;
+      hd->found.pk_no = (pk||sk)? pk_no : 0;
+      hd->found.uid_no = uid? uid_no : 0;
+    }
+  else if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      hd->current.eof = 1;
+      /* if we scanned all keyrings, we are sure that
+       * all known key IDs are in our offtbl, mark that. */
+      if (use_offtbl && !kr_offtbl_ready)
+        {
+          KR_NAME kr;
+          
+          /* First set the did_full_scan flag for this keyring (ignore
+             secret keyrings) */
+          for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
+            {
+              if (!kr->secret && hd->resource == kr) 
+                {
+                  kr->did_full_scan = 1;
+                  break;
+                }
+            }
+          /* Then check whether all flags are set and if so, mark the
+             offtbl ready */
+          for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
+            {
+              if (!kr->secret && !kr->did_full_scan) 
+                break;
+            }
+          if (!kr)
+            kr_offtbl_ready = 1;
+        }
+    }
+  else 
+    hd->current.error = rc;
+
+  free_packet(&pkt);
+  set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+create_tmp_file (const char *template,
+                 char **r_bakfname, char **r_tmpfname, IOBUF *r_fp)
+{  
+  char *bakfname, *tmpfname;
+  mode_t oldmask;
+
+  *r_bakfname = NULL;
+  *r_tmpfname = NULL;
+
+# ifdef USE_ONLY_8DOT3
+  /* Here is another Windoze bug?:
+   * you cant rename("pubring.gpg.tmp", "pubring.gpg");
+   * but	rename("pubring.gpg.tmp", "pubring.aaa");
+   * works.  So we replace .gpg by .bak or .tmp
+   */
+  if (strlen (template) > 4
+      && !strcmp (template+strlen(template)-4, EXTSEP_S "gpg") )
+    {
+      bakfname = xmalloc (strlen (template) + 1);
+      strcpy (bakfname, template);
+      strcpy (bakfname+strlen(template)-4, EXTSEP_S "bak");
+
+      tmpfname = xmalloc (strlen( template ) + 1 );
+      strcpy (tmpfname,template);
+      strcpy (tmpfname+strlen(template)-4, EXTSEP_S "tmp");
+    }
+    else 
+      { /* file does not end with gpg; hmmm */
+	bakfname = xmalloc (strlen( template ) + 5);
+	strcpy (stpcpy(bakfname, template), EXTSEP_S "bak");
+
+	tmpfname = xmalloc (strlen( template ) + 5);
+	strcpy (stpcpy(tmpfname, template), EXTSEP_S "tmp");
+    }
+# else /* Posix file names */
+    bakfname = xmalloc (strlen( template ) + 2);
+    strcpy (stpcpy (bakfname,template),"~");
+
+    tmpfname = xmalloc (strlen( template ) + 5);
+    strcpy (stpcpy(tmpfname,template), EXTSEP_S "tmp");
+# endif /* Posix filename */
+
+    /* Create the temp file with limited access */
+    oldmask=umask(077);
+    if (is_secured_filename (tmpfname))
+      {
+        *r_fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    else
+      *r_fp = iobuf_create (tmpfname);
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if (!*r_fp)
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), tmpfname, strerror(errno) );
+        xfree (tmpfname);
+        xfree (bakfname);
+	return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+      }
+    
+    *r_bakfname = bakfname;
+    *r_tmpfname = tmpfname;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+rename_tmp_file (const char *bakfname, const char *tmpfname,
+                 const char *fname, int secret )
+{
+  int rc=0;
+
+  /* invalidate close caches*/
+  iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)tmpfname );
+  iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)bakfname );
+  iobuf_ioctl (NULL, 2, 0, (char*)fname );
+
+  /* first make a backup file except for secret keyrings */
+  if (!secret)
+    { 
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__riscos__)
+      remove (bakfname);
+#endif
+      if (rename (fname, bakfname) )
+        {
+          log_error ("renaming `%s' to `%s' failed: %s\n",
+                     fname, bakfname, strerror(errno) );
+          return G10ERR_RENAME_FILE;
+	}
+    }
+  
+  /* then rename the file */
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__riscos__)
+  remove( fname );
+#endif
+  if (secret)
+    unregister_secured_file (fname);
+  if (rename (tmpfname, fname) )
+    {
+      log_error (_("renaming `%s' to `%s' failed: %s\n"),
+                 tmpfname, fname, strerror(errno) );
+      register_secured_file (fname);
+      rc = G10ERR_RENAME_FILE;
+      if (secret)
+        {
+          log_info(_("WARNING: 2 files with confidential"
+                     " information exists.\n"));
+          log_info(_("%s is the unchanged one\n"), fname );
+          log_info(_("%s is the new one\n"), tmpfname );
+          log_info(_("Please fix this possible security flaw\n"));
+	}
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  /* Now make sure the file has the same permissions as the original */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+  {
+    struct stat statbuf;
+
+    statbuf.st_mode=S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
+
+    if(((secret && !opt.preserve_permissions) ||
+	(stat(bakfname,&statbuf)==0)) &&
+       (chmod(fname,statbuf.st_mode)==0))
+      ;
+    else
+      log_error("WARNING: unable to restore permissions to `%s': %s",
+		fname,strerror(errno));
+  }
+#endif
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_keyblock (IOBUF fp, KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE kbctx = NULL, node;
+  int rc;
+  
+  while ( (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ) 
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) 
+        continue; /* we write it later on our own */
+
+      if ( (rc = build_packet (fp, node->pkt) ))
+        {
+          log_error ("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
+                     node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+          return rc;
+        }
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) 
+        { /* always write a signature cache packet */
+          PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+          unsigned int cacheval = 0;
+          
+          if (sig->flags.checked) 
+            {
+              cacheval |= 1;
+              if (sig->flags.valid)
+                cacheval |= 2;
+            }
+          iobuf_put (fp, 0xb0); /* old style packet 12, 1 byte len*/
+          iobuf_put (fp, 2);    /* 2 bytes */
+          iobuf_put (fp, 0);    /* unused */
+          if (iobuf_put (fp, cacheval)) {
+            log_error ("writing sigcache packet failed\n");
+            return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+          }
+        }
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Walk over all public keyrings, check the signatures and replace the
+ * keyring with a new one where the signature cache is then updated.
+ * This is only done for the public keyrings.
+ */
+int
+keyring_rebuild_cache (void *token,int noisy)
+{
+  KEYRING_HANDLE hd;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  KBNODE keyblock = NULL, node;
+  const char *lastresname = NULL, *resname;
+  IOBUF tmpfp = NULL;
+  char *tmpfilename = NULL;
+  char *bakfilename = NULL;
+  int rc;
+  ulong count = 0, sigcount = 0;
+
+  hd = keyring_new (token, 0);
+  memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+
+  rc=keyring_lock (hd, 1);
+  if(rc)
+    goto leave;
+
+  while ( !(rc = keyring_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL)) )
+    {
+      desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+      resname = keyring_get_resource_name (hd);
+      if (lastresname != resname )
+        { /* we have switched to a new keyring - commit changes */
+          if (tmpfp)
+            {
+              if (iobuf_close (tmpfp))
+                {
+                  log_error ("error closing `%s': %s\n",
+                             tmpfilename, strerror (errno));
+                  rc = G10ERR_CLOSE_FILE;
+                  goto leave;
+                }
+              /* because we have switched resources, we can be sure that
+               * the original file is closed */
+              tmpfp = NULL;
+            }
+          rc = lastresname? rename_tmp_file (bakfilename, tmpfilename, 
+                                             lastresname, 0) : 0;
+          xfree (tmpfilename);  tmpfilename = NULL;
+          xfree (bakfilename);  bakfilename = NULL;
+          if (rc)
+            goto leave;
+          lastresname = resname;
+          if (noisy && !opt.quiet)
+            log_info (_("caching keyring `%s'\n"), resname);
+          rc = create_tmp_file (resname, &bakfilename, &tmpfilename, &tmpfp);
+          if (rc)
+            goto leave;
+        }
+      
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      rc = keyring_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+      if (rc) 
+        {
+          log_error ("keyring_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+      /* check all signature to set the signature's cache flags */
+      for (node=keyblock; node; node=node->next)
+        {
+	  /* Note that this doesn't cache the result of a revocation
+	     issued by a designated revoker.  This is because the pk
+	     in question does not carry the revkeys as we haven't
+	     merged the key and selfsigs.  It is questionable whether
+	     this matters very much since there are very very few
+	     designated revoker revocation packets out there. */
+
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+            {
+	      PKT_signature *sig=node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+	      if(!opt.no_sig_cache && sig->flags.checked && sig->flags.valid
+		 && (check_digest_algo(sig->digest_algo)
+		     || check_pubkey_algo(sig->pubkey_algo)))
+		sig->flags.checked=sig->flags.valid=0;
+	      else
+		check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
+
+              sigcount++;
+            }
+        }
+      
+      /* write the keyblock to the temporary file */
+      rc = write_keyblock (tmpfp, keyblock);
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+
+      if ( !(++count % 50) && noisy && !opt.quiet)
+        log_info(_("%lu keys cached so far (%lu signatures)\n"),
+                 count, sigcount );
+
+    } /* end main loop */ 
+  if (rc == -1)
+    rc = 0;
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keyring_search failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  if(noisy || opt.verbose)
+    log_info(_("%lu keys cached (%lu signatures)\n"), count, sigcount );
+  if (tmpfp)
+    {
+      if (iobuf_close (tmpfp))
+        {
+          log_error ("error closing `%s': %s\n",
+                     tmpfilename, strerror (errno));
+          rc = G10ERR_CLOSE_FILE;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+      /* because we have switched resources, we can be sure that
+       * the original file is closed */
+      tmpfp = NULL;
+    }
+  rc = lastresname? rename_tmp_file (bakfilename, tmpfilename,
+                                     lastresname, 0) : 0;
+  xfree (tmpfilename);  tmpfilename = NULL;
+  xfree (bakfilename);  bakfilename = NULL;
+
+ leave:
+  if (tmpfp)
+    iobuf_cancel (tmpfp);
+  xfree (tmpfilename);  
+  xfree (bakfilename);  
+  release_kbnode (keyblock);
+  keyring_lock (hd, 0);
+  keyring_release (hd);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Perform insert/delete/update operation.
+ * mode 1 = insert
+ *	2 = delete
+ *	3 = update
+ */
+static int
+do_copy (int mode, const char *fname, KBNODE root, int secret,
+         off_t start_offset, unsigned int n_packets )
+{
+    IOBUF fp, newfp;
+    int rc=0;
+    char *bakfname = NULL;
+    char *tmpfname = NULL;
+
+    /* Open the source file. Because we do a rename, we have to check the 
+       permissions of the file */
+    if (access (fname, W_OK))
+      return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+
+    fp = iobuf_open (fname);
+    if (mode == 1 && !fp && errno == ENOENT) { 
+	/* insert mode but file does not exist: create a new file */
+	KBNODE kbctx, node;
+	mode_t oldmask;
+
+	oldmask=umask(077);
+        if (!secret && is_secured_filename (fname)) {
+            newfp = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+        }
+        else
+            newfp = iobuf_create (fname);
+	umask(oldmask);
+	if( !newfp )
+	  {
+	    log_error (_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno));
+	    return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	  }
+	if( !opt.quiet )
+	    log_info(_("%s: keyring created\n"), fname );
+
+	kbctx=NULL;
+	while ( (node = walk_kbnode( root, &kbctx, 0 )) ) {
+	    if( (rc = build_packet( newfp, node->pkt )) ) {
+		log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
+			    node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+		iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+		return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( iobuf_close(newfp) ) {
+	    log_error ("%s: close failed: %s\n", fname, strerror(errno));
+	    return G10ERR_CLOSE_FILE;
+	}
+	return 0; /* ready */
+    }
+
+    if( !fp )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    /* Create the new file.  */
+    rc = create_tmp_file (fname, &bakfname, &tmpfname, &newfp);
+    if (rc) {
+	iobuf_close(fp);
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if (secret)
+      register_secured_file (tmpfname);
+
+    if( mode == 1 ) { /* insert */
+	/* copy everything to the new file */
+	rc = copy_all_packets (fp, newfp);
+	if( rc != -1 ) {
+	    log_error("%s: copy to `%s' failed: %s\n",
+		      fname, tmpfname, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    iobuf_close(fp);
+            if (secret)
+              unregister_secured_file (tmpfname);
+	    iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    if( mode == 2 || mode == 3 ) { /* delete or update */
+	/* copy first part to the new file */
+	rc = copy_some_packets( fp, newfp, start_offset );
+	if( rc ) { /* should never get EOF here */
+	    log_error ("%s: copy to `%s' failed: %s\n",
+                       fname, tmpfname, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    iobuf_close(fp);
+            if (secret)
+              unregister_secured_file (tmpfname);
+	    iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	/* skip this keyblock */
+	assert( n_packets );
+	rc = skip_some_packets( fp, n_packets );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("%s: skipping %u packets failed: %s\n",
+			    fname, n_packets, g10_errstr(rc));
+	    iobuf_close(fp);
+            if (secret)
+              unregister_secured_file (tmpfname);
+	    iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( mode == 1 || mode == 3 ) { /* insert or update */
+        rc = write_keyblock (newfp, root);
+        if (rc) {
+          iobuf_close(fp);
+          if (secret)
+            unregister_secured_file (tmpfname);
+          iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+          goto leave;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if( mode == 2 || mode == 3 ) { /* delete or update */
+	/* copy the rest */
+	rc = copy_all_packets( fp, newfp );
+	if( rc != -1 ) {
+	    log_error("%s: copy to `%s' failed: %s\n",
+		      fname, tmpfname, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    iobuf_close(fp);
+            if (secret)
+              unregister_secured_file (tmpfname);
+	    iobuf_cancel(newfp);
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* close both files */
+    if( iobuf_close(fp) ) {
+	log_error("%s: close failed: %s\n", fname, strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_CLOSE_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( iobuf_close(newfp) ) {
+	log_error("%s: close failed: %s\n", tmpfname, strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_CLOSE_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    rc = rename_tmp_file (bakfname, tmpfname, fname, secret);
+
+  leave:
+    xfree(bakfname);
+    xfree(tmpfname);
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/keyring.h b/g10/keyring.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c4ea73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyring.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* keyring.h - Keyring operations
+ *	Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GPG_KEYRING_H
+#define GPG_KEYRING_H 1
+
+#include "global.h"
+
+typedef struct keyring_handle *KEYRING_HANDLE;
+
+int keyring_register_filename (const char *fname, int secret, void **ptr);
+int keyring_is_writable (void *token);
+
+KEYRING_HANDLE keyring_new (void *token, int secret);
+void keyring_release (KEYRING_HANDLE hd);
+const char *keyring_get_resource_name (KEYRING_HANDLE hd);
+int keyring_lock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, int yes);
+int keyring_get_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb);
+int keyring_update_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb);
+int keyring_insert_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE kb);
+int keyring_locate_writable (KEYRING_HANDLE hd);
+int keyring_delete_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd);
+int keyring_search_reset (KEYRING_HANDLE hd);
+int keyring_search (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+		    size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex);
+int keyring_rebuild_cache (void *token,int noisy);
+
+#endif /*GPG_KEYRING_H*/
diff --git a/g10/keyserver-internal.h b/g10/keyserver-internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a365986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyserver-internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* keyserver-internal.h - Keyserver internals
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYSERVER_INTERNAL_H_
+#define _KEYSERVER_INTERNAL_H_
+
+#include <time.h>
+#include "keyserver.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "types.h"
+
+int parse_keyserver_options(char *options);
+void free_keyserver_spec(struct keyserver_spec *keyserver);
+struct keyserver_spec *keyserver_match(struct keyserver_spec *spec);
+struct keyserver_spec *parse_keyserver_uri(const char *string,
+					   int require_scheme,
+					   const char *configname,
+					   unsigned int configlineno);
+struct keyserver_spec *parse_preferred_keyserver(PKT_signature *sig);
+int keyserver_export(STRLIST users);
+int keyserver_import(STRLIST users);
+int keyserver_import_fprint(const byte *fprint,size_t fprint_len,
+			    struct keyserver_spec *keyserver);
+int keyserver_import_keyid(u32 *keyid,struct keyserver_spec *keyserver);
+int keyserver_refresh(STRLIST users);
+int keyserver_search(STRLIST tokens);
+int keyserver_fetch(STRLIST urilist);
+int keyserver_import_cert(const char *name,
+			  unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len);
+int keyserver_import_pka(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len);
+int keyserver_import_name(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+			  struct keyserver_spec *keyserver);
+int keyserver_import_ldap(const char *name,
+			  unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len);
+
+#endif /* !_KEYSERVER_INTERNAL_H_ */
diff --git a/g10/keyserver.c b/g10/keyserver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f69245
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/keyserver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2132 @@
+/* keyserver.c - generic keyserver code
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "exec.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+struct keyrec
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  u32 createtime,expiretime;
+  int size,flags;
+  byte type;
+  IOBUF uidbuf;
+  unsigned int lines;
+};
+
+enum ks_action {KS_UNKNOWN=0,KS_GET,KS_GETNAME,KS_SEND,KS_SEARCH};
+
+static struct parse_options keyserver_opts[]=
+  {
+    /* some of these options are not real - just for the help
+       message */
+    {"max-cert-size",0,NULL,NULL},
+    {"include-revoked",0,NULL,N_("include revoked keys in search results")},
+    {"include-subkeys",0,NULL,N_("include subkeys when searching by key ID")},
+    {"use-temp-files",0,NULL,
+     N_("use temporary files to pass data to keyserver helpers")},
+    {"keep-temp-files",KEYSERVER_KEEP_TEMP_FILES,NULL,
+     N_("do not delete temporary files after using them")},
+    {"refresh-add-fake-v3-keyids",KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3,NULL,
+     NULL},
+    {"auto-key-retrieve",KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE,NULL,
+     N_("automatically retrieve keys when verifying signatures")},
+    {"honor-keyserver-url",KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL,NULL,
+     N_("honor the preferred keyserver URL set on the key")},
+    {"honor-pka-record",KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD,NULL,
+     N_("honor the PKA record set on a key when retrieving keys")},
+    {NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
+  };
+
+static int keyserver_work(enum ks_action action,STRLIST list,
+			  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,int count,
+			  unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+			  struct keyserver_spec *keyserver);
+
+/* Reasonable guess */
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_CERT_SIZE 16384
+
+static size_t max_cert_size=DEFAULT_MAX_CERT_SIZE;
+
+static void
+add_canonical_option(char *option,STRLIST *list)
+{
+  char *arg=argsplit(option);
+
+  if(arg)
+    {
+      char *joined;
+
+      joined=xmalloc(strlen(option)+1+strlen(arg)+1);
+      /* Make a canonical name=value form with no spaces */
+      strcpy(joined,option);
+      strcat(joined,"=");
+      strcat(joined,arg);
+      append_to_strlist(list,joined);
+      xfree(joined);
+    }
+  else
+    append_to_strlist(list,option);
+}
+
+int
+parse_keyserver_options(char *options)
+{
+  int ret=1;
+  char *tok;
+  char *max_cert=NULL;
+
+  keyserver_opts[0].value=&max_cert;
+
+  while((tok=optsep(&options)))
+    {
+      if(tok[0]=='\0')
+	continue;
+
+      /* For backwards compatibility.  1.2.x used honor-http-proxy and
+	 there are a good number of documents published that recommend
+	 it. */
+      if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"honor-http-proxy")==0)
+	tok="http-proxy";
+      else if(ascii_strcasecmp(tok,"no-honor-http-proxy")==0)
+	tok="no-http-proxy";
+
+      /* We accept quite a few possible options here - some options to
+	 handle specially, the keyserver_options list, and import and
+	 export options that pertain to keyserver operations.  Note
+	 that you must use strncasecmp here as there might be an
+	 =argument attached which will foil the use of strcasecmp. */
+
+#ifdef EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
+      if(ascii_strncasecmp(tok,"use-temp-files",14)==0 ||
+	      ascii_strncasecmp(tok,"no-use-temp-files",17)==0)
+	log_info(_("WARNING: keyserver option `%s' is not used"
+		   " on this platform\n"),tok);
+#else
+      if(ascii_strncasecmp(tok,"use-temp-files",14)==0)
+	opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES;
+      else if(ascii_strncasecmp(tok,"no-use-temp-files",17)==0)
+	opt.keyserver_options.options&=~KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES;
+#endif
+      else if(!parse_options(tok,&opt.keyserver_options.options,
+			     keyserver_opts,0)
+	 && !parse_import_options(tok,
+				  &opt.keyserver_options.import_options,0)
+	 && !parse_export_options(tok,
+				  &opt.keyserver_options.export_options,0))
+	{
+	  /* All of the standard options have failed, so the option is
+	     destined for a keyserver plugin. */
+	  add_canonical_option(tok,&opt.keyserver_options.other);
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(max_cert)
+    {
+      max_cert_size=strtoul(max_cert,(char **)NULL,10);
+
+      if(max_cert_size==0)
+	max_cert_size=DEFAULT_MAX_CERT_SIZE;
+    }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void
+free_keyserver_spec(struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  xfree(keyserver->uri);
+  xfree(keyserver->scheme);
+  xfree(keyserver->auth);
+  xfree(keyserver->host);
+  xfree(keyserver->port);
+  xfree(keyserver->path);
+  xfree(keyserver->opaque);
+  free_strlist(keyserver->options);
+  xfree(keyserver);
+}
+
+/* Return 0 for match */
+static int
+cmp_keyserver_spec(struct keyserver_spec *one,struct keyserver_spec *two)
+{
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(one->scheme,two->scheme)==0)
+    {
+      if(one->host && two->host && ascii_strcasecmp(one->host,two->host)==0)
+	{
+	  if((one->port && two->port
+	      && ascii_strcasecmp(one->port,two->port)==0)
+	     || (!one->port && !two->port))
+	    return 0;
+	}
+      else if(one->opaque && two->opaque
+	      && ascii_strcasecmp(one->opaque,two->opaque)==0)
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Try and match one of our keyservers.  If we can, return that.  If
+   we can't, return our input. */
+struct keyserver_spec *
+keyserver_match(struct keyserver_spec *spec)
+{
+  struct keyserver_spec *ks;
+
+  for(ks=opt.keyserver;ks;ks=ks->next)
+    if(cmp_keyserver_spec(spec,ks)==0)
+      return ks;
+
+  return spec;
+}
+
+/* TODO: once we cut over to an all-curl world, we don't need this
+   parser any longer so it can be removed, or at least moved to
+   keyserver/ksutil.c for limited use in gpgkeys_ldap or the like. */
+
+struct keyserver_spec *
+parse_keyserver_uri(const char *string,int require_scheme,
+		    const char *configname,unsigned int configlineno)
+{
+  int assume_hkp=0;
+  struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
+  const char *idx;
+  int count;
+  char *uri,*options;
+
+  assert(string!=NULL);
+
+  keyserver=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(struct keyserver_spec));
+
+  uri=xstrdup(string);
+
+  options=strchr(uri,' ');
+  if(options)
+    {
+      char *tok;
+
+      *options='\0';
+      options++;
+
+      while((tok=optsep(&options)))
+	add_canonical_option(tok,&keyserver->options);
+    }
+
+  /* Get the scheme */
+
+  for(idx=uri,count=0;*idx && *idx!=':';idx++)
+    {
+      count++;
+
+      /* Do we see the start of an RFC-2732 ipv6 address here?  If so,
+	 there clearly isn't a scheme so get out early. */
+      if(*idx=='[')
+	{
+	  /* Was the '[' the first thing in the string?  If not, we
+	     have a mangled scheme with a [ in it so fail. */
+	  if(count==1)
+	    break;
+	  else
+	    goto fail;
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(count==0)
+    goto fail;
+
+  if(*idx=='\0' || *idx=='[')
+    {
+      if(require_scheme)
+	return NULL;
+
+      /* Assume HKP if there is no scheme */
+      assume_hkp=1;
+      keyserver->scheme=xstrdup("hkp");
+
+      keyserver->uri=xmalloc(strlen(keyserver->scheme)+3+strlen(uri)+1);
+      strcpy(keyserver->uri,keyserver->scheme);
+      strcat(keyserver->uri,"://");
+      strcat(keyserver->uri,uri);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      int i;
+
+      keyserver->uri=xstrdup(uri);
+
+      keyserver->scheme=xmalloc(count+1);
+
+      /* Force to lowercase */
+      for(i=0;i<count;i++)
+	keyserver->scheme[i]=ascii_tolower(uri[i]);
+
+      keyserver->scheme[i]='\0';
+
+      /* Skip past the scheme and colon */
+      uri+=count+1;
+    }
+
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(keyserver->scheme,"x-broken-hkp")==0)
+    {
+      deprecated_warning(configname,configlineno,"x-broken-hkp",
+			 "--keyserver-options ","broken-http-proxy");
+      xfree(keyserver->scheme);
+      keyserver->scheme=xstrdup("hkp");
+      append_to_strlist(&opt.keyserver_options.other,"broken-http-proxy");
+    }
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(keyserver->scheme,"x-hkp")==0)
+    {
+      /* Canonicalize this to "hkp" so it works with both the internal
+	 and external keyserver interface. */
+      xfree(keyserver->scheme);
+      keyserver->scheme=xstrdup("hkp");
+    }
+
+  if(assume_hkp || (uri[0]=='/' && uri[1]=='/'))
+    {
+      /* Two slashes means network path. */
+
+      /* Skip over the "//", if any */
+      if(!assume_hkp)
+	uri+=2;
+
+      /* Do we have userinfo auth data present? */
+      for(idx=uri,count=0;*idx && *idx!='@' && *idx!='/';idx++)
+	count++;
+
+      /* We found a @ before the slash, so that means everything
+	 before the @ is auth data. */
+      if(*idx=='@')
+	{
+	  if(count==0)
+	    goto fail;
+
+	  keyserver->auth=xmalloc(count+1);
+	  strncpy(keyserver->auth,uri,count);
+	  keyserver->auth[count]='\0';
+	  uri+=count+1;
+	}
+
+      /* Is it an RFC-2732 ipv6 [literal address] ? */
+      if(*uri=='[')
+	{
+	  for(idx=uri+1,count=1;*idx
+		&& ((isascii (*idx) && isxdigit(*idx))
+                    || *idx==':' || *idx=='.');idx++)
+	    count++;
+
+	  /* Is the ipv6 literal address terminated? */
+	  if(*idx==']')
+	    count++;
+	  else
+	    goto fail;
+	}
+      else
+	for(idx=uri,count=0;*idx && *idx!=':' && *idx!='/';idx++)
+	  count++;
+
+      if(count==0)
+	goto fail;
+
+      keyserver->host=xmalloc(count+1);
+      strncpy(keyserver->host,uri,count);
+      keyserver->host[count]='\0';
+
+      /* Skip past the host */
+      uri+=count;
+
+      if(*uri==':')
+	{
+	  /* It would seem to be reasonable to limit the range of the
+	     ports to values between 1-65535, but RFC 1738 and 1808
+	     imply there is no limit.  Of course, the real world has
+	     limits. */
+
+	  for(idx=uri+1,count=0;*idx && *idx!='/';idx++)
+	    {
+	      count++;
+
+	      /* Ports are digits only */
+	      if(!digitp(idx))
+		goto fail;
+	    }
+
+	  keyserver->port=xmalloc(count+1);
+	  strncpy(keyserver->port,uri+1,count);
+	  keyserver->port[count]='\0';
+
+	  /* Skip past the colon and port number */
+	  uri+=1+count;
+	}
+
+      /* Everything else is the path */
+      if(*uri)
+	keyserver->path=xstrdup(uri);
+      else
+	keyserver->path=xstrdup("/");
+
+      if(keyserver->path[1])
+	keyserver->flags.direct_uri=1;
+    }
+  else if(uri[0]!='/')
+    {
+      /* No slash means opaque.  Just record the opaque blob and get
+	 out. */
+      keyserver->opaque=xstrdup(uri);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* One slash means absolute path.  We don't need to support that
+	 yet. */
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  return keyserver;
+
+ fail:
+  free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+struct keyserver_spec *
+parse_preferred_keyserver(PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  struct keyserver_spec *spec=NULL;
+  const byte *p;
+  size_t plen;
+
+  p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&plen);
+  if(p && plen)
+    {
+      byte *dupe=xmalloc(plen+1);
+
+      memcpy(dupe,p,plen);
+      dupe[plen]='\0';
+      spec=parse_keyserver_uri(dupe,1,NULL,0);
+      xfree(dupe);
+    }
+
+  return spec;
+}
+
+static void
+print_keyrec(int number,struct keyrec *keyrec)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  iobuf_writebyte(keyrec->uidbuf,0);
+  iobuf_flush_temp(keyrec->uidbuf);
+  printf("(%d)\t%s  ",number,iobuf_get_temp_buffer(keyrec->uidbuf));
+
+  if(keyrec->size>0)
+    printf("%d bit ",keyrec->size);
+
+  if(keyrec->type)
+    {
+      const char *str=pubkey_algo_to_string(keyrec->type);
+
+      if(str)
+	printf("%s ",str);
+      else
+	printf("unknown ");
+    }
+
+  switch(keyrec->desc.mode)
+    {
+      /* If the keyserver helper gave us a short keyid, we have no
+	 choice but to use it.  Do check --keyid-format to add a 0x if
+	 needed. */
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
+      printf("key %s%08lX",
+	     (opt.keyid_format==KF_0xSHORT
+	      || opt.keyid_format==KF_0xLONG)?"0x":"",
+	     (ulong)keyrec->desc.u.kid[1]);
+      break;
+
+      /* However, if it gave us a long keyid, we can honor
+	 --keyid-format */
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
+      printf("key %s",keystr(keyrec->desc.u.kid));
+      break;
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
+      printf("key ");
+      for(i=0;i<16;i++)
+	printf("%02X",keyrec->desc.u.fpr[i]);
+      break;
+
+    case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
+      printf("key ");
+      for(i=0;i<20;i++)
+	printf("%02X",keyrec->desc.u.fpr[i]);
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      BUG();
+      break;
+    }
+
+  if(keyrec->createtime>0)
+    {
+      printf(", ");
+      printf(_("created: %s"),strtimestamp(keyrec->createtime));
+    }
+
+  if(keyrec->expiretime>0)
+    {
+      printf(", ");
+      printf(_("expires: %s"),strtimestamp(keyrec->expiretime));
+    }
+
+  if(keyrec->flags&1)
+    printf(" (%s)",_("revoked"));
+  if(keyrec->flags&2)
+    printf(" (%s)",_("disabled"));
+  if(keyrec->flags&4)
+    printf(" (%s)",_("expired"));
+
+  printf("\n");
+}
+
+/* Returns a keyrec (which must be freed) once a key is complete, and
+   NULL otherwise.  Call with a NULL keystring once key parsing is
+   complete to return any unfinished keys. */
+static struct keyrec *
+parse_keyrec(char *keystring)
+{
+  static struct keyrec *work=NULL;
+  struct keyrec *ret=NULL;
+  char *record;
+  int i;
+
+  if(keystring==NULL)
+    {
+      if(work==NULL)
+	return NULL;
+      else if(work->desc.mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE)
+	{
+	  xfree(work);
+	  return NULL;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  ret=work;
+	  work=NULL;
+	  return ret;
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(work==NULL)
+    {
+      work=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(struct keyrec));
+      work->uidbuf=iobuf_temp();
+    }
+
+  /* Remove trailing whitespace */
+  for(i=strlen(keystring);i>0;i--)
+    if(ascii_isspace(keystring[i-1]))
+      keystring[i-1]='\0';
+    else
+      break;
+
+  if((record=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+    return ret;
+
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp("pub",record)==0)
+    {
+      char *tok;
+
+      if(work->desc.mode)
+	{
+	  ret=work;
+	  work=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(struct keyrec));
+	  work->uidbuf=iobuf_temp();
+	}
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      classify_user_id(tok,&work->desc);
+      if(work->desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
+	 && work->desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
+	 && work->desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+	 && work->desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20)
+	{
+	  work->desc.mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE;
+	  return ret;
+	}
+
+      /* Note all items after this are optional.  This allows us to
+         have a pub line as simple as pub:keyid and nothing else. */
+
+      work->lines++;
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      work->type=atoi(tok);
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      work->size=atoi(tok);
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      if(atoi(tok)<=0)
+	work->createtime=0;
+      else
+	work->createtime=atoi(tok);
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      if(atoi(tok)<=0)
+	work->expiretime=0;
+      else
+	{
+	  work->expiretime=atoi(tok);
+	  /* Force the 'e' flag on if this key is expired. */
+	  if(work->expiretime<=make_timestamp())
+	    work->flags|=4;
+	}
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      while(*tok)
+	switch(*tok++)
+	  {
+	  case 'r':
+	  case 'R':
+	    work->flags|=1;
+	    break;
+	    
+	  case 'd':
+	  case 'D':
+	    work->flags|=2;
+	    break;
+
+	  case 'e':
+	  case 'E':
+	    work->flags|=4;
+	    break;
+	  }
+    }
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp("uid",record)==0 && work->desc.mode)
+    {
+      char *userid,*tok,*decoded;
+
+      if((tok=strsep(&keystring,":"))==NULL)
+	return ret;
+
+      if(strlen(tok)==0)
+	return ret;
+
+      userid=tok;
+
+      /* By definition, de-%-encoding is always smaller than the
+         original string so we can decode in place. */
+
+      i=0;
+
+      while(*tok)
+	if(tok[0]=='%' && tok[1] && tok[2])
+	  {
+	    if((userid[i]=hextobyte(&tok[1]))==-1)
+	      userid[i]='?';
+
+	    i++;
+	    tok+=3;
+	  }
+	else
+	  userid[i++]=*tok++;
+
+      /* We don't care about the other info provided in the uid: line
+         since no keyserver supports marking userids with timestamps
+         or revoked/expired/disabled yet. */
+
+      /* No need to check for control characters, as utf8_to_native
+	 does this for us. */
+
+      decoded=utf8_to_native(userid,i,0);
+      if(strlen(decoded)>opt.screen_columns-10)
+	decoded[opt.screen_columns-10]='\0';
+      iobuf_writestr(work->uidbuf,decoded);
+      xfree(decoded);
+      iobuf_writestr(work->uidbuf,"\n\t");
+      work->lines++;
+    }
+
+  /* Ignore any records other than "pri" and "uid" for easy future
+     growth. */
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* TODO: do this as a list sent to keyserver_work rather than calling
+   it once for each key to get the correct counts after the import
+   (cosmetics, really) and to better take advantage of the keyservers
+   that can do multiple fetches in one go (LDAP). */
+static int
+show_prompt(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,int numdesc,int count,const char *search)
+{
+  char *answer;
+
+  if(count && opt.command_fd==-1)
+    {
+      static int from=1;
+      tty_printf("Keys %d-%d of %d for \"%s\".  ",from,numdesc,count,search);
+      from=numdesc+1;
+    }
+
+  answer=cpr_get_no_help("keysearch.prompt",
+			 _("Enter number(s), N)ext, or Q)uit > "));
+  /* control-d */
+  if(answer[0]=='\x04')
+    {
+      printf("Q\n");
+      answer[0]='q';
+    }
+
+  if(answer[0]=='q' || answer[0]=='Q')
+    {
+      xfree(answer);
+      return 1;
+    }
+  else if(atoi(answer)>=1 && atoi(answer)<=numdesc)
+    {
+      char *split=answer,*num;
+
+      while((num=strsep(&split," ,"))!=NULL)
+	if(atoi(num)>=1 && atoi(num)<=numdesc)
+	  keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,&desc[atoi(num)-1],1,
+			 NULL,NULL,opt.keyserver);
+
+      xfree(answer);
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Count and searchstr are just for cosmetics.  If the count is too
+   small, it will grow safely.  If negative it disables the "Key x-y
+   of z" messages.  searchstr should be UTF-8 (rather than native). */
+static void
+keyserver_search_prompt(IOBUF buffer,const char *searchstr)
+{
+  int i=0,validcount=0,started=0,header=0,count=1;
+  unsigned int maxlen,buflen,numlines=0;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc;
+  byte *line=NULL;
+  char *localstr=NULL;
+
+  if(searchstr)
+    localstr=utf8_to_native(searchstr,strlen(searchstr),0);
+
+  desc=xmalloc(count*sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC));
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      struct keyrec *keyrec;
+      int rl;
+
+      maxlen=1024;
+      rl=iobuf_read_line(buffer,&line,&buflen,&maxlen);
+
+      if(opt.with_colons)
+	{
+	  if(!header && ascii_strncasecmp("SEARCH ",line,7)==0
+	     && ascii_strncasecmp(" BEGIN",&line[strlen(line)-7],6)==0)
+	    {
+	      header=1;
+	      continue;
+	    }
+	  else if(ascii_strncasecmp("SEARCH ",line,7)==0
+		  && ascii_strncasecmp(" END",&line[strlen(line)-5],4)==0)
+	    continue;
+
+	  printf("%s",line);
+	}
+
+      /* Look for an info: line.  The only current info: values
+	 defined are the version and key count. */
+      if(!started && rl>0 && ascii_strncasecmp("info:",line,5)==0)
+	{
+	  char *tok,*str=&line[5];
+
+	  if((tok=strsep(&str,":"))!=NULL)
+	    {
+	      int version;
+
+	      if(sscanf(tok,"%d",&version)!=1)
+		version=1;
+
+	      if(version!=1)
+		{
+		  log_error(_("invalid keyserver protocol "
+			      "(us %d!=handler %d)\n"),1,version);
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  if((tok=strsep(&str,":"))!=NULL && sscanf(tok,"%d",&count)==1)
+	    {
+	      if(count==0)
+		goto notfound;
+	      else if(count<0)
+		count=10;
+	      else
+		validcount=1;
+
+	      desc=xrealloc(desc,count*sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC));
+	    }
+
+	  started=1;
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      if(rl==0)
+	{
+	  keyrec=parse_keyrec(NULL);
+
+	  if(keyrec==NULL)
+	    {
+	      if(i==0)
+		{
+		  count=0;
+		  break;
+		}
+
+	      if(i!=count)
+		validcount=0;
+
+	      for(;;)
+		{
+		  if(show_prompt(desc,i,validcount?count:0,localstr))
+		    break;
+		  validcount=0;
+		}
+
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	keyrec=parse_keyrec(line);
+
+      if(i==count)
+	{
+	  /* keyserver helper sent more keys than they claimed in the
+	     info: line. */
+	  count+=10;
+	  desc=xrealloc(desc,count*sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC));
+	  validcount=0;
+	}
+
+      if(keyrec)
+	{
+	  desc[i]=keyrec->desc;
+
+	  if(!opt.with_colons)
+	    {
+	      /* screen_lines - 1 for the prompt. */
+	      if(numlines+keyrec->lines>opt.screen_lines-1)
+		{
+		  if(show_prompt(desc,i,validcount?count:0,localstr))
+		    break;
+		  else
+		    numlines=0;
+		}
+
+	      print_keyrec(i+1,keyrec);
+	    }
+
+	  numlines+=keyrec->lines;
+	  iobuf_close(keyrec->uidbuf);
+	  xfree(keyrec);
+
+	  started=1;
+	  i++;
+	}
+    }
+
+ notfound:
+  /* Leave this commented out or now, and perhaps for a very long
+     time.  All HKPish servers return HTML error messages for
+     no-key-found. */
+  /* 
+     if(!started)
+     log_info(_("keyserver does not support searching\n"));
+     else
+  */
+  if(count==0)
+    {
+      if(localstr)
+	log_info(_("key \"%s\" not found on keyserver\n"),localstr);
+      else
+	log_info(_("key not found on keyserver\n"));
+    }
+
+  xfree(localstr);
+  xfree(desc);
+  xfree(line);
+}
+
+/* We sometimes want to use a different gpgkeys_xxx for a given
+   protocol (for example, ldaps is handled by gpgkeys_ldap).  Map
+   these here. */
+static const char *
+keyserver_typemap(const char *type)
+{
+  if(strcmp(type,"ldaps")==0)
+    return "ldap";
+  else
+    return type;
+}
+
+/* The PGP LDAP and the curl fetch-a-LDAP-object methodologies are
+   sufficiently different that we can't use curl to do LDAP. */
+static int
+direct_uri_map(const char *scheme,unsigned int is_direct)
+{
+  if(is_direct && strcmp(scheme,"ldap")==0)
+    return 1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+#define GPGKEYS_PREFIX "gpgkeys_"
+#define GPGKEYS_CURL GPGKEYS_PREFIX "curl" EXEEXT
+#define GPGKEYS_PREFIX_LEN (strlen(GPGKEYS_CURL))
+#define KEYSERVER_ARGS_KEEP " -o \"%O\" \"%I\""
+#define KEYSERVER_ARGS_NOKEEP " -o \"%o\" \"%i\""
+
+static int 
+keyserver_spawn(enum ks_action action,STRLIST list,KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+		int count,int *prog,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+		struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  int ret=0,i,gotversion=0,outofband=0;
+  STRLIST temp;
+  unsigned int maxlen,buflen;
+  char *command,*end,*searchstr=NULL;
+  byte *line=NULL;
+  struct exec_info *spawn;
+  const char *scheme;
+  const char *libexecdir = get_libexecdir ();
+
+  assert(keyserver);
+
+#ifdef EXEC_TEMPFILE_ONLY
+  opt.keyserver_options.options|=KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES;
+#endif
+
+  /* Build the filename for the helper to execute */
+  scheme=keyserver_typemap(keyserver->scheme);
+
+#ifdef DISABLE_KEYSERVER_PATH
+  /* Destroy any path we might have.  This is a little tricky,
+     portability-wise.  It's not correct to delete the PATH
+     environment variable, as that may fall back to a system built-in
+     PATH.  Similarly, it is not correct to set PATH to the null
+     string (PATH="") since this actually deletes the PATH environment
+     variable under MinGW.  The safest thing to do here is to force
+     PATH to be GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR.  All this is not that meaningful on
+     Unix-like systems (since we're going to give a full path to
+     gpgkeys_foo), but on W32 it prevents loading any DLLs from
+     directories in %PATH%.
+
+     After some more thinking about this we came to the conclusion
+     that it is better to load the helpers from the directory where
+     the program of this process lives.  Fortunately Windows provides
+     a way to retrieve this and our get_libexecdir function has been
+     modified to return just this.  Setting the exec-path is not
+     anymore required.  
+       set_exec_path(libexecdir);
+ */
+#else
+  if(opt.exec_path_set)
+    {
+      /* If exec-path was set, and DISABLE_KEYSERVER_PATH is
+	 undefined, then don't specify a full path to gpgkeys_foo, so
+	 that the PATH can work. */
+      command=xmalloc(GPGKEYS_PREFIX_LEN+strlen(scheme)+3+strlen(EXEEXT)+1);
+      command[0]='\0';
+    }
+  else
+#endif
+    {
+      /* Specify a full path to gpgkeys_foo. */
+      command=xmalloc(strlen(libexecdir)+strlen(DIRSEP_S)+
+		      GPGKEYS_PREFIX_LEN+strlen(scheme)+3+strlen(EXEEXT)+1);
+      strcpy(command,libexecdir);
+      strcat(command,DIRSEP_S);
+    }
+
+  end=command+strlen(command);
+
+  /* Build a path for the keyserver helper.  If it is direct_uri
+     (i.e. an object fetch and not a keyserver), then add "_uri" to
+     the end to distinguish the keyserver helper from an object
+     fetcher that can speak that protocol (this is a problem for
+     LDAP). */
+
+  strcat(command,GPGKEYS_PREFIX); 
+  strcat(command,scheme);
+
+  /* This "_uri" thing is in case we need to call a direct handler
+     instead of the keyserver handler.  This lets us use gpgkeys_curl
+     or gpgkeys_ldap_uri (we don't provide it, but a user might)
+     instead of gpgkeys_ldap to fetch things like
+     ldap://keyserver.pgp.com/o=PGP%20keys?pgpkey?sub?pgpkeyid=99242560 */
+
+  if(direct_uri_map(scheme,keyserver->flags.direct_uri))
+    strcat(command,"_uri");
+
+  strcat(command,EXEEXT);
+
+  /* Can we execute it?  If not, try curl as our catchall. */
+  if(path_access(command,X_OK)!=0)
+    strcpy(end,GPGKEYS_CURL);
+
+  if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES)
+    {
+      if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_KEEP_TEMP_FILES)
+	{
+	  command=xrealloc(command,strlen(command)+
+			    strlen(KEYSERVER_ARGS_KEEP)+1);
+	  strcat(command,KEYSERVER_ARGS_KEEP);
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  command=xrealloc(command,strlen(command)+
+			    strlen(KEYSERVER_ARGS_NOKEEP)+1);
+	  strcat(command,KEYSERVER_ARGS_NOKEEP);  
+	}
+
+      ret=exec_write(&spawn,NULL,command,NULL,0,0);
+    }
+  else
+    ret=exec_write(&spawn,command,NULL,NULL,0,0);
+
+  xfree(command);
+
+  if(ret)
+    return ret;
+
+  fprintf(spawn->tochild,
+	  "# This is a GnuPG %s keyserver communications file\n",VERSION);
+  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"VERSION %d\n",KEYSERVER_PROTO_VERSION);
+  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"PROGRAM %s\n",VERSION);
+  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"SCHEME %s\n",keyserver->scheme);
+
+  if(keyserver->opaque)
+    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"OPAQUE %s\n",keyserver->opaque);
+  else
+    {
+      if(keyserver->auth)
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"AUTH %s\n",keyserver->auth);
+
+      if(keyserver->host)
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"HOST %s\n",keyserver->host);
+
+      if(keyserver->port)
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"PORT %s\n",keyserver->port);
+
+      if(keyserver->path)
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"PATH %s\n",keyserver->path);
+    }
+
+  /* Write global options */
+
+  for(temp=opt.keyserver_options.other;temp;temp=temp->next)
+    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"OPTION %s\n",temp->d);
+
+  /* Write per-keyserver options */
+
+  for(temp=keyserver->options;temp;temp=temp->next)
+    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"OPTION %s\n",temp->d);
+
+  switch(action)
+    {
+    case KS_GET:
+      {
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"COMMAND GET\n\n");
+
+	/* Which keys do we want? */
+
+	for(i=0;i<count;i++)
+	  {
+	    int quiet=0;
+
+	    if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20)
+	      {
+		int f;
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"0x");
+
+		for(f=0;f<MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;f++)
+		  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%02X",desc[i].u.fpr[f]);
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+	      }
+	    else if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16)
+	      {
+		int f;
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"0x");
+
+		for(f=0;f<16;f++)
+		  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%02X",desc[i].u.fpr[f]);
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+	      }
+	    else if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
+	      fprintf(spawn->tochild,"0x%08lX%08lX\n",
+		      (ulong)desc[i].u.kid[0],
+		      (ulong)desc[i].u.kid[1]);
+	    else if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID)
+	      fprintf(spawn->tochild,"0x%08lX\n",
+		      (ulong)desc[i].u.kid[1]);
+	    else if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT)
+	      {
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"0x0000000000000000\n");
+		quiet=1;
+	      }
+	    else if(desc[i].mode==KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE)
+	      continue;
+	    else
+	      BUG();
+
+	    if(!quiet)
+	      {
+		if(keyserver->host)
+		  log_info(_("requesting key %s from %s server %s\n"),
+			   keystr_from_desc(&desc[i]),
+			   keyserver->scheme,keyserver->host);
+		else
+		  log_info(_("requesting key %s from %s\n"),
+			   keystr_from_desc(&desc[i]),keyserver->uri);
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+
+	break;
+      }
+
+    case KS_GETNAME:
+      {
+	STRLIST key;
+
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"COMMAND GETNAME\n\n");
+
+	/* Which names do we want? */
+
+	for(key=list;key!=NULL;key=key->next)
+	  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%s\n",key->d);
+
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+
+	if(keyserver->host)
+	  log_info(_("searching for names from %s server %s\n"),
+		   keyserver->scheme,keyserver->host);
+	else
+	  log_info(_("searching for names from %s\n"),keyserver->uri);
+
+	break;
+      }
+
+    case KS_SEND:
+      {
+	STRLIST key;
+
+	/* Note the extra \n here to send an empty keylist block */
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"COMMAND SEND\n\n\n");
+
+	for(key=list;key!=NULL;key=key->next)
+	  {
+	    armor_filter_context_t *afx;
+	    IOBUF buffer=iobuf_temp();
+	    KBNODE block;
+
+	    temp=NULL;
+	    add_to_strlist(&temp,key->d);
+
+	    afx = new_armor_context ();
+	    afx->what = 1;
+	    /* Tell the armor filter to use Unix-style \n line
+	       endings, since we're going to fprintf this to a file
+	       that (on Win32) is open in text mode.  The win32 stdio
+	       will transform the \n to \r\n and we'll end up with the
+	       proper line endings on win32.  This is a no-op on
+	       Unix. */
+	    afx->eol[0]='\n';
+	    push_armor_filter (afx, buffer);
+            release_armor_context (afx);
+
+	    /* TODO: Remove Comment: lines from keys exported this
+	       way? */
+
+	    if(export_pubkeys_stream(buffer,temp,&block,
+				     opt.keyserver_options.export_options)==-1)
+	      iobuf_close(buffer);
+	    else
+	      {
+		KBNODE node;
+
+		iobuf_flush_temp(buffer);
+
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig(block);
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"INFO %08lX%08lX BEGIN\n",
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[0],
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[1]);
+
+		for(node=block;node;node=node->next)
+		  {
+		    switch(node->pkt->pkttype)
+		      {
+		      default:
+			continue;
+
+		      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+			{
+			  PKT_public_key *pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+			  keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%sb:%08lX%08lX:%u:%u:%u:%u:",
+				  node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY?"pu":"su",
+				  (ulong)pk->keyid[0],(ulong)pk->keyid[1],
+				  pk->pubkey_algo,
+				  nbits_from_pk(pk),
+				  pk->timestamp,
+				  pk->expiredate);
+
+			  if(pk->is_revoked)
+			    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"r");
+			  if(pk->has_expired)
+			    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"e");
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+			}
+			break;
+
+		      case PKT_USER_ID:
+			{
+			  PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+			  int r;
+
+			  if(uid->attrib_data)
+			    continue;
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"uid:");
+
+			  /* Quote ':', '%', and any 8-bit
+			     characters */
+			  for(r=0;r<uid->len;r++)
+			    {
+			      if(uid->name[r]==':' || uid->name[r]=='%'
+				 || uid->name[r]&0x80)
+				fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%%%02X",
+					(byte)uid->name[r]);
+			      else
+				fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%c",uid->name[r]);
+			    }
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,":%u:%u:",
+				  uid->created,uid->expiredate);
+
+			  if(uid->is_revoked)
+			    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"r");
+			  if(uid->is_expired)
+			    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"e");
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+			}
+			break;
+
+			/* This bit is really for the benefit of
+			   people who store their keys in LDAP
+			   servers.  It makes it easy to do queries
+			   for things like "all keys signed by
+			   Isabella". */
+		      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+			{
+			  PKT_signature *sig=node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+			  if(!IS_UID_SIG(sig))
+			    continue;
+
+			  fprintf(spawn->tochild,"sig:%08lX%08lX:%X:%u:%u\n",
+				  (ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+				  sig->sig_class,sig->timestamp,
+				  sig->expiredate);
+			}
+			break;
+		      }
+		  }
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"INFO %08lX%08lX END\n",
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[0],
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[1]);
+
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"KEY %08lX%08lX BEGIN\n",
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[0],
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[1]);
+		fwrite(iobuf_get_temp_buffer(buffer),
+		       iobuf_get_temp_length(buffer),1,spawn->tochild);
+		fprintf(spawn->tochild,"KEY %08lX%08lX END\n",
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[0],
+			(ulong)block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid[1]);
+
+		iobuf_close(buffer);
+
+		if(keyserver->host)
+		  log_info(_("sending key %s to %s server %s\n"),
+			   keystr(block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid),
+			   keyserver->scheme,keyserver->host);
+		else
+		  log_info(_("sending key %s to %s\n"),
+			   keystr(block->pkt->pkt.public_key->keyid),
+			   keyserver->uri);
+
+		release_kbnode(block);
+	      }
+
+	    free_strlist(temp);
+	  }
+
+	break;
+      }
+
+    case KS_SEARCH:
+      {
+	STRLIST key;
+
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"COMMAND SEARCH\n\n");
+
+	/* Which keys do we want?  Remember that the gpgkeys_ program
+           is going to lump these together into a search string. */
+
+	for(key=list;key!=NULL;key=key->next)
+	  {
+	    fprintf(spawn->tochild,"%s\n",key->d);
+	    if(key!=list)
+	      {
+		searchstr=xrealloc(searchstr,
+				    strlen(searchstr)+strlen(key->d)+2);
+		strcat(searchstr," ");
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		searchstr=xmalloc(strlen(key->d)+1);
+		searchstr[0]='\0';
+	      }
+
+	    strcat(searchstr,key->d);
+	  }
+
+	fprintf(spawn->tochild,"\n");
+
+	if(keyserver->host)
+	  log_info(_("searching for \"%s\" from %s server %s\n"),
+		   searchstr,keyserver->scheme,keyserver->host);
+	else
+	  log_info(_("searching for \"%s\" from %s\n"),
+		   searchstr,keyserver->uri);
+
+	break;
+      }
+
+    default:
+      log_fatal(_("no keyserver action!\n"));
+      break;
+    }
+
+  /* Done sending, so start reading. */
+  ret=exec_read(spawn);
+  if(ret)
+    goto fail;
+
+  /* Now handle the response */
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      int plen;
+      char *ptr;
+
+      maxlen=1024;
+      if(iobuf_read_line(spawn->fromchild,&line,&buflen,&maxlen)==0)
+	{
+	  ret=G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	  goto fail; /* i.e. EOF */
+	}
+
+      ptr=line;
+
+      /* remove trailing whitespace */
+      plen=strlen(ptr);
+      while(plen>0 && ascii_isspace(ptr[plen-1]))
+	plen--;
+      plen[ptr]='\0';
+
+      if(*ptr=='\0')
+	break;
+
+      if(ascii_strncasecmp(ptr,"VERSION ",8)==0)
+	{
+	  gotversion=1;
+
+	  if(atoi(&ptr[8])!=KEYSERVER_PROTO_VERSION)
+	    {
+	      log_error(_("invalid keyserver protocol (us %d!=handler %d)\n"),
+			KEYSERVER_PROTO_VERSION,atoi(&ptr[8]));
+	      goto fail;
+	    }
+	}
+      else if(ascii_strncasecmp(ptr,"PROGRAM ",8)==0)
+	{
+	  if(ascii_strncasecmp(&ptr[8],VERSION,strlen(VERSION))!=0)
+	    log_info(_("WARNING: keyserver handler from a different"
+		       " version of GnuPG (%s)\n"),&ptr[8]);
+	}
+      else if(ascii_strncasecmp(ptr,"OPTION OUTOFBAND",16)==0)
+	outofband=1; /* Currently the only OPTION */
+    }
+
+  if(!gotversion)
+    {
+      log_error(_("keyserver did not send VERSION\n"));
+      goto fail;
+    }
+
+  if(!outofband)
+    switch(action)
+      {
+      case KS_GET:
+      case KS_GETNAME:
+	{
+	  void *stats_handle;
+
+	  stats_handle=import_new_stats_handle();
+
+	  /* Slurp up all the key data.  In the future, it might be
+	     nice to look for KEY foo OUTOFBAND and FAILED indicators.
+	     It's harmless to ignore them, but ignoring them does make
+	     gpg complain about "no valid OpenPGP data found".  One
+	     way to do this could be to continue parsing this
+	     line-by-line and make a temp iobuf for each key. */
+
+	  import_keys_stream(spawn->fromchild,stats_handle,fpr,fpr_len,
+			     opt.keyserver_options.import_options);
+
+	  import_print_stats(stats_handle);
+	  import_release_stats_handle(stats_handle);
+
+	  break;
+	}
+
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+      case KS_SEND:
+	break;
+
+      case KS_SEARCH:
+	keyserver_search_prompt(spawn->fromchild,searchstr);
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	log_fatal(_("no keyserver action!\n"));
+	break;
+      }
+
+ fail:
+  xfree(line);
+  xfree(searchstr);
+
+
+  *prog=exec_finish(spawn);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int 
+keyserver_work(enum ks_action action,STRLIST list,KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
+	       int count,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+	       struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  int rc=0,ret=0;
+
+  if(!keyserver)
+    {
+      log_error(_("no keyserver known (use option --keyserver)\n"));
+      return G10ERR_BAD_URI;
+    }
+
+#ifdef DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS
+
+  log_error(_("external keyserver calls are not supported in this build\n"));
+  return G10ERR_KEYSERVER;
+
+#else
+  /* Spawn a handler */
+
+  rc=keyserver_spawn(action,list,desc,count,&ret,fpr,fpr_len,keyserver);
+  if(ret)
+    {
+      switch(ret)
+	{
+	case KEYSERVER_SCHEME_NOT_FOUND:
+	  log_error(_("no handler for keyserver scheme `%s'\n"),
+		    keyserver->scheme);
+	  break;
+
+	case KEYSERVER_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+	  log_error(_("action `%s' not supported with keyserver "
+		      "scheme `%s'\n"),
+		    action==KS_GET?"get":action==KS_SEND?"send":
+		    action==KS_SEARCH?"search":"unknown",
+		    keyserver->scheme);
+	  break;
+
+	case KEYSERVER_VERSION_ERROR:
+	  log_error(_(GPGKEYS_PREFIX "%s does not support"
+		      " handler version %d\n"),
+		    keyserver_typemap(keyserver->scheme),
+		    KEYSERVER_PROTO_VERSION);
+	  break;
+
+	case KEYSERVER_TIMEOUT:
+	  log_error(_("keyserver timed out\n"));
+	  break;
+
+	case KEYSERVER_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+	default:
+	  log_error(_("keyserver internal error\n"));
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      return G10ERR_KEYSERVER;
+    }
+
+  if(rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("keyserver communications error: %s\n"),g10_errstr(rc));
+
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+#endif /* ! DISABLE_KEYSERVER_HELPERS*/
+}
+
+int 
+keyserver_export(STRLIST users)
+{
+  STRLIST sl=NULL;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  int rc=0;
+
+  /* Weed out descriptors that we don't support sending */
+  for(;users;users=users->next)
+    {
+      classify_user_id (users->d, &desc);
+      if(desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID &&
+	 desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID &&
+	 desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16 &&
+	 desc.mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("\"%s\" not a key ID: skipping\n"),users->d);
+	  continue;
+	}
+      else
+	append_to_strlist(&sl,users->d);
+    }
+
+  if(sl)
+    {
+      rc=keyserver_work(KS_SEND,sl,NULL,0,NULL,NULL,opt.keyserver);
+      free_strlist(sl);
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int 
+keyserver_import(STRLIST users)
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc;
+  int num=100,count=0;
+  int rc=0;
+
+  /* Build a list of key ids */
+  desc=xmalloc(sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC)*num);
+
+  for(;users;users=users->next)
+    {
+      classify_user_id (users->d, &desc[count]);
+      if(desc[count].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID &&
+	 desc[count].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID &&
+	 desc[count].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16 &&
+	 desc[count].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("\"%s\" not a key ID: skipping\n"),users->d);
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      count++;
+      if(count==num)
+	{
+	  num+=100;
+	  desc=xrealloc(desc,sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC)*num);
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(count>0)
+    rc=keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,desc,count,NULL,NULL,opt.keyserver);
+
+  xfree(desc);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int
+keyserver_import_fprint(const byte *fprint,size_t fprint_len,
+			struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+  memset(&desc,0,sizeof(desc));
+
+  if(fprint_len==16)
+    desc.mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16;
+  else if(fprint_len==20)
+    desc.mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+  else
+    return -1;
+
+  memcpy(desc.u.fpr,fprint,fprint_len);
+
+  /* TODO: Warn here if the fingerprint we got doesn't match the one
+     we asked for? */
+  return keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,&desc,1,NULL,NULL,keyserver);
+}
+
+int 
+keyserver_import_keyid(u32 *keyid,struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+  memset(&desc,0,sizeof(desc));
+
+  desc.mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+  desc.u.kid[0]=keyid[0];
+  desc.u.kid[1]=keyid[1];
+
+  return keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,&desc,1,NULL,NULL,keyserver);
+}
+
+/* code mostly stolen from do_export_stream */
+static int 
+keyidlist(STRLIST users,KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC **klist,int *count,int fakev3)
+{
+  int rc=0,ndesc,num=100;
+  KBNODE keyblock=NULL,node;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc;
+  STRLIST sl;
+
+  *count=0;
+
+  *klist=xmalloc(sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC)*num);
+
+  kdbhd=keydb_new(0);
+
+  if(!users)
+    {
+      ndesc = 1;
+      desc = xmalloc_clear ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
+      desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++) 
+	;
+      desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
+        
+      for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next)
+	{
+	  if(classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc))
+	    ndesc++;
+	  else
+	    log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
+		       sl->d, g10_errstr (G10ERR_INV_USER_ID));
+	}
+    }
+
+  while (!(rc = keydb_search (kdbhd, desc, ndesc)))
+    {
+      if (!users) 
+	desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+
+      /* read the keyblock */
+      rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
+      if( rc )
+	{
+	  log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+
+      if((node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)))
+	{
+	  /* This is to work around a bug in some keyservers (pksd and
+             OKS) that calculate v4 RSA keyids as if they were v3 RSA.
+             The answer is to refresh both the correct v4 keyid
+             (e.g. 99242560) and the fake v3 keyid (e.g. 68FDDBC7).
+             This only happens for key refresh using the HKP scheme
+             and if the refresh-add-fake-v3-keyids keyserver option is
+             set. */
+	  if(fakev3 && is_RSA(node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo) &&
+	     node->pkt->pkt.public_key->version>=4)
+	    {
+	      (*klist)[*count].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	      mpi_get_keyid(node->pkt->pkt.public_key->pkey[0],
+			    (*klist)[*count].u.kid);
+	      (*count)++;
+
+	      if(*count==num)
+		{
+		  num+=100;
+		  *klist=xrealloc(*klist,sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC)*num);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  /* v4 keys get full fingerprints.  v3 keys get long keyids.
+             This is because it's easy to calculate any sort of keyid
+             from a v4 fingerprint, but not a v3 fingerprint. */
+
+	  if(node->pkt->pkt.public_key->version<4)
+	    {
+	      (*klist)[*count].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	      keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+			    (*klist)[*count].u.kid);
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      size_t dummy;
+
+	      (*klist)[*count].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	      fingerprint_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+				  (*klist)[*count].u.fpr,&dummy);
+	    }
+
+	  /* This is a little hackish, using the skipfncvalue as a
+	     void* pointer to the keyserver spec, but we don't need
+	     the skipfnc here, and it saves having an additional field
+	     for this (which would be wasted space most of the
+	     time). */
+
+	  (*klist)[*count].skipfncvalue=NULL;
+
+	  /* Are we honoring preferred keyservers? */
+	  if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
+	    {
+	      PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
+	      PKT_signature *sig=NULL;
+
+	      merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
+
+	      for(node=node->next;node;node=node->next)
+		{
+		  if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+		     && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
+		    uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+		  else if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE
+			  && node->pkt->pkt.signature->
+			  flags.chosen_selfsig && uid)
+		    {
+		      sig=node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+		      break;
+		    }
+		}
+
+	      /* Try and parse the keyserver URL.  If it doesn't work,
+		 then we end up writing NULL which indicates we are
+		 the same as any other key. */
+	      if(sig)
+		(*klist)[*count].skipfncvalue=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
+	    }
+
+	  (*count)++;
+
+	  if(*count==num)
+	    {
+	      num+=100;
+	      *klist=xrealloc(*klist,sizeof(KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC)*num);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(rc==-1)
+    rc=0;
+  
+ leave:
+  if(rc)
+    xfree(*klist);
+  xfree(desc);
+  keydb_release(kdbhd);
+  release_kbnode(keyblock);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Note this is different than the original HKP refresh.  It allows
+   usernames to refresh only part of the keyring. */
+
+int
+keyserver_refresh(STRLIST users)
+{
+  int rc,count,numdesc,fakev3=0;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc;
+  unsigned int options=opt.keyserver_options.import_options;
+
+  /* We switch merge-only on during a refresh, as 'refresh' should
+     never import new keys, even if their keyids match. */
+  opt.keyserver_options.import_options|=IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY;
+
+  /* Similarly, we switch on fast-import, since refresh may make
+     multiple import sets (due to preferred keyserver URLs).  We don't
+     want each set to rebuild the trustdb.  Instead we do it once at
+     the end here. */
+  opt.keyserver_options.import_options|=IMPORT_FAST;
+
+  /* If refresh_add_fake_v3_keyids is on and it's a HKP or MAILTO
+     scheme, then enable fake v3 keyid generation. */
+  if((opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3) && opt.keyserver
+     && (ascii_strcasecmp(opt.keyserver->scheme,"hkp")==0 ||
+	 ascii_strcasecmp(opt.keyserver->scheme,"mailto")==0))
+    fakev3=1;
+
+  rc=keyidlist(users,&desc,&numdesc,fakev3);
+  if(rc)
+    return rc;
+
+  count=numdesc;
+  if(count>0)
+    {
+      int i;
+
+      /* Try to handle preferred keyserver keys first */
+      for(i=0;i<numdesc;i++)
+	{
+	  if(desc[i].skipfncvalue)
+	    {
+	      struct keyserver_spec *keyserver=desc[i].skipfncvalue;
+
+	      /* We use the keyserver structure we parsed out before.
+		 Note that a preferred keyserver without a scheme://
+		 will be interpreted as hkp:// */
+
+	      rc=keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,&desc[i],1,NULL,NULL,keyserver);
+	      if(rc)
+		log_info(_("WARNING: unable to refresh key %s"
+			   " via %s: %s\n"),keystr_from_desc(&desc[i]),
+			 keyserver->uri,g10_errstr(rc));
+	      else
+		{
+		  /* We got it, so mark it as NONE so we don't try and
+		     get it again from the regular keyserver. */
+
+		  desc[i].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE;
+		  count--;
+		}
+
+	      free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  if(count>0)
+    {
+      if(opt.keyserver)
+	{
+	  if(count==1)
+	    log_info(_("refreshing 1 key from %s\n"),opt.keyserver->uri);
+	  else
+	    log_info(_("refreshing %d keys from %s\n"),
+		     count,opt.keyserver->uri);
+	}
+
+      rc=keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,desc,numdesc,NULL,NULL,opt.keyserver);
+    }
+
+  xfree(desc);
+
+  opt.keyserver_options.import_options=options;
+
+  /* If the original options didn't have fast import, and the trustdb
+     is dirty, rebuild. */
+  if(!(opt.keyserver_options.import_options&IMPORT_FAST))
+    trustdb_check_or_update();
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int
+keyserver_search(STRLIST tokens)
+{
+  if(tokens)
+    return keyserver_work(KS_SEARCH,tokens,NULL,0,NULL,NULL,opt.keyserver);
+  else
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+keyserver_fetch(STRLIST urilist)
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  STRLIST sl;
+  unsigned int options=opt.keyserver_options.import_options;
+
+  /* Switch on fast-import, since fetch can handle more than one
+     import and we don't want each set to rebuild the trustdb.
+     Instead we do it once at the end. */
+  opt.keyserver_options.import_options|=IMPORT_FAST;
+
+  /* A dummy desc since we're not actually fetching a particular key
+     ID */
+  memset(&desc,0,sizeof(desc));
+  desc.mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT;
+
+  for(sl=urilist;sl;sl=sl->next)
+    {
+      struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+      spec=parse_keyserver_uri(sl->d,1,NULL,0);
+      if(spec)
+	{
+	  int rc;
+
+	  rc=keyserver_work(KS_GET,NULL,&desc,1,NULL,NULL,spec);
+	  if(rc)
+	    log_info (_("WARNING: unable to fetch URI %s: %s\n"),
+		     sl->d,g10_errstr(rc));
+
+	  free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+	}
+      else
+	log_info (_("WARNING: unable to parse URI %s\n"),sl->d);
+    }
+
+  opt.keyserver_options.import_options=options;
+
+  /* If the original options didn't have fast import, and the trustdb
+     is dirty, rebuild. */
+  if(!(opt.keyserver_options.import_options&IMPORT_FAST))
+    trustdb_check_or_update();
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Import key in a CERT or pointed to by a CERT */
+int
+keyserver_import_cert(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len)
+{
+  char *domain,*look,*url;
+  IOBUF key;
+  int type,rc=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  look=xstrdup(name);
+
+  domain=strrchr(look,'@');
+  if(domain)
+    *domain='.';
+
+  type=get_cert(look,max_cert_size,&key,fpr,fpr_len,&url);
+  if(type==1)
+    {
+      int armor_status=opt.no_armor;
+
+      /* CERTs are always in binary format */
+      opt.no_armor=1;
+
+      rc=import_keys_stream(key,NULL,fpr,fpr_len,
+			    opt.keyserver_options.import_options);
+
+      opt.no_armor=armor_status;
+
+      iobuf_close(key);
+    }
+  else if(type==2 && *fpr)
+    {
+      /* We only consider the IPGP type if a fingerprint was provided.
+	 This lets us select the right key regardless of what a URL
+	 points to, or get the key from a keyserver. */
+      if(url)
+	{
+	  struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+	  spec=parse_keyserver_uri(url,1,NULL,0);
+	  if(spec)
+	    {
+	      STRLIST list=NULL;
+
+	      add_to_strlist(&list,url);
+
+	      rc=keyserver_fetch(list);
+
+	      free_strlist(list);
+	      free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+	    }
+	}
+      else if(opt.keyserver)
+	{
+	  /* If only a fingerprint is provided, try and fetch it from
+	     our --keyserver */
+
+	  rc=keyserver_import_fprint(*fpr,*fpr_len,opt.keyserver);
+	}
+      else
+	log_info(_("no keyserver known (use option --keyserver)\n"));
+
+      /* Give a better string here? "CERT fingerprint for \"%s\"
+	 found, but no keyserver" " known (use option
+	 --keyserver)\n" ? */
+
+      xfree(url);
+    }
+
+  xfree(look);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Import key pointed to by a PKA record. Return the requested
+   fingerprint in fpr. */
+int
+keyserver_import_pka(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len)
+{
+  char *uri;
+  int rc=-1;
+
+  *fpr=xmalloc(20);
+  *fpr_len=20;
+
+  uri = get_pka_info (name, *fpr);
+  if (uri)
+    {
+      struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+      spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
+      if (spec)
+	{
+	  rc=keyserver_import_fprint (*fpr, 20, spec);
+	  free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+	}
+      xfree (uri);
+    }
+
+  if(rc!=0)
+    xfree(*fpr);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Import all keys that match name */
+int
+keyserver_import_name(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
+		      struct keyserver_spec *keyserver)
+{
+  STRLIST list=NULL;
+  int rc;
+
+  append_to_strlist(&list,name);
+
+  rc=keyserver_work(KS_GETNAME,list,NULL,0,fpr,fpr_len,keyserver);
+
+  free_strlist(list);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/* Use the PGP Universal trick of asking ldap://keys.(maildomain) for
+   the key. */
+int
+keyserver_import_ldap(const char *name,unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len)
+{
+  char *domain;
+  struct keyserver_spec *keyserver;
+  STRLIST list=NULL;
+  int rc;
+
+  append_to_strlist(&list,name);
+
+  /* Parse out the domain */
+  domain=strrchr(name,'@');
+  if(!domain)
+    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  domain++;
+
+  keyserver=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(struct keyserver_spec));
+
+  keyserver->scheme=xstrdup("ldap");
+  keyserver->host=xmalloc(5+strlen(domain)+1);
+  strcpy(keyserver->host,"keys.");
+  strcat(keyserver->host,domain);
+  keyserver->uri=xmalloc(strlen(keyserver->scheme)+
+			 3+strlen(keyserver->host)+1);
+  strcpy(keyserver->uri,keyserver->scheme);
+  strcat(keyserver->uri,"://");
+  strcat(keyserver->uri,keyserver->host);
+    
+  rc=keyserver_work(KS_GETNAME,list,NULL,0,fpr,fpr_len,keyserver);
+
+  free_strlist(list);
+
+  free_keyserver_spec(keyserver);
+
+  return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7abb2b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/* main.h
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+#ifndef G10_MAIN_H
+#define G10_MAIN_H
+#include "types.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+
+/* It could be argued that the default cipher should be 3DES rather
+   than CAST5, and the default compression should be 0
+   (i.e. uncompressed) rather than 1 (zip).  However, the real world
+   issues of speed and size come into play here. */
+
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO     CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
+#define DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO     DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+#define DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO   COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP
+#define DEFAULT_S2K_DIGEST_ALGO DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+
+#define S2K_DIGEST_ALGO (opt.s2k_digest_algo?opt.s2k_digest_algo:DEFAULT_S2K_DIGEST_ALGO)
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  int header_okay;
+  PK_LIST pk_list;
+  DEK *symkey_dek;
+  STRING2KEY *symkey_s2k;
+  cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+} encrypt_filter_context_t;
+
+struct groupitem
+{
+  char *name;
+  STRLIST values;
+  struct groupitem *next;
+};
+
+/*-- gpg.c --*/
+extern int g10_errors_seen;
+
+#if __GNUC__ > 2 || (__GNUC__ == 2 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5 )
+  void g10_exit(int rc) __attribute__ ((noreturn));
+#else
+  void g10_exit(int rc);
+#endif
+void print_pubkey_algo_note( int algo );
+void print_cipher_algo_note( int algo );
+void print_digest_algo_note( int algo );
+
+/*-- armor.c --*/
+char *make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len );
+
+/*-- misc.c --*/
+void trap_unaligned(void);
+int disable_core_dumps(void);
+void register_secured_file (const char *fname);
+void unregister_secured_file (const char *fname);
+int  is_secured_file (int fd);
+int  is_secured_filename (const char *fname);
+u16 checksum_u16( unsigned n );
+u16 checksum( byte *p, unsigned n );
+u16 checksum_mpi( MPI a );
+u32 buffer_to_u32( const byte *buffer );
+const byte *get_session_marker( size_t *rlen );
+int openpgp_cipher_test_algo( int algo );
+int openpgp_pk_test_algo( int algo, unsigned int usage_flags );
+int openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( int algo );
+int openpgp_md_test_algo( int algo );
+
+#ifdef USE_IDEA
+void idea_cipher_warn( int show );
+#else
+#define idea_cipher_warn(a)
+#endif
+
+struct expando_args
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  PKT_secret_key *sk;
+  byte imagetype;
+};
+
+char *pct_expando(const char *string,struct expando_args *args);
+void deprecated_warning(const char *configname,unsigned int configlineno,
+			const char *option,const char *repl1,const char *repl2);
+void deprecated_command (const char *name);
+
+const char *compress_algo_to_string(int algo);
+int string_to_compress_algo(const char *string);
+int check_compress_algo(int algo);
+int default_cipher_algo(void);
+int default_compress_algo(void);
+const char *compliance_option_string(void);
+void compliance_failure(void);
+
+struct parse_options
+{
+  char *name;
+  unsigned int bit;
+  char **value;
+  char *help;
+};
+
+char *optsep(char **stringp);
+char *argsplit(char *string);
+int parse_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,
+		  struct parse_options *opts,int noisy);
+char *unescape_percent_string (const unsigned char *s);
+int has_invalid_email_chars (const char *s);
+int is_valid_mailbox (const char *name);
+char *default_homedir (void);
+const char *get_libexecdir (void);
+int path_access(const char *file,int mode);
+
+/*-- helptext.c --*/
+void display_online_help( const char *keyword );
+
+/*-- encode.c --*/
+int setup_symkey(STRING2KEY **symkey_s2k,DEK **symkey_dek);
+int encode_symmetric( const char *filename );
+int encode_store( const char *filename );
+int encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr, int use_symkey );
+void encode_crypt_files(int nfiles, char **files, STRLIST remusr);
+int encrypt_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+		    IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
+
+
+/*-- sign.c --*/
+int complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_key *sk, MD_HANDLE md );
+int sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
+	       int do_encrypt, STRLIST remusr, const char *outfile );
+int clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile );
+int sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr);
+
+/*-- sig-check.c --*/
+int check_revocation_keys (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig);
+int check_backsig(PKT_public_key *main_pk,PKT_public_key *sub_pk,
+		  PKT_signature *backsig);
+int check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig );
+int check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
+			  PKT_public_key *ret_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+			  u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired );
+
+/*-- delkey.c --*/
+int delete_keys( STRLIST names, int secret, int allow_both );
+
+/*-- keyedit.c --*/
+void keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr,
+		   STRLIST commands, int quiet, int seckey_check );
+void show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock);
+
+/*-- keygen.c --*/
+u32 parse_expire_string(const char *string);
+u32 ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire);
+u32 ask_expiredate(void);
+void generate_keypair( const char *fname, const char *card_serialno,
+                       const char *backup_encryption_dir );
+int keygen_set_std_prefs (const char *string,int personal);
+PKT_user_id *keygen_get_std_prefs (void);
+int keygen_add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
+int keygen_add_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
+int keygen_upd_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
+int keygen_add_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque);
+int keygen_add_notations(PKT_signature *sig,void *opaque);
+int keygen_add_revkey(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque);
+int make_backsig(PKT_signature *sig,PKT_public_key *pk,
+		 PKT_public_key *sub_pk,PKT_secret_key *sub_sk);
+int generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+int generate_card_subkeypair (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock,
+                              int keyno, const char *serialno);
+int save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno);
+#endif
+
+/*-- openfile.c --*/
+int overwrite_filep( const char *fname );
+char *make_outfile_name( const char *iname );
+char *ask_outfile_name( const char *name, size_t namelen );
+int   open_outfile( const char *iname, int mode, IOBUF *a );
+IOBUF open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx );
+void try_make_homedir( const char *fname );
+
+/*-- seskey.c --*/
+void make_session_key( DEK *dek );
+MPI encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits );
+MPI encode_md_value( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		     MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo );
+
+/*-- import.c --*/
+int parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy);
+void import_keys( char **fnames, int nnames,
+		  void *stats_hd, unsigned int options );
+int import_keys_stream( IOBUF inp,void *stats_hd,unsigned char **fpr,
+			size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options );
+void *import_new_stats_handle (void);
+void import_release_stats_handle (void *p);
+void import_print_stats (void *hd);
+
+int collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock );
+
+int auto_create_card_key_stub ( const char *serialnostr, 
+                                const unsigned char *fpr1,
+                                const unsigned char *fpr2,
+                                const unsigned char *fpr3);
+
+/*-- export.c --*/
+int parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy);
+int export_pubkeys( STRLIST users, unsigned int options );
+int export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users,
+			   KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options );
+int export_seckeys( STRLIST users );
+int export_secsubkeys( STRLIST users );
+
+/* dearmor.c --*/
+int dearmor_file( const char *fname );
+int enarmor_file( const char *fname );
+
+/*-- revoke.c --*/
+struct revocation_reason_info;
+int gen_revoke( const char *uname );
+int gen_desig_revoke( const char *uname, STRLIST locusr);
+int revocation_reason_build_cb( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
+struct revocation_reason_info *
+		ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint );
+void release_revocation_reason_info( struct revocation_reason_info *reason );
+
+/*-- keylist.c --*/
+void public_key_list( STRLIST list );
+void secret_key_list( STRLIST list );
+void print_subpackets_colon(PKT_signature *sig);
+void reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock);
+void list_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque );
+void print_fingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int mode);
+void print_revokers(PKT_public_key *pk);
+void show_policy_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode);
+void show_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode);
+void show_notation(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode,int which);
+void dump_attribs(const PKT_user_id *uid,
+		  PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk);
+void set_attrib_fd(int fd);
+void print_seckey_info (PKT_secret_key *sk);
+void print_pubkey_info (FILE *fp, PKT_public_key *pk);
+void print_card_key_info (FILE *fp, KBNODE keyblock);
+
+/*-- verify.c --*/
+void print_file_status( int status, const char *name, int what );
+int verify_signatures( int nfiles, char **files );
+int verify_files( int nfiles, char **files );
+
+/*-- decrypt.c --*/
+int decrypt_message( const char *filename );
+void decrypt_messages(int nfiles, char *files[]);
+
+/*-- plaintext.c --*/
+int hash_datafiles( MD_HANDLE md, MD_HANDLE md2,
+		    STRLIST files, const char *sigfilename, int textmode );
+PKT_plaintext *setup_plaintext_name(const char *filename,IOBUF iobuf);
+
+/*-- pipemode.c --*/
+void run_in_pipemode (void);
+
+/*-- signal.c --*/
+void init_signals(void);
+void pause_on_sigusr( int which );
+void block_all_signals(void);
+void unblock_all_signals(void);
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+/*-- card-util.c --*/
+void change_pin (int no, int allow_admin);
+void card_status (FILE *fp, char *serialno, size_t serialnobuflen);
+void card_edit (STRLIST commands);
+int  card_generate_subkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock);
+int  card_store_subkey (KBNODE node, int use);
+#endif
+
+#define S2K_DECODE_COUNT(_val) ((16ul + ((_val) & 15)) << (((_val) >> 4) + 6))
+
+#endif /*G10_MAIN_H*/
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb4432a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2083 @@
+/* mainproc.c - handle packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+
+
+struct kidlist_item {
+    struct kidlist_item *next;
+    u32 kid[2];
+    int pubkey_algo;
+    int reason;
+};
+
+
+/****************
+ * Structure to hold the context
+ */
+typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
+struct mainproc_context
+{
+  struct mainproc_context *anchor;  /* May be useful in the future. */
+  PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
+  PKT_secret_key *last_seckey;
+  PKT_user_id     *last_user_id;
+  md_filter_context_t mfx;
+  int sigs_only;    /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
+  int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
+  STRLIST signed_data;
+  const char *sigfilename;
+  DEK *dek;
+  int last_was_session_key;
+  KBNODE list;      /* The current list of packets. */
+  int have_data;
+  IOBUF iobuf;      /* Used to get the filename etc. */
+  int trustletter;  /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
+  ulong symkeys;
+  struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+  struct 
+  {
+    int op;
+    int stop_now;
+  } pipemode;
+  int any_sig_seen;  /* Set to true if a signature packet has been seen. */
+};
+
+
+static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
+
+static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+
+
+static void
+release_list( CTX c )
+{
+    if( !c->list )
+	return;
+    proc_tree(c, c->list );
+    release_kbnode( c->list );
+    while( c->pkenc_list ) {
+	struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+	xfree( c->pkenc_list );
+	c->pkenc_list = tmp;
+    }
+    c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+    c->list = NULL;
+    c->have_data = 0;
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+    c->pipemode.op = 0;
+    c->pipemode.stop_now = 0;
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+
+  if ( c->list ) /* add another packet */
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+  else /* insert the first one */
+    c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* New clear text signature.
+         * Process the last one and reset everything */
+        release_list(c);
+    }   
+    else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
+        /* Pipemode control packet */
+        if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
+        if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
+            /* start the whole thing */
+            assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */
+            assert ( !c->pipemode.op );
+            c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1];
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) {
+            /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) {
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+            release_list (c);
+            /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
+            c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
+        }
+        else 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
+        return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
+    }   
+
+    if( c->list )  /* add another packet */
+        add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+    else /* insert the first one */
+	c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("orphaned user ID\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+
+    c->any_sig_seen = 1;
+    if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
+	/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
+	 * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
+	 * onepass-sig packets.  The drawback of PGP's method
+	 * of prepending the signature to the data is
+	 * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
+	 * from stdin.	(GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
+	node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+	c->list = node;
+	return 1;
+    }
+    else if( !c->list )
+	return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
+    else if( !c->list->pkt )
+	BUG();	/* so nicht */
+
+    /* add a new signature node id at the end */
+    node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+    add_kbnode( c->list, node );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
+{
+  CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
+
+  if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
+    {
+      log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
+		  (int)slen);
+      return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    }
+
+  hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
+  cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+  cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
+  cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen );
+  cipher_close( hd );
+
+  /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+     decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+
+  dek->keylen=slen-1;
+  dek->algo=seskey[0];
+
+  if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+    BUG ();
+
+  /* This is not completely accurate, since a bad passphrase may have
+     resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since
+     a bogus byte here will fail later. */
+  if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+    idea_cipher_warn(0);
+
+  memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+
+  /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+
+  return 0;
+}   
+
+static void
+proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+
+    enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
+    if (!enc)
+        log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+    else if(!c->dek)
+      {
+        int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+	const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
+
+	if(s)
+	  {
+	    if(!opt.quiet)
+	      {
+		if(enc->seskeylen)
+		  log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
+		else
+		  log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
+
+	if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+			" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+	    s=NULL;
+	  }
+
+	c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+	if(!s || opt.list_only)
+	  goto leave;
+
+	if(opt.override_session_key)
+	  {
+	    c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	    if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+	      {
+		xfree(c->dek);
+		c->dek = NULL;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+            int canceled;
+
+	    c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0,
+                                        NULL, &canceled);
+            if (canceled)
+              {
+                /* For unknown reasons passphrase_to_dek does only
+                   return NULL if a new passphrase has been requested
+                   and has not been repeated correctly.  Thus even
+                   with a cancel requested (by means of the gpg-agent)
+                   it won't return NULL but an empty passphrase.  We
+                   take the most conservative approach for now and
+                   work around it right here. */
+                xfree (c->dek);
+                c->dek = NULL;
+              }
+
+	    if(c->dek)
+	      {
+		c->dek->symmetric=1;
+
+		/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
+		   key comes before a public key in the message - if
+		   the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
+		   a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
+		   to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+		   appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+		   come later. */
+		if(enc->seskeylen)
+		  {
+		    if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
+					     enc->seskeylen))
+		      {
+			xfree(c->dek);
+			c->dek=NULL;
+		      }
+		  }
+		else
+		  c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+ leave:
+    c->symkeys++;
+    free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+static void
+proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
+    int result = 0;
+
+    /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */
+    c->last_was_session_key = 1;
+    enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
+    /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+    /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+     * function to check it. */
+    if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) );
+
+    if( is_status_enabled() ) {
+	char buf[50];
+	sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+		(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
+    }
+
+    if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
+	/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+	 * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+	 * command line and the GCHQ knows about it.  */
+	c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
+	if ( result ) {
+	    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+	}
+    }
+    else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
+	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)  ) {
+      /* FIXME:  strore this all in a list and process it later */
+
+	if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+                          || opt.try_all_secrets
+			  || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
+	    if( opt.list_only )
+		result = -1;
+	    else {
+		c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+		if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
+		    /* error: delete the DEK */
+		    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    }
+    else
+	result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+    if( result == -1 )
+	;
+    else
+      {
+        /* store it for later display */
+	struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x );
+	x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+	x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+	x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+	x->reason = result;
+	x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+	c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+        if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
+	  log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
+      }
+
+    free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
+ * not decrypt.
+ */
+static void
+print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
+{
+    for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
+	PKT_public_key *pk;
+	const char *algstr;
+        
+        if ( failed && !list->reason )
+            continue;
+        if ( !failed && list->reason )
+            continue;
+
+        algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo );
+        pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+
+	if( !algstr )
+	    algstr = "[?]";
+	pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
+	if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) )
+	  {
+	    char *p;
+	    log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+		      nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+		      strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
+	    p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
+	    fprintf(log_stream(),_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	    xfree(p);
+	  }
+	else
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+		   algstr,keystr(list->kid));
+
+	free_public_key( pk );
+
+	if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
+	    if( is_status_enabled() ) {
+		char buf[20];
+		sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
+					  (ulong)list->kid[1] );
+		write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (list->reason)
+	    log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+						g10_errstr(list->reason));
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    int result = 0;
+
+    if (!opt.quiet)
+      {
+	if(c->symkeys>1)
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys);
+	else if(c->symkeys==1)
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+      }
+
+    /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+
+
+    write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
+
+    /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
+    if( opt.list_only )
+	result = -1;
+    else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
+        int algo;
+        STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
+
+	if(opt.override_session_key)
+	  {
+	    c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	    result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+	    if(result)
+	      {
+		xfree(c->dek);
+		c->dek = NULL;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
+	    if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
+	      log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+                        cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+	    else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
+	      {
+		algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+		if (!algo)
+		  algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+		idea_cipher_warn(1);
+		log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+			    "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+			  cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+		if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+		  {
+		    /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
+		    s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+		    s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+		    s2k = &s2kbuf;
+		  }
+		log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+	      }
+
+	    c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
+	    if (c->dek)
+	      c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( !c->dek )
+	result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    if( !result )
+	result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+    if( result == -1 )
+	;
+    else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
+	if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
+	    write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
+	else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
+	    log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+	if(opt.show_session_key)
+	  {
+	    int i;
+	    char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
+	    sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
+	    for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
+	      sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
+	    log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf );
+	    write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+	log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
+	write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
+    }
+    else {
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
+	log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
+	/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
+	 * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
+    }
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+    write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
+    int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc;
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
+	log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+    else if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
+    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+    c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0);
+    /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
+     * and no armoring - Not yet tested
+     * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
+     * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
+     * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
+     */
+    any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0;
+    for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+      {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG )
+	  {
+  	    /* For the onepass signature case */
+	    if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo )
+	      {
+		md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
+		if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo
+		    == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
+		  only_md5 = 1;
+		else
+		  only_md5 = 0;
+		any = 1;
+	      }
+	    if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
+	      only_md5 = 0;
+	  }
+	else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+		 == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+	  {
+	    /* For the clearsigned message case */
+            size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+            const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+            /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
+            if ( datalen < 2 )
+	      log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); 
+            /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+             * documents */
+            clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+            for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
+	      md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data );
+            any = 1;
+            break;  /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
+                       expected.  */
+	  }
+	else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
+	  {
+	    /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
+	    md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
+	    any=1;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if( !any && !opt.skip_verify )
+      {
+	/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case.  It's not legal
+	   according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that
+	   often.  There is no good way to specify what algorithms to
+	   use in that case, so these three are the historical
+	   answer. */
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
+      }
+    if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
+	/* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2.  It does only
+	 * catch those mails which are armored.  To catch the non-armored
+	 * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
+	 * in front of the plaintext.  If someone needs this, send me a patch.
+	 */
+	c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
+    }
+    if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
+	md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+	if ( c->mfx.md2  )
+	    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+    }
+    if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 );
+    else {
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
+        if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
+            /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
+             * check the signature */
+            rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+        }
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+    /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+     * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
+     */
+    n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+    if (c->list)
+        add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+    else 
+        c->list = n;
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+{
+    return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data,
+					    ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
+}
+
+static int
+proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+{
+    return proc_encryption_packets( info, a );
+}
+
+static void
+proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
+    int rc;
+
+    /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
+    if( !zd->algorithm )
+      rc=G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
+    else if( c->sigs_only )
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c );
+    else if( c->encrypt_only )
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c );
+    else
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
+    if( rc )
+	log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * check the signature
+ * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
+ */
+static int
+do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
+	      int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
+    int algo, rc;
+
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
+    if( is_selfsig )
+	*is_selfsig = 0;
+    sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+    algo = sig->digest_algo;
+    if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
+	return rc;
+
+    if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
+	if( c->mfx.md )
+	    md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+	else /* detached signature */
+	    md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
+	/* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
+	 * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
+	if( c->mfx.md ) {
+	    md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+	    if( c->mfx.md2 )
+	       md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
+	}
+	else { /* detached signature */
+	  log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
+	    md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+	    md2 = md_open( 0, 0 );
+	}
+    }
+    else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x18
+             || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x20
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x30	) { 
+	if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	    || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
+	}
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
+	    log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
+                         "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
+	    return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+	}
+	else {
+	    log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
+							sig->sig_class);
+	    return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+	return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+    rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
+	rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    md_close(md);
+    md_close(md2);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !pkt )
+	BUG();
+    if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
+	return;
+    }
+    if( opt.with_colons )
+      {
+	if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+	  printf("%u %lu",
+		 pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+		 pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+	else
+	  print_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
+      }
+    else
+	print_utf8_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				     pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * List the certificate in a user friendly way
+ */
+
+static void
+list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+    int any=0;
+    int mainkey;
+
+    if( !node )
+	;
+    else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) )
+	     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	  {
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+	    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+	    if( mainkey )
+	      c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
+		0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
+	    printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
+	    if( c->trustletter )
+	      putchar( c->trustletter );
+	    printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+		   nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		   pk->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+		   colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+	    if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
+	      putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
+	    putchar(':');
+	    if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
+	      putchar('\n'); any=1;
+	      if( opt.fingerprint )
+		print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+	      printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
+		     node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
+	    }
+	  }
+	else
+	  printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s%s",
+		 mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		 pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ),
+		 datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":"");
+
+	if( mainkey ) {
+	    /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
+	    for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
+			    puts("[revoked]");
+			else
+			    putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+		    if( any ) {
+			if( opt.with_colons )
+			    printf("%s:::::::::",
+			      node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+			else
+			    printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
+		    }
+		    print_userid( node->pkt );
+		    if( opt.with_colons )
+			putchar(':');
+		    putchar('\n');
+		    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
+			print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+		    if( opt.with_colons
+                        && node->next
+			&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
+			printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
+                               node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
+                               node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
+		    }
+		    any=1;
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* of subkey */
+	    if( pk->is_revoked )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	    else if( pk->expiredate )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if( !any )
+	    putchar('\n');
+	if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
+	    print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+    }
+    else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
+	     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	  {
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+	    keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+	    printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
+		   mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+		   nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+		   sk->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
+		   colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
+		   /* fixme: add LID */ );
+	  }
+	else
+	  printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+		 nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+		 keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk ));
+	if( mainkey ) {
+	    /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
+	    for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
+			    puts("[revoked]");
+			else
+			    putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+		    if( any ) {
+			if( opt.with_colons )
+			    printf("%s:::::::::",
+			      node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+			else
+			    printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
+		    }
+		    print_userid( node->pkt );
+		    if( opt.with_colons )
+			putchar(':');
+		    putchar('\n');
+		    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
+			print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
+		    any=1;
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !any )
+	    putchar('\n');
+	if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
+	    print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE  ) {
+	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	int is_selfsig = 0;
+	int rc2=0;
+	size_t n;
+	char *p;
+	int sigrc = ' ';
+
+	if( !opt.verbose )
+	    return;
+
+	if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
+	    fputs("rev", stdout);
+	else
+	    fputs("sig", stdout);
+	if( opt.check_sigs ) {
+	    fflush(stdout);
+	    switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
+	      case 0:		       sigrc = '!'; break;
+	      case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:    sigrc = '-'; break;
+	      case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: 
+	      case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:  sigrc = '?'; break;
+	      default:		       sigrc = '%'; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else {	/* check whether this is a self signature */
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+
+	    if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+		if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		    keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid );
+		else
+		    keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid );
+
+		if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
+		    is_selfsig = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( opt.with_colons ) {
+	    putchar(':');
+	    if( sigrc != ' ' )
+		putchar(sigrc);
+	    printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
+		   colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+
+	    if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+	      printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+	    printf(":");
+
+	    if(sig->trust_regexp)
+	      print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
+			   strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
+	    printf(":");
+	}
+	else
+	  printf("%c       %s %s   ",
+		 sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
+	if( sigrc == '%' )
+	    printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
+	else if( sigrc == '?' )
+	    ;
+	else if( is_selfsig ) {
+	    if( opt.with_colons )
+		putchar(':');
+	    fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout);
+	    if( opt.with_colons )
+		putchar(':');
+	}
+	else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+	    p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
+	    print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
+	    xfree(p);
+	}
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	    printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+	putchar('\n');
+    }
+    else
+	log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
+}
+
+
+
+int
+proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+{
+    int rc;
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
+			STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
+{
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+    int rc;
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    c->sigs_only = 1;
+    c->signed_data = signedfiles;
+    c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+
+    /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+       messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+       Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+       error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+       with an error. */ 
+    if (!rc && !c->any_sig_seen)
+      {
+	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+        log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA;
+      }
+
+    /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on
+       success so that we won't issue the nodata status several
+       times. */
+    if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any_sig_seen)
+      c->anchor->any_sig_seen = 1;
+
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+{
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+    int rc;
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    c->encrypt_only = 1;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+    int rc=0;
+    int any_data=0;
+    int newpkt;
+
+    c->iobuf = a;
+    init_packet(pkt);
+    while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
+	any_data = 1;
+	if( rc ) {
+	    free_packet(pkt);
+            /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+             * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
+	    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
+		break;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	newpkt = -1;
+	if( opt.list_packets ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( c->sigs_only ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+		rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+		goto leave;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( c->encrypt_only ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+		rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+		goto leave;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+		release_list( c );
+		c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+		newpkt = 1;
+		break;
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+		newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
+		break;
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:     newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      case PKT_RING_TRUST:  newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+        /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+         * I used it.  Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+         * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+         * packet and not to reuse the current one ...  It works right
+         * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
+         * an extra layer.
+         * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? 
+         */
+	if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
+	    c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+
+	if( newpkt == -1 )
+	    ;
+	else if( newpkt ) {
+	    pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	}
+	else
+	    free_packet(pkt);
+        if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
+            /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to 
+             * break the loop here */ 
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
+    if( any_data )
+	rc = 0;
+    else if( rc == -1 )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
+
+
+  leave:
+    release_list( c );
+    xfree(c->dek);
+    free_packet( pkt );
+    xfree( pkt );
+    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
+   of the notation data. */
+static pka_info_t *
+get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
+  struct notation *nd,*notation;
+
+  notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+  for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
+    {
+      if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
+        continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
+
+      /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
+	 we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
+	 list. */
+      if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
+	{
+	  pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
+	  pka->valid = 0;
+	  pka->checked = 0;
+	  pka->uri = NULL;
+	  strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notation);
+
+  return pka;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record.  If this record has already
+   be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
+   out and try to get that DNS record. */
+static const char *
+pka_uri_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
+    {
+      assert (!sig->pka_info);
+      sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
+      sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
+      if (sig->pka_info)
+        {
+          char *uri;
+
+          uri = get_pka_info (sig->pka_info->email, sig->pka_info->fpr);
+          if (uri)
+            {
+              sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
+              if (!*uri)
+                xfree (uri);
+              else
+                sig->pka_info->uri = uri;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+  const char *astr;
+  int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
+
+  if (opt.skip_verify)
+    {
+      log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  /* Check that the message composition is valid.
+
+     Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
+
+     S{1,n}           -- detached signature.
+     S{1,n} P         -- old style PGP2 signature
+     O{1,n} P S{1,n}  -- standard OpenPGP signature.
+     C P S{1,n}       -- cleartext signature.
+
+        
+          O = One-Pass Signature packet.
+          S = Signature packet.
+          P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
+                 (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
+                  for a signed message but that does not work as it
+                  introduces ambiguities.)
+              We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
+              CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
+          C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
+
+     We reject all other messages.
+     
+     Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
+     each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
+     introduce a bug here.
+  */
+  {
+    KBNODE n;
+    int n_onepass, n_sig;
+
+/*     log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
+/*     dump_kbnode (c->list); */
+
+    n = c->list;
+    assert (n);
+    if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) 
+      {
+        /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
+           "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
+        for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
+          if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+            break;
+        if (!n)
+          ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature.  */
+        else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                     == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
+          {
+            if (n->next)
+              goto ambiguous;  /* We only allow one P packet. */
+          }
+        else
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) 
+      {
+        /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
+        for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
+          n_onepass++;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (!n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+        if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
+          goto ambiguous;
+        if (n_onepass != n_sig)
+          {
+            log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
+                      "number of signature packets\n");
+            goto ambiguous;
+          }
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+      {
+        /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
+        n = n->next;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (n || !n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else 
+      {
+      ambiguous:
+        log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+  }
+
+  /* (Indendation below not yet changed to GNU style.) */
+
+    astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo );
+    if(keystrlen()>8)
+      {
+	log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+	log_info(_("               using %s key %s\n"),
+		 astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
+      }
+    else
+      log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+	       asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+	       keystr(sig->keyid));
+
+    rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+
+    /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
+
+    if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+      {
+	const byte *p;
+	int seq=0;
+	size_t n;
+
+	while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+	  {
+	    /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
+	       grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
+	       page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver.  I'm
+	       not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
+	    log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+	    print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n );
+	    putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+
+	    if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+	       && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
+	      {
+		struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+		spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
+		if(spec)
+		  {
+		    int res;
+
+		    glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+		    res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec);
+		    glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+		    if(!res)
+		      rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+		    free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+
+		    if(!rc)
+		      break;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
+       try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
+    if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY 
+	 && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+         && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD)
+      {
+        const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
+        
+        if (uri)
+          {
+            /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+               fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+            int res;
+            struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+            
+            spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
+            if (spec)
+              {
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+                res = keyserver_import_keyid (sig->keyid, spec);
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+                if (!res)
+                  rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+              }
+          }
+      }
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
+       no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
+
+    if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver
+	&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+      {
+	int res;
+
+	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+	res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
+	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+	if(!res)
+	  rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+      }
+
+    if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+	KBNODE un, keyblock;
+	int count=0, statno;
+        char keyid_str[50];
+	PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+
+	if(rc)
+	  statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
+	else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	  statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
+	else if(is_expkey)
+	  statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+	else if(is_revkey)
+	  statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+	else
+	  statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
+
+	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
+
+        sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+                 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+
+        /* find and print the primary user ID */
+	for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+	    char *p;
+	    int valid;
+	    if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+	      {
+	        pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+		continue;
+	      }
+	    if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+		continue;
+	    if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
+	        continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
+                continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
+                continue;
+	    if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
+	        continue;
+	    /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+	    if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+	        continue;
+
+	    assert(pk);
+
+	    /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
+	       the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
+	       line. */
+	    valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+
+            keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+	    p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			     un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+
+	    if(rc)
+	      log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	      log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else
+	      log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+
+	    xfree(p);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+	      fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+	    else
+	      fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            count++;
+	}
+	if( !count ) {	/* just in case that we have no valid textual
+                           userid */
+	    char *p;
+
+	    /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+		    !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                    break;
+            }
+
+	    /* Try for any userid at all */
+	    if(!un) {
+	        for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                    if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+                        break;
+		}
+	    }
+
+            if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+                keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+	    if(un)
+	      p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+	    else
+	      p=xstrdup("[?]");
+
+	    if(rc)
+	      log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	      log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else
+	      log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+            if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
+	      {
+                putc(' ', log_stream() );
+                fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() );
+	      }
+	    fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+	}
+
+        /* If we have a good signature and already printed 
+         * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+        if ( count && !rc ) {
+	    char *p;
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+                    continue;
+                if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+		    || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		   && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+		  continue;
+		/* Only skip textual primaries */
+                if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
+		     !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+		    continue;
+
+		if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+		  {
+		    dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
+
+		    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+		      show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+				  un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+		  }
+
+		p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+		log_info(_("                aka \"%s\""),p);
+		xfree(p);
+
+		if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+		  {
+		    const char *valid;
+		    if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+		      valid=_("revoked");
+		    else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		      valid=_("expired");
+		    else
+		      valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
+							       un->pkt->
+							       pkt.user_id));
+		    fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",valid);
+		  }
+		else
+		  fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            }
+	}
+	release_kbnode( keyblock );
+
+	if( !rc )
+	  {
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)
+	      show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
+	    else
+	      show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)
+	      show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
+	    else
+	      show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS)
+	      show_notation(sig,0,1,
+		        ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
+			((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
+	    else
+	      show_notation(sig,0,2,0);
+	  }
+
+	if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	    /* print a status response with the fingerprint */
+	    PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
+
+	    if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
+		byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+		char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
+		size_t i, n;
+
+                bufp = buf;
+		fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+		p = array;
+		for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+		/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
+		   with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
+		   etc.).  Remember to make the buffer larger to
+		   match! */
+		sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
+                        strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
+                        (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
+			sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
+			sig->sig_class);
+                bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
+                if (!vpk->is_primary) {
+                   u32 akid[2];
+ 
+                   akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
+                   akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
+                   free_public_key (vpk);
+                   vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
+                   if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
+                     /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
+                     n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
+                     memset (array, 0, n);
+                   }
+                   else
+                     fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+                }
+		p = array;
+		for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+		write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
+	    }
+	    free_public_key( vpk );
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+          {
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS)
+	      pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
+	    rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
+          }
+
+	if(sig->flags.expired)
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
+		     asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+	    rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
+	  }
+	else if(sig->expiredate)
+	  log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+	if(opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
+		   sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+		   sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+		   digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo));
+
+	if( rc )
+	    g10_errors_seen = 1;
+	if( opt.batch && rc )
+	    g10_exit(1);
+    }
+    else {
+	char buf[50];
+	sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
+		     (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		     sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
+		     sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
+	if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
+	    buf[16] = 0;
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
+	}
+	if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
+	    log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Process the tree which starts at node
+ */
+static void
+proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+    KBNODE n1;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
+	return;
+
+    /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
+       they may be the root packet.  These packets are only used in
+       addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
+    while ( node
+            && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+            && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                         == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
+        node = node->next;
+    }
+    if (!node)
+        return;
+
+    c->trustletter = ' ';
+    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
+	list_node( c, node );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+	merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
+	list_node( c, node );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
+	/* check all signatures */
+	if( !c->have_data ) {
+	    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+	    /* prepare to create all requested message digests */
+	    c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+
+	    /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
+               one-pass packet? */
+	    for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
+		md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+	    }
+	    /* ask for file and hash it */
+	    if( c->sigs_only ) {
+		rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL,
+				     c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
+			n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+						iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+			n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+	    }
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+
+	for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* clear text signed message */
+	if( !c->have_data ) {
+            log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+	
+	for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	int multiple_ok=1;
+
+	n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+	if(n1)
+	  {
+	    byte class=sig->sig_class;
+	    byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
+
+	    for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+	      {
+		/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+		   different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
+		   to run a different hash context for each), but if
+		   they are all the same, make an exception. */
+		if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
+		   || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
+		  {
+		    multiple_ok=0;
+		    log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected.  "
+			       "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+		    break;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
+	    log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
+						    sig->sig_class);
+	else if( !c->have_data ) {
+	    /* detached signature */
+	    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+	    c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
+	    if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
+		;
+	    else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+		     && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
+		/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
+		c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
+	    }
+	    else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+		     && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+		     && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
+		/* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached
+		 * signature has been created in textmode */
+		c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
+	    }
+#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
+	    /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
+	     * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
+	     * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
+	     * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
+	     * then produce the "correct" hash.  This is very, very ugly
+	     * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
+	     */
+		    /*	c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
+#endif
+            if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
+                md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+                if ( c->mfx.md2  )
+                    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+            }
+	    if( c->sigs_only ) {
+		rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+				     c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
+				     (sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+						iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+						(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+	    }
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+            ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */
+	else if (!opt.quiet)
+	    log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
+
+	if(multiple_ok)
+	  for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+	else
+	  check_sig_and_print( c, node );
+    }
+    else {
+        dump_kbnode (c->list);
+	log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
+        dump_kbnode (node);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/mdfilter.c b/g10/mdfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3605db8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/mdfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* mdfilter.c - filter data and calculate a message digest
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * This filter is used to collect a message digest
+ */
+int
+md_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	       IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    md_filter_context_t *mfx = opaque;
+    int i, rc=0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+	if( mfx->maxbuf_size && size > mfx->maxbuf_size )
+	    size = mfx->maxbuf_size;
+	i = iobuf_read( a, buf, size );
+	if( i == -1 ) i = 0;
+	if( i ) {
+	    md_write(mfx->md, buf, i );
+	    if( mfx->md2 )
+		md_write(mfx->md2, buf, i );
+	}
+	else
+	    rc = -1; /* eof */
+	*ret_len = i;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+	*(char**)buf = "md_filter";
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+free_md_filter_context( md_filter_context_t *mfx )
+{
+    md_close(mfx->md);
+    md_close(mfx->md2);
+    mfx->md = NULL;
+    mfx->md2 = NULL;
+    mfx->maxbuf_size = 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/misc.c b/g10/misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbe4492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1284 @@
+/* misc.c -  miscellaneous functions
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__alpha__) && __GLIBC__ < 2
+#include <asm/sysinfo.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#include <time.h>
+#include <process.h>
+#include <windows.h> 
+#include <shlobj.h>
+#ifndef CSIDL_APPDATA
+#define CSIDL_APPDATA 0x001a
+#endif
+#ifndef CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA
+#define CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA 0x001c
+#endif
+#ifndef CSIDL_FLAG_CREATE
+#define CSIDL_FLAG_CREATE 0x8000
+#endif
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "dynload.h"
+#endif /*_WIN32*/
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+
+
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+/* A object and a global variable to keep track of files marked as
+   secured. */
+struct secured_file_item 
+{
+  struct secured_file_item *next;
+  ino_t ino;
+  dev_t dev;
+};
+static struct secured_file_item *secured_files;
+#endif /*ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS*/
+
+
+
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__alpha__) && __GLIBC__ < 2
+static int
+setsysinfo(unsigned long op, void *buffer, unsigned long size,
+		     int *start, void *arg, unsigned long flag)
+{
+    return syscall(__NR_osf_setsysinfo, op, buffer, size, start, arg, flag);
+}
+
+void
+trap_unaligned(void)
+{
+    unsigned int buf[2];
+
+    buf[0] = SSIN_UACPROC;
+    buf[1] = UAC_SIGBUS | UAC_NOPRINT;
+    setsysinfo(SSI_NVPAIRS, buf, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+#else
+void
+trap_unaligned(void)
+{  /* dummy */
+}
+#endif
+
+
+int
+disable_core_dumps()
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+    return 0;
+#else
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+    struct rlimit limit;
+
+    limit.rlim_cur = 0;
+    limit.rlim_max = 0;
+    if( !setrlimit( RLIMIT_CORE, &limit ) )
+	return 0;
+    if( errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOSYS )
+	log_fatal(_("can't disable core dumps: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
+#endif
+    return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/* For the sake of SELinux we want to restrict access through gpg to
+   certain files we keep under our own control.  This function
+   registers such a file and is_secured_file may then be used to
+   check whether a file has ben registered as secured. */
+void
+register_secured_file (const char *fname)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+  struct stat buf;
+  struct secured_file_item *sf;
+
+  /* Note that we stop immediatley if something goes wrong here. */
+  if (stat (fname, &buf))
+    log_fatal (_("fstat of `%s' failed in %s: %s\n"), fname, 
+               "register_secured_file", strerror (errno));
+/*   log_debug ("registering `%s' i=%lu.%lu\n", fname, */
+/*              (unsigned long)buf.st_dev, (unsigned long)buf.st_ino); */
+  for (sf=secured_files; sf; sf = sf->next)
+    {
+      if (sf->ino == buf.st_ino && sf->dev == buf.st_dev)
+        return; /* Already registered.  */
+    }
+
+  sf = xmalloc (sizeof *sf);
+  sf->ino = buf.st_ino;
+  sf->dev = buf.st_dev;
+  sf->next = secured_files;
+  secured_files = sf;
+#endif /*ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS*/
+}
+
+/* Remove a file registerd as secure. */
+void
+unregister_secured_file (const char *fname)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+  struct stat buf;
+  struct secured_file_item *sf, *sfprev;
+
+  if (stat (fname, &buf))
+    {
+      log_error (_("fstat of `%s' failed in %s: %s\n"), fname,
+                 "unregister_secured_file", strerror (errno));
+      return;
+    }
+/*   log_debug ("unregistering `%s' i=%lu.%lu\n", fname,  */
+/*              (unsigned long)buf.st_dev, (unsigned long)buf.st_ino); */
+  for (sfprev=NULL,sf=secured_files; sf; sfprev=sf, sf = sf->next)
+    {
+      if (sf->ino == buf.st_ino && sf->dev == buf.st_dev)
+        {
+          if (sfprev)
+            sfprev->next = sf->next;
+          else
+            secured_files = sf->next;
+          xfree (sf);
+          return;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /*ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS*/
+}
+
+/* Return true if FD is corresponds to a secured file.  Using -1 for
+   FS is allowed and will return false. */ 
+int 
+is_secured_file (int fd)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+  struct stat buf;
+  struct secured_file_item *sf;
+
+  if (fd == -1)
+    return 0; /* No file descriptor so it can't be secured either.  */
+
+  /* Note that we print out a error here and claim that a file is
+     secure if something went wrong. */
+  if (fstat (fd, &buf))
+    {
+      log_error (_("fstat(%d) failed in %s: %s\n"), fd, 
+                 "is_secured_file", strerror (errno));
+      return 1;
+    }
+/*   log_debug ("is_secured_file (%d) i=%lu.%lu\n", fd, */
+/*              (unsigned long)buf.st_dev, (unsigned long)buf.st_ino); */
+  for (sf=secured_files; sf; sf = sf->next)
+    {
+      if (sf->ino == buf.st_ino && sf->dev == buf.st_dev)
+        return 1; /* Yes.  */
+    }
+#endif /*ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS*/
+  return 0; /* No. */
+}
+
+/* Return true if FNAME is corresponds to a secured file.  Using NULL,
+   "" or "-" for FS is allowed and will return false. This function is
+   used before creating a file, thus it won't fail if the file does
+   not exist. */ 
+int 
+is_secured_filename (const char *fname)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
+  struct stat buf;
+  struct secured_file_item *sf;
+
+  if (iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) || !*fname)
+    return 0; 
+
+  /* Note that we print out a error here and claim that a file is
+     secure if something went wrong. */
+  if (stat (fname, &buf))
+    {
+      if (errno == ENOENT || errno == EPERM || errno == EACCES)
+        return 0;
+      log_error (_("fstat of `%s' failed in %s: %s\n"), fname,
+                 "is_secured_filename", strerror (errno));
+      return 1;
+    }
+/*   log_debug ("is_secured_filename (%s) i=%lu.%lu\n", fname, */
+/*              (unsigned long)buf.st_dev, (unsigned long)buf.st_ino); */
+  for (sf=secured_files; sf; sf = sf->next)
+    {
+      if (sf->ino == buf.st_ino && sf->dev == buf.st_dev)
+        return 1; /* Yes.  */
+    }
+#endif /*ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS*/
+  return 0; /* No. */
+}
+
+
+
+u16
+checksum_u16( unsigned n )
+{
+    u16 a;
+
+    a  = (n >> 8) & 0xff;
+    a += n & 0xff;
+    return a;
+}
+
+
+u16
+checksum( byte *p, unsigned n )
+{
+    u16 a;
+
+    for(a=0; n; n-- )
+	a += *p++;
+    return a;
+}
+
+u16
+checksum_mpi( MPI a )
+{
+    u16 csum;
+    byte *buffer;
+    unsigned nbytes;
+    unsigned nbits;
+
+    buffer = mpi_get_buffer( a, &nbytes, NULL );
+    nbits = mpi_get_nbits(a);
+    csum = checksum_u16( nbits );
+    csum += checksum( buffer, nbytes );
+    xfree( buffer );
+    return csum;
+}
+
+u32
+buffer_to_u32( const byte *buffer )
+{
+    unsigned long a;
+    a =  *buffer << 24;
+    a |= buffer[1] << 16;
+    a |= buffer[2] << 8;
+    a |= buffer[3];
+    return a;
+}
+
+void
+print_pubkey_algo_note( int algo )
+{
+  if(algo >= 100 && algo <= 110)
+    {
+      static int warn=0;
+      if(!warn)
+	{
+	  warn=1;
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: using experimental public key algorithm %s\n"),
+		   pubkey_algo_to_string(algo));
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+print_cipher_algo_note( int algo )
+{
+  if(algo >= 100 && algo <= 110)
+    {
+      static int warn=0;
+      if(!warn)
+	{
+	  warn=1;
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: using experimental cipher algorithm %s\n"),
+		   cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+print_digest_algo_note( int algo )
+{
+  if(algo >= 100 && algo <= 110)
+    {
+      static int warn=0;
+      if(!warn)
+	{
+	  warn=1;
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: using experimental digest algorithm %s\n"),
+		   digest_algo_to_string(algo));
+	}
+    }
+  else if(algo==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
+    log_info(_("WARNING: digest algorithm %s is deprecated\n"),
+	     digest_algo_to_string(algo));
+}
+
+/* Return a string which is used as a kind of process ID */
+const byte *
+get_session_marker( size_t *rlen )
+{
+    static byte marker[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG*2];
+    static int initialized;
+
+    if ( !initialized ) {
+        volatile ulong aa, bb; /* we really want the uninitialized value */
+        ulong a, b;
+
+        initialized = 1;
+        /* also this marker is guessable it is not easy to use this 
+         * for a faked control packet because an attacker does not
+         * have enough control about the time the verification does 
+         * take place.  Of course, we can add just more random but 
+         * than we need the random generator even for verification
+         * tasks - which does not make sense. */
+        a = aa ^ (ulong)getpid();
+        b = bb ^ (ulong)time(NULL);
+        memcpy( marker, &a, SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG );
+        memcpy( marker+SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG, &b, SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG );
+    }
+    *rlen = sizeof(marker);
+    return marker;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Wrapper around the libgcrypt function with addional checks on
+ * openPGP contraints for the algo ID.
+ */
+int
+openpgp_cipher_test_algo( int algo )
+{
+    if( algo < 0 || algo > 110 )
+        return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
+    return check_cipher_algo(algo);
+}
+
+int
+openpgp_pk_test_algo( int algo, unsigned int usage_flags )
+{
+    if( algo < 0 || algo > 110 )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    return check_pubkey_algo2( algo, usage_flags );
+}
+
+int 
+openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( int algo )
+{
+    int use = 0; 
+    
+    /* they are hardwired in gpg 1.0 */
+    switch ( algo ) {    
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
+          use = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT | PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC | PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+          break;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
+          use = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+          break;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
+          use = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT | PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+          break;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
+          use = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+          break;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:  
+          use = PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT | PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
+          break;
+      default:
+          break;
+    }
+    return use;
+}
+
+int
+openpgp_md_test_algo( int algo )
+{
+    if( algo < 0 || algo > 110 )
+        return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
+    return check_digest_algo(algo);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_IDEA
+/* Special warning for the IDEA cipher */
+void
+idea_cipher_warn(int show)
+{
+  static int warned=0;
+
+  if(!warned || show)
+    {
+      log_info(_("the IDEA cipher plugin is not present\n"));
+      log_info(_("please see %s for more information\n"),
+               "http://www.gnupg.org/faq/why-not-idea.html");
+      warned=1;
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long get_signature_count(PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+  if(sk && sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)
+    {
+      struct agent_card_info_s info;
+      if(agent_scd_getattr("SIG-COUNTER",&info)==0)
+	return info.sig_counter;
+    }  
+#endif
+
+  /* How to do this without a card? */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Expand %-strings.  Returns a string which must be xfreed.  Returns
+   NULL if the string cannot be expanded (too large). */
+char *
+pct_expando(const char *string,struct expando_args *args)
+{
+  const char *ch=string;
+  int idx=0,maxlen=0,done=0;
+  u32 pk_keyid[2]={0,0},sk_keyid[2]={0,0};
+  char *ret=NULL;
+
+  if(args->pk)
+    keyid_from_pk(args->pk,pk_keyid);
+
+  if(args->sk)
+    keyid_from_sk(args->sk,sk_keyid);
+
+  /* This is used so that %k works in photoid command strings in
+     --list-secret-keys (which of course has a sk, but no pk). */
+  if(!args->pk && args->sk)
+    keyid_from_sk(args->sk,pk_keyid);
+
+  while(*ch!='\0')
+    {
+      char *str=NULL;
+
+      if(!done)
+	{
+	  /* 8192 is way bigger than we'll need here */
+	  if(maxlen>=8192)
+	    goto fail;
+
+	  maxlen+=1024;
+	  ret=xrealloc(ret,maxlen);
+	}
+
+      done=0;
+
+      if(*ch=='%')
+	{
+	  switch(*(ch+1))
+	    {
+	    case 's': /* short key id */
+	      if(idx+8<maxlen)
+		{
+		  sprintf(&ret[idx],"%08lX",(ulong)sk_keyid[1]);
+		  idx+=8;
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'S': /* long key id */
+	      if(idx+16<maxlen)
+		{
+		  sprintf(&ret[idx],"%08lX%08lX",
+			  (ulong)sk_keyid[0],(ulong)sk_keyid[1]);
+		  idx+=16;
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'k': /* short key id */
+	      if(idx+8<maxlen)
+		{
+		  sprintf(&ret[idx],"%08lX",(ulong)pk_keyid[1]);
+		  idx+=8;
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'K': /* long key id */
+	      if(idx+16<maxlen)
+		{
+		  sprintf(&ret[idx],"%08lX%08lX",
+			  (ulong)pk_keyid[0],(ulong)pk_keyid[1]);
+		  idx+=16;
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'c': /* signature count from card, if any. */
+	      if(idx+10<maxlen)
+		{
+		  sprintf(&ret[idx],"%lu",get_signature_count(args->sk));
+		  idx+=strlen(&ret[idx]);
+		  done=1;
+		}	      
+	      break;
+
+	    case 'p': /* primary pk fingerprint of a sk */
+	    case 'f': /* pk fingerprint */
+	    case 'g': /* sk fingerprint */
+	      {
+		byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+		size_t len;
+		int i;
+
+		if((*(ch+1))=='p' && args->sk)
+		  {
+		    if(args->sk->is_primary)
+		      fingerprint_from_sk(args->sk,array,&len);
+		    else if(args->sk->main_keyid[0] || args->sk->main_keyid[1])
+		      {
+			PKT_public_key *pk=
+			  xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
+
+			if(get_pubkey_fast(pk,args->sk->main_keyid)==0)
+			  fingerprint_from_pk(pk,array,&len);
+			else
+			  memset(array,0,(len=MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN));
+			free_public_key(pk);
+		      }
+		    else
+		      memset(array,0,(len=MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN));
+		  }
+		else if((*(ch+1))=='f' && args->pk)
+		  fingerprint_from_pk(args->pk,array,&len);
+		else if((*(ch+1))=='g' && args->sk)
+		  fingerprint_from_sk(args->sk,array,&len);
+		else
+		  memset(array,0,(len=MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN));
+
+		if(idx+(len*2)<maxlen)
+		  {
+		    for(i=0;i<len;i++)
+		      {
+			sprintf(&ret[idx],"%02X",array[i]);
+			idx+=2;
+		      }
+		    done=1;
+		  }
+	      }
+	      break;
+
+	    case 't': /* e.g. "jpg" */
+	      str=image_type_to_string(args->imagetype,0);
+	      /* fall through */
+
+	    case 'T': /* e.g. "image/jpeg" */
+	      if(str==NULL)
+		str=image_type_to_string(args->imagetype,2);
+
+	      if(idx+strlen(str)<maxlen)
+		{
+		  strcpy(&ret[idx],str);
+		  idx+=strlen(str);
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	    case '%':
+	      if(idx+1<maxlen)
+		{
+		  ret[idx++]='%';
+		  ret[idx]='\0';
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+
+	      /* Any unknown %-keys (like %i, %o, %I, and %O) are
+		 passed through for later expansion.  Note this also
+		 handles the case where the last character in the
+		 string is a '%' - the terminating \0 will end up here
+		 and properly terminate the string. */
+	    default:
+	      if(idx+2<maxlen)
+		{
+		  ret[idx++]='%';
+		  ret[idx++]=*(ch+1);
+		  ret[idx]='\0';
+		  done=1;
+		}
+	      break;
+	      }
+
+	  if(done)
+	    ch++;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  if(idx+1<maxlen)
+	    {
+	      ret[idx++]=*ch;
+	      ret[idx]='\0';
+	      done=1;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(done)
+	ch++;
+    }
+
+  return ret;
+
+ fail:
+  xfree(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+deprecated_warning(const char *configname,unsigned int configlineno,
+		   const char *option,const char *repl1,const char *repl2)
+{
+  if(configname)
+    {
+      if(strncmp("--",option,2)==0)
+	option+=2;
+
+      if(strncmp("--",repl1,2)==0)
+	repl1+=2;
+
+      log_info(_("%s:%d: deprecated option \"%s\"\n"),
+	       configname,configlineno,option);
+    }
+  else
+    log_info(_("WARNING: \"%s\" is a deprecated option\n"),option);
+
+  log_info(_("please use \"%s%s\" instead\n"),repl1,repl2);
+}
+
+
+void
+deprecated_command (const char *name)
+{
+  log_info(_("WARNING: \"%s\" is a deprecated command - do not use it\n"),
+           name);
+}
+
+
+const char *
+compress_algo_to_string(int algo)
+{
+  const char *s=NULL;
+
+  switch(algo)
+    {
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE:
+      s=_("Uncompressed");
+      break;
+
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP:
+      s="ZIP";
+      break;
+
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_ZLIB:
+      s="ZLIB";
+      break;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BZIP2
+    case COMPRESS_ALGO_BZIP2:
+      s="BZIP2";
+      break;
+#endif
+    }
+
+  return s;
+}
+
+int
+string_to_compress_algo(const char *string)
+{
+  /* NOTE TO TRANSLATOR: See doc/TRANSLATE about this string. */
+  if(match_multistr(_("uncompressed|none"),string))
+    return 0;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"uncompressed")==0)
+    return 0;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"none")==0)
+    return 0;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"zip")==0)
+    return 1;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"zlib")==0)
+    return 2;
+#ifdef HAVE_BZIP2
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"bzip2")==0)
+    return 3;
+#endif
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"z0")==0)
+    return 0;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"z1")==0)
+    return 1;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"z2")==0)
+    return 2;
+#ifdef HAVE_BZIP2
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(string,"z3")==0)
+    return 3;
+#endif
+  else
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int
+check_compress_algo(int algo)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_BZIP2
+  if(algo>=0 && algo<=3)
+    return 0;
+#else
+  if(algo>=0 && algo<=2)
+    return 0;
+#endif
+
+  return G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
+}
+
+int
+default_cipher_algo(void)
+{
+  if(opt.def_cipher_algo)
+    return opt.def_cipher_algo;
+  else if(opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
+    return opt.personal_cipher_prefs[0].value;
+  else
+    return opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+}
+
+/* There is no default_digest_algo function, but see
+   sign.c:hash_for() */
+
+int
+default_compress_algo(void)
+{
+  if(opt.compress_algo!=-1)
+    return opt.compress_algo;
+  else if(opt.personal_compress_prefs)
+    return opt.personal_compress_prefs[0].value;
+  else
+    return DEFAULT_COMPRESS_ALGO;
+}
+
+const char *
+compliance_option_string(void)
+{
+  switch(opt.compliance)
+    {
+    case CO_RFC2440:
+      return "--openpgp";
+    case CO_PGP2:
+      return "--pgp2";
+    case CO_PGP6:
+      return "--pgp6";
+    case CO_PGP7:
+      return "--pgp7";
+    case CO_PGP8:
+      return "--pgp8";
+    default:
+      return "???";
+    }
+}
+
+static const char *
+compliance_string(void)
+{
+  switch(opt.compliance)
+    {
+    case CO_RFC2440:
+      return "OpenPGP";
+    case CO_PGP2:
+      return "PGP 2.x";
+    case CO_PGP6:
+      return "PGP 6.x";
+    case CO_PGP7:
+      return "PGP 7.x";
+    case CO_PGP8:
+      return "PGP 8.x";
+    default:
+      return "???";
+    }
+}
+
+void
+compliance_failure(void)
+{
+  log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),compliance_string());
+  opt.compliance=CO_GNUPG;
+}
+
+/* Break a string into successive option pieces.  Accepts single word
+   options and key=value argument options. */
+char *
+optsep(char **stringp)
+{
+  char *tok,*end;
+
+  tok=*stringp;
+  if(tok)
+    {
+      end=strpbrk(tok," ,=");
+      if(end)
+	{
+	  int sawequals=0;
+	  char *ptr=end;
+
+	  /* what we need to do now is scan along starting with *end,
+	     If the next character we see (ignoring spaces) is an =
+	     sign, then there is an argument. */
+
+	  while(*ptr)
+	    {
+	      if(*ptr=='=')
+		sawequals=1;
+	      else if(*ptr!=' ')
+		break;
+	      ptr++;
+	    }
+
+	  /* There is an argument, so grab that too.  At this point,
+	     ptr points to the first character of the argument. */
+	  if(sawequals)
+	    {
+	      /* Is it a quoted argument? */
+	      if(*ptr=='"')
+		{
+		  ptr++;
+		  end=strchr(ptr,'"');
+		  if(end)
+		    end++;
+		}
+	      else
+		end=strpbrk(ptr," ,");
+	    }
+
+	  if(end && *end)
+	    {
+	      *end='\0';
+	      *stringp=end+1;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    *stringp=NULL;
+	}
+      else
+	*stringp=NULL;
+    }
+
+  return tok;
+}
+
+/* Breaks an option value into key and value.  Returns NULL if there
+   is no value.  Note that "string" is modified to remove the =value
+   part. */
+char *
+argsplit(char *string)
+{
+  char *equals,*arg=NULL;
+
+  equals=strchr(string,'=');
+  if(equals)
+    {
+      char *quote,*space;
+
+      *equals='\0';
+      arg=equals+1;
+
+      /* Quoted arg? */
+      quote=strchr(arg,'"');
+      if(quote)
+	{
+	  arg=quote+1;
+
+	  quote=strchr(arg,'"');
+	  if(quote)
+	    *quote='\0';
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  size_t spaces;
+
+	  /* Trim leading spaces off of the arg */
+	  spaces=strspn(arg," ");
+	  arg+=spaces;
+	}
+
+      /* Trim tailing spaces off of the tag */
+      space=strchr(string,' ');
+      if(space)
+	*space='\0';
+    }
+
+  return arg;
+}
+
+/* Return the length of the initial token, leaving off any
+   argument. */
+static size_t
+optlen(const char *s)
+{
+  char *end=strpbrk(s," =");
+
+  if(end)
+    return end-s;
+  else
+    return strlen(s);
+}
+
+int
+parse_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,
+	      struct parse_options *opts,int noisy)
+{
+  char *tok;
+
+  if (str && !strcmp (str, "help"))
+    {
+      int i,maxlen=0;
+
+      /* Figure out the longest option name so we can line these up
+	 neatly. */
+      for(i=0;opts[i].name;i++)
+	if(opts[i].help && maxlen<strlen(opts[i].name))
+	  maxlen=strlen(opts[i].name);
+
+      for(i=0;opts[i].name;i++)
+        if(opts[i].help)
+	  printf("%s%*s%s\n",opts[i].name,
+		 maxlen+2-(int)strlen(opts[i].name),"",_(opts[i].help));
+
+      g10_exit(0);
+    }
+
+  while((tok=optsep(&str)))
+    {
+      int i,rev=0;
+      char *otok=tok;
+
+      if(tok[0]=='\0')
+	continue;
+
+      if(ascii_strncasecmp("no-",tok,3)==0)
+	{
+	  rev=1;
+	  tok+=3;
+	}
+
+      for(i=0;opts[i].name;i++)
+	{
+	  size_t toklen=optlen(tok);
+
+	  if(ascii_strncasecmp(opts[i].name,tok,toklen)==0)
+	    {
+	      /* We have a match, but it might be incomplete */
+	      if(toklen!=strlen(opts[i].name))
+		{
+		  int j;
+
+		  for(j=i+1;opts[j].name;j++)
+		    {
+		      if(ascii_strncasecmp(opts[j].name,tok,toklen)==0)
+			{
+			  if(noisy)
+			    log_info(_("ambiguous option `%s'\n"),otok);
+			  return 0;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+
+	      if(rev)
+		{
+		  *options&=~opts[i].bit;
+		  if(opts[i].value)
+		    *opts[i].value=NULL;
+		}
+	      else
+		{
+		  *options|=opts[i].bit;
+		  if(opts[i].value)
+		    *opts[i].value=argsplit(tok);
+		}
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(!opts[i].name)
+	{
+	  if(noisy)
+	    log_info(_("unknown option `%s'\n"),otok);
+	  return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Return a new malloced string by unescaping the string S.  Escaping
+   is percent escaping and '+'/space mapping.  A binary nul will
+   silently be replaced by a 0xFF. */
+char *
+unescape_percent_string (const unsigned char *s)
+{
+  char *buffer, *d;
+
+  buffer = d = xmalloc (strlen (s)+1);
+  while (*s)
+    {
+      if (*s == '%' && s[1] && s[2])
+        { 
+          s++;
+          *d = xtoi_2 (s);
+          if (!*d)
+            *d = '\xff';
+          d++;
+          s += 2;
+        }
+      else if (*s == '+')
+        {
+          *d++ = ' ';
+          s++;
+        }
+      else
+        *d++ = *s++;
+    }
+  *d = 0; 
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+
+int
+has_invalid_email_chars (const char *s)
+{
+  int at_seen=0;
+  const char *valid_chars=
+    "01234567890_-.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
+
+  for ( ; *s; s++ ) 
+    {
+      if ( *s & 0x80 )
+        return 1;
+      if ( *s == '@' )
+        at_seen=1;
+      else if ( !at_seen && !( !!strchr( valid_chars, *s ) || *s == '+' ) )
+        return 1;
+      else if ( at_seen && !strchr( valid_chars, *s ) )
+        return 1;
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Check whether NAME represents a valid mailbox according to
+   RFC822. Returns true if so. */
+int
+is_valid_mailbox (const char *name)
+{
+  return !( !name
+            || !*name
+            || has_invalid_email_chars (name)
+            || string_count_chr (name,'@') != 1
+            || *name == '@'
+            || name[strlen(name)-1] == '@'
+            || name[strlen(name)-1] == '.'
+            || strstr (name, "..") );
+}
+
+
+/* This is a helper function to load a Windows function from either of
+   one DLLs. */
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+static HRESULT
+w32_shgetfolderpath (HWND a, int b, HANDLE c, DWORD d, LPSTR e)
+{
+  static int initialized;
+  static HRESULT (WINAPI * func)(HWND,int,HANDLE,DWORD,LPSTR);
+
+  if (!initialized)
+    {
+      static char *dllnames[] = { "shell32.dll", "shfolder.dll", NULL };
+      void *handle;
+      int i;
+
+      initialized = 1;
+
+      for (i=0, handle = NULL; !handle && dllnames[i]; i++)
+        {
+          handle = dlopen (dllnames[i], RTLD_LAZY);
+          if (handle)
+            {
+              func = dlsym (handle, "SHGetFolderPathA");
+              if (!func)
+                {
+                  dlclose (handle);
+                  handle = NULL;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (func)
+    return func (a,b,c,d,e);
+  else
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
+
+
+/* Set up the default home directory.  The usual --homedir option
+   should be parsed later. */
+char *
+default_homedir (void)
+{
+  char *dir;
+
+  dir = getenv("GNUPGHOME");
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+  if (!dir || !*dir)
+    dir = read_w32_registry_string (NULL, "Software\\GNU\\GnuPG", "HomeDir");
+  if (!dir || !*dir)
+    {
+      char path[MAX_PATH];
+      
+      /* It might be better to use LOCAL_APPDATA because this is
+         defined as "non roaming" and thus more likely to be kept
+         locally.  For private keys this is desired.  However, given
+         that many users copy private keys anyway forth and back,
+         using a system roaming serives might be better than to let
+         them do it manually.  A security conscious user will anyway
+         use the registry entry to have better control.  */
+      if (w32_shgetfolderpath (NULL, CSIDL_APPDATA|CSIDL_FLAG_CREATE, 
+                               NULL, 0, path) >= 0) 
+        {
+          char *tmp = xmalloc (strlen (path) + 6 +1);
+          strcpy (stpcpy (tmp, path), "\\gnupg");
+          dir = tmp;
+          
+          /* Try to create the directory if it does not yet
+             exists.  */
+          if (access (dir, F_OK))
+            CreateDirectory (dir, NULL);
+        }
+    }
+#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
+  if (!dir || !*dir)
+    dir = GNUPG_HOMEDIR;
+
+  return dir;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the name of the libexec directory.  The name is allocated in
+   a static area on the first use.  This function won't fail. */
+const char *
+get_libexecdir (void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
+  static int got_dir;
+  static char dir[MAX_PATH+5];
+
+  if (!got_dir)
+    {
+      char *p;
+
+      if ( !GetModuleFileName ( NULL, dir, MAX_PATH) )
+        {
+          log_debug ("GetModuleFileName failed: %s\n", w32_strerror (0));
+          *dir = 0;
+        }
+      got_dir = 1;
+      p = strrchr (dir, DIRSEP_C);
+      if (p)
+        *p = 0;
+      else
+        {
+          log_debug ("bad filename `%s' returned for this process\n", dir);
+          *dir = 0; 
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (*dir)
+    return dir;
+  /* Fallback to the hardwired value. */
+#endif /*HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/
+
+  return GNUPG_LIBEXECDIR;
+}
+
+/* Similar to access(2), but uses PATH to find the file. */
+int
+path_access(const char *file,int mode)
+{
+  char *envpath;
+  int ret=-1;
+
+  envpath=getenv("PATH");
+
+  if(!envpath
+#ifdef HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS
+     || (((file[0]>='A' && file[0]<='Z')
+	  || (file[0]>='a' && file[0]<='z'))
+	 && file[1]==':')
+#else
+     || file[0]=='/'
+#endif
+     )
+    return access(file,mode);
+  else
+    {
+      /* At least as large as, but most often larger than we need. */
+      char *buffer=xmalloc(strlen(envpath)+1+strlen(file)+1);
+      char *split,*item,*path=xstrdup(envpath);
+
+      split=path;
+
+      while((item=strsep(&split,PATHSEP_S)))
+	{
+	  strcpy(buffer,item);
+	  strcat(buffer,"/");
+	  strcat(buffer,file);
+	  ret=access(buffer,mode);
+	  if(ret==0)
+	    break;
+	}
+
+      xfree(path);
+      xfree(buffer);
+    }
+
+  return ret;
+}
diff --git a/g10/openfile.c b/g10/openfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c106cdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/openfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+/* openfile.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_ONLY_8DOT3
+#define SKELEXT ".skl"
+#else
+#define SKELEXT EXTSEP_S "skel"
+#endif
+
+#if defined (HAVE_DRIVE_LETTERS) || defined (__riscos__)
+#define CMP_FILENAME(a,b) ascii_strcasecmp( (a), (b) )
+#else
+#define CMP_FILENAME(a,b) strcmp( (a), (b) )
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MKDIR_TAKES_ONE_ARG
+#undef mkdir
+#define mkdir(a,b) mkdir(a)
+#endif
+
+/* FIXME:  Implement opt.interactive. */
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an
+ * existing one.
+ * Returns: True: it's okay to overwrite or the file does not exist
+ *	    False: Do not overwrite
+ */
+int
+overwrite_filep( const char *fname )
+{
+    if( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) )
+	return 1; /* Writing to stdout is always okay */
+
+    if( access( fname, F_OK ) )
+	return 1; /* does not exist */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+    if ( !strcmp ( fname, "/dev/null" ) )
+        return 1; /* does not do any harm */
+#endif
+
+    /* fixme: add some backup stuff in case of overwrite */
+    if( opt.answer_yes )
+	return 1;
+    if( opt.answer_no || opt.batch )
+	return 0;  /* do not overwrite */
+
+    tty_printf(_("File `%s' exists. "), fname);
+    if( cpr_enabled () )
+        tty_printf ("\n");
+    if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("openfile.overwrite.okay",
+			       _("Overwrite? (y/N) ")) )
+	return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Strip know extensions from iname and return a newly allocated
+ * filename.  Return NULL if we can't do that.
+ */
+char *
+make_outfile_name( const char *iname )
+{
+    size_t n;
+
+    if ( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) )
+	return xstrdup("-");
+
+    n = strlen(iname);
+    if( n > 4 && (    !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "gpg")
+		   || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "pgp")
+		   || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
+		   || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "asc") ) ) {
+	char *buf = xstrdup( iname );
+	buf[n-4] = 0;
+	return buf;
+    }
+    else if( n > 5 && !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-5, EXTSEP_S "sign") ) {
+	char *buf = xstrdup( iname );
+	buf[n-5] = 0;
+	return buf;
+    }
+
+    log_info(_("%s: unknown suffix\n"), iname );
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Ask for a outputfilename and use the given one as default.
+ * Return NULL if no file has been given or it is not possible to
+ * ask the user.
+ */
+char *
+ask_outfile_name( const char *name, size_t namelen )
+{
+    size_t n;
+    const char *s;
+    char *prompt;
+    char *fname;
+    char *defname;
+
+    if( opt.batch )
+	return NULL;
+
+    s = _("Enter new filename");
+
+    defname = name && namelen? make_printable_string( name, namelen, 0): NULL;
+    n = strlen(s) + (defname?strlen (defname):0) + 10;
+    prompt = xmalloc(n);
+    if( defname )
+	sprintf(prompt, "%s [%s]: ", s, defname );
+    else
+	sprintf(prompt, "%s: ", s );
+    tty_enable_completion(NULL);
+    fname = cpr_get("openfile.askoutname", prompt );
+    cpr_kill_prompt();
+    tty_disable_completion();
+    xfree(prompt);
+    if( !*fname ) {
+	xfree( fname ); fname = NULL;
+	fname = defname; defname = NULL;
+    }
+    xfree(defname);
+    if (fname)
+        trim_spaces (fname);
+    return fname;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Make an output filename for the inputfile INAME.
+ * Returns an IOBUF and an errorcode
+ * Mode 0 = use ".gpg"
+ *	1 = use ".asc"
+ *	2 = use ".sig"
+ */
+int
+open_outfile( const char *iname, int mode, IOBUF *a )
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  *a = NULL;
+  if( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) && !opt.outfile ) {
+    *a = iobuf_create(NULL);
+    if( !*a ) {
+      log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), "[stdout]", strerror(errno) );
+      rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+    }
+    else if( opt.verbose )
+      log_info(_("writing to stdout\n"));
+  }
+  else {
+    char *buf = NULL;
+    const char *name;
+    
+    if( opt.dry_run )
+      name = "/dev/null";
+    else if( opt.outfile )
+      name = opt.outfile;
+    else {
+#ifdef USE_ONLY_8DOT3
+      if (opt.mangle_dos_filenames)
+        {
+          /* It is quite common for DOS system to have only one dot in a
+           * a filename So if we have something like this, we simple
+           * replace the suffix except in cases where the suffix is
+           * larger than 3 characters and not identlically to the new one.
+           * We should really map the filenames to 8.3 but this tends to
+           * be more complicated and is probaly a duty of the filesystem
+           */
+          char *dot;
+          const char *newsfx = mode==1 ? ".asc" :
+                               mode==2 ? ".sig" : ".gpg";
+          
+          buf = xmalloc(strlen(iname)+4+1);
+          strcpy(buf,iname);
+          dot = strrchr(buf, '.' );
+          if ( dot && dot > buf && dot[1] && strlen(dot) <= 4
+               && CMP_FILENAME(newsfx, dot) 
+               && !(strchr (dot, '/') || strchr (dot, '\\')))
+            {
+              /* There is a dot, the dot is not the first character,
+                 the suffix is not longer than 3, the suffix is not
+                 equal to the new suffix and tehre is no path delimter
+                 after the dot (e.g. foo.1/bar): Replace the
+                 suffix. */
+              strcpy (dot, newsfx );
+            }
+          else if ( dot && !dot[1] ) /* Don't duplicate a trailing dot. */
+            strcpy ( dot, newsfx+1 );
+          else
+            strcat ( buf, newsfx ); /* Just append the new suffix. */
+        }
+      if (!buf)
+#endif /* USE_ONLY_8DOT3 */
+        {
+          buf = xmalloc(strlen(iname)+4+1);
+          strcpy(stpcpy(buf,iname), mode==1 ? EXTSEP_S "asc" :
+		                   mode==2 ? EXTSEP_S "sig" : EXTSEP_S "gpg");
+        }
+      name = buf;
+    }
+
+    rc = 0;
+    while( !overwrite_filep (name) )
+      {
+        char *tmp = ask_outfile_name (NULL, 0);
+        if ( !tmp || !*tmp )
+          {
+            xfree (tmp);
+            rc = G10ERR_FILE_EXISTS;
+            break;
+          }
+        xfree (buf);
+        name = buf = tmp;
+      }
+    
+    if( !rc )
+      {
+        if (is_secured_filename (name) )
+          {
+            *a = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+          }
+        else
+          *a = iobuf_create( name );
+        if( !*a )
+          {
+            log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), name, strerror(errno) );
+            rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+          }
+        else if( opt.verbose )
+          log_info(_("writing to `%s'\n"), name );
+      }
+    xfree(buf);
+  }
+
+  if (*a)
+    iobuf_ioctl (*a,3,1,NULL); /* disable fd caching */
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Try to open a file without the extension ".sig" or ".asc"
+ * Return NULL if such a file is not available.
+ */
+IOBUF
+open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx )
+{
+    IOBUF a = NULL;
+    size_t len;
+
+    if( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) ) {
+	len = strlen(iname);
+	if( len > 4 && ( !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig")
+                        || ( len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign") )
+                        || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")) ) {
+	    char *buf;
+	    buf = xstrdup(iname);
+	    buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ;
+	    a = iobuf_open( buf );
+            if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a)))
+              {
+                iobuf_close (a);
+                a = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+              }
+	    if( a && opt.verbose )
+		log_info(_("assuming signed data in `%s'\n"), buf );
+	    if (a && pfx)
+	      handle_progress (pfx, a, buf);
+            xfree(buf);
+	}
+    }
+    return a;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Copy the option file skeleton to the given directory.
+ */
+static void
+copy_options_file( const char *destdir )
+{
+    const char *datadir = GNUPG_DATADIR;
+    char *fname;
+    FILE *src, *dst;
+    int linefeeds=0;
+    int c;
+    mode_t oldmask;
+    int esc = 0;
+    int any_option = 0;
+
+    if( opt.dry_run )
+	return;
+
+    fname = xmalloc( strlen(datadir) + strlen(destdir) + 15 );
+    strcpy(stpcpy(fname, datadir), DIRSEP_S "options" SKELEXT );
+    src = fopen( fname, "r" );
+    if (src && is_secured_file (fileno (src)))
+      {
+        fclose (src);
+        src = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !src ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	xfree(fname);
+	return;
+    }
+    strcpy(stpcpy(fname, destdir), DIRSEP_S "gpg" EXTSEP_S "conf" );
+    oldmask=umask(077);
+    if ( is_secured_filename (fname) )
+      {
+        dst = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    else
+      dst = fopen( fname, "w" );
+    umask(oldmask);
+    if( !dst ) {
+	log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	fclose( src );
+	xfree(fname);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    while( (c=getc(src)) != EOF ) {
+	if( linefeeds < 3 ) {
+	    if( c == '\n' )
+		linefeeds++;
+	}
+	else {
+	    putc( c, dst );
+            if (c== '\n')
+                esc = 1;
+            else if (esc == 1) {
+                if (c == ' ' || c == '\t')
+                    ;
+                else if (c == '#')
+                    esc = 2;
+                else 
+                    any_option = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    fclose( dst );
+    fclose( src );
+    log_info(_("new configuration file `%s' created\n"), fname );
+    if (any_option)
+        log_info (_("WARNING: options in `%s'"
+                    " are not yet active during this run\n"),
+                  fname);
+    xfree(fname);
+}
+
+
+void
+try_make_homedir( const char *fname )
+{
+    const char *defhome = GNUPG_HOMEDIR;
+
+    /* Create the directory only if the supplied directory name
+     * is the same as the default one.  This way we avoid to create
+     * arbitrary directories when a non-default homedirectory is used.
+     * To cope with HOME, we do compare only the suffix if we see that
+     * the default homedir does start with a tilde.
+     */
+    if( opt.dry_run || opt.no_homedir_creation )
+	return;
+
+    if ( ( *defhome == '~'
+           && ( strlen(fname) >= strlen (defhome+1)
+                && !strcmp(fname+strlen(fname)-strlen(defhome+1),
+                           defhome+1 ) ))
+         || ( *defhome != '~'
+              && !compare_filenames( fname, defhome ) )
+        ) {
+	if( mkdir( fname, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR ) )
+	    log_fatal( _("can't create directory `%s': %s\n"),
+					fname,	strerror(errno) );
+	else if( !opt.quiet )
+	    log_info( _("directory `%s' created\n"), fname );
+	copy_options_file( fname );
+/*  	log_info(_("you have to start GnuPG again, " */
+/*  		   "so it can read the new configuration file\n") ); */
+/*  	g10_exit(1); */
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f866e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/options.h
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+/* options.h
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+#ifndef G10_OPTIONS_H
+#define G10_OPTIONS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <types.h>
+#include "main.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+#ifndef EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
+/* Norcraft can't cope with common symbols */
+#if defined (__riscos__) && !defined (INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE)
+#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE extern
+#else
+#define EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE 
+#endif
+#endif
+
+EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
+struct
+{
+  int verbose;
+  int quiet;
+  unsigned debug;
+  int armor;
+  char *outfile;
+  off_t max_output;
+  int dry_run;
+  int list_only;
+  int textmode;
+  int expert;
+  const char *def_sig_expire;
+  int ask_sig_expire;
+  const char *def_cert_expire;
+  int ask_cert_expire;
+  int batch;	    /* run in batch mode */
+  int answer_yes; /* answer yes on most questions */
+  int answer_no;  /* answer no on most questions */
+  int check_sigs; /* check key signatures */
+  int with_colons;
+  int with_key_data;
+  int with_fingerprint; /* opt --with-fingerprint active */
+  int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
+  int list_sigs;   /* list signatures */
+  int no_armor;
+  int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
+  int def_cipher_algo;
+  int force_v3_sigs;
+  int force_v4_certs;
+  int force_mdc;
+  int disable_mdc;
+  int def_digest_algo;
+  int cert_digest_algo;
+  int compress_algo;
+  int compress_level;
+  int bz2_compress_level;
+  int bz2_decompress_lowmem;
+  const char *def_secret_key;
+  char *def_recipient;
+  int def_recipient_self;
+  int def_cert_level;
+  int min_cert_level;
+  int ask_cert_level;
+  int no_version;
+  int marginals_needed;
+  int completes_needed;
+  int max_cert_depth;
+  const char *homedir;
+
+  char *display;      /* 5 options to be passed to the gpg-agent */
+  char *ttyname;     
+  char *ttytype;
+  char *lc_ctype;
+  char *lc_messages;
+
+  int skip_verify;
+  int compress_keys;
+  int compress_sigs;
+  /* TM_CLASSIC must be zero to accomodate trustdbs generated before
+     we started storing the trust model inside the trustdb. */
+  enum
+    {
+      TM_CLASSIC=0, TM_PGP=1, TM_EXTERNAL=2, TM_ALWAYS, TM_DIRECT, TM_AUTO
+    } trust_model;
+  int force_ownertrust;
+  enum
+    {
+      CO_GNUPG=0, CO_RFC2440, CO_RFC1991, CO_PGP2, CO_PGP6, CO_PGP7, CO_PGP8
+    } compliance;
+  enum
+    {
+      KF_SHORT, KF_LONG, KF_0xSHORT, KF_0xLONG
+    } keyid_format;
+  int pgp2_workarounds;
+  int shm_coprocess;
+  const char *set_filename;
+  STRLIST comments;
+  int throw_keyid;
+  const char *photo_viewer;
+  int s2k_mode;
+  int s2k_digest_algo;
+  int s2k_cipher_algo;
+  unsigned char s2k_count; /* This is the encoded form, not the raw
+			      count */
+  int simple_sk_checksum; /* create the deprecated rfc2440 secret key
+			     protection */
+  int not_dash_escaped;
+  int escape_from;
+  int lock_once;
+  struct keyserver_spec
+  {
+    char *uri;
+    char *scheme;
+    char *auth;
+    char *host;
+    char *port;
+    char *path;
+    char *opaque;
+    STRLIST options;
+    struct
+    {
+      unsigned int direct_uri:1;
+    } flags;
+    struct keyserver_spec *next;
+  } *keyserver;
+  struct
+  {
+    unsigned int options;
+    unsigned int import_options;
+    unsigned int export_options;
+    STRLIST other;
+  } keyserver_options;
+  int exec_disable;
+  int exec_path_set;
+  unsigned int import_options;
+  unsigned int export_options;
+  unsigned int list_options;
+  unsigned int verify_options;
+  const char *def_preference_list;
+  const char *def_keyserver_url;
+  prefitem_t *personal_cipher_prefs;
+  prefitem_t *personal_digest_prefs;
+  prefitem_t *personal_compress_prefs;
+  int no_perm_warn;
+  int no_mdc_warn;
+  char *temp_dir;
+  int no_encrypt_to;
+  int interactive;
+  struct notation *sig_notations;
+  struct notation *cert_notations;
+  STRLIST sig_policy_url;
+  STRLIST cert_policy_url;
+  STRLIST sig_keyserver_url;
+  STRLIST cert_subpackets;
+  STRLIST sig_subpackets;
+  int allow_non_selfsigned_uid;
+  int allow_freeform_uid;
+  int no_literal;
+  ulong set_filesize;
+  int fast_list_mode;
+  int fixed_list_mode;
+  int ignore_time_conflict;
+  int ignore_valid_from;
+  int ignore_crc_error;
+  int ignore_mdc_error;
+  int command_fd;
+  const char *override_session_key;
+  int show_session_key;
+  int use_agent;
+  const char *gpg_agent_info;
+  int try_all_secrets;
+  int no_expensive_trust_checks;
+  int no_sig_cache;
+  int no_sig_create_check;
+  int no_auto_check_trustdb;
+  int preserve_permissions;
+  int no_homedir_creation;
+  struct groupitem *grouplist;
+  int strict;
+  int mangle_dos_filenames;
+  int enable_progress_filter;
+  unsigned int screen_columns;
+  unsigned int screen_lines;
+  byte *show_subpackets;
+  int rfc2440_text;
+
+  /* If true, let write failures on the status-fd exit the process. */
+  int exit_on_status_write_error;
+
+  /* If > 0, limit the number of card insertion prompts to this
+     value. */
+  int limit_card_insert_tries; 
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+  const char *ctapi_driver; /* Library to access the ctAPI. */
+  const char *pcsc_driver;  /* Library to access the PC/SC system. */
+  int disable_ccid;    /* Disable the use of the internal CCID driver. */
+#endif /*ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+
+  struct
+  {
+    /* If set, require an 0x19 backsig to be present on signatures
+       made by signing subkeys.  If not set, a missing backsig is not
+       an error (but an invalid backsig still is). */
+    unsigned int require_cross_cert:1;
+    unsigned int use_embedded_filename:1;
+    unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
+    unsigned int dsa2:1;
+  } flags;
+
+  /* Linked list of ways to find a key if the key isn't on the local
+     keyring. */
+  struct akl
+  {
+    enum {AKL_CERT, AKL_PKA, AKL_LDAP, AKL_KEYSERVER, AKL_SPEC} type;
+    struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+    struct akl *next;
+  } *auto_key_locate;
+
+  /* True if multiple concatenated signatures may be verified. */
+  int allow_multisig_verification; 
+  int passwd_repeat;
+} opt;
+
+/* CTRL is used to keep some global variables we currently can't
+   avoid.  Future concurrent versions of gpg will put it into a per
+   request structure CTRL. */
+EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE
+struct {
+  int in_auto_key_retrieve; /* True if we are doing an
+                               auto_key_retrieve. */
+} glo_ctrl;
+
+#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE  1	/* debug packet reading/writing */
+#define DBG_MPI_VALUE	  2	/* debug mpi details */
+#define DBG_CIPHER_VALUE  4	/* debug cipher handling */
+				/* (may reveal sensitive data) */
+#define DBG_FILTER_VALUE  8	/* debug internal filter handling */
+#define DBG_IOBUF_VALUE   16	/* debug iobuf stuff */
+#define DBG_MEMORY_VALUE  32	/* debug memory allocation stuff */
+#define DBG_CACHE_VALUE   64	/* debug the cacheing */
+#define DBG_MEMSTAT_VALUE 128	/* show memory statistics */
+#define DBG_TRUST_VALUE   256	/* debug the trustdb */
+#define DBG_HASHING_VALUE 512	/* debug hashing operations */
+#define DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE 1024  /* debug external program calls */
+#define DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE 2048  /* debug smart card I/O.  */
+
+#define DBG_PACKET (opt.debug & DBG_PACKET_VALUE)
+#define DBG_FILTER (opt.debug & DBG_FILTER_VALUE)
+#define DBG_CACHE  (opt.debug & DBG_CACHE_VALUE)
+#define DBG_TRUST  (opt.debug & DBG_TRUST_VALUE)
+#define DBG_HASHING (opt.debug & DBG_HASHING_VALUE)
+#define DBG_EXTPROG (opt.debug & DBG_EXTPROG_VALUE)
+#define DBG_CARD_IO (opt.debug & DBG_CARD_IO_VALUE)
+
+
+#define GNUPG   (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG)
+#define RFC1991 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC1991 || opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
+#define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440)
+#define PGP2    (opt.compliance==CO_PGP2)
+#define PGP6    (opt.compliance==CO_PGP6)
+#define PGP7    (opt.compliance==CO_PGP7)
+#define PGP8    (opt.compliance==CO_PGP8)
+
+/* Various option flags.  Note that there should be no common string
+   names between the IMPORT_ and EXPORT_ flags as they can be mixed in
+   the keyserver-options option. */
+
+#define IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS                (1<<0)
+#define IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG     (1<<1)
+#define IMPORT_FAST                      (1<<2)
+#define IMPORT_SK2PK                     (1<<3)
+#define IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY                (1<<4)
+#define IMPORT_MINIMAL                   (1<<5)
+#define IMPORT_CLEAN                     (1<<6)
+
+#define EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS                (1<<0)
+#define EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES                (1<<1)
+#define EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS         (1<<2)
+#define EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD       (1<<3)
+#define EXPORT_MINIMAL                   (1<<4)
+#define EXPORT_CLEAN                     (1<<5)
+
+#define LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS                 (1<<0)
+#define LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS            (1<<1)
+#define LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS          (1<<2)
+#define LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS         (1<<3)
+#define LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS (LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS|LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
+#define LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS         (1<<4)
+#define LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY           (1<<5)
+#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS          (1<<6)
+#define LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS       (1<<7)
+#define LIST_SHOW_KEYRING                (1<<8)
+#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE             (1<<9)
+#define LIST_SHOW_SIG_SUBPACKETS         (1<<10)
+
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS               (1<<0)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS          (1<<1)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS        (1<<2)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS       (1<<3)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS (VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS|VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS       (1<<4)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY         (1<<5)
+#define VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS        (1<<6)
+#define VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS               (1<<7)
+#define VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE        (1<<8)
+
+#define KEYSERVER_USE_TEMP_FILES         (1<<0)
+#define KEYSERVER_KEEP_TEMP_FILES        (1<<1)
+#define KEYSERVER_ADD_FAKE_V3            (1<<2)
+#define KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE      (1<<3)
+#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL    (1<<4)
+#define KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD       (1<<5)
+
+#endif /*G10_OPTIONS_H*/
diff --git a/g10/options.skel b/g10/options.skel
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83c0949
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/options.skel
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+# These first three lines are not copied to the gpg.conf file in
+# the users home directory.
+# $Id: options.skel 4106 2006-04-11 19:20:08Z dshaw $
+# Options for GnuPG
+# Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# 
+# This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+# unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+# modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+# 
+# This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even the
+# implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+#
+# Unless you specify which option file to use (with the command line
+# option "--options filename"), GnuPG uses the file ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf
+# by default.
+#
+# An options file can contain any long options which are available in
+# GnuPG. If the first non white space character of a line is a '#',
+# this line is ignored.  Empty lines are also ignored.
+#
+# See the man page for a list of options.
+
+# Uncomment the following option to get rid of the copyright notice
+
+#no-greeting
+
+# If you have more than 1 secret key in your keyring, you may want to
+# uncomment the following option and set your preferred keyid.
+
+#default-key 621CC013
+
+# If you do not pass a recipient to gpg, it will ask for one.  Using
+# this option you can encrypt to a default key.  Key validation will
+# not be done in this case.  The second form uses the default key as
+# default recipient.
+
+#default-recipient some-user-id
+#default-recipient-self
+
+# Use --encrypt-to to add the specified key as a recipient to all
+# messages.  This is useful, for example, when sending mail through a
+# mail client that does not automatically encrypt mail to your key.
+# In the example, this option allows you to read your local copy of
+# encrypted mail that you've sent to others.
+
+#encrypt-to some-key-id
+
+# By default GnuPG creates version 3 signatures for data files.  This
+# is not strictly OpenPGP compliant but PGP 6 and most versions of PGP
+# 7 require them.  To disable this behavior, you may use this option
+# or --openpgp.
+
+#no-force-v3-sigs
+
+# Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From "
+# it is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating
+# cleartext signatures; all other PGP versions do it this way too.
+# To enable full OpenPGP compliance you may want to use this option.
+
+#no-escape-from-lines
+
+# If you do not use the Latin-1 (ISO-8859-1) charset, you should tell
+# GnuPG which is the native character set.  Please check the man page
+# for supported character sets.  This character set is only used for
+# metadata and not for the actual message which does not undergo any
+# translation.  Note that future version of GnuPG will change to UTF-8
+# as default character set.  In most cases this option is not required 
+# GnuPG is able to figure out the correct charset and use that.
+
+#charset utf-8
+
+# Group names may be defined like this:
+#   group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
+#
+# Any time "mynames" is a recipient (-r or --recipient), it will be
+# expanded to the names "paige", "joe", and "patti", and the key ID
+# "0x12345678".  Note there is only one level of expansion - you
+# cannot make an group that points to another group.  Note also that
+# if there are spaces in the recipient name, this will appear as two
+# recipients.  In these cases it is better to use the key ID.
+
+#group mynames = paige 0x12345678 joe patti
+
+# Lock the file only once for the lifetime of a process.  If you do
+# not define this, the lock will be obtained and released every time
+# it is needed, which is usually preferable.
+
+#lock-once
+
+# GnuPG can send and receive keys to and from a keyserver.  These
+# servers can be HKP, email, or LDAP (if GnuPG is built with LDAP
+# support).
+#
+# Example HKP keyserver:
+#      hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
+#
+# Example email keyserver:
+#      mailto:pgp-public-keys@keys.pgp.net
+#
+# Example LDAP keyservers:
+#      ldap://keyserver.pgp.com
+#
+# Regular URL syntax applies, and you can set an alternate port
+# through the usual method:
+#      hkp://keyserver.example.net:22742
+#
+# If you have problems connecting to a HKP server through a buggy http
+# proxy, you can use keyserver option broken-http-proxy (see below),
+# but first you should make sure that you have read the man page
+# regarding proxies (keyserver option honor-http-proxy)
+#
+# Most users just set the name and type of their preferred keyserver.
+# Note that most servers (with the notable exception of
+# ldap://keyserver.pgp.com) synchronize changes with each other.  Note
+# also that a single server name may actually point to multiple
+# servers via DNS round-robin.  hkp://subkeys.pgp.net is an example of
+# such a "server", which spreads the load over a number of physical
+# servers.
+
+keyserver hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
+#keyserver mailto:pgp-public-keys@keys.nl.pgp.net
+#keyserver ldap://keyserver.pgp.com
+
+# Common options for keyserver functions:
+#
+# include-disabled = when searching, include keys marked as "disabled"
+#                    on the keyserver (not all keyservers support this).
+#
+# no-include-revoked = when searching, do not include keys marked as
+#                      "revoked" on the keyserver.
+#
+# verbose = show more information as the keys are fetched.
+#           Can be used more than once to increase the amount
+#           of information shown.
+#
+# use-temp-files = use temporary files instead of a pipe to talk to the
+#                  keyserver.  Some platforms (Win32 for one) always
+#                  have this on.
+#
+# keep-temp-files = do not delete temporary files after using them
+#                   (really only useful for debugging)
+#
+# honor-http-proxy = if the keyserver uses HTTP, honor the http_proxy
+#                    environment variable
+#
+# broken-http-proxy = try to work around a buggy HTTP proxy
+#
+# auto-key-retrieve = automatically fetch keys as needed from the keyserver
+#                     when verifying signatures or when importing keys that
+#                     have been revoked by a revocation key that is not
+#                     present on the keyring.
+#
+# no-include-attributes = do not include attribute IDs (aka "photo IDs")
+#                         when sending keys to the keyserver.
+
+#keyserver-options auto-key-retrieve
+
+# Display photo user IDs in key listings
+
+# list-options show-photos
+
+# Display photo user IDs when a signature from a key with a photo is
+# verified
+
+# verify-options show-photos
+
+# Use this program to display photo user IDs
+#
+# %i is expanded to a temporary file that contains the photo.
+# %I is the same as %i, but the file isn't deleted afterwards by GnuPG.
+# %k is expanded to the key ID of the key.
+# %K is expanded to the long OpenPGP key ID of the key.
+# %t is expanded to the extension of the image (e.g. "jpg").
+# %T is expanded to the MIME type of the image (e.g. "image/jpeg").
+# %f is expanded to the fingerprint of the key.
+# %% is %, of course.
+#
+# If %i or %I are not present, then the photo is supplied to the
+# viewer on standard input.  If your platform supports it, standard
+# input is the best way to do this as it avoids the time and effort in
+# generating and then cleaning up a secure temp file.
+#
+# If no photo-viewer is provided, GnuPG will look for xloadimage, eog,
+# or display (ImageMagick).  On Mac OS X and Windows, the default is
+# to use your regular JPEG image viewer.
+#
+# Some other viewers:
+# photo-viewer "qiv %i"
+# photo-viewer "ee %i"
+#
+# This one saves a copy of the photo ID in your home directory:
+# photo-viewer "cat > ~/photoid-for-key-%k.%t"
+#
+# Use your MIME handler to view photos:
+# photo-viewer "metamail -q -d -b -c %T -s 'KeyID 0x%k' -f GnuPG"
+
+# Passphrase agent
+#
+# We support the old experimental passphrase agent protocol as well as
+# the new Assuan based one (currently available in the "newpg" package
+# at ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/alpha/aegypten/).  To make use of the agent,
+# you have to run an agent as daemon and use the option
+#
+# use-agent
+# 
+# which tries to use the agent but will fallback to the regular mode
+# if there is a problem connecting to the agent.  The normal way to
+# locate the agent is by looking at the environment variable
+# GPG_AGENT_INFO which should have been set during gpg-agent startup.
+# In certain situations the use of this variable is not possible, thus
+# the option
+# 
+# --gpg-agent-info=<path>:<pid>:1
+#
+# may be used to override it.
+
+# Automatic key location
+#
+# GnuPG can automatically locate and retrieve keys as needed using the
+# auto-key-locate option.  This happens when encrypting to an email
+# address (in the "user@example.com" form), and there are no
+# user@example.com keys on the local keyring.  This option takes the
+# following arguments, in the order they are to be tried:
+# 
+# cert = locate a key using DNS CERT, as specified in 2538bis
+# (currently in draft): http://www.josefsson.org/rfc2538bis/
+#
+# pka = locate a key using DNS PKA.
+#
+# ldap = locate a key using the PGP Universal method of checking
+# "ldap://keys.(thedomain)".
+#
+# keyserver = locate a key using whatever keyserver is defined using
+# the keyserver option.
+#
+# You may also list arbitrary keyservers here by URL.
+#
+# Try CERT, then PKA, then LDAP, then hkp://subkeys.net:
+#auto-key-locate cert pka ldap hkp://subkeys.pgp.net
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f318133
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
+/* packet.h - packet definitions
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef G10_PACKET_H
+#define G10_PACKET_H
+
+#include "types.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "global.h"
+
+#define DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET 1
+
+typedef enum {
+	PKT_NONE	   =0,
+	PKT_PUBKEY_ENC	   =1, /* public key encrypted packet */
+	PKT_SIGNATURE	   =2, /* secret key encrypted packet */
+	PKT_SYMKEY_ENC	   =3, /* session key packet (OpenPGP)*/
+	PKT_ONEPASS_SIG    =4, /* one pass sig packet (OpenPGP)*/
+	PKT_SECRET_KEY	   =5, /* secret key */
+	PKT_PUBLIC_KEY	   =6, /* public key */
+	PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY  =7, /* secret subkey (OpenPGP) */
+	PKT_COMPRESSED	   =8, /* compressed data packet */
+	PKT_ENCRYPTED	   =9, /* conventional encrypted data */
+	PKT_MARKER	  =10, /* marker packet (OpenPGP) */
+	PKT_PLAINTEXT	  =11, /* plaintext data with filename and mode */
+	PKT_RING_TRUST	  =12, /* keyring trust packet */
+	PKT_USER_ID	  =13, /* user id packet */
+	PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY =14, /* public subkey (OpenPGP) */
+	PKT_OLD_COMMENT   =16, /* comment packet from an OpenPGP draft */
+	PKT_ATTRIBUTE     =17, /* PGP's attribute packet */
+	PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC =18, /* integrity protected encrypted data */
+	PKT_MDC 	  =19, /* manipulation detection code packet */
+	PKT_COMMENT	  =61, /* new comment packet (private) */
+        PKT_GPG_CONTROL   =63  /* internal control packet */
+} pkttype_t;
+
+typedef struct packet_struct PACKET;
+
+/* PKT_GPG_CONTROL types */
+typedef enum {
+    CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START = 1,
+    CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE = 2,
+    CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK =3
+} ctrlpkttype_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    PREFTYPE_NONE = 0,
+    PREFTYPE_SYM = 1,
+    PREFTYPE_HASH = 2,
+    PREFTYPE_ZIP = 3
+} preftype_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    byte type; 
+    byte value;
+} prefitem_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    int  mode;
+    byte hash_algo;
+    byte salt[8];
+    u32  count;
+} STRING2KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+    byte version;
+    byte cipher_algo;	 /* cipher algorithm used */
+    STRING2KEY s2k;
+    byte seskeylen;   /* keylength in byte or 0 for no seskey */
+    byte seskey[1];
+} PKT_symkey_enc;
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32     keyid[2];	    /* 64 bit keyid */
+    byte    version;
+    byte    pubkey_algo;    /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
+    byte    throw_keyid;
+    MPI     data[PUBKEY_MAX_NENC];
+} PKT_pubkey_enc;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32     keyid[2];	    /* 64 bit keyid */
+    byte    sig_class;	    /* sig classification */
+    byte    digest_algo;    /* algorithm used for digest */
+    byte    pubkey_algo;    /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
+    byte    last;	    /* a stupid flag */
+} PKT_onepass_sig;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    size_t size;  /* allocated */
+    size_t len;   /* used */
+    byte data[1];
+} subpktarea_t;
+
+struct revocation_key {
+  byte class;
+  byte algid;
+  byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+};
+
+
+/* Object to keep information about a PKA DNS record. */
+typedef struct
+{
+  int valid;    /* An actual PKA record exists for EMAIL. */
+  int checked;  /* Set to true if the FPR has been checked against the
+                   actual key. */
+  char *uri;    /* Malloced string with the URI. NULL if the URI is
+                   not available.*/
+  unsigned char fpr[20]; /* The fingerprint as stored in the PKA RR. */
+  char email[1];/* The email address from the notation data. */
+} pka_info_t;
+
+
+/* Object to keep information pertaining to a signature. */
+typedef struct 
+{
+  struct 
+  {
+    unsigned checked:1;         /* Signature has been checked. */
+    unsigned valid:1;           /* Signature is good (if checked is set). */
+    unsigned chosen_selfsig:1;  /* A selfsig that is the chosen one. */
+    unsigned unknown_critical:1;
+    unsigned exportable:1;
+    unsigned revocable:1;
+    unsigned policy_url:1;  /* At least one policy URL is present */
+    unsigned notation:1;    /* At least one notation is present */
+    unsigned pref_ks:1;     /* At least one preferred keyserver is present */
+    unsigned expired:1;
+    unsigned pka_tried:1;   /* Set if we tried to retrieve the PKA record. */
+  } flags;
+  u32     keyid[2];	  /* 64 bit keyid */
+  u32     timestamp;	  /* Signature made (seconds since Epoch). */
+  u32     expiredate;     /* Expires at this date or 0 if not at all. */
+  byte    version;
+  byte    sig_class;	  /* Sig classification, append for MD calculation. */
+  byte    pubkey_algo;    /* Algorithm used for public key scheme */
+                          /* (PUBKEY_ALGO_xxx) */
+  byte    digest_algo;    /* Algorithm used for digest (DIGEST_ALGO_xxxx). */
+  byte    trust_depth;
+  byte    trust_value;
+  const byte *trust_regexp;
+  struct revocation_key **revkey;
+  int numrevkeys;
+  pka_info_t *pka_info;      /* Malloced PKA data or NULL if not
+                                available.  See also flags.pka_tried. */
+  subpktarea_t *hashed;      /* All subpackets with hashed data (v4 only). */
+  subpktarea_t *unhashed;    /* Ditto for unhashed data. */
+  byte digest_start[2];      /* First 2 bytes of the digest. */
+  MPI  data[PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG];
+} PKT_signature;
+
+#define ATTRIB_IMAGE 1
+
+/* This is the cooked form of attributes */
+struct user_attribute {
+  byte type;
+  const byte *data;
+  u32 len;
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  int ref;              /* reference counter */
+  int len;	        /* length of the name */
+  struct user_attribute *attribs;
+  int numattribs;
+  byte *attrib_data;    /* if this is not NULL, the packet is an attribute */
+  unsigned long attrib_len;
+  byte *namehash;
+  int help_key_usage;
+  u32 help_key_expire;
+  int help_full_count;
+  int help_marginal_count;
+  int is_primary;       /* 2 if set via the primary flag, 1 if calculated */
+  int is_revoked;
+  int is_expired;
+  u32 expiredate;       /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */
+  prefitem_t *prefs;    /* list of preferences (may be NULL)*/
+  u32 created;          /* according to the self-signature */
+  byte selfsigversion;
+  struct
+  {
+    /* TODO: Move more flags here */
+    unsigned mdc:1;
+    unsigned ks_modify:1;
+    unsigned compacted:1;
+  } flags;
+  char name[1];
+} PKT_user_id;
+
+struct revoke_info
+{
+  /* revoked at this date */
+  u32 date;
+  /* the keyid of the revoking key (selfsig or designated revoker) */
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  /* the algo of the revoking key */
+  byte algo;
+};
+
+/****************
+ * Note about the pkey/skey elements:  We assume that the secret keys
+ * has the same elemts as the public key at the begin of the array, so
+ * that npkey < nskey and it is possible to compare the secret and
+ * public keys by comparing the first npkey elements of pkey againts skey.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    u32     timestamp;	    /* key made */
+    u32     expiredate;     /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */
+    u32     max_expiredate; /* must not expire past this date */
+    struct revoke_info revoked;
+    byte    hdrbytes;	    /* number of header bytes */
+    byte    version;
+    byte    selfsigversion; /* highest version of all of the self-sigs */
+    byte    pubkey_algo;    /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
+    byte    pubkey_usage;   /* for now only used to pass it to getkey() */
+    byte    req_usage;      /* hack to pass a request to getkey() */
+    byte    req_algo;       /* Ditto */
+    u32     has_expired;    /* set to the expiration date if expired */ 
+    int     is_revoked;     /* key has been revoked, 1 if by the
+			       owner, 2 if by a designated revoker */
+    int     maybe_revoked;  /* a designated revocation is present, but
+			       without the key to check it */
+    int     is_valid;       /* key (especially subkey) is valid */
+    int     dont_cache;     /* do not cache this */
+    byte    backsig;        /* 0=none, 1=bad, 2=good */
+    u32     main_keyid[2];  /* keyid of the primary key */
+    u32     keyid[2];	    /* calculated by keyid_from_pk() */
+    byte    is_primary;
+    byte    is_disabled;    /* 0 for unset, 1 for enabled, 2 for disabled. */
+    prefitem_t *prefs;      /* list of preferences (may be NULL) */
+    int     mdc_feature;    /* mdc feature set */
+    PKT_user_id *user_id;   /* if != NULL: found by that uid */
+    struct revocation_key *revkey;
+    int     numrevkeys;
+    u32     trust_timestamp;
+    byte    trust_depth;
+    byte    trust_value;
+    const byte *trust_regexp;
+    MPI     pkey[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
+} PKT_public_key;
+
+/* Evaluates as true if the pk is disabled, and false if it isn't.  If
+   there is no disable value cached, fill one in. */
+#define pk_is_disabled(a) (((a)->is_disabled)?((a)->is_disabled==2):(cache_disabled_value((a))))
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32     timestamp;	    /* key made */
+    u32     expiredate;     /* expires at this date or 0 if not at all */
+    u32     max_expiredate; /* must not expire past this date */
+    byte    hdrbytes;	    /* number of header bytes */
+    byte    version;
+    byte    pubkey_algo;    /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
+    byte    pubkey_usage;
+    byte    req_usage;
+    byte    req_algo;
+    u32     has_expired;    /* set to the expiration date if expired */ 
+    int     is_revoked;     /* key has been revoked */
+    int     is_valid;       /* key (especially subkey) is valid */
+    u32     main_keyid[2];  /* keyid of the primary key */
+    u32     keyid[2];   
+    byte is_primary;
+    byte is_protected;	/* The secret info is protected and must */
+			/* be decrypted before use, the protected */
+			/* MPIs are simply (void*) pointers to memory */
+			/* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */
+    struct {
+	byte algo;  /* cipher used to protect the secret information*/
+        byte sha1chk;  /* SHA1 is used instead of a 16 bit checksum */ 
+	STRING2KEY s2k;
+	byte ivlen;  /* used length of the iv */
+	byte iv[16]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
+    } protect;
+    MPI skey[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+    u16 csum;		/* checksum */
+} PKT_secret_key;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    int  len;		  /* length of data */
+    char data[1];
+} PKT_comment;
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32  len;		  /* reserved */
+    byte  new_ctb;
+    byte  algorithm;
+    IOBUF buf;		  /* IOBUF reference */
+} PKT_compressed;
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32  len;		  /* length of encrypted data */
+    int  extralen;        /* this is (blocksize+2) */
+    byte new_ctb;	  /* uses a new CTB */
+    byte is_partial;      /* partial length encoded */
+    byte mdc_method;	  /* > 0: integrity protected encrypted data packet */
+    IOBUF buf;		  /* IOBUF reference */
+} PKT_encrypted;
+
+typedef struct {
+    byte hash[20];
+} PKT_mdc;
+
+typedef struct {
+    unsigned int trustval;
+    unsigned int sigcache;
+} PKT_ring_trust;
+
+typedef struct {
+    u32  len;		  /* length of encrypted data */
+    IOBUF buf;		  /* IOBUF reference */
+    byte new_ctb;
+    byte is_partial;      /* partial length encoded */
+    int mode;
+    u32 timestamp;
+    int  namelen;
+    char name[1];
+} PKT_plaintext;
+
+typedef struct {
+    int  control;
+    size_t datalen;
+    char data[1];
+} PKT_gpg_control;
+
+/* combine all packets into a union */
+struct packet_struct {
+    pkttype_t pkttype;
+    union {
+	void *generic;
+	PKT_symkey_enc	*symkey_enc;	/* PKT_SYMKEY_ENC */
+	PKT_pubkey_enc	*pubkey_enc;	/* PKT_PUBKEY_ENC */
+	PKT_onepass_sig *onepass_sig;	/* PKT_ONEPASS_SIG */
+	PKT_signature	*signature;	/* PKT_SIGNATURE */
+	PKT_public_key	*public_key;	/* PKT_PUBLIC_[SUB)KEY */
+	PKT_secret_key	*secret_key;	/* PKT_SECRET_[SUB]KEY */
+	PKT_comment	*comment;	/* PKT_COMMENT */
+	PKT_user_id	*user_id;	/* PKT_USER_ID */
+	PKT_compressed	*compressed;	/* PKT_COMPRESSED */
+	PKT_encrypted	*encrypted;	/* PKT_ENCRYPTED[_MDC] */
+	PKT_mdc 	*mdc;		/* PKT_MDC */
+	PKT_ring_trust	*ring_trust;	/* PKT_RING_TRUST */
+	PKT_plaintext	*plaintext;	/* PKT_PLAINTEXT */
+        PKT_gpg_control *gpg_control;   /* PKT_GPG_CONTROL */
+    } pkt;
+};
+
+#define init_packet(a) do { (a)->pkttype = 0;		\
+			    (a)->pkt.generic = NULL;	\
+		       } while(0)
+
+typedef enum {
+    SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL=-3,
+    SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED=-2,
+    SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED  =-1,
+    SIGSUBPKT_NONE	   = 0,
+    SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED  = 2, /* signature creation time */
+    SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE   = 3, /* signature expiration time */
+    SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE   = 4, /* exportable */
+    SIGSUBPKT_TRUST	   = 5, /* trust signature */
+    SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP	   = 6, /* regular expression */
+    SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE    = 7, /* revocable */
+    SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE   = 9, /* key expiration time */
+    SIGSUBPKT_ARR	   =10, /* additional recipient request */
+    SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM	   =11, /* preferred symmetric algorithms */
+    SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY	   =12, /* revocation key */
+    SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER	   =16, /* issuer key ID */
+    SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION	   =20, /* notation data */
+    SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH    =21, /* preferred hash algorithms */
+    SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR   =22, /* preferred compression algorithms */
+    SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS	   =23, /* key server preferences */
+    SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS	   =24, /* preferred key server */
+    SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID  =25, /* primary user id */
+    SIGSUBPKT_POLICY	   =26, /* policy URL */
+    SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS    =27, /* key flags */
+    SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID  =28, /* signer's user id */
+    SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON =29, /* reason for revocation */
+    SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES     =30, /* feature flags */
+
+    SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE    =32, /* embedded signature */
+
+    SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL=128
+} sigsubpkttype_t;
+
+struct notation
+{
+  char *name;
+  char *value;
+  char *altvalue;
+  unsigned char *bdat;
+  size_t blen;
+  struct
+  {
+    unsigned int critical:1;
+    unsigned int ignore:1;
+  } flags;
+  struct notation *next;
+};
+
+/*-- mainproc.c --*/
+int proc_packets( void *ctx, IOBUF a );
+int proc_signature_packets( void *ctx, IOBUF a,
+			    STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfile );
+int proc_encryption_packets( void *ctx, IOBUF a );
+int list_packets( IOBUF a );
+
+/*-- parse-packet.c --*/
+int set_packet_list_mode( int mode );
+
+#if DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int dbg_search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid,
+                       const char* file, int lineno  );
+int dbg_parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *ret_pkt,
+                      const char* file, int lineno );
+int dbg_copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out,
+                          const char* file, int lineno  );
+int dbg_copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff,
+                           const char* file, int lineno  );
+int dbg_skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n,
+                           const char* file, int lineno	);
+#define search_packet( a,b,c,d )   \
+             dbg_search_packet( (a), (b), (c), (d), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
+#define parse_packet( a, b )  \
+	     dbg_parse_packet( (a), (b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
+#define copy_all_packets( a,b )  \
+             dbg_copy_all_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
+#define copy_some_packets( a,b,c ) \
+             dbg_copy_some_packets((a),(b),(c), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
+#define skip_some_packets( a,b ) \
+             dbg_skip_some_packets((a),(b), __FILE__, __LINE__ )
+#else
+int search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid );
+int parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *ret_pkt);
+int copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out );
+int copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff );
+int skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n );
+#endif
+
+int parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+		     PKT_signature *sig );
+const byte *enum_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t *subpkts,
+                              sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+                              size_t *ret_n, int *start, int *critical );
+const byte *parse_sig_subpkt ( const subpktarea_t *buffer,
+                               sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+                               size_t *ret_n );
+const byte *parse_sig_subpkt2 ( PKT_signature *sig,
+                                sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+                                size_t *ret_n );
+int parse_one_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type );
+void parse_revkeys(PKT_signature *sig);
+int parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid);
+void make_attribute_uidname(PKT_user_id *uid, size_t max_namelen);
+PACKET *create_gpg_control ( ctrlpkttype_t type,
+                             const byte *data,
+                             size_t datalen );
+
+/*-- build-packet.c --*/
+int build_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt );
+u32 calc_packet_length( PACKET *pkt );
+void build_sig_subpkt( PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
+			const byte *buffer, size_t buflen );
+void build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
+int  delete_sig_subpkt(subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t type );
+void build_attribute_subpkt(PKT_user_id *uid,byte type,
+			    const void *buf,u32 buflen,
+			    const void *header,u32 headerlen);
+struct notation *string_to_notation(const char *string,int is_utf8);
+struct notation *sig_to_notation(PKT_signature *sig);
+void free_notation(struct notation *notation);
+
+/*-- free-packet.c --*/
+void free_symkey_enc( PKT_symkey_enc *enc );
+void free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc );
+void free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *enc );
+int  digest_algo_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig );
+void release_public_key_parts( PKT_public_key *pk );
+void free_public_key( PKT_public_key *key );
+void release_secret_key_parts( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+void free_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+void free_attributes(PKT_user_id *uid);
+void free_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid );
+void free_comment( PKT_comment *rem );
+void free_packet( PACKET *pkt );
+prefitem_t *copy_prefs (const prefitem_t *prefs);
+PKT_public_key *copy_public_key( PKT_public_key *d, PKT_public_key *s );
+void copy_public_parts_to_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk );
+PKT_secret_key *copy_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *d, PKT_secret_key *s );
+PKT_signature *copy_signature( PKT_signature *d, PKT_signature *s );
+PKT_user_id *scopy_user_id (PKT_user_id *sd );
+int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *a, PKT_public_key *b );
+int cmp_secret_keys( PKT_secret_key *a, PKT_secret_key *b );
+int cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b );
+int cmp_public_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk );
+int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b );
+
+
+/*-- sig-check.c --*/
+int signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest );
+int signature_check2( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest, u32 *r_expiredate,
+		      int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk );
+
+/*-- seckey-cert.c --*/
+int is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk );
+int check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int retries );
+int protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek );
+
+/*-- pubkey-enc.c --*/
+int get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek );
+int get_override_session_key( DEK *dek, const char *string );
+
+/*-- compress.c --*/
+int handle_compressed( void *ctx, PKT_compressed *cd,
+		       int (*callback)(IOBUF, void *), void *passthru );
+
+/*-- encr-data.c --*/
+int decrypt_data( void *ctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek );
+
+/*-- plaintext.c --*/
+int handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
+					int nooutput, int clearsig );
+int ask_for_detached_datafile( MD_HANDLE md, MD_HANDLE md2,
+			       const char *inname, int textmode );
+
+/*-- sign.c --*/
+int make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+			PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk,
+			PKT_secret_key *sk, int sigclass, int digest_algo,
+			int sigversion, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+			int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
+			void *opaque  );
+int update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
+                      PKT_signature *orig_sig,
+                      PKT_public_key *pk,
+                      PKT_user_id *uid,
+                      PKT_public_key *subpk,
+                      PKT_secret_key *sk,
+                      int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
+                      void *opaque   );
+
+/*-- keygen.c --*/
+PKT_user_id *generate_user_id(void);
+
+#endif /*G10_PACKET_H*/
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31f21bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2411 @@
+/* parse-packet.c  - read packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+static int mpi_print_mode;
+static int list_mode;
+static FILE *listfp;
+
+static int  parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts,
+                  off_t *retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+		   ,const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
+#endif
+		 );
+static int  copy_packet( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
+			 unsigned long pktlen, int partial );
+static void skip_packet( IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
+			 unsigned long pktlen, int partial );
+static void *read_rest( IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen, int partial );
+static int  parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							     PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							     PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							PKT_onepass_sig *ops );
+static int  parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+				      byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							   PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_attribute( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							   PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							   PACKET *packet );
+static void parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+							   PACKET *packet );
+static int  parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+			     PACKET *packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
+static int  parse_compressed( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+					       PACKET *packet, int new_ctb );
+static int  parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+			     PACKET *packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
+static int  parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+					       PACKET *packet, int new_ctb);
+static int  parse_gpg_control( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+                               PACKET *packet, int partial );
+
+static unsigned short
+read_16(IOBUF inp)
+{
+    unsigned short a;
+    a = iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
+    a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    return a;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+read_32(IOBUF inp)
+{
+    unsigned long a;
+    a =  iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 24;
+    a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 16;
+    a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp) << 8;
+    a |= iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    return a;
+}
+
+
+int
+set_packet_list_mode( int mode )
+{
+    int old = list_mode;
+    list_mode = mode;
+    mpi_print_mode = DBG_MPI;
+    /* We use stdout print only if invoked by the --list-packets
+       command but switch to stderr in all otehr cases.  This breaks
+       the previous behaviour but that seems to be more of a bug than
+       intentional.  I don't believe that any application makes use of
+       this long standing annoying way of printing to stdout except
+       when doing a --list-packets. If this assumption fails, it will
+       be easy to add an option for the listing stream.  Note that we
+       initialize it only once; mainly because some code may switch
+       the option value later back to 1 and we want to have all output
+       to the same stream.  
+
+       Using stderr is not actually very clean because it bypasses the
+       logging code but it is a special thing anyay.  I am not sure
+       whether using log_stream() would be better.  Perhaps we should
+       enable the list mdoe only with a special option. */
+    if (!listfp)
+        listfp = opt.list_packets == 2 ? stdout : stderr;
+    return old;
+}
+
+static void
+unknown_pubkey_warning( int algo )
+{
+    static byte unknown_pubkey_algos[256];
+
+    algo &= 0xff;
+    if( !unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] ) {
+	if( opt.verbose )
+	    log_info(_("can't handle public key algorithm %d\n"), algo );
+	unknown_pubkey_algos[algo] = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Parse a Packet and return it in packet
+ * Returns: 0 := valid packet in pkt
+ *	   -1 := no more packets
+ *	   >0 := error
+ * Note: The function may return an error and a partly valid packet;
+ * caller must free this packet.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int
+dbg_parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
+{
+    int skip, rc;
+
+    do {
+	rc = parse( inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0, "parse", dbg_f, dbg_l );
+    } while( skip );
+    return rc;
+}
+#else
+int
+parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    int skip, rc;
+
+    do {
+	rc = parse( inp, pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 0 );
+    } while( skip );
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************
+ * Like parse packet, but only return secret or public (sub)key packets.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int
+dbg_search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid,
+		   const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
+{
+    int skip, rc;
+
+    do {
+	rc = parse( inp, pkt, with_uid?2:1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0, "search", dbg_f, dbg_l );
+    } while( skip );
+    return rc;
+}
+#else
+int
+search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, off_t *retpos, int with_uid )
+{
+    int skip, rc;
+
+    do {
+	rc = parse( inp, pkt, with_uid?2:1, retpos, &skip, NULL, 0 );
+    } while( skip );
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************
+ * Copy all packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int
+dbg_copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out,
+		   const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    do {
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+    } while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0, "copy", dbg_f, dbg_l )));
+    return rc;
+}
+#else
+int
+copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    do {
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+    } while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0 )));
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************
+ * Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
+ * Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later offsets)
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int
+dbg_copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff,
+		   const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    do {
+	if( iobuf_tell(inp) >= stopoff )
+	    return 0;
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+    } while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0,
+				     "some", dbg_f, dbg_l )) );
+    return rc;
+}
+#else
+int
+copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, off_t stopoff )
+{
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    do {
+	if( iobuf_tell(inp) >= stopoff )
+	    return 0;
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+    } while( !(rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, out, 0 )) );
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************
+ * Skip over N packets
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+int
+dbg_skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n,
+		   const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l )
+{
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    for( ;n && !rc; n--) {
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+	rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1, "skip", dbg_f, dbg_l );
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+#else
+int
+skip_some_packets( IOBUF inp, unsigned n )
+{
+    int skip, rc=0;
+    PACKET pkt;
+
+    for( ;n && !rc; n--) {
+	init_packet(&pkt);
+	rc = parse( inp, &pkt, 0, NULL, &skip, NULL, 1 );
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************
+ * Parse packet. Set the variable skip points to 1 if the packet
+ * should be skipped; this is the case if either ONLYKEYPKTS is set
+ * and the parsed packet isn't one or the
+ * packet-type is 0, indicating deleted stuff.
+ * if OUT is not NULL, a special copymode is used.
+ */
+static int
+parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t *retpos,
+       int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+       ,const char *dbg_w, const char *dbg_f, int dbg_l
+#endif
+     )
+{
+    int rc=0, c, ctb, pkttype, lenbytes;
+    unsigned long pktlen;
+    byte hdr[8];
+    int hdrlen;
+    int new_ctb = 0, partial=0;
+    int with_uid = (onlykeypkts == 2);
+
+    *skip = 0;
+    assert( !pkt->pkt.generic );
+    if( retpos )
+	*retpos = iobuf_tell(inp);
+
+    if( (ctb = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
+	rc = -1;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    hdrlen=0;
+    hdr[hdrlen++] = ctb;
+    if( !(ctb & 0x80) ) {
+        log_error("%s: invalid packet (ctb=%02x)\n", iobuf_where(inp), ctb );
+	rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    pktlen = 0;
+    new_ctb = !!(ctb & 0x40);
+    if( new_ctb ) {
+        pkttype = ctb & 0x3f;
+	if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 ) {
+	    log_error("%s: 1st length byte missing\n", iobuf_where(inp) );
+	    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+        if (pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) {
+             iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(inp, c & 0xff);
+             pktlen = 0;/* to indicate partial length */
+	     partial=1;
+        }
+        else {
+             hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
+             if( c < 192 )
+	       pktlen = c;
+             else if( c < 224 )
+	       {
+		 pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
+		 if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 )
+		   {
+		     log_error("%s: 2nd length byte missing\n",
+			       iobuf_where(inp) );
+		     rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		     goto leave;
+		   }
+		 hdr[hdrlen++] = c;
+		 pktlen += c + 192;
+	       }
+             else if( c == 255 )
+	       {
+		 pktlen  = (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 24;
+		 pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 16;
+		 pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp)) << 8;
+		 if( (c = iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 )
+		   {
+		     log_error("%s: 4 byte length invalid\n",
+			       iobuf_where(inp) );
+		     rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		     goto leave;
+		   }
+		 pktlen |= (hdr[hdrlen++] = c );
+	       }
+             else
+	       {
+		 /* Partial body length.  Note that we handled
+		    PKT_COMPRESSED earlier. */
+		 if(pkttype==PKT_PLAINTEXT || pkttype==PKT_ENCRYPTED
+		    || pkttype==PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC)
+		   {
+		     iobuf_set_partial_block_mode(inp, c & 0xff);
+		     pktlen = 0;/* to indicate partial length */
+		     partial=1;
+		   }
+		 else
+		   {
+		     log_error("%s: partial length for invalid"
+			       " packet type %d\n",iobuf_where(inp),pkttype);
+		     rc=G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		     goto leave;
+		   }
+	       }
+	}
+    }
+    else
+      {
+	pkttype = (ctb>>2)&0xf;
+	lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
+	if( !lenbytes )
+	  {
+	    pktlen = 0; /* don't know the value */
+	    /* This isn't really partial, but we can treat it the same
+	       in a "read until the end" sort of way. */
+	    partial=1;
+	    if(pkttype!=PKT_ENCRYPTED && pkttype!=PKT_PLAINTEXT
+	       && pkttype!=PKT_COMPRESSED)
+	      {
+		log_error ("%s: indeterminate length for invalid"
+			   " packet type %d\n", iobuf_where(inp), pkttype );
+		rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		goto leave;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    for( ; lenbytes; lenbytes-- )
+	      {
+		pktlen <<= 8;
+		pktlen |= hdr[hdrlen++] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if (pktlen == 0xffffffff) {
+        /* with a some probability this is caused by a problem in the
+         * the uncompressing layer - in some error cases it just loops
+         * and spits out 0xff bytes. */
+        log_error ("%s: garbled packet detected\n", iobuf_where(inp) );
+	g10_exit (2);
+    }
+
+    if( out && pkttype	) {
+	if( iobuf_write( out, hdr, hdrlen ) == -1 )
+	    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	else
+	    rc = copy_packet(inp, out, pkttype, pktlen, partial );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if (with_uid && pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        ;
+    else if( do_skip 
+        || !pkttype
+        || (onlykeypkts && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+                        && pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                        && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
+                        && pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY  ) ) {
+	iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, partial);
+	*skip = 1;
+	rc = 0;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if( DBG_PACKET ) {
+#ifdef DEBUG_PARSE_PACKET
+	log_debug("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s (%s.%s.%d)\n",
+		   iobuf_id(inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb?" (new_ctb)":"",
+		    dbg_w, dbg_f, dbg_l );
+#else
+	log_debug("parse_packet(iob=%d): type=%d length=%lu%s\n",
+		   iobuf_id(inp), pkttype, pktlen, new_ctb?" (new_ctb)":"" );
+#endif
+    }
+    pkt->pkttype = pkttype;
+    rc = G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
+    switch( pkttype ) {
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+	pkt->pkt.public_key = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_key );
+	rc = parse_key(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+      case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+	pkt->pkt.secret_key = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+	rc = parse_key(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+	rc = parse_symkeyenc( inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
+	break;
+      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+	rc = parse_pubkeyenc(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
+	break;
+      case PKT_SIGNATURE:
+	pkt->pkt.signature = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.signature );
+	rc = parse_signature(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.signature );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG:
+	pkt->pkt.onepass_sig = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.onepass_sig );
+	rc = parse_onepass_sig(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt->pkt.onepass_sig );
+	break;
+      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	rc = parse_user_id(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
+	pkt->pkttype = pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;  /* we store it in the userID */
+	rc = parse_attribute(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
+	break;
+      case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
+      case PKT_COMMENT:
+	rc = parse_comment(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
+	break;
+      case PKT_RING_TRUST:
+	parse_trust(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
+	rc = 0;
+	break;
+      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
+	rc = parse_plaintext(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial );
+	break;
+      case PKT_COMPRESSED:
+	rc = parse_compressed(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
+	break;
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+	rc = parse_encrypted(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb, partial );
+	break;
+      case PKT_MDC:
+	rc = parse_mdc(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb );
+	break;
+      case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
+        rc = parse_gpg_control(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial );
+        break;
+      default:
+	skip_packet(inp, pkttype, pktlen, partial);
+	break;
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    if( !rc && iobuf_error(inp) )
+	rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+dump_hex_line( int c, int *i )
+{
+    if( *i && !(*i%8) ) {
+	if( *i && !(*i%24) )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\n%4d:", *i );
+	else
+	    putc (' ', listfp);
+    }
+    if( c == -1 )
+	fprintf (listfp, " EOF" );
+    else
+	fprintf (listfp, " %02x", c );
+    ++*i;
+}
+
+
+static int
+copy_packet( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, int pkttype,
+	     unsigned long pktlen, int partial )
+{
+    int n;
+    char buf[100];
+
+    if( partial ) {
+	while( (n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, 100 )) != -1 )
+	    if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
+		return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
+    }
+    else if( !pktlen && pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED ) {
+	log_debug("copy_packet: compressed!\n");
+	/* compressed packet, copy till EOF */
+	while( (n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, 100 )) != -1 )
+	    if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
+		return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
+    }
+    else {
+	for( ; pktlen; pktlen -= n ) {
+	    n = pktlen > 100 ? 100 : pktlen;
+	    n = iobuf_read( inp, buf, n );
+	    if( n == -1 )
+		return G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	    if( iobuf_write(out, buf, n ) )
+		return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE; /* write error */
+	}
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+skip_packet( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, int partial )
+{
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	if( pkttype == PKT_MARKER )
+	    fputs(":marker packet:\n", listfp );
+	else
+	    fprintf (listfp, ":unknown packet: type %2d, length %lu\n",
+                     pkttype, pktlen);
+	if( pkttype ) {
+	    int c, i=0 ;
+	    if( pkttype != PKT_MARKER )
+		fputs("dump:", listfp );
+	    if( partial ) {
+		while( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
+		    dump_hex_line(c, &i);
+	    }
+	    else {
+		for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- )
+		    dump_hex_line(iobuf_get(inp), &i);
+	    }
+	    putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp,pktlen,partial);
+}
+
+
+static void *
+read_rest( IOBUF inp, size_t pktlen, int partial )
+{
+    byte *p;
+    int i;
+
+    if( partial ) {
+	log_error("read_rest: can't store stream data\n");
+	p = NULL;
+    }
+    else {
+	p = xmalloc( pktlen );
+	for(i=0; pktlen; pktlen--, i++ )
+	    p[i] = iobuf_get(inp);
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+{
+    PKT_symkey_enc *k;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
+
+    if( pktlen < 4 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( version != 4 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( pktlen > 200 ) { /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */
+	log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    s2kmode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    switch( s2kmode ) {
+      case 0:  /* simple s2k */
+	minlen = 0;
+	break;
+      case 1:  /* salted s2k */
+	minlen = 8;
+	break;
+      case 3:  /* iterated+salted s2k */
+	minlen = 9;
+	break;
+      default:
+	log_error("unknown S2K %d\n", s2kmode );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( minlen > pktlen ) {
+	log_error("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode );
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    seskeylen = pktlen - minlen;
+    k = packet->pkt.symkey_enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *packet->pkt.symkey_enc
+						+ seskeylen - 1 );
+    k->version = version;
+    k->cipher_algo = cipher_algo;
+    k->s2k.mode = s2kmode;
+    k->s2k.hash_algo = hash_algo;
+    if( s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3 ) {
+	for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+	    k->s2k.salt[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    }
+    if( s2kmode == 3 ) {
+	k->s2k.count = iobuf_get(inp); pktlen--;
+    }
+    k->seskeylen = seskeylen;
+    if(k->seskeylen)
+      {
+	for(i=0; i < seskeylen && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+	  k->seskey[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+
+	/* What we're watching out for here is a session key decryptor
+	   with no salt.  The RFC says that using salt for this is a
+	   MUST. */
+	if(s2kmode!=1 && s2kmode!=3)
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: potentially insecure symmetrically"
+		     " encrypted session key\n"));
+      }
+    assert( !pktlen );
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	fprintf (listfp, ":symkey enc packet: version %d, cipher %d, s2k %d, hash %d",
+	       version, cipher_algo, s2kmode, hash_algo);
+	if(seskeylen)
+	  fprintf (listfp, ", seskey %d bits",(seskeylen-1)*8);
+	fprintf (listfp, "\n");
+	if( s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3 ) {
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\tsalt ");
+	    for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
+		fprintf (listfp, "%02x", k->s2k.salt[i]);
+	    if( s2kmode == 3 )
+		fprintf (listfp, ", count %lu (%lu)",
+			 S2K_DECODE_COUNT((ulong)k->s2k.count),
+			 (ulong)k->s2k.count );
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\n");
+	}
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+{
+    unsigned int n;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int i, ndata;
+    PKT_pubkey_enc *k;
+
+    k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc);
+    if( pktlen < 12 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    k->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( k->version != 2 && k->version != 3 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    k->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    k->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    k->throw_keyid = 0; /* only used as flag for build_packet */
+    if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
+	  k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
+
+    ndata = pubkey_get_nenc(k->pubkey_algo);
+    if( !ndata ) {
+	if( list_mode )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\tunsupported algorithm %d\n", k->pubkey_algo );
+	unknown_pubkey_warning( k->pubkey_algo );
+	k->data[0] = NULL;  /* no need to store the encrypted data */
+    }
+    else {
+	for( i=0; i < ndata; i++ ) {
+	    n = pktlen;
+	    k->data[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0); pktlen -=n;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
+		mpi_print(listfp, k->data[i], mpi_print_mode );
+		putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    }
+            if (!k->data[i])
+                rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	}
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
+		 const byte *buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length )
+{
+    const char *p=NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    /* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to
+     * detect the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked
+     * ARR and add an additional notice */
+    if ( type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed ) {
+        fprintf (listfp,
+                 "\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n"
+                 "WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically "
+                 "encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to "
+                 "the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n",
+                 type, (unsigned)length );
+    }
+    
+    buffer++;
+    length--;
+   
+    fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*)*/
+	      critical ? "critical ":"",
+	      hashed ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)length );
+    if( length > buflen ) {
+	fprintf (listfp, "too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned)buflen );
+	return;
+    }
+    switch( type ) {
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "sig created %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	  {
+	    if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
+	      fprintf (listfp, "sig expires after %s",
+		       strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	    else
+	      fprintf (listfp, "sig does not expire");
+	  }
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
+	if( length )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "%sexportable", *buffer? "":"not ");
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
+	if(length!=2)
+	  p="[invalid trust subpacket]";
+	else
+	  fprintf (listfp, "trust signature of depth %d, value %d",buffer[0],buffer[1]);
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
+	if(!length)
+	  p="[invalid regexp subpacket]";
+	else
+	  fprintf (listfp, "regular expression: \"%s\"",buffer);
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
+	if( length )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "%srevocable", *buffer? "":"not ");
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	  {
+	    if(buffer_to_u32(buffer))
+	      fprintf (listfp, "key expires after %s",
+		       strtimevalue( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	    else
+	      fprintf (listfp, "key does not expire");
+	  }
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
+	fputs("pref-sym-algos:", listfp );
+	for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
+	    fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i] );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+	fputs("revocation key: ", listfp );
+	if( length < 22 )
+	    p = "[too short]";
+	else {
+	    fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1] );
+	    for( i=2; i < length; i++ )
+		fprintf (listfp, "%02X", buffer[i] );
+	}
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
+	if( length >= 8 )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
+		      (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer),
+		      (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer+4) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+	{
+	    fputs("notation: ", listfp );
+	    if( length < 8 )
+		p = "[too short]";
+	    else {
+		const byte *s = buffer;
+		size_t n1, n2;
+
+		n1 = (s[4] << 8) | s[5];
+		n2 = (s[6] << 8) | s[7];
+		s += 8;
+		if( 8+n1+n2 != length )
+		    p = "[error]";
+		else {
+		    print_string( listfp, s, n1, ')' );
+		    putc( '=', listfp );
+
+		    if( *buffer & 0x80 )
+		      print_string( listfp, s+n1, n2, ')' );
+		    else
+		      p = "[not human readable]";
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
+	fputs("pref-hash-algos:", listfp );
+	for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
+	    fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i] );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
+	fputs("pref-zip-algos:", listfp );
+	for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
+	    fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i] );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
+	fputs("key server preferences:",listfp);
+	for(i=0;i<length;i++)
+	  fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i]);
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
+	fputs("preferred key server: ", listfp );
+	print_string( listfp, buffer, length, ')' );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
+	p = "primary user ID";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+	fputs("policy: ", listfp );
+	print_string( listfp, buffer, length, ')' );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
+        fputs ( "key flags:", listfp );
+        for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
+            fprintf (listfp, " %02X", buffer[i] );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
+	p = "signer's user ID";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
+        if( length ) {
+	    fprintf (listfp, "revocation reason 0x%02x (", *buffer );
+	    print_string( listfp, buffer+1, length-1, ')' );
+	    p = ")";
+	}
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_ARR:
+        fputs("Big Brother's key (ignored): ", listfp );
+	if( length < 22 )
+	    p = "[too short]";
+	else {
+	    fprintf (listfp, "c=%02x a=%d f=", buffer[0], buffer[1] );
+	    for( i=2; i < length; i++ )
+		fprintf (listfp, "%02X", buffer[i] );
+	}
+        break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
+        fputs ( "features:", listfp );
+        for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
+            fprintf (listfp, " %02x", buffer[i] );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+	fputs("signature: ",listfp);
+	if(length<17)
+	  p="[too short]";
+	else
+	  fprintf (listfp, "v%d, class 0x%02X, algo %d, digest algo %d",
+		 buffer[0],
+		 buffer[0]==3?buffer[2]:buffer[1],
+		 buffer[0]==3?buffer[15]:buffer[2],
+		 buffer[0]==3?buffer[16]:buffer[3]);
+	break;
+      default:
+	if(type>=100 && type<=110)
+	  p="experimental / private subpacket";
+	else
+	  p = "?";
+	break;
+    }
+
+    fprintf (listfp, "%s)\n", p? p: "");
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Returns: >= 0 use this offset into buffer
+ *	    -1 explicitly reject returning this type
+ *	    -2 subpacket too short
+ */
+int
+parse_one_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type )
+{
+  switch( type )
+    {
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+      if(n < 22)
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
+      if( n < 4 )
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON:
+      if( !n )
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
+      if( n < 8 )
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+      /* minimum length needed, and the subpacket must be well-formed
+	 where the name length and value length all fit inside the
+	 packet. */
+      if(n<8 || 8+((buffer[4]<<8)|buffer[5])+((buffer[6]<<8)|buffer[7]) != n)
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
+      if ( n != 1 )
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
+      if ( n != 2 )
+	break;
+      return 0;
+    default: return 0;
+    }
+  return -2;
+}
+
+/* Not many critical notations we understand yet... */
+static int
+can_handle_critical_notation(const byte *name,size_t len)
+{
+  if(len==32 && memcmp(name,"preferred-email-encoding@pgp.com",32)==0)
+    return 1;
+  if(len==21 && memcmp(name,"pka-address@gnupg.org",21)==0)
+    return 1;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+can_handle_critical( const byte *buffer, size_t n, int type )
+{
+  switch( type )
+    {
+    case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+      if(n>=8)
+	return can_handle_critical_notation(buffer+8,(buffer[4]<<8)|buffer[5]);
+      else
+	return 0;
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:/* issuer key ID */
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
+      /* Is it enough to show the policy or keyserver? */
+    case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+    case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
+      return 1;
+
+    default:
+      return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+
+const byte *
+enum_sig_subpkt( const subpktarea_t *pktbuf, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+		 size_t *ret_n, int *start, int *critical )
+{
+    const byte *buffer;
+    int buflen;
+    int type;
+    int critical_dummy;
+    int offset;
+    size_t n;
+    int seq = 0;
+    int reqseq = start? *start: 0;
+
+    if(!critical)
+      critical=&critical_dummy;
+
+    if( !pktbuf || reqseq == -1 ) {
+	/* return some value different from NULL to indicate that
+	 * there is no critical bit we do not understand.  The caller
+	 * will never use the value.  Yes I know, it is an ugly hack */
+	return reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL? (const byte*)&pktbuf : NULL;
+    }
+    buffer = pktbuf->data;
+    buflen = pktbuf->len;
+    while( buflen ) {
+	n = *buffer++; buflen--;
+	if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
+	    if( buflen < 4 )
+		goto too_short;
+	    n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+                | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
+	    buffer += 4;
+	    buflen -= 4;
+	}
+	else if( n >= 192 ) { /* 2 byte special encoded length header */
+	    if( buflen < 2 )
+		goto too_short;
+	    n = (( n - 192 ) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
+	    buffer++;
+	    buflen--;
+	}
+	if( buflen < n )
+	    goto too_short;
+	type = *buffer;
+	if( type & 0x80 ) {
+	    type &= 0x7f;
+	    *critical = 1;
+	}
+	else
+	    *critical = 0;
+	if( !(++seq > reqseq) )
+	    ;
+	else if( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL ) {
+	    if( *critical ) {
+		if( n-1 > buflen+1 )
+		    goto too_short;
+		if( !can_handle_critical(buffer+1, n-1, type ) )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.verbose)
+		      log_info(_("subpacket of type %d has "
+				 "critical bit set\n"),type);
+		    if( start )
+		      *start = seq;
+		    return NULL; /* this is an error */
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( reqtype < 0 ) /* list packets */
+	    dump_sig_subpkt( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
+				    type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n );
+	else if( type == reqtype ) { /* found */
+	    buffer++;
+	    n--;
+	    if( n > buflen )
+		goto too_short;
+	    if( ret_n )
+		*ret_n = n;
+	    offset = parse_one_sig_subpkt(buffer, n, type );
+	    switch( offset ) {
+	      case -2:
+		log_error("subpacket of type %d too short\n", type);
+		return NULL;
+	      case -1:
+		return NULL;
+	      default:
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if( start )
+		*start = seq;
+	    return buffer+offset;
+	}
+	buffer += n; buflen -=n;
+    }
+    if( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL )
+	return buffer; /* as value true to indicate that there is no */
+		       /* critical bit we don't understand */
+    if( start )
+	*start = -1;
+    return NULL; /* end of packets; not found */
+
+  too_short:
+    if(opt.verbose)
+      log_info("buffer shorter than subpacket\n");
+    if( start )
+	*start = -1;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+const byte *
+parse_sig_subpkt (const subpktarea_t *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+                  size_t *ret_n)
+{
+    return enum_sig_subpkt( buffer, reqtype, ret_n, NULL, NULL );
+}
+
+const byte *
+parse_sig_subpkt2 (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
+                   size_t *ret_n )
+{
+    const byte *p;
+
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, reqtype, ret_n );
+    if( !p )
+	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, reqtype, ret_n );
+    return p;
+}
+
+/* Find all revocation keys. Look in hashed area only. */
+void parse_revkeys(PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  struct revocation_key *revkey;
+  int seq=0;
+  size_t len;
+
+  if(sig->sig_class!=0x1F)
+    return;
+
+  while((revkey=
+	 (struct revocation_key *)enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,
+						  SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY,
+						  &len,&seq,NULL)))
+    {
+      if(len==sizeof(struct revocation_key) &&
+	 (revkey->class&0x80)) /* 0x80 bit must be set */
+	{
+	  sig->revkey=xrealloc(sig->revkey,
+			  sizeof(struct revocation_key *)*(sig->numrevkeys+1));
+	  sig->revkey[sig->numrevkeys]=revkey;
+	  sig->numrevkeys++;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+int
+parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+					  PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    int md5_len=0;
+    unsigned n;
+    int is_v4=0;
+    int rc=0;
+    int i, ndata;
+
+    if( pktlen < 16 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    sig->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( sig->version == 4 )
+	is_v4=1;
+    else if( sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, sig->version);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if( !is_v4 ) {
+	md5_len = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    }
+    sig->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( !is_v4 ) {
+	sig->timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+	sig->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+	sig->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    }
+    sig->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    sig->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    sig->flags.exportable=1;
+    sig->flags.revocable=1;
+    if( is_v4 ) { /* read subpackets */
+	n = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; /* length of hashed data */
+	if( n > 10000 ) {
+	    log_error("signature packet: hashed data too long\n");
+	    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	if( n ) {
+	    sig->hashed = xmalloc (sizeof (*sig->hashed) + n - 1 );
+            sig->hashed->size = n;
+	    sig->hashed->len = n;
+	    if( iobuf_read (inp, sig->hashed->data, n ) != n ) {
+		log_error ("premature eof while reading "
+                           "hashed signature data\n");
+		rc = -1;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	    pktlen -= n;
+	}
+	n = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; /* length of unhashed data */
+	if( n > 10000 ) {
+	    log_error("signature packet: unhashed data too long\n");
+	    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	if( n ) {
+	    sig->unhashed = xmalloc (sizeof(*sig->unhashed) + n - 1 );
+            sig->unhashed->size = n;
+	    sig->unhashed->len = n;
+	    if( iobuf_read(inp, sig->unhashed->data, n ) != n ) {
+		log_error("premature eof while reading "
+                          "unhashed signature data\n");
+		rc = -1;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	    pktlen -= n;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( pktlen < 5 ) { /* sanity check */
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+	rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+
+    if( is_v4 && sig->pubkey_algo )
+      { /*extract required information */
+	const byte *p;
+	size_t len;
+
+	/* set sig->flags.unknown_critical if there is a
+	 * critical bit set for packets which we do not understand */
+	if( !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL, NULL)
+	    || !parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_TEST_CRITICAL,
+				  NULL) )
+	  sig->flags.unknown_critical = 1;
+
+	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED, NULL );
+	if(p)
+	  sig->timestamp = buffer_to_u32(p);
+	else if(!(sig->pubkey_algo>=100 && sig->pubkey_algo<=110)
+		&& opt.verbose)
+	  log_info ("signature packet without timestamp\n");
+
+	p = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER, NULL );
+	if(p)
+	  {
+	    sig->keyid[0] = buffer_to_u32(p);
+	    sig->keyid[1] = buffer_to_u32(p+4);
+	  }
+	else if(!(sig->pubkey_algo>=100 && sig->pubkey_algo<=110)
+		&& opt.verbose)
+	  log_info ("signature packet without keyid\n");
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE,NULL);
+	if(p && buffer_to_u32(p))
+	  sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+buffer_to_u32(p);
+	if(sig->expiredate && sig->expiredate<=make_timestamp())
+	  sig->flags.expired=1;
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,NULL);
+	if(p)
+	  sig->flags.policy_url=1;
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,NULL);
+	if(p)
+	  sig->flags.pref_ks=1;
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,NULL);
+	if(p)
+	  sig->flags.notation=1;
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE,NULL);
+	if(p && *p==0)
+	  sig->flags.revocable=0;
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_TRUST,&len);
+	if(p && len==2)
+	  {
+	    sig->trust_depth=p[0];
+	    sig->trust_value=p[1];
+
+	    /* Only look for a regexp if there is also a trust
+	       subpacket. */
+	    sig->trust_regexp=
+	      parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,&len);
+
+	    /* If the regular expression is of 0 length, there is no
+	       regular expression. */
+	    if(len==0)
+	      sig->trust_regexp=NULL;
+	  }
+
+	/* We accept the exportable subpacket from either the hashed
+	   or unhashed areas as older versions of gpg put it in the
+	   unhashed area.  In theory, anyway, we should never see this
+	   packet off of a local keyring. */
+
+	p=parse_sig_subpkt2(sig,SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE,NULL);
+	if(p && *p==0)
+	  sig->flags.exportable=0;
+
+	/* Find all revocation keys. */
+	if(sig->sig_class==0x1F)
+	  parse_revkeys(sig);
+      }
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	fprintf (listfp, ":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
+	       "\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass %02x\n"
+	       "\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n",
+		sig->pubkey_algo,
+		(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		sig->version, (ulong)sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class,
+		sig->digest_algo,
+		sig->digest_start[0], sig->digest_start[1] );
+	if( is_v4 ) {
+	    parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,   SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED, NULL );
+	    parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_LIST_UNHASHED, NULL);
+	}
+    }
+
+    ndata = pubkey_get_nsig(sig->pubkey_algo);
+    if( !ndata ) {
+	if( list_mode )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo );
+	unknown_pubkey_warning( sig->pubkey_algo );
+	/* we store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
+	 * to write it back with build_packet() */
+	sig->data[0]= mpi_set_opaque(NULL, read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+	pktlen = 0;
+    }
+    else {
+	for( i=0; i < ndata; i++ ) {
+	    n = pktlen;
+	    sig->data[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 );
+	    pktlen -=n;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp, "\tdata: ");
+		mpi_print(listfp, sig->data[i], mpi_print_mode );
+		putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    }
+            if (!sig->data[i])
+                rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	}
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+					     PKT_onepass_sig *ops )
+{
+    int version;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if( pktlen < 13 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( version != 3 ) {
+	log_error("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    ops->digest_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    ops->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    ops->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    ops->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    ops->last = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":onepass_sig packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
+	       "\tversion %d, sigclass %02x, digest %d, pubkey %d, last=%d\n",
+		(ulong)ops->keyid[0], (ulong)ops->keyid[1],
+		version, ops->sig_class,
+		ops->digest_algo, ops->pubkey_algo, ops->last );
+
+
+  leave:
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static MPI
+read_protected_v3_mpi (IOBUF inp, unsigned long *length)
+{
+  int c;
+  unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
+  unsigned char *buf, *p;
+  MPI val;
+
+  if (*length < 2)
+    {
+      log_error ("mpi too small\n");
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  if ((c=iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
+    return NULL;
+  --*length;
+  nbits = c << 8;
+  if ((c=iobuf_get(inp)) == -1)
+    return NULL;
+  --*length;
+  nbits |= c;
+
+  if (nbits > 16384)
+    {
+      log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  nbytes = (nbits+7) / 8;
+  buf = p = xmalloc (2 + nbytes);
+  *p++ = nbits >> 8;
+  *p++ = nbits;
+  for (; nbytes && length; nbytes--, --*length)
+    *p++ = iobuf_get (inp);
+  if (nbytes)
+    {
+      log_error ("packet shorter tham mpi\n");
+      xfree (buf);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  /* convert buffer into an opaque MPI */
+  val = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buf, p-buf); 
+  return val;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+			      byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    int i, version, algorithm;
+    unsigned n;
+    unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate;
+    int npkey, nskey;
+    int is_v4=0;
+    int rc=0;
+
+    version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && version == '#' ) {
+	/* early versions of G10 use old PGP comments packets;
+	 * luckily all those comments are started by a hash */
+	if( list_mode ) {
+	    fprintf (listfp, ":rfc1991 comment packet: \"" );
+	    for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
+		int c;
+		c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+		if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
+		    putc (c, listfp);
+		else
+		    fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", c );
+	    }
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
+	}
+	iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+	return 0;
+    }
+    else if( version == 4 )
+	is_v4=1;
+    else if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if( pktlen < 11 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
+    if( is_v4 ) {
+	expiredate = 0; /* have to get it from the selfsignature */
+	max_expiredate = 0;
+    }
+    else {
+	unsigned short ndays;
+	ndays = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
+	if( ndays )
+	    expiredate = timestamp + ndays * 86400L;
+	else
+	    expiredate = 0;
+
+	max_expiredate=expiredate;
+    }
+    algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":%s key packet:\n"
+	       "\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, expires %lu\n",
+		pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "public" :
+		pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "secret" :
+		pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY? "public sub" :
+		pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY? "secret sub" : "??",
+		version, algorithm, timestamp, expiredate );
+
+    if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )  {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+	sk->timestamp = timestamp;
+	sk->expiredate = expiredate;
+	sk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
+	sk->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
+	sk->version = version;
+	sk->is_primary = pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+	sk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
+	sk->req_usage = 0; 
+	sk->pubkey_usage = 0; /* not yet used */
+    }
+    else {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	pk->timestamp = timestamp;
+	pk->expiredate = expiredate;
+	pk->max_expiredate = max_expiredate;
+	pk->hdrbytes	= hdrlen;
+	pk->version	= version;
+	pk->is_primary = pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	pk->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
+	pk->req_usage = 0; 
+	pk->pubkey_usage = 0; /* not yet used */
+        pk->is_revoked = 0;
+	pk->is_disabled = 0;
+	pk->keyid[0] = 0;
+	pk->keyid[1] = 0;
+    }
+    nskey = pubkey_get_nskey( algorithm );
+    npkey = pubkey_get_npkey( algorithm );
+    if( !npkey ) {
+	if( list_mode )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", algorithm );
+	unknown_pubkey_warning( algorithm );
+    }
+
+
+    if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	byte temp[16];
+        size_t snlen = 0;
+
+	if( !npkey ) {
+	    sk->skey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
+					  read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+	    pktlen = 0;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+	for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) {
+	    n = pktlen; sk->skey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp,   "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
+		mpi_print(listfp, sk->skey[i], mpi_print_mode  );
+		putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    }
+            if (!sk->skey[i])
+                rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	}
+        if (rc) /* one of the MPIs were bad */
+            goto leave;
+	sk->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+        sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
+	if( sk->protect.algo ) {
+	    sk->is_protected = 1;
+	    sk->protect.s2k.count = 0;
+	    if( sk->protect.algo == 254 || sk->protect.algo == 255 ) {
+		if( pktlen < 3 ) {
+		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		    goto leave;
+		}
+                sk->protect.sha1chk = (sk->protect.algo == 254);
+		sk->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+		/* Note that a sk->protect.algo > 110 is illegal, but
+		   I'm not erroring on it here as otherwise there
+		   would be no way to delete such a key. */
+		sk->protect.s2k.mode  = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+		sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+		/* check for the special GNU extension */
+		if( is_v4 && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 101 ) {
+		    for(i=0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+			temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+		    if( i < 4 || memcmp( temp, "GNU", 3 ) ) {
+			if( list_mode )
+			    fprintf (listfp,   "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
+						sk->protect.s2k.mode );
+			rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+			goto leave;
+		    }
+		    /* here we know that it is a gnu extension
+		     * What follows is the GNU protection mode:
+		     * All values have special meanings
+		     * and they are mapped in the mode with a base of 1000.
+		     */
+		    sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1000 + temp[3];
+		}
+		switch( sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
+		  case 1:
+		  case 3:
+		    for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+			temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+		    memcpy(sk->protect.s2k.salt, temp, 8 );
+		    break;
+		}
+		switch( sk->protect.s2k.mode ) {
+		  case 0: if( list_mode ) fprintf (listfp, "\tsimple S2K" );
+		    break;
+		  case 1: if( list_mode ) fprintf (listfp, "\tsalted S2K" );
+		    break;
+		  case 3: if( list_mode ) fprintf (listfp, "\titer+salt S2K" );
+		    break;
+		  case 1001: if( list_mode ) fprintf (listfp,
+                                                      "\tgnu-dummy S2K" );
+		    break;
+		  case 1002: if (list_mode) fprintf (listfp,
+                                                  "\tgnu-divert-to-card S2K");
+		    break;
+		  default:
+		    if( list_mode )
+			fprintf (listfp,   "\tunknown %sS2K %d\n",
+				 sk->protect.s2k.mode < 1000? "":"GNU ",
+						   sk->protect.s2k.mode );
+		    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		    goto leave;
+		}
+
+		if( list_mode ) {
+		    fprintf (listfp, ", algo: %d,%s hash: %d",
+				     sk->protect.algo,
+                                     sk->protect.sha1chk?" SHA1 protection,"
+                                                        :" simple checksum,",
+				     sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+		    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1
+			|| sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 ) {
+			fprintf (listfp, ", salt: ");
+			for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
+			    fprintf (listfp, "%02x", sk->protect.s2k.salt[i]);
+		    }
+		    putc ('\n', listfp);
+		}
+
+		if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 3 ) {
+		    if( pktlen < 1 ) {
+			rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+			goto leave;
+		    }
+		    sk->protect.s2k.count = iobuf_get(inp);
+		    pktlen--;
+		    if( list_mode )
+			fprintf (listfp, "\tprotect count: %lu\n",
+					    (ulong)sk->protect.s2k.count);
+		}
+		else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) {
+                    /* Read the serial number. */
+                    if (pktlen < 1) {
+                      rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+			goto leave;
+		    }
+		    snlen = iobuf_get (inp);
+		    pktlen--;
+                    if (pktlen < snlen || snlen == -1) {
+			rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+			goto leave;
+                    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    /* Note that a sk->protect.algo > 110 is illegal, but I'm
+	       not erroring on it here as otherwise there would be no
+	       way to delete such a key. */
+	    else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */
+		sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0;
+		sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+		if( list_mode )
+		    fprintf (listfp,   "\tprotect algo: %d  (hash algo: %d)\n",
+			 sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
+	    }
+	    /* It is really ugly that we don't know the size
+	     * of the IV here in cases we are not aware of the algorithm.
+	     * so a
+	     *	 sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize(sk->protect.algo);
+	     * won't work.  The only solution I see is to hardwire it here.
+	     * NOTE: if you change the ivlen above 16, don't forget to
+	     * enlarge temp.
+	     */
+	    switch( sk->protect.algo ) {
+	      case 7: case 8: case 9: /* reserved for AES */
+	      case 10: /* Twofish */
+		sk->protect.ivlen = 16;
+		break;
+	      default:
+		sk->protect.ivlen = 8;
+	    }
+	    if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 )
+		sk->protect.ivlen = 0;
+	    else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
+		sk->protect.ivlen = snlen < 16? snlen : 16;
+
+	    if( pktlen < sk->protect.ivlen ) {
+		rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	    for(i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
+		temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp,
+                         sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002? "\tserial-number: "
+                                                     : "\tprotect IV: ");
+		for(i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++ )
+		    fprintf (listfp, " %02x", temp[i] );
+		putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    }
+	    memcpy(sk->protect.iv, temp, sk->protect.ivlen );
+	}
+	else
+	    sk->is_protected = 0;
+	/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
+	 * If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
+	 * we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
+	 * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 
+            || sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) {
+	    /* better set some dummy stuff here */
+	    sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, xstrdup("dummydata"), 10);
+	    pktlen = 0;
+	}
+	else if( is_v4 && sk->is_protected ) {
+	    /* ugly; the length is encrypted too, so we read all
+	     * stuff up to the end of the packet into the first
+	     * skey element */
+	    sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL,
+					     read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),pktlen);
+	    pktlen = 0;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp, "\tencrypted stuff follows\n");
+	    }
+	}
+	else { /* v3 method: the mpi length is not encrypted */
+	    for(i=npkey; i < nskey; i++ ) {
+                if ( sk->is_protected ) {
+                    sk->skey[i] = read_protected_v3_mpi (inp, &pktlen);
+                    if( list_mode ) 
+                        fprintf (listfp,   "\tskey[%d]: [encrypted]\n", i);
+                }
+                else {
+                    n = pktlen;
+                    sk->skey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 );
+                    pktlen -=n;
+                    if( list_mode ) {
+                        fprintf (listfp,   "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
+                        mpi_print(listfp, sk->skey[i], mpi_print_mode  );
+                        putc ('\n', listfp);
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (!sk->skey[i])
+                    rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	    }
+            if (rc)
+                goto leave;
+
+	    sk->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp, "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", sk->csum);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    else {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	if( !npkey ) {
+	    pk->pkey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
+					  read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+	    pktlen = 0;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+	for(i=0; i < npkey; i++ ) {
+	    n = pktlen; pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+	    if( list_mode ) {
+		fprintf (listfp,   "\tpkey[%d]: ", i);
+		mpi_print(listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode  );
+		putc ('\n', listfp);
+	    }
+            if (!pk->pkey[i])
+                rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	}
+        if (rc)
+            goto leave;
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Attribute subpackets have the same format as v4 signature
+   subpackets.  This is not part of OpenPGP, but is done in several
+   versions of PGP nevertheless. */
+int
+parse_attribute_subpkts(PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  size_t n;
+  int count=0;
+  struct user_attribute *attribs=NULL;
+  const byte *buffer=uid->attrib_data;
+  int buflen=uid->attrib_len;
+  byte type;
+
+  xfree(uid->attribs);
+
+  while(buflen)
+    {
+      n = *buffer++; buflen--;
+      if( n == 255 ) { /* 4 byte length header */
+	if( buflen < 4 )
+	  goto too_short;
+	n = (buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16)
+	  | (buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3];
+	buffer += 4;
+	buflen -= 4;
+      }
+      else if( n >= 192 ) { /* 2 byte special encoded length header */
+	if( buflen < 2 )
+	  goto too_short;
+	n = (( n - 192 ) << 8) + *buffer + 192;
+	buffer++;
+	buflen--;
+      }
+      if( buflen < n )
+	goto too_short;
+
+      attribs=xrealloc(attribs,(count+1)*sizeof(struct user_attribute));
+      memset(&attribs[count],0,sizeof(struct user_attribute));
+
+      type=*buffer;
+      buffer++;
+      buflen--;
+      n--;
+
+      attribs[count].type=type;
+      attribs[count].data=buffer;
+      attribs[count].len=n;
+      buffer+=n;
+      buflen-=n;
+      count++;
+    }
+
+  uid->attribs=attribs;
+  uid->numattribs=count;
+  return count;
+
+ too_short:
+  if(opt.verbose)
+    log_info("buffer shorter than attribute subpacket\n");
+  uid->attribs=attribs;
+  uid->numattribs=count;
+  return count;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+{
+    byte *p;
+
+    /* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
+       that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
+       as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
+       avoid allocation problems.  A large pktlen may not be
+       allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
+       allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
+
+    if(pktlen>2048)
+      {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
+	iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
+	return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+      }
+
+    packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
+    packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
+    packet->pkt.user_id->ref=1;
+
+    p = packet->pkt.user_id->name;
+    for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
+	*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    *p = 0;
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len;
+	fprintf (listfp, ":user ID packet: \"");
+	/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with print_string?? */
+	for(p=packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n-- ) {
+	    if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
+		putc (*p, listfp);
+	    else
+		fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p );
+	}
+	fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+void
+make_attribute_uidname(PKT_user_id *uid, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+  assert ( max_namelen > 70 );
+  if(uid->numattribs<=0)
+    sprintf(uid->name,"[bad attribute packet of size %lu]",uid->attrib_len);
+  else if(uid->numattribs>1)
+    sprintf(uid->name,"[%d attributes of size %lu]",
+	    uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
+  else
+    {
+      /* Only one attribute, so list it as the "user id" */
+
+      if(uid->attribs->type==ATTRIB_IMAGE)
+	{
+	  u32 len;
+	  byte type;
+
+	  if(parse_image_header(uid->attribs,&type,&len))
+	    sprintf(uid->name,"[%.20s image of size %lu]",
+		    image_type_to_string(type,1),(ulong)len);
+	  else
+	    sprintf(uid->name,"[invalid image]");
+	}
+      else
+	sprintf(uid->name,"[unknown attribute of size %lu]",
+		(ulong)uid->attribs->len);
+    }
+
+  uid->len = strlen(uid->name);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_attribute( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+{
+    byte *p;
+
+#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
+    packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id
+					+ EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
+    packet->pkt.user_id->ref=1;
+    packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data = xmalloc(pktlen);
+    packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_len = pktlen;
+
+    p = packet->pkt.user_id->attrib_data;
+    for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
+	*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+
+    /* Now parse out the individual attribute subpackets.  This is
+       somewhat pointless since there is only one currently defined
+       attribute type (jpeg), but it is correct by the spec. */
+    parse_attribute_subpkts(packet->pkt.user_id);
+
+    make_attribute_uidname(packet->pkt.user_id, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	fprintf (listfp, ":attribute packet: %s\n", packet->pkt.user_id->name );
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
+{
+    byte *p;
+
+    /* Cap comment packet at a reasonable value to avoid an integer
+       overflow in the malloc below.  Comment packets are actually not
+       anymore define my OpenPGP and we even stopped to use our
+       private comment packet. */
+    if (pktlen>65536)
+      {
+	log_error ("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
+	iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
+	return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+      }
+    packet->pkt.comment = xmalloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.comment + pktlen - 1);
+    packet->pkt.comment->len = pktlen;
+    p = packet->pkt.comment->data;
+    for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
+	*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	int n = packet->pkt.comment->len;
+	fprintf (listfp, ":%scomment packet: \"", pkttype == PKT_OLD_COMMENT?
+					 "OpenPGP draft " : "GnuPG " );
+	for(p=packet->pkt.comment->data; n; p++, n-- ) {
+	    if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
+		putc (*p, listfp);
+	    else
+		fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p );
+	}
+	fprintf (listfp, "\"\n");
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+  int c;
+
+  if (pktlen)
+    {
+      c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+      pktlen--;
+      pkt->pkt.ring_trust = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt->pkt.ring_trust );
+      pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval = c;
+      pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = 0;
+      if (!c && pktlen==1)
+        {
+          c = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
+          pktlen--;
+          /* we require that bit 7 of the sigcache is 0 (easier eof handling)*/
+          if ( !(c & 0x80) )
+            pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache = c;
+        }
+      if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: flag=%02x sigcache=%02x\n",
+               pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval,
+               pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":trust packet: empty\n");
+    }
+  iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, 0);
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+		 PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb, int partial )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int mode, namelen;
+    PKT_plaintext *pt;
+    byte *p;
+    int c, i;
+
+    if( !partial && pktlen < 6 ) {
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong)pktlen);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    mode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
+    namelen = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
+    /* Note that namelen will never exceeds 255 byte. */
+    pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext = xmalloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.plaintext + namelen -1);
+    pt->new_ctb = new_ctb;
+    pt->mode = mode;
+    pt->namelen = namelen;
+    pt->is_partial = partial;
+    if( pktlen ) {
+	for( i=0; pktlen > 4 && i < namelen; pktlen--, i++ )
+	    pt->name[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    }
+    else {
+	for( i=0; i < namelen; i++ )
+	    if( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    else
+		pt->name[i] = c;
+    }
+    pt->timestamp = read_32(inp); if( pktlen) pktlen -= 4;
+    pt->len = pktlen;
+    pt->buf = inp;
+    pktlen = 0;
+
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	fprintf (listfp, ":literal data packet:\n"
+	       "\tmode %c (%X), created %lu, name=\"",
+	            mode >= ' ' && mode <'z'? mode : '?', mode,
+		    (ulong)pt->timestamp );
+	for(p=pt->name,i=0; i < namelen; p++, i++ ) {
+	    if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
+		putc (*p, listfp);
+	    else
+		fprintf (listfp, "\\x%02x", *p );
+	}
+	fprintf (listfp, "\",\n\traw data: ");
+	if(partial)
+	  fprintf (listfp, "unknown length\n");
+	else
+	  fprintf (listfp, "%lu bytes\n", (ulong)pt->len );
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_compressed( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+		  PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
+{
+    PKT_compressed *zd;
+
+    /* pktlen is here 0, but data follows
+     * (this should be the last object in a file or
+     *	the compress algorithm should know the length)
+     */
+    zd = pkt->pkt.compressed =	xmalloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.compressed );
+    zd->algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+    zd->len = 0; /* not used */ 
+    zd->new_ctb = new_ctb;
+    zd->buf = inp;
+    if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":compressed packet: algo=%d\n", zd->algorithm);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+		 PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb, int partial )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    PKT_encrypted *ed;
+    unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
+
+    ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted =  xmalloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted );
+    ed->len = pktlen;
+    /* we don't know the extralen which is (cipher_blocksize+2)
+       because the algorithm ist not specified in this packet.
+       However, it is only important to know this for some sanity
+       checks on the packet length - it doesn't matter that we can't
+       do it */
+    ed->extralen = 0;
+    ed->buf = NULL;
+    ed->new_ctb = new_ctb;
+    ed->is_partial = partial;
+    ed->mdc_method = 0;
+    if( pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC ) {
+	/* fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks */
+	int version;
+
+	version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); 
+        if (orig_pktlen)
+            pktlen--;
+	if( version != 1 ) {
+	    log_error("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n",
+								version);
+            /*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */
+            rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+	ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+    }
+    if( orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10 ) { /* actually this is blocksize+2 */
+	log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, partial);
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( list_mode ) {
+	if( orig_pktlen )
+	    fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n",
+                     orig_pktlen);
+	else
+	    fprintf (listfp, ":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n");
+	if( ed->mdc_method )
+	    fprintf (listfp, "\tmdc_method: %d\n", ed->mdc_method );
+    }
+
+    ed->buf = inp;
+
+  leave:
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
+				   PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    PKT_mdc *mdc;
+    byte *p;
+
+    mdc = pkt->pkt.mdc=  xmalloc(sizeof *pkt->pkt.mdc );
+    if( list_mode )
+	fprintf (listfp, ":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen);
+    if( !new_ctb || pktlen != 20 ) {
+	log_error("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
+        rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    p = mdc->hash;
+    for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
+	*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+
+  leave:
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This packet is internally generated by GPG (by armor.c) to
+ * transfer some information to the lower layer.  To make sure that
+ * this packet is really a GPG faked one and not one comming from outside,
+ * we first check that there is a unique tag in it.
+ * The format of such a control packet is:
+ *   n byte  session marker
+ *   1 byte  control type CTRLPKT_xxxxx
+ *   m byte  control data
+ */
+
+static int
+parse_gpg_control( IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
+		   unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet, int partial )
+{
+    byte *p;
+    const byte *sesmark;
+    size_t sesmarklen;
+    int i;
+
+    if ( list_mode )
+        fprintf (listfp, ":packet 63: length %lu ",  pktlen);
+
+    sesmark = get_session_marker ( &sesmarklen );
+    if ( pktlen < sesmarklen+1 ) /* 1 is for the control bytes */
+        goto skipit;
+    for( i=0; i < sesmarklen; i++, pktlen-- ) {
+	if ( sesmark[i] != iobuf_get_noeof(inp) )
+            goto skipit;
+    }
+    if (pktlen > 4096)
+      goto skipit; /* Definitely too large.  We skip it to avoid an
+                      overflow in the malloc. */
+    if ( list_mode )
+        puts ("- gpg control packet");
+
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+                                      + pktlen - 1);
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = pktlen;
+    p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+    for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
+	*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+
+    return 0;
+
+ skipit:
+    if ( list_mode ) {
+        int c;
+
+        i=0;
+        fprintf (listfp, "- private (rest length %lu)\n",  pktlen);
+        if( partial ) {
+            while( (c=iobuf_get(inp)) != -1 )
+                dump_hex_line(c, &i);
+        }
+        else {
+            for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- )
+                dump_hex_line(iobuf_get(inp), &i);
+        }
+        putc ('\n', listfp);
+    }
+    iobuf_skip_rest(inp,pktlen, 0);
+    return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
+}
+
+/* create a gpg control packet to be used internally as a placeholder */
+PACKET *
+create_gpg_control( ctrlpkttype_t type, const byte *data, size_t datalen )
+{
+    PACKET *packet;
+    byte *p;
+
+    packet = xmalloc( sizeof *packet );
+    init_packet(packet);
+    packet->pkttype = PKT_GPG_CONTROL;
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control = xmalloc(sizeof *packet->pkt.gpg_control
+                                      + datalen - 1);
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control->control = type;
+    packet->pkt.gpg_control->datalen = datalen;
+    p = packet->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+    for( ; datalen; datalen--, p++ )
+	*p = *data++;
+
+    return packet;
+}
diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dd2f83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1084 @@
+/* passphrase.c -  Get a passphrase
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#if !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) && !defined(__riscos__)
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+#if defined (_WIN32)
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+#include <locale.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET
+#include <langinfo.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+#include "assuan.h"
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+static char *fd_passwd = NULL;
+static char *next_pw = NULL;
+static char *last_pw = NULL;
+
+static void hash_passphrase( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k, int create );
+
+int
+have_static_passphrase()
+{
+    if ( opt.use_agent )
+        return 0;
+    return !!fd_passwd;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Set the passphrase to be used for the next query and only for the next
+ * one.
+ */
+void
+set_next_passphrase( const char *s )
+{
+    xfree(next_pw);
+    next_pw = NULL;
+    if( s ) {
+	next_pw = xmalloc_secure( strlen(s)+1 );
+	strcpy(next_pw, s );
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Get the last passphrase used in passphrase_to_dek.
+ * Note: This removes the passphrase from this modules and
+ * the caller must free the result.  May return NULL:
+ */
+char *
+get_last_passphrase()
+{
+    char *p = last_pw;
+    last_pw = NULL;
+    return p;
+}
+
+/* As if we had used the passphrase - make it the last_pw. */
+void
+next_to_last_passphrase(void)
+{
+  if(next_pw)
+    {
+      last_pw=next_pw;
+      next_pw=NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Here's an interesting question: since this passphrase was passed in
+   on the command line, is there really any point in using secure
+   memory for it?  I'm going with 'yes', since it doesn't hurt, and
+   might help in some small way (swapping). */
+
+void
+set_passphrase_from_string(const char *pass)
+{
+  xfree( fd_passwd );
+  fd_passwd = xmalloc_secure(strlen(pass)+1);
+  strcpy(fd_passwd,pass);
+}
+
+
+void
+read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
+{
+  int i, len;
+  char *pw;
+  
+  if ( opt.use_agent ) 
+    { /* Not used but we have to do a dummy read, so that it won't end
+         up at the begin of the message if the quite usual trick to
+         prepend the passphtrase to the message is used. */
+      char buf[1];
+
+      while (!(read (fd, buf, 1) != 1 || *buf == '\n' ))
+        ;
+      *buf = 0;
+      return; 
+    }
+
+  if (!opt.batch )
+	tty_printf("Reading passphrase from file descriptor %d ...", fd );
+  for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ ) 
+    {
+      if (i >= len-1 ) 
+        {
+          char *pw2 = pw;
+          len += 100;
+          pw = xmalloc_secure( len );
+          if( pw2 )
+            {
+              memcpy(pw, pw2, i );
+              xfree (pw2);
+            }
+          else
+            i=0;
+	}
+      if (read( fd, pw+i, 1) != 1 || pw[i] == '\n' )
+        break;
+    }
+  pw[i] = 0;
+  if (!opt.batch)
+    tty_printf("\b\b\b   \n" );
+
+  xfree( fd_passwd );
+  fd_passwd = pw;
+}
+
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+/* Send one option to the gpg-agent.  */
+static int
+agent_send_option (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+  char *line;
+  int rc; 
+  
+  if (!value || !*value)
+    return 0; /* Avoid sending empty option values. */
+
+  line = xmalloc (7 + strlen (name) + 1 + strlen (value) + 1);
+  strcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (stpcpy (line, "OPTION "), name), "="), value);
+  rc = assuan_transact (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+  xfree (line);
+  return rc? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Send all required options to the gpg-agent.  */
+static int 
+agent_send_all_options (assuan_context_t ctx)
+{
+  char *dft_display = NULL;
+  const char *dft_ttyname = NULL;
+  char *dft_ttytype = NULL;
+  char *old_lc = NULL;
+  char *dft_lc = NULL;
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  dft_display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
+  if (opt.display || dft_display)
+    {
+      if (agent_send_option (ctx, "display",
+                             opt.display ? opt.display : dft_display))
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+  if (!opt.ttyname)
+    {
+      const char *tmp;
+
+      dft_ttyname = getenv ("GPG_TTY");
+      if ((!dft_ttyname || !*dft_ttyname) && (tmp=ttyname (0)))
+        dft_ttyname = tmp;
+      if ((!dft_ttyname || !*dft_ttyname) && (tmp=tty_get_ttyname ()))
+        dft_ttyname = tmp;
+    }
+  if (opt.ttyname || dft_ttyname)
+    {
+      if (agent_send_option (ctx, "ttyname",
+                             opt.ttyname ? opt.ttyname : dft_ttyname))
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+  dft_ttytype = getenv ("TERM");
+  if (opt.ttytype || (dft_ttyname && dft_ttytype))
+    {
+      if (agent_send_option (ctx, "ttytype",
+                             opt.ttyname ? opt.ttytype : dft_ttytype))
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_CTYPE)
+  old_lc = setlocale (LC_CTYPE, NULL);
+  if (old_lc)
+    old_lc = xstrdup (old_lc);
+  dft_lc = setlocale (LC_CTYPE, "");
+#endif
+  if (opt.lc_ctype || (dft_ttyname && dft_lc))
+    {
+      rc = agent_send_option (ctx, "lc-ctype",
+                              opt.lc_ctype ? opt.lc_ctype : dft_lc);
+    }
+#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_CTYPE)
+  if (old_lc)
+    {
+      setlocale (LC_CTYPE, old_lc);
+      xfree (old_lc);
+    }
+#endif
+  if (rc)
+    return rc;
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_MESSAGES)
+  old_lc = setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, NULL);
+  if (old_lc)
+    old_lc = xstrdup (old_lc);
+  dft_lc = setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, "");
+#endif
+  if (opt.lc_messages || (dft_ttyname && dft_lc))
+    {
+      rc = agent_send_option (ctx, "lc-messages",
+                              opt.lc_messages ? opt.lc_messages : dft_lc);
+    }
+#if defined(HAVE_SETLOCALE) && defined(LC_MESSAGES)
+  if (old_lc)
+    {
+      setlocale (LC_MESSAGES, old_lc);
+      xfree (old_lc);
+    }
+#endif
+  return rc;
+}
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+/*
+ * Open a connection to the agent and initializes the connection.
+ * Returns: -1 on error; on success an Assuan context for that
+ * connection is returned.  With TRY set to true, no error messages
+ * are printed and the use of the agent won't get disabled on failure.
+ * If ORIG_CODESET is not NULL, the function will swithc the codeset
+ * back to that one before printing error messages.
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+assuan_context_t
+agent_open (int try, const char *orig_codeset)
+{
+  int rc;
+  assuan_context_t ctx;
+  char *infostr, *p;
+  int prot;
+  int pid;
+
+  if (opt.gpg_agent_info)
+    infostr = xstrdup (opt.gpg_agent_info);
+  else
+    {
+      infostr = getenv ( "GPG_AGENT_INFO" );
+      if (!infostr || !*infostr) 
+        {
+          if (!try)
+            {
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+              if (orig_codeset)
+                bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif /*ENABLE_NLS*/
+              log_info (_("gpg-agent is not available in this session\n"));
+              opt.use_agent = 0;
+            }
+          return NULL;
+        }
+      infostr = xstrdup ( infostr );
+    }
+  
+  if ( !(p = strchr (infostr, PATHSEP_C)) || p == infostr)
+    {
+      if (!try)
+        {
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+          if (orig_codeset)
+            bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif /*ENABLE_NLS*/
+          log_error ( _("malformed GPG_AGENT_INFO environment variable\n"));
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+      xfree (infostr);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  *p++ = 0;
+  pid = atoi (p);
+  while (*p && *p != PATHSEP_C)
+    p++;
+  prot = *p? atoi (p+1) : 0;
+  if (prot != 1)
+    {
+      if (!try)
+        {
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+          if (orig_codeset)
+            bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif /*ENABLE_NLS*/
+          log_error (_("gpg-agent protocol version %d is not supported\n"),
+                     prot);
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+      xfree (infostr);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+     
+  rc = assuan_socket_connect (&ctx, infostr, pid);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      if (!try)
+        {
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+          if (orig_codeset)
+            bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif /*ENABLE_NLS*/
+          log_info ( _("can't connect to `%s': %s\n"), 
+                      infostr, assuan_strerror (rc));
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+      xfree (infostr );
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  xfree (infostr);
+
+  if (agent_send_all_options (ctx))
+    {
+      if (!try)
+        {
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+          if (orig_codeset)
+            bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif /*ENABLE_NLS*/
+          log_error (_("problem with the agent - disabling agent use\n"));
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+      assuan_disconnect (ctx);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  return ctx;
+}
+#endif/*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+void
+agent_close (assuan_context_t ctx)
+{
+  assuan_disconnect (ctx);
+}
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+/* Copy the text ATEXT into the buffer P and do plus '+' and percent
+   escaping.  Note that the provided buffer needs to be 3 times the
+   size of ATEXT plus 1.  Returns a pointer to the leading Nul in P. */
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+static char *
+percent_plus_escape (char *p, const char *atext)
+{
+  const unsigned char *s;
+
+  for (s=atext; *s; s++)
+    {
+      if (*s < ' ' || *s == '+')
+        {
+          sprintf (p, "%%%02X", *s);
+          p += 3;
+        }
+      else if (*s == ' ')
+        *p++ = '+';
+      else
+        *p++ = *s;
+    }
+  *p = 0;
+  return p;
+}
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+
+/* Object for the agent_okay_cb function.  */
+struct agent_okay_cb_s {
+  char *pw;
+};
+
+/* A callback used to get the passphrase from the okay line.  See
+   agent-get_passphrase for details.  LINE is the rest of the OK
+   status line without leading white spaces. */
+static assuan_error_t
+agent_okay_cb (void *opaque, const char *line)
+{ 
+  struct agent_okay_cb_s *parm = opaque;
+  int i;
+
+  /* Note: If the malloc below fails we won't be able to wipe the
+     memory at LINE given the current implementation of the Assuan
+     code. There is no easy ay around this w/o adding a lot of more
+     memory function code to allow wiping arbitrary stuff on memory
+     failure. */
+  parm->pw = xmalloc_secure (strlen (line)/2+2);
+  
+  for (i=0; hexdigitp (line) && hexdigitp (line+1); line += 2)
+    parm->pw[i++] = xtoi_2 (line);
+  parm->pw[i] = 0; 
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Ask the GPG Agent for the passphrase.
+ * Mode 0:  Allow cached passphrase
+ *      1:  No cached passphrase FIXME: Not really implemented
+ *      2:  Ditto, but change the text to "repeat entry"
+ *
+ * Note that TRYAGAIN_TEXT must not be translated.  If canceled is not
+ * NULL, the function does set it to 1 if the user canceled the
+ * operation.  If CACHEID is not NULL, it will be used as the cacheID
+ * for the gpg-agent; if is NULL and a key fingerprint can be
+ * computed, this will be used as the cacheid.
+ */
+static char *
+agent_get_passphrase ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid,
+                       const char *tryagain_text,
+                       const char *custom_description,
+                       const char *custom_prompt, int *canceled)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+  char *atext = NULL;
+  assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
+  char *pw = NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+  byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  int have_fpr = 0;
+  char *orig_codeset = NULL;
+
+  if (canceled)
+    *canceled = 0;
+
+#if MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20
+#error agent needs a 20 byte fingerprint
+#endif
+
+  memset (fpr, 0, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
+  if( keyid && get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
+    {
+      if (pk)
+        free_public_key( pk );      
+      pk = NULL; /* oops: no key for some reason */
+    }
+  
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+  /* The Assuan agent protocol requires us to transmit utf-8 strings */
+  orig_codeset = bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET
+  if (!orig_codeset)
+    orig_codeset = nl_langinfo (CODESET);
+#endif
+  if (orig_codeset)
+    { /* We only switch when we are able to restore the codeset later. */
+      orig_codeset = xstrdup (orig_codeset);
+      if (!bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, "utf-8"))
+        orig_codeset = NULL; 
+    }
+#endif
+
+  if ( !(ctx = agent_open (0, orig_codeset)) ) 
+    goto failure;
+
+  if (custom_description)
+    atext = native_to_utf8 (custom_description);
+  else if ( !mode && pk && keyid )
+    { 
+      char *uid;
+      size_t uidlen;
+      const char *algo_name = pubkey_algo_to_string ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+      const char *timestr;
+      char *maink;
+      
+      if ( !algo_name )
+        algo_name = "?";
+
+#define KEYIDSTRING _(" (main key ID %s)")
+
+      maink = xmalloc ( strlen (KEYIDSTRING) + keystrlen() + 20 );
+      if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2] 
+          && keyid[1] != keyid[3] )
+        sprintf( maink, KEYIDSTRING, keystr(&keyid[2]) );
+      else
+        *maink = 0;
+      
+      uid = get_user_id ( keyid, &uidlen ); 
+      timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
+
+#undef KEYIDSTRING
+
+#define PROMPTSTRING _("You need a passphrase to unlock the secret" \
+		       " key for user:\n" \
+		       "\"%.*s\"\n" \
+		       "%u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s%s\n" )
+
+      atext = xmalloc ( 100 + strlen (PROMPTSTRING)  
+                        + uidlen + 15 + strlen(algo_name) + keystrlen()
+                        + strlen (timestr) + strlen (maink) );
+      sprintf (atext, PROMPTSTRING,
+               (int)uidlen, uid,
+               nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name, keystr(&keyid[0]), timestr,
+               maink  );
+      xfree (uid);
+      xfree (maink);
+
+#undef PROMPTSTRING
+
+      { 
+        size_t dummy;
+        fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &dummy );
+        have_fpr = 1;
+      }
+      
+    }
+  else if (mode == 2 ) 
+    atext = xstrdup ( _("Repeat passphrase\n") );
+  else
+    atext = xstrdup ( _("Enter passphrase\n") );
+                
+  { 
+      char *line, *p;
+      int i, rc; 
+      struct agent_okay_cb_s okay_cb_parm;
+
+      if (!tryagain_text)
+        tryagain_text = "X";
+      else
+        tryagain_text = _(tryagain_text);
+
+      /* We allocate 23 times the needed space for thye texts so that
+         there is enough space for escaping. */
+      line = xmalloc (15 + 46 
+                      + 3*strlen (atext)
+                      + 3*strlen (custom_prompt? custom_prompt:"")
+                      + (cacheid? (3*strlen (cacheid)): 0)
+                      + 3*strlen (tryagain_text)
+                      + 1);
+      strcpy (line, "GET_PASSPHRASE ");
+      p = line+15;
+      if (!mode && cacheid)
+        {
+          p = percent_plus_escape (p, cacheid);
+        }
+      else if (!mode && have_fpr)
+        {
+          for (i=0; i < 20; i++, p +=2 )
+            sprintf (p, "%02X", fpr[i]);
+        }
+      else
+        *p++ = 'X'; /* No caching. */
+      *p++ = ' ';
+
+      p = percent_plus_escape (p, tryagain_text);
+      *p++ = ' ';
+
+      /* The prompt.  */
+      if (custom_prompt)
+        {
+          char *tmp = native_to_utf8 (custom_prompt);
+          p = percent_plus_escape (p, tmp);
+          xfree (tmp);
+        }
+      else
+        *p++ = 'X'; /* Use the standard prompt. */
+      *p++ = ' ';
+
+      /* Copy description. */
+      percent_plus_escape (p, atext);
+
+      /* Call gpg-agent.  */
+      memset (&okay_cb_parm, 0, sizeof okay_cb_parm);
+      rc = assuan_transact2 (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+                             agent_okay_cb, &okay_cb_parm);
+
+      xfree (line);
+      xfree (atext); atext = NULL;
+      if (!rc)
+        {
+          assert (okay_cb_parm.pw);
+          pw = okay_cb_parm.pw;
+          agent_close (ctx);
+          if (pk)
+            free_public_key( pk );
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+          if (orig_codeset)
+            bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+#endif
+          xfree (orig_codeset);
+          return pw;
+        }
+      else if (rc && (rc & 0xffff) == 99)
+	{
+	  /* 99 is GPG_ERR_CANCELED. */
+          log_info (_("cancelled by user\n") );
+          if (canceled)
+            *canceled = 1;
+        }
+      else 
+        {
+          log_error (_("problem with the agent - disabling agent use\n"));
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+  }
+      
+        
+ failure:
+#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+  if (orig_codeset)
+    {
+      bind_textdomain_codeset (PACKAGE, orig_codeset);
+      xfree (orig_codeset);
+    }
+#endif
+  xfree (atext);
+  agent_close (ctx);
+  xfree (pw );
+  if (pk)
+    free_public_key( pk );
+
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Clear the cached passphrase.  If CACHEID is not NULL, it will be
+ * used instead of a cache ID derived from KEYID.
+ */
+void
+passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT
+  assuan_context_t ctx = NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  
+#if MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20
+#error agent needs a 20 byte fingerprint
+#endif
+    
+  if (!opt.use_agent)
+    return;
+  
+  if (!cacheid)
+    {
+      pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
+      memset (fpr, 0, MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
+      if( !keyid || get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
+        {
+          goto failure; /* oops: no key for some reason */
+        }
+  
+      {
+        size_t dummy;
+        fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &dummy );
+      }
+    }
+  else
+    pk = NULL;
+    
+  if ( !(ctx = agent_open (0, NULL)) ) 
+    goto failure;
+
+  { 
+      char *line, *p;
+      int i, rc; 
+
+      if (cacheid)
+        {
+          line = xmalloc (17 + 3*strlen (cacheid) + 2);
+          strcpy (line, "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE ");
+          p = line+17;
+          p = percent_plus_escape (p, cacheid);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          line = xmalloc (17 + 40 + 2);
+          strcpy (line, "CLEAR_PASSPHRASE ");
+          p = line+17;
+          for (i=0; i < 20; i++, p +=2 )
+            sprintf (p, "%02X", fpr[i]);
+        }
+      *p = 0;
+
+      rc = assuan_transact (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+      xfree (line);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error (_("problem with the agent - disabling agent use\n"));
+          opt.use_agent = 0;
+        }
+    }
+        
+ failure:
+  agent_close (ctx);
+  if (pk)
+    free_public_key( pk );
+#endif /*ENABLE_AGENT_SUPPORT*/
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Ask for a passphrase and return that string.
+ */
+char *
+ask_passphrase (const char *description,
+                const char *tryagain_text,
+                const char *promptid,
+                const char *prompt,
+                const char *cacheid, int *canceled)
+{
+  char *pw = NULL;
+  
+  if (canceled)
+    *canceled = 0;
+
+  if (!opt.batch && description)
+    {
+      if (strchr (description, '%'))
+        {
+          char *tmp = unescape_percent_string (description);
+          tty_printf ("\n%s\n", tmp);
+          xfree (tmp);
+        }
+      else
+        tty_printf ("\n%s\n",description);
+    }
+               
+ agent_died:
+  if ( opt.use_agent ) 
+    {
+      pw = agent_get_passphrase (NULL, 0, cacheid,
+                                 tryagain_text, description, prompt,
+                                 canceled );
+      if (!pw)
+        {
+          if (!opt.use_agent)
+            goto agent_died;
+          pw = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+  else if (fd_passwd) 
+    {
+      pw = xmalloc_secure (strlen(fd_passwd)+1);
+      strcpy (pw, fd_passwd);
+    }
+  else if (opt.batch)
+    {
+      log_error(_("can't query passphrase in batch mode\n"));
+      pw = NULL;
+    }
+  else {
+    if (tryagain_text)
+      tty_printf(_("%s.\n"), tryagain_text);
+    pw = cpr_get_hidden(promptid? promptid : "passphrase.ask",
+                        prompt?prompt : _("Enter passphrase: ") );
+    tty_kill_prompt();
+  }
+
+  if (!pw || !*pw)
+    write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
+
+  return pw;
+}
+
+
+/* Return a new DEK object Using the string-to-key sepcifier S2K.  Use
+ * KEYID and PUBKEY_ALGO to prompt the user.
+
+   MODE 0:  Allow cached passphrase
+        1:  Ignore cached passphrase 
+        2:  Ditto, but change the text to "repeat entry"
+*/
+DEK *
+passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
+		   int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
+                   const char *tryagain_text, int *canceled)
+{
+    char *pw = NULL;
+    DEK *dek;
+    STRING2KEY help_s2k;
+
+    if (canceled)
+      *canceled = 0;
+
+    if( !s2k ) {
+        /* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode 
+         * Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
+	s2k = &help_s2k;
+	s2k->mode = 0;
+	s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+    }
+
+    /* If we do not have a passphrase available in NEXT_PW and status
+       information are request, we print them now. */
+    if( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	char buf[50];
+ 
+	if( keyid ) {
+            u32 used_kid[2];
+            char *us;
+
+	    if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] ) {
+                used_kid[0] = keyid[2];
+                used_kid[1] = keyid[3];
+            }
+            else {
+                used_kid[0] = keyid[0];
+                used_kid[1] = keyid[1];
+            }
+
+            us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
+            write_status_text( STATUS_USERID_HINT, us );
+            xfree(us);
+
+	    sprintf( buf, "%08lX%08lX %08lX%08lX %d 0",
+                     (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+                     (ulong)used_kid[0], (ulong)used_kid[1],
+                     pubkey_algo );
+                     
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE, buf );
+	}
+	else {
+	    sprintf( buf, "%d %d %d", cipher_algo, s2k->mode, s2k->hash_algo );
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM, buf );
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* If we do have a keyID, we do not have a passphrase available in
+       NEXT_PW, we are not running in batch mode and we do not want to
+       ignore the passphrase cache (mode!=1), print a prompt with
+       information on that key. */
+    if( keyid && !opt.batch && !next_pw && mode!=1 ) {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+	char *p;
+
+	p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+	tty_printf("\n");
+	tty_printf(_("You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for\n"
+		     "user: \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	xfree(p);
+
+	if( !get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) ) {
+	    const char *s = pubkey_algo_to_string( pk->pubkey_algo );
+	    tty_printf( _("%u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s"),
+		       nbits_from_pk( pk ), s?s:"?", keystr(keyid),
+		       strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
+	    if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2]
+				     && keyid[1] != keyid[3] )
+	      {
+		if(keystrlen()>10)
+		  {
+		    tty_printf("\n");
+		    tty_printf(_("         (subkey on main key ID %s)"),
+			       keystr(&keyid[2]) );
+		  }
+		else
+		  tty_printf( _(" (main key ID %s)"), keystr(&keyid[2]) );
+	      }
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	}
+
+	tty_printf("\n");
+        if (pk)
+          free_public_key( pk );
+    }
+
+ agent_died:
+    if( next_pw ) {
+        /* Simply return the passphrase we already have in NEXT_PW. */
+	pw = next_pw;
+	next_pw = NULL;
+    }
+    else if ( opt.use_agent ) {
+      /* Divert to the gpg-agent. */
+        pw = agent_get_passphrase ( keyid, mode == 2? 1: 0, NULL,
+                                    tryagain_text, NULL, NULL, canceled );
+        if (!pw)
+          {
+            if (!opt.use_agent)
+              goto agent_died;
+            pw = xstrdup ("");
+          }
+        if( *pw && mode == 2 )
+	  {
+	    int i;
+	    for(i=0;i<opt.passwd_repeat;i++)
+	      {
+		char *pw2 = agent_get_passphrase ( keyid, 2, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+						   NULL, canceled );
+		if (!pw2)
+		  {
+		    if (!opt.use_agent)
+		      {
+			xfree (pw);
+			pw = NULL;
+			goto agent_died;
+		      }
+		    pw2 = xstrdup ("");
+		  }
+		if( strcmp(pw, pw2) )
+		  {
+		    xfree(pw2);
+		    xfree(pw);
+		    return NULL;
+		  }
+		xfree(pw2);
+	      }
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( fd_passwd ) {
+        /* Return the passphrase we have store in FD_PASSWD. */
+	pw = xmalloc_secure( strlen(fd_passwd)+1 );
+	strcpy( pw, fd_passwd );
+    }
+    else if( opt.batch )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't query passphrase in batch mode\n"));
+	pw = xstrdup( "" ); /* return an empty passphrase */
+      }
+    else {
+        /* Read the passphrase from the tty or the command-fd. */
+	pw = cpr_get_hidden("passphrase.enter", _("Enter passphrase: ") );
+	tty_kill_prompt();
+	if( mode == 2 && !cpr_enabled() )
+	  {
+	    int i;
+	    for(i=0;i<opt.passwd_repeat;i++)
+	      {
+		char *pw2 = cpr_get_hidden("passphrase.repeat",
+					   _("Repeat passphrase: ") );
+		tty_kill_prompt();
+		if( strcmp(pw, pw2) )
+		  {
+		    xfree(pw2);
+		    xfree(pw);
+		    return NULL;
+		  }
+		xfree(pw2);
+	      }
+	  }
+    }
+
+    if( !pw || !*pw )
+	write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
+
+    /* Hash the passphrase and store it in a newly allocated DEK
+       object.  Keep a copy of the passphrase in LAST_PW for use by
+       get_last_passphrase(). */
+    dek = xmalloc_secure_clear ( sizeof *dek );
+    dek->algo = cipher_algo;
+    if( !*pw && mode == 2 )
+	dek->keylen = 0;
+    else
+	hash_passphrase( dek, pw, s2k, mode==2 );
+    xfree(last_pw);
+    last_pw = pw;
+    return dek;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Hash a passphrase using the supplied s2k. If create is true, create
+ * a new salt or what else must be filled into the s2k for a new key.
+ * always needs: dek->algo, s2k->mode, s2k->hash_algo.
+ */
+static void
+hash_passphrase( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k, int create )
+{
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+    int pass, i;
+    int used = 0;
+    int pwlen = strlen(pw);
+
+    assert( s2k->hash_algo );
+    dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( dek->algo ) / 8;
+    if( !(dek->keylen > 0 && dek->keylen <= DIM(dek->key)) )
+	BUG();
+
+    md = md_open( s2k->hash_algo, 1);
+    for(pass=0; used < dek->keylen ; pass++ ) {
+	if( pass ) {
+            md_reset(md);
+	    for(i=0; i < pass; i++ ) /* preset the hash context */
+		md_putc(md, 0 );
+	}
+
+	if( s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3 ) {
+	    int len2 = pwlen + 8;
+	    ulong count = len2;
+
+	    if( create && !pass ) {
+		randomize_buffer(s2k->salt, 8, 1);
+		if( s2k->mode == 3 )
+		    s2k->count = opt.s2k_count;
+	    }
+
+	    if( s2k->mode == 3 ) {
+		count = S2K_DECODE_COUNT(s2k->count);
+		if( count < len2 )
+		    count = len2;
+	    }
+	    /* a little bit complicated because we need a ulong for count */
+	    while( count > len2 ) { /* maybe iterated+salted */
+		md_write( md, s2k->salt, 8 );
+		md_write( md, pw, pwlen );
+		count -= len2;
+	    }
+	    if( count < 8 )
+		md_write( md, s2k->salt, count );
+	    else {
+		md_write( md, s2k->salt, 8 );
+		count -= 8;
+                md_write( md, pw, count );
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    md_write( md, pw, pwlen );
+	md_final( md );
+	i = md_digest_length( s2k->hash_algo );
+	if( i > dek->keylen - used )
+	    i = dek->keylen - used;
+	memcpy( dek->key+used, md_read(md, s2k->hash_algo), i );
+	used += i;
+    }
+    md_close(md);
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/photoid.c b/g10/photoid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3676d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/photoid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/* photoid.c - photo ID handling code
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef _WIN32 
+# include <windows.h>
+# ifndef VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_WINDOWS
+#  define VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_WINDOWS 1
+# endif
+#endif
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "exec.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+
+/* Generate a new photo id packet, or return NULL if canceled */
+PKT_user_id *
+generate_photo_id(PKT_public_key *pk,const char *photo_name)
+{
+  PKT_user_id *uid;
+  int error=1,i;
+  unsigned int len;
+  char *filename;
+  byte *photo=NULL;
+  byte header[16];
+  IOBUF file;
+  int overflow;
+
+  header[0]=0x10; /* little side of photo header length */
+  header[1]=0;    /* big side of photo header length */
+  header[2]=1;    /* 1 == version of photo header */
+  header[3]=1;    /* 1 == JPEG */
+
+  for(i=4;i<16;i++) /* The reserved bytes */
+    header[i]=0;
+
+#define EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE 71
+  uid=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*uid)+71);
+
+  if(photo_name && *photo_name)
+    filename=make_filename(photo_name,(void *)NULL);
+  else
+    {
+      tty_printf(_("\nPick an image to use for your photo ID."
+		   "  The image must be a JPEG file.\n"
+		   "Remember that the image is stored within your public key."
+		   "  If you use a\n"
+		   "very large picture, your key will become very large"
+		   " as well!\n"
+		   "Keeping the image close to 240x288 is a good size"
+		   " to use.\n"));
+      filename=NULL;
+    }
+
+  while(photo==NULL)
+    {
+      if(filename==NULL)
+	{
+	  char *tempname;
+
+	  tty_printf("\n");
+
+	  tty_enable_completion(NULL);
+
+	  tempname=cpr_get("photoid.jpeg.add",
+			   _("Enter JPEG filename for photo ID: "));
+
+	  tty_disable_completion();
+
+	  filename=make_filename(tempname,(void *)NULL);
+
+	  xfree(tempname);
+
+	  if(strlen(filename)==0)
+	    goto scram;
+	}
+
+      file=iobuf_open(filename);
+      if (file && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (file)))
+        {
+          iobuf_close (file);
+          file = NULL;
+          errno = EPERM;
+        }
+      if(!file)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("unable to open JPEG file `%s': %s\n"),
+		    filename,strerror(errno));
+	  xfree(filename);
+	  filename=NULL;
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      
+      len=iobuf_get_filelength(file, &overflow);
+      if(len>6144 || overflow)
+	{
+	  tty_printf( _("This JPEG is really large (%d bytes) !\n"),len);
+	  if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("photoid.jpeg.size",
+			    _("Are you sure you want to use it? (y/N) ")))
+	  {
+	    iobuf_close(file);
+	    xfree(filename);
+	    filename=NULL;
+	    continue;
+	  }
+	}
+
+      photo=xmalloc(len);
+      iobuf_read(file,photo,len);
+      iobuf_close(file);
+
+      /* Is it a JPEG? */
+      if(photo[0]!=0xFF || photo[1]!=0xD8 ||
+	 photo[6]!='J' || photo[7]!='F' || photo[8]!='I' || photo[9]!='F')
+	{
+	  log_error(_("`%s' is not a JPEG file\n"),filename);
+	  xfree(photo);
+	  photo=NULL;
+	  xfree(filename);
+	  filename=NULL;
+	  continue;
+	}
+
+      /* Build the packet */
+      build_attribute_subpkt(uid,1,photo,len,header,16);
+      parse_attribute_subpkts(uid);
+      make_attribute_uidname(uid, EXTRA_UID_NAME_SPACE);
+
+      /* Showing the photo is not safe when noninteractive since the
+         "user" may not be able to dismiss a viewer window! */
+      if(opt.command_fd==-1)
+	{
+	  show_photos(uid->attribs,uid->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+	  switch(cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit("photoid.jpeg.okay",
+					 _("Is this photo correct (y/N/q)? ")))
+	    {
+	    case -1:
+	      goto scram;
+	    case 0:
+	      free_attributes(uid);
+	      xfree(photo);
+	      photo=NULL;
+	      xfree(filename);
+	      filename=NULL;
+	      continue;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  error=0;
+  uid->ref=1;
+
+ scram:
+  xfree(filename);
+  xfree(photo);
+
+  if(error)
+    {
+      free_attributes(uid);
+      xfree(uid);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  return uid;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 for error, 1 for valid */
+int parse_image_header(const struct user_attribute *attr,byte *type,u32 *len)
+{
+  u16 headerlen;
+
+  if(attr->len<3)
+    return 0;
+
+  /* For historical reasons (i.e. "oops!"), the header length is
+     little endian. */
+  headerlen=(attr->data[1]<<8) | attr->data[0];
+
+  if(headerlen>attr->len)
+    return 0;
+
+  if(type && attr->len>=4)
+    {
+      if(attr->data[2]==1) /* header version 1 */
+	*type=attr->data[3];
+      else
+	*type=0;
+    }
+
+  *len=attr->len-headerlen;
+
+  if(*len==0)
+    return 0;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* style==0 for extension, 1 for name, 2 for MIME type.  Remember that
+   the "name" style string could be used in a user ID name field, so
+   make sure it is not too big (see parse-packet.c:parse_attribute).
+   Extensions should be 3 characters long for the best cross-platform
+   compatibility. */
+char *image_type_to_string(byte type,int style)
+{
+  char *string;
+
+  switch(type)
+    {
+    case 1: /* jpeg */
+      if(style==0)
+	string="jpg";
+      else if(style==1)
+	string="jpeg";
+      else
+	string="image/jpeg";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      if(style==0)
+	string="bin";
+      else if(style==1)
+	string="unknown";
+      else
+	string="image/x-unknown";
+      break;
+    }
+
+  return string;
+}
+
+#if !defined(FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER) && !defined(DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER)
+static const char *
+get_default_photo_command(void)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+  OSVERSIONINFO osvi;
+
+  memset(&osvi,0,sizeof(osvi));
+  osvi.dwOSVersionInfoSize=sizeof(osvi);
+  GetVersionEx(&osvi);
+
+  if(osvi.dwPlatformId==VER_PLATFORM_WIN32_WINDOWS)
+    return "start /w %i";
+  else
+    return "cmd /c start /w %i";
+#elif defined(__APPLE__)
+  /* OS X.  This really needs more than just __APPLE__. */
+  return "open %I";
+#elif defined(__riscos__)
+  return "Filer_Run %I";
+#else
+  if(path_access("xloadimage",X_OK)==0)
+    return "xloadimage -fork -quiet -title 'KeyID 0x%k' stdin";
+  else if(path_access("eog",X_OK)==0)
+    return "eog %i";
+  else if(path_access("display",X_OK)==0)
+    return "display -title 'KeyID 0x%k' %i";
+  else
+    return "";
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+void show_photos(const struct user_attribute *attrs,
+		 int count,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+#ifndef DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER
+  int i;
+  struct expando_args args;
+  u32 len;
+  u32 kid[2]={0,0};
+
+  memset(&args,0,sizeof(args));
+  args.pk=pk;
+  args.sk=sk;
+
+  if(pk)
+    keyid_from_pk(pk,kid);
+  else if(sk)
+    keyid_from_sk(sk,kid);
+
+  for(i=0;i<count;i++)
+    if(attrs[i].type==ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
+       parse_image_header(&attrs[i],&args.imagetype,&len))
+      {
+	char *command,*name;
+	struct exec_info *spawn;
+	int offset=attrs[i].len-len;
+
+#ifdef FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER
+	opt.photo_viewer=FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER;
+#else
+	if(!opt.photo_viewer)
+	  opt.photo_viewer=get_default_photo_command();
+#endif
+
+	if(!*opt.photo_viewer)
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("no photo viewer set\n"));
+	    goto fail;
+	  }
+
+	/* make command grow */
+	command=pct_expando(opt.photo_viewer,&args);
+	if(!command)
+	  goto fail;
+
+	name=xmalloc(16+strlen(EXTSEP_S)+
+		     strlen(image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0))+1);
+
+	/* Make the filename.  Notice we are not using the image
+           encoding type for more than cosmetics.  Most external image
+           viewers can handle a multitude of types, and even if one
+           cannot understand a particular type, we have no way to know
+           which.  The spec permits this, by the way. -dms */
+
+#ifdef USE_ONLY_8DOT3
+	sprintf(name,"%08lX" EXTSEP_S "%s",(ulong)kid[1],
+		image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0));
+#else
+	sprintf(name,"%08lX%08lX" EXTSEP_S "%s",(ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
+		image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0));
+#endif
+
+	if(exec_write(&spawn,NULL,command,name,1,1)!=0)
+	  {
+	    xfree(name);
+	    goto fail;
+	  }
+
+#ifdef __riscos__
+        riscos_set_filetype_by_mimetype(spawn->tempfile_in,
+                                        image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,2));
+#endif
+
+	xfree(name);
+
+	fwrite(&attrs[i].data[offset],attrs[i].len-offset,1,spawn->tochild);
+
+	if(exec_read(spawn)!=0)
+	  {
+	    exec_finish(spawn);
+	    goto fail;
+	  }
+
+	if(exec_finish(spawn)!=0)
+	  goto fail;
+      }
+
+  return;
+
+ fail:
+  log_error(_("unable to display photo ID!\n"));
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/g10/photoid.h b/g10/photoid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d13669c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/photoid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* photoid.h
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+/* Photo ID functions */
+
+#ifndef _PHOTOID_H_
+#define _PHOTOID_H_
+
+#include "packet.h"
+
+PKT_user_id *generate_photo_id(PKT_public_key *pk,const char *filename);
+int parse_image_header(const struct user_attribute *attr,byte *type,u32 *len);
+char *image_type_to_string(byte type,int style);
+void show_photos(const struct user_attribute *attrs,
+		 int count,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk);
+
+#endif /* !_PHOTOID_H_ */
diff --git a/g10/pipemode.c b/g10/pipemode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..750aa3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/pipemode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/* pipemode.c - pipemode handler
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1990, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+
+
+#define CONTROL_PACKET_SPACE 30 
+#define FAKED_LITERAL_PACKET_SPACE (9+2+2)
+
+
+enum pipemode_state_e {
+    STX_init = 0,
+    STX_wait_operation,
+    STX_begin,
+    STX_text,
+    STX_detached_signature,
+    STX_detached_signature_wait_text,
+    STX_signed_data,
+    STX_wait_init
+};
+
+struct pipemode_context_s {
+    enum pipemode_state_e state;
+    int operation;
+    int stop;
+    int block_mode;
+    UnarmorPump unarmor_ctx;
+};
+
+
+static size_t
+make_control ( byte *buf, int code, int operation )
+{
+    const byte *sesmark;
+    size_t sesmarklen, n=0;;
+
+    sesmark = get_session_marker( &sesmarklen );
+    if ( sesmarklen > 20 )
+        BUG();
+
+    buf[n++] = 0xff; /* new format, type 63, 1 length byte */
+    n++;   /* length will fixed below */
+    memcpy(buf+n, sesmark, sesmarklen ); n+= sesmarklen;
+    buf[n++] = CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE;    
+    buf[n++] = code;
+    buf[n++] = operation;
+    buf[1] = n-2;
+    return n;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+pipemode_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	         IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{ 
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    struct pipemode_context_s *stx = opaque;
+    int rc=0;
+    size_t n = 0;
+    int esc = 0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+        *ret_len = 0;
+        /* reserve some space for one control packet */
+        if ( size <= CONTROL_PACKET_SPACE+FAKED_LITERAL_PACKET_SPACE )
+            BUG();
+        size -= CONTROL_PACKET_SPACE+FAKED_LITERAL_PACKET_SPACE;
+
+        if ( stx->block_mode ) {
+            /* reserve 2 bytes for the block length */
+            buf[n++] = 0;
+            buf[n++] = 0;
+        }
+            
+
+        while ( n < size ) {
+            /* FIXME: we have to make sure that we have a large enough
+             * buffer for a control packet even after we already read 
+             * something. The easest way to do this is probably by ungetting
+             * the control sequence and returning the buffer we have
+             * already assembled */
+            int c = iobuf_get (a);
+            if (c == -1) {
+                if ( stx->state != STX_init ) {
+                    log_error ("EOF encountered at wrong state\n");
+                    stx->stop = 1;
+                    return -1;
+                }
+                break;
+            }
+            if ( esc ) {
+                switch (c) {
+                  case '@':  
+                    if ( stx->state == STX_text ) {
+                        buf[n++] = c;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    else if ( stx->state == STX_detached_signature ) {
+                        esc = 0;
+                        goto do_unarmor; /* not a very elegant solution */
+                    }
+                    else if ( stx->state == STX_detached_signature_wait_text) {
+                        esc = 0;
+                        break; /* just ignore it in this state */
+                    }
+                    log_error ("@@ not allowed in current state\n");
+                    return -1;
+                  case '<': /* begin of stream part */
+                    if ( stx->state != STX_init ) {
+                        log_error ("nested begin of stream\n");
+                        stx->stop = 1;
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                    stx->state = STX_wait_operation;
+                    stx->block_mode = 0;
+                    unarmor_pump_release (stx->unarmor_ctx);
+                    stx->unarmor_ctx = NULL;
+                    break;
+                   case '>': /* end of stream part */
+                     if ( stx->state != STX_wait_init ) {
+                        log_error ("invalid state for @>\n");
+                        stx->stop = 1;
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                    stx->state = STX_init;
+                    break;
+                  case 'V': /* operation = verify */
+                  case 'E': /* operation = encrypt */
+                  case 'S': /* operation = sign */
+                  case 'B': /* operation = detach sign */
+                  case 'C': /* operation = clearsign */
+                  case 'D': /* operation = decrypt */
+                    if ( stx->state != STX_wait_operation ) {
+                        log_error ("invalid state for operation code\n");
+                        stx->stop = 1;
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                    stx->operation = c;
+                    if ( stx->operation == 'B') {
+                        stx->state = STX_detached_signature;
+                        if ( !opt.no_armor )
+                            stx->unarmor_ctx = unarmor_pump_new ();
+                    }
+                    else
+                        stx->state = STX_begin;
+                    n += make_control ( buf+n, 1, stx->operation );
+                    /* must leave after a control packet */
+                    goto leave;
+
+                  case 't': /* plaintext text follows */
+                    if ( stx->state == STX_detached_signature_wait_text ) 
+                        stx->state = STX_detached_signature;
+                    if ( stx->state == STX_detached_signature ) {
+                        if ( stx->operation != 'B' ) {
+                            log_error ("invalid operation for this state\n");
+                            stx->stop = 1;
+                            return -1;
+                        }
+                        stx->state = STX_signed_data;
+                        n += make_control ( buf+n, 2, 'B' );
+                        /* and now we fake a literal data packet much the same
+                         * as in armor.c */
+                        buf[n++] = 0xaf; /* old packet format, type 11,
+                                            var length */
+                        buf[n++] = 0;	 /* set the length header */
+                        buf[n++] = 6;
+                        buf[n++] = 'b';  /* we ignore it anyway */
+                        buf[n++] = 0;	 /* namelength */
+                        memset(buf+n, 0, 4); /* timestamp */
+                        n += 4;
+                        /* and return now so that we are sure to have
+                         * more space in the bufer for the next control
+                         * packet */
+                        stx->block_mode = 1;
+                        goto leave2;
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        log_error ("invalid state for @t\n");
+                        stx->stop = 1;
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                    break;
+
+                  case '.': /* ready */
+                    if ( stx->state == STX_signed_data ) { 
+                        if (stx->block_mode) {
+                            buf[0] = (n-2) >> 8;
+                            buf[1] = (n-2);
+                            if ( buf[0] || buf[1] ) {
+                                /* end of blocks marker */
+                                buf[n++] = 0;
+                                buf[n++] = 0;
+                            }
+                            stx->block_mode = 0;
+                        }
+                        n += make_control ( buf+n, 3, 'B' );
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        log_error ("invalid state for @.\n");
+                        stx->stop = 1;
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                    stx->state = STX_wait_init;
+                    goto leave;
+
+                 default:      
+                    log_error ("invalid escape sequence 0x%02x in stream\n",
+                               c);
+                    stx->stop = 1;
+                    return -1;
+                }
+                esc = 0;
+            }
+            else if (c == '@') 
+                esc = 1;
+            else if (stx->unarmor_ctx) {
+          do_unarmor: /* used to handle a @@ */
+                c = unarmor_pump (stx->unarmor_ctx, c);
+                if ( !(c & ~255) )
+                    buf[n++] = c;
+                else if ( c < 0 ) {
+                    /* end of armor or error - we don't care becuase
+                      the armor can be modified anyway.  The unarmored
+                      stuff should stand for itself. */ 
+                    unarmor_pump_release (stx->unarmor_ctx);
+                    stx->unarmor_ctx = NULL;
+                    stx->state = STX_detached_signature_wait_text;
+                }
+            }
+            else if (stx->state == STX_detached_signature_wait_text)
+                ; /* just wait */
+            else
+                buf[n++] = c; 
+        }
+
+      leave:      
+        if ( !n ) {
+            stx->stop = 1;
+            rc = -1; /* eof */
+        }
+        if ( stx->block_mode ) {
+            /* fixup the block length */
+            buf[0] = (n-2) >> 8;
+            buf[1] = (n-2);
+        }
+      leave2:
+        /*log_hexdump ("pipemode:", buf, n );*/
+	*ret_len = n;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+	*(char**)buf = "pipemode_filter";
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+void
+run_in_pipemode(void)
+{
+    IOBUF fp;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    struct pipemode_context_s stx;
+    int rc;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &stx, 0, sizeof stx);
+
+    fp = iobuf_open("-");
+    iobuf_push_filter (fp, pipemode_filter, &stx );
+
+    do {
+        write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_STREAM);
+        rc = proc_packets( NULL, fp );
+        write_status (STATUS_END_STREAM);
+    } while ( !stx.stop );
+  
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c0ffd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/pkclist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1448 @@
+/* pkclist.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
+
+/****************
+ * Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
+ */
+static void
+do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    size_t n, nn;
+    const byte *p, *pp;
+    int seq = 0;
+    const char *text;
+
+    while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
+				 &n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
+	if( !n )
+	    continue; /* invalid - just skip it */
+
+	if( *p == 0 )
+	    text = _("No reason specified");
+	else if( *p == 0x01 )
+	    text = _("Key is superseded");
+	else if( *p == 0x02 )
+	    text = _("Key has been compromised");
+	else if( *p == 0x03 )
+	    text = _("Key is no longer used");
+	else if( *p == 0x20 )
+	    text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
+	else
+	    text = NULL;
+
+	log_info( _("reason for revocation: ") );
+	if( text )
+	    fputs( text, log_stream() );
+	else
+	    fprintf( log_stream(), "code=%02x", *p );
+	putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+	n--; p++;
+	pp = NULL;
+	do {
+	    /* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
+	    while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
+		p++;
+		n--;
+	    }
+	    if( n ) {
+		pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
+		nn = pp? pp - p : n;
+		log_info( _("revocation comment: ") );
+		print_string( log_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
+		putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+		p += nn; n -= nn;
+	    }
+	} while( pp );
+    }
+}
+
+/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
+   subkeys, etc.)  Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */
+
+void
+show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
+{
+    /* Hmmm, this is not so easy becuase we have to duplicate the code
+     * used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags.  We need to find
+     * a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
+     * signatures.  And there should be no duplicate code.  Because we
+     * enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
+     * a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
+     * display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
+     * until we have a better solution.  */
+    KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
+    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+    size_t fingerlen;
+    int rc;
+
+    /* get the keyblock */
+    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
+    rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
+    if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
+	log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+        if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
+	  ( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    && !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
+	    break;
+    }
+    if( !node ) {
+	log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
+	release_kbnode( keyblock );
+	return;
+    }
+    /* now find the revocation certificate */
+    for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+	    break;
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+	    && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
+		|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
+		/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
+		do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
+		break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
+    if(!node && !mode)
+      show_revocation_reason(pk,1);
+
+    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * mode: 0 = standard
+ *       1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
+ *           this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
+ * Returns: 
+ *      -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
+ *      -1 = quit operation
+ *       0 = nothing changed
+ *       1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
+ */
+static int
+do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
+                    unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
+{
+  char *p;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  int changed=0;
+  int quit=0;
+  int show=0;
+  int min_num;
+  int did_help=defer_help;
+  unsigned int minimum=get_min_ownertrust(pk);
+
+  switch(minimum)
+    {
+    default:
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: min_num=1; break;
+    case TRUST_NEVER:     min_num=2; break;
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  min_num=3; break;
+    case TRUST_FULLY:     min_num=4; break;
+    }
+
+  keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+  for(;;) {
+    /* A string with valid answers.
+
+       Note to translators: These are the allowed answers in lower and
+       uppercase.  Below you will find the matching strings which
+       should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to
+       match the one in the answer string.
+    
+         i = please show me more information
+         m = back to the main menu
+         s = skip this key
+	 q = quit
+    */
+    const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
+
+    if( !did_help ) 
+      {
+        if( !mode ) 
+          {
+            KBNODE keyblock, un;
+
+            tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to:\n"));
+	    tty_printf("%4u%c/%s %s\n",nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		       pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+                       keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
+	    p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+	    tty_printf(_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	    xfree(p);
+
+            keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
+            if (!keyblock)
+                BUG ();
+            for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+	      {
+                if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+		  continue;
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
+		  continue;
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
+		  continue;
+		/* Only skip textual primaries */
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
+		    && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+		  continue;
+                
+		if((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+		   && un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+		  show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+			      un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+
+		p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+
+		tty_printf(_("  aka \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	      }
+        
+            print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
+            tty_printf("\n");
+	    release_kbnode (keyblock);
+          }
+
+	if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_("How much do you trust that this key actually "
+			 "belongs to the named user?\n"));
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* This string also used in keyedit.c:trustsig_prompt */
+	    tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to"
+			 " correctly verify other users' keys\n"
+			 "(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from"
+			 " different sources, etc.)\n"));
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+	  }
+
+	if(min_num<=1)
+	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I don't know or won't say\n"), 1);
+	if(min_num<=2)
+	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
+	if(min_num<=3)
+	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
+	if(min_num<=4)
+	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
+        if (mode)
+          tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
+#if 0
+	/* not yet implemented */
+        tty_printf ("  i = please show me more information\n");
+#endif
+        if( mode )
+          tty_printf(_("  m = back to the main menu\n"));
+        else
+	  {
+	    tty_printf(_("  s = skip this key\n"));
+	    tty_printf(_("  q = quit\n"));
+	  }
+        tty_printf("\n");
+	if(minimum)
+	  tty_printf(_("The minimum trust level for this key is: %s\n\n"),
+		     trust_value_to_string(minimum));
+        did_help = 1;
+      }
+    if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
+      BUG();
+    p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
+    trim_spaces(p);
+    cpr_kill_prompt();
+    if( !*p )
+      did_help = 0;
+    else if( *p && p[1] )
+      ;
+    else if( !p[1] && ((*p >= '0'+min_num) && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) ) 
+      {
+        unsigned int trust;
+        switch( *p )
+          {
+          case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
+          case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER    ; break;
+          case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
+          case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY    ; break;
+          case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
+          default: BUG();
+          }
+        if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
+            && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
+                                       _("Do you really want to set this key"
+                                         " to ultimate trust? (y/N) ")))
+          ; /* no */
+        else
+          {
+            *new_trust = trust;
+            changed = 1;
+            break;
+          }
+      }
+#if 0
+    /* not yet implemented */
+    else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] ) 
+      {
+        tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
+        show = 1;
+        break;
+      }
+#endif
+    else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) ) 
+      {
+        break ; /* back to the menu */
+      }
+    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
+      {
+	break; /* skip */
+      }
+    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
+      {
+        quit = 1;
+        break ; /* back to the menu */
+      }
+    xfree(p); p = NULL;
+  }
+  xfree(p);
+  return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
+ * be a primary key).  
+ * For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
+ */
+int
+edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
+{
+  unsigned int trust = 0;  /* Needs to be initialized to avoid gcc warning. */
+  int no_help = 0;
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
+        {
+        case -1: /* quit */
+          return -1;
+        case -2: /* show info */
+          no_help = 1;
+          break;
+        case 1: /* trust value set */
+          trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+          trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+          update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
+ * Returns: true if we trust.
+ */
+static int
+do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
+{
+  /* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
+     key */
+  if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
+     || trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
+     || (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
+    BUG();
+
+  if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
+    {
+      if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info("No trust check due to `--trust-model always' option\n");
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
+    {
+    default:
+      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
+		 trustlevel);
+      /* fall thru */
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
+      log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
+		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+      return 0; /* no */
+
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
+      log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
+		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+      return 1; /* yes */
+
+    case TRUST_FULLY:
+      if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the named user\n"));
+      return 1; /* yes */
+
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
+      if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
+      return 1; /* yes */
+    }
+
+  return 1; /*NOTREACHED*/
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
+ * key anyway.
+ */
+static int
+do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
+{
+  int rc;
+
+  rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
+
+  if( !opt.batch && !rc )
+    {
+      print_pubkey_info(NULL,pk);
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      tty_printf(
+	       _("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
+		 "in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
+		 "you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));
+
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
+				_("Use this key anyway? (y/N) "))  )
+	rc = 1;
+
+      /* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
+       *	 his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
+       */
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether we can trust this signature.
+ * Returns: Error if we shall not trust this signatures.
+ */
+int
+check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+  unsigned int trustlevel;
+  int rc=0;
+
+  rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
+  if (rc) 
+    { /* this should not happen */
+      log_error("Ooops; the key vanished  - can't check the trust\n");
+      rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if ( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
+    {
+      if( !opt.quiet )
+        log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  if(pk->maybe_revoked && !pk->is_revoked)
+    log_info(_("WARNING: this key might be revoked (revocation key"
+	       " not present)\n"));
+
+  trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
+
+  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) 
+    {
+      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
+      if(pk->is_revoked==2)
+	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its"
+		   " designated revoker!\n"));
+      else
+	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forged.\n"));
+      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
+    }
+  else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) 
+    {
+      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
+      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
+    }
+  
+  if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
+    log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
+
+  /* If we have PKA information adjust the trustlevel. */
+  if (sig->pka_info && sig->pka_info->valid)
+    {
+      unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+      PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
+      size_t fprlen;
+      int okay;
+
+
+      primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *primary_pk);
+      get_pubkey (primary_pk, pk->main_keyid);
+      fingerprint_from_pk (primary_pk, fpr, &fprlen);
+      free_public_key (primary_pk);
+
+      if ( fprlen == 20 && !memcmp (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, 20) )
+        {
+          okay = 1;
+          write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD, sig->pka_info->email);
+          log_info (_("Note: Verified signer's address is `%s'\n"),
+                    sig->pka_info->email);
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          okay = 0;
+          write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD, sig->pka_info->email);
+          log_info (_("Note: Signer's address `%s' "
+                      "does not match DNS entry\n"), sig->pka_info->email);
+        }
+
+      switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+        {
+        case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
+        case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
+        case TRUST_MARGINAL:
+          if (okay && opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE)
+            {
+              trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_FULLY);
+              log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to FULL"
+                          " due to valid PKA info\n"));
+            }
+          /* (fall through) */
+        case TRUST_FULLY:
+          if (!okay)
+            {
+              trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_NEVER);
+              log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to NEVER"
+                          " due to bad PKA info\n"));
+            }
+          break;
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Now let the user know what up with the trustlevel. */
+  switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+    {
+    case TRUST_EXPIRED:
+      log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+        
+    default:
+      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
+                 trustlevel);
+      /* fall thru */
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
+                 " a trusted signature!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         There is no indication that the "
+                 "signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_NEVER:
+      /* currently we won't get that status */
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
+                 " sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         It is not certain that the"
+                 " signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_FULLY:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  free_public_key( pk );
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+release_pk_list( PK_LIST pk_list )
+{
+    PK_LIST pk_rover;
+
+    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover ) {
+	pk_rover = pk_list->next;
+	free_public_key( pk_list->pk );
+	xfree( pk_list );
+    }
+}
+
+
+static int
+key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
+	if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
+	    return 0;
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return a malloced string with a default reciepient if there is any
+ */
+static char *
+default_recipient(void)
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+    size_t n;
+    char *p;
+    int i;
+
+    if( opt.def_recipient )
+	return xstrdup( opt.def_recipient );
+    if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
+	return NULL;
+    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+    i = get_seckey_byname( sk, NULL, 0 );
+    if( i ) {
+	free_secret_key( sk );
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
+    fingerprint_from_sk( sk, fpr, &n );
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    p = xmalloc( 2*n+3 );
+    *p++ = '0';
+    *p++ = 'x';
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
+    p -= 2;
+    return p;
+}
+
+static int
+expand_id(const char *id,STRLIST *into,unsigned int flags)
+{
+  struct groupitem *groups;
+  int count=0;
+
+  for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
+    {
+      /* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
+      if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
+	{
+	  STRLIST each,sl;
+
+	  /* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
+	  for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
+	    {
+	      sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
+	      sl->flags=flags;
+	      count++;
+	    }
+
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  return count;
+}
+
+/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
+   you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
+static STRLIST
+expand_group(STRLIST input)
+{
+  STRLIST sl,output=NULL,rover;
+
+  for(rover=input;rover;rover=rover->next)
+    if(expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags)==0)
+      {
+	/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
+	sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
+	sl->flags=rover->flags;
+      }
+
+  return output;
+}
+
+
+/* This is the central function to collect the keys for recipients.
+   It is thus used to prepare a public key encryption. encrypt-to
+   keys, default keys and the keys for the actual recipients are all
+   collected here.  When not in batch mode and no recipient has been
+   passed on the commandline, the function will also ask for
+   recipients.
+
+   RCPTS is a string list with the recipients; NULL is an allowed
+   value but not very useful.  Group expansion is done on these names;
+   they may be in any of the user Id formats we can handle.  The flags
+   bits for each string in the string list are used for:
+     Bit 0: This is an encrypt-to recipient.
+     Bit 1: This is a hidden recipient.
+
+   USE is the desired use for the key - usually PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC.
+   RET_PK_LIST.
+
+   On success a list of keys is stored at the address RET_PK_LIST; the
+   caller must free this list.  On error the value at this address is
+   not changed.
+ */
+int
+build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned int use )
+{
+  PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+  int rc=0;
+  int any_recipients=0;
+  STRLIST rov,remusr;
+  char *def_rec = NULL;
+
+  /* Try to expand groups if any have been defined. */
+  if (opt.grouplist)
+    remusr = expand_group (rcpts);
+  else
+    remusr = rcpts;
+
+  /* Check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
+   * list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them). */
+  for ( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next ) 
+    {
+      if ( !(rov->flags & 1) )
+        {
+          /* This is a regular recipient; i.e. not an encrypt-to
+             one. */
+          any_recipients = 1;
+
+          /* Hidden recipients are not allowed while in PGP mode,
+             issue a warning and switch into GnuPG mode. */
+          if ((rov->flags&2) && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
+            {
+              log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
+                       "--hidden-recipient",
+                       compliance_option_string());
+
+              compliance_failure();
+            }
+        }
+      else if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) 
+        {
+          /* Encryption has been requested and --encrypt-to has not
+             been disabled.  Check this encrypt-to key. */
+          pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+          pk->req_usage = use;
+
+          /* We explicitly allow encrypt-to to an disabled key; thus
+             we pass 1 as last argument. */
+          if ( (rc = get_pubkey_byname ( pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL, 1 )) ) 
+            {
+              free_public_key ( pk ); pk = NULL;
+              log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+              write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                            rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
+              goto fail;
+            }
+          else if ( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) 
+            {
+              /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
+               * in the list.  Add it to our list if not. */
+              if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
+                {
+                  free_public_key (pk); pk = NULL;
+                  log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
+                            rov->d);
+                }
+              else
+                {
+                  PK_LIST r;
+                  r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+                  r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                  r->next = pk_list;
+                  r->flags = (rov->flags&2)?1:0;
+                  pk_list = r;
+
+                  /* Hidden encrypt-to recipients are not allowed while
+                     in PGP mode, issue a warning and switch into
+                     GnuPG mode. */
+                  if ((r->flags&1) && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
+                    {
+                      log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
+                               "--hidden-encrypt-to",
+                               compliance_option_string());
+
+                      compliance_failure();
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+          else 
+            {
+              /* The public key is not usable for encryption or not
+                 available. */
+              free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+              log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+              write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                            rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
+              goto fail;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* If we don't have any recipients yet and we are not in batch mode
+     drop into interactive selection mode. */
+  if ( !any_recipients && !opt.batch ) 
+    { 
+      int have_def_rec;
+      char *answer = NULL;
+      STRLIST backlog = NULL;
+
+      if (pk_list)
+        any_recipients = 1;
+      def_rec = default_recipient();
+      have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
+      if ( !have_def_rec )
+        tty_printf(_("You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));
+
+      for (;;) 
+        {
+          rc = 0;
+          xfree(answer);
+          if ( have_def_rec )
+            {
+              /* A default recipient is taken as the first entry. */
+              answer = def_rec;
+              def_rec = NULL;
+            }
+          else if (backlog) 
+            {
+              /* This is part of our trick to expand and display groups. */
+              answer = pop_strlist (&backlog);
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              /* Show the list of already collected recipients and ask
+                 for more. */
+              PK_LIST iter;
+
+              tty_printf("\n");
+              tty_printf(_("Current recipients:\n"));
+              for (iter=pk_list;iter;iter=iter->next)
+                {
+                  u32 keyid[2];
+
+                  keyid_from_pk(iter->pk,keyid);
+                  tty_printf("%4u%c/%s %s \"",
+                             nbits_from_pk(iter->pk),
+                             pubkey_letter(iter->pk->pubkey_algo),
+                             keystr(keyid),
+                             datestr_from_pk(iter->pk));
+
+                  if (iter->pk->user_id)
+                    tty_print_utf8_string(iter->pk->user_id->name,
+                                          iter->pk->user_id->len);
+                  else
+                    {
+                      size_t n;
+                      char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
+                      tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
+                      xfree(p);
+                    }
+                  tty_printf("\"\n");
+                }
+
+              answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
+                                    _("\nEnter the user ID.  "
+                                      "End with an empty line: "));
+              trim_spaces(answer);
+              cpr_kill_prompt();
+            }
+          
+          if ( !answer || !*answer ) 
+            {
+              xfree(answer);
+              break;  /* No more recipients entered - get out of loop. */
+            }
+
+          /* Do group expand here too.  The trick here is to continue
+             the loop if any expansion occured.  The code above will
+             then list all expanded keys. */
+          if (expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
+            continue;
+
+          /* Get and check key for the current name. */
+          if (pk)
+            free_public_key (pk);
+          pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+          pk->req_usage = use;
+          rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 0 );
+          if (rc)
+            tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
+          else if ( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) 
+            {
+              if ( have_def_rec )
+                {
+                  /* No validation for a default recipient. */
+                  if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk)) 
+                    {
+                      free_public_key (pk); pk = NULL;
+                      log_info (_("skipped: public key "
+                                  "already set as default recipient\n") );
+                    }
+                  else
+                    {
+                      PK_LIST r = xmalloc (sizeof *r);
+                      r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                      r->next = pk_list;
+                      r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
+                      pk_list = r;
+                    }
+                  any_recipients = 1;
+                  continue;
+                }
+              else
+                { /* Check validity of this key. */
+                  int trustlevel;
+		    
+                  trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
+                  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) 
+                    {
+                      tty_printf (_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
+                    }
+                  else if ( do_we_trust_pre (pk, trustlevel) ) 
+                    {
+                      /* Skip the actual key if the key is already
+                       * present in the list */
+                      if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
+                        {
+                          free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                          log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
+                        }
+                      else
+                        {
+                          PK_LIST r;
+                          r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+                          r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                          r->next = pk_list;
+                          r->flags = 0; /* No throwing interactive ids. */
+                          pk_list = r;
+                        }
+                      any_recipients = 1;
+                      continue;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+          xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
+          have_def_rec = 0;
+        }
+      if ( pk )
+        {
+          free_public_key( pk );
+          pk = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+  else if ( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient()) ) 
+    {
+      /* We are in batch mode and have only a default recipient. */
+      pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+      pk->req_usage = use;
+
+      /* The default recipient is allowed to be disabled; thus pass 1
+         as last argument. */
+      rc = get_pubkey_byname (pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL, 1);
+      if (rc)
+        log_error(_("unknown default recipient \"%s\"\n"), def_rec );
+      else if ( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) 
+        {
+          /* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
+             would have been used if it wasn't already there.  It
+             doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
+             recipient or an encrypt-to. */
+          any_recipients = 1;
+          if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
+            log_info (_("skipped: public key already set "
+                        "as default recipient\n"));
+          else 
+            {
+              PK_LIST r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+              r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+              r->next = pk_list;
+              r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
+              pk_list = r;
+            }
+        }
+      if ( pk )
+        {
+          free_public_key( pk );
+          pk = NULL;
+        }
+      xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
+    }
+  else 
+    {
+      /* General case: Check all keys. */
+      any_recipients = 0;
+      for (; remusr; remusr = remusr->next ) 
+        {
+          if ( (remusr->flags & 1) )
+            continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled. */
+
+          pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+          pk->req_usage = use;
+          if ( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, remusr->d, NULL, NULL, 0 )) ) 
+            {
+              /* Key not found or other error. */
+              free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+              log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+              write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                            remusr->d, strlen (remusr->d),
+                                            -1);
+              goto fail;
+            }
+          else if ( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) 
+            {
+              /* Key found and usable.  Check validity. */
+              int trustlevel;
+              
+              trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
+              if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) 
+                {
+                  /*Key has been disabled. */
+                  free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                  log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"),
+                           remusr->d);
+                  write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                                remusr->d,
+                                                strlen (remusr->d),
+                                                -1);
+                  rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+                  goto fail;
+                }
+              else if ( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) 
+                {
+                  /* Note: do_we_trust may have changed the trustlevel */
+
+                  /* We have at least one valid recipient. It doesn't
+                   * matters if this recipient is already present. */
+                  any_recipients = 1;
+
+                  /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
+                   * in the list */
+                  if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk)) 
+                    {
+                      free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                      log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
+                               remusr->d);
+                    }
+                  else
+                    {
+                      PK_LIST r;
+                      r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+                      r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                      r->next = pk_list;
+                      r->flags = (remusr->flags&2)?1:0;
+                      pk_list = r;
+                    }
+                }
+              else
+                { /* We don't trust this key. */
+                  free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+                  write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "10 ",
+                                                remusr->d,
+                                                strlen (remusr->d),
+                                                -1);
+                  rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+                  goto fail;
+                }
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              /* Key found but not usable for us (e.g. sign-only key). */
+              free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+              write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                            remusr->d,
+                                            strlen (remusr->d),
+                                            -1);
+              log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+              goto fail;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  
+  if ( !rc && !any_recipients ) 
+    {
+      log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
+      write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
+      rc = G10ERR_NO_USER_ID;
+    }
+  
+ fail:
+
+  if ( rc )
+    release_pk_list( pk_list );
+  else
+    *ret_pk_list = pk_list;
+  if (opt.grouplist)
+    free_strlist(remusr);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
+   CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
+   and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1).  pgp7 and pgp8
+   mode expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8),
+   AES256 (9), and TWOFISH (10).  pgp8 adds the SHA-256 hash (8).  For
+   a true PGP key all of this is unneeded as they are the only items
+   present in the preferences subpacket, but checking here covers the
+   weird case of encrypting to a key that had preferences from a
+   different implementation which was then used with PGP.  I am not
+   completely comfortable with this as the right thing to do, as it
+   slightly alters the list of what the user is supposedly requesting.
+   It is not against the RFC however, as the preference chosen will
+   never be one that the user didn't specify somewhere ("The
+   implementation may use any mechanism to pick an algorithm in the
+   intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
+   preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
+
+int
+algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint )
+{
+  if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
+    {
+      if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
+	return 0;
+      
+      if(PGP7 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
+		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
+	return 0;
+
+      /* PGP8 supports all the ciphers we do.. */
+
+      return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
+    {
+      if(hint && hint->digest_length)
+	{
+	  if(hint->digest_length!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
+	    {
+	      /* If --enable-dsa2 is set or the hash isn't 160 bits
+		 (which implies DSA2), then we'll accept a hash that
+		 is larger than we need.  Otherwise we won't accept
+		 any hash that isn't exactly the right size. */
+	      if(hint->digest_length > md_digest_length(algo))
+		return 0;
+	    }
+	  else if(hint->digest_length != md_digest_length(algo))
+	    return 0;
+	}
+
+      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+			    && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+			    && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
+	return 0;
+
+
+      if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
+		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
+	return 0;
+
+      return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
+    {
+      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
+			    && algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
+	return 0;
+
+      /* PGP8 supports all the compression algos we do */
+
+      return !check_compress_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
+ */
+int
+select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
+		       int request, const union pref_hint *hint)
+{
+    PK_LIST pkr;
+    u32 bits[8];
+    const prefitem_t *prefs;
+    int i, j;
+    int compr_hack=0;
+    int any;
+
+    if( !pk_list )
+	return -1;
+
+    memset( bits, ~0, 8 * sizeof *bits );
+    for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next ) {
+	u32 mask[8];
+
+	memset( mask, 0, 8 * sizeof *mask );
+	if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
+	  if( PGP2 &&
+	      pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
+	      pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
+	    mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys
+				  with v3 selfsigs (rfc2440:12.1) if
+				  --pgp2 mode is on.  This doesn't
+				  mean it's actually available, of
+				  course. */
+	  else
+	    mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* 3DES is implicitly there for everyone else */
+	}
+	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
+	  /* While I am including this code for completeness, note
+	     that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
+	     function will never even be called.  Even if the hash
+	     wasn't locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in
+	     --pgp2 mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is
+	     used anyway. -dms */
+	  if( PGP2 &&
+	      pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
+	      pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
+	    mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* MD5 is there for v3 keys with v3
+				  selfsigs when --pgp2 is on. */
+	  else
+	    mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* SHA1 is there for everyone else */
+	}
+	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
+	  mask[0] |= (1<<0); /* Uncompressed is implicit */
+
+        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
+            prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
+        else
+            prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;
+
+	any = 0;
+	if( prefs ) {
+	    for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+		if( prefs[i].type == preftype ) {
+		    mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1 << (prefs[i].value%32);
+		    any = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if( (!prefs || !any) && preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
+	    mask[0] |= 3; /* asume no_compression and old pgp */
+	    compr_hack = 1;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	log_debug("pref mask=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
+	       (ulong)mask[7], (ulong)mask[6], (ulong)mask[5], (ulong)mask[4],
+	     (ulong)mask[3], (ulong)mask[2], (ulong)mask[1], (ulong)mask[0]);
+#endif
+	for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
+	    bits[i] &= mask[i];
+#if 0
+	log_debug("pref bits=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
+	       (ulong)bits[7], (ulong)bits[6], (ulong)bits[5], (ulong)bits[4],
+	     (ulong)bits[3], (ulong)bits[2], (ulong)bits[1], (ulong)bits[0]);
+#endif
+    }
+    /* usable algorithms are now in bits
+     * We now use the last key from pk_list to select
+     * the algorithm we want to use. there are no
+     * preferences for the last key, we select the one
+     * corresponding to first set bit.
+     */
+    i = -1;
+    any = 0;
+
+    /* Can we use the requested algorithm? */
+    if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
+       algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
+      return request;
+
+    /* If we have personal prefs set, use them instead of the last key */
+    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
+    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
+    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;
+
+    if( prefs ) {
+	for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ ) {
+	    if( prefs[j].type == preftype ) {
+                if( (bits[prefs[j].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[j].value%32))) ) {
+		    if( algo_available( preftype, prefs[j].value, hint ) ) {
+			any = 1;
+			i = prefs[j].value;
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if( !prefs || !any ) {
+	for(j=0; j < 256; j++ )
+	    if( (bits[j/32] & (1<<(j%32))) ) {
+		if( algo_available( preftype, j, hint ) ) {
+		    i = j;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+    }
+
+#if 0
+    log_debug("prefs of type %d: selected %d\n", preftype, i );
+#endif
+    if( compr_hack && !i ) {
+	/* selected no compression, but we should check whether
+	 * algorithm 1 is also available (the ordering is not relevant
+	 * in this case). */
+	if( bits[0] & (1<<1) )
+	    i = 1; /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
+    }
+
+    /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
+       may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer
+       would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the
+       recipient requests it." RFC2440:13.  If we settle on MD5, and
+       SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead.  Of course, if the
+       user intentionally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
+       prefs), then we should do what they say. */
+
+    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
+       i==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && (bits[0] & (1<<DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)))
+      {
+	i=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+	if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+	  for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ )
+	    if(opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].type==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
+	       opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].value==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
+	      {
+		i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+		break;
+	      }
+      }
+
+    return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select the MDC flag from the pk_list.  We can only use MDC if all recipients
+ * support this feature 
+ */
+int
+select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
+{
+    PK_LIST pkr;
+
+    if( !pk_list )
+	return 0;
+
+    for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next) {
+        int mdc;
+
+        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
+            mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
+        else
+            mdc = pkr->pk->mdc_feature;
+        if (!mdc)
+            return 0; /* at least one recipient does not support it */
+    }
+    return 1; /* can be used */
+}
diff --git a/g10/plaintext.c b/g10/plaintext.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..243296b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/plaintext.c
@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
+/* plaintext.c -  process plaintext packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
+#endif
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+/****************
+ * Handle a plaintext packet.  If MFX is not NULL, update the MDs
+ * Note: we should use the filter stuff here, but we have to add some
+ *	 easy mimic to set a read limit, so we calculate only the
+ *	 bytes from the plaintext.
+ */
+int
+handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
+		  int nooutput, int clearsig )
+{
+    char *fname = NULL;
+    FILE *fp = NULL;
+    static off_t count=0;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int c;
+    int convert = (pt->mode == 't' || pt->mode == 'u');
+#ifdef __riscos__
+    int filetype = 0xfff;
+#endif
+
+    /* Let people know what the plaintext info is. This allows the
+       receiving program to try and do something different based on
+       the format code (say, recode UTF-8 to local). */
+    if(!nooutput && is_status_enabled())
+      {
+	char status[50];
+
+	sprintf(status,"%X %lu ",(byte)pt->mode,(ulong)pt->timestamp);
+	write_status_text_and_buffer(STATUS_PLAINTEXT,
+				     status,pt->name,pt->namelen,0);
+
+	if(!pt->is_partial)
+	  {
+	    sprintf(status,"%lu",(ulong)pt->len);
+	    write_status_text(STATUS_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH,status);
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* create the filename as C string */
+    if( nooutput )
+	;
+    else if( opt.outfile ) {
+	fname = xmalloc( strlen( opt.outfile ) + 1);
+	strcpy(fname, opt.outfile );
+    }
+    else if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) {
+	log_info(_("data not saved; use option \"--output\" to save it\n"));
+	nooutput = 1;
+    }
+    else if( !opt.flags.use_embedded_filename ) {
+	fname = make_outfile_name( iobuf_get_real_fname(pt->buf) );
+	if( !fname )
+	    fname = ask_outfile_name( pt->name, pt->namelen );
+	if( !fname ) {
+	    rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+      fname=utf8_to_native(pt->name,pt->namelen,0);
+
+    if( nooutput )
+	;
+    else if ( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) || !*fname)
+      {
+	/* No filename or "-" given; write to stdout. */
+	fp = stdout;
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+	setmode ( fileno(fp) , O_BINARY );
+#endif
+      }
+    else {
+	while( !overwrite_filep (fname) ) {
+            char *tmp = ask_outfile_name (NULL, 0);
+            if ( !tmp || !*tmp ) {
+                xfree (tmp);
+                rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+                goto leave;
+            }
+            xfree (fname);
+            fname = tmp;
+        }
+    }
+
+#ifndef __riscos__
+    if( fp || nooutput )
+	;
+    else if (is_secured_filename (fname))
+      {
+        errno = EPERM;
+	log_error(_("error creating `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+    else if( !(fp = fopen(fname,"wb")) ) {
+	log_error(_("error creating `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+#else /* __riscos__ */
+    /* If no output filename was given, i.e. we constructed it,
+       convert all '.' in fname to '/' but not vice versa as
+       we don't create directories! */
+    if( !opt.outfile )
+        for( c=0; fname[c]; ++c )
+            if( fname[c] == '.' )
+                fname[c] = '/';
+
+    if( fp || nooutput )
+	;
+    else {
+        fp = fopen(fname,"wb");
+        if( !fp ) {
+            log_error(_("error creating `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+            rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+            if (errno == 106)
+                log_info("Do output file and input file have the same name?\n");
+            goto leave;
+	}
+
+        /* If there's a ,xxx extension in the embedded filename,
+           use that, else check whether the user input (in fname)
+           has a ,xxx appended, then use that in preference */
+        if( (c = riscos_get_filetype_from_string( pt->name,
+                                                  pt->namelen )) != -1 )
+            filetype = c;
+        if( (c = riscos_get_filetype_from_string( fname,
+                                                  strlen(fname) )) != -1 )
+            filetype = c;
+        riscos_set_filetype_by_number(fname, filetype);
+    }
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+
+    if( !pt->is_partial ) {
+        /* We have an actual length (which might be zero). */
+
+        if (clearsig) {
+            log_error ("clearsig encountered while not expected\n");
+            rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+            goto leave;
+        }
+
+	if( convert ) { /* text mode */
+	    for( ; pt->len; pt->len-- ) {
+		if( (c = iobuf_get(pt->buf)) == -1 ) {
+		    log_error("Problem reading source (%u bytes remaining)\n",
+			      (unsigned)pt->len);
+		    rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+		    goto leave;
+		}
+		if( mfx->md )
+		    md_putc(mfx->md, c );
+#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+		if( c == '\r' )  /* convert to native line ending */
+		    continue;	 /* fixme: this hack might be too simple */
+#endif
+		if( fp )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.max_output && (++count)>opt.max_output)
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname,"exceeded --max-output limit\n");
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		    else if( putc( c, fp ) == EOF )
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname, strerror(errno) );
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+	else { /* binary mode */
+	    byte *buffer = xmalloc( 32768 );
+	    while( pt->len ) {
+		int len = pt->len > 32768 ? 32768 : pt->len;
+		len = iobuf_read( pt->buf, buffer, len );
+		if( len == -1 ) {
+		    log_error("Problem reading source (%u bytes remaining)\n",
+			      (unsigned)pt->len);
+		    rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+		    xfree( buffer );
+		    goto leave;
+		}
+		if( mfx->md )
+		    md_write( mfx->md, buffer, len );
+		if( fp )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.max_output && (count+=len)>opt.max_output)
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname,"exceeded --max-output limit\n");
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			xfree( buffer );
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		    else if( fwrite( buffer, 1, len, fp ) != len )
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname, strerror(errno) );
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			xfree( buffer );
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		  }
+		pt->len -= len;
+	    }
+	    xfree( buffer );
+	}
+    }
+    else if( !clearsig ) {
+	if( convert ) { /* text mode */
+	    while( (c = iobuf_get(pt->buf)) != -1 ) {
+		if( mfx->md )
+		    md_putc(mfx->md, c );
+#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+		if( convert && c == '\r' )
+		    continue; /* fixme: this hack might be too simple */
+#endif
+		if( fp )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.max_output && (++count)>opt.max_output)
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname,"exceeded --max-output limit\n");
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		    else if( putc( c, fp ) == EOF )
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname, strerror(errno) );
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		  }
+	    }
+	}
+	else { /* binary mode */
+	    byte *buffer = xmalloc( 32768 );
+	    int eof;
+	    for( eof=0; !eof; ) {
+		/* Why do we check for len < 32768:
+		 * If we won't, we would practically read 2 EOFs but
+		 * the first one has already popped the block_filter
+		 * off and therefore we don't catch the boundary.
+		 * So, always assume EOF if iobuf_read returns less bytes
+		 * then requested */
+		int len = iobuf_read( pt->buf, buffer, 32768 );
+		if( len == -1 )
+		    break;
+		if( len < 32768 )
+		    eof = 1;
+		if( mfx->md )
+		    md_write( mfx->md, buffer, len );
+		if( fp )
+		  {
+		    if(opt.max_output && (count+=len)>opt.max_output)
+		      {
+			log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				  fname,"exceeded --max-output limit\n");
+			rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+			xfree( buffer );
+			goto leave;
+		      }
+		    else if( fwrite( buffer, 1, len, fp ) != len ) {
+		      log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+				fname, strerror(errno) );
+		      rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		      xfree( buffer );
+		      goto leave;
+		    }
+		  }
+	    }
+	    xfree( buffer );
+	}
+	pt->buf = NULL;
+    }
+    else {  /* clear text signature - don't hash the last cr,lf  */
+	int state = 0;
+
+	while( (c = iobuf_get(pt->buf)) != -1 ) {
+	    if( fp )
+	      {
+		if(opt.max_output && (++count)>opt.max_output)
+		  {
+		    log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+			      fname,"exceeded --max-output limit\n");
+		    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		    goto leave;
+		  }
+		else if( putc( c, fp ) == EOF )
+		  {
+		    log_error("Error writing to `%s': %s\n",
+			      fname, strerror(errno) );
+		    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+		    goto leave;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    if( !mfx->md )
+		continue;
+	    if( state == 2 ) {
+		md_putc(mfx->md, '\r' );
+		md_putc(mfx->md, '\n' );
+		state = 0;
+	    }
+	    if( !state ) {
+		if( c == '\r'  )
+		    state = 1;
+		else if( c == '\n'  )
+		    state = 2;
+		else
+		    md_putc(mfx->md, c );
+	    }
+	    else if( state == 1 ) {
+		if( c == '\n'  )
+		    state = 2;
+		else {
+		    md_putc(mfx->md, '\r' );
+		    if( c == '\r'  )
+			state = 1;
+		    else {
+			state = 0;
+			md_putc(mfx->md, c );
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	pt->buf = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if( fp && fp != stdout && fclose(fp) ) {
+	log_error("Error closing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror(errno) );
+	fp = NULL;
+	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    fp = NULL;
+
+  leave:
+    if( fp && fp != stdout )
+	fclose(fp);
+    xfree(fname);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+do_hash( MD_HANDLE md, MD_HANDLE md2, IOBUF fp, int textmode )
+{
+    text_filter_context_t tfx;
+    int c;
+
+    if( textmode ) {
+	memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+	iobuf_push_filter( fp, text_filter, &tfx );
+    }
+    if( md2 ) { /* work around a strange behaviour in pgp2 */
+	/* It seems that at least PGP5 converts a single CR to a CR,LF too */
+	int lc = -1;
+	while( (c = iobuf_get(fp)) != -1 ) {
+	    if( c == '\n' && lc == '\r' )
+		md_putc(md2, c);
+	    else if( c == '\n' ) {
+		md_putc(md2, '\r');
+		md_putc(md2, c);
+	    }
+	    else if( c != '\n' && lc == '\r' ) {
+		md_putc(md2, '\n');
+		md_putc(md2, c);
+	    }
+	    else
+		md_putc(md2, c);
+
+	    if( md )
+		md_putc(md, c );
+	    lc = c;
+	}
+    }
+    else {
+	while( (c = iobuf_get(fp)) != -1 ) {
+	    if( md )
+		md_putc(md, c );
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Ask for the detached datafile and calculate the digest from it.
+ * INFILE is the name of the input file.
+ */
+int
+ask_for_detached_datafile( MD_HANDLE md, MD_HANDLE md2,
+			   const char *inname, int textmode )
+{
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    char *answer = NULL;
+    IOBUF fp;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    fp = open_sigfile( inname, &pfx ); /* open default file */
+
+    if( !fp && !opt.batch ) {
+	int any=0;
+	tty_printf(_("Detached signature.\n"));
+	do {
+	    char *name;
+	    xfree(answer);
+	    tty_enable_completion(NULL);
+	    name = cpr_get("detached_signature.filename",
+			   _("Please enter name of data file: "));
+	    tty_disable_completion();
+	    cpr_kill_prompt();
+	    answer=make_filename(name,(void *)NULL);
+	    xfree(name);
+
+	    if( any && !*answer ) {
+		rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	    fp = iobuf_open(answer);
+            if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+              {
+                iobuf_close (fp);
+                fp = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+              }
+	    if( !fp && errno == ENOENT ) {
+		tty_printf("No such file, try again or hit enter to quit.\n");
+		any++;
+	    }
+	    else if( !fp )
+	      {
+		log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), answer, strerror(errno));
+		rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+		goto leave;
+	      }
+	} while( !fp );
+    }
+
+    if( !fp ) {
+	if( opt.verbose )
+	    log_info(_("reading stdin ...\n"));
+	fp = iobuf_open( NULL );
+	assert(fp);
+    }
+    do_hash( md, md2, fp, textmode );
+    iobuf_close(fp);
+
+  leave:
+    xfree(answer);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Hash the given files and append the hash to hash context md.
+ * If FILES is NULL, hash stdin.
+ */
+int
+hash_datafiles( MD_HANDLE md, MD_HANDLE md2, STRLIST files,
+		const char *sigfilename, int textmode )
+{
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    IOBUF fp;
+    STRLIST sl;
+
+    if( !files ) {
+	/* check whether we can open the signed material */
+	fp = open_sigfile( sigfilename, &pfx );
+	if( fp ) {
+	    do_hash( md, md2, fp, textmode );
+	    iobuf_close(fp);
+	    return 0;
+	}
+        log_error (_("no signed data\n"));
+        return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+    }
+
+
+    for (sl=files; sl; sl = sl->next ) {
+	fp = iobuf_open( sl->d );
+        if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+          {
+            iobuf_close (fp);
+            fp = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+          }
+	if( !fp ) {
+	    log_error(_("can't open signed data `%s'\n"),
+						print_fname_stdin(sl->d));
+	    return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	}
+        handle_progress (&pfx, fp, sl->d);
+	do_hash( md, md2, fp, textmode );
+	iobuf_close(fp);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Set up a plaintext packet with the appropriate filename.  If there
+   is a --set-filename, use it (it's already UTF8).  If there is a
+   regular filename, UTF8-ize it if necessary.  If there is no
+   filenames at all, set the field empty. */
+
+PKT_plaintext *
+setup_plaintext_name(const char *filename,IOBUF iobuf)
+{
+  PKT_plaintext *pt;
+
+  if(filename || opt.set_filename)
+    {
+      char *s;
+
+      if(opt.set_filename)
+	s=make_basename(opt.set_filename,iobuf_get_real_fname(iobuf));
+      else if(filename && !opt.flags.utf8_filename)
+	{
+	  char *tmp=native_to_utf8(filename);
+	  s=make_basename(tmp,iobuf_get_real_fname(iobuf));
+	  xfree(tmp);
+	}
+      else
+	s=make_basename(filename,iobuf_get_real_fname(iobuf));
+
+      pt = xmalloc (sizeof *pt + strlen(s) - 1);
+      pt->namelen = strlen (s);
+      memcpy (pt->name, s, pt->namelen);
+      xfree (s);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      /* no filename */
+      pt = xmalloc (sizeof *pt - 1);
+      pt->namelen = 0;
+    }
+
+  return pt;
+}
diff --git a/g10/progress.c b/g10/progress.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c8265f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/progress.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* progress.c
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+/****************
+ * The filter is used to report progress to the user.
+ */
+int
+progress_filter (void *opaque, int control,
+		 IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  progress_filter_context_t *pfx = opaque;
+
+  if (control == IOBUFCTRL_INIT)
+    {
+      char buffer[50];
+
+      pfx->last = 0;
+      pfx->offset = 0;
+      pfx->last_time = make_timestamp ();
+
+      sprintf (buffer, "%.20s ? %lu %lu",
+               pfx->what? pfx->what : "?",
+               pfx->offset,
+	       pfx->total);
+      write_status_text (STATUS_PROGRESS, buffer);
+    }
+  else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW)
+    {
+      u32 timestamp = make_timestamp ();
+      int len = iobuf_read (a, buf, *ret_len);
+
+      if (len >= 0)
+	{
+	  pfx->offset += len;
+	  *ret_len = len;
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  *ret_len = 0;
+	  rc = -1;
+	}
+      if ((len == -1 && pfx->offset != pfx->last)
+	  || timestamp - pfx->last_time > 0)
+	{
+	  char buffer[50];
+	  
+	  sprintf (buffer, "%.20s ? %lu %lu",
+                   pfx->what? pfx->what : "?", 
+                   pfx->offset,
+		   pfx->total);
+	  write_status_text (STATUS_PROGRESS, buffer);
+
+	  pfx->last = pfx->offset;
+	  pfx->last_time = timestamp;
+	}
+    }
+  else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE)
+    {
+      /* Note, that we must always dealloc resources of a filter
+         within the filter handler and not anywhere else.  (We set it
+         to NULL and check all uses just in case.) */
+      xfree (pfx->what);
+      pfx->what = NULL;
+    }
+  else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC)
+    *(char**)buf = "progress_filter";
+  return rc;
+}
+
+void
+handle_progress (progress_filter_context_t *pfx, IOBUF inp, const char *name)
+{
+  off_t filesize = 0;
+
+  if (!opt.enable_progress_filter)
+    return;
+
+  if (!is_status_enabled ())
+    return;
+
+  if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (name) && *name )
+    filesize = iobuf_get_filelength (inp, NULL);
+  else if (opt.set_filesize)
+    filesize = opt.set_filesize;
+
+  /* register the progress filter */
+  pfx->what = xstrdup (name ? name : "stdin");
+  pfx->total = filesize;
+  iobuf_push_filter (inp, progress_filter, pfx);
+}
diff --git a/g10/pubkey-enc.c b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cffa79c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+/* pubkey-enc.c -  public key encoded packet handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+
+static int get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *k,
+		   DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid );
+
+
+/* check that the given algo is mentioned in one of the valid user IDs */
+static int
+is_algo_in_prefs ( KBNODE keyblock, preftype_t type, int algo )
+{
+    KBNODE k;
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k=k->next) {
+        if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
+            PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
+            
+            if (uid->created && prefs &&
+		!uid->is_revoked && !uid->is_expired ) {
+                for (; prefs->type; prefs++ )
+                    if (prefs->type == type && prefs->value == algo)
+                        return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get the session key from a pubkey enc packet and return
+ * it in DEK, which should have been allocated in secure memory.
+ */
+int
+get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = check_pubkey_algo2 (k->pubkey_algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC);
+    if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+    if( (k->keyid[0] || k->keyid[1]) && !opt.try_all_secrets ) {
+	sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+	sk->pubkey_algo = k->pubkey_algo; /* we want a pubkey with this algo*/
+	if( !(rc = get_seckey( sk, k->keyid )) )
+	    rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, k->keyid );
+    }
+    else { /* anonymous receiver: Try all available secret keys */
+	void *enum_context = NULL;
+	u32 keyid[2];
+	char *p;
+
+	for(;;) {
+	    if( sk )
+		free_secret_key( sk );
+	    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+	    rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 1, 0);
+	    if( rc ) {
+		rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if( sk->pubkey_algo != k->pubkey_algo )
+		continue;
+	    keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+	    log_info(_("anonymous recipient; trying secret key %s ...\n"),
+                     keystr(keyid));
+
+	    if(!opt.try_all_secrets && !is_status_enabled())
+	      {
+		p=get_last_passphrase();
+		set_next_passphrase(p);
+		xfree(p);
+	      }
+
+	    rc = check_secret_key( sk, opt.try_all_secrets?1:-1 ); /* ask
+								      only
+								      once */
+	    if( !rc )
+	      {
+		rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, keyid );
+		/* Successfully checked the secret key (either it was
+		   a card, had no passphrase, or had the right
+		   passphrase) but couldn't decrypt the session key,
+		   so thus that key is not the anonymous recipient.
+		   Move the next passphrase into last for the next
+		   round.  We only do this if the secret key was
+		   successfully checked as in the normal case,
+		   check_secret_key handles this for us via
+		   passphrase_to_dek */
+		if(rc)
+		  next_to_last_passphrase();
+	      }
+
+	    if( !rc )
+	      {
+		log_info(_("okay, we are the anonymous recipient.\n") );
+		break;
+	      }
+	}
+	enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0, 0 ); /* free context */
+    }
+
+  leave:
+    if( sk )
+	free_secret_key( sk );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+  int rc;
+  MPI plain_dek  = NULL;
+  byte *frame = NULL;
+  unsigned n, nframe;
+  u16 csum, csum2;
+  
+  int card = 0;
+
+  if (sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+    { /* Note, that we only support RSA for now. */
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+      unsigned char *rbuf;
+      size_t rbuflen;
+      char *snbuf;
+      unsigned char *indata = NULL;
+      unsigned int indatalen;
+
+      snbuf = serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, sk);
+
+      indata = mpi_get_buffer (enc->data[0], &indatalen, NULL);
+      if (!indata)
+        BUG ();
+
+      rc = agent_scd_pkdecrypt (snbuf, indata, indatalen, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
+      xfree (snbuf);
+      xfree (indata);
+      if (rc)
+        goto leave;
+
+      frame = rbuf;
+      nframe = rbuflen;
+      card = 1;
+#else
+      rc = G10ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+      goto leave;
+#endif /*!ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT*/
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      rc = pubkey_decrypt(sk->pubkey_algo, &plain_dek, enc->data, sk->skey );
+      if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+      frame = mpi_get_buffer( plain_dek, &nframe, NULL );
+      mpi_free( plain_dek ); plain_dek = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Now get the DEK (data encryption key) from the frame
+     *
+     * Old versions encode the DEK in in this format (msb is left):
+     *
+     *	   0  1  DEK(16 bytes)	CSUM(2 bytes)  0  RND(n bytes) 2
+     *
+     * Later versions encode the DEK like this:
+     *
+     *	   0  2  RND(n bytes)  0  A  DEK(k bytes)  CSUM(2 bytes)
+     *
+     * (mpi_get_buffer already removed the leading zero).
+     *
+     * RND are non-zero randow bytes.
+     * A   is the cipher algorithm
+     * DEK is the encryption key (session key) with length k
+     * CSUM
+     */
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_hexdump("DEK frame:", frame, nframe );
+    n=0;
+    if (!card)
+      {
+        if( n + 7 > nframe )
+          { rc = G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY; goto leave; }
+        if( frame[n] == 1 && frame[nframe-1] == 2 ) {
+          log_info(_("old encoding of the DEK is not supported\n"));
+          rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+        if( frame[n] != 2 )  /* somethink is wrong */
+          { rc = G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY; goto leave; }
+        for(n++; n < nframe && frame[n]; n++ ) /* skip the random bytes */
+          ;
+        n++; /* and the zero byte */
+      }
+
+    if( n + 4 > nframe )
+	{ rc = G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY; goto leave; }
+
+    dek->keylen = nframe - (n+1) - 2;
+    dek->algo = frame[n++];
+    if( dek->algo ==  CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA )
+	write_status(STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA);
+    rc = check_cipher_algo( dek->algo );
+    if( rc ) {
+	if( !opt.quiet && rc == G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO ) {
+	    log_info(_("cipher algorithm %d%s is unknown or disabled\n"),
+                     dek->algo, dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA? " (IDEA)":"");
+	    if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+	      idea_cipher_warn(0);
+	}
+	dek->algo = 0;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( (dek->keylen*8) != cipher_get_keylen( dek->algo ) ) {
+	rc = G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* copy the key to DEK and compare the checksum */
+    csum  = frame[nframe-2] << 8;
+    csum |= frame[nframe-1];
+    memcpy( dek->key, frame+n, dek->keylen );
+    for( csum2=0, n=0; n < dek->keylen; n++ )
+	csum2 += dek->key[n];
+    if( csum != csum2 ) {
+	rc = G10ERR_WRONG_SECKEY;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_hexdump("DEK is:", dek->key, dek->keylen );
+    /* check that the algo is in the preferences and whether it has expired */
+    {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+        KBNODE pkb = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
+
+	if( !pkb ) {
+            rc = -1;
+	    log_error("oops: public key not found for preference check\n");
+        }
+	else if(pkb->pkt->pkt.public_key->selfsigversion > 3
+		&& dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+		&& !opt.quiet
+		&& !is_algo_in_prefs( pkb, PREFTYPE_SYM, dek->algo ))
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: cipher algorithm %s not found in recipient"
+		     " preferences\n"),cipher_algo_to_string(dek->algo));
+        if (!rc) {
+            KBNODE k;
+            
+            for (k=pkb; k; k = k->next) {
+                if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY 
+                    || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY){
+                    u32 aki[2];
+        	    keyid_from_pk(k->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+
+                    if (aki[0]==keyid[0] && aki[1]==keyid[1]) {
+                        pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if (!pk)
+                BUG ();
+            if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate <= make_timestamp() ) {
+                log_info(_("NOTE: secret key %s expired at %s\n"),
+                         keystr(keyid), asctimestamp( pk->expiredate) );
+            }
+        }
+
+        if ( pk &&  pk->is_revoked ) {
+            log_info( _("NOTE: key has been revoked") );
+            putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+            show_revocation_reason( pk, 1 );
+        }
+
+	release_kbnode (pkb);
+	rc = 0;
+    }
+
+
+  leave:
+    mpi_free(plain_dek);
+    xfree(frame);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get the session key from the given string.
+ * String is supposed to be formatted as this:
+ *  <algo-id>:<even-number-of-hex-digits>
+ */
+int
+get_override_session_key( DEK *dek, const char *string )
+{
+    const char *s;
+    int i;
+
+    if ( !string )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    dek->algo = atoi(string);
+    if ( dek->algo < 1 )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    if ( !(s = strchr ( string, ':' )) )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    s++;
+    for(i=0; i < DIM(dek->key) && *s; i++, s +=2 ) {
+	int c = hextobyte ( s );
+	if (c == -1)
+	    return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+	dek->key[i] = c;
+    }
+    if ( *s )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    dek->keylen = i;
+    return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2deefa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/revoke.c
@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+/* revoke.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+struct revocation_reason_info {
+    int code;
+    char *desc;
+};
+
+
+int
+revocation_reason_build_cb( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+{
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason = opaque;
+    char *ud = NULL;
+    byte *buffer;
+    size_t buflen = 1;
+
+    if(!reason)
+      return 0;
+
+    if( reason->desc ) {
+	ud = native_to_utf8( reason->desc );
+	buflen += strlen(ud);
+    }
+    buffer = xmalloc( buflen );
+    *buffer = reason->code;
+    if( ud ) {
+	memcpy(buffer+1, ud, strlen(ud) );
+	xfree( ud );
+    }
+
+    build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON, buffer, buflen );
+    xfree( buffer );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Outputs a minimal pk (as defined by 2440) from a keyblock.  A
+   minimal pk consists of the public key packet and a user ID.  We try
+   and pick a user ID that has a uid signature, and include it if
+   possible. */
+static int
+export_minimal_pk(IOBUF out,KBNODE keyblock,
+		  PKT_signature *revsig,PKT_signature *revkey)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PACKET pkt;
+  PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
+  PKT_signature *selfsig=NULL;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  int rc;
+
+  node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+  if(!node)
+    {
+      log_error("key incomplete\n");
+      return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+    }
+
+  keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key,keyid);
+
+  pkt=*node->pkt;
+  rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
+  if(rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  init_packet(&pkt);
+  pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+
+  /* the revocation itself, if any.  2440 likes this to come first. */
+  if(revsig)
+    {
+      pkt.pkt.signature=revsig;
+      rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
+      if(rc)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+  /* If a revkey in a 1F sig is present, include it too */
+  if(revkey)
+    {
+      pkt.pkt.signature=revkey;
+      rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
+      if(rc)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+  while(!selfsig)
+    {
+      KBNODE signode;
+
+      node=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_USER_ID);
+      if(!node)
+	{
+	  /* We're out of user IDs - none were self-signed. */
+	  if(uid)
+	    break;
+	  else
+	    {
+	      log_error(_("key %s has no user IDs\n"),keystr(keyid));
+	      return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      if(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+	continue;
+
+      uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+      signode=node;
+
+      while((signode=find_next_kbnode(signode,PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+	{
+	  if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] &&
+	     keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] &&
+	     IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature))
+	    {
+	      selfsig=signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+  pkt.pkttype=PKT_USER_ID;
+  pkt.pkt.user_id=uid;
+
+  rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
+  if(rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  if(selfsig)
+    {
+      pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+      pkt.pkt.signature=selfsig;
+
+      rc=build_packet(out,&pkt);
+      if(rc)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  return rc;
+	}
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME via a designated revoker
+ */
+int
+gen_desig_revoke( const char *uname, STRLIST locusr )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
+    IOBUF out = NULL;
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+    KBNODE keyblock=NULL,node;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    int i,any=0;
+    SK_LIST sk_list=NULL;
+
+    if( opt.batch )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+	return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+      }
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+
+    kdbhd = keydb_new (0);
+    classify_user_id (uname, &desc);
+    rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1) : G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+    if (rc) {
+	log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),uname, g10_errstr (rc));
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* To parse the revkeys */
+    merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
+
+    /* get the key from the keyblock */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    if( !node ) 
+      BUG ();
+
+    pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+    keyid_from_pk(pk,keyid);
+
+    if(locusr)
+      {
+	rc=build_sk_list(locusr,&sk_list,0,PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
+	if(rc)
+	  goto leave;
+      }
+
+    /* Are we a designated revoker for this key? */
+
+    if(!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
+      BUG();
+
+    for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+      {
+	SK_LIST list;
+
+	if(sk)
+	  free_secret_key(sk);
+
+	if(sk_list)
+	  {
+	    for(list=sk_list;list;list=list->next)
+	      {
+		byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+		size_t fprlen;
+
+		fingerprint_from_sk(list->sk,fpr,&fprlen);
+
+		/* Don't get involved with keys that don't have 160
+		   bit fingerprints */
+		if(fprlen!=20)
+		  continue;
+
+		if(memcmp(fpr,pk->revkey[i].fpr,20)==0)
+		  break;
+	      }
+
+	    if(list)
+	      sk=copy_secret_key(NULL,list->sk);
+	    else
+	      continue;
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    sk=xmalloc_secure_clear(sizeof(*sk));
+	    rc=get_seckey_byfprint(sk,pk->revkey[i].fpr,MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
+	  }
+
+	/* We have the revocation key */
+	if(!rc)
+	  {
+	    PKT_signature *revkey = NULL;
+
+	    any = 1;
+
+            print_pubkey_info (NULL, pk);
+	    tty_printf ("\n");
+
+	    tty_printf (_("To be revoked by:\n"));
+            print_seckey_info (sk);
+
+	    if(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)
+	      tty_printf(_("(This is a sensitive revocation key)\n"));
+	    tty_printf("\n");
+
+	    if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("gen_desig_revoke.okay",
+         _("Create a designated revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) ")))
+	      continue;
+
+	    /* get the reason for the revocation (this is always v4) */
+	    reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 1 );
+	    if( !reason )
+	      continue;
+
+	    rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+	    if( rc )
+	      continue;
+
+	    if( !opt.armor )
+	      tty_printf(_("ASCII armored output forced.\n"));
+
+	    if( (rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out )) )
+	      goto leave;
+
+	    afx.what = 1;
+	    afx.hdrlines = "Comment: A designated revocation certificate"
+	      " should follow\n";
+	    iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+	    /* create it */
+	    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x20, 0,
+				     0, 0, 0,
+				     revocation_reason_build_cb, reason );
+	    if( rc ) {
+	      log_error(_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	      goto leave;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Spit out a minimal pk as well, since otherwise there is
+               no way to know which key to attach this revocation to.
+               Also include the direct key signature that contains
+               this revocation key.  We're allowed to include
+               sensitive revocation keys along with a revocation, as
+               this may be the only time the recipient has seen it.
+               Note that this means that if we have multiple different
+               sensitive revocation keys in a given direct key
+               signature, we're going to include them all here.  This
+               is annoying, but the good outweighs the bad, since
+               without including this a sensitive revoker can't really
+               do their job.  People should not include multiple
+               sensitive revocation keys in one signature: 2440 says
+               "Note that it may be appropriate to isolate this
+               subpacket within a separate signature so that it is not
+               combined with other subpackets that need to be
+               exported." -dms */
+
+	    while(!revkey)
+	      {
+		KBNODE signode;
+
+		signode=find_next_kbnode(node,PKT_SIGNATURE);
+		if(!signode)
+		  break;
+
+		node=signode;
+
+		if(keyid[0]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] &&
+		   keyid[1]==signode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] &&
+		   IS_KEY_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature))
+		  {
+		    int j;
+
+		    for(j=0;j<signode->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;j++)
+		      {
+			if(pk->revkey[i].class==
+			   signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->class &&
+			   pk->revkey[i].algid==
+			   signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->algid &&
+			   memcmp(pk->revkey[i].fpr,
+				  signode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[j]->fpr,
+				  MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)==0)
+			  {
+			    revkey=signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+			    break;
+			  }
+		      }
+		  }
+	      }
+
+	    if(!revkey)
+	      BUG();
+
+	    rc=export_minimal_pk(out,keyblock,sig,revkey);
+	    if(rc)
+	      goto leave;
+
+	    /* and issue a usage notice */
+	    tty_printf(_("Revocation certificate created.\n"));
+	    break;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if(!any)
+      log_error(_("no revocation keys found for \"%s\"\n"),uname);
+
+  leave:
+    if( pk )
+	free_public_key( pk );
+    if( sk )
+	free_secret_key( sk );
+    if( sig )
+	free_seckey_enc( sig );
+
+    release_sk_list(sk_list);
+
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a revocation certificate for UNAME
+ */
+int
+gen_revoke( const char *uname )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk; /* used as pointer into a kbnode */
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig = NULL;
+    u32 sk_keyid[2];
+    IOBUF out = NULL;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL, pub_keyblock = NULL;
+    KBNODE node;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+    if( opt.batch )
+      {
+	log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
+	return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+      }
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+
+    /* search the userid: 
+     * We don't want the whole getkey stuff here but the entire keyblock
+     */
+    kdbhd = keydb_new (1);
+    classify_user_id (uname, &desc);
+    rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (kdbhd, &desc, 1) : G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+    if (rc)
+      {
+	log_error (_("secret key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
+                   uname, g10_errstr (rc));
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* get the keyid from the keyblock */
+    node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    if( !node ) 
+	BUG ();
+
+    /* fixme: should make a function out of this stuff,
+     * it's used all over the source */
+    sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+    keyid_from_sk( sk, sk_keyid );
+    print_seckey_info (sk);
+
+    pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+
+    /* FIXME: We should get the public key direct from the secret one */
+
+    pub_keyblock=get_pubkeyblock(sk_keyid);
+    if(!pub_keyblock)
+      {
+	log_error(_("no corresponding public key: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    node=find_kbnode(pub_keyblock,PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+    if(!node)
+      BUG();
+
+    pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+    if( cmp_public_secret_key( pk, sk ) ) {
+	log_error(_("public key does not match secret key!\n") );
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    tty_printf("\n");
+    if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("gen_revoke.okay",
+		  _("Create a revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) ")) )
+      {
+	rc = 0;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+
+    if(sk->version>=4 || opt.force_v4_certs) {
+      /* get the reason for the revocation */
+      reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 1 );
+      if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
+	rc = 0;
+	goto leave;
+      }
+    }
+
+    switch( is_secret_key_protected( sk ) ) {
+      case -1:
+	log_error(_("unknown protection algorithm\n"));
+	rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+	break;
+      case -3:
+	tty_printf (_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n"));
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+        break;
+      case 0:
+	tty_printf(_("NOTE: This key is not protected!\n"));
+	break;
+      default:
+        rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+	break;
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+
+    if( !opt.armor )
+	tty_printf(_("ASCII armored output forced.\n"));
+
+    if( (rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    afx.what = 1;
+    afx.hdrlines = "Comment: A revocation certificate should follow\n";
+    iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    /* create it */
+    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x20, 0,
+			     opt.force_v4_certs?4:0, 0, 0,
+			     revocation_reason_build_cb, reason );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error(_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	goto leave;
+    }
+
+    if(PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8)
+      {
+	/* Use a minimal pk for PGPx mode, since PGP can't import bare
+	   revocation certificates. */
+	rc=export_minimal_pk(out,pub_keyblock,sig,NULL);
+	if(rc)
+	  goto leave;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+	init_packet( &pkt );
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
+
+	rc = build_packet( out, &pkt );
+	if( rc ) {
+	  log_error(_("build_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  goto leave;
+	}
+      }
+
+    /* and issue a usage notice */
+    tty_printf(_("Revocation certificate created.\n\n"
+"Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n"
+"access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.\n"
+"It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case\n"
+"your media become unreadable.  But have some caution:  The print system of\n"
+"your machine might store the data and make it available to others!\n"));
+
+  leave:
+    if( sig )
+	free_seckey_enc( sig );
+    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+    release_kbnode( pub_keyblock );
+    keydb_release (kdbhd);
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+struct revocation_reason_info *
+ask_revocation_reason( int key_rev, int cert_rev, int hint )
+{
+    int code=-1;
+    char *description = NULL;
+    struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
+    const char *text_0 = _("No reason specified");
+    const char *text_1 = _("Key has been compromised");
+    const char *text_2 = _("Key is superseded");
+    const char *text_3 = _("Key is no longer used");
+    const char *text_4 = _("User ID is no longer valid");
+    const char *code_text = NULL;
+
+    do {
+        code=-1;
+	xfree(description);
+	description = NULL;
+
+	tty_printf(_("Please select the reason for the revocation:\n"));
+	tty_printf(    "  0 = %s\n", text_0 );
+	if( key_rev )
+	    tty_printf("  1 = %s\n", text_1 );
+	if( key_rev )
+	    tty_printf("  2 = %s\n", text_2 );
+	if( key_rev )
+	    tty_printf("  3 = %s\n", text_3 );
+	if( cert_rev )
+	    tty_printf("  4 = %s\n", text_4 );
+	tty_printf(    "  Q = %s\n", _("Cancel") );
+	if( hint )
+	    tty_printf(_("(Probably you want to select %d here)\n"), hint );
+
+	while(code==-1) {
+	    int n;
+	    char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.code",
+						_("Your decision? "));
+	    trim_spaces( answer );
+	    cpr_kill_prompt();
+	    if( *answer == 'q' || *answer == 'Q')
+	      return NULL; /* cancel */
+	    if( hint && !*answer )
+		n = hint;
+	    else if(!digitp( answer ) )
+ 	        n = -1;
+	    else
+		n = atoi(answer);
+	    xfree(answer);
+	    if( n == 0 ) {
+	        code = 0x00; /* no particular reason */
+		code_text = text_0;
+	    }
+	    else if( key_rev && n == 1 ) {
+		code = 0x02; /* key has been compromised */
+		code_text = text_1;
+	    }
+	    else if( key_rev && n == 2 ) {
+		code = 0x01; /* key is superseded */
+		code_text = text_2;
+	    }
+	    else if( key_rev && n == 3 ) {
+		code = 0x03; /* key is no longer used */
+		code_text = text_3;
+	    }
+	    else if( cert_rev && n == 4 ) {
+		code = 0x20; /* uid is no longer valid */
+		code_text = text_4;
+	    }
+	    else
+		tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
+	}
+
+	tty_printf(_("Enter an optional description; "
+		     "end it with an empty line:\n") );
+	for(;;) {
+	    char *answer = cpr_get("ask_revocation_reason.text", "> " );
+	    trim_trailing_ws( answer, strlen(answer) );
+	    cpr_kill_prompt();
+	    if( !*answer ) {
+		xfree(answer);
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    {
+		char *p = make_printable_string( answer, strlen(answer), 0 );
+		xfree(answer);
+		answer = p;
+	    }
+
+	    if( !description )
+		description = xstrdup(answer);
+	    else {
+		char *p = xmalloc( strlen(description) + strlen(answer) + 2 );
+		strcpy(stpcpy(stpcpy( p, description),"\n"),answer);
+		xfree(description);
+		description = p;
+	    }
+	    xfree(answer);
+	}
+
+	tty_printf(_("Reason for revocation: %s\n"), code_text );
+	if( !description )
+	    tty_printf(_("(No description given)\n") );
+	else
+	    tty_printf("%s\n", description );
+
+    } while( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revocation_reason.okay",
+					    _("Is this okay? (y/N) "))  );
+
+    reason = xmalloc( sizeof *reason );
+    reason->code = code;
+    reason->desc = description;
+    return reason;
+}
+
+void
+release_revocation_reason_info( struct revocation_reason_info *reason )
+{
+    if( reason ) {
+	xfree( reason->desc );
+	xfree( reason );
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79cf22a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+/* seckey-cert.c -  secret key certificate packet handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "status.h"
+
+
+static int
+do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
+          int *canceled )
+{
+    byte *buffer;
+    u16 csum=0;
+    int i, res;
+    unsigned nbytes;
+
+    if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
+	DEK *dek = NULL;
+	u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
+	CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
+	PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
+
+	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+	    log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
+	    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	}
+	if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
+	    BUG();
+	if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
+	    log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
+			sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
+	    if (sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+              {
+                write_status (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA);
+                idea_cipher_warn (0);
+              }
+	    return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
+	}
+	if(check_digest_algo(sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo))
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"),
+		     sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo);
+	    return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
+	  }
+	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+	keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
+	if( !sk->is_primary ) {
+            keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
+            keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
+	}
+	dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
+				 &sk->protect.s2k, mode,
+                                 tryagain_text, canceled );
+        if (!dek && canceled && *canceled)
+	    return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+	cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
+				 CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1);
+	cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+	xfree(dek);
+	save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
+	cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
+	csum = 0;
+	if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
+	    unsigned int ndata;
+	    byte *p, *data;
+            u16 csumc = 0;
+
+	    i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+	    assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
+	    p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
+            if ( ndata > 1 )
+                csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
+	    data = xmalloc_secure( ndata );
+	    cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
+	    mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
+	    p = data;
+            if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
+                /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
+                   tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
+                   attack */
+                sk->csum = 0;
+                csum = 1;
+                if( ndata < 20 ) 
+                    log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
+                else {
+                    MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
+                    if (!h)
+                        BUG(); /* algo not available */
+                    md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
+                    md_final (h);
+                    if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
+                                 data + ndata - 20, 20) ) {
+                        /* digest does match.  We have to keep the old
+                           style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
+                           test used for unprotected keys does work.
+                           This test gets used when we are adding new
+                           keys. */
+                        sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
+                    }
+                    md_close (h);
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                if( ndata < 2 ) {
+                    log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
+                    sk->csum = 0;
+                    csum = 1;
+                }
+                else {
+                    csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
+                    sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
+                    if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
+                        /* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
+                        sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            /* Must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
+               because the length may have an arbitrary value */
+            if( sk->csum == csum ) {
+                for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+                    nbytes = ndata;
+                    sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
+                    if (!sk->skey[i])
+                      {
+                        /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
+                           decrypted.  */
+                        sk->csum = 0;
+                        csum = 1;
+                        break;
+                      }
+                    ndata -= nbytes;
+                    p += nbytes;
+                }
+                /* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
+                   checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
+            }
+	    xfree(data);
+	}
+	else {
+	    for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+		    i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+                byte *p;
+                unsigned int ndata;
+
+                assert (mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]));
+                p = mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndata);
+                assert (ndata >= 2);
+                assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
+                buffer = xmalloc_secure (ndata);
+		cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
+                buffer[0] = p[0];
+                buffer[1] = p[1];
+                cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, p+2, ndata-2);
+                csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
+                mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
+                sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &ndata, 1);
+		xfree (buffer);
+                if (!sk->skey[i])
+                  {
+                    /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
+                       decrypted.  */
+                    sk->csum = 0;
+                    csum = 1;
+                    break;
+                  }
+/*  		csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
+	    }
+	}
+	cipher_close( cipher_hd );
+	/* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
+	if( csum != sk->csum ) {
+	    copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
+            passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
+	    free_secret_key( save_sk );
+	    return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
+	}
+	/* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
+	res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
+	if( res ) {
+	    copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
+            passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
+	    free_secret_key( save_sk );
+	    return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
+	}
+	free_secret_key( save_sk );
+	sk->is_protected = 0;
+    }
+    else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
+	csum = 0;
+	for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+		i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+	    csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
+	}
+	if( csum != sk->csum )
+	    return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check the secret key
+ * Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
+ * If n is negative, disable the key info prompt and make n=abs(n)
+ */
+int
+check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
+{
+    int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
+    int i,mode;
+
+    if (sk && sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+      return 0; /* Let the card support stuff handle this. */
+
+    if(n<0)
+      {
+	n=abs(n);
+	mode=1;
+      }
+    else
+      mode=0;
+
+    if( n < 1 )
+	n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
+
+    for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
+        int canceled = 0;
+        const char *tryagain = NULL;
+	if (i) {
+            tryagain = N_("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
+            log_info (_("%s ...\n"), _(tryagain));
+        }
+	rc = do_check( sk, tryagain, mode, &canceled );
+	if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	    u32 kid[2];
+	    char buf[50];
+
+	    keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
+	    sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
+	}
+	if( have_static_passphrase() || canceled)
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    if( !rc )
+	write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * check whether the secret key is protected.
+ * Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
+ *                           -2 indicates a card stub.
+ *                           -3 indicates a not-online stub.
+ */
+int
+is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    return sk->is_protected?
+               sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002? -2 :
+               sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001? -3 : sk->protect.algo : 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Protect the secret key with the passphrase from DEK
+ */
+int
+protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
+{
+    int i,j, rc = 0;
+    byte *buffer;
+    unsigned nbytes;
+    u16 csum;
+
+    if( !dek )
+	return 0;
+
+    if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
+	CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
+
+	if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
+	    rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
+	else {
+	    print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
+	    cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
+				     CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
+	    if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
+		log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
+			   " - please change passphrase again.\n"));
+	    sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo );
+	    assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
+	    if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 )
+		BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */
+	    randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
+	    cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
+	    if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
+                byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+		unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+		unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+		int ndata=0;
+		byte *p, *data;
+
+		for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+			i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
+		    assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
+		    bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL );
+		    nbits[j]  = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
+		    ndata += narr[j] + 2;
+		}
+		for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
+		    bufarr[j] = NULL;
+		ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */
+
+		data = xmalloc_secure( ndata );
+		p = data;
+		for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
+		    p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
+		    p[1] = nbits[j];
+		    p += 2;
+		    memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
+		    p += narr[j];
+		    xfree(bufarr[j]);
+		}
+                
+                if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) {
+                    log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum"
+                              " for secret key protection\n")); 
+                    csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
+                    sk->csum = csum;
+                    *p++ =	csum >> 8;
+                    *p++ =	csum;
+                    sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
+                }
+                else {
+                    MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
+                    if (!h)
+                        BUG(); /* algo not available */
+                    md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
+                    md_final (h);
+                    memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20);
+                    p += 20;
+                    md_close (h);
+                    sk->csum = csum = 0;
+                    sk->protect.sha1chk = 1;
+                }
+                assert( p == data+ndata );
+
+		cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata );
+		for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+			i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+		    mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
+		    sk->skey[i] = NULL;
+		}
+		i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+		sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		csum = 0;
+		for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
+			i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+                    byte *data;
+		    unsigned int nbits;
+
+		    csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]);
+		    buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
+		    cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
+		    assert ( !mpi_is_opaque (sk->skey[i]) );
+                    data = xmalloc (nbytes+2);
+                    nbits  = mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]);
+                    assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8);
+                    data[0] = nbits >> 8;
+                    data[1] = nbits;
+		    cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, buffer, nbytes);
+		    xfree( buffer );
+                    
+                    mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
+                    sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data, nbytes+2);
+		}
+		sk->csum = csum;
+	    }
+	    sk->is_protected = 1;
+	    cipher_close( cipher_hd );
+	}
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd4dc0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/seskey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/* seskey.c -  make sesssion keys etc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+/****************
+ * Make a session key and put it into DEK
+ */
+void
+make_session_key( DEK *dek )
+{
+    CIPHER_HANDLE chd;
+    int i, rc;
+
+    dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( dek->algo ) / 8;
+
+    chd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
+    randomize_buffer( dek->key, dek->keylen, 1 );
+    for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
+	rc = cipher_setkey( chd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+	if( !rc ) {
+	    cipher_close( chd );
+	    return;
+	}
+	log_info(_("weak key created - retrying\n") );
+	/* Renew the session key until we get a non-weak key. */
+	randomize_buffer( dek->key, dek->keylen, 1 );
+    }
+    log_fatal(_(
+	    "cannot avoid weak key for symmetric cipher; tried %d times!\n"),
+		  i);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Encode the session key. NBITS is the number of bits which should be used
+ * for packing the session key.
+ * returns: A mpi with the session key (caller must free)
+ */
+MPI
+encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
+{
+    int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+    byte *p;
+    byte *frame;
+    int i,n;
+    u16 csum;
+    MPI a;
+
+    /* the current limitation is that we can only use a session key
+     * whose length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB
+     * I think we can live with that.
+     */
+    if( dek->keylen + 7 > nframe || !nframe )
+	log_bug("can't encode a %d bit key in a %d bits frame\n",
+		    dek->keylen*8, nbits );
+
+    /* We encode the session key in this way:
+     *
+     *	   0  2  RND(n bytes)  0  A  DEK(k bytes)  CSUM(2 bytes)
+     *
+     * (But how can we store the leading 0 - the external representaion
+     *	of MPIs doesn't allow leading zeroes =:-)
+     *
+     * RND are non-zero random bytes.
+     * A   is the cipher algorithm
+     * DEK is the encryption key (session key) length k depends on the
+     *	   cipher algorithm (20 is used with blowfish160).
+     * CSUM is the 16 bit checksum over the DEK
+     */
+    csum = 0;
+    for( p = dek->key, i=0; i < dek->keylen; i++ )
+	csum += *p++;
+
+    frame = xmalloc_secure( nframe );
+    n = 0;
+    frame[n++] = 0;
+    frame[n++] = 2;
+    i = nframe - 6 - dek->keylen;
+    assert( i > 0 );
+    p = get_random_bits( i*8, 1, 1 );
+    /* replace zero bytes by new values */
+    for(;;) {
+	int j, k;
+	byte *pp;
+
+	/* count the zero bytes */
+	for(j=k=0; j < i; j++ )
+	    if( !p[j] )
+		k++;
+	if( !k )
+	    break; /* okay: no zero bytes */
+	k += k/128 + 3; /* better get some more */
+	pp = get_random_bits( k*8, 1, 1);
+	for(j=0; j < i && k ;) {
+	    if( !p[j] )
+		p[j] = pp[--k];
+            if (p[j])
+              j++;
+        }
+	xfree(pp);
+    }
+    memcpy( frame+n, p, i );
+    xfree(p);
+    n += i;
+    frame[n++] = 0;
+    frame[n++] = dek->algo;
+    memcpy( frame+n, dek->key, dek->keylen ); n += dek->keylen;
+    frame[n++] = csum >>8;
+    frame[n++] = csum;
+    assert( n == nframe );
+    a = mpi_alloc_secure( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    mpi_set_buffer( a, frame, nframe, 0 );
+    xfree(frame);
+    return a;
+}
+
+
+static MPI
+do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
+	      const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
+{
+    int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+    byte *frame;
+    int i,n;
+    MPI a;
+
+    if( len + asnlen + 4  > nframe )
+	log_bug("can't encode a %d bit MD into a %d bits frame\n",
+		    (int)(len*8), (int)nbits);
+
+    /* We encode the MD in this way:
+     *
+     *	   0  1 PAD(n bytes)   0  ASN(asnlen bytes)  MD(len bytes)
+     *
+     * PAD consists of FF bytes.
+     */
+    frame = md_is_secure(md)? xmalloc_secure( nframe ) : xmalloc( nframe );
+    n = 0;
+    frame[n++] = 0;
+    frame[n++] = 1; /* block type */
+    i = nframe - len - asnlen -3 ;
+    assert( i > 1 );
+    memset( frame+n, 0xff, i ); n += i;
+    frame[n++] = 0;
+    memcpy( frame+n, asn, asnlen ); n += asnlen;
+    memcpy( frame+n, md_read(md, algo), len ); n += len;
+    assert( n == nframe );
+    a = md_is_secure(md)?
+	 mpi_alloc_secure( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB )
+	 : mpi_alloc( (nframe+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    mpi_set_buffer( a, frame, nframe, 0 );
+    xfree(frame);
+
+    /* Note that PGP before version 2.3 encoded the MD as:
+     *
+     *   0   1   MD(16 bytes)   0   PAD(n bytes)   1
+     *
+     * The MD is always 16 bytes here because it's always MD5.  We do
+     * not support pre-v2.3 signatures, but I'm including this comment
+     * so the information is easily found in the future.
+     */
+
+    return a;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Encode a message digest into an MPI.
+ * If it's for a DSA signature, make sure that the hash is large
+ * enough to fill up q.  If the hash is too big, take the leftmost
+ * bits.
+ */
+MPI
+encode_md_value( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		 MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo )
+{
+  MPI frame;
+
+  assert(hash_algo);
+  assert(pk || sk);
+
+  if((pk?pk->pubkey_algo:sk->pubkey_algo) == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
+    {
+      /* It's a DSA signature, so find out the size of q. */
+
+      unsigned int qbytes=mpi_get_nbits(pk?pk->pkey[1]:sk->skey[1]);
+
+      /* Make sure it is a multiple of 8 bits. */
+
+      if(qbytes%8)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("DSA requires the hash length to be a"
+		      " multiple of 8 bits\n"));
+	  return NULL;
+	}
+
+      /* Don't allow any q smaller than 160 bits.  This might need a
+	 revisit as the DSA2 design firms up, but for now, we don't
+	 want someone to issue signatures from a key with a 16-bit q
+	 or something like that, which would look correct but allow
+	 trivial forgeries.  Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
+	 DSA. ;) */
+
+      if(qbytes<160)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
+		    pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes);
+	  return NULL;
+	}
+
+      qbytes/=8;
+
+      /* Check if we're too short.  Too long is safe as we'll
+	 automatically left-truncate. */
+
+      if(md_digest_length(hash_algo) < qbytes)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
+		    pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes*8);
+	  return NULL;
+	}
+
+      frame = md_is_secure(md)? mpi_alloc_secure((qbytes+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)
+						 / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB )
+	: mpi_alloc((qbytes+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+
+      mpi_set_buffer( frame, md_read(md, hash_algo), qbytes, 0 );
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      const byte *asn;
+      size_t asnlen,mdlen;
+
+      asn = md_asn_oid( hash_algo, &asnlen, &mdlen );
+      frame = do_encode_md( md, hash_algo, mdlen,
+			    mpi_get_nbits(pk?pk->pkey[0]:sk->skey[0]),
+			    asn, asnlen );
+    }
+
+  return frame;
+}
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1570334
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+/* sig-check.c -  Check a signature
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "mpi.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "options.h"
+
+struct cmp_help_context_s {
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+};
+
+static int do_check( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest,
+		     int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk);
+
+/****************
+ * Check the signature which is contained in SIG.
+ * The MD_HANDLE should be currently open, so that this function
+ * is able to append some data, before finalizing the digest.
+ */
+int
+signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
+{
+    return signature_check2( sig, digest, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
+}
+
+int
+signature_check2( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest, u32 *r_expiredate, 
+		  int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( (rc=check_digest_algo(sig->digest_algo)) )
+      ; /* we don't have this digest */
+    else if((rc=check_pubkey_algo(sig->pubkey_algo)))
+      ; /* we don't have this pubkey algo */
+    else if(!md_algo_present(digest,sig->digest_algo))
+      {
+	/* Sanity check that the md has a context for the hash that the
+	   sig is expecting.  This can happen if a onepass sig header does
+	   not match the actual sig, and also if the clearsign "Hash:"
+	   header is missing or does not match the actual sig. */
+
+        log_info(_("WARNING: signature digest conflict in message\n"));
+	rc=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+      }
+    else if( get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) )
+	rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    else if(!pk->is_valid && !pk->is_primary)
+        rc=G10ERR_BAD_PUBKEY; /* you cannot have a good sig from an
+				 invalid subkey */
+    else
+      {
+        if(r_expiredate)
+	  *r_expiredate = pk->expiredate;
+
+	rc = do_check( pk, sig, digest, r_expired, r_revoked, ret_pk );
+
+	/* Check the backsig.  This is a 0x19 signature from the
+	   subkey on the primary key.  The idea here is that it should
+	   not be possible for someone to "steal" subkeys and claim
+	   them as their own.  The attacker couldn't actually use the
+	   subkey, but they could try and claim ownership of any
+	   signaures issued by it. */
+	if(rc==0 && !pk->is_primary && pk->backsig<2)
+	  {
+	    if(pk->backsig==0)
+	      {
+		log_info(_("WARNING: signing subkey %s is not"
+			   " cross-certified\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+		log_info(_("please see %s for more information\n"),
+			 "http://www.gnupg.org/faq/subkey-cross-certify.html");
+		/* --require-cross-certification makes this warning an
+                     error.  TODO: change the default to require this
+                     after more keys have backsigs. */
+		if(opt.flags.require_cross_cert)
+		  rc=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	      }
+	    else if(pk->backsig==1)
+	      {
+		log_info(_("WARNING: signing subkey %s has an invalid"
+			   " cross-certification\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+		rc=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    free_public_key( pk );
+
+    if( !rc && sig->sig_class < 2 && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	/* This signature id works best with DLP algorithms because
+	 * they use a random parameter for every signature.  Instead of
+	 * this sig-id we could have also used the hash of the document
+	 * and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is
+	 * not possible to sign more than one identical document within
+	 * one second.	Some remote batch processing applications might
+	 * like this feature here */
+	MD_HANDLE md;
+	u32 a = sig->timestamp;
+	int i, nsig = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
+	byte *p, *buffer;
+
+	md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+	md_putc( digest, sig->pubkey_algo );
+	md_putc( digest, sig->digest_algo );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >>	8) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest,  a	   & 0xff );
+	for(i=0; i < nsig; i++ ) {
+	    unsigned n = mpi_get_nbits( sig->data[i]);
+
+	    md_putc( md, n>>8);
+	    md_putc( md, n );
+	    p = mpi_get_buffer( sig->data[i], &n, NULL );
+	    md_write( md, p, n );
+	    xfree(p);
+	}
+	md_final( md );
+	p = make_radix64_string( md_read( md, 0 ), 20 );
+	buffer = xmalloc( strlen(p) + 60 );
+	sprintf( buffer, "%s %s %lu",
+		 p, strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ), (ulong)sig->timestamp );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_ID, buffer );
+	xfree(buffer);
+	xfree(p);
+	md_close(md);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_check_messages( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig,
+		   int *r_expired, int *r_revoked )
+{
+    u32 cur_time;
+
+    if(r_expired)
+      *r_expired = 0;
+    if(r_revoked)
+      *r_revoked = 0;
+
+    if( pk->timestamp > sig->timestamp )
+      {
+	ulong d = pk->timestamp - sig->timestamp;
+	log_info(d==1
+		 ?_("public key %s is %lu second newer than the signature\n")
+		 :_("public key %s is %lu seconds newer than the signature\n"),
+		 keystr_from_pk(pk),d );
+	if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
+	  return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT; /* pubkey newer than signature */
+      }
+
+    cur_time = make_timestamp();
+    if( pk->timestamp > cur_time )
+      {
+	ulong d = pk->timestamp - cur_time;
+	log_info( d==1
+		  ? _("key %s was created %lu second"
+		      " in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
+		  : _("key %s was created %lu seconds"
+		      " in the future (time warp or clock problem)\n"),
+		  keystr_from_pk(pk),d );
+	if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
+	  return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+      }
+
+    if( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate < cur_time ) {
+        char buf[11];
+        if (opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("NOTE: signature key %s expired %s\n"),
+		   keystr_from_pk(pk), asctimestamp( pk->expiredate ) );
+	/* SIGEXPIRED is deprecated.  Use KEYEXPIRED. */
+	sprintf(buf,"%lu",(ulong)pk->expiredate);
+	write_status_text(STATUS_KEYEXPIRED,buf);
+	write_status(STATUS_SIGEXPIRED);
+	if(r_expired)
+	  *r_expired = 1;
+    }
+
+    if(pk->is_revoked && r_revoked)
+      *r_revoked=1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_check( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest,
+	  int *r_expired, int *r_revoked, PKT_public_key *ret_pk )
+{
+    MPI result = NULL;
+    int rc=0;
+    struct cmp_help_context_s ctx;
+
+    if( (rc=do_check_messages(pk,sig,r_expired,r_revoked)) )
+        return rc;
+
+    /* make sure the digest algo is enabled (in case of a detached signature)*/
+    md_enable( digest, sig->digest_algo );
+
+    /* complete the digest */
+    if( sig->version >= 4 )
+	md_putc( digest, sig->version );
+    md_putc( digest, sig->sig_class );
+    if( sig->version < 4 ) {
+	u32 a = sig->timestamp;
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest, (a >>	8) & 0xff );
+	md_putc( digest,  a	   & 0xff );
+    }
+    else {
+	byte buf[6];
+	size_t n;
+	md_putc( digest, sig->pubkey_algo );
+	md_putc( digest, sig->digest_algo );
+	if( sig->hashed ) {
+	    n = sig->hashed->len;
+            md_putc (digest, (n >> 8) );
+            md_putc (digest,  n       );
+	    md_write (digest, sig->hashed->data, n);
+	    n += 6;
+	}
+	else {
+	  /* Two octets for the (empty) length of the hashed
+             section. */
+          md_putc (digest, 0);
+	  md_putc (digest, 0);
+	  n = 6;
+	}
+	/* add some magic */
+	buf[0] = sig->version;
+	buf[1] = 0xff;
+	buf[2] = n >> 24;
+	buf[3] = n >> 16;
+	buf[4] = n >>  8;
+	buf[5] = n;
+	md_write( digest, buf, 6 );
+    }
+    md_final( digest );
+
+    result = encode_md_value( pk, NULL, digest, sig->digest_algo );
+    if (!result)
+        return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+    ctx.sig = sig;
+    ctx.md = digest;
+    rc = pubkey_verify( pk->pubkey_algo, result, sig->data, pk->pkey );
+    mpi_free( result );
+
+    if( !rc && sig->flags.unknown_critical )
+      {
+	log_info(_("assuming bad signature from key %s"
+		   " due to an unknown critical bit\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+      }
+
+    if(!rc && ret_pk)
+      copy_public_key(ret_pk,pk);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+hash_uid_node( KBNODE unode, MD_HANDLE md, PKT_signature *sig )
+{
+    PKT_user_id *uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+    assert( unode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
+    if( uid->attrib_data ) {
+	if( sig->version >=4 ) {
+	    byte buf[5];
+	    buf[0] = 0xd1;		     /* packet of type 17 */
+	    buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
+	    buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
+	    buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >>  8;
+	    buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
+	    md_write( md, buf, 5 );
+	}
+	md_write( md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
+    }
+    else {
+	if( sig->version >=4 ) {
+	    byte buf[5];
+	    buf[0] = 0xb4;	      /* indicates a userid packet */
+	    buf[1] = uid->len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
+	    buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
+	    buf[3] = uid->len >>  8;
+	    buf[4] = uid->len;
+	    md_write( md, buf, 5 );
+	}
+	md_write( md, uid->name, uid->len );
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+cache_sig_result ( PKT_signature *sig, int result )
+{
+    if ( !result ) {
+        sig->flags.checked = 1;
+        sig->flags.valid = 1;
+    }
+    else if ( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+        sig->flags.checked = 1;
+        sig->flags.valid = 0;
+    }
+    else {
+        sig->flags.checked = 0;
+        sig->flags.valid = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Check the revocation keys to see if any of them have revoked our
+   pk.  sig is the revocation sig.  pk is the key it is on.  This code
+   will need to be modified if gpg ever becomes multi-threaded.  Note
+   that this guarantees that a designated revocation sig will never be
+   considered valid unless it is actually valid, as well as being
+   issued by a revocation key in a valid direct signature.  Note also
+   that this is written so that a revoked revoker can still issue
+   revocations: i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still
+   revoked.  I'm not completely convinced this is the proper behavior,
+   but it matches how PGP does it. -dms */
+
+/* Returns 0 if sig is valid (i.e. pk is revoked), non-0 if not
+   revoked.  It is important that G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY is only returned
+   when a revocation signature is from a valid revocation key
+   designated in a revkey subpacket, but the revocation key itself
+   isn't present. */
+int
+check_revocation_keys(PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  static int busy=0;
+  int i,rc=G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+  assert(IS_KEY_REV(sig));
+  assert((sig->keyid[0]!=pk->keyid[0]) || (sig->keyid[0]!=pk->keyid[1]));
+
+  if(busy)
+    {
+      /* return an error (i.e. not revoked), but mark the pk as
+         uncacheable as we don't really know its revocation status
+         until it is checked directly. */
+
+      pk->dont_cache=1;
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  busy=1;
+
+  /*  printf("looking at %08lX with a sig from %08lX\n",(ulong)pk->keyid[1],
+      (ulong)sig->keyid[1]); */
+
+  /* is the issuer of the sig one of our revokers? */
+  if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
+     BUG();
+  else
+      for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+	{
+          u32 keyid[2];
+    
+          keyid_from_fingerprint(pk->revkey[i].fpr,MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
+    
+          if(keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1])
+	    {
+              MD_HANDLE md;
+    
+              md=md_open(sig->digest_algo,0);
+              hash_public_key(md,pk);
+              rc=signature_check(sig,md);
+	      cache_sig_result(sig,rc);
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+  busy=0;
+
+  return rc;
+} 
+
+/* Backsigs (0x19) have the same format as binding sigs (0x18), but
+   this function is simpler than check_key_signature in a few ways.
+   For example, there is no support for expiring backsigs since it is
+   questionable what such a thing actually means.  Note also that the
+   sig cache check here, unlike other sig caches in GnuPG, is not
+   persistent. */
+int
+check_backsig(PKT_public_key *main_pk,PKT_public_key *sub_pk,
+	      PKT_signature *backsig)
+{
+  MD_HANDLE md;
+  int rc;
+
+  if(!opt.no_sig_cache && backsig->flags.checked)
+    {
+      if((rc=check_digest_algo(backsig->digest_algo)))
+	return rc;
+
+      return backsig->flags.valid? 0 : G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+    }
+
+  md=md_open(backsig->digest_algo,0);
+  hash_public_key(md,main_pk);
+  hash_public_key(md,sub_pk);
+  rc=do_check(sub_pk,backsig,md,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+  cache_sig_result(backsig,rc);
+  md_close(md);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * check the signature pointed to by NODE. This is a key signature.
+ * If the function detects a self-signature, it uses the PK from
+ * ROOT and does not read any public key.
+ */
+int
+check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
+{
+  return check_key_signature2(root, node, NULL, NULL, is_selfsig, NULL, NULL );
+}
+
+/* If check_pk is set, then use it to check the signature in node
+   rather than getting it from root or the keydb.  If ret_pk is set,
+   fill in the public key that was used to verify the signature.
+   ret_pk is only meaningful when the verification was successful. */
+/* TODO: add r_revoked here as well.  It has the same problems as
+   r_expiredate and r_expired and the cache. */
+int
+check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
+		      PKT_public_key *ret_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+		      u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired )
+{
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+    PKT_public_key *pk;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int algo;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( is_selfsig )
+	*is_selfsig = 0;
+    if( r_expiredate )
+        *r_expiredate = 0;
+    if( r_expired )
+        *r_expired = 0;
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
+    assert( root->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+
+    pk = root->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    algo = sig->digest_algo;
+
+    /* Check whether we have cached the result of a previous signature
+       check.  Note that we may no longer have the pubkey or hash
+       needed to verify a sig, but can still use the cached value.  A
+       cache refresh detects and clears these cases. */
+    if ( !opt.no_sig_cache ) {
+        if (sig->flags.checked) { /*cached status available*/
+	    if( is_selfsig ) {	
+		u32 keyid[2];	
+
+		keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+		if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
+		    *is_selfsig = 1;
+	    }
+	    /* BUG: This is wrong for non-self-sigs.. needs to be the
+	       actual pk */
+	    if((rc=do_check_messages(pk,sig,r_expired,NULL)))
+	      return rc;
+            return sig->flags.valid? 0 : G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if( (rc=check_pubkey_algo(sig->pubkey_algo)) )
+	return rc;
+    if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
+	return rc;
+
+    if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { /* key revocation */
+        u32 keyid[2];	
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+
+	/* is it a designated revoker? */
+        if(keyid[0]!=sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1]!=sig->keyid[1])
+	  rc=check_revocation_keys(pk,sig);
+	else
+	  {
+	    md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+	    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+	    rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk );
+	    cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
+	    md_close(md);
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) { /* subkey revocation */
+	KBNODE snode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+
+	if( snode ) {
+	    md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+	    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+	    hash_public_key( md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+	    rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk );
+            cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
+	    md_close(md);
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+            if (opt.verbose)
+	      log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for subkey"
+			  " revocation signature\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	    rc = G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) { /* key binding */
+	KBNODE snode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+
+	if( snode ) {
+	    if( is_selfsig ) {	/* does this make sense????? */
+		u32 keyid[2];	/* it should always be a selfsig */
+
+		keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+		if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
+		    *is_selfsig = 1;
+	    }
+	    md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+	    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+	    hash_public_key( md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+	    rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk );
+            cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
+	    md_close(md);
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+            if (opt.verbose)
+	      log_info(_("key %s: no subkey for subkey"
+			 " binding signature\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+	    rc = G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1f ) { /* direct key signature */
+	md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+	hash_public_key( md, pk );
+	rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk );
+        cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
+	md_close(md);
+    }
+    else { /* all other classes */
+	KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_USER_ID );
+
+	if( unode ) {
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+
+	    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+	    md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+	    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+	    hash_uid_node( unode, md, sig );
+	    if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
+	      {
+		if( is_selfsig )
+		  *is_selfsig = 1;
+		rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired, NULL, ret_pk );
+	      }
+	    else if (check_pk)
+	      rc=do_check(check_pk,sig,md,r_expired,NULL,ret_pk);
+	    else
+	      rc=signature_check2(sig,md,r_expiredate,r_expired,NULL,ret_pk);
+
+            cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
+	    md_close(md);
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+            if (!opt.quiet)
+	      log_info ("key %s: no user ID for key signature packet"
+			" of class %02x\n",keystr_from_pk(pk),sig->sig_class);
+	    rc = G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	  }
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82076d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1578 @@
+/* sign.c - sign data
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
+ *               2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h> /* need sleep() */
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cardglue.h"
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#define LF "\r\n"
+void __stdcall Sleep(ulong);
+#define sleep(a)  Sleep((a)*1000)
+#else
+#define LF "\n"
+#endif
+
+static int recipient_digest_algo=0;
+
+/****************
+ * Create notations and other stuff.  It is assumed that the stings in
+ * STRLIST are already checked to contain only printable data and have
+ * a valid NAME=VALUE format.
+ */
+static void
+mk_notation_policy_etc( PKT_signature *sig,
+			PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    const char *string;
+    char *s=NULL;
+    STRLIST pu=NULL;
+    struct notation *nd=NULL;
+    struct expando_args args;
+
+    memset(&args,0,sizeof(args));
+    args.pk=pk;
+    args.sk=sk;
+
+    /* It is actually impossible to get here when making a v3 key
+       signature since keyedit.c:sign_uids will automatically bump a
+       signature with a notation or policy url up to v4, but it is
+       good to do these checks anyway. */
+
+    /* notation data */
+    if(IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_notations)
+      {
+	if(sig->version<4)
+	  log_error(_("can't put notation data into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
+		      "signatures\n"));
+	else
+	  nd=opt.sig_notations;
+      }
+    else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_notations )
+      {
+	if(sig->version<4)
+	  log_error(_("can't put notation data into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
+		      "key signatures\n"));
+	else
+	  nd=opt.cert_notations;
+      }
+
+    if(nd)
+      {
+	struct notation *i;
+
+	for(i=nd;i;i=i->next)
+	  {
+	    i->altvalue=pct_expando(i->value,&args);
+	    if(!i->altvalue)
+	      log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand notation "
+			  "(too large).  Using unexpanded.\n"));
+	  }
+
+	keygen_add_notations(sig,nd);
+
+	for(i=nd;i;i=i->next)
+	  {
+	    xfree(i->altvalue);
+	    i->altvalue=NULL;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* set policy URL */
+    if( IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_policy_url )
+      {
+	if(sig->version<4)
+	  log_error(_("can't put a policy URL into v3 (PGP 2.x style) "
+		      "signatures\n"));
+	else
+	  pu=opt.sig_policy_url;
+      }
+    else if( IS_CERT(sig) && opt.cert_policy_url )
+      {
+	if(sig->version<4)
+	  log_error(_("can't put a policy URL into v3 key (PGP 2.x style) "
+		      "signatures\n"));
+	else
+	  pu=opt.cert_policy_url;
+      }
+
+    for(;pu;pu=pu->next)
+      {
+        string = pu->d;
+
+	s=pct_expando(string,&args);
+	if(!s)
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand policy URL "
+			"(too large).  Using unexpanded.\n"));
+	    s=xstrdup(string);
+	  }
+
+	build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY|
+			 ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0),
+			 s,strlen(s));
+
+	xfree(s);
+      }
+
+    /* preferred keyserver URL */
+    if( IS_SIG(sig) && opt.sig_keyserver_url )
+      {
+	if(sig->version<4)
+	  log_info("can't put a preferred keyserver URL into v3 signatures\n");
+	else
+	  pu=opt.sig_keyserver_url;
+      }
+
+    for(;pu;pu=pu->next)
+      {
+        string = pu->d;
+
+	s=pct_expando(string,&args);
+	if(!s)
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("WARNING: unable to %%-expand preferred keyserver URL"
+			" (too large).  Using unexpanded.\n"));
+	    s=xstrdup(string);
+	  }
+
+	build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS|
+			 ((pu->flags & 1)?SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL:0),
+			 s,strlen(s));
+
+	xfree(s);
+      }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper to hash a user ID packet.  
+ */
+static void
+hash_uid (MD_HANDLE md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+    if ( sigversion >= 4 ) {
+        byte buf[5];
+
+	if(uid->attrib_data) {
+	  buf[0] = 0xd1;	           /* indicates an attribute packet */
+	  buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
+	  buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
+	  buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >>  8;
+	  buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
+	}
+	else {
+	  buf[0] = 0xb4;	    /* indicates a userid packet */
+	  buf[1] = uid->len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
+	  buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
+	  buf[3] = uid->len >>  8;
+	  buf[4] = uid->len;
+	}
+        md_write( md, buf, 5 );
+    }
+
+    if(uid->attrib_data)
+      md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
+    else
+      md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Helper to hash some parts from the signature
+ */
+static void
+hash_sigversion_to_magic (MD_HANDLE md, const PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+    if (sig->version >= 4) 
+        md_putc (md, sig->version);
+    md_putc (md, sig->sig_class);
+    if (sig->version < 4) {
+        u32 a = sig->timestamp;
+        md_putc (md, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
+        md_putc (md, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
+        md_putc (md, (a >>  8) & 0xff );
+        md_putc (md,  a	       & 0xff );
+    }
+    else {
+        byte buf[6];
+        size_t n;
+        
+        md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo);
+        md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo);
+        if (sig->hashed) {
+            n = sig->hashed->len;
+            md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
+            md_putc (md,  n       );
+            md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
+            n += 6;
+        }
+        else {
+            md_putc (md, 0);  /* always hash the length of the subpacket*/
+            md_putc (md, 0);
+            n = 6;
+        }
+        /* add some magic */
+        buf[0] = sig->version;
+        buf[1] = 0xff;
+        buf[2] = n >> 24; /* hmmm, n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0 */
+        buf[3] = n >> 16;
+        buf[4] = n >>  8;
+        buf[5] = n;
+        md_write (md, buf, 6);
+    }
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_sign( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig,
+	 MD_HANDLE md, int digest_algo )
+{
+    MPI frame;
+    byte *dp;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( sk->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) {
+	ulong d = sk->timestamp - sig->timestamp;
+	log_info( d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second "
+			   "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
+		       : _("key has been created %lu seconds "
+			   "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"), d );
+	if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
+	    return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+    }
+
+
+    print_pubkey_algo_note(sk->pubkey_algo);
+
+    if( !digest_algo )
+	digest_algo = md_get_algo(md);
+
+    print_digest_algo_note( digest_algo );
+    dp = md_read( md, digest_algo );
+    sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
+    sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0];
+    sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
+    if (sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) 
+      { 
+#ifdef ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT
+        unsigned char *rbuf;
+        size_t rbuflen;
+        char *snbuf;
+        
+        snbuf = serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (sk->protect.iv,
+                                          sk->protect.ivlen, sk);
+        rc = agent_scd_pksign (snbuf, digest_algo,
+                               md_read (md, digest_algo),
+                               md_digest_length (digest_algo),
+                               &rbuf, &rbuflen);
+        xfree (snbuf);
+        if (!rc)
+          {
+            sig->data[0] = mpi_alloc ( (rbuflen+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)
+                                       / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+            mpi_set_buffer (sig->data[0], rbuf, rbuflen, 0);
+            xfree (rbuf);
+          }
+#else
+        return G10ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+#endif /* ENABLE_CARD_SUPPORT */
+      }
+    else 
+      {
+        frame = encode_md_value( NULL, sk, md, digest_algo );
+        if (!frame)
+          return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+        rc = pubkey_sign( sk->pubkey_algo, sig->data, frame, sk->skey );
+        mpi_free(frame);
+      }
+
+    if (!rc && !opt.no_sig_create_check) {
+        /* check that the signature verification worked and nothing is
+         * fooling us e.g. by a bug in the signature create
+         * code or by deliberately introduced faults. */
+        PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+
+        if( get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) )
+            rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+        else {
+	    frame = encode_md_value (pk, NULL, md, sig->digest_algo );
+            if (!frame)
+                rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+            else
+                rc = pubkey_verify (pk->pubkey_algo, frame,
+                                    sig->data, pk->pkey );
+            mpi_free (frame);
+        }
+        if (rc)
+            log_error (_("checking created signature failed: %s\n"),
+                         g10_errstr (rc));
+        free_public_key (pk);
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+    else {
+	if( opt.verbose ) {
+	    char *ustr = get_user_id_string_native (sig->keyid);
+	    log_info(_("%s/%s signature from: \"%s\"\n"),
+		     pubkey_algo_to_string(sk->pubkey_algo),
+		     digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo),
+		     ustr );
+	    xfree(ustr);
+	}
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_key *sk, MD_HANDLE md )
+{
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( !(rc=check_secret_key( sk, 0 )) )
+	rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, 0 );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+match_dsa_hash(unsigned int qbytes)
+{
+  if(qbytes<=20)
+    return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+#ifdef USE_SHA256
+  if(qbytes<=28)
+    return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224;
+  if(qbytes<=32)
+    return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHA512
+  if(qbytes<=48)
+    return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384;
+  if(qbytes<=64)
+    return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512;
+#endif
+  return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
+  /* DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO will certainly fail, but it's the best wrong
+     answer we have if the larger SHAs aren't there. */
+}
+
+
+/*
+  First try --digest-algo.  If that isn't set, see if the recipient
+  has a preferred algorithm (which is also filtered through
+  --preferred-digest-prefs).  If we're making a signature without a
+  particular recipient (i.e. signing, rather than signing+encrypting)
+  then take the first algorithm in --preferred-digest-prefs that is
+  usable for the pubkey algorithm.  If --preferred-digest-prefs isn't
+  set, then take the OpenPGP default (i.e. SHA-1).
+
+  Possible improvement: Use the highest-ranked usable algorithm from
+  the signing key prefs either before or after using the personal
+  list?
+*/
+
+static int
+hash_for(PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+  if( opt.def_digest_algo )
+    return opt.def_digest_algo;
+  else if( recipient_digest_algo )
+    return recipient_digest_algo;
+  else if(sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
+    {
+      unsigned int qbytes=mpi_get_nbits(sk->skey[1])/8;
+
+      /* It's a DSA key, so find a hash that is the same size as q or
+	 larger.  If q is 160, assume it is an old DSA key and use a
+	 160-bit hash unless --enable-dsa2 is set, in which case act
+	 like a new DSA key that just happens to have a 160-bit q
+	 (i.e. allow truncation).  If q is not 160, by definition it
+	 must be a new DSA key. */
+
+      if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+	{
+	  prefitem_t *prefs;
+
+	  if(qbytes!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
+	    {
+	      for(prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++)
+		if(md_digest_length(prefs->value)>=qbytes)
+		  return prefs->value;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      for(prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++)
+		if(md_digest_length(prefs->value)==qbytes)
+		  return prefs->value;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      return match_dsa_hash(qbytes);
+    }
+  else if(sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)
+    {
+      /* The sk lives on a smartcard, and current smartcards only
+	 handle SHA-1 and RIPEMD/160.  This is correct now, but may
+	 need revision as the cards add algorithms. */
+
+      if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+	{
+	  prefitem_t *prefs;
+
+	  for(prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;prefs->type;prefs++)
+	    if(prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+	       || prefs->value==DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160)
+	      return prefs->value;
+	}
+
+      return DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+    }
+  else if(PGP2 && sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && sk->version < 4 )
+    {
+      /* Old-style PGP only understands MD5 */
+      return DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+    }
+  else if( opt.personal_digest_prefs )
+    {
+      /* It's not DSA, so we can use whatever the first hash algorithm
+	 is in the pref list */
+      return opt.personal_digest_prefs[0].value;
+    }
+  else
+    return DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO;
+}
+
+static int
+only_old_style( SK_LIST sk_list )
+{
+    SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+    int old_style = 0;
+
+    /* if there are only old style capable key we use the old sytle */
+    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	if( sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && sk->version < 4 )
+	    old_style = 1;
+	else
+	    return 0;
+    }
+    return old_style;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_status_sig_created ( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig, int what )
+{
+    byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+    char buf[100+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2];
+    size_t i, n;
+
+    sprintf(buf, "%c %d %d %02x %lu ",
+	    what, sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class,
+	    (ulong)sig->timestamp );
+
+    fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
+    p = buf + strlen(buf);
+    for(i=0; i < n ; i++ )
+	sprintf(p+2*i, "%02X", array[i] );
+
+    write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_CREATED, buf );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Loop over the secret certificates in SK_LIST and build the one pass
+ * signature packets.  OpenPGP says that the data should be bracket by
+ * the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we build these onepass
+ * packet here in reverse order 
+ */
+static int
+write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
+{
+    int skcount;
+    SK_LIST sk_rover;
+
+    for (skcount=0, sk_rover=sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
+        skcount++;
+
+    for (; skcount; skcount--) {
+        PKT_secret_key *sk;
+        PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
+        PACKET pkt;
+        int i, rc;
+        
+        for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+            if (++i == skcount)
+                break;
+        }
+
+        sk = sk_rover->sk;
+        ops = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ops);
+        ops->sig_class = sigclass;
+        ops->digest_algo = hash_for (sk);
+        ops->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+        keyid_from_sk (sk, ops->keyid);
+        ops->last = (skcount == 1);
+        
+        init_packet(&pkt);
+        pkt.pkttype = PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
+        pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
+        rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
+        free_packet (&pkt);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
+                       g10_errstr(rc));
+            return rc;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to write the plaintext (literal data) packet
+ */
+static int
+write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
+{
+    PKT_plaintext *pt = NULL;
+    u32 filesize;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal)
+      pt=setup_plaintext_name(fname,inp);
+
+    /* try to calculate the length of the data */
+    if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) && *fname )
+      {
+        off_t tmpsize;
+        int overflow;
+
+        if( !(tmpsize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp, &overflow))
+            && !overflow )
+	  log_info (_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), fname);
+
+        /* We can't encode the length of very large files because
+           OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes.  So if the size of
+           a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for packet
+           headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
+        if ( tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536) )
+          filesize = tmpsize;
+        else
+          filesize = 0;
+
+        /* Because the text_filter modifies the length of the
+         * data, it is not possible to know the used length
+         * without a double read of the file - to avoid that
+         * we simple use partial length packets. */
+        if ( ptmode == 't' )
+	  filesize = 0;
+      }
+    else
+      filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
+
+    if (!opt.no_literal) {
+        PACKET pkt;
+
+        pt->timestamp = make_timestamp ();
+        pt->mode = ptmode;
+        pt->len = filesize;
+        pt->new_ctb = !pt->len && !RFC1991;
+        pt->buf = inp;
+        init_packet(&pkt);
+        pkt.pkttype = PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+        pkt.pkt.plaintext = pt;
+        /*cfx.datalen = filesize? calc_packet_length( &pkt ) : 0;*/
+        if( (rc = build_packet (out, &pkt)) )
+            log_error ("build_packet(PLAINTEXT) failed: %s\n",
+                       g10_errstr(rc) );
+        pt->buf = NULL;
+    }
+    else {
+        byte copy_buffer[4096];
+        int  bytes_copied;
+
+        while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read(inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
+            if (iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied) == -1) {
+                rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+                log_error ("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
+                           g10_errstr(rc));
+                break;
+            }
+        wipememory(copy_buffer,4096); /* burn buffer */
+    }
+    /* fixme: it seems that we never freed pt/pkt */
+    
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the signatures from the SK_LIST to OUT. HASH must be a non-finalized
+ * hash which will not be changes here.
+ */
+static int
+write_signature_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, MD_HANDLE hash,
+                         int sigclass, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+			 int status_letter)
+{
+    SK_LIST sk_rover;
+
+    /* loop over the secret certificates */
+    for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk;
+	PKT_signature *sig;
+	MD_HANDLE md;
+        int rc;
+
+	sk = sk_rover->sk;
+
+	/* build the signature packet */
+	sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sig);
+	if(opt.force_v3_sigs || RFC1991)
+	  sig->version=3;
+	else if(duration || opt.sig_policy_url
+		|| opt.sig_notations || opt.sig_keyserver_url)
+	  sig->version=4;
+	else
+	  sig->version=sk->version;
+	keyid_from_sk (sk, sig->keyid);
+	sig->digest_algo = hash_for(sk);
+	sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+	if(timestamp)
+	  sig->timestamp = timestamp;
+	else
+	  sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
+	if(duration)
+	  sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp+duration;
+	sig->sig_class = sigclass;
+
+	md = md_copy (hash);
+
+	if (sig->version >= 4)
+	    build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig);
+	mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, NULL, sk);
+
+        hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+	md_final (md);
+
+	rc = do_sign( sk, sig, md, hash_for (sk) );
+	md_close (md);
+
+	if( !rc ) { /* and write it */
+            PACKET pkt;
+
+	    init_packet(&pkt);
+	    pkt.pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+	    pkt.pkt.signature = sig;
+	    rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
+	    if (!rc && is_status_enabled()) {
+		print_status_sig_created ( sk, sig, status_letter);
+	    }
+	    free_packet (&pkt);
+	    if (rc)
+		log_error ("build signature packet failed: %s\n",
+                           g10_errstr(rc) );
+	}
+	if( rc )
+	    return rc;;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Sign the files whose names are in FILENAME.
+ * If DETACHED has the value true,
+ * make a detached signature.  If FILENAMES->d is NULL read from stdin
+ * and ignore the detached mode.  Sign the file with all secret keys
+ * which can be taken from LOCUSR, if this is NULL, use the default one
+ * If ENCRYPTFLAG is true, use REMUSER (or ask if it is NULL) to encrypt the
+ * signed data for these users.
+ * If OUTFILE is not NULL; this file is used for output and the function
+ * does not ask for overwrite permission; output is then always
+ * uncompressed, non-armored and in binary mode.
+ */
+int
+sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
+	   int encryptflag, STRLIST remusr, const char *outfile )
+{
+    const char *fname;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+    md_filter_context_t mfx;
+    text_filter_context_t tfx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    encrypt_filter_context_t efx;
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int rc = 0;
+    PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
+    SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+    SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+    int multifile = 0;
+    u32 duration=0;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+    memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
+    memset( &efx, 0, sizeof efx);
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+
+    if( filenames ) {
+	fname = filenames->d;
+	multifile = !!filenames->next;
+    }
+    else
+	fname = NULL;
+
+    if( fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encryptflag) )
+	log_bug("multiple files can only be detached signed");
+
+    if(encryptflag==2
+       && (rc=setup_symkey(&efx.symkey_s2k,&efx.symkey_dek)))
+      goto leave;
+
+    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs && !RFC1991)
+      {
+	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
+	else
+	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
+      }
+
+    if( (rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    if(PGP2 && !only_old_style(sk_list))
+      {
+	log_info(_("you can only detach-sign with PGP 2.x style keys "
+		   "while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+	compliance_failure();
+      }
+
+    if(encryptflag && (rc=build_pk_list( remusr, &pk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )))
+      goto leave;
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    if( multifile )  /* have list of filenames */
+	inp = NULL; /* we do it later */
+    else {
+      inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+      if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+        {
+          iobuf_close (inp);
+          inp = NULL;
+          errno = EPERM;
+        }
+      if( !inp ) {
+	    log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+		      strerror(errno) );
+	    rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+        handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+    }
+
+    if( outfile ) {
+        if (is_secured_filename ( outfile )) {
+            out = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+        }
+        else
+            out = iobuf_create( outfile );
+	if( !out )
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
+	    rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+	else if( opt.verbose )
+	    log_info(_("writing to `%s'\n"), outfile );
+    }
+    else if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, opt.armor? 1: detached? 2:0, &out )))
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
+    if( opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile )
+      {
+	memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+	iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+      }
+
+    mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+    if (DBG_HASHING)
+	md_start_debug (mfx.md, "sign");
+
+    /* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the
+       hash algorithm to use out of the recepient key prefs.  This is
+       best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are
+       cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2
+       wants >160 and smartcards want =160).  In the future this could
+       be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the
+       current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */
+    if(pk_list)
+      {
+	if(opt.def_digest_algo)
+	  {
+	    if(!opt.expert &&
+	       select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
+				      opt.def_digest_algo,
+				      NULL)!=opt.def_digest_algo)
+	  log_info(_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)"
+		     " violates recipient preferences\n"),
+		   digest_algo_to_string(opt.def_digest_algo),
+		   opt.def_digest_algo);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    union pref_hint hint;
+	    int algo,smartcard=0;
+
+	    hint.digest_length=0;
+
+	    /* Of course, if the recipient asks for something
+	       unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then
+	       don't do it.  Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live
+	       on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we
+	       may not be able to give the recipient what they want.
+	       For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have.  Note
+	       that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160
+	       key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key.
+	       The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs
+	       completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in
+	       hash_for().  The override behavior here is more or less
+	       reasonable as it is under the control of the user which
+	       keys they sign with for a given message and the fact
+	       that the message with multiple signatures won't be
+	       usable on an implementation that doesn't understand
+	       DSA2 anyway. */
+
+	    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
+	      {
+		if(sk_rover->sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
+		  {
+		    int temp_hashlen=mpi_get_nbits(sk_rover->sk->skey[1])/8;
+
+		    /* Pick a hash that is large enough for our
+		       largest q */
+
+		    if(hint.digest_length<temp_hashlen)
+		      hint.digest_length=temp_hashlen;
+		  }
+		else if(sk_rover->sk->is_protected
+			&& sk_rover->sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)
+		  smartcard=1;
+	      }
+
+	    /* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes.  If we have
+	       to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the
+	       recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the
+	       same time and recipient prefs currently require a
+	       single hash for all signatures.  All this may well have
+	       to change as the cards add algorithms. */
+
+	    if(!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20))
+	      if((algo=
+		  select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,-1,&hint))>0)
+		recipient_digest_algo=algo;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	md_enable(mfx.md, hash_for(sk));
+    }
+
+    if( !multifile )
+	iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx );
+
+    if( detached && !encryptflag && !RFC1991 )
+	afx.what = 2;
+
+    if( opt.armor && !outfile  )
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    if( encryptflag ) {
+	efx.pk_list = pk_list;
+	/* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */
+	iobuf_push_filter( out, encrypt_filter, &efx );
+    }
+
+    if( opt.compress_algo && !outfile && ( !detached || opt.compress_sigs) )
+      {
+        int compr_algo=opt.compress_algo;
+
+	/* If not forced by user */
+	if(compr_algo==-1)
+	  {
+	    /* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs
+	       will fail and we'll end up with the default.  If we are
+	       encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since
+	       there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data.
+	       Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the
+	       default. */
+ 
+	    if((compr_algo=
+		select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1)
+	      compr_algo=default_compress_algo();
+	  }
+ 	else if(!opt.expert && pk_list
+ 		&& select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,
+					  compr_algo,NULL)!=compr_algo)
+ 	  log_info(_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)"
+ 		     " violates recipient preferences\n"),
+ 		   compress_algo_to_string(compr_algo),compr_algo);
+
+	/* algo 0 means no compression */
+	if( compr_algo )
+	  push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,compr_algo);
+      }
+
+    /* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */
+    if (!detached && !RFC1991) {
+        rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
+                                        opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00);
+        if (rc)
+            goto leave;
+    }
+
+    write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING);
+
+    /* Setup the inner packet. */
+    if( detached ) {
+	if( multifile ) {
+	    STRLIST sl;
+
+	    if( opt.verbose )
+		log_info(_("signing:") );
+	    /* must walk reverse trough this list */
+	    for( sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl;
+			sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl ) ) {
+                inp = iobuf_open(sl->d);
+                if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+                  {
+                    iobuf_close (inp);
+                    inp = NULL;
+                    errno = EPERM;
+                  }
+		if( !inp )
+		  {
+		    log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"),
+			      sl->d,strerror(errno));
+		    rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+		    goto leave;
+		  }
+                handle_progress (&pfx, inp, sl->d);
+		if( opt.verbose )
+		    fprintf(stderr, " `%s'", sl->d );
+		if(opt.textmode)
+		  {
+		    memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+		    iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
+		  }
+		iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx );
+		while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 )
+		    ;
+		iobuf_close(inp); inp = NULL;
+	    }
+	    if( opt.verbose )
+		putc( '\n', stderr );
+	}
+	else {
+	    /* read, so that the filter can calculate the digest */
+	    while( iobuf_get(inp) != -1 )
+		;
+	}
+    }
+    else {
+        rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
+                                     opt.textmode && !outfile ? 't':'b');
+    }
+
+    /* catch errors from above */
+    if (rc)
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* write the signatures */
+    rc = write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, mfx.md,
+                                  opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00,
+				  0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S');
+    if( rc )
+        goto leave;
+
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else {
+	iobuf_close(out);
+        if (encryptflag)
+            write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+    }
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    md_close( mfx.md );
+    release_sk_list( sk_list );
+    release_pk_list( pk_list );
+    recipient_digest_algo=0;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed
+ */
+int
+clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
+{
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    MD_HANDLE textmd = NULL;
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    int rc = 0;
+    SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+    SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+    int old_style = RFC1991;
+    int only_md5 = 0;
+    u32 duration=0;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+
+    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs && !RFC1991)
+      {
+	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
+	else
+	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
+      }
+
+    if( (rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    if( !old_style && !duration )
+	old_style = only_old_style( sk_list );
+
+    if(PGP2 && !only_old_style(sk_list))
+      {
+	log_info(_("you can only clearsign with PGP 2.x style keys "
+		   "while in --pgp2 mode\n"));
+	compliance_failure();
+      }
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !inp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname? fname: "[stdin]",
+					strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+
+    if( outfile ) {
+        if (is_secured_filename (outfile) ) {
+            outfile = NULL;
+            errno = EPERM;
+        }
+        else 
+            out = iobuf_create( outfile );
+	if( !out )
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("can't create `%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
+	    rc = G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;
+	    goto leave;
+	  }
+	else if( opt.verbose )
+	    log_info(_("writing to `%s'\n"), outfile );
+    }
+    else if( (rc = open_outfile( fname, 1, &out )) )
+	goto leave;
+
+    iobuf_writestr(out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF );
+
+    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	if( hash_for(sk) == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
+	    only_md5 = 1;
+	else {
+	    only_md5 = 0;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( !(old_style && only_md5) ) {
+	const char *s;
+	int any = 0;
+	byte hashs_seen[256];
+
+	memset( hashs_seen, 0, sizeof hashs_seen );
+	iobuf_writestr(out, "Hash: " );
+	for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	    int i = hash_for(sk);
+
+	    if( !hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] ) {
+		s = digest_algo_to_string( i );
+		if( s ) {
+		    hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] = 1;
+		    if( any )
+			iobuf_put(out, ',' );
+		    iobuf_writestr(out, s );
+		    any = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	assert(any);
+	iobuf_writestr(out, LF );
+    }
+
+    if( opt.not_dash_escaped )
+      iobuf_writestr( out,
+		  "NotDashEscaped: You need GnuPG to verify this message" LF );
+    iobuf_writestr(out, LF );
+
+    textmd = md_open(0, 0);
+    for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	md_enable(textmd, hash_for(sk));
+    }
+    if ( DBG_HASHING )
+	md_start_debug( textmd, "clearsign" );
+    copy_clearsig_text( out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped,
+			opt.escape_from, (old_style && only_md5) );
+    /* fixme: check for read errors */
+
+    /* now write the armor */
+    afx.what = 2;
+    iobuf_push_filter( out, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    /* write the signatures */
+    rc=write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, textmd, 0x01, 0, duration, 'C');
+    if( rc )
+        goto leave;
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else
+	iobuf_close(out);
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    md_close( textmd );
+    release_sk_list( sk_list );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
+ * FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
+ */
+int
+sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr)
+{
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    compress_filter_context_t zfx;
+    md_filter_context_t mfx;
+    text_filter_context_t tfx;
+    cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
+    IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
+    PACKET pkt;
+    STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+    int rc = 0;
+    SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+    SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
+    int algo;
+    u32 duration=0;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
+    memset( &mfx, 0, sizeof mfx);
+    memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
+    memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
+    init_packet( &pkt );
+
+    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs && !RFC1991)
+      {
+	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
+	else
+	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
+      }
+
+    rc = build_sk_list (locusr, &sk_list, 1, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
+    if (rc) 
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* prepare iobufs */
+    inp = iobuf_open(fname);
+    if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (inp);
+        inp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !inp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), 
+                  fname? fname: "[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
+	rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+	goto leave;
+    }
+    handle_progress (&pfx, inp, fname);
+
+    /* prepare key */
+    s2k = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
+    s2k->mode = RFC1991? 0:opt.s2k_mode;
+    s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
+
+    algo = default_cipher_algo();
+    if (!opt.quiet || !opt.batch)
+        log_info (_("%s encryption will be used\n"),
+		    cipher_algo_to_string(algo) );
+    cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 2, NULL, NULL);
+
+    if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
+        rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
+        log_error(_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        goto leave;
+    }
+
+    /* We have no way to tell if the recipient can handle messages
+       with an MDC, so this defaults to no.  Perhaps in a few years,
+       this can be defaulted to yes.  Note that like regular
+       encrypting, --force-mdc overrides --disable-mdc. */
+    if(opt.force_mdc)
+      cfx.dek->use_mdc=1;
+
+    /* now create the outfile */
+    rc = open_outfile (fname, opt.armor? 1:0, &out);
+    if (rc)
+	goto leave;
+
+    /* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
+    if (opt.textmode)
+	iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
+    mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+    if ( DBG_HASHING )
+	md_start_debug (mfx.md, "symc-sign");
+
+    for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
+	md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk));
+    }
+
+    iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
+
+    /* Push armor output filter */
+    if (opt.armor)
+	iobuf_push_filter (out, armor_filter, &afx);
+
+    /* Write the symmetric key packet */
+    /*(current filters: armor)*/
+    if (!RFC1991) {
+	PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
+	enc->version = 4;
+	enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+	enc->s2k = *s2k;
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+	pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+	if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+	    log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	xfree(enc);
+    }
+
+    /* Push the encryption filter */
+    iobuf_push_filter( out, cipher_filter, &cfx );
+
+    /* Push the compress filter */
+    if (default_compress_algo())
+      push_compress_filter(out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
+
+    /* Write the one-pass signature packets */
+    /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+    if (!RFC1991) {
+        rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
+                                        opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00);
+        if (rc)
+            goto leave;
+    }
+
+    write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING);
+
+    /* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff */
+    /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+    rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname, opt.textmode ? 't':'b');
+    if (rc)
+	goto leave;
+    
+    /* Write the signatures */
+    /*(current filters: zip - encrypt - armor)*/
+    rc = write_signature_packets (sk_list, out, mfx.md,
+				  opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00,
+				  0, duration, 'S');
+    if( rc )
+        goto leave;
+
+
+  leave:
+    if( rc )
+	iobuf_cancel(out);
+    else {
+	iobuf_close(out);
+        write_status( STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION );
+    }
+    iobuf_close(inp);
+    release_sk_list( sk_list );
+    md_close( mfx.md );
+    xfree(cfx.dek);
+    xfree(s2k);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Create a signature packet for the given public key certificate and
+ * the user id and return it in ret_sig. User signature class SIGCLASS
+ * user-id is not used (and may be NULL if sigclass is 0x20) If
+ * DIGEST_ALGO is 0 the function selects an appropriate one.
+ * SIGVERSION gives the minimal required signature packet version;
+ * this is needed so that special properties like local sign are not
+ * applied (actually: dropped) when a v3 key is used.  TIMESTAMP is
+ * the timestamp to use for the signature. 0 means "now" */
+int
+make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+		    PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk,
+		    PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		    int sigclass, int digest_algo,
+                    int sigversion, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+		    int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque
+		   )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int rc=0;
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+
+    assert( (sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) || sigclass == 0x1F
+	    || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19
+	    || sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 );
+
+    if (opt.force_v4_certs)
+        sigversion = 4;
+
+    if (sigversion < sk->version)
+        sigversion = sk->version;
+
+    /* If you are making a signature on a v4 key using your v3 key, it
+       doesn't make sense to generate a v3 sig.  After all, no v3-only
+       PGP implementation could understand the v4 key in the first
+       place.  Note that this implies that a signature on an attribute
+       uid is usually going to be v4 as well, since they are not
+       generally found on v3 keys. */
+    if (sigversion < pk->version)
+        sigversion = pk->version;
+
+    if( !digest_algo )
+      {
+	/* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless it's a v3 RSA
+	   key making a v3 cert (use MD5), or the user specified
+	   something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA (use the
+	   best match).  They still can't pick an inappropriate hash
+	   for DSA or the signature will fail.  Note that this still
+	   allows the caller of make_keysig_packet to override the
+	   user setting if it must. */
+
+	if(opt.cert_digest_algo)
+	  digest_algo=opt.cert_digest_algo;
+	else if(sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+		&& pk->version<4 && sigversion<4)
+	  digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+	else if(sk->pubkey_algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
+	  digest_algo = match_dsa_hash(mpi_get_nbits(sk->skey[1])/8);
+	else
+	  digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+      }
+
+    md = md_open( digest_algo, 0 );
+
+    /* hash the public key certificate */
+    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+
+    if( sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19 || sigclass == 0x28 )
+      {
+	/* hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation */
+	hash_public_key( md, subpk );
+      }
+    else if( sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20 )
+      {
+	/* hash the user id */
+        hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid);
+      }
+    /* and make the signature packet */
+    sig = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
+    sig->version = sigversion;
+    sig->flags.exportable=1;
+    sig->flags.revocable=1;
+    keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
+    sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
+    sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
+    if(timestamp)
+      sig->timestamp=timestamp;
+    else
+      sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+    if(duration)
+      sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+duration;
+    sig->sig_class = sigclass;
+    if( sig->version >= 4 )
+	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+    mk_notation_policy_etc( sig, pk, sk );
+
+    /* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
+       to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
+       function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
+    if( sig->version >= 4 && mksubpkt )
+	rc = (*mksubpkt)( sig, opaque );
+
+    if( !rc ) {
+        hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+	md_final(md);
+
+	rc = complete_sig( sig, sk, md );
+    }
+
+    md_close( md );
+    if( rc )
+	free_seckey_enc( sig );
+    else
+	*ret_sig = sig;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Create a new signature packet based on an existing one.
+ * Only user ID signatures are supported for now.
+ * TODO: Merge this with make_keysig_packet.
+ */
+int
+update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
+                      PKT_signature *orig_sig,
+                      PKT_public_key *pk,
+                      PKT_user_id *uid, 
+                      PKT_public_key *subpk,
+                      PKT_secret_key *sk,
+                      int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
+                      void *opaque )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    int rc=0;
+    MD_HANDLE md;
+
+    if ((!orig_sig || !pk || !sk)
+	|| (orig_sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && orig_sig->sig_class <= 0x13 && !uid)
+	|| (orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !subpk))
+      return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+
+    md = md_open( orig_sig->digest_algo, 0 );
+
+    /* hash the public key certificate and the user id */
+    hash_public_key( md, pk );
+
+    if( orig_sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+      hash_public_key( md, subpk );
+    else
+      hash_uid (md, orig_sig->version, uid);
+
+    /* create a new signature packet */
+    sig = copy_signature (NULL, orig_sig);
+ 
+    /* We need to create a new timestamp so that new sig expiration
+       calculations are done correctly... */
+    sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+
+    /* ... but we won't make a timestamp earlier than the existing
+       one. */
+    while(sig->timestamp<=orig_sig->timestamp)
+      {
+	sleep(1);
+	sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
+      }
+
+    /* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a
+       duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
+       detects this case. */
+
+    if( sig->version >= 4 )
+      {
+	/* Put the updated timestamp into the sig.  Note that this
+	   will automagically lower any sig expiration dates to
+	   correctly correspond to the differences in the timestamps
+	   (i.e. the duration will shrink). */
+	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+
+	if (mksubpkt)
+	  rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
+      }
+
+    if (!rc) {
+        hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
+	md_final(md);
+
+	rc = complete_sig( sig, sk, md );
+    }
+
+    md_close (md);
+    if( rc )
+	free_seckey_enc (sig);
+    else
+	*ret_sig = sig;
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/signal.c b/g10/signal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e40af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/signal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/* signal.c - signal handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+#include <readline/readline.h>
+#include <readline/history.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+void init_signals(void) {}
+void pause_on_sigusr(int which) {}
+#else
+static volatile int caught_fatal_sig = 0;
+static volatile int caught_sigusr1 = 0;
+
+static void
+init_one_signal (int sig, RETSIGTYPE (*handler)(int), int check_ign )
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SIGACTION)
+    struct sigaction oact, nact;
+
+    if (check_ign) {
+        /* we don't want to change an IGN handler */
+        sigaction (sig, NULL, &oact );
+        if (oact.sa_handler == SIG_IGN )
+            return;
+    }
+
+    nact.sa_handler = handler;
+    sigemptyset (&nact.sa_mask);
+    nact.sa_flags = 0;
+    sigaction ( sig, &nact, NULL);
+#else 
+    RETSIGTYPE (*ohandler)(int);
+
+    ohandler = signal (sig, handler);
+    if (check_ign && ohandler == SIG_IGN) {
+        /* Change it back if it was already set to IGN */
+        signal (sig, SIG_IGN);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+static RETSIGTYPE
+got_fatal_signal( int sig )
+{
+    const char *s;
+
+    if( caught_fatal_sig )
+	raise( sig );
+    caught_fatal_sig = 1;
+
+    secmem_term();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE
+    rl_free_line_state ();
+    rl_cleanup_after_signal ();
+#endif
+
+    /* Better don't translate these messages. */
+    write(2, "\n", 1 );
+    s = log_get_name(); if( s ) write(2, s, strlen(s) );
+    write(2, ": ", 2 );
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_SYS_SIGLIST && defined(NSIG)
+    s = (sig >= 0 && sig < NSIG) ? sys_siglist[sig] : "?";
+    write (2, s, strlen(s) );
+#else
+    write (2, "signal ", 7 );
+    if (sig < 0 || sig >=100)
+        write (2, "?", 1);
+    else {
+        if (sig >= 10)
+            write (2, "0123456789"+(sig/10), 1 );
+        write (2, "0123456789"+(sig%10), 1 );
+    }
+#endif
+    write(2, " caught ... exiting\n", 20 );
+
+    /* Reset action to default action and raise signal again. */
+    init_one_signal (sig, SIG_DFL, 0);
+    remove_lockfiles ();
+#ifdef __riscos__
+    riscos_close_fds ();
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+    raise( sig );
+}
+
+
+static RETSIGTYPE
+got_usr_signal( int sig )
+{
+    caught_sigusr1 = 1;
+}
+
+
+void
+init_signals()
+{
+    init_one_signal (SIGINT, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGHUP, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGTERM, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGQUIT, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGSEGV, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGUSR1, got_usr_signal, 0 );
+    init_one_signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN, 0 );
+}
+
+
+void
+pause_on_sigusr( int which )
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SIGPROCMASK) && defined(HAVE_SIGSET_T)
+    sigset_t mask, oldmask;
+
+    assert( which == 1 );
+    sigemptyset( &mask );
+    sigaddset( &mask, SIGUSR1 );
+
+    sigprocmask( SIG_BLOCK, &mask, &oldmask );
+    while( !caught_sigusr1 )
+	sigsuspend( &oldmask );
+    caught_sigusr1 = 0;
+    sigprocmask( SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL );
+#else 
+     assert (which == 1);
+     sighold (SIGUSR1);
+     while (!caught_sigusr1)
+         sigpause(SIGUSR1);
+     caught_sigusr1 = 0;
+     sigrelse(SIGUSR1);
+#endif /*! HAVE_SIGPROCMASK && HAVE_SIGSET_T */
+}
+
+/* Disabled - see comment in tdbio.c:tdbio_begin_transaction() */
+#if 0
+static void
+do_block( int block )
+{
+    static int is_blocked;
+#if defined(HAVE_SIGPROCMASK) && defined(HAVE_SIGSET_T)
+    static sigset_t oldmask;
+
+    if( block ) {
+        sigset_t newmask;
+
+	if( is_blocked )
+	    log_bug("signals are already blocked\n");
+	sigfillset( &newmask );
+	sigprocmask( SIG_BLOCK, &newmask, &oldmask );
+	is_blocked = 1;
+    }
+    else {
+	if( !is_blocked )
+	    log_bug("signals are not blocked\n");
+	sigprocmask( SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL );
+	is_blocked = 0;
+    }
+#else /*! HAVE_SIGPROCMASK && HAVE_SIGSET_T */
+
+#if defined(NSIG)
+#define SIGSMAX (NSIG)
+#elif defined(MAXSIG)
+#define SIGSMAX (MAXSIG+1)
+#else
+#error "define SIGSMAX to the number of signals on your platform plus one"
+#endif
+
+    static void (*disposition[SIGSMAX])(int);
+    int sig;
+
+    if( block ) {
+	if( is_blocked )
+	    log_bug("signals are already blocked\n");
+        for (sig=1; sig < SIGSMAX; sig++) {
+            disposition[sig] = sigset (sig, SIG_HOLD);
+        }
+	is_blocked = 1;
+    }
+    else {
+	if( !is_blocked )
+	    log_bug("signals are not blocked\n");
+        for (sig=1; sig < SIGSMAX; sig++) {
+            sigset (sig, disposition[sig]);
+        }
+	is_blocked = 0;
+    }
+#endif /*! HAVE_SIGPROCMASK && HAVE_SIGSET_T */
+}
+
+void
+block_all_signals()
+{
+    do_block(1);
+}
+
+void
+unblock_all_signals()
+{
+    do_block(0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM */
diff --git a/g10/skclist.c b/g10/skclist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e55e24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/skclist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/* skclist.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+
+void
+release_sk_list( SK_LIST sk_list )
+{
+    SK_LIST sk_rover;
+
+    for( ; sk_list; sk_list = sk_rover ) {
+	sk_rover = sk_list->next;
+	free_secret_key( sk_list->sk );
+	xfree( sk_list );
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Check that we are only using keys which don't have
+ * the string "(insecure!)" or "not secure" or "do not use"
+ * in one of the user ids
+ */
+static int
+is_insecure( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    u32 keyid[2];
+    KBNODE node = NULL, u;
+    int insecure = 0;
+
+    keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+    node = get_pubkeyblock( keyid );
+    for ( u = node; u; u = u->next ) {
+        if ( u->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+            PKT_user_id *id = u->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            if ( id->attrib_data )
+                continue; /* skip attribute packets */
+            if ( strstr( id->name, "(insecure!)" )
+                 || strstr( id->name, "not secure" )
+                 || strstr( id->name, "do not use" )
+                 || strstr( id->name, "(INSECURE!)" ) ) {
+                insecure = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    release_kbnode( node );
+    
+    return insecure;
+}
+
+static int
+key_present_in_sk_list(SK_LIST sk_list, PKT_secret_key *sk)
+{
+    for (; sk_list; sk_list = sk_list->next) {
+	if ( !cmp_secret_keys(sk_list->sk, sk) )
+	    return 0;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+is_duplicated_entry (STRLIST list, STRLIST item)
+{
+    for(; list && list != item; list = list->next) {
+        if ( !strcmp (list->d, item->d) )
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+int
+build_sk_list( STRLIST locusr, SK_LIST *ret_sk_list,
+               int unlock, unsigned int use )
+{
+    SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( !locusr )
+      { /* use the default one */
+	PKT_secret_key *sk;
+
+	sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+	sk->req_usage = use;
+	if( (rc = get_seckey_byname( sk, NULL, unlock )) ) {
+	  free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+	  log_error("no default secret key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	}
+	else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(sk->pubkey_algo, use)) )
+	  {
+	    SK_LIST r;
+
+	    if( random_is_faked() && !is_insecure( sk ) )
+	      {
+		log_info(_("key is not flagged as insecure - "
+			   "can't use it with the faked RNG!\n"));
+		free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+		r->sk = sk; sk = NULL;
+		r->next = sk_list;
+		r->mark = 0;
+		sk_list = r;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+	    log_error("invalid default secret key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	  }
+      }
+    else {
+        STRLIST locusr_orig = locusr;
+	for(; locusr; locusr = locusr->next ) {
+	    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+            
+            rc = 0;
+            /* Do an early check agains duplicated entries.  However this
+             * won't catch all duplicates because the user IDs may be
+             * specified in different ways.
+             */
+            if ( is_duplicated_entry ( locusr_orig, locusr ) )
+	      {
+		log_error(_("skipped \"%s\": duplicated\n"), locusr->d );
+                continue;
+	      }
+	    sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+	    sk->req_usage = use;
+	    if( (rc = get_seckey_byname( sk, locusr->d, 0 )) )
+	      {
+		free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+		log_error(_("skipped \"%s\": %s\n"),
+			  locusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	      }
+            else if ( key_present_in_sk_list(sk_list, sk) == 0) {
+                free_secret_key(sk); sk = NULL;
+                log_info(_("skipped: secret key already present\n"));
+            }
+            else if ( unlock && (rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 )) )
+	      {
+		free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+		log_error(_("skipped \"%s\": %s\n"),
+			  locusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	      }
+	    else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(sk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
+		SK_LIST r;
+
+		if( sk->version == 4 && (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+		    && sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E )
+		  {
+		    log_info(_("skipped \"%s\": %s\n"),locusr->d,
+			     _("this is a PGP generated Elgamal key which"
+			       " is not secure for signatures!"));
+		    free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+		  }
+		else if( random_is_faked() && !is_insecure( sk ) ) {
+		    log_info(_("key is not flagged as insecure - "
+			       "can't use it with the faked RNG!\n"));
+		    free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+		}
+		else {
+		    r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+		    r->sk = sk; sk = NULL;
+		    r->next = sk_list;
+		    r->mark = 0;
+		    sk_list = r;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else {
+		free_secret_key( sk ); sk = NULL;
+		log_error("skipped \"%s\": %s\n", locusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+
+    if( !rc && !sk_list ) {
+	log_error("no valid signators\n");
+	rc = G10ERR_NO_USER_ID;
+    }
+
+    if( rc )
+	release_sk_list( sk_list );
+    else
+	*ret_sk_list = sk_list;
+    return rc;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/status.c b/g10/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2044820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+/* status.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IPC_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ipc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SHM_H
+#include <sys/shm.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_MLOCK)
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#include "util.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "cipher.h" /* for progress functions */
+
+#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
+
+
+
+static FILE *statusfp;
+
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+  static int shm_id = -1;
+  static volatile char *shm_area;
+  static size_t shm_size;
+  static int shm_is_locked;
+#endif /*USE_SHM_COPROCESSING*/
+
+
+static void
+progress_cb ( void *ctx, int c )
+{
+    char buf[50];
+
+    if ( c == '\n' )
+	sprintf ( buf, "%.20s X 100 100", (char*)ctx );
+    else
+	sprintf ( buf, "%.20s %c 0 0", (char*)ctx, c );
+    write_status_text ( STATUS_PROGRESS, buf );
+}
+
+static const char *
+get_status_string ( int no ) 
+{
+  const char *s;
+
+  switch( no )
+    {
+    case STATUS_ENTER  : s = "ENTER"; break;
+    case STATUS_LEAVE  : s = "LEAVE"; break;
+    case STATUS_ABORT  : s = "ABORT"; break;
+    case STATUS_NEWSIG : s = "NEWSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_GOODSIG: s = "GOODSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_KEYEXPIRED: s = "KEYEXPIRED"; break;
+    case STATUS_KEYREVOKED: s = "KEYREVOKED"; break;
+    case STATUS_BADSIG : s = "BADSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_ERRSIG : s = "ERRSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_BADARMOR : s = "BADARMOR"; break;
+    case STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA : s= "RSA_OR_IDEA"; break;
+    case STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED: s = "TRUST_UNDEFINED"; break;
+    case STATUS_TRUST_NEVER	 : s = "TRUST_NEVER"; break;
+    case STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL : s = "TRUST_MARGINAL"; break;
+    case STATUS_TRUST_FULLY	 : s = "TRUST_FULLY"; break;
+    case STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE : s = "TRUST_ULTIMATE"; break;
+    case STATUS_GET_BOOL	 : s = "GET_BOOL"; break;
+    case STATUS_GET_LINE	 : s = "GET_LINE"; break;
+    case STATUS_GET_HIDDEN	 : s = "GET_HIDDEN"; break;
+    case STATUS_GOT_IT	 : s = "GOT_IT"; break;
+    case STATUS_SHM_INFO	 : s = "SHM_INFO"; break;
+    case STATUS_SHM_GET	 : s = "SHM_GET"; break;
+    case STATUS_SHM_GET_BOOL	 : s = "SHM_GET_BOOL"; break;
+    case STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN : s = "SHM_GET_HIDDEN"; break;
+    case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE"; break;
+    case STATUS_VALIDSIG	 : s = "VALIDSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_SIG_ID	 : s = "SIG_ID"; break;
+    case STATUS_ENC_TO	 : s = "ENC_TO"; break;
+    case STATUS_NODATA	 : s = "NODATA"; break;
+    case STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE : s = "BAD_PASSPHRASE"; break;
+    case STATUS_NO_PUBKEY	 : s = "NO_PUBKEY"; break;
+    case STATUS_NO_SECKEY	 : s = "NO_SECKEY"; break;
+    case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM"; break;
+    case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN"; break;
+    case STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED: s = "DECRYPTION_FAILED"; break;
+    case STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY: s = "DECRYPTION_OKAY"; break;
+    case STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE: s = "MISSING_PASSPHRASE"; break;
+    case STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE : s = "GOOD_PASSPHRASE"; break;
+    case STATUS_GOODMDC	 : s = "GOODMDC"; break;
+    case STATUS_BADMDC	 : s = "BADMDC"; break;
+    case STATUS_ERRMDC	 : s = "ERRMDC"; break;
+    case STATUS_IMPORTED	 : s = "IMPORTED"; break;
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_OK	 : s = "IMPORT_OK"; break;
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK   : s = "IMPORT_CHECK"; break;
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_RES	 : s = "IMPORT_RES"; break;
+    case STATUS_FILE_START	 : s = "FILE_START"; break;
+    case STATUS_FILE_DONE	 : s = "FILE_DONE"; break;
+    case STATUS_FILE_ERROR	 : s = "FILE_ERROR"; break;
+    case STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION:s = "BEGIN_DECRYPTION"; break;
+    case STATUS_END_DECRYPTION : s = "END_DECRYPTION"; break;
+    case STATUS_BEGIN_ENCRYPTION:s = "BEGIN_ENCRYPTION"; break;
+    case STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION : s = "END_ENCRYPTION"; break;
+    case STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM : s = "DELETE_PROBLEM"; break;
+    case STATUS_PROGRESS       : s = "PROGRESS"; break;
+    case STATUS_SIG_CREATED    : s = "SIG_CREATED"; break;
+    case STATUS_SESSION_KEY    : s = "SESSION_KEY"; break;
+    case STATUS_NOTATION_NAME  : s = "NOTATION_NAME" ; break;
+    case STATUS_NOTATION_DATA  : s = "NOTATION_DATA" ; break;
+    case STATUS_POLICY_URL     : s = "POLICY_URL" ; break;
+    case STATUS_BEGIN_STREAM   : s = "BEGIN_STREAM"; break;
+    case STATUS_END_STREAM     : s = "END_STREAM"; break;
+    case STATUS_KEY_CREATED    : s = "KEY_CREATED"; break;
+    case STATUS_KEY_NOT_CREATED: s = "KEY_NOT_CREATED"; break;
+    case STATUS_USERID_HINT    : s = "USERID_HINT"; break;
+    case STATUS_UNEXPECTED     : s = "UNEXPECTED"; break;
+    case STATUS_INV_RECP       : s = "INV_RECP"; break;
+    case STATUS_NO_RECP        : s = "NO_RECP"; break;
+    case STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED : s = "ALREADY_SIGNED"; break;
+    case STATUS_SIGEXPIRED     : s = "SIGEXPIRED deprecated-use-keyexpired-instead"; break;
+    case STATUS_EXPSIG         : s = "EXPSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_EXPKEYSIG      : s = "EXPKEYSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_REVKEYSIG      : s = "REVKEYSIG"; break;
+    case STATUS_ATTRIBUTE      : s = "ATTRIBUTE"; break;
+    case STATUS_CARDCTRL       : s = "CARDCTRL"; break;
+    case STATUS_PLAINTEXT      : s = "PLAINTEXT"; break;
+    case STATUS_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH:s = "PLAINTEXT_LENGTH"; break;
+    case STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET  : s = "SIG_SUBPACKET"; break;
+    case STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS  : s = "SC_OP_SUCCESS"; break;
+    case STATUS_SC_OP_FAILURE  : s = "SC_OP_FAILURE"; break;
+    case STATUS_BACKUP_KEY_CREATED:s="BACKUP_KEY_CREATED"; break;
+    case STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD  : s = "PKA_TRUST_BAD"; break;
+    case STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD : s = "PKA_TRUST_GOOD"; break;
+    case STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING  : s = "BEGIN_SIGNING"; break;
+    default: s = "?"; break;
+    }
+  return s;
+}
+
+
+/* Return true if the status message NO may currently be issued.  We
+   need this to avoid syncronisation problem while auto retrieving a
+   key.  There it may happen that a status NODATA is issued for a non
+   available key and the user may falsely interpret this has a missing
+   signature. */
+static int
+status_currently_allowed (int no)
+{
+  if (!glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve)
+    return 1; /* Yes. */
+
+  /* We allow some statis anyway, so that import statistics are
+     correct and to avoid problems if the retriebval subsystem will
+     prompt the user. */
+  switch (no)
+    {
+    case STATUS_GET_BOOL:	 
+    case STATUS_GET_LINE:	 
+    case STATUS_GET_HIDDEN:	 
+    case STATUS_GOT_IT:	 
+    case STATUS_IMPORTED:
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_OK:	
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK:  
+    case STATUS_IMPORT_RES:
+      return 1; /* Yes. */
+    default:
+      break;
+    }
+  return 0; /* No. */
+}
+
+
+void
+set_status_fd ( int fd )
+{
+    static int last_fd = -1;
+
+    if ( fd != -1 && last_fd == fd )
+        return;
+
+    if ( statusfp && statusfp != stdout && statusfp != stderr )
+        fclose (statusfp);
+    statusfp = NULL;
+    if ( fd == -1 ) 
+        return;
+
+    if( fd == 1 )
+	statusfp = stdout;
+    else if( fd == 2 )
+	statusfp = stderr;
+    else
+	statusfp = fdopen( fd, "w" );
+    if( !statusfp ) {
+	log_fatal("can't open fd %d for status output: %s\n",
+                  fd, strerror(errno));
+    }
+    last_fd = fd;
+    register_primegen_progress ( progress_cb, "primegen" );
+    register_pk_dsa_progress ( progress_cb, "pk_dsa" );
+    register_pk_elg_progress ( progress_cb, "pk_elg" );
+}
+
+int
+is_status_enabled()
+{
+    return !!statusfp;
+}
+
+void
+write_status ( int no )
+{
+    write_status_text( no, NULL );
+}
+
+void
+write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
+{
+    if( !statusfp || !status_currently_allowed (no) )
+	return;  /* Not enabled or allowed. */
+
+    fputs ( "[GNUPG:] ", statusfp );
+    fputs ( get_status_string (no), statusfp );
+    if( text ) {
+        putc ( ' ', statusfp );
+        for (; *text; text++) {
+            if (*text == '\n')
+                fputs ( "\\n", statusfp );
+            else if (*text == '\r')
+                fputs ( "\\r", statusfp );
+            else 
+                putc ( *(const byte *)text,  statusfp );
+        }
+    }
+    putc ('\n',statusfp);
+    if ( fflush (statusfp) && opt.exit_on_status_write_error )
+      g10_exit (0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Write a status line with a buffer using %XX escapes.  If WRAP is >
+ * 0 wrap the line after this length.  If STRING is not NULL it will
+ * be prepended to the buffer, no escaping is done for string.
+ * A wrap of -1 forces spaces not to be encoded as %20.
+ */
+void
+write_status_text_and_buffer ( int no, const char *string,
+                               const char *buffer, size_t len, int wrap )
+{
+    const char *s, *text;
+    int esc, first;
+    int lower_limit = ' ';
+    size_t n, count, dowrap;
+
+    if( !statusfp || !status_currently_allowed (no) )
+	return;  /* Not enabled or allowed. */
+    
+    if (wrap == -1) {
+        lower_limit--;
+        wrap = 0;
+    }
+
+    text = get_status_string (no);
+    count = dowrap = first = 1;
+    do {
+        if (dowrap) {
+            fprintf (statusfp, "[GNUPG:] %s ", text );
+            count = dowrap = 0;
+            if (first && string) {
+                fputs (string, statusfp);
+                count += strlen (string);
+            }
+            first = 0;
+        }
+        for (esc=0, s=buffer, n=len; n && !esc; s++, n-- ) {
+            if ( *s == '%' || *(const byte*)s <= lower_limit 
+                           || *(const byte*)s == 127 ) 
+                esc = 1;
+            if ( wrap && ++count > wrap ) {
+                dowrap=1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (esc) {
+            s--; n++;
+        }
+        if (s != buffer) 
+            fwrite (buffer, s-buffer, 1, statusfp );
+        if ( esc ) {
+            fprintf (statusfp, "%%%02X", *(const byte*)s );
+            s++; n--;
+        }
+        buffer = s;
+        len = n;
+        if ( dowrap && len )
+            putc ( '\n', statusfp );
+    } while ( len );
+
+    putc ('\n',statusfp);
+    if ( fflush (statusfp) && opt.exit_on_status_write_error )
+      g10_exit (0);
+}
+
+void
+write_status_buffer ( int no, const char *buffer, size_t len, int wrap )
+{
+    write_status_text_and_buffer (no, NULL, buffer, len, wrap);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+
+#ifndef IPC_RMID_DEFERRED_RELEASE
+static void
+remove_shmid( void )
+{
+    if( shm_id != -1 ) {
+	shmctl ( shm_id, IPC_RMID, 0);
+	shm_id = -1;
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+init_shm_coprocessing ( ulong requested_shm_size, int lock_mem )
+{
+    char buf[100];
+    struct shmid_ds shmds;
+
+#ifndef IPC_RMID_DEFERRED_RELEASE
+    atexit( remove_shmid );
+#endif
+    requested_shm_size = (requested_shm_size + 4095) & ~4095;
+    if ( requested_shm_size > 2 * 4096 )
+	log_fatal("too much shared memory requested; only 8k are allowed\n");
+    shm_size = 4096 /* one page for us */ + requested_shm_size;
+
+    shm_id = shmget( IPC_PRIVATE, shm_size, IPC_CREAT | 0700 );
+    if ( shm_id == -1 )
+	log_fatal("can't get %uk of shared memory: %s\n",
+				(unsigned)shm_size/1024, strerror(errno));
+
+#if !defined(IPC_HAVE_SHM_LOCK) \
+      && defined(HAVE_MLOCK) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_MLOCK)
+    /* part of the old code which uses mlock */
+    shm_area = shmat( shm_id, 0, 0 );
+    if ( shm_area == (char*)-1 )
+	log_fatal("can't attach %uk shared memory: %s\n",
+				(unsigned)shm_size/1024, strerror(errno));
+    log_debug("mapped %uk shared memory at %p, id=%d\n",
+			    (unsigned)shm_size/1024, shm_area, shm_id );
+    if( lock_mem ) {
+#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
+	cap_set_proc( cap_from_text("cap_ipc_lock+ep") );
+#endif
+	/* (need the cast for Solaris with Sun's workshop compilers) */
+	if ( mlock ( (char*)shm_area, shm_size) )
+	    log_info("locking shared memory %d failed: %s\n",
+				shm_id, strerror(errno));
+	else
+	    shm_is_locked = 1;
+#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
+	cap_set_proc( cap_from_text("cap_ipc_lock+p") );
+#endif
+    }
+
+#ifdef IPC_RMID_DEFERRED_RELEASE
+    if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_RMID, 0) )
+	log_fatal("shmctl IPC_RMDID of %d failed: %s\n",
+					    shm_id, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+    if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_STAT, &shmds ) )
+	log_fatal("shmctl IPC_STAT of %d failed: %s\n",
+					    shm_id, strerror(errno));
+    if( shmds.shm_perm.uid != getuid() ) {
+	shmds.shm_perm.uid = getuid();
+	if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_SET, &shmds ) )
+	    log_fatal("shmctl IPC_SET of %d failed: %s\n",
+						shm_id, strerror(errno));
+    }
+
+#else /* this is the new code which handles the changes in the SHM
+       * semantics introduced with Linux 2.4.  The changes is that we
+       * now change the permissions and then attach to the memory.
+       */
+
+    if( lock_mem ) {
+#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
+	cap_set_proc( cap_from_text("cap_ipc_lock+ep") );
+#endif
+#ifdef IPC_HAVE_SHM_LOCK
+	if ( shmctl (shm_id, SHM_LOCK, 0) )
+	    log_info("locking shared memory %d failed: %s\n",
+				shm_id, strerror(errno));
+	else
+	    shm_is_locked = 1;
+#else
+	log_info("Locking shared memory %d failed: No way to do it\n", shm_id );
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_CAPABILITIES
+	cap_set_proc( cap_from_text("cap_ipc_lock+p") );
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_STAT, &shmds ) )
+	log_fatal("shmctl IPC_STAT of %d failed: %s\n",
+					    shm_id, strerror(errno));
+    if( shmds.shm_perm.uid != getuid() ) {
+	shmds.shm_perm.uid = getuid();
+	if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_SET, &shmds ) )
+	    log_fatal("shmctl IPC_SET of %d failed: %s\n",
+						shm_id, strerror(errno));
+    }
+
+    shm_area = shmat( shm_id, 0, 0 );
+    if ( shm_area == (char*)-1 )
+	log_fatal("can't attach %uk shared memory: %s\n",
+				(unsigned)shm_size/1024, strerror(errno));
+    log_debug("mapped %uk shared memory at %p, id=%d\n",
+			    (unsigned)shm_size/1024, shm_area, shm_id );
+
+#ifdef IPC_RMID_DEFERRED_RELEASE
+    if( shmctl( shm_id, IPC_RMID, 0) )
+	log_fatal("shmctl IPC_RMDID of %d failed: %s\n",
+					    shm_id, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+#endif
+    /* write info; Protocol version, id, size, locked size */
+    sprintf( buf, "pv=1 pid=%d shmid=%d sz=%u lz=%u", (int)getpid(),
+	    shm_id, (unsigned)shm_size, shm_is_locked? (unsigned)shm_size:0 );
+    write_status_text( STATUS_SHM_INFO, buf );
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Request a string from client
+ * If bool, returns static string on true (do not free) or NULL for false
+ */
+static char *
+do_shm_get( const char *keyword, int hidden, int bool )
+{
+    size_t n;
+    byte *p;
+    char *string;
+
+    if( !shm_area )
+	BUG();
+
+    shm_area[0] = 0;  /* msb of length of control block */
+    shm_area[1] = 32; /* and lsb */
+    shm_area[2] = 1;  /* indicate that we are waiting on a reply */
+    shm_area[3] = 0;  /* clear data available flag */
+
+    write_status_text( bool? STATUS_SHM_GET_BOOL :
+		       hidden? STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN : STATUS_SHM_GET, keyword );
+
+    do {
+	pause_on_sigusr(1);
+	if( shm_area[0] || shm_area[1] != 32 || shm_area[2] != 1 )
+	    log_fatal("client modified shm control block - abort\n");
+    } while( !shm_area[3] );
+    shm_area[2] = 0; /* reset request flag */
+    p = (byte*)shm_area+32;
+    n = p[0] << 8 | p[1];
+    p += 2;
+    if( n+32+2+1 > 4095 )
+	log_fatal("client returns too large data (%u bytes)\n", (unsigned)n );
+
+    if( bool )
+	return p[0]? "" : NULL;
+
+    string = hidden? xmalloc_secure( n+1 ) : xmalloc( n+1 );
+    memcpy(string, p, n );
+    string[n] = 0; /* make sure it is a string */
+    if( hidden ) /* invalidate the memory */
+	memset( p, 0, n );
+
+    return string;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SHM_COPROCESSING */
+
+static int
+myread(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+    int rc;
+    do {
+        rc = read( fd, buf, count );
+    } while ( rc == -1 && errno == EINTR );
+    if ( !rc && count ) {
+        static int eof_emmited=0;
+        if ( eof_emmited < 3 ) {
+            *(char*)buf = CONTROL_D;
+            rc = 1;
+            eof_emmited++;
+        }
+        else { /* Ctrl-D not caught - do something reasonable */
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+            raise (SIGINT);  /* nothing to hangup under DOS */
+#else
+            raise (SIGHUP); /* no more input data */
+#endif
+        }
+    }    
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Request a string from the client over the command-fd
+ * If bool, returns static string on true (do not free) or NULL for false
+ */
+static char *
+do_get_from_fd( const char *keyword, int hidden, int bool )
+{
+    int i, len;
+    char *string;
+
+    if(statusfp!=stdout)
+      fflush(stdout);
+
+    write_status_text( bool? STATUS_GET_BOOL :
+		       hidden? STATUS_GET_HIDDEN : STATUS_GET_LINE, keyword );
+
+    for( string = NULL, i = len = 200; ; i++ ) {
+	if( i >= len-1 ) {
+	    char *save = string;
+	    len += 100;
+	    string = hidden? xmalloc_secure ( len ) : xmalloc ( len );
+	    if( save )
+		memcpy(string, save, i );
+	    else
+		i=0;
+	}
+	/* Hmmm: why not use our read_line function here */
+	if( myread( opt.command_fd, string+i, 1) != 1 || string[i] == '\n'  )
+            break;
+        else if ( string[i] == CONTROL_D ) {
+            /* found ETX - cancel the line and return a sole ETX */
+            string[0] = CONTROL_D;
+            i=1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    string[i] = 0;
+
+    write_status( STATUS_GOT_IT );
+
+    if( bool )	 /* Fixme: is this correct??? */
+	return (string[0] == 'Y' || string[0] == 'y') ? "" : NULL;
+
+    return string;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+cpr_enabled()
+{
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return 1;
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return 1;
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
+
+char *
+cpr_get_no_help( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return do_shm_get( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#endif
+    for(;;) {
+	p = tty_get( prompt );
+        return p;
+    }
+}
+
+char *
+cpr_get( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return do_shm_get( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#endif
+    for(;;) {
+	p = tty_get( prompt );
+	if( *p=='?' && !p[1] && !(keyword && !*keyword)) {
+	    xfree(p);
+	    display_online_help( keyword );
+	}
+	else
+	    return p;
+    }
+}
+
+
+char *
+cpr_get_utf8( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    char *p;
+    p = cpr_get( keyword, prompt );
+    if( p ) {
+	char *utf8 = native_to_utf8( p );
+	xfree( p );
+	p = utf8;
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+char *
+cpr_get_hidden( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    char *p;
+
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 1, 0 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return do_shm_get( keyword, 1, 0 );
+#endif
+    for(;;) {
+	p = tty_get_hidden( prompt );
+	if( *p == '?' && !p[1] ) {
+	    xfree(p);
+	    display_online_help( keyword );
+	}
+	else
+	    return p;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+cpr_kill_prompt(void)
+{
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return;
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return;
+#endif
+    tty_kill_prompt();
+    return;
+}
+
+int
+cpr_get_answer_is_yes( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    int yes;
+    char *p;
+
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return !!do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 0, 1 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return !!do_shm_get( keyword, 0, 1 );
+#endif
+    for(;;) {
+	p = tty_get( prompt );
+	trim_spaces(p); /* it is okay to do this here */
+	if( *p == '?' && !p[1] ) {
+	    xfree(p);
+	    display_online_help( keyword );
+	}
+	else {
+	    tty_kill_prompt();
+	    yes = answer_is_yes(p);
+	    xfree(p);
+	    return yes;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+int
+cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit( const char *keyword, const char *prompt )
+{
+    int yes;
+    char *p;
+
+    if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+	return !!do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 0, 1 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+    if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+	return !!do_shm_get( keyword, 0, 1 );
+#endif
+    for(;;) {
+	p = tty_get( prompt );
+	trim_spaces(p); /* it is okay to do this here */
+	if( *p == '?' && !p[1] ) {
+	    xfree(p);
+	    display_online_help( keyword );
+	}
+	else {
+	    tty_kill_prompt();
+	    yes = answer_is_yes_no_quit(p);
+	    xfree(p);
+	    return yes;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+int
+cpr_get_answer_okay_cancel (const char *keyword,
+                            const char *prompt,
+                            int def_answer)
+{
+  int yes;
+  char *answer = NULL;
+  char *p;
+
+  if( opt.command_fd != -1 )
+    answer = do_get_from_fd ( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+  else if( opt.shm_coprocess )
+    answer = do_shm_get( keyword, 0, 0 );
+#endif
+
+  if (answer)
+    {
+      yes = answer_is_okay_cancel (answer, def_answer);
+      xfree (answer);
+      return yes;
+    }
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      p = tty_get( prompt );
+      trim_spaces(p); /* it is okay to do this here */
+      if (*p == '?' && !p[1])
+        {
+          xfree(p);
+          display_online_help (keyword);
+	}
+      else
+        {
+          tty_kill_prompt();
+          yes = answer_is_okay_cancel (p, def_answer);
+          xfree(p);
+          return yes;
+	}
+    }
+}
diff --git a/g10/status.h b/g10/status.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc7271d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/status.h
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/* status.h
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+#ifndef G10_STATUS_H
+#define G10_STATUS_H
+
+#define STATUS_ENTER	 1
+#define STATUS_LEAVE	 2
+#define STATUS_ABORT	 3
+
+#define STATUS_GOODSIG	 4
+#define STATUS_BADSIG	 5
+#define STATUS_ERRSIG	 6
+
+#define STATUS_BADARMOR  7
+
+#define STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA 8
+#define STATUS_KEYEXPIRED  9
+#define STATUS_KEYREVOKED  10
+
+#define STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED 11
+#define STATUS_TRUST_NEVER     12
+#define STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL  13
+#define STATUS_TRUST_FULLY     14
+#define STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE  15
+
+#define STATUS_SHM_INFO        16
+#define STATUS_SHM_GET	       17
+#define STATUS_SHM_GET_BOOL    18
+#define STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN  19
+
+#define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE 20
+#define STATUS_VALIDSIG        21
+#define STATUS_SIG_ID	       22
+#define STATUS_ENC_TO	       23
+#define STATUS_NODATA	       24
+#define STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE  25
+#define STATUS_NO_PUBKEY       26
+#define STATUS_NO_SECKEY       27
+#define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM 28
+#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED 29
+#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY	 30
+#define STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE 31
+#define STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE	32
+#define STATUS_GOODMDC		33
+#define STATUS_BADMDC		34
+#define STATUS_ERRMDC		35
+#define STATUS_IMPORTED 	36
+#define STATUS_IMPORT_RES	37
+#define STATUS_FILE_START	38
+#define STATUS_FILE_DONE	39
+#define STATUS_FILE_ERROR	40
+
+#define STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION 41
+#define STATUS_END_DECRYPTION	42
+#define STATUS_BEGIN_ENCRYPTION 43
+#define STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION	44
+
+#define STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM	45
+#define STATUS_GET_BOOL 	46
+#define STATUS_GET_LINE 	47
+#define STATUS_GET_HIDDEN	48
+#define STATUS_GOT_IT		49
+#define STATUS_PROGRESS 	50
+#define STATUS_SIG_CREATED	51
+#define STATUS_SESSION_KEY	52
+#define STATUS_NOTATION_NAME    53
+#define STATUS_NOTATION_DATA    54
+#define STATUS_POLICY_URL       55
+#define STATUS_BEGIN_STREAM     56
+#define STATUS_END_STREAM       57
+#define STATUS_KEY_CREATED      58
+#define STATUS_USERID_HINT      59
+#define STATUS_UNEXPECTED       60
+#define STATUS_INV_RECP         61
+#define STATUS_NO_RECP          62
+#define STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED   63
+#define STATUS_SIGEXPIRED       64
+#define STATUS_EXPSIG           65
+#define STATUS_EXPKEYSIG        66
+#define STATUS_ATTRIBUTE        67
+#define STATUS_IMPORT_OK 	68
+#define STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK     69
+#define STATUS_REVKEYSIG        70
+#define STATUS_CARDCTRL         71
+#define STATUS_NEWSIG           72
+#define STATUS_PLAINTEXT        73
+#define STATUS_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH 74
+#define STATUS_KEY_NOT_CREATED  75
+#define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_PIN 76
+#define STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET    77
+
+/* Extra status codes for certain smartcard operations.  Primary
+   useful to double check that change PIN worked as expected.  */
+#define STATUS_SC_OP_FAILURE    79
+#define STATUS_SC_OP_SUCCESS    80
+
+#define STATUS_BACKUP_KEY_CREATED 81
+
+#define STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD    82
+#define STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD   83
+
+#define STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING    84
+
+
+/*-- status.c --*/
+void set_status_fd ( int fd );
+int  is_status_enabled ( void );
+void write_status ( int no );
+void write_status_text ( int no, const char *text );
+void write_status_buffer ( int no,
+                           const char *buffer, size_t len, int wrap );
+void write_status_text_and_buffer ( int no, const char *text,
+                                    const char *buffer, size_t len, int wrap );
+
+#ifdef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING
+  void init_shm_coprocessing ( ulong requested_shm_size, int lock_mem );
+#endif /*USE_SHM_COPROCESSING*/
+
+int cpr_enabled(void);
+char *cpr_get( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+char *cpr_get_no_help( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+char *cpr_get_utf8( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+char *cpr_get_hidden( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+void cpr_kill_prompt(void);
+int  cpr_get_answer_is_yes( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+int  cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit( const char *keyword, const char *prompt );
+int  cpr_get_answer_okay_cancel (const char *keyword,
+                                 const char *prompt,
+                                 int def_answer);
+
+#endif /*G10_STATUS_H*/
diff --git a/g10/tdbdump.c b/g10/tdbdump.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09ce119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/tdbdump.c
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/* tdbdump.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "tdbio.h"
+
+
+#define HEXTOBIN(x) ( (x) >= '0' && (x) <= '9' ? ((x)-'0') : \
+		      (x) >= 'A' && (x) <= 'F' ? ((x)-'A'+10) : ((x)-'a'+10))
+
+
+/****************
+ * Wirte a record but die on error
+ */
+static void
+write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
+{
+    int rc = tdbio_write_record( rec );
+    if( !rc )
+	return;
+    log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
+			    rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+    tdbio_invalid();
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Dump the entire trustdb or only the entries of one key.
+ */
+void
+list_trustdb( const char *username )
+{
+    TRUSTREC rec;
+
+    init_trustdb();
+    /* for now we ignore the user ID */
+    if (1) {
+	ulong recnum;
+	int i;
+
+	printf("TrustDB: %s\n", tdbio_get_dbname() );
+	for(i=9+strlen(tdbio_get_dbname()); i > 0; i-- )
+	    putchar('-');
+	putchar('\n');
+	for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
+	    tdbio_dump_record( &rec, stdout );
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print a list of all defined owner trust value.
+ */
+void
+export_ownertrust()
+{
+    TRUSTREC rec;
+    ulong recnum;
+    int i;
+    byte *p;
+
+    init_trustdb();
+    printf(_("# List of assigned trustvalues, created %s\n"
+	     "# (Use \"gpg --import-ownertrust\" to restore them)\n"),
+	   asctimestamp( make_timestamp() ) );
+    for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) {
+	if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST ) {
+	    if( !rec.r.trust.ownertrust )
+		continue;
+	    p = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
+	    for(i=0; i < 20; i++, p++ )
+		printf("%02X", *p );
+	    printf(":%u:\n", (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust );
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+void
+import_ownertrust( const char *fname )
+{
+    FILE *fp;
+    int is_stdin=0;
+    char line[256];
+    char *p;
+    size_t n, fprlen;
+    unsigned int otrust;
+    byte fpr[20];
+    int any = 0;
+    int rc;
+
+    init_trustdb();
+    if( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) ) {
+	fp = stdin;
+	fname = "[stdin]";
+	is_stdin = 1;
+    }
+    else if( !(fp = fopen( fname, "r" )) ) {
+	log_error ( _("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (is_secured_file (fileno (fp)))
+      {
+        fclose (fp);
+        errno = EPERM;
+	log_error (_("can't open `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	return;
+      }
+
+    while( fgets( line, DIM(line)-1, fp ) ) {
+	TRUSTREC rec;
+
+	if( !*line || *line == '#' )
+	    continue;
+	n = strlen(line);
+	if( line[n-1] != '\n' ) {
+	    log_error (_("error in `%s': %s\n"), fname, _("line too long") );
+	    /* ... or last line does not have a LF */
+	    break; /* can't continue */
+	}
+	for(p = line; *p && *p != ':' ; p++ )
+	    if( !hexdigitp(p) )
+		break;
+	if( *p != ':' ) {
+	    log_error (_("error in `%s': %s\n"), fname, _("colon missing") );
+	    continue;
+	}
+	fprlen = p - line;
+	if( fprlen != 32 && fprlen != 40 ) {
+	    log_error (_("error in `%s': %s\n"),
+                       fname, _("invalid fingerprint") );
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if( sscanf(p, ":%u:", &otrust ) != 1 ) {
+	    log_error (_("error in `%s': %s\n"),
+                       fname, _("ownertrust value missing"));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if( !otrust )
+	    continue; /* no otrust defined - no need to update or insert */
+	/* convert the ascii fingerprint to binary */
+	for(p=line, fprlen=0; fprlen < 20 && *p != ':'; p += 2 )
+	    fpr[fprlen++] = HEXTOBIN(p[0]) * 16 + HEXTOBIN(p[1]);
+	while (fprlen < 20)
+	    fpr[fprlen++] = 0;
+        
+	rc = tdbio_search_trust_byfpr (fpr, &rec);
+	if( !rc ) { /* found: update */
+	    if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != otrust)
+              {
+                if( rec.r.trust.ownertrust )
+                  log_info("changing ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
+                           rec.r.trust.ownertrust, otrust );
+                else
+                  log_info("setting ownertrust to %u\n", otrust );
+                rec.r.trust.ownertrust = otrust;
+                write_record (&rec );
+                any = 1;
+              }
+	}
+	else if( rc == -1 ) { /* not found: insert */
+            log_info("inserting ownertrust of %u\n", otrust );
+            memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+            rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+            rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+            memcpy (rec.r.trust.fingerprint, fpr, 20);
+            rec.r.trust.ownertrust = otrust;
+            write_record (&rec );
+            any = 1;
+	}
+	else /* error */
+	    log_error (_("error finding trust record in `%s': %s\n"),
+                       fname, g10_errstr(rc));
+    }
+    if( ferror(fp) )
+	log_error ( _("read error in `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+    if( !is_stdin )
+	fclose(fp);
+    
+    if (any)
+      {
+        revalidation_mark ();
+        rc = tdbio_sync ();
+        if (rc)
+          log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+      }
+    
+}
+
+
diff --git a/g10/tdbio.c b/g10/tdbio.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbd569d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/tdbio.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1633 @@
+/* tdbio.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "tdbio.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)
+#define ftruncate chsize
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define MY_O_BINARY  O_BINARY
+#else
+#define MY_O_BINARY  0
+#endif
+
+
+/****************
+ * Yes, this is a very simple implementation. We should really
+ * use a page aligned buffer and read complete pages.
+ * To implement a simple trannsaction system, this is sufficient.
+ */
+typedef struct cache_ctrl_struct *CACHE_CTRL;
+struct cache_ctrl_struct {
+    CACHE_CTRL next;
+    struct {
+	unsigned used:1;
+	unsigned dirty:1;
+    } flags;
+    ulong recno;
+    char data[TRUST_RECORD_LEN];
+};
+
+#define MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_SOFT	200    /* may be increased while in a */
+#define MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_HARD	10000  /* transaction to this one */
+static CACHE_CTRL cache_list;
+static int cache_entries;
+static int cache_is_dirty;
+
+/* a type used to pass infomation to cmp_krec_fpr */
+struct cmp_krec_fpr_struct {
+    int pubkey_algo;
+    const char *fpr;
+    int fprlen;
+};
+
+/* a type used to pass infomation to cmp_[s]dir */
+struct cmp_xdir_struct {
+    int pubkey_algo;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+};
+
+
+static char *db_name;
+static DOTLOCK lockhandle;
+static int is_locked;
+static int  db_fd = -1;
+static int in_transaction;
+
+static void open_db(void);
+static void migrate_from_v2 (void);
+
+
+
+/*************************************
+ ************* record cache **********
+ *************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * Get the data from therecord cache and return a
+ * pointer into that cache.  Caller should copy
+ * the return data.  NULL is returned on a cache miss.
+ */
+static const char *
+get_record_from_cache( ulong recno )
+{
+    CACHE_CTRL r;
+
+    for( r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	if( r->flags.used && r->recno == recno )
+	    return r->data;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+write_cache_item( CACHE_CTRL r )
+{
+    int n;
+
+    if( lseek( db_fd, r->recno * TRUST_RECORD_LEN, SEEK_SET ) == -1 ) {
+	log_error(_("trustdb rec %lu: lseek failed: %s\n"),
+					    r->recno, strerror(errno) );
+	return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+    }
+    n = write( db_fd, r->data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN);
+    if( n != TRUST_RECORD_LEN ) {
+	log_error(_("trustdb rec %lu: write failed (n=%d): %s\n"),
+					    r->recno, n, strerror(errno) );
+	return G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+    }
+    r->flags.dirty = 0;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Put data into the cache.  This function may flush the
+ * some cache entries if there is not enough space available.
+ */
+int
+put_record_into_cache( ulong recno, const char *data )
+{
+    CACHE_CTRL r, unused;
+    int dirty_count = 0;
+    int clean_count = 0;
+
+    /* see whether we already cached this one */
+    for( unused = NULL, r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	if( !r->flags.used ) {
+	    if( !unused )
+		unused = r;
+	}
+	else if( r->recno == recno ) {
+	    if( !r->flags.dirty ) {
+		/* Hmmm: should we use a a copy and compare? */
+		if( memcmp(r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN ) ) {
+		    r->flags.dirty = 1;
+		    cache_is_dirty = 1;
+		}
+	    }
+	    memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	    return 0;
+	}
+	if( r->flags.used ) {
+	    if( r->flags.dirty )
+		dirty_count++;
+	    else
+		clean_count++;
+	}
+    }
+    /* not in the cache: add a new entry */
+    if( unused ) { /* reuse this entry */
+	r = unused;
+	r->flags.used = 1;
+	r->recno = recno;
+	memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	r->flags.dirty = 1;
+	cache_is_dirty = 1;
+	cache_entries++;
+	return 0;
+    }
+    /* see whether we reached the limit */
+    if( cache_entries < MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_SOFT ) { /* no */
+	r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+	r->flags.used = 1;
+	r->recno = recno;
+	memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	r->flags.dirty = 1;
+	r->next = cache_list;
+	cache_list = r;
+	cache_is_dirty = 1;
+	cache_entries++;
+	return 0;
+    }
+    /* cache is full: discard some clean entries */
+    if( clean_count ) {
+	int n = clean_count / 3; /* discard a third of the clean entries */
+	if( !n )
+	    n = 1;
+	for( unused = NULL, r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	    if( r->flags.used && !r->flags.dirty ) {
+		if( !unused )
+		    unused = r;
+		r->flags.used = 0;
+		cache_entries--;
+		if( !--n )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	assert( unused );
+	r = unused;
+	r->flags.used = 1;
+	r->recno = recno;
+	memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	r->flags.dirty = 1;
+	cache_is_dirty = 1;
+	cache_entries++;
+	return 0;
+    }
+    /* no clean entries: have to flush some dirty entries */
+    if( in_transaction ) {
+	/* but we can't do this while in a transaction
+	 * we increase the cache size instead */
+	if( cache_entries < MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES_HARD ) { /* no */
+	    if( opt.debug && !(cache_entries % 100) )
+		log_debug("increasing tdbio cache size\n");
+	    r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
+	    r->flags.used = 1;
+	    r->recno = recno;
+	    memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	    r->flags.dirty = 1;
+	    r->next = cache_list;
+	    cache_list = r;
+	    cache_is_dirty = 1;
+	    cache_entries++;
+	    return 0;
+	}
+	log_info(_("trustdb transaction too large\n"));
+	return G10ERR_RESOURCE_LIMIT;
+    }
+    if( dirty_count ) {
+	int n = dirty_count / 5; /* discard some dirty entries */
+	if( !n )
+	    n = 1;
+	if( !is_locked ) {
+	    if( make_dotlock( lockhandle, -1 ) )
+		log_fatal("can't acquire lock - giving up\n");
+	    else
+		is_locked = 1;
+	}
+	for( unused = NULL, r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	    if( r->flags.used && r->flags.dirty ) {
+		int rc = write_cache_item( r );
+		if( rc )
+		    return rc;
+		if( !unused )
+		    unused = r;
+		r->flags.used = 0;
+		cache_entries--;
+		if( !--n )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !opt.lock_once ) {
+	    if( !release_dotlock( lockhandle ) )
+		is_locked = 0;
+	}
+	assert( unused );
+	r = unused;
+	r->flags.used = 1;
+	r->recno = recno;
+	memcpy( r->data, data, TRUST_RECORD_LEN );
+	r->flags.dirty = 1;
+	cache_is_dirty = 1;
+	cache_entries++;
+	return 0;
+    }
+    BUG();
+}
+
+
+int
+tdbio_is_dirty()
+{
+    return cache_is_dirty;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Flush the cache.  This cannot be used while in a transaction.
+ */
+int
+tdbio_sync()
+{
+    CACHE_CTRL r;
+    int did_lock = 0;
+
+    if( db_fd == -1 )
+	open_db();
+    if( in_transaction )
+	log_bug("tdbio: syncing while in transaction\n");
+
+    if( !cache_is_dirty )
+	return 0;
+
+    if( !is_locked ) {
+	if( make_dotlock( lockhandle, -1 ) )
+	    log_fatal("can't acquire lock - giving up\n");
+	else
+	    is_locked = 1;
+	did_lock = 1;
+    }
+    for( r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	if( r->flags.used && r->flags.dirty ) {
+	    int rc = write_cache_item( r );
+	    if( rc )
+		return rc;
+	}
+    }
+    cache_is_dirty = 0;
+    if( did_lock && !opt.lock_once ) {
+	if( !release_dotlock( lockhandle ) )
+	    is_locked = 0;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* The transaction code is disabled in the 1.2.x branch, as it is not
+   yet used.  It will be enabled in 1.3.x. */
+
+/****************
+ * Simple transactions system:
+ * Everything between begin_transaction and end/cancel_transaction
+ * is not immediatly written but at the time of end_transaction.
+ *
+ */
+int
+tdbio_begin_transaction()
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( in_transaction )
+	log_bug("tdbio: nested transactions\n");
+    /* flush everything out */
+    rc = tdbio_sync();
+    if( rc )
+	return rc;
+    in_transaction = 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+tdbio_end_transaction()
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( !in_transaction )
+	log_bug("tdbio: no active transaction\n");
+    if( !is_locked ) {
+	if( make_dotlock( lockhandle, -1 ) )
+	    log_fatal("can't acquire lock - giving up\n");
+	else
+	    is_locked = 1;
+    }
+    block_all_signals();
+    in_transaction = 0;
+    rc = tdbio_sync();
+    unblock_all_signals();
+    if( !opt.lock_once ) {
+	if( !release_dotlock( lockhandle ) )
+	    is_locked = 0;
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+tdbio_cancel_transaction()
+{
+    CACHE_CTRL r;
+
+    if( !in_transaction )
+	log_bug("tdbio: no active transaction\n");
+
+    /* remove all dirty marked entries, so that the original ones
+     * are read back the next time */
+    if( cache_is_dirty ) {
+	for( r = cache_list; r; r = r->next ) {
+	    if( r->flags.used && r->flags.dirty ) {
+		r->flags.used = 0;
+		cache_entries--;
+	    }
+	}
+	cache_is_dirty = 0;
+    }
+
+    in_transaction = 0;
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/********************************************************
+ **************** cached I/O functions ******************
+ ********************************************************/
+
+static void
+cleanup(void)
+{
+    if( is_locked ) {
+	if( !release_dotlock(lockhandle) )
+	    is_locked = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Caller must sync */
+int
+tdbio_update_version_record (void)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+
+  memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+
+  rc=tdbio_read_record( 0, &rec, RECTYPE_VER);
+  if(rc==0)
+    {
+      rec.r.ver.created     = make_timestamp();
+      rec.r.ver.marginals   = opt.marginals_needed;
+      rec.r.ver.completes   = opt.completes_needed;
+      rec.r.ver.cert_depth  = opt.max_cert_depth;
+      rec.r.ver.trust_model = opt.trust_model;
+      rc=tdbio_write_record(&rec);
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+create_version_record (void)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+  rec.r.ver.version     = 3;
+  rec.r.ver.created     = make_timestamp();
+  rec.r.ver.marginals   = opt.marginals_needed;
+  rec.r.ver.completes   = opt.completes_needed;
+  rec.r.ver.cert_depth  = opt.max_cert_depth;
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+    rec.r.ver.trust_model = opt.trust_model;
+  else
+    rec.r.ver.trust_model = TM_PGP;
+  rec.rectype = RECTYPE_VER;
+  rec.recnum = 0;
+  rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+  if( !rc )
+    tdbio_sync();
+  return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+tdbio_set_dbname( const char *new_dbname, int create )
+{
+    char *fname;
+    static int initialized = 0;
+
+    if( !initialized ) {
+	atexit( cleanup );
+	initialized = 1;
+    }
+
+    if(new_dbname==NULL)
+      fname=make_filename(opt.homedir,"trustdb" EXTSEP_S "gpg", NULL);
+    else if (*new_dbname != DIRSEP_C )
+      {
+	if (strchr(new_dbname, DIRSEP_C) )
+	  fname = make_filename (new_dbname, NULL);
+	else
+	  fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, new_dbname, NULL);
+      }
+    else
+      fname = xstrdup (new_dbname);
+
+    if( access( fname, R_OK ) ) {
+	if( errno != ENOENT ) {
+	    log_error( _("can't access `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	    xfree(fname);
+	    return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	if( create ) {
+	    FILE *fp;
+	    TRUSTREC rec;
+	    int rc;
+	    char *p = strrchr( fname, DIRSEP_C );
+	    mode_t oldmask;
+
+	    assert(p);
+	    *p = 0;
+	    if( access( fname, F_OK ) ) {
+		try_make_homedir( fname );
+		log_fatal( _("%s: directory does not exist!\n"), fname );
+	    }
+	    *p = DIRSEP_C;
+
+	    xfree(db_name);
+	    db_name = fname;
+#ifdef __riscos__
+	    if( !lockhandle )
+		lockhandle = create_dotlock( db_name );
+	    if( !lockhandle )
+		log_fatal( _("can't create lock for `%s'\n"), db_name );
+            if( make_dotlock( lockhandle, -1 ) )
+                log_fatal( _("can't lock `%s'\n"), db_name );
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+	    oldmask=umask(077);
+            if (is_secured_filename (fname)) {
+                fp = NULL;
+                errno = EPERM;
+            }
+            else
+                fp =fopen( fname, "wb" );
+	    umask(oldmask);
+	    if( !fp )
+		log_fatal( _("can't create `%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
+	    fclose(fp);
+	    db_fd = open( db_name, O_RDWR | MY_O_BINARY );
+	    if( db_fd == -1 )
+		log_fatal( _("can't open `%s': %s\n"), db_name, strerror(errno) );
+
+#ifndef __riscos__
+	    if( !lockhandle )
+		lockhandle = create_dotlock( db_name );
+	    if( !lockhandle )
+		log_fatal( _("can't create lock for `%s'\n"), db_name );
+#endif /* !__riscos__ */
+
+            rc = create_version_record ();
+	    if( rc )
+		log_fatal( _("%s: failed to create version record: %s"),
+						   fname, g10_errstr(rc));
+	    /* and read again to check that we are okay */
+	    if( tdbio_read_record( 0, &rec, RECTYPE_VER ) )
+		log_fatal( _("%s: invalid trustdb created\n"), db_name );
+
+	    if( !opt.quiet )
+		log_info(_("%s: trustdb created\n"), db_name);
+
+	    return 0;
+	}
+    }
+    xfree(db_name);
+    db_name = fname;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+const char *
+tdbio_get_dbname()
+{
+    return db_name;
+}
+
+
+
+static void
+open_db()
+{
+  byte buf[10];
+  int n;
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+
+  assert( db_fd == -1 );
+
+  if (!lockhandle )
+    lockhandle = create_dotlock( db_name );
+  if (!lockhandle )
+    log_fatal( _("can't create lock for `%s'\n"), db_name );
+#ifdef __riscos__
+  if (make_dotlock( lockhandle, -1 ) )
+    log_fatal( _("can't lock `%s'\n"), db_name );
+#endif /* __riscos__ */
+  db_fd = open (db_name, O_RDWR | MY_O_BINARY );
+  if (db_fd == -1 && (errno == EACCES
+#ifdef EROFS
+                      || errno == EROFS)
+#endif
+      ) {
+      db_fd = open (db_name, O_RDONLY | MY_O_BINARY );
+      if (db_fd != -1)
+          log_info (_("NOTE: trustdb not writable\n"));
+  }
+  if ( db_fd == -1 )
+    log_fatal( _("can't open `%s': %s\n"), db_name, strerror(errno) );
+  register_secured_file (db_name);
+
+  /* check whether we need to do a version migration */
+  do
+    n = read (db_fd, buf, 5);
+  while (n==-1 && errno == EINTR);
+  if (n == 5 && !memcmp (buf, "\x01gpg\x02", 5))
+    {
+      migrate_from_v2 ();
+    }
+  
+  /* read the version record */
+  if (tdbio_read_record (0, &rec, RECTYPE_VER ) )
+    log_fatal( _("%s: invalid trustdb\n"), db_name );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Make a hashtable: type 0 = trust hash
+ */
+static void
+create_hashtable( TRUSTREC *vr, int type )
+{
+    TRUSTREC rec;
+    off_t offset;
+    ulong recnum;
+    int i, n, rc;
+
+    offset = lseek( db_fd, 0, SEEK_END );
+    if( offset == -1 )
+	log_fatal("trustdb: lseek to end failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
+    recnum = offset / TRUST_RECORD_LEN;
+    assert(recnum); /* this is will never be the first record */
+
+    if( !type )
+	vr->r.ver.trusthashtbl = recnum;
+
+    /* Now write the records */
+    n = (256+ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD-1) / ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD;
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++, recnum++ ) {
+	 memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+	 rec.rectype = RECTYPE_HTBL;
+	 rec.recnum = recnum;
+	 rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+	 if( rc )
+	     log_fatal( _("%s: failed to create hashtable: %s\n"),
+					db_name, g10_errstr(rc));
+    }
+    /* update the version record */
+    rc = tdbio_write_record( vr );
+    if( !rc )
+	rc = tdbio_sync();
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error updating version record: %s\n"),
+						  db_name, g10_errstr(rc));
+}
+
+
+int
+tdbio_db_matches_options()
+{
+  static int yes_no = -1;
+
+  if( yes_no == -1 )
+    {
+      TRUSTREC vr;
+      int rc;
+
+      rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+      if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+		   db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+
+      yes_no = vr.r.ver.marginals == opt.marginals_needed
+	&& vr.r.ver.completes == opt.completes_needed
+	&& vr.r.ver.cert_depth == opt.max_cert_depth
+	&& vr.r.ver.trust_model == opt.trust_model;
+    }
+
+  return yes_no;
+}
+
+byte
+tdbio_read_model(void)
+{
+  TRUSTREC vr;
+  int rc;
+ 
+  rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+  if( rc )
+    log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+	       db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+  return vr.r.ver.trust_model;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Return the nextstamp value.
+ */
+ulong
+tdbio_read_nextcheck ()
+{
+    TRUSTREC vr;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+						    db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+    return vr.r.ver.nextcheck;
+}
+
+/* Return true when the stamp was actually changed. */
+int
+tdbio_write_nextcheck (ulong stamp)
+{
+    TRUSTREC vr;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+				       db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+
+    if (vr.r.ver.nextcheck == stamp)
+      return 0;
+
+    vr.r.ver.nextcheck = stamp;
+    rc = tdbio_write_record( &vr );
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error writing version record: %s\n"),
+				       db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return the record number of the trusthash tbl or create a new one.
+ */
+static ulong
+get_trusthashrec(void)
+{
+    static ulong trusthashtbl; /* record number of the trust hashtable */
+
+    if( !trusthashtbl ) {
+	TRUSTREC vr;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+					    db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	if( !vr.r.ver.trusthashtbl )
+	    create_hashtable( &vr, 0 );
+
+	trusthashtbl = vr.r.ver.trusthashtbl;
+    }
+    return trusthashtbl;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Update a hashtable.
+ * table gives the start of the table, key and keylen is the key,
+ * newrecnum is the record number to insert.
+ */
+static int
+upd_hashtable( ulong table, byte *key, int keylen, ulong newrecnum )
+{
+    TRUSTREC lastrec, rec;
+    ulong hashrec, item;
+    int msb;
+    int level=0;
+    int rc, i;
+
+    hashrec = table;
+  next_level:
+    msb = key[level];
+    hashrec += msb / ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD;
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( hashrec, &rec, RECTYPE_HTBL );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("upd_hashtable: read failed: %s\n",	g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    item = rec.r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD];
+    if( !item ) { /* insert a new item into the hash table */
+	rec.r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD] = newrecnum;
+	rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error("upd_hashtable: write htbl failed: %s\n",
+							    g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc;
+	}
+    }
+    else if( item != newrecnum ) {  /* must do an update */
+	lastrec = rec;
+	rc = tdbio_read_record( item, &rec, 0 );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error( "upd_hashtable: read item failed: %s\n",
+							    g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc;
+	}
+
+	if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_HTBL ) {
+	    hashrec = item;
+	    level++;
+	    if( level >= keylen ) {
+		log_error( "hashtable has invalid indirections.\n");
+		return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	    }
+	    goto next_level;
+	}
+	else if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_HLST ) { /* extend list */
+	    /* see whether the key is already in this list */
+	    for(;;) {
+		for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+		    if( rec.r.hlst.rnum[i] == newrecnum ) {
+			return 0; /* okay, already in the list */
+		    }
+		}
+		if( rec.r.hlst.next ) {
+		    rc = tdbio_read_record( rec.r.hlst.next,
+						       &rec, RECTYPE_HLST);
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error( "upd_hashtable: read hlst failed: %s\n",
+							     g10_errstr(rc) );
+			return rc;
+		    }
+		}
+		else
+		    break; /* not there */
+	    }
+	    /* find the next free entry and put it in */
+	    for(;;) {
+		for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+		    if( !rec.r.hlst.rnum[i] ) {
+			rec.r.hlst.rnum[i] = newrecnum;
+			rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+			if( rc )
+			    log_error( "upd_hashtable: write hlst failed: %s\n",
+							      g10_errstr(rc) );
+			return rc; /* done */
+		    }
+		}
+		if( rec.r.hlst.next ) {
+		    rc = tdbio_read_record( rec.r.hlst.next,
+						      &rec, RECTYPE_HLST );
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error( "upd_hashtable: read hlst failed: %s\n",
+							     g10_errstr(rc) );
+			return rc;
+		    }
+		}
+		else { /* add a new list record */
+		    rec.r.hlst.next = item = tdbio_new_recnum();
+		    rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error( "upd_hashtable: write hlst failed: %s\n",
+							  g10_errstr(rc) );
+			return rc;
+		    }
+		    memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+		    rec.rectype = RECTYPE_HLST;
+		    rec.recnum = item;
+		    rec.r.hlst.rnum[0] = newrecnum;
+		    rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+		    if( rc )
+			log_error( "upd_hashtable: write ext hlst failed: %s\n",
+							  g10_errstr(rc) );
+		    return rc; /* done */
+		}
+	    } /* end loop over hlst slots */
+	}
+	else if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST ) { /* insert a list record */
+	    if( rec.recnum == newrecnum ) {
+		return 0;
+	    }
+	    item = rec.recnum; /* save number of key record */
+	    memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+	    rec.rectype = RECTYPE_HLST;
+	    rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
+	    rec.r.hlst.rnum[0] = item;	     /* old keyrecord */
+	    rec.r.hlst.rnum[1] = newrecnum; /* and new one */
+	    rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error( "upd_hashtable: write new hlst failed: %s\n",
+						  g10_errstr(rc) );
+		return rc;
+	    }
+	    /* update the hashtable record */
+	    lastrec.r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD] = rec.recnum;
+	    rc = tdbio_write_record( &lastrec );
+	    if( rc )
+		log_error( "upd_hashtable: update htbl failed: %s\n",
+							     g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc; /* ready */
+	}
+	else {
+	    log_error( "hashtbl %lu: %lu/%d points to an invalid record %lu\n",
+		       table, hashrec, (msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD), item);
+	    list_trustdb(NULL);
+	    return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Drop an entry from a hashtable
+ * table gives the start of the table, key and keylen is the key,
+ */
+static int
+drop_from_hashtable( ulong table, byte *key, int keylen, ulong recnum )
+{
+    TRUSTREC rec;
+    ulong hashrec, item;
+    int msb;
+    int level=0;
+    int rc, i;
+
+    hashrec = table;
+  next_level:
+    msb = key[level];
+    hashrec += msb / ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD;
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( hashrec, &rec, RECTYPE_HTBL );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("drop_from_hashtable: read failed: %s\n",
+							g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    item = rec.r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD];
+    if( !item )  /* not found - forget about it  */
+	return 0;
+
+    if( item == recnum ) {  /* tables points direct to the record */
+	rec.r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD] = 0;
+	rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_error("drop_from_hashtable: write htbl failed: %s\n",
+							    g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( item, &rec, 0 );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error( "drop_from_hashtable: read item failed: %s\n",
+							g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_HTBL ) {
+	hashrec = item;
+	level++;
+	if( level >= keylen ) {
+	    log_error( "hashtable has invalid indirections.\n");
+	    return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	goto next_level;
+    }
+
+    if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_HLST ) {
+	for(;;) {
+	    for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+		if( rec.r.hlst.rnum[i] == recnum ) {
+		    rec.r.hlst.rnum[i] = 0; /* drop */
+		    rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+		    if( rc )
+			log_error("drop_from_hashtable: write htbl failed: %s\n",
+									g10_errstr(rc) );
+		    return rc;
+		}
+	    }
+	    if( rec.r.hlst.next ) {
+		rc = tdbio_read_record( rec.r.hlst.next,
+						   &rec, RECTYPE_HLST);
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error( "drop_from_hashtable: read hlst failed: %s\n",
+							 g10_errstr(rc) );
+		    return rc;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+		return 0; /* key not in table */
+	}
+    }
+
+    log_error( "hashtbl %lu: %lu/%d points to wrong record %lu\n",
+		    table, hashrec, (msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD), item);
+    return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Lookup a record via the hashtable tablewith key/keylen and return the
+ * result in rec.  cmp() should return if the record is the desired one.
+ * Returns -1 if not found, 0 if found or another errocode
+ */
+static int
+lookup_hashtable( ulong table, const byte *key, size_t keylen,
+		  int (*cmpfnc)(void*, const TRUSTREC *), void *cmpdata,
+						TRUSTREC *rec )
+{
+    int rc;
+    ulong hashrec, item;
+    int msb;
+    int level=0;
+
+    hashrec = table;
+  next_level:
+    msb = key[level];
+    hashrec += msb / ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD;
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( hashrec, rec, RECTYPE_HTBL );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error("lookup_hashtable failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+
+    item = rec->r.htbl.item[msb % ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD];
+    if( !item )
+	return -1; /* not found */
+
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( item, rec, 0 );
+    if( rc ) {
+	log_error( "hashtable read failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	return rc;
+    }
+    if( rec->rectype == RECTYPE_HTBL ) {
+	hashrec = item;
+	level++;
+	if( level >= keylen ) {
+	    log_error("hashtable has invalid indirections\n");
+	    return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	goto next_level;
+    }
+    else if( rec->rectype == RECTYPE_HLST ) {
+	for(;;) {
+	    int i;
+
+	    for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+		if( rec->r.hlst.rnum[i] ) {
+		    TRUSTREC tmp;
+
+		    rc = tdbio_read_record( rec->r.hlst.rnum[i], &tmp, 0 );
+		    if( rc ) {
+			log_error( "lookup_hashtable: read item failed: %s\n",
+							      g10_errstr(rc) );
+			return rc;
+		    }
+		    if( (*cmpfnc)( cmpdata, &tmp ) ) {
+			*rec = tmp;
+			return 0;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    if( rec->r.hlst.next ) {
+		rc = tdbio_read_record( rec->r.hlst.next, rec, RECTYPE_HLST );
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error( "lookup_hashtable: read hlst failed: %s\n",
+							 g10_errstr(rc) );
+		    return rc;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+		return -1; /* not found */
+	}
+    }
+
+
+    if( (*cmpfnc)( cmpdata, rec ) )
+	return 0; /* really found */
+
+    return -1; /* no: not found */
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Update the trust hashtbl or create the table if it does not exist
+ */
+static int
+update_trusthashtbl( TRUSTREC *tr )
+{
+    return upd_hashtable( get_trusthashrec(),
+			  tr->r.trust.fingerprint, 20, tr->recnum );
+}
+
+
+
+void
+tdbio_dump_record( TRUSTREC *rec, FILE *fp  )
+{
+    int i;
+    ulong rnum = rec->recnum;
+
+    fprintf(fp, "rec %5lu, ", rnum );
+
+    switch( rec->rectype ) {
+      case 0: fprintf(fp, "blank\n");
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_VER: fprintf(fp,
+	    "version, td=%lu, f=%lu, m/c/d=%d/%d/%d tm=%d nc=%lu (%s)\n",
+                                   rec->r.ver.trusthashtbl,
+				   rec->r.ver.firstfree,
+				   rec->r.ver.marginals,
+				   rec->r.ver.completes,
+				   rec->r.ver.cert_depth,
+				   rec->r.ver.trust_model,
+                                   rec->r.ver.nextcheck,
+				   strtimestamp(rec->r.ver.nextcheck)
+                                 );
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_FREE: fprintf(fp, "free, next=%lu\n", rec->r.free.next );
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_HTBL:
+	fprintf(fp, "htbl,");
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD; i++ )
+	    fprintf(fp, " %lu", rec->r.htbl.item[i] );
+	putc('\n', fp);
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_HLST:
+	fprintf(fp, "hlst, next=%lu,", rec->r.hlst.next );
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ )
+	    fprintf(fp, " %lu", rec->r.hlst.rnum[i] );
+	putc('\n', fp);
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_TRUST:
+	fprintf(fp, "trust ");
+	for(i=0; i < 20; i++ )
+	    fprintf(fp, "%02X", rec->r.trust.fingerprint[i] );
+        fprintf (fp, ", ot=%d, d=%d, vl=%lu\n", rec->r.trust.ownertrust,
+                 rec->r.trust.depth, rec->r.trust.validlist);
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_VALID:
+	fprintf(fp, "valid ");
+	for(i=0; i < 20; i++ )
+	    fprintf(fp, "%02X", rec->r.valid.namehash[i] );
+        fprintf (fp, ", v=%d, next=%lu\n", rec->r.valid.validity,
+                 rec->r.valid.next);
+	break;
+      default:
+	fprintf(fp, "unknown type %d\n", rec->rectype );
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * read the record with number recnum
+ * returns: -1 on error, 0 on success
+ */
+int
+tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
+{
+    byte readbuf[TRUST_RECORD_LEN];
+    const byte *buf, *p;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( db_fd == -1 )
+	open_db();
+    buf = get_record_from_cache( recnum );
+    if( !buf ) {
+	if( lseek( db_fd, recnum * TRUST_RECORD_LEN, SEEK_SET ) == -1 ) {
+	    log_error(_("trustdb: lseek failed: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
+	    return G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	}
+	n = read( db_fd, readbuf, TRUST_RECORD_LEN);
+	if( !n ) {
+	    return -1; /* eof */
+	}
+	else if( n != TRUST_RECORD_LEN ) {
+	    log_error(_("trustdb: read failed (n=%d): %s\n"), n,
+							strerror(errno) );
+	    return G10ERR_READ_FILE;
+	}
+	buf = readbuf;
+    }
+    rec->recnum = recnum;
+    rec->dirty = 0;
+    p = buf;
+    rec->rectype = *p++;
+    if( expected && rec->rectype != expected ) {
+	log_error("%lu: read expected rec type %d, got %d\n",
+		    recnum, expected, rec->rectype );
+	return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+    }
+    p++;    /* skip reserved byte */
+    switch( rec->rectype ) {
+      case 0:  /* unused (free) record */
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_VER: /* version record */
+	if( memcmp(buf+1, "gpg", 3 ) ) {
+	    log_error( _("%s: not a trustdb file\n"), db_name );
+	    rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	p += 2; /* skip "gpg" */
+	rec->r.ver.version  = *p++;
+	rec->r.ver.marginals = *p++;
+	rec->r.ver.completes = *p++;
+	rec->r.ver.cert_depth = *p++;
+	rec->r.ver.trust_model = *p++;
+	p += 3;
+	rec->r.ver.created  = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	rec->r.ver.nextcheck = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	rec->r.ver.firstfree =buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	rec->r.ver.trusthashtbl =buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	if( recnum ) {
+	    log_error( _("%s: version record with recnum %lu\n"), db_name,
+							     (ulong)recnum );
+	    rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	else if( rec->r.ver.version != 3 ) {
+	    log_error( _("%s: invalid file version %d\n"), db_name,
+							rec->r.ver.version );
+	    rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	}
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_FREE:
+	rec->r.free.next  = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_HTBL:
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD; i++ ) {
+	    rec->r.htbl.item[i] = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	}
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_HLST:
+	rec->r.hlst.next = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+	    rec->r.hlst.rnum[i] = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	}
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_TRUST:
+	memcpy( rec->r.trust.fingerprint, p, 20); p+=20;
+        rec->r.trust.ownertrust = *p++;
+        rec->r.trust.depth = *p++;
+        rec->r.trust.min_ownertrust = *p++;
+        p++;
+	rec->r.trust.validlist = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_VALID:
+	memcpy( rec->r.valid.namehash, p, 20); p+=20;
+        rec->r.valid.validity = *p++;
+	rec->r.valid.next = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
+	rec->r.valid.full_count = *p++;
+	rec->r.valid.marginal_count = *p++;
+	break;
+      default:
+	log_error( "%s: invalid record type %d at recnum %lu\n",
+				   db_name, rec->rectype, (ulong)recnum );
+	rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
+	break;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Write the record at RECNUM
+ */
+int
+tdbio_write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
+{
+    byte buf[TRUST_RECORD_LEN], *p;
+    int rc = 0;
+    int i;
+    ulong recnum = rec->recnum;
+
+    if( db_fd == -1 )
+	open_db();
+
+    memset(buf, 0, TRUST_RECORD_LEN);
+    p = buf;
+    *p++ = rec->rectype; p++;
+    switch( rec->rectype ) {
+      case 0:  /* unused record */
+	break;
+      case RECTYPE_VER: /* version record */
+	if( recnum )
+	    BUG();
+	memcpy(p-1, "gpg", 3 ); p += 2;
+	*p++ = rec->r.ver.version;
+	*p++ = rec->r.ver.marginals;
+	*p++ = rec->r.ver.completes;
+	*p++ = rec->r.ver.cert_depth;
+	*p++ = rec->r.ver.trust_model;
+	p += 3;
+	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.ver.created); p += 4;
+	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.ver.nextcheck); p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.ver.firstfree ); p += 4;
+	p += 4;
+	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.ver.trusthashtbl ); p += 4;
+	break;
+
+      case RECTYPE_FREE:
+	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.free.next); p += 4;
+	break;
+
+
+      case RECTYPE_HTBL:
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD; i++ ) {
+	    ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.htbl.item[i]); p += 4;
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case RECTYPE_HLST:
+	ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.hlst.next); p += 4;
+	for(i=0; i < ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD; i++ ) {
+	    ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.hlst.rnum[i]); p += 4;
+	}
+	break;
+
+      case RECTYPE_TRUST:
+	memcpy( p, rec->r.trust.fingerprint, 20); p += 20;
+	*p++ = rec->r.trust.ownertrust;
+	*p++ = rec->r.trust.depth;
+	*p++ = rec->r.trust.min_ownertrust;
+        p++;
+	ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.trust.validlist); p += 4;
+	break;
+
+      case RECTYPE_VALID:
+	memcpy( p, rec->r.valid.namehash, 20); p += 20;
+	*p++ = rec->r.valid.validity;
+	ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.valid.next); p += 4;
+	*p++ = rec->r.valid.full_count;
+	*p++ = rec->r.valid.marginal_count;
+	break;
+
+      default:
+	BUG();
+    }
+
+    rc = put_record_into_cache( recnum, buf );
+    if( rc )
+	;
+    else if( rec->rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST )
+	rc = update_trusthashtbl( rec );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+tdbio_delete_record( ulong recnum )
+{
+    TRUSTREC vr, rec;
+    int rc;
+
+    /* Must read the record fist, so we can drop it from the hash tables */
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0 );
+    if( rc )
+	;
+    else if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST ) {
+         rc = drop_from_hashtable( get_trusthashrec(),
+				   rec.r.trust.fingerprint, 20, rec.recnum );
+    }
+
+    if( rc )
+	return rc;
+
+    /* now we can chnage it to a free record */
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+				       db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+
+    rec.recnum = recnum;
+    rec.rectype = RECTYPE_FREE;
+    rec.r.free.next = vr.r.ver.firstfree;
+    vr.r.ver.firstfree = recnum;
+    rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+    if( !rc )
+	rc = tdbio_write_record( &vr );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * create a new record and return its record number
+ */
+ulong
+tdbio_new_recnum()
+{
+    off_t offset;
+    ulong recnum;
+    TRUSTREC vr, rec;
+    int rc;
+
+    /* look for unused records */
+    rc = tdbio_read_record( 0, &vr, RECTYPE_VER );
+    if( rc )
+	log_fatal( _("%s: error reading version record: %s\n"),
+					     db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+    if( vr.r.ver.firstfree ) {
+	recnum = vr.r.ver.firstfree;
+	rc = tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, RECTYPE_FREE );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error( _("%s: error reading free record: %s\n"),
+						  db_name,  g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc;
+	}
+	/* update dir record */
+	vr.r.ver.firstfree = rec.r.free.next;
+	rc = tdbio_write_record( &vr );
+	if( rc ) {
+	    log_error( _("%s: error writing dir record: %s\n"),
+						     db_name, g10_errstr(rc) );
+	    return rc;
+	}
+	/*zero out the new record */
+	memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+	rec.rectype = 0; /* unused record */
+	rec.recnum = recnum;
+	rc = tdbio_write_record( &rec );
+	if( rc )
+	    log_fatal(_("%s: failed to zero a record: %s\n"),
+				       db_name, g10_errstr(rc));
+    }
+    else { /* not found, append a new record */
+	offset = lseek( db_fd, 0, SEEK_END );
+	if( offset == -1 )
+	    log_fatal("trustdb: lseek to end failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
+	recnum = offset / TRUST_RECORD_LEN;
+	assert(recnum); /* this is will never be the first record */
+	/* we must write a record, so that the next call to this function
+	 * returns another recnum */
+	memset( &rec, 0, sizeof rec );
+	rec.rectype = 0; /* unused record */
+	rec.recnum = recnum;
+	rc = 0;
+	if( lseek( db_fd, recnum * TRUST_RECORD_LEN, SEEK_SET ) == -1 ) {
+	    log_error(_("trustdb rec %lu: lseek failed: %s\n"),
+						recnum, strerror(errno) );
+	    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	}
+	else {
+	    int n = write( db_fd, &rec, TRUST_RECORD_LEN);
+	    if( n != TRUST_RECORD_LEN ) {
+		log_error(_("trustdb rec %lu: write failed (n=%d): %s\n"),
+						 recnum, n, strerror(errno) );
+		rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if( rc )
+	    log_fatal(_("%s: failed to append a record: %s\n"),
+				    db_name,	g10_errstr(rc));
+    }
+    return recnum ;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+cmp_trec_fpr ( void *fpr, const TRUSTREC *rec )
+{
+    return rec->rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
+	   && !memcmp( rec->r.trust.fingerprint, fpr, 20);
+}
+
+
+int
+tdbio_search_trust_byfpr( const byte *fingerprint, TRUSTREC *rec )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    /* locate the trust record using the hash table */
+    rc = lookup_hashtable( get_trusthashrec(), fingerprint, 20,
+			   cmp_trec_fpr, (void*)fingerprint, rec );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+tdbio_search_trust_bypk (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+    size_t fingerlen;
+
+    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
+    for (; fingerlen < 20; fingerlen++ )
+      fingerprint[fingerlen] = 0;
+    return tdbio_search_trust_byfpr (fingerprint, rec);
+}
+
+
+
+void
+tdbio_invalid(void)
+{
+    log_error(_(
+	"the trustdb is corrupted; please run \"gpg --fix-trustdb\".\n") );
+    g10_exit(2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Migrate the trustdb as just up to gpg 1.0.6 (trustdb version 2)
+ * to the 2.1 version as used with 1.0.6b - This is pretty trivial as needs
+ * only to scan the tdb and insert new the new trust records.  The old ones are
+ * obsolte from now on
+ */
+static void
+migrate_from_v2 ()
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int i, n;
+  struct {
+    ulong keyrecno;
+    byte  ot;
+    byte okay;
+    byte  fpr[20];
+  } *ottable;
+  int ottable_size, ottable_used;
+  byte oldbuf[40];
+  ulong recno;
+  int rc, count;
+
+  ottable_size = 5;
+  ottable = xmalloc (ottable_size * sizeof *ottable);
+  ottable_used = 0;
+
+  /* We have some restrictions here.  We can't use the version record
+   * and we can't use any of the old hashtables because we dropped the
+   * code.  So we first collect all ownertrusts and then use a second
+   * pass fo find the associated keys.  We have to do this all without using 
+   * the regular record read functions.
+   */
+
+  /* get all the ownertrusts */
+  if (lseek (db_fd, 0, SEEK_SET ) == -1 ) 
+      log_fatal ("migrate_from_v2: lseek failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+  for (recno=0;;recno++)
+    {
+      do
+        n = read (db_fd, oldbuf, 40);
+      while (n==-1 && errno == EINTR);
+      if (!n)
+        break; /* eof */
+      if (n != 40)
+        log_fatal ("migrate_vfrom_v2: read error or short read\n");
+
+      if (*oldbuf != 2)
+        continue;
+      
+      /* v2 dir record */
+      if (ottable_used == ottable_size)
+        {
+          ottable_size += 1000;
+          ottable = xrealloc (ottable, ottable_size * sizeof *ottable);
+        }
+      ottable[ottable_used].keyrecno = buftoulong (oldbuf+6);
+      ottable[ottable_used].ot = oldbuf[18];
+      ottable[ottable_used].okay = 0;
+      memset (ottable[ottable_used].fpr,0, 20);
+      if (ottable[ottable_used].keyrecno && ottable[ottable_used].ot)
+        ottable_used++;
+    }
+  log_info ("found %d ownertrust records\n", ottable_used);
+
+  /* Read again and find the fingerprints */
+  if (lseek (db_fd, 0, SEEK_SET ) == -1 ) 
+      log_fatal ("migrate_from_v2: lseek failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
+  for (recno=0;;recno++)
+    {
+      do
+        n = read (db_fd, oldbuf, 40);
+      while (n==-1 && errno == EINTR);
+      if (!n)
+        break; /* eof */
+      if (n != 40)
+        log_fatal ("migrate_from_v2: read error or short read\n");
+
+      if (*oldbuf != 3) 
+        continue;
+
+      /* v2 key record */
+      for (i=0; i < ottable_used; i++)
+        {
+          if (ottable[i].keyrecno == recno)
+            {
+              memcpy (ottable[i].fpr, oldbuf+20, 20);
+              ottable[i].okay = 1;
+              break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* got everything - create the v3 trustdb */
+  if (ftruncate (db_fd, 0))
+    log_fatal ("can't truncate `%s': %s\n", db_name, strerror (errno) );
+  if (create_version_record ())
+    log_fatal ("failed to recreate version record of `%s'\n", db_name);
+
+  /* access the hash table, so it is store just after the version record, 
+   * this is not needed put a dump is more pretty */
+  get_trusthashrec ();
+
+  /* And insert the old ownertrust values */
+  count = 0;
+  for (i=0; i < ottable_used; i++)
+    {
+      if (!ottable[i].okay)
+        continue;
+      
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      memcpy(rec.r.trust.fingerprint, ottable[i].fpr, 20);
+      rec.r.trust.ownertrust = ottable[i].ot;
+      if (tdbio_write_record (&rec))
+        log_fatal ("failed to write trust record of `%s'\n", db_name);
+      count++;
+    }
+
+  revalidation_mark ();
+  rc = tdbio_sync ();
+  if (rc)
+    log_fatal ("failed to sync `%s'\n", db_name);
+  log_info ("migrated %d version 2 ownertrusts\n", count);
+  xfree (ottable);
+}
diff --git a/g10/tdbio.h b/g10/tdbio.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80a70d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/tdbio.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* tdbio.h - Trust database I/O functions
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef G10_TDBIO_H
+#define G10_TDBIO_H
+
+#include "host2net.h"
+
+#define TRUST_RECORD_LEN 40
+#define SIGS_PER_RECORD 	((TRUST_RECORD_LEN-10)/5)
+#define ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD	((TRUST_RECORD_LEN-2)/4)
+#define ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD	((TRUST_RECORD_LEN-6)/5)
+#define ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD	(TRUST_RECORD_LEN-10)
+#if ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD % 2
+#error ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD must be even
+#endif
+#define MAX_LIST_SIGS_DEPTH  20
+
+
+#define RECTYPE_VER  1
+#define RECTYPE_HTBL 10
+#define RECTYPE_HLST 11
+#define RECTYPE_TRUST 12
+#define RECTYPE_VALID 13
+#define RECTYPE_FREE 254
+
+
+struct trust_record {
+    int  rectype;
+    int  mark;
+    int  dirty; 		/* for now only used internal by functions */
+    struct trust_record *next;	/* help pointer to build lists in memory */
+    ulong recnum;
+    union {
+	struct {	     /* version record: */
+	    byte  version;   /* should be 3 */
+	    byte  marginals;
+	    byte  completes;
+	    byte  cert_depth;
+	    byte  trust_model;
+	    ulong created;   /* timestamp of trustdb creation  */
+	    ulong nextcheck; /* timestamp of next scheduled check */
+	    ulong reserved;  
+	    ulong reserved2;
+	    ulong firstfree;
+	    ulong reserved3;
+            ulong trusthashtbl;
+	} ver;
+	struct {	    /* free record */
+	    ulong next;
+	} free;
+	struct {
+	    ulong item[ITEMS_PER_HTBL_RECORD];
+	} htbl;
+	struct {
+	    ulong next;
+	    ulong rnum[ITEMS_PER_HLST_RECORD]; /* of another record */
+	} hlst;
+      struct {
+        byte fingerprint[20];
+        byte ownertrust;
+        byte depth;
+        ulong validlist;
+	byte min_ownertrust;
+      } trust;
+      struct {
+        byte namehash[20];
+        ulong next;  
+        byte validity;
+	byte full_count;
+	byte marginal_count;
+      } valid;
+    } r;
+};
+typedef struct trust_record TRUSTREC;
+
+/*-- tdbio.c --*/
+int tdbio_update_version_record(void);
+int tdbio_set_dbname( const char *new_dbname, int create );
+const char *tdbio_get_dbname(void);
+void tdbio_dump_record( TRUSTREC *rec, FILE *fp );
+int tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected );
+int tdbio_write_record( TRUSTREC *rec );
+int tdbio_db_matches_options(void);
+byte tdbio_read_model(void);
+ulong tdbio_read_nextcheck (void);
+int tdbio_write_nextcheck (ulong stamp);
+int tdbio_is_dirty(void);
+int tdbio_sync(void);
+int tdbio_begin_transaction(void);
+int tdbio_end_transaction(void);
+int tdbio_cancel_transaction(void);
+int tdbio_delete_record( ulong recnum );
+ulong tdbio_new_recnum(void);
+int tdbio_search_trust_byfpr(const byte *fingerprint, TRUSTREC *rec );
+int tdbio_search_trust_bypk(PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec );
+
+void tdbio_invalid(void);
+
+#endif /*G10_TDBIO_H*/
diff --git a/g10/textfilter.c b/g10/textfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8665a72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/textfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* textfilter.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "status.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+#define LF "\r\n"
+#else
+#define LF "\n"
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_LINELEN 19995 /* a little bit smaller than in armor.c */
+			  /* to make sure that a warning is displayed while */
+			  /* creating a message */
+
+static unsigned
+len_without_trailing_chars( byte *line, unsigned len, const char *trimchars )
+{
+    byte *p, *mark;
+    unsigned n;
+
+    for(mark=NULL, p=line, n=0; n < len; n++, p++ ) {
+	if( strchr( trimchars, *p ) ) {
+	    if( !mark )
+		mark = p;
+	}
+	else
+	    mark = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return mark? (mark - line) : len;
+}
+
+
+static int
+standard( text_filter_context_t *tfx, IOBUF a,
+	  byte *buf, size_t size, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    int rc=0;
+    size_t len = 0;
+    unsigned maxlen;
+
+    assert( size > 10 );
+    size -= 2;	/* reserve 2 bytes to append CR,LF */
+    while( !rc && len < size ) {
+	int lf_seen;
+
+	while( len < size && tfx->buffer_pos < tfx->buffer_len )
+	    buf[len++] = tfx->buffer[tfx->buffer_pos++];
+	if( len >= size )
+	    continue;
+
+	/* read the next line */
+	maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	tfx->buffer_pos = 0;
+	tfx->buffer_len = iobuf_read_line( a, &tfx->buffer,
+					   &tfx->buffer_size, &maxlen );
+	if( !maxlen )
+	    tfx->truncated++;
+	if( !tfx->buffer_len ) {
+	    if( !len )
+		rc = -1; /* eof */
+	    break;
+	}
+	lf_seen = tfx->buffer[tfx->buffer_len-1] == '\n';
+
+	/* The story behind this is that 2440 says that textmode
+	   hashes should canonicalize line endings to CRLF and remove
+	   spaces and tabs.  2440bis-12 says to just canonicalize to
+	   CRLF.  1.4.0 was released using the bis-12 behavior, but it
+	   was discovered that many mail clients do not canonicalize
+	   PGP/MIME signature text appropriately (and were relying on
+	   GnuPG to handle trailing spaces).  So, we default to the
+	   2440 behavior, but use the 2440bis-12 behavior if the user
+	   specifies --no-rfc2440-text.  The default will be changed
+	   at some point in the future when the mail clients have been
+	   upgraded.  Aside from PGP/MIME and broken mail clients,
+	   this makes no difference to any signatures in the real
+	   world except for a textmode detached signature.  PGP always
+	   used the 2440bis-12 behavior (ignoring 2440 itself), so
+	   this actually makes us compatible with PGP textmode
+	   detached signatures for the first time. */
+	if(opt.rfc2440_text)
+	  tfx->buffer_len=trim_trailing_chars(tfx->buffer,tfx->buffer_len,
+					      " \t\r\n");
+	else
+	  tfx->buffer_len=trim_trailing_chars(tfx->buffer,tfx->buffer_len,
+					      "\r\n");
+
+	if( lf_seen ) {
+	    tfx->buffer[tfx->buffer_len++] = '\r';
+	    tfx->buffer[tfx->buffer_len++] = '\n';
+	}
+    }
+    *ret_len = len;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * The filter is used to make canonical text: Lines are terminated by
+ * CR, LF, trailing white spaces are removed.
+ */
+int
+text_filter( void *opaque, int control,
+	     IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
+{
+    size_t size = *ret_len;
+    text_filter_context_t *tfx = opaque;
+    int rc=0;
+
+    if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) {
+	rc = standard( tfx, a, buf, size, ret_len );
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) {
+	if( tfx->truncated )
+	    log_error(_("can't handle text lines longer than %d characters\n"),
+			MAX_LINELEN );
+	xfree( tfx->buffer );
+	tfx->buffer = NULL;
+    }
+    else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
+	*(char**)buf = "text_filter";
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Copy data from INP to OUT and do some escaping if requested.
+ * md is updated as required by rfc2440
+ */
+int
+copy_clearsig_text( IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, MD_HANDLE md,
+		    int escape_dash, int escape_from, int pgp2mode )
+{
+    unsigned maxlen;
+    byte *buffer = NULL;    /* malloced buffer */
+    unsigned bufsize;	    /* and size of this buffer */
+    unsigned n;
+    int truncated = 0;
+    int pending_lf = 0;
+
+    if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
+	pgp2mode = 0;
+
+    if( !escape_dash )
+	escape_from = 0;
+
+    write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_SIGNING);
+
+    for(;;) {
+	maxlen = MAX_LINELEN;
+	n = iobuf_read_line( inp, &buffer, &bufsize, &maxlen );
+	if( !maxlen )
+	    truncated++;
+
+	if( !n )
+	    break; /* read_line has returned eof */
+
+	/* update the message digest */
+	if( escape_dash ) {
+	    if( pending_lf ) {
+		md_putc( md, '\r' );
+		md_putc( md, '\n' );
+	    }
+	    md_write( md, buffer,
+		     len_without_trailing_chars( buffer, n,
+						 pgp2mode? " \r\n":" \t\r\n"));
+	}
+	else
+	    md_write( md, buffer, n );
+	pending_lf = buffer[n-1] == '\n';
+
+	/* write the output */
+	if(    ( escape_dash && *buffer == '-')
+	    || ( escape_from && n > 4 && !memcmp(buffer, "From ", 5 ) ) ) {
+	    iobuf_put( out, '-' );
+	    iobuf_put( out, ' ' );
+	}
+
+#if  0 /*defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM)*/
+	/* We don't use this anymore because my interpretation of rfc2440 7.1
+	 * is that there is no conversion needed.  If one decides to
+	 * clearsign a unix file on a DOS box he will get a mixed line endings.
+	 * If at some point it turns out, that a conversion is a nice feature
+	 * we can make an option out of it.
+	 */
+	/* make sure the lines do end in CR,LF */
+	if( n > 1 && ( (buffer[n-2] == '\r' && buffer[n-1] == '\n' )
+			    || (buffer[n-2] == '\n' && buffer[n-1] == '\r'))) {
+	    iobuf_write( out, buffer, n-2 );
+	    iobuf_put( out, '\r');
+	    iobuf_put( out, '\n');
+	}
+	else if( n && buffer[n-1] == '\n' ) {
+	    iobuf_write( out, buffer, n-1 );
+	    iobuf_put( out, '\r');
+	    iobuf_put( out, '\n');
+	}
+	else
+	    iobuf_write( out, buffer, n );
+
+#else
+	iobuf_write( out, buffer, n );
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /* at eof */
+    if( !pending_lf ) { /* make sure that the file ends with a LF */
+	iobuf_writestr( out, LF );
+	if( !escape_dash )
+	    md_putc( md, '\n' );
+    }
+
+    if( truncated )
+	log_info(_("input line longer than %d characters\n"), MAX_LINELEN );
+
+    return 0; /* okay */
+}
diff --git a/g10/tlv.c b/g10/tlv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7233e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/tlv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/* tlv.c - Tag-Length-Value Utilities
+ *	Copyright (C) 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#if GNUPG_MAJOR_VERSION == 1
+#define GPG_ERR_EOF               (-1)
+#define GPG_ERR_BAD_BER           (1)  /*G10ERR_GENERAL*/
+#define GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP          (45) /*G10ERR_INV_ARG*/
+typedef int gpg_error_t;
+#define gpg_error(n) (n)
+#else
+#include <gpg-error.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#include "tlv.h"
+
+static const unsigned char *
+do_find_tlv (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+             int tag, size_t *nbytes, int nestlevel)
+{
+  const unsigned char *s = buffer;
+  size_t n = length;
+  size_t len;
+  int this_tag;
+  int composite;
+    
+  for (;;)
+    {
+      buffer = s;
+      if (n < 2)
+        return NULL; /* Buffer definitely too short for tag and length. */
+      if (!*s || *s == 0xff)
+        { /* Skip optional filler between TLV objects. */
+          s++;
+          n--;
+          continue;
+        }
+      composite = !!(*s & 0x20);
+      if ((*s & 0x1f) == 0x1f)
+        { /* more tag bytes to follow */
+          s++;
+          n--;
+          if (n < 2)
+            return NULL; /* buffer definitely too short for tag and length. */
+          if ((*s & 0x1f) == 0x1f)
+            return NULL; /* We support only up to 2 bytes. */
+          this_tag = (s[-1] << 8) | (s[0] & 0x7f);
+        }
+      else
+        this_tag = s[0];
+      len = s[1];
+      s += 2; n -= 2;
+      if (len < 0x80)
+        ;
+      else if (len == 0x81)
+        { /* One byte length follows. */
+          if (!n)
+            return NULL; /* we expected 1 more bytes with the length. */
+          len = s[0];
+          s++; n--;
+        }
+      else if (len == 0x82)
+        { /* Two byte length follows. */
+          if (n < 2)
+            return NULL; /* We expected 2 more bytes with the length. */
+          len = (s[0] << 8) | s[1];
+          s += 2; n -= 2;
+        }
+      else
+        return NULL; /* APDU limit is 65535, thus it does not make
+                        sense to assume longer length fields. */
+
+      if (composite && nestlevel < 100)
+        { /* Dive into this composite DO after checking for a too deep
+             nesting. */
+          const unsigned char *tmp_s;
+          size_t tmp_len;
+          
+          tmp_s = do_find_tlv (s, len, tag, &tmp_len, nestlevel+1);
+          if (tmp_s)
+            {
+              *nbytes = tmp_len;
+              return tmp_s;
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (this_tag == tag)
+        {
+          *nbytes = len;
+          return s;
+        }
+      if (len > n)
+        return NULL; /* Buffer too short to skip to the next tag. */
+      s += len; n -= len;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* Locate a TLV encoded data object in BUFFER of LENGTH and
+   return a pointer to value as well as its length in NBYTES.  Return
+   NULL if it was not found or if the object does not fit into the buffer. */
+const unsigned char *
+find_tlv (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+          int tag, size_t *nbytes)
+{
+  const unsigned char *p;
+
+  p = do_find_tlv (buffer, length, tag, nbytes, 0);
+  if (p && *nbytes > (length - (p-buffer)))
+    p = NULL; /* Object longer than buffer. */
+  return p;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Locate a TLV encoded data object in BUFFER of LENGTH and
+   return a pointer to value as well as its length in NBYTES.  Return
+   NULL if it was not found.  Note, that the function does not check
+   whether the value fits into the provided buffer. */
+const unsigned char *
+find_tlv_unchecked (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+                    int tag, size_t *nbytes)
+{
+  return do_find_tlv (buffer, length, tag, nbytes, 0);
+}
+
+
+/* ASN.1 BER parser: Parse BUFFER of length SIZE and return the tag
+   and the length part from the TLV triplet.  Update BUFFER and SIZE
+   on success. */
+gpg_error_t
+parse_ber_header (unsigned char const **buffer, size_t *size,
+                  int *r_class, int *r_tag, 
+                  int *r_constructed, int *r_ndef,
+                  size_t *r_length, size_t *r_nhdr)
+{
+  int c;
+  unsigned long tag;
+  const unsigned char *buf = *buffer;
+  size_t length = *size;
+
+  *r_ndef = 0;
+  *r_length = 0;
+  *r_nhdr = 0;
+
+  /* Get the tag. */
+  if (!length)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
+  c = *buf++; length--; ++*r_nhdr;
+
+  *r_class = (c & 0xc0) >> 6;
+  *r_constructed = !!(c & 0x20);
+  tag = c & 0x1f;
+
+  if (tag == 0x1f)
+    {
+      tag = 0;
+      do
+        {
+          tag <<= 7;
+          if (!length)
+            return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
+          c = *buf++; length--; ++*r_nhdr;
+          tag |= c & 0x7f;
+
+        }
+      while (c & 0x80);
+    }
+  *r_tag = tag;
+
+  /* Get the length. */
+  if (!length)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
+  c = *buf++; length--; ++*r_nhdr;
+
+  if ( !(c & 0x80) )
+    *r_length = c;
+  else if (c == 0x80)
+    *r_ndef = 1;
+  else if (c == 0xff)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
+  else
+    {
+      unsigned long len = 0;
+      int count = c & 0x7f;
+
+      if (count > sizeof (len) || count > sizeof (size_t))
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
+
+      for (; count; count--)
+        {
+          len <<= 8;
+          if (!length)
+            return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
+          c = *buf++; length--; ++*r_nhdr;
+          len |= c & 0xff;
+        }
+      *r_length = len;
+    }
+  
+  /* Without this kludge some example certs can't be parsed. */
+  if (*r_class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && !*r_tag)
+    *r_length = 0;
+  
+  *buffer = buf;
+  *size = length;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* FIXME: The following function should not go into this file but for
+   now it is easier to keep it here. */
+
+/* Return the next token of an canconical encoded S-expression.  BUF
+   is the pointer to the S-expression and BUFLEN is a pointer to the
+   length of this S-expression (used to validate the syntax).  Both
+   are updated to reflect the new position.  The token itself is
+   returned as a pointer into the orginal buffer at TOK and TOKLEN.
+   If a parentheses is the next token, TOK will be set to NULL.
+   TOKLEN is checked to be within the bounds.  On error a error code
+   is returned and all pointers should are not guaranteed to point to
+   a meanigful value. DEPTH should be initialized to 0 and will
+   reflect on return the actual depth of the tree. To detect the end
+   of the S-expression it is advisable to check DEPTH after a
+   successful return:
+
+   depth = 0;
+   while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))
+          && depth)
+     process_token (tok, toklen);
+   if (err)  
+     handle_error ();
+ */
+gpg_error_t
+parse_sexp (unsigned char const **buf, size_t *buflen,
+            int *depth, unsigned char const **tok, size_t *toklen)
+{
+  const unsigned char *s;
+  size_t n, vlen;
+
+  s = *buf;
+  n = *buflen;
+  *tok = NULL;
+  *toklen = 0;
+  if (!n)
+    return *depth ? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP) : 0;
+  if (*s == '(')
+    {
+      s++; n--;
+      (*depth)++;
+      *buf = s;
+      *buflen = n;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  if (*s == ')')
+    {
+      if (!*depth)
+        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
+      *toklen = 1;
+      s++; n--;
+      (*depth)--;
+      *buf = s;
+      *buflen = n;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  for (vlen=0; n && *s && *s != ':' && (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9'); s++, n--)
+    vlen = vlen*10 + (*s - '0');
+  if (!n || *s != ':')
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
+  s++; n--;
+  if (vlen > n)
+    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
+  *tok = s;
+  *toklen = vlen;
+  s += vlen;
+  n -= vlen;
+  *buf = s;
+  *buflen = n;
+  return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/g10/tlv.h b/g10/tlv.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..877573d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/tlv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* tlv.h - Tag-Length-Value Utilities
+ *	Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SCD_TLV_H
+#define SCD_TLV_H 1
+
+
+enum tlv_tag_class {
+  CLASS_UNIVERSAL = 0,
+  CLASS_APPLICATION = 1,
+  CLASS_CONTEXT = 2,
+  CLASS_PRIVATE =3
+};
+
+enum tlv_tag_type {
+  TAG_NONE = 0,
+  TAG_BOOLEAN = 1,
+  TAG_INTEGER = 2,
+  TAG_BIT_STRING = 3,
+  TAG_OCTET_STRING = 4,
+  TAG_NULL = 5,
+  TAG_OBJECT_ID = 6,
+  TAG_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR = 7,
+  TAG_EXTERNAL = 8,
+  TAG_REAL = 9,
+  TAG_ENUMERATED = 10,
+  TAG_EMBEDDED_PDV = 11,
+  TAG_UTF8_STRING = 12,
+  TAG_REALTIVE_OID = 13,
+  TAG_SEQUENCE = 16,
+  TAG_SET = 17,
+  TAG_NUMERIC_STRING = 18,
+  TAG_PRINTABLE_STRING = 19,
+  TAG_TELETEX_STRING = 20,
+  TAG_VIDEOTEX_STRING = 21,
+  TAG_IA5_STRING = 22,
+  TAG_UTC_TIME = 23,
+  TAG_GENERALIZED_TIME = 24,
+  TAG_GRAPHIC_STRING = 25,
+  TAG_VISIBLE_STRING = 26,
+  TAG_GENERAL_STRING = 27,
+  TAG_UNIVERSAL_STRING = 28,
+  TAG_CHARACTER_STRING = 29,
+  TAG_BMP_STRING = 30
+};
+
+
+/* Locate a TLV encoded data object in BUFFER of LENGTH and return a
+   pointer to value as well as its length in NBYTES.  Return NULL if
+   it was not found or if the object does not fit into the buffer. */
+const unsigned char *find_tlv (const unsigned char *buffer, size_t length,
+                               int tag, size_t *nbytes);
+
+
+/* Locate a TLV encoded data object in BUFFER of LENGTH and return a
+   pointer to value as well as its length in NBYTES.  Return NULL if
+   it was not found.  Note, that the function does not check whether
+   the value fits into the provided buffer.*/
+const unsigned char *find_tlv_unchecked (const unsigned char *buffer,
+                                         size_t length,
+                                         int tag, size_t *nbytes);
+
+
+/* ASN.1 BER parser: Parse BUFFER of length SIZE and return the tag
+   and the length part from the TLV triplet.  Update BUFFER and SIZE
+   on success. */
+gpg_error_t parse_ber_header (unsigned char const **buffer, size_t *size,
+                              int *r_class, int *r_tag, 
+                              int *r_constructed,
+                              int *r_ndef, size_t *r_length, size_t *r_nhdr);
+
+
+
+/* Return the next token of an canconical encoded S-expression.  BUF
+   is the pointer to the S-expression and BUFLEN is a pointer to the
+   length of this S-expression (used to validate the syntax).  Both
+   are updated to reflect the new position.  The token itself is
+   returned as a pointer into the orginal buffer at TOK and TOKLEN.
+   If a parentheses is the next token, TOK will be set to NULL.
+   TOKLEN is checked to be within the bounds.  On error a error code
+   is returned and all pointers should are not guaranteed to point to
+   a meanigful value. DEPTH should be initialized to 0 and will
+   reflect on return the actual depth of the tree. To detect the end
+   of the S-expression it is advisable to check DEPTH after a
+   successful return. */
+gpg_error_t parse_sexp (unsigned char const **buf, size_t *buflen,
+                        int *depth, unsigned char const **tok, size_t *toklen);
+
+
+
+#endif /* SCD_TLV_H */
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e372bf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2368 @@
+/* trustdb.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef USE_INTERNAL_REGEX
+#include "_regex.h"
+#else
+#include <regex.h>
+#endif
+#endif /* !DISABLE_REGEX */
+
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "tdbio.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed
+ * for validation 
+ */
+struct key_item {
+  struct key_item *next;
+  unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust;
+  byte trust_depth;
+  byte trust_value;
+  char *trust_regexp;
+  u32 kid[2];
+};
+
+
+typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
+
+/*
+ * Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
+ * the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL. 
+ * Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
+ */
+struct key_array {
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+};
+
+
+/* control information for the trust DB */
+static struct {
+    int init;
+    int level;
+    char *dbname;
+} trustdb_args;
+
+/* some globals */
+static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
+static struct key_item *utk_list;      /* all ultimately trusted keys */
+
+static int pending_check_trustdb;
+
+static int validate_keys (int interactive);
+
+
+/**********************************************
+ ************* some helpers *******************
+ **********************************************/
+
+static struct key_item *
+new_key_item (void)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+  
+  k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
+  return k;
+}
+
+static void
+release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
+{
+  struct key_item *k2;
+
+  for (; k; k = k2)
+    {
+      k2 = k->next;
+      xfree (k->trust_regexp);
+      xfree (k);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * For fast keylook up we need a hash table.  Each byte of a KeyIDs
+ * should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
+ * for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
+ * can just use 10 bits to index a table of 1024 key items. 
+ * Possible optimization: Don not use key_items but other hash_table when the
+ * duplicates lists gets too large. 
+ */
+static KeyHashTable 
+new_key_hash_table (void)
+{
+  struct key_item **tbl;
+
+  tbl = xmalloc_clear (1024 * sizeof *tbl);
+  return tbl;
+}
+
+static void
+release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  if (!tbl)
+    return;
+  for (i=0; i < 1024; i++)
+    release_key_items (tbl[i]);
+  xfree (tbl);
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
+ */
+static int
+test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return 1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a new key to the hash table.  The key is identified by its key ID.
+ */
+static void
+add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k, *kk;
+
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return; /* already in table */
+  
+  kk = new_key_item ();
+  kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  kk->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)];
+  tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release a key_array
+ */
+static void
+release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
+{
+    struct key_array *k;
+
+    if (keys) {
+        for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
+            release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
+        xfree (keys);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ **********  Initialization  *****************
+ *********************************************/
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
+ * before initializing the validation module.
+ * FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
+ */
+void
+register_trusted_keyid(u32 *keyid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = keyid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = keyid[1];
+  k->next = user_utk_list;
+  user_utk_list = k;
+}
+
+void
+register_trusted_key( const char *string )
+{
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+
+  if (classify_user_id (string, &desc) != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID )
+    {
+      log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
+      return;
+    }
+
+  register_trusted_keyid(desc.u.kid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
+ * Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list.
+ */
+static int
+add_utk (u32 *kid)
+{
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next) 
+    {
+      if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+        {
+          return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
+  k->next = utk_list;
+  utk_list = k;
+  if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+    log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
+ */
+static void
+verify_own_keys(void)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  ulong recnum;
+  int rc;
+  struct key_item *k;
+
+  if (utk_list)
+    return;
+
+  /* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
+  for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) 
+    {
+      if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST 
+           && (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+        {
+            byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
+            int fprlen;
+            u32 kid[2];
+            
+            /* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
+             * we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
+             * use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
+             * butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
+             * the whole validation code to only work with
+             * fingerprints */
+            fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
+            keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid);
+            if (!add_utk (kid))
+	      log_info(_("key %s occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
+		       keystr(kid));
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */
+  for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next) 
+    {
+      if ( add_utk (k->kid) ) 
+        { /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
+          PKT_public_key pk;
+
+          memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
+          rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid);
+          if (rc)
+	    log_info(_("key %s: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
+		     keystr(k->kid));
+          else
+	    {
+	      update_ownertrust (&pk,
+				 ((get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
+				  | TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
+	      release_public_key_parts (&pk);
+	    }
+
+          log_info (_("key %s marked as ultimately trusted\n"),keystr(k->kid));
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* release the helper table table */
+  release_key_items (user_utk_list);
+  user_utk_list = NULL;
+  return;
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ *********** TrustDB stuff *******************
+ *********************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Read a record but die if it does not exist
+ */
+static void
+read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
+{
+  int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
+                recno, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+  if (rectype != rec->rectype)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
+                rec->recnum, rectype);
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a record and die on error
+ */
+static void
+write_record (TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+  int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
+			    rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * sync the TrustDb and die on error
+ */
+static void
+do_sync(void)
+{
+    int rc = tdbio_sync ();
+    if(rc)
+      {
+        log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        g10_exit(2);
+      }
+}
+
+static const char *
+trust_model_string(void)
+{
+  switch(opt.trust_model)
+    {
+    case TM_CLASSIC:  return "classic";
+    case TM_PGP:      return "PGP";
+    case TM_EXTERNAL: return "external";
+    case TM_ALWAYS:   return "always";
+    case TM_DIRECT:   return "direct";
+    default:          return "unknown";
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Perform some checks over the trustdb
+ *  level 0: only open the db
+ *	  1: used for initial program startup
+ */
+int
+setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
+{
+    /* just store the args */
+    if( trustdb_args.init )
+	return 0;
+    trustdb_args.level = level;
+    trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void
+init_trustdb()
+{
+  int level = trustdb_args.level;
+  const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
+
+  if( trustdb_args.init )
+    return;
+
+  trustdb_args.init = 1;
+
+  if(level==0 || level==1)
+    {
+      int rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level );
+      if( rc )
+	log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+    }
+  else
+    BUG();
+
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO)
+    {
+      /* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says
+	 it is. */
+      opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model();
+
+      /* Sanity check this ;) */
+      if(opt.trust_model!=TM_CLASSIC
+	 && opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP
+	 && opt.trust_model!=TM_EXTERNAL)
+	{
+	  log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - "
+		     "assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"PGP");
+	  opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
+	}
+
+      if(opt.verbose)
+	log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),trust_model_string());
+    }
+
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+    {
+      /* Verify the list of ultimately trusted keys and move the
+	 --trusted-keys list there as well. */
+      if(level==1)
+	verify_own_keys();
+
+      if(!tdbio_db_matches_options())
+	pending_check_trustdb=1;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************
+ *************	Print helpers	****************
+ ***********************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * This function returns a letter for a trustvalue  Trust flags
+ * are ignore.
+ */
+static int
+trust_letter (unsigned int value)
+{
+  switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+    {
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN:   return '-';
+    case TRUST_EXPIRED:   return 'e';
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
+    case TRUST_NEVER:     return 'n';
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  return 'm';
+    case TRUST_FULLY:     return 'f';
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:  return 'u';
+    default:              return '?';
+    }
+}
+
+/* NOTE TO TRANSLATOR: these strings are similar to those in
+   trust_value_to_string(), but are a fixed length.  This is needed to
+   make attractive information listings where columns line up
+   properly.  The value "10" should be the length of the strings you
+   choose to translate to.  This is the length in printable columns.
+   It gets passed to atoi() so everything after the number is
+   essentially a comment and need not be translated.  Either key and
+   uid are both NULL, or neither are NULL. */
+const char *
+uid_trust_string_fixed(PKT_public_key *key,PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  if(!key && !uid)
+    return _("10 translator see trustdb.c:uid_trust_string_fixed");
+  else if(uid->is_revoked || (key && key->is_revoked))
+    return                         _("[ revoked]");
+  else if(uid->is_expired)
+    return                         _("[ expired]");
+  else if(key)
+    switch(get_validity(key,uid)&TRUST_MASK)
+      {
+      case TRUST_UNKNOWN:   return _("[ unknown]");
+      case TRUST_EXPIRED:   return _("[ expired]");
+      case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return _("[  undef ]");
+      case TRUST_MARGINAL:  return _("[marginal]");
+      case TRUST_FULLY:     return _("[  full  ]");
+      case TRUST_ULTIMATE:  return _("[ultimate]");
+      }
+
+  return "err";
+}
+
+/* The strings here are similar to those in
+   pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust() */
+const char *
+trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value)
+{
+  switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+    {
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN:   return _("unknown");
+    case TRUST_EXPIRED:   return _("expired");
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return _("undefined");
+    case TRUST_NEVER:     return _("never");
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  return _("marginal");
+    case TRUST_FULLY:     return _("full");
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:  return _("ultimate");
+    default:              return "err";
+    }
+}
+
+int
+string_to_trust_value (const char *str)
+{
+  if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"undefined")==0)
+    return TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"never")==0)
+    return TRUST_NEVER;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"marginal")==0)
+    return TRUST_MARGINAL;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"full")==0)
+    return TRUST_FULLY;
+  else if(ascii_strcasecmp(str,"ultimate")==0)
+    return TRUST_ULTIMATE;
+  else
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts.  Special
+ * feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
+ * when a check is due.  This can be used to run the check from a crontab
+ */
+void
+check_trustdb ()
+{
+  init_trustdb();
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+    {
+      if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
+	{
+	  ulong scheduled;
+
+	  scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+	  if (!scheduled)
+	    {
+	      log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
+	      return;
+	    }
+
+	  if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
+	    {
+	      log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+			strtimestamp (scheduled));
+	      return;
+	    }
+	}
+
+      validate_keys (0);
+    }
+  else
+    log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with `%s' trust model\n"),
+	      trust_model_string());
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recreate the WoT. 
+ */
+void
+update_trustdb()
+{
+  init_trustdb();
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
+    validate_keys (1);
+  else
+    log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with `%s' trust model\n"),
+	      trust_model_string());
+}
+
+void
+revalidation_mark (void)
+{
+  init_trustdb();
+  /* we simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
+   * so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled */
+  if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1))
+      do_sync ();
+  pending_check_trustdb = 1;
+}
+
+int
+trustdb_pending_check(void)
+{
+  return pending_check_trustdb;
+}
+
+/* If the trustdb is dirty, and we're interactive, update it.
+   Otherwise, check it unless no-auto-check-trustdb is set. */
+void
+trustdb_check_or_update(void)
+{
+  if(trustdb_pending_check())
+    {
+      if(opt.interactive)
+	update_trustdb();
+      else if(!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
+	check_trustdb();
+    }
+}
+
+void
+read_trust_options(byte *trust_model,ulong *created,ulong *nextcheck,
+		   byte *marginals,byte *completes,byte *cert_depth)
+{
+  TRUSTREC opts;
+
+  init_trustdb();
+
+  read_record(0,&opts,RECTYPE_VER);
+
+  if(trust_model)
+    *trust_model=opts.r.ver.trust_model;
+  if(created)
+    *created=opts.r.ver.created;
+  if(nextcheck)
+    *nextcheck=opts.r.ver.nextcheck;
+  if(marginals)
+    *marginals=opts.r.ver.marginals;
+  if(completes)
+    *completes=opts.r.ver.completes;
+  if(cert_depth)
+    *cert_depth=opts.r.ver.cert_depth;
+}
+
+/***********************************************
+ ***********  Ownertrust et al. ****************
+ ***********************************************/
+
+static int 
+read_trust_record (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+  int rc;
+  
+  init_trustdb();
+  rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    return -1; /* no record yet */
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
+                 g10_errstr (rc));
+      return rc; 
+    }
+      
+  if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
+    {
+      log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
+                 rec->recnum);
+      return G10ERR_TRUSTDB; 
+    }      
+  
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
+ * The key should be the primary key.
+ */
+unsigned int 
+get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return rc; /* actually never reached */
+    }
+
+  return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
+}
+
+unsigned int 
+get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return rc; /* actually never reached */
+    }
+
+  return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as get_ownertrust but this takes the minimum ownertrust value
+ * into into account, and will bump up the value as needed.
+ */
+static int
+get_ownertrust_with_min (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  unsigned int otrust,otrust_min;
+
+  otrust = (get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_MASK);
+  otrust_min = get_min_ownertrust (pk);
+  if(otrust<otrust_min)
+    {
+      /* If the trust that the user has set is less than the trust
+	 that was calculated from a trust signature chain, use the
+	 higher of the two.  We do this here and not in
+	 get_ownertrust since the underlying ownertrust should not
+	 really be set - just the appearance of the ownertrust. */
+
+      otrust=otrust_min;
+    }
+
+  return otrust;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust letter instead of an
+ * value.  This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account.
+ */
+int
+get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  return trust_letter(get_ownertrust_with_min(pk));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust string instead of an
+ * value.  This takes the minimum ownertrust value into account.
+ */
+const char *
+get_ownertrust_string (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  return trust_value_to_string(get_ownertrust_with_min(pk));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
+ * The key should be a primary one.
+ */
+void
+update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
+                   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+          write_record( &rec );
+          revalidation_mark ();
+          do_sync ();
+        }
+    }
+  else if (rc == -1)
+    { /* no record yet - create a new one */
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
+
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+      write_record (&rec);
+      revalidation_mark ();
+      do_sync ();
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+  else 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+update_min_ownertrust (u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust )
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+
+  pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+  rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),keystr(kid),g10_errstr(rc));
+      return;
+    }
+
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("key %08lX%08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
+                   (ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
+		   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust,
+		   new_trust );
+      if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
+          write_record( &rec );
+          revalidation_mark ();
+          do_sync ();
+        }
+    }
+  else if (rc == -1)
+    { /* no record yet - create a new one */
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
+
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
+      write_record (&rec);
+      revalidation_mark ();
+      do_sync ();
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+  else 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+}
+
+/* Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values.  Return true if a
+   change actually happened. */
+int
+clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+	{
+	  log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
+		     (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
+	  log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
+		     (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust);
+	}
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust || rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+          rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0;
+          write_record( &rec );
+          revalidation_mark ();
+          do_sync ();
+          return 1;
+        }
+    }
+  else if (rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+    }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Note: Caller has to do a sync 
+ */
+static void
+update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
+                 int depth, int validity)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  int rc;
+  ulong recno;
+
+  namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - create a new one */
+    { 
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      rc = 0;
+      memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
+      trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+      }
+
+  /* locate an existing one */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+      if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
+        break;
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+
+  if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
+    {
+      memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
+      vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
+      memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
+      vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+      trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
+    }
+  vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
+  vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
+  vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
+  write_record (&vrec);
+  trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
+  write_record (&trec);
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************
+ *********  Query trustdb values  **************
+ ***********************************************/
+
+/* Return true if key is disabled */
+int
+cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  int rc;
+  TRUSTREC trec;
+  int disabled=0;
+
+  if(pk->is_disabled)
+    return (pk->is_disabled==2);
+
+  init_trustdb();
+
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record found, so assume not disabled */
+    goto leave;
+ 
+  if(trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED)
+    disabled=1;
+ 
+  /* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every
+     time */
+  if(disabled)
+    pk->is_disabled=2;
+  else
+    pk->is_disabled=1;
+
+ leave:
+   return disabled;
+}
+
+void
+check_trustdb_stale(void)
+{
+  static int did_nextcheck=0;
+
+  init_trustdb ();
+  if (!did_nextcheck
+      && (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC))
+    {
+      ulong scheduled;
+
+      did_nextcheck = 1;
+      scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+      if (scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
+        {
+          if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb) 
+            {
+              pending_check_trustdb = 1;
+              log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n"));
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
+              validate_keys (0);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the validity information for PK.  If the namehash is not
+ * NULL, the validity of the corresponsing user ID is returned,
+ * otherwise, a reasonable value for the entire key is returned. 
+ */
+unsigned int
+get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  int rc;
+  ulong recno;
+  unsigned int validity;
+  u32 kid[2];
+  PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+
+  if(uid)
+    namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+  init_trustdb ();
+  check_trustdb_stale();
+
+  keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
+  if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1])
+    { /* this is a subkey - get the mainkey */
+      main_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk);
+      rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+	  char *tempkeystr=xstrdup(keystr(pk->main_keyid));
+          log_error ("error getting main key %s of subkey %s: %s\n",
+                     tempkeystr, keystr(kid), g10_errstr(rc));
+	  xfree(tempkeystr);
+          validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; 
+          goto leave;
+	}
+    }
+  else
+    main_pk = pk;
+
+  if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
+    {
+      /* Note that this happens BEFORE any user ID stuff is checked.
+	 The direct trust model applies to keys as a whole. */
+      validity=get_ownertrust(main_pk);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return 0;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record found */
+    {
+      validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; 
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* loop over all user IDs */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  validity = 0;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+
+      if(uid)
+	{
+	  /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
+	     user ID ONLY.  If the namehash is not found, then there
+	     is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
+	     signed). */
+	  if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
+	    {
+	      validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+	      break;
+	    }
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  /* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity
+	     over all user IDs */
+	  if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
+	    validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+	}
+
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+  
+  if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
+    {
+      validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+      pk->is_disabled=2;
+    }
+  else
+    pk->is_disabled=1;
+
+ leave:
+  /* set some flags direct from the key */
+  if (main_pk->is_revoked)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
+  if (main_pk != pk && pk->is_revoked)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
+  /* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why
+   * I initially designed it that way */
+  if (main_pk->has_expired || pk->has_expired)
+    validity = (validity & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_EXPIRED;
+  
+  if (pending_check_trustdb)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;
+
+  if (main_pk != pk)
+    free_public_key (main_pk);
+  return validity;
+}
+
+int
+get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+    int trustlevel;
+
+    trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid);
+    if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
+	return 'r';
+    return trust_letter ( trustlevel );
+}
+
+const char *
+get_validity_string (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  int trustlevel;
+
+  trustlevel = get_validity (pk, uid);
+  if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
+    return _("revoked");
+  return trust_value_to_string(trustlevel);
+}
+
+static void
+get_validity_counts (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  ulong recno;
+
+  if(pk==NULL || uid==NULL)
+    BUG();
+
+  namehash_from_uid(uid);
+
+  uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0;
+
+  init_trustdb ();
+
+  if(read_trust_record (pk, &trec)!=0)
+    return;
+
+  /* loop over all user IDs */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+
+      if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
+	{
+	  uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count;
+	  uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count;
+	  /*  printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */
+	  break;
+	}
+
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+list_trust_path( const char *username )
+{
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
+ * the given key.  This function does not return the key itself or
+ * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain).  Only
+ * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
+ * are listed.	If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
+ * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
+ *
+ *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
+ *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
+ *     Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
+ *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
+ *     to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
+ *  4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
+ *     so that it can free its context.
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
+ */
+int
+enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
+		 unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
+{
+    return -1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print the current path
+ */
+void
+enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
+				       int refresh, ulong selected_lid )
+{
+    return;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************
+ *********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
+ ****************************************/
+
+static int
+ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid,int minimum)
+{
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  int rc;
+  int ot;
+
+  pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+  rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
+                 keystr(kid), g10_errstr(rc) );
+      return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+ 
+  if(opt.force_ownertrust)
+    {
+      log_info("force trust for key %s to %s\n",
+	       keystr(kid),trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust));
+      update_ownertrust(pk,opt.force_ownertrust);
+      ot=opt.force_ownertrust;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
+      if(ot>0)
+	ot = get_ownertrust (pk);
+      else if(ot==0)
+	ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+      else
+	ot = -1; /* quit */
+    }
+
+  free_public_key( pk );
+
+  return ot;
+}
+
+
+static void
+mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
+{
+  for ( ;node; node = node->next )
+    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+      {
+        u32 aki[2];
+
+        keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+        add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
+      }
+}
+
+
+static void
+dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
+{
+  struct key_array *kar;
+
+  for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+    {
+      KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
+      u32 kid[2];
+
+      keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+      printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
+              depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');
+
+      for (; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+            {
+              int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
+
+              if (len > 30)
+                len = 30;
+              printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
+                      depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
+                      (node->flag & 4)? 'f':
+                      (node->flag & 2)? 'm':
+                      (node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
+              print_string (stdout,  node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, len, ':');
+              putchar (':');
+              putchar ('\n');
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}  
+
+
+static void
+store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock, KeyHashTable stored)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  int status;
+  int any = 0;
+
+  for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        {
+          PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+          if (node->flag & 4)
+            status = TRUST_FULLY;
+          else if (node->flag & 2)
+            status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
+          else if (node->flag & 1)
+            status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+          else
+            status = 0;
+          
+          if (status)
+            {
+              update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+			       uid, depth, status);
+
+	      mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock);
+
+              any = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (any)
+    do_sync ();
+}  
+
+/*
+ * check whether the signature sig is in the klist k
+ */
+static struct key_item *
+is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  for (; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+        return k;
+    }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
+ * To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
+ * from the remain ones we look for the latest one.  If this is not a
+ * certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
+ * node flag bit 8.  Revocations are marked with flag 11, and sigs
+ * from unavailable keys are marked with flag 12.  Note that flag bits
+ * 9 and 10 are used for internal purposes.
+ */
+static void
+mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
+                       u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
+                       u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_signature *sig;
+  
+  /* first check all signatures */
+  for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      int rc;
+
+      node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+          || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        break; /* ready */
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+        continue;
+      sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      if (main_kid
+	  && sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
+        continue; /* ignore self-signatures if we pass in a main_kid */
+      if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
+        continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
+      if(sig->sig_class>=0x11 && sig->sig_class<=0x13 &&
+	 sig->sig_class-0x10<opt.min_cert_level)
+	continue; /* treat anything under our min_cert_level as an
+		     invalid signature */
+      if (klist && !is_in_klist (klist, sig))
+        continue;  /* no need to check it then */
+      if ((rc=check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL)))
+	{
+	  /* we ignore anything that won't verify, but tag the
+	     no_pubkey case */
+	  if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+	    node->flag |= 1<<12;
+	  continue;
+	}
+      node->flag |= 1<<9;
+    }      
+  /* reset the remaining flags */
+  for (; node; node = node->next)
+      node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
+
+  /* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
+   * bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
+   * processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures, and bit
+   * 11 will be set for usable revocations. */
+
+  /* for each cert figure out the latest valid one */
+  for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      KBNODE n, signode;
+      u32 kid[2];
+      u32 sigdate;
+
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        break;
+      if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
+        continue; /* not a node to look at */
+      if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
+        continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
+      node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
+      sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      signode = node;
+      sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+      kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
+
+      /* Now find the latest and greatest signature */
+      for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
+        {
+          if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+            break;
+          if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
+            continue;
+          if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
+            continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
+          sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
+          if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
+            continue;
+          n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
+
+	  /* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
+             then take signode (skip).  It doesn't matter which is
+             older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
+             as signode is nonrevocable.  If n was older then we're
+             automatically fine. */
+	  
+	  if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+	       !signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+	       (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
+	     (!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+		!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+		(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		 n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
+	    continue;
+
+	  /* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
+             then take n.  Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
+             n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
+             nonrevocable.  If signode was older then we're
+             automatically fine. */
+	  
+	  if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+		!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+		(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		 signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
+	     ((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+	       !n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+	       (n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
+            {
+              signode = n;
+              sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+	      continue;
+            }
+
+	  /* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
+             remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
+             revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
+             If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
+             packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
+             their original order. */
+
+          if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
+            {
+              signode = n;
+              sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+            }
+        }
+
+      sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
+        { /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked. 
+           * Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
+           * We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
+           * certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
+           * want that after the expiration of his certificate the
+           * system falls back to an older certification which has a
+           * different expiration time */
+          const byte *p;
+          u32 expire;
+                    
+          p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
+          expire = p? sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p) : 0;
+
+          if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
+            {
+              signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
+              if (next_expire && expire && expire < *next_expire)
+                *next_expire = expire;
+            }
+        }
+      else
+	signode->flag |= (1<<11);
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+clean_sigs_from_uid(KBNODE keyblock,KBNODE uidnode,int noisy,int self_only)
+{
+  int deleted=0;
+  KBNODE node;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+
+  assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+  keyid_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,keyid);
+
+  /* Passing in a 0 for current time here means that we'll never weed
+     out an expired sig.  This is correct behavior since we want to
+     keep the most recent expired sig in a series. */
+  mark_usable_uid_certs(keyblock,uidnode,NULL,NULL,0,NULL);
+
+  /* What we want to do here is remove signatures that are not
+     considered as part of the trust calculations.  Thus, all invalid
+     signatures are out, as are any signatures that aren't the last of
+     a series of uid sigs or revocations It breaks down like this:
+     coming out of mark_usable_uid_certs, if a sig is unflagged, it is
+     not even a candidate.  If a sig has flag 9 or 10, that means it
+     was selected as a candidate and vetted.  If a sig has flag 8 it
+     is a usable signature.  If a sig has flag 11 it is a usable
+     revocation.  If a sig has flag 12 it was issued by an unavailable
+     key.  "Usable" here means the most recent valid
+     signature/revocation in a series from a particular signer.
+
+     Delete everything that isn't a usable uid sig (which might be
+     expired), a usable revocation, or a sig from an unavailable
+     key. */
+
+  for(node=uidnode->next;
+      node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
+      node=node->next)
+    {
+      int keep=self_only?(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0]
+			  && node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1]):1;
+
+      /* Keep usable uid sigs ... */
+      if((node->flag & (1<<8)) && keep)
+	continue;
+
+      /* ... and usable revocations... */
+      if((node->flag & (1<<11)) && keep)
+	continue;
+
+      /* ... and sigs from unavailable keys. */
+      /* disabled for now since more people seem to want sigs from
+	 unavailable keys removed altogether.  */
+      /*
+	if(node->flag & (1<<12))
+	continue;
+      */
+
+      /* Everything else we delete */
+
+      /* At this point, if 12 is set, the signing key was unavailable.
+	 If 9 or 10 is set, it's superceded.  Otherwise, it's
+	 invalid. */
+
+      if(noisy)
+	log_info("removing signature from key %s on user ID \"%s\": %s\n",
+		 keystr(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid),
+		 uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+		 node->flag&(1<<12)?"key unavailable":
+		 node->flag&(1<<9)?"signature superceded":"invalid signature");
+
+      delete_kbnode(node);
+      deleted++;
+    }
+    
+  return deleted;
+}
+
+/* This is substantially easier than clean_sigs_from_uid since we just
+   have to establish if the uid has a valid self-sig, is not revoked,
+   and is not expired.  Note that this does not take into account
+   whether the uid has a trust path to it - just whether the keyholder
+   themselves has certified the uid.  Returns true if the uid was
+   compacted.  To "compact" a user ID, we simply remove ALL signatures
+   except the self-sig that caused the user ID to be remove-worthy.
+   We don't actually remove the user ID packet itself since it might
+   be ressurected in a later merge.  Note that this function requires
+   that the caller has already done a merge_keys_and_selfsig().
+
+   TODO: change the import code to allow importing a uid with only a
+   revocation if the uid already exists on the keyring. */
+
+static int
+clean_uid_from_key(KBNODE keyblock,KBNODE uidnode,int noisy)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_user_id *uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+  int deleted=0;
+
+  assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+  assert(uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
+
+  /* Skip valid user IDs, compacted user IDs, and non-self-signed user
+     IDs if --allow-non-selfsigned-uid is set. */
+  if(uid->created || uid->flags.compacted
+     || (!uid->is_expired && !uid->is_revoked
+	 && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid))
+    return 0;
+
+  for(node=uidnode->next;
+      node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
+      node=node->next)
+    if(!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
+      {
+	delete_kbnode(node);
+	deleted=1;
+	uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted=1;
+      }
+
+  if(noisy)
+    {
+      const char *reason;
+      char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,uid->len,0);
+
+      if(uid->is_revoked)
+	reason=_("revoked");
+      else if(uid->is_expired)
+	reason=_("expired");
+      else
+	reason=_("invalid");
+
+      log_info("compacting user ID \"%s\" on key %s: %s\n",
+	       user,keystr_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key),
+	       reason);
+
+      xfree(user);
+    }
+
+  return deleted;
+}
+
+/* Needs to be called after a merge_keys_and_selfsig() */
+void
+clean_one_uid(KBNODE keyblock,KBNODE uidnode,int noisy,int self_only,
+	      int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned)
+{
+  int dummy;
+
+  assert(keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
+  assert(uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
+
+  if(!uids_cleaned)
+    uids_cleaned=&dummy;
+
+  if(!sigs_cleaned)
+    sigs_cleaned=&dummy;
+
+  /* Do clean_uid_from_key first since if it fires off, we don't
+     have to bother with the other */
+  *uids_cleaned+=clean_uid_from_key(keyblock,uidnode,noisy);
+  if(!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted)
+    *sigs_cleaned+=clean_sigs_from_uid(keyblock,uidnode,noisy,self_only);
+}
+
+void
+clean_key(KBNODE keyblock,int noisy,int self_only,
+	  int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned)
+{
+  KBNODE uidnode;
+
+  merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
+
+  for(uidnode=keyblock->next;
+      uidnode && uidnode->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+      uidnode=uidnode->next)
+    if(uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
+      clean_one_uid(keyblock,uidnode,noisy,self_only,
+		    uids_cleaned,sigs_cleaned);
+}
+
+/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust
+   signature.  Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex
+   error. */
+static int
+check_regexp(const char *expr,const char *string)
+{
+#ifdef DISABLE_REGEX
+  /* When DISABLE_REGEX is defined, assume all regexps do not
+     match. */
+  return 0;
+#elif defined(__riscos__)
+  return riscos_check_regexp(expr, string, DBG_TRUST);
+#else
+  int ret;
+  regex_t pat;
+
+  if(regcomp(&pat,expr,REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB|REG_EXTENDED)!=0)
+    return 0;
+
+  ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0);
+
+  regfree(&pat);
+
+  if(DBG_TRUST)
+    log_debug("regexp `%s' on `%s': %s\n",expr,string,ret==0?"YES":"NO");
+
+  return (ret==0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
+ * key ID list.  User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
+ * flags as follows:
+ *  flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
+ *           1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
+ *           2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
+ *           8: Used for internal purposes.
+ *           9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
+ *          10: Ditto (ditto)
+ * This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
+ */
+static int
+validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
+                       u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  struct key_item *kr;
+  KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
+  PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  u32 main_kid[2];
+  int issigned=0, any_signed = 0;
+
+  keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
+  for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      /* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
+	 to be built among only self-signed uids?  On the one hand, a
+	 self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
+	 intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
+	 signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
+	 even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
+	 key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key.  I'm
+	 going with the latter.  However, if the user ID was
+	 explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
+	 should stop validity through the user ID until it is
+	 resigned.  -dshaw */
+
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+	  && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+        {
+          if (uidnode && issigned)
+            {
+              if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
+                  || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+                uidnode->flag |= 4; 
+              else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
+                uidnode->flag |= 2;
+              uidnode->flag |= 1;
+              any_signed = 1;
+            }
+          uidnode = node;
+	  uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+	  /* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
+	  if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
+	    *next_expire = uid->expiredate;
+
+          issigned = 0;
+	  get_validity_counts(pk,uid);
+          mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist, 
+                                 curtime, next_expire);
+        }
+      else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+	       && (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
+        {
+	  /* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
+          PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+          
+          kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
+	  /* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig
+             did not exist.  This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
+             since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
+             trust sig. */
+          if (kr && (kr->trust_regexp==NULL || opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP ||
+		     (uidnode && check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
+					    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
+            {
+	      if(DBG_TRUST && opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth)
+		log_debug("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d, kr depth is %d\n",
+			  uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,sig->trust_depth,
+			  kr->trust_depth);
+
+	      /* Are we part of a trust sig chain?  We always favor
+                 the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
+                 lesser trust sig or value.  I could make a decent
+                 argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
+                 what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
+	      if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP && sig->trust_depth
+		 && pk->trust_timestamp<=sig->timestamp
+		 && (sig->trust_depth<=kr->trust_depth
+		     || kr->ownertrust==TRUST_ULTIMATE))
+		{
+		  /* If we got here, we know that:
+
+		     this is a trust sig.
+
+		     it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
+		     sig on this key (not uid).
+
+		     it is legal in that it was either generated by an
+		     ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
+		     chain, and the depth does not violate the
+		     original trust sig.
+
+		     if there is a regexp attached, it matched
+		     successfully.
+		  */
+
+		  if(DBG_TRUST)
+		    log_debug("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
+			      "depth %d with %d\n",
+			      pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
+			      pk->trust_depth,sig->trust_depth);
+
+		  pk->trust_value=sig->trust_value;
+		  pk->trust_depth=sig->trust_depth-1;
+
+		  /* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
+		     on the pk for the next round. */
+		  if(sig->trust_regexp)
+		    pk->trust_regexp=sig->trust_regexp;
+		}
+
+              if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+                uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+                uid->help_full_count++;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+                uid->help_marginal_count++;
+              issigned = 1;
+	    }
+        }
+    }
+
+  if (uidnode && issigned)
+    {
+      if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
+	  || uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+        uidnode->flag |= 4; 
+      else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
+        uidnode->flag |= 2;
+      uidnode->flag |= 1;
+      any_signed = 1;
+    }
+
+  return any_signed;
+}
+
+
+static int
+search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid, PKT_user_id *dummy)
+{
+  return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
+ * kllist.  The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
+ * to create our own.  Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
+ * an error.  No results found are indicated by an empty array.
+ * Caller hast to release the returned array.  
+ */
+static struct key_array *
+validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust,
+                   struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
+  int rc;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  
+  maxkeys = 1000;
+  keys = xmalloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+  nkeys = 0;
+  
+  rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      xfree (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+  desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
+  desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust;
+  rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+      return keys;
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      xfree (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
+  do
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+        
+      rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+      if (rc) 
+        {
+          log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+          xfree (keys);
+          return NULL;
+        }
+      
+      if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) 
+        {
+          log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
+                     keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
+          dump_kbnode (keyblock);
+          release_kbnode(keyblock);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
+      merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock); 
+      clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      if (pk->has_expired || pk->is_revoked)
+        {
+          /* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
+          mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+        }
+      else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire))
+        {
+	  KBNODE node;
+
+          if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
+              && pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
+            *next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+
+          if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
+            maxkeys += 1000;
+            keys = xrealloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+          }
+          keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
+
+	  /* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we
+	     never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */
+
+	  for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+	    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4))
+	      break;
+
+	  if(node==NULL)
+	    mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+
+          keyblock = NULL;
+        }
+
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      keyblock = NULL;
+    } 
+  while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) );
+  if (rc && rc != -1) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      xfree (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+  return keys;
+} 
+
+/* Caller must sync */
+static void
+reset_trust_records(void)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  ulong recnum;
+  int count = 0, nreset = 0;
+
+  for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) 
+    {
+      if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_TRUST)
+	{
+	  count++;
+	  if(rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
+	    {
+	      rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0;
+	      write_record(&rec);
+	    }
+
+	}
+      else if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_VALID
+	      && ((rec.r.valid.validity&TRUST_MASK)
+		  || rec.r.valid.marginal_count
+		  || rec.r.valid.full_count))
+	{
+	  rec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
+	  rec.r.valid.marginal_count=rec.r.valid.full_count=0;
+	  nreset++;
+	  write_record(&rec);
+	}
+
+    }
+
+  if (opt.verbose)
+    log_info (_("%d keys processed (%d validity counts cleared)\n"),
+	      count, nreset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run the key validation procedure.
+ *
+ * This works this way:
+ * Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
+ *         mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
+ * Step 2: loop max_cert_times
+ * Step 3:   if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
+ *             ask user to assign ownertrust
+ * Step 4:   Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen 
+ * Step 5:     if key is revoked or expired
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *                continue loop at Step 4
+ * Step 6:     For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
+ *                Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
+ *                Set validity of user ID
+ * Step 7:     If any signed user ID was found
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *             End Loop
+ * Step 8:   Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
+ *           End Loop
+ *         Ready  
+ *
+ */
+static int
+validate_keys (int interactive)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  int quit=0;
+  struct key_item *klist = NULL;
+  struct key_item *k;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  struct key_array *kar;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
+  KBNODE node;
+  int depth;
+  int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
+  KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust;
+  u32 start_time, next_expire;
+
+  /* Make sure we have all sigs cached.  TODO: This is going to
+     require some architectual re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
+     Perhaps combine this with reset_trust_records(), or only check
+     the caches on keys that are actually involved in the web of
+     trust. */
+  keydb_rebuild_caches(0);
+
+  start_time = make_timestamp ();
+  next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
+  stored = new_key_hash_table ();
+  used = new_key_hash_table ();
+  full_trust = new_key_hash_table ();
+
+  kdb = keydb_new (0);
+  reset_trust_records();
+
+  /* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
+   * here when needed */
+  if (!utk_list)
+    {
+      if (!opt.quiet)
+        log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n"));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to
+     ultimate */
+  for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      KBNODE keyblock;
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+      keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
+      if (!keyblock)
+        {
+          log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
+                       " trusted key %s not found\n"), keystr(k->kid));
+          continue;
+        }
+      mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock);
+      mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock);
+      mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+	    update_validity (pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
+        }
+      if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
+           && pk->expiredate < next_expire)
+        next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+      
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+
+  klist = utk_list;
+
+  log_info(_("%d marginal(s) needed, %d complete(s) needed, %s trust model\n"),
+	   opt.marginals_needed,opt.completes_needed,trust_model_string());
+
+  for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
+    {
+      int valids=0,key_count;
+      /* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
+         klist.  */
+      ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
+      ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
+      for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
+        {
+	  int min=0;
+
+	  /* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */
+	  if(k->trust_value>=120)
+	    min=TRUST_FULLY;
+	  else if(k->trust_value>=60)
+	    min=TRUST_MARGINAL;
+
+	  if(min!=k->min_ownertrust)
+	    update_min_ownertrust(k->kid,min);
+
+          if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+	    {
+	      k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid,min);
+
+	      if (k->ownertrust == -1)
+		{
+		  quit=1;
+		  goto leave;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	  /* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb
+	     before trust sigs.  It can also happen if a user uses two
+	     different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model
+	     setting. */
+	  if(k->ownertrust<min)
+	    {
+	      if(DBG_TRUST)
+		log_debug("key %08lX%08lX:"
+			  " overriding ownertrust `%s' with `%s'\n",
+			  (ulong)k->kid[0],(ulong)k->kid[1],
+			  trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust),
+			  trust_value_to_string(min));
+
+	      k->ownertrust=min;
+	    }
+
+	  if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+            ot_unknown++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
+            ot_undefined++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
+            ot_never++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+            ot_marginal++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+            ot_full++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+            ot_ultimate++;
+
+	  valids++;
+        }
+
+      /* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
+      keys = validate_key_list (kdb, full_trust, klist,
+				start_time, &next_expire);
+      if (!keys) 
+        {
+          log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
+          rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+          goto leave;
+        }
+
+      for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
+        ;
+
+      /* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
+      if (opt.verbose > 1)
+        dump_key_array (depth, keys);
+
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+          store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock, stored);
+
+      log_info (_("depth: %d  valid: %3d  signed: %3d"
+                  "  trust: %d-, %dq, %dn, %dm, %df, %du\n"), 
+                depth, valids, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
+                ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate ); 
+
+      /* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
+      if (klist != utk_list)
+        release_key_items (klist);
+      klist = NULL;
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+        {
+          for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+            {
+              if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
+                {
+		  u32 kid[2];
+
+		  /* have we used this key already? */
+                  keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+		  if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0)
+		    {
+		      /* Normally we add both the primary and subkey
+			 ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but
+			 since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc,
+			 that doesn't matter here. */
+		      add_key_hash_table (used,kid);
+		      k = new_key_item ();
+		      k->kid[0]=kid[0];
+		      k->kid[1]=kid[1];
+		      k->ownertrust =
+			(get_ownertrust (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key)
+			 & TRUST_MASK);
+		      k->min_ownertrust =
+			get_min_ownertrust(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+		      k->trust_depth=
+			kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth;
+		      k->trust_value=
+			kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value;
+		      if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp)
+			k->trust_regexp=
+			  xstrdup(kar->keyblock->pkt->
+				   pkt.public_key->trust_regexp);
+		      k->next = klist;
+		      klist = k;
+		      break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+      release_key_array (keys);
+      keys = NULL;
+      if (!klist)
+        break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
+    }
+
+ leave:
+  keydb_release (kdb);
+  release_key_array (keys);
+  release_key_items (klist);
+  release_key_hash_table (full_trust);
+  release_key_hash_table (used);
+  release_key_hash_table (stored);
+  if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
+    {
+      if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time )
+        tdbio_write_nextcheck (0); 
+      else
+        {
+          tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire); 
+          log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+                    strtimestamp (next_expire));
+        }
+
+      if(tdbio_update_version_record()!=0)
+	{
+	  log_error(_("unable to update trustdb version record: "
+		      "write failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
+	  tdbio_invalid();
+	}
+
+      do_sync ();
+      pending_check_trustdb = 0;
+    }
+
+  return rc;
+}
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.h b/g10/trustdb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d0581f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/trustdb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* trustdb.h - Trust database
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef G10_TRUSTDB_H
+#define G10_TRUSTDB_H
+
+/* Trust values must be sorted in ascending order */
+#define TRUST_MASK	 15
+#define TRUST_UNKNOWN	  0  /* o: not yet calculated/assigned */
+#define TRUST_EXPIRED	  1  /* e: calculation may be invalid */
+#define TRUST_UNDEFINED   2  /* q: not enough information for calculation */
+#define TRUST_NEVER	  3  /* n: never trust this pubkey */
+#define TRUST_MARGINAL	  4  /* m: marginally trusted */
+#define TRUST_FULLY	  5  /* f: fully trusted      */
+#define TRUST_ULTIMATE	  6  /* u: ultimately trusted */
+/* trust values not covered by the mask */
+#define TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED 32 /* r: revoked */
+#define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64 /* r: revoked but for subkeys */
+#define TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED 128 /* d: key/uid disabled */
+#define TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK 256 /* a check-trustdb is pending */
+
+#define NAMEHASH_HASH DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
+#define NAMEHASH_LEN  20
+
+/*-- trustdb.c --*/
+void register_trusted_keyid(u32 *keyid);
+void register_trusted_key( const char *string );
+void check_trustdb (void);
+void update_trustdb (void);
+int setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname );
+void init_trustdb( void );
+void check_trustdb_stale(void);
+void sync_trustdb( void );
+
+const char *uid_trust_string_fixed(PKT_public_key *key,PKT_user_id *uid);
+const char *trust_value_to_string (unsigned int value);
+int string_to_trust_value (const char *str);
+
+void revalidation_mark (void);
+int trustdb_pending_check(void);
+void trustdb_check_or_update(void);
+
+int cache_disabled_value(PKT_public_key *pk);
+
+unsigned int get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid);
+int get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid);
+const char *get_validity_string (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid);
+
+void list_trust_path( const char *username );
+int enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
+		     unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity );
+void enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
+					   int refresh, ulong selected_lid );
+
+void read_trust_options(byte *trust_model,ulong *created,ulong *nextcheck,
+			byte *marginals,byte *completes,byte *cert_depth);
+
+unsigned int get_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk);
+unsigned int get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk);
+int get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk);
+const char *get_ownertrust_string (PKT_public_key *pk);
+
+void update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust );
+int clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk);
+
+void clean_one_uid(KBNODE keyblock,KBNODE uidnode,int noisy,int self_only,
+		   int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned);
+void clean_key(KBNODE keyblock,int noisy,int self_only,
+	       int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned);
+
+/*-- tdbdump.c --*/
+void list_trustdb(const char *username);
+void export_ownertrust(void);
+void import_ownertrust(const char *fname);
+
+/*-- pkclist.c --*/
+int edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode );
+
+#endif /*G10_TRUSTDB_H*/
diff --git a/g10/verify.c b/g10/verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..082db89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* verify.c - verify signed data
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h> /* for isatty() */
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Assume that the input is a signature and verify it without
+ * generating any output.  With no arguments, the signature packet
+ * is read from stdin (it may be a detached signature when not
+ * used in batch mode). If only a sigfile is given, it may be a complete
+ * signature or a detached signature in which case the signed stuff
+ * is expected from stdin. With more than 1 argument, the first should
+ * be a detached signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff.
+ */
+
+int
+verify_signatures( int nfiles, char **files )
+{
+    IOBUF fp;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    const char *sigfile;
+    int i, rc;
+    STRLIST sl;
+
+    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+    /* decide whether we should handle a detached or a normal signature,
+     * which is needed so that the code later can hash the correct data and
+     * not have a normal signature act as detached signature and ignoring the
+     * indended signed material from the 2nd file or stdin.
+     * 1. gpg <file        - normal
+     * 2. gpg file         - normal (or detached)
+     * 3. gpg file <file2  - detached
+     * 4. gpg file file2   - detached
+     * The question is how decide between case 2 and 3?  The only way
+     * we can do it is by reading one byte from stdin and the unget
+     * it; the problem here is that we may be reading from the
+     * terminal (which could be detected using isatty() but won't work
+     * when under contol of a pty using program (e.g. expect)) and
+     * might get us in trouble when stdin is used for another purpose
+     * (--passphrase-fd 0).  So we have to break with the behaviour
+     * prior to gpg 1.0.4 by assuming that case 3 is a normal
+     * signature (where file2 is ignored and require for a detached
+     * signature to indicate signed material comes from stdin by using
+     * case 4 with a file2 of "-".
+     *
+     * Actually we don't have to change anything here but can handle
+     * that all quite easily in mainproc.c 
+     */
+     
+
+    sigfile = nfiles? *files : NULL;
+
+    /* open the signature file */
+    fp = iobuf_open(sigfile);
+    if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (fp);
+        fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !fp ) {
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(sigfile));
+	return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+    }
+    handle_progress (&pfx, fp, sigfile);
+
+    if( !opt.no_armor && use_armor_filter( fp ) )
+	iobuf_push_filter( fp, armor_filter, &afx );
+
+    sl = NULL;
+    for(i=nfiles-1 ; i > 0 ; i-- )
+	add_to_strlist( &sl, files[i] );
+    rc = proc_signature_packets( NULL, fp, sl, sigfile );
+    free_strlist(sl);
+    iobuf_close(fp);
+    if( (afx.no_openpgp_data && rc == -1) || rc == G10ERR_NO_DATA ) {
+	log_error(_("the signature could not be verified.\n"
+		   "Please remember that the signature file (.sig or .asc)\n"
+		   "should be the first file given on the command line.\n") );
+	rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+print_file_status( int status, const char *name, int what )
+{
+    char *p = xmalloc(strlen(name)+10);
+    sprintf(p, "%d %s", what, name );
+    write_status_text( status, p );
+    xfree(p);
+}
+
+
+static int
+verify_one_file( const char *name )
+{
+    IOBUF fp;
+    armor_filter_context_t afx;
+    progress_filter_context_t pfx;
+    int rc;
+
+    print_file_status( STATUS_FILE_START, name, 1 );
+    fp = iobuf_open(name);
+    if (fp)
+      iobuf_ioctl (fp,3,1,NULL); /* disable fd caching */
+    if (fp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (fp)))
+      {
+        iobuf_close (fp);
+        fp = NULL;
+        errno = EPERM;
+      }
+    if( !fp ) {
+	print_file_status( STATUS_FILE_ERROR, name, 1 );
+	log_error(_("can't open `%s'\n"), print_fname_stdin(name));
+	return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
+    }
+    handle_progress (&pfx, fp, name);
+
+    if( !opt.no_armor ) {
+	if( use_armor_filter( fp ) ) {
+	    memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
+	    iobuf_push_filter( fp, armor_filter, &afx );
+	}
+    }
+
+    rc = proc_signature_packets( NULL, fp, NULL, name );
+    iobuf_close(fp);
+    write_status( STATUS_FILE_DONE );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Verify each file given in the files array or read the names of the
+ * files from stdin.
+ * Note:  This function can not handle detached signatures.
+ */
+int
+verify_files( int nfiles, char **files )
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if( !nfiles ) { /* read the filenames from stdin */
+	char line[2048];
+	unsigned int lno = 0;
+
+	while( fgets(line, DIM(line), stdin) ) {
+	    lno++;
+	    if( !*line || line[strlen(line)-1] != '\n' ) {
+		log_error(_("input line %u too long or missing LF\n"), lno );
+		return G10ERR_GENERAL;
+	    }
+	    /* This code does not work on MSDOS but how cares there are
+	     * also no script languages available.  We don't strip any
+	     * spaces, so that we can process nearly all filenames */
+	    line[strlen(line)-1] = 0;
+	    verify_one_file( line );
+            iobuf_ioctl( NULL, 2, 0, NULL); /* Invalidate entire cache. */
+	}
+
+    }
+    else {  /* take filenames from the array */
+        for(i=0; i < nfiles; i++ ) {
+	    verify_one_file( files[i] );
+            iobuf_ioctl( NULL, 2, 0, NULL); /* Invalidate entire cache. */
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}