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Diffstat (limited to 'g10/mainproc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 2083 |
1 files changed, 2083 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb4432a --- /dev/null +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -0,0 +1,2083 @@ +/* mainproc.c - handle packets + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, + * 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, + * USA. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <time.h> + +#include "packet.h" +#include "iobuf.h" +#include "memory.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "keydb.h" +#include "filter.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "trustdb.h" +#include "keyserver-internal.h" +#include "photoid.h" + + +struct kidlist_item { + struct kidlist_item *next; + u32 kid[2]; + int pubkey_algo; + int reason; +}; + + +/**************** + * Structure to hold the context + */ +typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX; +struct mainproc_context +{ + struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */ + PKT_public_key *last_pubkey; + PKT_secret_key *last_seckey; + PKT_user_id *last_user_id; + md_filter_context_t mfx; + int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */ + int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */ + STRLIST signed_data; + const char *sigfilename; + DEK *dek; + int last_was_session_key; + KBNODE list; /* The current list of packets. */ + int have_data; + IOBUF iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */ + int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */ + ulong symkeys; + struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */ + struct + { + int op; + int stop_now; + } pipemode; + int any_sig_seen; /* Set to true if a signature packet has been seen. */ +}; + + +static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ); + +static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ); +static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ); + + +static void +release_list( CTX c ) +{ + if( !c->list ) + return; + proc_tree(c, c->list ); + release_kbnode( c->list ); + while( c->pkenc_list ) { + struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; + xfree( c->pkenc_list ); + c->pkenc_list = tmp; + } + c->pkenc_list = NULL; + c->list = NULL; + c->have_data = 0; + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + c->pipemode.op = 0; + c->pipemode.stop_now = 0; + xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; +} + + +static int +add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + KBNODE node; + + if ( c->list ) /* add another packet */ + add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); + else /* insert the first one */ + c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt ); + + return 1; +} + + +static int +add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { + /* New clear text signature. + * Process the last one and reset everything */ + release_list(c); + } + else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) { + /* Pipemode control packet */ + if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) + log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n"); + if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) { + /* start the whole thing */ + assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */ + assert ( !c->pipemode.op ); + c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1]; + } + else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) { + /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */ + assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); + } + else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) { + assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); + release_list (c); + /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */ + c->pipemode.stop_now = 1; + } + else + log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n"); + return 0; /* no need to store the packet */ + } + + if( c->list ) /* add another packet */ + add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); + else /* insert the first one */ + c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); + + return 1; +} + + + +static int +add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + if( !c->list ) { + log_error("orphaned user ID\n" ); + return 0; + } + add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); + return 1; +} + +static int +add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + if( !c->list ) { + log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" ); + return 0; + } + add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); + return 1; +} + +static int +add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + if( !c->list ) { + log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" ); + return 0; + } + add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); + return 1; +} + + +static int +add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + KBNODE node; + + c->any_sig_seen = 1; + if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { + /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. + * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses + * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method + * of prepending the signature to the data is + * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read + * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ + node = new_kbnode( pkt ); + c->list = node; + return 1; + } + else if( !c->list ) + return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ + else if( !c->list->pkt ) + BUG(); /* so nicht */ + + /* add a new signature node id at the end */ + node = new_kbnode( pkt ); + add_kbnode( c->list, node ); + return 1; +} + +static int +symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen ) +{ + CIPHER_HANDLE hd; + + if(slen < 17 || slen > 33) + { + log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"), + (int)slen); + return G10ERR_BAD_KEY; + } + + hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 ); + cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ); + cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 ); + cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen ); + cipher_close( hd ); + + /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key to + decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */ + + dek->keylen=slen-1; + dek->algo=seskey[0]; + + if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key)) + BUG (); + + /* This is not completely accurate, since a bad passphrase may have + resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since + a bogus byte here will fail later. */ + if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) + idea_cipher_warn(0); + + memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen); + + /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/ + + return 0; +} + +static void +proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + PKT_symkey_enc *enc; + + enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; + if (!enc) + log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n"); + else if(!c->dek) + { + int algo = enc->cipher_algo; + const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo); + + if(s) + { + if(!opt.quiet) + { + if(enc->seskeylen) + log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s ); + else + log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s ); + } + } + else + log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo ); + + if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo)) + { + log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest" + " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo); + s=NULL; + } + + c->last_was_session_key = 2; + if(!s || opt.list_only) + goto leave; + + if(opt.override_session_key) + { + c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); + if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key)) + { + xfree(c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else + { + int canceled; + + c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, + NULL, &canceled); + if (canceled) + { + /* For unknown reasons passphrase_to_dek does only + return NULL if a new passphrase has been requested + and has not been repeated correctly. Thus even + with a cancel requested (by means of the gpg-agent) + it won't return NULL but an empty passphrase. We + take the most conservative approach for now and + work around it right here. */ + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + + if(c->dek) + { + c->dek->symmetric=1; + + /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric + key comes before a public key in the message - if + the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is + a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen + to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek + appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that + come later. */ + if(enc->seskeylen) + { + if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey, + enc->seskeylen)) + { + xfree(c->dek); + c->dek=NULL; + } + } + else + c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; + } + } + } + + leave: + c->symkeys++; + free_packet(pkt); +} + +static void +proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; + int result = 0; + + /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */ + c->last_was_session_key = 1; + enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; + /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ + /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is + * function to check it. */ + if( opt.verbose ) + log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) ); + + if( is_status_enabled() ) { + char buf[50]; + sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", + (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo ); + write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf ); + } + + if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) { + /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in + * secure memory because it has already been passed on the + * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */ + c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); + result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key ); + if ( result ) { + xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) { + /* FIXME: strore this all in a list and process it later */ + + if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) + || opt.try_all_secrets + || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) { + if( opt.list_only ) + result = -1; + else { + c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); + if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) { + /* error: delete the DEK */ + xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + } + } + } + else + result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; + } + else + result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; + + if( result == -1 ) + ; + else + { + /* store it for later display */ + struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x ); + x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; + x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; + x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; + x->reason = result; + x->next = c->pkenc_list; + c->pkenc_list = x; + + if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 ) + log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") ); + } + + free_packet(pkt); +} + + + +/**************** + * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could + * not decrypt. + */ +static void +print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed ) +{ + for( ; list; list = list->next ) { + PKT_public_key *pk; + const char *algstr; + + if ( failed && !list->reason ) + continue; + if ( !failed && list->reason ) + continue; + + algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo ); + pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk ); + + if( !algstr ) + algstr = "[?]"; + pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; + if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) + { + char *p; + log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"), + nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk), + strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) ); + p=get_user_id_native(list->kid); + fprintf(log_stream(),_(" \"%s\"\n"),p); + xfree(p); + } + else + log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"), + algstr,keystr(list->kid)); + + free_public_key( pk ); + + if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) { + if( is_status_enabled() ) { + char buf[20]; + sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0], + (ulong)list->kid[1] ); + write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf ); + } + } + else if (list->reason) + log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), + g10_errstr(list->reason)); + } +} + + +static void +proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + int result = 0; + + if (!opt.quiet) + { + if(c->symkeys>1) + log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys); + else if(c->symkeys==1) + log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n")); + print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); + print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); + } + + /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */ + + + write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION ); + + /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ + if( opt.list_only ) + result = -1; + else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) { + int algo; + STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL; + + if(opt.override_session_key) + { + c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); + result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key); + if(result) + { + xfree(c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else + { + /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */ + if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo)) + log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), + cipher_algo_to_string(algo)); + else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) + { + algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; + if (!algo) + algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo; + idea_cipher_warn(1); + log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, " + "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"), + cipher_algo_to_string(algo)); + } + else + { + algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; + if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) + { + /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */ + s2kbuf.mode = 0; + s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5; + s2k = &s2kbuf; + } + log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA"); + } + + c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL ); + if (c->dek) + c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; + } + } + else if( !c->dek ) + result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; + if( !result ) + result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); + + if( result == -1 ) + ; + else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) { + write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY ); + if( opt.verbose > 1 ) + log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); + if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result ) + write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC ); + else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn) + log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); + if(opt.show_session_key) + { + int i; + char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 ); + sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo ); + for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ ) + sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] ); + log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf ); + write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf ); + } + } + else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { + log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); + write_status( STATUS_BADMDC ); + write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); + } + else { + write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); + log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result)); + /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple + * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/ + } + xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + free_packet(pkt); + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION ); +} + + +static void +proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; + int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc; + KBNODE n; + + if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) + log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); + else if( opt.verbose ) + log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); + free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); + c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0); + /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 + * and no armoring - Not yet tested + * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 + * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? + * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 + */ + any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0; + for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) + { + if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) + { + /* For the onepass signature case */ + if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) + { + md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ); + if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo + == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ) + only_md5 = 1; + else + only_md5 = 0; + any = 1; + } + if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) + only_md5 = 0; + } + else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) + { + /* For the clearsigned message case */ + size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; + const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; + + /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */ + if ( datalen < 2 ) + log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); + /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped + * documents */ + clearsig = (*data == 0x01); + for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ ) + md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data ); + any = 1; + break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not + expected. */ + } + else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) + { + /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */ + md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo ); + any=1; + } + } + + if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) + { + /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal + according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that + often. There is no good way to specify what algorithms to + use in that case, so these three are the historical + answer. */ + md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 ); + md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 ); + md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ); + } + if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) { + /* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only + * catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored + * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet + * in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch. + */ + c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0); + } + if ( DBG_HASHING ) { + md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); + if ( c->mfx.md2 ) + md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); + } + if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) + rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 ); + else { + rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig ); + if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) { + /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to + * check the signature */ + rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig ); + } + } + if( rc ) + log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + free_packet(pkt); + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + + /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet. + * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. + */ + n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0)); + if (c->list) + add_kbnode (c->list, n); + else + c->list = n; +} + + +static int +proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) +{ + return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data, + ((CTX)info)->sigfilename ); +} + +static int +proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) +{ + return proc_encryption_packets( info, a ); +} + +static void +proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +{ + PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed; + int rc; + + /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/ + if( !zd->algorithm ) + rc=G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO; + else if( c->sigs_only ) + rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c ); + else if( c->encrypt_only ) + rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c ); + else + rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL ); + if( rc ) + log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + free_packet(pkt); + c->last_was_session_key = 0; +} + +/**************** + * check the signature + * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code + */ +static int +do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig, + int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey ) +{ + PKT_signature *sig; + MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL; + int algo, rc; + + assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ); + if( is_selfsig ) + *is_selfsig = 0; + sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + + algo = sig->digest_algo; + if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) ) + return rc; + + if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) { + if( c->mfx.md ) + md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); + else /* detached signature */ + md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ + } + else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { + /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text + * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ + if( c->mfx.md ) { + md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); + if( c->mfx.md2 ) + md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 ); + } + else { /* detached signature */ + log_debug("Do we really need this here?"); + md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ + md2 = md_open( 0, 0 ); + } + } + else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 + || sig->sig_class == 0x18 + || sig->sig_class == 0x1f + || sig->sig_class == 0x20 + || sig->sig_class == 0x28 + || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { + if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { + return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); + } + else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { + log_error (_("standalone revocation - " + "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); + return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; + } + else { + log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", + sig->sig_class); + return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; + } + } + else + return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; + rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); + if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 ) + rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); + md_close(md); + md_close(md2); + + return rc; +} + + +static void +print_userid( PACKET *pkt ) +{ + if( !pkt ) + BUG(); + if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) { + printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); + return; + } + if( opt.with_colons ) + { + if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) + printf("%u %lu", + pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, + pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len); + else + print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':'); + } + else + print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); +} + + +/**************** + * List the certificate in a user friendly way + */ + +static void +list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) +{ + int any=0; + int mainkey; + + if( !node ) + ; + else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ) + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { + PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; + + if( opt.with_colons ) + { + u32 keyid[2]; + keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); + if( mainkey ) + c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode? + 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL ); + printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" ); + if( c->trustletter ) + putchar( c->trustletter ); + printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::", + nbits_from_pk( pk ), + pk->pubkey_algo, + (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], + colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ), + colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) ); + if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode ) + putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) ); + putchar(':'); + if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) { + putchar('\n'); any=1; + if( opt.fingerprint ) + print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); + printf("rtv:1:%u:\n", + node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); + } + } + else + printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s%s", + mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ), + pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ), + datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":""); + + if( mainkey ) { + /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ + for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { + if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { + if( !any ) { + if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) + puts("[revoked]"); + else + putchar('\n'); + any = 1; + } + list_node(c, node ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { + if( any ) { + if( opt.with_colons ) + printf("%s:::::::::", + node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); + else + printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); + } + print_userid( node->pkt ); + if( opt.with_colons ) + putchar(':'); + putchar('\n'); + if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) + print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); + if( opt.with_colons + && node->next + && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) { + printf("rtv:2:%u:\n", + node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust? + node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0); + } + any=1; + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { + if( !any ) { + putchar('\n'); + any = 1; + } + list_node(c, node ); + } + } + } + else + { + /* of subkey */ + if( pk->is_revoked ) + { + printf(" ["); + printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk)); + printf("]"); + } + else if( pk->expiredate ) + { + printf(" ["); + printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk)); + printf("]"); + } + } + + if( !any ) + putchar('\n'); + if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) + print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); + } + else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) ) + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { + PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; + + if( opt.with_colons ) + { + u32 keyid[2]; + keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); + printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::", + mainkey? "sec":"ssb", + nbits_from_sk( sk ), + sk->pubkey_algo, + (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], + colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ), + colon_strtime (sk->expiredate) + /* fixme: add LID */ ); + } + else + printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb", + nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ), + keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk )); + if( mainkey ) { + /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ + for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { + if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { + if( !any ) { + if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) + puts("[revoked]"); + else + putchar('\n'); + any = 1; + } + list_node(c, node ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { + if( any ) { + if( opt.with_colons ) + printf("%s:::::::::", + node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); + else + printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); + } + print_userid( node->pkt ); + if( opt.with_colons ) + putchar(':'); + putchar('\n'); + if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) + print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); + any=1; + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { + if( !any ) { + putchar('\n'); + any = 1; + } + list_node(c, node ); + } + } + } + if( !any ) + putchar('\n'); + if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) + print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { + PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + int is_selfsig = 0; + int rc2=0; + size_t n; + char *p; + int sigrc = ' '; + + if( !opt.verbose ) + return; + + if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) + fputs("rev", stdout); + else + fputs("sig", stdout); + if( opt.check_sigs ) { + fflush(stdout); + switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) { + case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; + case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break; + case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: + case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break; + default: sigrc = '%'; break; + } + } + else { /* check whether this is a self signature */ + u32 keyid[2]; + + if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { + if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) + keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid ); + else + keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid ); + + if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) + is_selfsig = 1; + } + } + if( opt.with_colons ) { + putchar(':'); + if( sigrc != ' ' ) + putchar(sigrc); + printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo, + (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], + colon_datestr_from_sig(sig), + colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig)); + + if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value) + printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value); + printf(":"); + + if(sig->trust_regexp) + print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp, + strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':'); + printf(":"); + } + else + printf("%c %s %s ", + sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig)); + if( sigrc == '%' ) + printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) ); + else if( sigrc == '?' ) + ; + else if( is_selfsig ) { + if( opt.with_colons ) + putchar(':'); + fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout); + if( opt.with_colons ) + putchar(':'); + } + else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) { + p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n ); + print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons ); + xfree(p); + } + if( opt.with_colons ) + printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l'); + putchar('\n'); + } + else + log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype); +} + + + +int +proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) +{ + int rc; + CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); + + c->anchor = anchor; + rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); + xfree( c ); + return rc; +} + + + +int +proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a, + STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename ) +{ + CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); + int rc; + + c->anchor = anchor; + c->sigs_only = 1; + c->signed_data = signedfiles; + c->sigfilename = sigfilename; + rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); + + /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error + messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code. + Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check + error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process + with an error. */ + if (!rc && !c->any_sig_seen) + { + write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4"); + log_error (_("no signature found\n")); + rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA; + } + + /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on + success so that we won't issue the nodata status several + times. */ + if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any_sig_seen) + c->anchor->any_sig_seen = 1; + + xfree( c ); + return rc; +} + +int +proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) +{ + CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); + int rc; + + c->anchor = anchor; + c->encrypt_only = 1; + rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); + xfree( c ); + return rc; +} + + +int +do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ) +{ + PACKET *pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt ); + int rc=0; + int any_data=0; + int newpkt; + + c->iobuf = a; + init_packet(pkt); + while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) { + any_data = 1; + if( rc ) { + free_packet(pkt); + /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered + * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */ + if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 ) + break; + continue; + } + newpkt = -1; + if( opt.list_packets ) { + switch( pkt->pkttype ) { + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; + } + } + else if( c->sigs_only ) { + switch( pkt->pkttype ) { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_USER_ID: + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); + rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; + goto leave; + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; + } + } + else if( c->encrypt_only ) { + switch( pkt->pkttype ) { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_USER_ID: + write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); + rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; + goto leave; + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; + } + } + else { + switch( pkt->pkttype ) { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + release_list( c ); + c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); + newpkt = 1; + break; + case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: + case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: + newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt ); + break; + case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; + case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; + } + } + /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why + * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. + * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted + * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right + * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just + * an extra layer. + * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? + */ + if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC ) + c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT; + + if( newpkt == -1 ) + ; + else if( newpkt ) { + pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt ); + init_packet(pkt); + } + else + free_packet(pkt); + if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) { + /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to + * break the loop here */ + rc = -1; + break; + } + } + if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET ) + write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" ); + if( any_data ) + rc = 0; + else if( rc == -1 ) + write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" ); + + + leave: + release_list( c ); + xfree(c->dek); + free_packet( pkt ); + xfree( pkt ); + free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); + return rc; +} + + +/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out + of the notation data. */ +static pka_info_t * +get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig) +{ + pka_info_t *pka = NULL; + struct notation *nd,*notation; + + notation=sig_to_notation(sig); + + for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next) + { + if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0) + continue; /* Not the notation we want. */ + + /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future + we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked + list. */ + if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value)) + { + pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value)); + pka->valid = 0; + pka->checked = 0; + pka->uri = NULL; + strcpy (pka->email, nd->value); + break; + } + } + + free_notation(notation); + + return pka; +} + + +/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already + be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go + out and try to get that DNS record. */ +static const char * +pka_uri_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig) +{ + if (!sig->flags.pka_tried) + { + assert (!sig->pka_info); + sig->flags.pka_tried = 1; + sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig); + if (sig->pka_info) + { + char *uri; + + uri = get_pka_info (sig->pka_info->email, sig->pka_info->fpr); + if (uri) + { + sig->pka_info->valid = 1; + if (!*uri) + xfree (uri); + else + sig->pka_info->uri = uri; + } + } + } + return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL; +} + + +static int +check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node ) +{ + PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + const char *astr; + int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0; + + if (opt.skip_verify) + { + log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n")); + return 0; + } + + /* Check that the message composition is valid. + + Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed: + + S{1,n} -- detached signature. + S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature + O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature. + C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature. + + + O = One-Pass Signature packet. + S = Signature packet. + P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal) + (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows + for a signed message but that does not work as it + introduces ambiguities.) + We keep track of these packages using the marker packet + CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK. + C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures. + + We reject all other messages. + + Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of + each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently + introduce a bug here. + */ + { + KBNODE n; + int n_onepass, n_sig; + +/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */ +/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */ + + n = c->list; + assert (n); + if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) + { + /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or + "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */ + for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next) + if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) + break; + if (!n) + ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */ + else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) ) + { + if (n->next) + goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */ + } + else + goto ambiguous; + } + else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) + { + /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */ + for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next; + n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next) + n_onepass++; + if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK))) + goto ambiguous; + for (n_sig=0, n = n->next; + n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next) + n_sig++; + if (!n_sig) + goto ambiguous; + if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification) + goto ambiguous; + if (n_onepass != n_sig) + { + log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match " + "number of signature packets\n"); + goto ambiguous; + } + } + else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) + { + /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */ + n = n->next; + if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK))) + goto ambiguous; + for (n_sig=0, n = n->next; + n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next) + n_sig++; + if (n || !n_sig) + goto ambiguous; + } + else + { + ambiguous: + log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n")); + return 0; + } + + } + + /* (Indendation below not yet changed to GNU style.) */ + + astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo ); + if(keystrlen()>8) + { + log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp)); + log_info(_(" using %s key %s\n"), + astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid)); + } + else + log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"), + asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?", + keystr(sig->keyid)); + + rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); + + /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */ + + if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks) + { + const byte *p; + int seq=0; + size_t n; + + while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL))) + { + /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English + grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web + page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm + not going to even try to make two strings here :) */ + log_info(_("Key available at: ") ); + print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n ); + putc( '\n', log_stream() ); + + if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE + && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL) + { + struct keyserver_spec *spec; + + spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig); + if(spec) + { + int res; + + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++; + res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec); + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; + if(!res) + rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); + free_keyserver_spec(spec); + + if(!rc) + break; + } + } + } + } + + /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second + try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */ + if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY + && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE + && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD) + { + const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig); + + if (uri) + { + /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the + fingerprint instead of the keyid. */ + int res; + struct keyserver_spec *spec; + + spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0); + if (spec) + { + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++; + res = keyserver_import_keyid (sig->keyid, spec); + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; + free_keyserver_spec (spec); + if (!res) + rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); + } + } + } + + /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got + no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */ + + if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver + && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE) + { + int res; + + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++; + res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver ); + glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; + if(!res) + rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); + } + + if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { + KBNODE un, keyblock; + int count=0, statno; + char keyid_str[50]; + PKT_public_key *pk=NULL; + + if(rc) + statno=STATUS_BADSIG; + else if(sig->flags.expired) + statno=STATUS_EXPSIG; + else if(is_expkey) + statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG; + else if(is_revkey) + statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG; + else + statno=STATUS_GOODSIG; + + keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid ); + + sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ", + (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]); + + /* find and print the primary user ID */ + for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { + char *p; + int valid; + if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) + { + pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key; + continue; + } + if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) + continue; + if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created ) + continue; + if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked ) + continue; + if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired ) + continue; + if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) + continue; + /* We want the textual primary user ID here */ + if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) + continue; + + assert(pk); + + /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting + the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" + line. */ + valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id); + + keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ + write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, + -1 ); + + p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0); + + if(rc) + log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p); + else if(sig->flags.expired) + log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p); + else + log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p); + + xfree(p); + + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY) + fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid)); + else + fputs("\n", log_stream() ); + count++; + } + if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual + userid */ + char *p; + + /* Try for an invalid textual userid */ + for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { + if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && + !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) + break; + } + + /* Try for any userid at all */ + if(!un) { + for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { + if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) + break; + } + } + + if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un) + keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ + + write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, + un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]", + un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, + -1 ); + + if(un) + p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0); + else + p=xstrdup("[?]"); + + if(rc) + log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p); + else if(sig->flags.expired) + log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p); + else + log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p); + if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un) + { + putc(' ', log_stream() ); + fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() ); + } + fputs("\n", log_stream() ); + } + + /* If we have a good signature and already printed + * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */ + if ( count && !rc ) { + char *p; + for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { + if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) + continue; + if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked + || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired) + && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS)) + continue; + /* Only skip textual primaries */ + if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary && + !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) + continue; + + if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) + { + dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL); + + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS) + show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL); + } + + p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0); + log_info(_(" aka \"%s\""),p); + xfree(p); + + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY) + { + const char *valid; + if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked) + valid=_("revoked"); + else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired) + valid=_("expired"); + else + valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk, + un->pkt-> + pkt.user_id)); + fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",valid); + } + else + fputs("\n", log_stream() ); + } + } + release_kbnode( keyblock ); + + if( !rc ) + { + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) + show_policy_url(sig,0,1); + else + show_policy_url(sig,0,2); + + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) + show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1); + else + show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2); + + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS) + show_notation(sig,0,1, + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+ + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)); + else + show_notation(sig,0,2,0); + } + + if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) { + /* print a status response with the fingerprint */ + PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk ); + + if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) { + byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; + char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp; + size_t i, n; + + bufp = buf; + fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); + p = array; + for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) + sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); + /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below + with bits for status flags (policy url, notation, + etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to + match! */ + sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ", + strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ), + (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate, + sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo, + sig->sig_class); + bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp); + if (!vpk->is_primary) { + u32 akid[2]; + + akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0]; + akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1]; + free_public_key (vpk); + vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk ); + if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) { + /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */ + n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20; + memset (array, 0, n); + } + else + fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); + } + p = array; + for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) + sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); + write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf ); + } + free_public_key( vpk ); + } + + if (!rc) + { + if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS) + pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */ + rc = check_signatures_trust( sig ); + } + + if(sig->flags.expired) + { + log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"), + asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); + rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */ + } + else if(sig->expiredate) + log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); + + if(opt.verbose) + log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"), + sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"): + sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"), + digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo)); + + if( rc ) + g10_errors_seen = 1; + if( opt.batch && rc ) + g10_exit(1); + } + else { + char buf[50]; + sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d", + (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], + sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, + sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc ); + write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf ); + if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) { + buf[16] = 0; + write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf ); + } + if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED ) + log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) ); + } + return rc; +} + + +/**************** + * Process the tree which starts at node + */ +static void +proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ) +{ + KBNODE n1; + int rc; + + if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only ) + return; + + /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase + they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in + addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */ + while ( node + && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { + node = node->next; + } + if (!node) + return; + + c->trustletter = ' '; + if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { + merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); + list_node( c, node ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { + merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); + list_node( c, node ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { + /* check all signatures */ + if( !c->have_data ) { + free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); + /* prepare to create all requested message digests */ + c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0); + + /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the + one-pass packet? */ + for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) { + md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); + } + /* ask for file and hash it */ + if( c->sigs_only ) { + rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL, + c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, + n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); + } + else { + rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), + n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); + } + if( rc ) { + log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + return; + } + } + else if ( c->signed_data ) { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); + return; + } + + for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) + check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control + == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { + /* clear text signed message */ + if( !c->have_data ) { + log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" ); + return; + } + else if ( c->signed_data ) { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); + return; + } + + for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) + check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); + } + else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { + PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + int multiple_ok=1; + + n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE); + if(n1) + { + byte class=sig->sig_class; + byte hash=sig->digest_algo; + + for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) + { + /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of + different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have + to run a different hash context for each), but if + they are all the same, make an exception. */ + if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class + || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash) + { + multiple_ok=0; + log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. " + "Only the first will be checked.\n")); + break; + } + } + } + + if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) + log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), + sig->sig_class); + else if( !c->have_data ) { + /* detached signature */ + free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); + c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0); + if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds ) + ; + else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 + && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) { + /* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */ + c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 ); + } + else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 + && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { + /* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached + * signature has been created in textmode */ + c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 ); + } +#if 0 /* workaround disabled */ + /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug + * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures; + * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail + * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should + * then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly + * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others) + */ + /* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */ +#endif + if ( DBG_HASHING ) { + md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); + if ( c->mfx.md2 ) + md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); + } + if( c->sigs_only ) { + rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, + (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); + } + else { + rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), + (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); + } + if( rc ) { + log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + return; + } + } + else if ( c->signed_data ) { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); + return; + } + else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) + ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */ + else if (!opt.quiet) + log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); + + if(multiple_ok) + for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) ) + check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); + else + check_sig_and_print( c, node ); + } + else { + dump_kbnode (c->list); + log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n")); + dump_kbnode (node); + } +} |