Git initHEAD2.0_alphamaster2.0alpha1.0_post

1 files changed, 2083 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb4432a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2083 @@
+/* mainproc.c - handle packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "status.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+
+
+struct kidlist_item {
+    struct kidlist_item *next;
+    u32 kid[2];
+    int pubkey_algo;
+    int reason;
+};
+
+
+/****************
+ * Structure to hold the context
+ */
+typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
+struct mainproc_context
+{
+  struct mainproc_context *anchor;  /* May be useful in the future. */
+  PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
+  PKT_secret_key *last_seckey;
+  PKT_user_id     *last_user_id;
+  md_filter_context_t mfx;
+  int sigs_only;    /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
+  int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
+  STRLIST signed_data;
+  const char *sigfilename;
+  DEK *dek;
+  int last_was_session_key;
+  KBNODE list;      /* The current list of packets. */
+  int have_data;
+  IOBUF iobuf;      /* Used to get the filename etc. */
+  int trustletter;  /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
+  ulong symkeys;
+  struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+  struct 
+  {
+    int op;
+    int stop_now;
+  } pipemode;
+  int any_sig_seen;  /* Set to true if a signature packet has been seen. */
+};
+
+
+static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
+
+static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+
+
+static void
+release_list( CTX c )
+{
+    if( !c->list )
+	return;
+    proc_tree(c, c->list );
+    release_kbnode( c->list );
+    while( c->pkenc_list ) {
+	struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+	xfree( c->pkenc_list );
+	c->pkenc_list = tmp;
+    }
+    c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+    c->list = NULL;
+    c->have_data = 0;
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+    c->pipemode.op = 0;
+    c->pipemode.stop_now = 0;
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+
+  if ( c->list ) /* add another packet */
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+  else /* insert the first one */
+    c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* New clear text signature.
+         * Process the last one and reset everything */
+        release_list(c);
+    }   
+    else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
+        /* Pipemode control packet */
+        if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
+        if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
+            /* start the whole thing */
+            assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */
+            assert ( !c->pipemode.op );
+            c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1];
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) {
+            /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) {
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+            release_list (c);
+            /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
+            c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
+        }
+        else 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
+        return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
+    }   
+
+    if( c->list )  /* add another packet */
+        add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+    else /* insert the first one */
+	c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+static int
+add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("orphaned user ID\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !c->list ) {
+	log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" );
+	return 0;
+    }
+    add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    KBNODE node;
+
+    c->any_sig_seen = 1;
+    if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
+	/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
+	 * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
+	 * onepass-sig packets.  The drawback of PGP's method
+	 * of prepending the signature to the data is
+	 * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
+	 * from stdin.	(GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
+	node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+	c->list = node;
+	return 1;
+    }
+    else if( !c->list )
+	return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
+    else if( !c->list->pkt )
+	BUG();	/* so nicht */
+
+    /* add a new signature node id at the end */
+    node = new_kbnode( pkt );
+    add_kbnode( c->list, node );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
+{
+  CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
+
+  if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
+    {
+      log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
+		  (int)slen);
+      return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    }
+
+  hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
+  cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+  cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
+  cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen );
+  cipher_close( hd );
+
+  /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+     decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+
+  dek->keylen=slen-1;
+  dek->algo=seskey[0];
+
+  if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+    BUG ();
+
+  /* This is not completely accurate, since a bad passphrase may have
+     resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since
+     a bogus byte here will fail later. */
+  if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+    idea_cipher_warn(0);
+
+  memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+
+  /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+
+  return 0;
+}   
+
+static void
+proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+
+    enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
+    if (!enc)
+        log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+    else if(!c->dek)
+      {
+        int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+	const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
+
+	if(s)
+	  {
+	    if(!opt.quiet)
+	      {
+		if(enc->seskeylen)
+		  log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
+		else
+		  log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
+
+	if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+	  {
+	    log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+			" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+	    s=NULL;
+	  }
+
+	c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+	if(!s || opt.list_only)
+	  goto leave;
+
+	if(opt.override_session_key)
+	  {
+	    c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	    if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+	      {
+		xfree(c->dek);
+		c->dek = NULL;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+            int canceled;
+
+	    c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0,
+                                        NULL, &canceled);
+            if (canceled)
+              {
+                /* For unknown reasons passphrase_to_dek does only
+                   return NULL if a new passphrase has been requested
+                   and has not been repeated correctly.  Thus even
+                   with a cancel requested (by means of the gpg-agent)
+                   it won't return NULL but an empty passphrase.  We
+                   take the most conservative approach for now and
+                   work around it right here. */
+                xfree (c->dek);
+                c->dek = NULL;
+              }
+
+	    if(c->dek)
+	      {
+		c->dek->symmetric=1;
+
+		/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
+		   key comes before a public key in the message - if
+		   the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
+		   a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
+		   to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+		   appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+		   come later. */
+		if(enc->seskeylen)
+		  {
+		    if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
+					     enc->seskeylen))
+		      {
+			xfree(c->dek);
+			c->dek=NULL;
+		      }
+		  }
+		else
+		  c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+ leave:
+    c->symkeys++;
+    free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+static void
+proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
+    int result = 0;
+
+    /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */
+    c->last_was_session_key = 1;
+    enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
+    /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+    /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+     * function to check it. */
+    if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) );
+
+    if( is_status_enabled() ) {
+	char buf[50];
+	sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+		(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
+    }
+
+    if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
+	/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+	 * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+	 * command line and the GCHQ knows about it.  */
+	c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
+	if ( result ) {
+	    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+	}
+    }
+    else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
+	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)  ) {
+      /* FIXME:  strore this all in a list and process it later */
+
+	if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+                          || opt.try_all_secrets
+			  || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
+	    if( opt.list_only )
+		result = -1;
+	    else {
+		c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+		if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
+		    /* error: delete the DEK */
+		    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    }
+    else
+	result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+    if( result == -1 )
+	;
+    else
+      {
+        /* store it for later display */
+	struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x );
+	x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+	x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+	x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+	x->reason = result;
+	x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+	c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+        if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
+	  log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
+      }
+
+    free_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
+ * not decrypt.
+ */
+static void
+print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
+{
+    for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
+	PKT_public_key *pk;
+	const char *algstr;
+        
+        if ( failed && !list->reason )
+            continue;
+        if ( !failed && list->reason )
+            continue;
+
+        algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo );
+        pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+
+	if( !algstr )
+	    algstr = "[?]";
+	pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
+	if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) )
+	  {
+	    char *p;
+	    log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+		      nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+		      strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
+	    p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
+	    fprintf(log_stream(),_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	    xfree(p);
+	  }
+	else
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+		   algstr,keystr(list->kid));
+
+	free_public_key( pk );
+
+	if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
+	    if( is_status_enabled() ) {
+		char buf[20];
+		sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
+					  (ulong)list->kid[1] );
+		write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (list->reason)
+	    log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+						g10_errstr(list->reason));
+    }
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    int result = 0;
+
+    if (!opt.quiet)
+      {
+	if(c->symkeys>1)
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys);
+	else if(c->symkeys==1)
+	  log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+      }
+
+    /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+
+
+    write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
+
+    /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
+    if( opt.list_only )
+	result = -1;
+    else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
+        int algo;
+        STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
+
+	if(opt.override_session_key)
+	  {
+	    c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+	    result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+	    if(result)
+	      {
+		xfree(c->dek);
+		c->dek = NULL;
+	      }
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
+	    if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
+	      log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+                        cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+	    else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
+	      {
+		algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+		if (!algo)
+		  algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+		idea_cipher_warn(1);
+		log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+			    "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+			  cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+		if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+		  {
+		    /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
+		    s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+		    s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+		    s2k = &s2kbuf;
+		  }
+		log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+	      }
+
+	    c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
+	    if (c->dek)
+	      c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( !c->dek )
+	result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    if( !result )
+	result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+    if( result == -1 )
+	;
+    else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
+	if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
+	    write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
+	else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
+	    log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+	if(opt.show_session_key)
+	  {
+	    int i;
+	    char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
+	    sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
+	    for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
+	      sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
+	    log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf );
+	    write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
+	  }
+    }
+    else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+	log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
+	write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
+    }
+    else {
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
+	log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
+	/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
+	 * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
+    }
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+    write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
+    int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc;
+    KBNODE n;
+
+    if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
+	log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+    else if( opt.verbose )
+	log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
+    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+    c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0);
+    /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
+     * and no armoring - Not yet tested
+     * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
+     * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
+     * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
+     */
+    any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0;
+    for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+      {
+	if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG )
+	  {
+  	    /* For the onepass signature case */
+	    if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo )
+	      {
+		md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
+		if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo
+		    == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
+		  only_md5 = 1;
+		else
+		  only_md5 = 0;
+		any = 1;
+	      }
+	    if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
+	      only_md5 = 0;
+	  }
+	else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+		 == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+	  {
+	    /* For the clearsigned message case */
+            size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+            const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+            /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
+            if ( datalen < 2 )
+	      log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); 
+            /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+             * documents */
+            clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+            for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
+	      md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data );
+            any = 1;
+            break;  /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
+                       expected.  */
+	  }
+	else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
+	  {
+	    /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
+	    md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
+	    any=1;
+	  }
+      }
+
+    if( !any && !opt.skip_verify )
+      {
+	/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case.  It's not legal
+	   according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that
+	   often.  There is no good way to specify what algorithms to
+	   use in that case, so these three are the historical
+	   answer. */
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
+      }
+    if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
+	/* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2.  It does only
+	 * catch those mails which are armored.  To catch the non-armored
+	 * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
+	 * in front of the plaintext.  If someone needs this, send me a patch.
+	 */
+	c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
+    }
+    if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
+	md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+	if ( c->mfx.md2  )
+	    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+    }
+    if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 );
+    else {
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
+        if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
+            /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
+             * check the signature */
+            rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+        }
+    }
+    if( rc )
+	log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+    /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+     * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
+     */
+    n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+    if (c->list)
+        add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+    else 
+        c->list = n;
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+{
+    return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data,
+					    ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
+}
+
+static int
+proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+{
+    return proc_encryption_packets( info, a );
+}
+
+static void
+proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
+    int rc;
+
+    /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
+    if( !zd->algorithm )
+      rc=G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
+    else if( c->sigs_only )
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c );
+    else if( c->encrypt_only )
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c );
+    else
+	rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
+    if( rc )
+	log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+    free_packet(pkt);
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * check the signature
+ * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
+ */
+static int
+do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
+	      int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
+{
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
+    int algo, rc;
+
+    assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
+    if( is_selfsig )
+	*is_selfsig = 0;
+    sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+    algo = sig->digest_algo;
+    if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
+	return rc;
+
+    if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
+	if( c->mfx.md )
+	    md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+	else /* detached signature */
+	    md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
+	/* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
+	 * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
+	if( c->mfx.md ) {
+	    md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+	    if( c->mfx.md2 )
+	       md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
+	}
+	else { /* detached signature */
+	  log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
+	    md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+	    md2 = md_open( 0, 0 );
+	}
+    }
+    else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x18
+             || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x20
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+	     || sig->sig_class == 0x30	) { 
+	if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	    || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
+	}
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
+	    log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
+                         "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
+	    return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+	}
+	else {
+	    log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
+							sig->sig_class);
+	    return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+	return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+    rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
+	rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    md_close(md);
+    md_close(md2);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if( !pkt )
+	BUG();
+    if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) {
+	printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
+	return;
+    }
+    if( opt.with_colons )
+      {
+	if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+	  printf("%u %lu",
+		 pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+		 pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+	else
+	  print_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
+      }
+    else
+	print_utf8_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				     pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * List the certificate in a user friendly way
+ */
+
+static void
+list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+    int any=0;
+    int mainkey;
+
+    if( !node )
+	;
+    else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) )
+	     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	  {
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+	    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+	    if( mainkey )
+	      c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
+		0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
+	    printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
+	    if( c->trustletter )
+	      putchar( c->trustletter );
+	    printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+		   nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		   pk->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+		   colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+	    if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
+	      putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
+	    putchar(':');
+	    if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
+	      putchar('\n'); any=1;
+	      if( opt.fingerprint )
+		print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+	      printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
+		     node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
+	    }
+	  }
+	else
+	  printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s%s",
+		 mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+		 pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ),
+		 datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":"");
+
+	if( mainkey ) {
+	    /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
+	    for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
+			    puts("[revoked]");
+			else
+			    putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+		    if( any ) {
+			if( opt.with_colons )
+			    printf("%s:::::::::",
+			      node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+			else
+			    printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
+		    }
+		    print_userid( node->pkt );
+		    if( opt.with_colons )
+			putchar(':');
+		    putchar('\n');
+		    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
+			print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+		    if( opt.with_colons
+                        && node->next
+			&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
+			printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
+                               node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
+                               node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
+		    }
+		    any=1;
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	  {
+	    /* of subkey */
+	    if( pk->is_revoked )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	    else if( pk->expiredate )
+	      {
+		printf(" [");
+		printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+		printf("]");
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if( !any )
+	    putchar('\n');
+	if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
+	    print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+    }
+    else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
+	     || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	  {
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+	    keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
+	    printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
+		   mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+		   nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+		   sk->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
+		   colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
+		   /* fixme: add LID */ );
+	  }
+	else
+	  printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+		 nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+		 keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk ));
+	if( mainkey ) {
+	    /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
+	    for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
+		if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
+			    puts("[revoked]");
+			else
+			    putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+		    if( any ) {
+			if( opt.with_colons )
+			    printf("%s:::::::::",
+			      node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+			else
+			    printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
+		    }
+		    print_userid( node->pkt );
+		    if( opt.with_colons )
+			putchar(':');
+		    putchar('\n');
+		    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
+			print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
+		    any=1;
+		}
+		else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+		    if( !any ) {
+			putchar('\n');
+			any = 1;
+		    }
+		    list_node(c,  node );
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	if( !any )
+	    putchar('\n');
+	if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
+	    print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE  ) {
+	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	int is_selfsig = 0;
+	int rc2=0;
+	size_t n;
+	char *p;
+	int sigrc = ' ';
+
+	if( !opt.verbose )
+	    return;
+
+	if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
+	    fputs("rev", stdout);
+	else
+	    fputs("sig", stdout);
+	if( opt.check_sigs ) {
+	    fflush(stdout);
+	    switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
+	      case 0:		       sigrc = '!'; break;
+	      case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:    sigrc = '-'; break;
+	      case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: 
+	      case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:  sigrc = '?'; break;
+	      default:		       sigrc = '%'; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else {	/* check whether this is a self signature */
+	    u32 keyid[2];
+
+	    if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+		|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+		if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		    keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid );
+		else
+		    keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid );
+
+		if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
+		    is_selfsig = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+	if( opt.with_colons ) {
+	    putchar(':');
+	    if( sigrc != ' ' )
+		putchar(sigrc);
+	    printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+		   (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		   colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
+		   colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+
+	    if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+	      printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+	    printf(":");
+
+	    if(sig->trust_regexp)
+	      print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
+			   strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
+	    printf(":");
+	}
+	else
+	  printf("%c       %s %s   ",
+		 sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
+	if( sigrc == '%' )
+	    printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
+	else if( sigrc == '?' )
+	    ;
+	else if( is_selfsig ) {
+	    if( opt.with_colons )
+		putchar(':');
+	    fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout);
+	    if( opt.with_colons )
+		putchar(':');
+	}
+	else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
+	    p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
+	    print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
+	    xfree(p);
+	}
+	if( opt.with_colons )
+	    printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+	putchar('\n');
+    }
+    else
+	log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
+}
+
+
+
+int
+proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+{
+    int rc;
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
+			STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
+{
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+    int rc;
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    c->sigs_only = 1;
+    c->signed_data = signedfiles;
+    c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+
+    /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+       messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+       Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+       error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+       with an error. */ 
+    if (!rc && !c->any_sig_seen)
+      {
+	write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+        log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA;
+      }
+
+    /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on
+       success so that we won't issue the nodata status several
+       times. */
+    if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any_sig_seen)
+      c->anchor->any_sig_seen = 1;
+
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+{
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+    int rc;
+
+    c->anchor = anchor;
+    c->encrypt_only = 1;
+    rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
+    xfree( c );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
+{
+    PACKET *pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+    int rc=0;
+    int any_data=0;
+    int newpkt;
+
+    c->iobuf = a;
+    init_packet(pkt);
+    while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
+	any_data = 1;
+	if( rc ) {
+	    free_packet(pkt);
+            /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+             * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
+	    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
+		break;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	newpkt = -1;
+	if( opt.list_packets ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( c->sigs_only ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+		rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+		goto leave;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if( c->encrypt_only ) {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+		rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+		goto leave;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+		release_list( c );
+		c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+		newpkt = 1;
+		break;
+	      case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+	      case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+		newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
+		break;
+	      case PKT_USER_ID:     newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:  proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+	      case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+	      case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+	      case PKT_RING_TRUST:  newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
+	      default: newpkt = 0; break;
+	    }
+	}
+        /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+         * I used it.  Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+         * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+         * packet and not to reuse the current one ...  It works right
+         * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
+         * an extra layer.
+         * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? 
+         */
+	if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
+	    c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+
+	if( newpkt == -1 )
+	    ;
+	else if( newpkt ) {
+	    pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+	    init_packet(pkt);
+	}
+	else
+	    free_packet(pkt);
+        if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
+            /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to 
+             * break the loop here */ 
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
+    if( any_data )
+	rc = 0;
+    else if( rc == -1 )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
+
+
+  leave:
+    release_list( c );
+    xfree(c->dek);
+    free_packet( pkt );
+    xfree( pkt );
+    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
+   of the notation data. */
+static pka_info_t *
+get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
+  struct notation *nd,*notation;
+
+  notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+  for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
+    {
+      if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
+        continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
+
+      /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
+	 we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
+	 list. */
+      if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
+	{
+	  pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
+	  pka->valid = 0;
+	  pka->checked = 0;
+	  pka->uri = NULL;
+	  strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+
+  free_notation(notation);
+
+  return pka;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record.  If this record has already
+   be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
+   out and try to get that DNS record. */
+static const char *
+pka_uri_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
+    {
+      assert (!sig->pka_info);
+      sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
+      sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
+      if (sig->pka_info)
+        {
+          char *uri;
+
+          uri = get_pka_info (sig->pka_info->email, sig->pka_info->fpr);
+          if (uri)
+            {
+              sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
+              if (!*uri)
+                xfree (uri);
+              else
+                sig->pka_info->uri = uri;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+  PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+  const char *astr;
+  int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
+
+  if (opt.skip_verify)
+    {
+      log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  /* Check that the message composition is valid.
+
+     Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
+
+     S{1,n}           -- detached signature.
+     S{1,n} P         -- old style PGP2 signature
+     O{1,n} P S{1,n}  -- standard OpenPGP signature.
+     C P S{1,n}       -- cleartext signature.
+
+        
+          O = One-Pass Signature packet.
+          S = Signature packet.
+          P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
+                 (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
+                  for a signed message but that does not work as it
+                  introduces ambiguities.)
+              We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
+              CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
+          C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
+
+     We reject all other messages.
+     
+     Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
+     each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
+     introduce a bug here.
+  */
+  {
+    KBNODE n;
+    int n_onepass, n_sig;
+
+/*     log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
+/*     dump_kbnode (c->list); */
+
+    n = c->list;
+    assert (n);
+    if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) 
+      {
+        /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
+           "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
+        for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
+          if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+            break;
+        if (!n)
+          ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature.  */
+        else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                     == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
+          {
+            if (n->next)
+              goto ambiguous;  /* We only allow one P packet. */
+          }
+        else
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) 
+      {
+        /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
+        for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
+          n_onepass++;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (!n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+        if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
+          goto ambiguous;
+        if (n_onepass != n_sig)
+          {
+            log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
+                      "number of signature packets\n");
+            goto ambiguous;
+          }
+      }
+    else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+      {
+        /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
+        n = n->next;
+        if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                    && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                        == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+          goto ambiguous;
+        for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+             n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+          n_sig++;
+        if (n || !n_sig)
+          goto ambiguous;
+      }
+    else 
+      {
+      ambiguous:
+        log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+  }
+
+  /* (Indendation below not yet changed to GNU style.) */
+
+    astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo );
+    if(keystrlen()>8)
+      {
+	log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+	log_info(_("               using %s key %s\n"),
+		 astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
+      }
+    else
+      log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+	       asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+	       keystr(sig->keyid));
+
+    rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+
+    /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
+
+    if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+      {
+	const byte *p;
+	int seq=0;
+	size_t n;
+
+	while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+	  {
+	    /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
+	       grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
+	       page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver.  I'm
+	       not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
+	    log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+	    print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n );
+	    putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+
+	    if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+	       && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
+	      {
+		struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+		spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
+		if(spec)
+		  {
+		    int res;
+
+		    glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+		    res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec);
+		    glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+		    if(!res)
+		      rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+		    free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+
+		    if(!rc)
+		      break;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
+       try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
+    if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY 
+	 && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+         && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD)
+      {
+        const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
+        
+        if (uri)
+          {
+            /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+               fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+            int res;
+            struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+            
+            spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
+            if (spec)
+              {
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+                res = keyserver_import_keyid (sig->keyid, spec);
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+                if (!res)
+                  rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+              }
+          }
+      }
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
+       no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
+
+    if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver
+	&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+      {
+	int res;
+
+	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+	res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
+	glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+	if(!res)
+	  rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+      }
+
+    if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+	KBNODE un, keyblock;
+	int count=0, statno;
+        char keyid_str[50];
+	PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+
+	if(rc)
+	  statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
+	else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	  statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
+	else if(is_expkey)
+	  statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+	else if(is_revkey)
+	  statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+	else
+	  statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
+
+	keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
+
+        sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+                 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+
+        /* find and print the primary user ID */
+	for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+	    char *p;
+	    int valid;
+	    if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+	      {
+	        pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+		continue;
+	      }
+	    if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+		continue;
+	    if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
+	        continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
+                continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
+                continue;
+	    if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
+	        continue;
+	    /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+	    if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+	        continue;
+
+	    assert(pk);
+
+	    /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
+	       the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
+	       line. */
+	    valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+
+            keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+	    p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+			     un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+
+	    if(rc)
+	      log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	      log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else
+	      log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+
+	    xfree(p);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+	      fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+	    else
+	      fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            count++;
+	}
+	if( !count ) {	/* just in case that we have no valid textual
+                           userid */
+	    char *p;
+
+	    /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+		    !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                    break;
+            }
+
+	    /* Try for any userid at all */
+	    if(!un) {
+	        for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                    if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+                        break;
+		}
+	    }
+
+            if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+                keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+	    if(un)
+	      p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+	    else
+	      p=xstrdup("[?]");
+
+	    if(rc)
+	      log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else if(sig->flags.expired)
+	      log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
+	    else
+	      log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+            if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
+	      {
+                putc(' ', log_stream() );
+                fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() );
+	      }
+	    fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+	}
+
+        /* If we have a good signature and already printed 
+         * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+        if ( count && !rc ) {
+	    char *p;
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+                    continue;
+                if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+		    || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		   && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+		  continue;
+		/* Only skip textual primaries */
+                if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
+		     !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+		    continue;
+
+		if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+		  {
+		    dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
+
+		    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+		      show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+				  un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+		  }
+
+		p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+				 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+		log_info(_("                aka \"%s\""),p);
+		xfree(p);
+
+		if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+		  {
+		    const char *valid;
+		    if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+		      valid=_("revoked");
+		    else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+		      valid=_("expired");
+		    else
+		      valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
+							       un->pkt->
+							       pkt.user_id));
+		    fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",valid);
+		  }
+		else
+		  fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            }
+	}
+	release_kbnode( keyblock );
+
+	if( !rc )
+	  {
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)
+	      show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
+	    else
+	      show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)
+	      show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
+	    else
+	      show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
+
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS)
+	      show_notation(sig,0,1,
+		        ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
+			((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
+	    else
+	      show_notation(sig,0,2,0);
+	  }
+
+	if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	    /* print a status response with the fingerprint */
+	    PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
+
+	    if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
+		byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+		char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
+		size_t i, n;
+
+                bufp = buf;
+		fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+		p = array;
+		for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+		/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
+		   with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
+		   etc.).  Remember to make the buffer larger to
+		   match! */
+		sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
+                        strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
+                        (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
+			sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
+			sig->sig_class);
+                bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
+                if (!vpk->is_primary) {
+                   u32 akid[2];
+ 
+                   akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
+                   akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
+                   free_public_key (vpk);
+                   vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
+                   if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
+                     /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
+                     n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
+                     memset (array, 0, n);
+                   }
+                   else
+                     fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+                }
+		p = array;
+		for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+		write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
+	    }
+	    free_public_key( vpk );
+	}
+
+	if (!rc)
+          {
+	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS)
+	      pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
+	    rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
+          }
+
+	if(sig->flags.expired)
+	  {
+	    log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
+		     asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+	    rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
+	  }
+	else if(sig->expiredate)
+	  log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+	if(opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
+		   sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+		   sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+		   digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo));
+
+	if( rc )
+	    g10_errors_seen = 1;
+	if( opt.batch && rc )
+	    g10_exit(1);
+    }
+    else {
+	char buf[50];
+	sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
+		     (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+		     sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
+		     sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
+	if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
+	    buf[16] = 0;
+	    write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
+	}
+	if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
+	    log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Process the tree which starts at node
+ */
+static void
+proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+{
+    KBNODE n1;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
+	return;
+
+    /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
+       they may be the root packet.  These packets are only used in
+       addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
+    while ( node
+            && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+            && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                         == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
+        node = node->next;
+    }
+    if (!node)
+        return;
+
+    c->trustletter = ' ';
+    if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
+	list_node( c, node );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+	merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
+	list_node( c, node );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
+	/* check all signatures */
+	if( !c->have_data ) {
+	    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+	    /* prepare to create all requested message digests */
+	    c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
+
+	    /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
+               one-pass packet? */
+	    for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
+		md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+	    }
+	    /* ask for file and hash it */
+	    if( c->sigs_only ) {
+		rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL,
+				     c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
+			n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+						iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+			n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+	    }
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+
+	for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* clear text signed message */
+	if( !c->have_data ) {
+            log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+	
+	for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+    }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	int multiple_ok=1;
+
+	n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+	if(n1)
+	  {
+	    byte class=sig->sig_class;
+	    byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
+
+	    for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+	      {
+		/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+		   different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
+		   to run a different hash context for each), but if
+		   they are all the same, make an exception. */
+		if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
+		   || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
+		  {
+		    multiple_ok=0;
+		    log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected.  "
+			       "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+		    break;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
+	    log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
+						    sig->sig_class);
+	else if( !c->have_data ) {
+	    /* detached signature */
+	    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
+	    c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
+	    if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
+		;
+	    else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+		     && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
+		/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
+		c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
+	    }
+	    else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+		     && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+		     && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
+		/* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached
+		 * signature has been created in textmode */
+		c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
+	    }
+#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
+	    /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
+	     * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
+	     * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
+	     * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
+	     * then produce the "correct" hash.  This is very, very ugly
+	     * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
+	     */
+		    /*	c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
+#endif
+            if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
+                md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+                if ( c->mfx.md2  )
+                    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+            }
+	    if( c->sigs_only ) {
+		rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+				     c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
+				     (sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+						iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+						(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+	    }
+	    if( rc ) {
+		log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+            ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */
+	else if (!opt.quiet)
+	    log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
+
+	if(multiple_ok)
+	  for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
+	    check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+	else
+	  check_sig_and_print( c, node );
+    }
+    else {
+        dump_kbnode (c->list);
+	log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
+        dump_kbnode (node);
+    }
+}