diff options
| author | jbj <devnull@localhost> | 2002-08-14 16:31:49 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | jbj <devnull@localhost> | 2002-08-14 16:31:49 +0000 |
| commit | d481ba55c02407124c499c7800ea556786137bc5 (patch) | |
| tree | e0d3fdb7906ae3290f019999e0661cfc5b1b3f58 /db/crypto | |
| parent | 9114d6ffea4ee330874ebc8febe225ce0e891eac (diff) | |
| download | librpm-tizen-d481ba55c02407124c499c7800ea556786137bc5.tar.gz librpm-tizen-d481ba55c02407124c499c7800ea556786137bc5.tar.bz2 librpm-tizen-d481ba55c02407124c499c7800ea556786137bc5.zip | |
Initial revision
CVS patchset: 5630
CVS date: 2002/08/14 16:31:49
Diffstat (limited to 'db/crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/aes_method.c | 276 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/crypto.c | 340 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/crypto.html | 639 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/mersenne/mt19937db.c | 196 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.c | 1466 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h | 40 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.c | 496 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h | 93 |
8 files changed, 3546 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/db/crypto/aes_method.c b/db/crypto/aes_method.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5cfc54b8c --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/aes_method.c @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/*- + * See the file LICENSE for redistribution information. + * + * Copyright (c) 2001-2002 + * Sleepycat Software. All rights reserved. + * + * + * Some parts of this code originally written by Adam Stubblefield, + * astubble@rice.edu. + */ + +#include "db_config.h" + +#ifndef lint +static const char revid[] = "Id: aes_method.c,v 1.16 2002/08/06 06:11:14 bostic Exp "; +#endif /* not lint */ + +#ifndef NO_SYSTEM_INCLUDES +#include <string.h> +#endif + +#include "db_int.h" +#include "dbinc/crypto.h" +#include "dbinc/hmac.h" + +static void __aes_err __P((DB_ENV *, int)); +static int __aes_derivekeys __P((DB_ENV *, DB_CIPHER *, u_int8_t *, size_t)); + +/* + * __aes_setup -- + * Setup AES functions. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_setup __P((DB_ENV *, DB_CIPHER *)); + */ +int +__aes_setup(dbenv, db_cipher) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; +{ + AES_CIPHER *aes_cipher; + int ret; + + db_cipher->adj_size = __aes_adj_size; + db_cipher->close = __aes_close; + db_cipher->decrypt = __aes_decrypt; + db_cipher->encrypt = __aes_encrypt; + db_cipher->init = __aes_init; + if ((ret = __os_calloc(dbenv, 1, sizeof(AES_CIPHER), &aes_cipher)) != 0) + return (ret); + db_cipher->data = aes_cipher; + return (0); +} + +/* + * __aes_adj_size -- + * Given a size, return an addition amount needed to meet the + * "chunk" needs of the algorithm. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_adj_size __P((size_t)); + */ +int +__aes_adj_size(len) + size_t len; +{ + if (len % DB_AES_CHUNK == 0) + return (0); + return ((int)(DB_AES_CHUNK - (len % DB_AES_CHUNK))); +} + +/* + * __aes_close -- + * Destroy the AES encryption instantiation. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_close __P((DB_ENV *, void *)); + */ +int +__aes_close(dbenv, data) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + void *data; +{ + __os_free(dbenv, data); + return (0); +} + +/* + * __aes_decrypt -- + * Decrypt data with AES. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_decrypt __P((DB_ENV *, void *, void *, + * PUBLIC: u_int8_t *, size_t)); + */ +int +__aes_decrypt(dbenv, aes_data, iv, cipher, cipher_len) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + void *aes_data; + void *iv; + u_int8_t *cipher; + size_t cipher_len; +{ + AES_CIPHER *aes; + cipherInstance c; + int ret; + + aes = (AES_CIPHER *)aes_data; + if (iv == NULL || cipher == NULL) + return (EINVAL); + if ((cipher_len % DB_AES_CHUNK) != 0) + return (EINVAL); + /* + * Initialize the cipher + */ + if ((ret = __db_cipherInit(&c, MODE_CBC, iv)) < 0) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + + /* Do the decryption */ + if ((ret = __db_blockDecrypt(&c, &aes->decrypt_ki, cipher, + cipher_len * 8, cipher)) < 0) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * __aes_encrypt -- + * Encrypt data with AES. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_encrypt __P((DB_ENV *, void *, void *, + * PUBLIC: u_int8_t *, size_t)); + */ +int +__aes_encrypt(dbenv, aes_data, iv, data, data_len) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + void *aes_data; + void *iv; + u_int8_t *data; + size_t data_len; +{ + AES_CIPHER *aes; + cipherInstance c; + u_int32_t tmp_iv[DB_IV_BYTES/4]; + int ret; + + aes = (AES_CIPHER *)aes_data; + if (aes == NULL || data == NULL) + return (EINVAL); + if ((data_len % DB_AES_CHUNK) != 0) + return (EINVAL); + /* + * Generate the IV here. We store it in a tmp IV because + * the IV might be stored within the data we are encrypting + * and so we will copy it over to the given location after + * encryption is done. + * We don't do this outside of there because some encryption + * algorithms someone might add may not use IV's and we always + * want on here. + */ + if ((ret = __db_generate_iv(dbenv, tmp_iv)) != 0) + return (ret); + + /* + * Initialize the cipher + */ + if ((ret = __db_cipherInit(&c, MODE_CBC, (char *)tmp_iv)) < 0) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + + /* Do the encryption */ + if ((ret = __db_blockEncrypt(&c, &aes->encrypt_ki, data, data_len * 8, + data)) < 0) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + memcpy(iv, tmp_iv, DB_IV_BYTES); + return (0); +} + +/* + * __aes_init -- + * Initialize the AES encryption instantiation. + * + * PUBLIC: int __aes_init __P((DB_ENV *, DB_CIPHER *)); + */ +int +__aes_init(dbenv, db_cipher) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; +{ + return (__aes_derivekeys(dbenv, db_cipher, (u_int8_t *)dbenv->passwd, + dbenv->passwd_len)); +} + +static int +__aes_derivekeys(dbenv, db_cipher, passwd, plen) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; + u_int8_t *passwd; + size_t plen; +{ + SHA1_CTX ctx; + AES_CIPHER *aes; + int ret; + u_int32_t temp[DB_MAC_KEY/4]; + + if (passwd == NULL) + return (EINVAL); + + aes = (AES_CIPHER *)db_cipher->data; + + /* Derive the crypto keys */ + __db_SHA1Init(&ctx); + __db_SHA1Update(&ctx, passwd, plen); + __db_SHA1Update(&ctx, (u_int8_t *)DB_ENC_MAGIC, strlen(DB_ENC_MAGIC)); + __db_SHA1Update(&ctx, passwd, plen); + __db_SHA1Final((u_int8_t *)temp, &ctx); + + if ((ret = __db_makeKey(&aes->encrypt_ki, DIR_ENCRYPT, + DB_AES_KEYLEN, (char *)temp)) != TRUE) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + if ((ret = __db_makeKey(&aes->decrypt_ki, DIR_DECRYPT, + DB_AES_KEYLEN, (char *)temp)) != TRUE) { + __aes_err(dbenv, ret); + return (EAGAIN); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * __aes_err -- + * Handle AES-specific errors. Codes and messages derived from + * rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h. + */ +static void +__aes_err(dbenv, err) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + int err; +{ + char *errstr; + + switch (err) { + case BAD_KEY_DIR: + errstr = "AES key direction is invalid"; + break; + case BAD_KEY_MAT: + errstr = "AES key material not of correct length"; + break; + case BAD_KEY_INSTANCE: + errstr = "AES key passwd not valid"; + break; + case BAD_CIPHER_MODE: + errstr = "AES cipher in wrong state (not initialized)"; + break; + case BAD_BLOCK_LENGTH: + errstr = "AES bad block length"; + break; + case BAD_CIPHER_INSTANCE: + errstr = "AES cipher instance is invalid"; + break; + case BAD_DATA: + errstr = "AES data contents are invalid"; + break; + case BAD_OTHER: + errstr = "AES unknown error"; + break; + default: + errstr = "AES error unrecognized"; + break; + } + __db_err(dbenv, errstr); + return; +} diff --git a/db/crypto/crypto.c b/db/crypto/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a47ca89bb --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +/*- + * See the file LICENSE for redistribution information. + * + * Copyright (c) 1996-2001 + * Sleepycat Software. All rights reserved. + * + * Some parts of this code originally written by Adam Stubblefield + * - astubble@rice.edu + */ + +#include "db_config.h" + +#ifndef lint +static const char revid[] = "Id: crypto.c,v 1.18 2002/08/06 06:11:14 bostic Exp "; +#endif /* not lint */ + +#ifndef NO_SYSTEM_INCLUDES +#include <string.h> +#endif + +#include "db_int.h" +#include "dbinc/db_page.h" +#include "dbinc/crypto.h" + +/* + * __crypto_region_init -- + * Initialize crypto. + * + * PUBLIC: int __crypto_region_init __P((DB_ENV *)); + */ +int +__crypto_region_init(dbenv) + DB_ENV *dbenv; +{ + REGENV *renv; + REGINFO *infop; + CIPHER *cipher; + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; + char *sh_passwd; + int ret; + + db_cipher = dbenv->crypto_handle; + + ret = 0; + infop = dbenv->reginfo; + renv = infop->primary; + MUTEX_LOCK(dbenv, &renv->mutex); + if (renv->cipher_off == INVALID_ROFF) { + if (!CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)) + goto out; + if (!F_ISSET(infop, REGION_CREATE)) { + __db_err(dbenv, + "Joining non-encrypted environment with encryption key"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY)) { + __db_err(dbenv, "Encryption algorithm not supplied"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* + * Must create the shared information. We need: + * Shared cipher information that contains the passwd. + * After we copy the passwd, we smash and free the one in the + * dbenv. + */ + if ((ret = __db_shalloc(infop->addr, + sizeof(CIPHER), MUTEX_ALIGN, &cipher)) != 0) + goto out; + memset(cipher, 0, sizeof(*cipher)); + if ((ret = __db_shalloc(infop->addr, + dbenv->passwd_len, 0, &sh_passwd)) != 0) { + __db_shalloc_free(infop->addr, cipher); + goto out; + } + memset(sh_passwd, 0, dbenv->passwd_len); + cipher->passwd = R_OFFSET(infop, sh_passwd); + cipher->passwd_len = dbenv->passwd_len; + cipher->flags = db_cipher->alg; + memcpy(sh_passwd, dbenv->passwd, cipher->passwd_len); + renv->cipher_off = R_OFFSET(infop, cipher); + } else { + if (!CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)) { + __db_err(dbenv, + "Encrypted environment: no encryption key supplied"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + cipher = R_ADDR(infop, renv->cipher_off); + sh_passwd = R_ADDR(infop, cipher->passwd); + if ((cipher->passwd_len != dbenv->passwd_len) || + memcmp(dbenv->passwd, sh_passwd, cipher->passwd_len) != 0) { + __db_err(dbenv, "Invalid password"); + ret = EPERM; + goto out; + } + if (!F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY) && + db_cipher->alg != cipher->flags) { + __db_err(dbenv, + "Environment encrypted using a different algorithm"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + if (F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY)) + /* + * We have CIPHER_ANY and we are joining the + * existing env. Setup our cipher structure + * for whatever algorithm this env has. + */ + if ((ret = __crypto_algsetup(dbenv, db_cipher, + cipher->flags, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + } + MUTEX_UNLOCK(dbenv, &renv->mutex); + ret = db_cipher->init(dbenv, db_cipher); + + /* + * On success, no matter if we allocated it or are using the + * already existing one, we are done with the passwd in the dbenv. + * We smash N-1 bytes so that we don't overwrite the nul. + */ + memset(dbenv->passwd, 0xff, dbenv->passwd_len-1); + __os_free(dbenv, dbenv->passwd); + dbenv->passwd = NULL; + dbenv->passwd_len = 0; + + if (0) { +out: MUTEX_UNLOCK(dbenv, &renv->mutex); + } + return (ret); +} + +/* + * __crypto_dbenv_close -- + * Crypto-specific destruction of DB_ENV structure. + * + * PUBLIC: int __crypto_dbenv_close __P((DB_ENV *)); + */ +int +__crypto_dbenv_close(dbenv) + DB_ENV *dbenv; +{ + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; + int ret; + + ret = 0; + db_cipher = dbenv->crypto_handle; + if (dbenv->passwd != NULL) { + memset(dbenv->passwd, 0xff, dbenv->passwd_len-1); + __os_free(dbenv, dbenv->passwd); + dbenv->passwd = NULL; + } + if (!CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)) + return (0); + if (!F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY)) + ret = db_cipher->close(dbenv, db_cipher->data); + __os_free(dbenv, db_cipher); + return (ret); +} + +/* + * __crypto_algsetup -- + * Given a db_cipher structure and a valid algorithm flag, call + * the specific algorithm setup function. + * + * PUBLIC: int __crypto_algsetup __P((DB_ENV *, DB_CIPHER *, u_int32_t, int)); + */ +int +__crypto_algsetup(dbenv, db_cipher, alg, do_init) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; + u_int32_t alg; + int do_init; +{ + int ret; + + ret = 0; + if (!CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)) { + __db_err(dbenv, "No cipher structure given"); + return (EINVAL); + } + F_CLR(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY); + switch (alg) { + case CIPHER_AES: + db_cipher->alg = CIPHER_AES; + ret = __aes_setup(dbenv, db_cipher); + break; + default: + __db_panic(dbenv, EINVAL); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + if (do_init) + ret = db_cipher->init(dbenv, db_cipher); + return (ret); +} + +/* + * __crypto_decrypt_meta -- + * Perform decryption on a metapage if needed. + * + * PUBLIC: int __crypto_decrypt_meta __P((DB_ENV *, DB *, + * PUBLIC: u_int8_t *, size_t, int)); + */ +int +__crypto_decrypt_meta(dbenv, dbp, mbuf, len, do_metachk) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + DB *dbp; + u_int8_t *mbuf; + size_t len; + int do_metachk; +{ + DB_CIPHER *db_cipher; + DB dummydb; + DBMETA *meta; + size_t pg_off; + int ret; + u_int8_t *iv; + + DB_ASSERT(len >= DBMETASIZE); + /* + * If we weren't given a dbp, we just want to decrypt the page + * on behalf of some internal subsystem, not on behalf of a user + * with a dbp. Therefore, set up a dummy dbp so that the call + * to P_OVERHEAD below works. + */ + if (dbp == NULL) { + memset(&dummydb, 0, sizeof(DB)); + dbp = &dummydb; + } + /* + * Meta-pages may be encrypted for DBMETASIZE bytes. If + * we have a non-zero IV (that is written after encryption) + * then we decrypt (or error if the user isn't set up for + * security). We guarantee that the IV space on non-encrypted + * pages will be zero and a zero-IV is illegal for encryption. + * Therefore any non-zero IV means an encrypted database. + * This basically checks the passwd on the file + * if we cannot find a good magic number. + * We walk through all the algorithms we know about attempting + * to decrypt (and possibly byteswap). + * + * !!! + * All method meta pages have the IV and checksum at the + * exact same location, but not in DBMETA, use BTMETA. + */ + ret = 0; + meta = (DBMETA *)mbuf; + if (meta->encrypt_alg != 0) { + db_cipher = (DB_CIPHER *)dbenv->crypto_handle; + if (!F_ISSET(dbp, DB_AM_ENCRYPT)) { + if (!CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)) { + __db_err(dbenv, + "Encrypted database: no encryption flag specified"); + return (EINVAL); + } + /* + * User has a correct, secure env, but has + * encountered a database in that env that is + * secure, but user didn't dbp->set_flags. Since + * it is existing, use encryption if it is that + * way already. + */ + F_SET(dbp, DB_AM_ENCRYPT|DB_AM_CHKSUM); + } + /* + * This was checked in set_flags when DB_AM_ENCRYPT was set. + * So it better still be true here. + */ + DB_ASSERT(CRYPTO_ON(dbenv)); + if (!F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY) && + meta->encrypt_alg != db_cipher->alg) { + __db_err(dbenv, + "Database encrypted using a different algorithm"); + return (EINVAL); + } + DB_ASSERT(F_ISSET(dbp, DB_AM_CHKSUM)); + iv = ((BTMETA *)mbuf)->iv; + /* + * For ALL pages, we do not encrypt the beginning + * of the page that contains overhead information. + * This is true of meta and all other pages. + */ + pg_off = P_OVERHEAD(dbp); +alg_retry: + /* + * If they asked for a specific algorithm, then + * use it. Otherwise walk through those we know. + */ + if (!F_ISSET(db_cipher, CIPHER_ANY)) { + if (do_metachk && (ret = db_cipher->decrypt(dbenv, + db_cipher->data, iv, mbuf + pg_off, + DBMETASIZE - pg_off))) + return (ret); + if (((BTMETA *)meta)->crypto_magic != + meta->magic) { + __db_err(dbenv, "Invalid password"); + return (EINVAL); + } + /* + * Success here. The algorithm asked for and the one + * on the file match. We've just decrypted the meta + * page and checked the magic numbers. They match, + * indicating the password is right. All is right + * with the world. + */ + return (0); + } + /* + * If we get here, CIPHER_ANY must be set. + */ + ret = __crypto_algsetup(dbenv, db_cipher, meta->encrypt_alg, 1); + goto alg_retry; + } else if (F_ISSET(dbp, DB_AM_ENCRYPT)) { + /* + * They gave us a passwd, but the database is not + * encrypted. This is an error. We do NOT want to + * silently allow them to write data in the clear when + * the user set up and expects encrypted data. + * + * This covers at least the following scenario. + * 1. User creates and sets up an encrypted database. + * 2. Attacker cannot read the actual data in the database + * because it is encrypted, but can remove/replace the file + * with an empty, unencrypted database file. + * 3. User sets encryption and we get to this code now. + * If we allowed the file to be used in the clear since + * it is that way on disk, the user would unsuspectingly + * write sensitive data in the clear. + * 4. Attacker reads data that user thought was encrypted. + * + * Therefore, asking for encryption with a database that + * was not encrypted is an error. + */ + __db_err(dbenv, + "Unencrypted database with a supplied encryption key"); + return (EINVAL); + } + return (ret); +} diff --git a/db/crypto/crypto.html b/db/crypto/crypto.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9475beb2a --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/crypto.html @@ -0,0 +1,639 @@ +<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en"> +<html> +<head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> + <meta name="GENERATOR" content="Mozilla/4.76 [en] (X11; U; FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE i386) [Netscape]"> +</head> +<body> + +<center> +<h1> + Security Interface for Berkeley DB</h1></center> + +<center><i>Susan LoVerso</i> +<br><i>sue@sleepycat.com</i> +<br><i>Rev 1.6</i> +<br><i>2002 Feb 26</i></center> + +<p>We provide an interface allowing secure access to Berkeley DB. +Our goal is to allow users to have encrypted secure databases. In +this document, the term <i>ciphering</i> means the act of encryption or +decryption. They are equal but opposite actions and the same issues +apply to both just in the opposite direction. +<h3> +Requirements</h3> +The overriding requirement is to provide a simple mechanism to allow users +to have a secure database. A secure database means that all of the +pages of a database will be encrypted, and all of the log files will be +encrypted. +<p>Falling out from this work will be a simple mechanism to allow users +to request that we checksum their data for additional error detection (without +encryption/decryption). +<p>We expect that data in process memory or stored in shared memory, potentially +backed by disk, is not encrypted or secure. +<h2> +<a NAME="DB Modifications"></a>DB Method Interface Modifications</h2> +With a logging environment, all database changes are recorded in the log +files. Therefore, users requiring secure databases in such environments +also require secure log files. +<p>A prior thought had been to allow different passwords on the environment +and the databases within. However, such a scheme, then requires that +the password be logged in order for recovery to be able to restore the +database. Therefore, any application having the password for the +log could get the password for any databases by reading the log. +So having a different password on a database does not gain any additional +security and it makes certain things harder and more complex. Some +of those more complex things include the need to handle database and env +passwords differently since they'd need to be stored and accessed from +different places. Also resolving the issue of how <i>db_checkpoint</i> +or <i>db_sync</i>, which flush database pages to disk, would find the passwords +of various databases without any dbps was unsolved. The feature didn't +gain anything and caused significant pain. Therefore the decision +is that there will be a single password protecting an environment and all +the logs and some databases within that environment. We do allow +users to have a secure environment and clear databases. Users that +want secure databases within a secure environment must set a flag. +<p>Users wishing to enable encryption on a database in a secure environment +or enable just checksumming on their database pages will use new flags +to <a href="../docs/api_c/db_set_flags.html">DB->set_flags()</a>. +Providing ciphering over an entire environment is accomplished by adding +a single environment method: <a href="../docs/api_c/env_set_encrypt.html">DBENV->set_encrypt()</a>. +Providing encryption for a database (not part of an environment) is accomplished +by adding a new database method: <a href="../docs/api_c/db_set_encrypt.html">DB->set_encrypt()</a>. +<p>Both of the <i>set_encrypt</i> methods must be called before their respective +<i>open</i> calls. The environment method must be before the environment +open because we must know about security before there is any possibility +of writing any log records out. The database method must be before +the database open in order to read the root page. The planned interfaces +for these methods are: +<pre>DBENV->set_encrypt(DBENV *dbenv, /* DB_ENV structure */ + char *passwd /* Password */ + u_int32_t flags); /* Flags */</pre> + +<pre>DB->set_encrypt(DB *dbp, /* DB structure */ + char *passwd /* Password */ + u_int32_t flags); /* Flags */</pre> +The flags accepted by these functions are: +<pre>#define DB_ENCRYPT_AES 0x00000001 /* Use the AES encryption algorithm */</pre> +Passwords are NULL-terminated strings. NULL or zero length strings +are illegal. These flags enable the checksumming and encryption using +the particular algorithms we have chosen for this implementation. +The flags are named such that there is a logical naming pattern if additional +checksum or encryption algorithms are used. If a user gives a flag of zero, +it will behave in a manner similar to DB_UNKNOWN. It will be illegal if +they are creating the environment or database, as an algorithm must be +specified. If they are joining an existing environment or opening an existing +database, they will use whatever algorithm is in force at the time. +Using DB_ENCRYPT_AES automatically implies SHA1 checksumming. +<p>These functions will perform several initialization steps. We +will allocate crypto_handle for our env handle and set up our function +pointers. We will allocate space and copy the password into our env +handle password area. Similar to <i>DB->set_cachesize</i>, calling +<i>DB->set_encrypt</i> +will actually reflect back into the local environment created by DB. +<p>Lastly, we will add a new flag, DB_OVERWRITE, to the <a href="../docs/api_c/env_remove.html">DBENV->remove</a> +method. The purpose of this flag is to force all of the memory used +by the shared regions to be overwritten before removal. We will use +<i>rm_overwrite</i>, +a function that overwrites and syncs a file 3 times with varying bit patterns +to really remove a file. Additionally, this flag will force a sync +of the overwritten regions to disk, if the regions are backed by the file +system. That way there is no residual information left in the clear +in memory or freed disk blocks. Although we expect that this flag +will be used by customers using security, primarily, its action is not +dependent on passwords or a secure setup, and so can be used by anyone. +<h4> +Initialization of the Environment</h4> +The setup of the security subsystem will be similar to replication initialization +since it is a sort of subsystem, but it does not have its own region. +When the environment handle is created via <i>db_env_create</i>, we initialize +our <i>set_encrypt</i> method to be the RPC or local version. Therefore +the <i>__dbenv</i> structure needs a new pointer: +<pre> void *crypto_handle; /* Security handle */</pre> +The crypto handle will really point to a new <i>__db_cipher</i> structure +that will contain a set of functions and a pointer to the in-memory information +needed by the specific encryption algorithm. It will look like: +<pre>typedef struct __db_cipher { + int (*init)__P((...)); /* Alg-specific initialization function */ + int (*encrypt)__P((...)); /* Alg-specific encryption algorithm */ + int (*decrypt)__P((...)); /* Alg-specific decryption function */ + void *data; /* Pointer to alg-specific information (AES_CIPHER) */ + u_int32_t flags; /* Cipher flags */ +} DB_CIPHER;</pre> + +<pre>#define DB_MAC_KEY 20 /* Size of the MAC key */ +typedef struct __aes_cipher { + keyInstance encrypt_ki; /* Encrypt keyInstance temp. */ + keyInstance decrypt_ki; /* Decrypt keyInstance temp. */ + u_int8_t mac_key[DB_MAC_KEY]; /* MAC key */ + u_int32_t flags; /* AES-specific flags */ +} AES_CIPHER;</pre> +It should be noted that none of these structures have their own mutex. +We hold the environment region locked while we are creating this, but once +this is set up, it is read-only forever. +<p>During <a href="../docs/api_c/env_set_encrypt.html">dbenv->set_encrypt</a>, +we set the encryption, decryption and checksumming methods to the appropriate +functions based on the flags. This function will allocate us a crypto +handle that we store in the <i>__dbenv</i> structure just like all the +other subsystems. For now, only AES ciphering functions and SHA1 +checksumming functions are supported. Also we will copy the password +into the <i>__dbenv</i> structure. We ultimately need to keep the +password in the environment's shared memory region or compare this one +against the one that is there, if we are joining an existing environment, +but we do not have it yet because open has not yet been called. We +will allocate a structure that will be used in initialization and set up +the function pointers to point to the algorithm-specific functions. +<p>In the <i>__dbenv_open</i> path, in <i>__db_e_attach</i>, if we +are creating the region and the <i>dbenv->passwd</i> field is set, we need +to use the length of the password in the initial computation of the environment's +size. This guarantees sufficient space for storing the password in +shared memory. Then we will call a new function to initialize the +security region, <i>__crypto_region_init</i> in <i>__dbenv_open</i>. +If we are the creator, we will allocate space in the shared region to store +the password and copy the password into that space. Or, if we are +not the creator we will compare the password stored in the dbenv with the +one in shared memory. Additionally, we will compare the ciphering +algorithm to the one stored in the shared region.We'll smash the dbenv +password and free it. If they do not match, we return an error. +If we are the creator we store the offset into the REGENV structure. +Then <i>__crypto_region_init </i> will call the initialization function +set up earlier based on the ciphering algorithm specified. For now +we will call <i>__aes_init</i>. Additionally this function will allocate +and set up the per-process state vector for this encryption's IVs. +See <a href="#Generating the Initialization Vector">Generating the Initialization +Vector</a> for a detailed description of the IV and state vector. +<p>In the AES-specific initialization function, <i>__aes_init</i>, +we will initialize it by calling +<i>__aes_derivekeys</i> in order to fill +in the keyInstance and mac_key fields in that structure. The REGENV +structure will have one additional item +<pre> roff_t passwd_off; /* Offset of passwd */</pre> + +<h4> +Initializing a Database</h4> +During <a href="../docs/api_c/db_set_encrypt.html">db->set_encrypt</a>, +we set the encryption, decryption and checksumming methods to the appropriate +functions based on the flags. Basically, we test that we are not +in an existing environment and we haven't called open. Then we just +call through the environment handle to set the password. +<p>Also, we will need to add a flag in the database meta-data page that +indicates that the database is encrypted and what its algorithm is. +This will be used when the meta-page is read after reopening a file. We +need this information on the meta-page in order to detect a user opening +a secure database without a password. I propose using the first unused1 +byte (renaming it too) in the meta page for this purpose. +<p>All pages will not be encrypted for the first 64 bytes of data. +Database meta-pages will be encrypted on the first 512 bytes only. +All meta-page types will have an IV and checksum added within the first +512 bytes as well as a crypto magic number. This will expand the +size of the meta-page from 256 bytes to 512 bytes. The page in/out routines, +<i>__db_pgin</i> and <i>__db_pgout</i> know the page type of the page and +will apply the 512 bytes ciphering to meta pages. In <i>__db_pgout</i>, +if we have a crypto handle in our (private) environment, we will apply +ciphering to either the entire page, or the first 512 bytes if it is a +meta-page. In <i>__db_pgin</i>, we will decrypt if the page we have +a crypto handle. +<p>When multiple processes share a database, all must use the same password +as the database creator. Using an existing database requires several conditions +to be true. First, if the creator of the database did not create +with security, then opening later with security is an error. Second, +if the creator did create it with security, then opening later without +security is an error. Third, we need to be able to test and check +that when another process opens a secure database that the password they +provided is the same as the one in use by the creator. +<p>When reading the meta-page, in <i>__db_file_setup</i>, we do not go +through the paging functions, but directly read via <i>__os_read</i>. +It is at this point that we will determine if the user is configured correctly. +If the meta-page we read has an IV and checksum, they better have a crypto +handle. If they have a crypto handle, then the meta-page must have +an IV and checksum. If both of those are true, we test the password. +We compare the unencrypted magic number to the newly-decrypted crypto magic +number and if they are not the same, then we report that the user gave +us a bad password. +<p>On a mostly unrelated topic, even when we go to very large pagesizes, +the meta information will still be within a disk sector. So, after +talking it over with Keith and Margo, we determined that unencrypted meta-pages +still will not need a checksum. +<h3> +Encryption and Checksum Routines</h3> +These routines are provided to us by Adam Stubblefield at Rice University +(astubble@rice.edu). The functional interfaces are: +<pre>__aes_derivekeys(DB_ENV *dbenv, /* dbenv */ + u_int8_t *passwd, /* Password */ + size_t passwd_len, /* Length of passwd */ + u_int8_t *mac_key, /* 20 byte array to store MAC key */ + keyInstance *encrypt_key, /* Encryption key of passwd */ + keyInstance *decrypt_key); /* Decryption key of passwd */</pre> +This is the only function requiring the textual user password. From +the password, this function generates a key used in the checksum function, +<i>__db_chksum</i>. +It also fills in <i>keyInstance</i> structures which are then used in the +encryption and decryption routines. The keyInstance structures must +already be allocated. These will be stored in the AES_CIPHER structure. +<pre> __db_chksum(u_int8_t *data, /* Data to checksum */ + size_t data_len, /* Length of data */ + u_int8_t *mac_key, /* 20 byte array from __db_derive_keys */ + u_int8_t *checksum); /* 20 byte array to store checksum */</pre> +This function generates a checksum on the data given. This function +will do double-duty for users that simply want error detection on their +pages. When users are using encryption, the <i>mac_key </i>will contain +the 20-byte key set up in <i>__aes_derivekeys</i>. If they just want +checksumming, then <i>mac_key</i> will be NULL. According to Adam, +we can safely use the first N-bytes of the checksum. So for seeding +the generator for initialization vectors, we'll hash the time and then +send in the first 4 bytes for the seed. I believe we can probably +do the same thing for checksumming log records. We can only use 4 +bytes for the checksum in the non-secure case. So when we want to +verify the log checksum we can compute the mac but just compare the first +4 bytes to the one we read. All locations where we generate or check +log record checksums that currently call <i>__ham_func4</i> will now call +<i>__db_chksum</i>. +I believe there are 5 such locations, +<i>__log_put, __log_putr, __log_newfile, +__log_rep_put +</i>and<i> __txn_force_abort.</i> +<pre>__aes_encrypt(DB_ENV *dbenv, /* dbenv */ + keyInstance *key, /* Password key instance from __db_derive_keys */ + u_int8_t *iv, /* Initialization vector */ + u_int8_t *data, /* Data to encrypt */ + size_t data_len); /* Length of data to encrypt - 16 byte multiple */</pre> +This is the function to encrypt data. It will be called to encrypt +pages and log records. The <i>key</i> instance is initialized in +<i>__aes_derivekeys</i>. +The initialization vector, <i>iv</i>, is the 16 byte random value set up +by the Mersenne Twister pseudo-random generator. Lastly, we pass +in a pointer to the <i>data</i> to encrypt and its length in <i>data_len</i>. +The <i>data_len</i> must be a multiple of 16 bytes. The encryption is done +in-place so that when the encryption code returns our encrypted data is +in the same location as the original data. +<pre>__aes_decrypt(DB_ENV *dbenv, /* dbenv */ + keyInstance *key, /* Password key instance from __db_derive_keys */ + u_int8_t *iv, /* Initialization vector */ + u_int8_t *data, /* Data to decrypt */ + size_t data_len); /* Length of data to decrypt - 16 byte multiple */</pre> +This is the function to decrypt the data. It is exactly the same +as the encryption function except for the action it performs. All +of the args and issues are the same. It also decrypts in place. +<h3> +<a NAME="Generating the Initialization Vector"></a>Generating the Initialization +Vector</h3> +Internally, we need to provide a unique initialization vector (IV) of 16 +bytes every time we encrypt any data with the same password. For +the IV we are planning on using mt19937, the Mersenne Twister, a random +number generator that has a period of 2**19937-1. This package can be found +at <a href="http://www.math.keio.ac.jp/~matumoto/emt.html">http://www.math.keio.ac.jp/~matumoto/emt.html</a>. +Tests show that although it repeats a single integer every once in a while, +that after several million iterations, it doesn't repeat any 4 integers +that we'd be stuffing into our 16-byte IV. We plan on seeding this +generator with the time (tv_sec) hashed through SHA1 when we create the +environment. This package uses a global state vector that contains +624 unsigned long integers. We do not allow a 16-byte IV of zero. +It is simpler just to reject any 4-byte value of 0 and if we get one, just +call the generator again and get a different number. We need to detect +holes in files and if we read an IV of zero that is a simple indication +that we need to check for an entire page of zero. The IVs are stored +on the page after encryption and are not encrypted themselves so it is +not possible for an entire encrypted page to be read as all zeroes, unless +it was a hole in a file. See <a href="#Holes in Files">Holes in Files</a> +for more details. +<p>We will not be holding any locks when we need to generate our IV but +we need to protect access to the state vector and the index. Calls +to the MT code will come while encrypting some data in <i>__aes_encrypt.</i> +The MT code will assume that all necessary locks are held in the caller. +We will have per-process state vectors that are set up when a process begins. +That way we minimize the contention and only multi-threaded processes need +acquire locks for the IV. We will have the state vector in the environment +handle in heap memory, as well as the index and there will be a mutex protecting +it for threaded access. This will be added to the <i>__dbenv</i> +structure: +<pre> DB_MUTEX *mt_mutexp; /* Mersenne Twister mutex */ + int *mti; /* MT index */ + u_long *mt; /* MT state vector */</pre> +This portion of the environment will be initialized at the end of _<i>_dbenv_open</i>, +right after we initialize the other mutex for the <i>dblist</i>. When we +allocate the space, we will generate our initial state vector. If we are +multi-threaded we'll allocate and initialize our mutex also. +<p>We need to make changes to the MT code to make it work in our namespace +and to take a pointer to the location of the state vector and +the index. There will be a wrapper function <i>__db_generate_iv</i> +that DB will call and it will call the appropriate MT function. I +am also going to change the default seed to use a hashed time instead of +a hard coded value. I have looked at other implementations of the +MT code available on the web site. The C++ version does a hash on +the current time. I will modify our MT code to seed with the hashed +time as well. That way the code to seed is contained within the MT +code and we can just write the wrapper to get an IV. We will not +be changing the core computational code of MT. +<h2> +DB Internal Issues</h2> + +<h4> +When do we Cipher?</h4> +All of the page ciphering is done in the <i>__db_pgin/__db_pgout</i> functions. +We will encrypt after the method-specific function on page-out and decrypt +before the method-specfic function on page-in. We do not hold any +locks when entering these functions. We determine that we need to +cipher based on the existence of the encryption flag in the dbp. +<p>For ciphering log records, the encryption will be done as the first +thing (or a new wrapper) in <i>__log_put. </i>See <a href="#Log Record Encryption">Log +Record Encryption</a> for those details. +<br> +<h4> +Page Changes</h4> +The checksum and IV values will be stored prior to the first index of the +page. We have a new P_INP macro that replaces use of inp[X] in the +code. This macro takes a dbp as an argument and determines where +our first index is based on whether we have DB_AM_CHKSUM and DB_AM_ENCRYPT +set. If neither is set, then our first index is where it always was. + If just checksumming is set, then we reserve a 4-byte checksum. +If encryption is set, then we reserve 36 bytes for our checksum/IV as well +as some space to get proper alignment to encrypt on a 16-byte boundary. +<p>Since several paging macros use inp[X] in them, those macros must now +take a dbp. There are a lot of changes to make all the necessary +paging macros take a dbp, although these changes are trivial in nature. +<p>Also, there is a new function <i>__db_chk_meta</i> to perform checksumming +and decryption checking on meta pages specifically. This function +is where we check that the database algorithm matches what the user gave +(or if they set DB_CIPHER_ANY then we set it), and other encryption related +testing for bad combinations of what is in the file versus what is in the +user structures. +<h4> +Verification</h4> +The verification code will also need to be updated to deal with secure +pages. Basically when the verification code reads in the meta page +it will call <i>__db_chk_meta</i> to perform any checksumming and decryption. +<h4> +<a NAME="Holes in Files"></a>Holes in Files</h4> +Holes in files will be dealt with rather simply. We need to be able +to distinguish reading a hole in a file from an encrypted page that happened +to encrypt to all zero's. If we read a hole in a file, we do not +want to send that empty page through the decryption routine. This +can be determined simply without incurring the performance penalty of comparing +every byte on a page on every read until we get a non-zero byte. +<br>The __db_pgin function is only given an invalid page P_INVALID in this +case. So, if the page type, which is always unencrypted, is +P_INVALID, then we do not perform any checksum verification or decryption. +<h4> +Errors and Recovery</h4> +Dealing with a checksum error is tricky. Ultimately, if a checksum +error occurs it is extremely likely that the user must do catastrophic +recovery. There is no other failure return other than DB_RUNRECOVERY +for indicating that the user should run catastrophic recovery. We +do not want to add a new error return for applications to check because +a lot of applications already look for and deal with DB_RUNRECOVERY as +an error condition and we want to fit ourselves into that application model. +We already indicate to the user that when they get that error, then they +need to run recovery. If recovery fails, then they need to run catastrophic +recovery. We need to get ourselves to the point where users will +run catastrophic recovery. +<p>If we get a checksum error, then we need to log a message stating a +checksum error occurred on page N. In <i>__db_pgin</i>, we can check +if logging is on in the environment. If so, we want to log the message. +<p>When the application gets the DB_RUNRECOVERY error, they'll have to +shut down their application and run recovery. When the recovery encounters +the record indicating checksum failure, then normal recovery will fail +and the user will have to perform catastrophic recovery. When catastrophic +recovery encounters that record, it will simply ignore it. +<h4> +<a NAME="Log Record Encryption"></a>Log Record Encryption</h4> +Log records will be ciphered. It might make sense to wrap <i>__log_put</i> +to encrypt the DBT we send down. The <i>__log_put </i>function is +where the checksum is computed before acquiring the region lock. +But also this function is where we call <i>__rep_send_message</i> to send +the DBT to the replication clients. Therefore, we need the DBT to +be encrypted prior to there. We also need it encrypted before checksumming. +I think <i>__log_put </i>will become <i>__log_put_internal</i>, and the +new <i>__log_put</i> will encrypt if needed and then call <i>__log_put_internal +</i>(the +function formerly known as <i>__log_put</i>). Log records are kept +in a shared memory region buffer prior to going out to disk. Records +in the buffer will be encrypted. No locks are held at the time we +will need to encrypt. +<p>On reading the log, via log cursors, the log code stores log records +in the log buffer. Records in that buffer will be encrypted, so decryption +will occur no matter whether we are returning records from the buffer or +if we are returning log records directly from the disk. Current checksum +checking is done in +<i>__log_get_c_int.</i> Decryption will be done +after the checksum is checked. +<p>There are currently two nasty issues with encrypted log records. +The first is that <i>__txn_force_abort</i> overwrites a commit record in +the log buffer with an abort record. Well, our log buffer will be +encrypted. Therefore, <i>__txn_force_abort</i> is going to need to +do encryption of its new record. This can be accomplished by sending +in the dbenv handle to the function. It is available to us in <i>__log_flush_commit</i> +and we can just pass it in. I don't like putting log encryption in +the txn code, but the layering violation is already there. +<p>The second issue is that the encryption code requires data that is a +multiple of 16 bytes and log record lengths are variable. We will +need to pad log records to meet the requirement. Since the callers +of <i>__log_put</i> set up the given DBT it is a logical place to pad if +necessary. We will modify the gen_rec.awk script to have all of the generated +logging functions pad for us if we have a crypto handle. This padding will +also expand the size of log files. Anyone calling <i>log_put</i> and using +security from the application will have to pad on their own or it will +return an error. +<p>When ciphering the log file, we will need a different header than the +current one. The current header only has space for a 4 byte checksum. +Our secure header will need space for the 16 byte IV and 20 byte checksum. +This will blow up our log files when running securely since every single +log record header will now consume 32 additional bytes. I believe +that the log header does not need to be encrypted. It contains an +offset, a length and our IV and checksum. Our IV and checksum are +never encrypted. I don't believe there to be any risk in having the +offset and length in the clear. +<p>I would prefer not to have two types of log headers that are incompatible +with each other. It is not acceptable to increase the log headers +of all users from 12 bytes to 44 bytes. Such a change would also +make log files incompatible with earlier releases. Worse even, is +that the <i>cksum</i> field of the header is in between the offset and +len. It would be really convenient if we could have just made a bigger +cksum portion without affecting the location of the other fields. +Oh well. Most customers will not be using encryption and we won't +make them pay the price of the expanded header. Keith indicates that +the log file format is changing with the next release so I will move the +cksum field so it can at least be overlaid. +<p>One method around this would be to have a single internal header that +contains all the information both mechanisms need, but when we write out +the header we choose which pieces to write. By appending the security +information to the end of the existing structure, and adding a size field, +we can modify a few places to use the size field to write out only the +current first 12 bytes, or the entire security header needed. +<h4> +Replication</h4> +Replication clients are going to need to start all of their individual +environment handles with the same password. The log records are going +to be sent to the clients decrypted and the clients will have to encrypt +them on their way to the client log files. We cannot send encrypted +log records to clients. The reason is that the checksum and IV are +stored in the log header and the master only sends the log record itself +to the client. Therefore, the client has no way to decrypt a log +record from the master. Therefore, anyone wanting to use truly secure +replication is going to have to have a secure transport mechanism. +By not encrypting records, clients can theoretically have different passwords +and DB won't care. +<p>On the master side we must copy the DBT sent in. We encrypt the +original and send to clients the clear record. On the client side, +support for encryption is added into <i>__log_rep_put</i>. +<h4> +Sharing the Environment</h4> +When multiple processes join the environment, all must use the same password +as the creator. +<p>Joining an existing environment requires several conditions to be true. +First, if the creator of the environment did not create with security, +then joining later with security is an error. Second, if the creator +did create it with security, then joining later without security is an +error. Third, we need to be able to test and check that when another +process joins a secure environment that the password they provided is the +same as the one in use by the creator. +<p>The first two scenarios should be fairly trivial to determine, if we +aren't creating the environment, we can compare what is there with what +we have. In the third case, the <i>__crypto_region_init</i> function +will see that the environment region has a valid passwd_off and we'll then +compare that password to the one we have in our dbenv handle. In +any case we'll smash the dbenv handle's passwd and free that memory before +returning whether we have a password match or not. +<p>We need to store the passwords themselves in the region because multiple +calls to the <i>__aes_derivekeys </i>function with the same password yields +different keyInstance contents. Therefore we don't have any way to +check passwords other than retaining and comparing the actual passwords. +<h4> +Other APIs</h4> +All of the other APIs will need interface enhancements to support the new +security methods. The Java and C++ interfaces will likely be done +by Michael Cahill and Sue will implement the Tcl and RPC changes. +Tcl will need the changes for testing purposes but the interface should +be public, not test-only. RPC should fully support security. +The biggest risk that I can see is that the client will send the password +to the server in the clear. Anyone sniffing the wires or running +tcpdump or other packet grabbing code could grab that. Someone really +interested in using security over RPC probably ought to add authentication +and other measures to the RPC server as well. +<h4> +<a NAME="Utilities"></a>Utilities</h4> +All should take a -P flag to specify a password for the environment or +password. Those that take an env and a database might need something +more to distinguish between env passwds and db passwds. Here is what we +do for each utility: +<ul> +<li> +berkeley_db_svc - Needs -P after each -h specified.</li> + +<li> +db_archive - Needs -P if the env is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_checkpoint - Needs -P if the env is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_deadlock - No changes</li> + +<li> +db_dump - Needs -P if the env or database is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_load - Needs -P if the env or database is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_printlog - Needs -P if the env is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_recover - Needs -P if the env is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_stat - Needs -P if the env or database is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_upgrade - Needs -P if the env or database is encrypted.</li> + +<li> +db_verify - Needs -P if the env or database is encrypted.</li> +</ul> + +<h2> +Testing</h2> +All testing should be able to be accomplished via Tcl. The following +tests (and probably others I haven't thought of yet) should be performed: +<ul> +<li> +Basic functionality - basically a test001 but encrypted without an env</li> + +<li> +Basic functionality, w/ env - like the previous test but with an env.</li> + +<li> +Basic functionality, multiple processes - like first test, but make sure +others can correctly join.</li> + +<li> +Basic functionality, mult. processes - like above test, but initialize/close +environment/database first so that the next test processes are all joiners +of an existing env, but creator no longer exists and the shared region +must be opened.</li> + +<li> +Recovery test - Run recovery over an encrypted environment.</li> + +<li> +Subdb test - Run with subdbs that are encrypted.</li> + +<li> +Utility test - Verify the new options to all the utilities.</li> + +<li> +Error handling - Test the basic setup errors for both env's and databases +with multiple processes. They are:</li> + +<ol> +<li> +Attempt to set a NULL or zero-length passwd.</li> + +<li> +Create Env w/ security and attempt to create database w/ its own password.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates with security. Proc2 joins without - should get an +error.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates without security. Proc2 joins with - should get an +error.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates with security. Proc2 joins with different password +- should get an error.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates with security. Closes. Proc2 reopens with different +password - should get an error.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates with security. Closes. Tcl overwrites a page +of the database with garbage. Proc2 reopens with the correct password. +Code should detect checksum error.</li> + +<li> +Env/DB creates with security. Open a 2nd identical DB with a different +password. Put the exact same data into both databases. Close. +Overwrite the identical page of DB1 with the one from DB2. Reopen +the database with correct DB1 password. Code should detect an encryption +error on that page.</li> +</ol> +</ul> + +<h2> +Risks</h2> +There are several holes in this design. It is important to document +them clearly. +<p>The first is that all of the pages are stored in memory and possibly +the file system in the clear. The password is stored in the shared +data regions in the clear. Therefore if an attacker can read the +process memory, they can do whatever they want. If the attacker can +read system memory or swap they can access the data as well. Since +everything in the shared data regions (with the exception of the buffered +log) will be in the clear, it is important to realize that file backed +regions will be written in the clear, including the portion of the regions +containing passwords. We recommend to users that they use system +memory instead of file backed shared memory. +</body> +</html> diff --git a/db/crypto/mersenne/mt19937db.c b/db/crypto/mersenne/mt19937db.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..07af61dc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/mersenne/mt19937db.c @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +#include "db_config.h" + +#ifndef lint +static const char revid[] = "Id: mt19937db.c,v 1.8 2002/03/27 04:31:10 bostic Exp "; +#endif /* not lint */ + +#include "db_int.h" +#include "dbinc/crypto.h" +#include "dbinc/hmac.h" +#include "dbinc/mutex.h" +#include "dbinc_auto/os_ext.h" + +/* A C-program for MT19937: Integer version (1999/10/28) */ +/* genrand() generates one pseudorandom unsigned integer (32bit) */ +/* which is uniformly distributed among 0 to 2^32-1 for each */ +/* call. sgenrand(seed) sets initial values to the working area */ +/* of 624 words. Before genrand(), sgenrand(seed) must be */ +/* called once. (seed is any 32-bit integer.) */ +/* Coded by Takuji Nishimura, considering the suggestions by */ +/* Topher Cooper and Marc Rieffel in July-Aug. 1997. */ + +/* This library is free software under the Artistic license: */ +/* see the file COPYING distributed together with this code. */ +/* For the verification of the code, its output sequence file */ +/* mt19937int.out is attached (2001/4/2) */ + +/* Copyright (C) 1997, 1999 Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura. */ +/* Any feedback is very welcome. For any question, comments, */ +/* see http://www.math.keio.ac.jp/matumoto/emt.html or email */ +/* matumoto@math.keio.ac.jp */ + +/* REFERENCE */ +/* M. Matsumoto and T. Nishimura, */ +/* "Mersenne Twister: A 623-Dimensionally Equidistributed Uniform */ +/* Pseudo-Random Number Generator", */ +/* ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation, */ +/* Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1998, pp 3--30. */ + +/* Period parameters */ +#define N 624 +#define M 397 +#define MATRIX_A 0x9908b0df /* constant vector a */ +#define UPPER_MASK 0x80000000 /* most significant w-r bits */ +#define LOWER_MASK 0x7fffffff /* least significant r bits */ + +/* Tempering parameters */ +#define TEMPERING_MASK_B 0x9d2c5680 +#define TEMPERING_MASK_C 0xefc60000 +#define TEMPERING_SHIFT_U(y) (y >> 11) +#define TEMPERING_SHIFT_S(y) (y << 7) +#define TEMPERING_SHIFT_T(y) (y << 15) +#define TEMPERING_SHIFT_L(y) (y >> 18) + +static void __db_sgenrand __P((unsigned long, unsigned long *, int *)); +#ifdef NOT_USED +static void __db_lsgenrand __P((unsigned long *, unsigned long *, int *)); +#endif +static unsigned long __db_genrand __P((DB_ENV *)); + +/* + * __db_generate_iv -- + * Generate an initialization vector (IV) + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_generate_iv __P((DB_ENV *, u_int32_t *)); + */ +int +__db_generate_iv(dbenv, iv) + DB_ENV *dbenv; + u_int32_t *iv; +{ + int i, n, ret; + + ret = 0; + n = DB_IV_BYTES / sizeof(u_int32_t); + MUTEX_THREAD_LOCK(dbenv, dbenv->mt_mutexp); + if (dbenv->mt == NULL) { + if ((ret = __os_calloc(dbenv, 1, N*sizeof(unsigned long), + &dbenv->mt)) != 0) + return (ret); + /* mti==N+1 means mt[N] is not initialized */ + dbenv->mti = N + 1; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) +{ + /* + * We do not allow 0. If we get one just try again. + */ + do { + iv[i] = (u_int32_t)__db_genrand(dbenv); + } while (iv[i] == 0); +} + + MUTEX_THREAD_UNLOCK(dbenv, dbenv->mt_mutexp); + return (0); +} + +/* Initializing the array with a seed */ +static void +__db_sgenrand(seed, mt, mtip) + unsigned long seed; + unsigned long mt[]; + int *mtip; +{ + int i; + + DB_ASSERT(seed != 0); + for (i=0;i<N;i++) { + mt[i] = seed & 0xffff0000; + seed = 69069 * seed + 1; + mt[i] |= (seed & 0xffff0000) >> 16; + seed = 69069 * seed + 1; + } + *mtip = N; +} + +#ifdef NOT_USED +/* Initialization by "sgenrand()" is an example. Theoretically, */ +/* there are 2^19937-1 possible states as an intial state. */ +/* This function allows to choose any of 2^19937-1 ones. */ +/* Essential bits in "seed_array[]" is following 19937 bits: */ +/* (seed_array[0]&UPPER_MASK), seed_array[1], ..., seed_array[N-1]. */ +/* (seed_array[0]&LOWER_MASK) is discarded. */ +/* Theoretically, */ +/* (seed_array[0]&UPPER_MASK), seed_array[1], ..., seed_array[N-1] */ +/* can take any values except all zeros. */ +static void +__db_lsgenrand(seed_array, mt, mtip) + unsigned long seed_array[]; + unsigned long mt[]; + int *mtip; + /* the length of seed_array[] must be at least N */ +{ + int i; + + for (i=0;i<N;i++) + mt[i] = seed_array[i]; + *mtip=N; +} +#endif + +static unsigned long +__db_genrand(dbenv) + DB_ENV *dbenv; +{ + unsigned long i, s, y; + static unsigned long mag01[2]={0x0, MATRIX_A}; + /* mag01[x] = x * MATRIX_A for x=0,1 */ + u_int32_t secs, usecs; + u_int8_t mac[DB_MAC_KEY]; + + /* + * We are called with the mt_mutexp locked + */ + if (dbenv->mti >= N) { /* generate N words at one time */ + int kk; + + if (dbenv->mti == N+1) { /* if sgenrand() has not been called, */ + /* + * Seed the generator with the hashed time. The __db_mac + * function returns a 20 byte value, but we can safely + * just use the first 4 bytes for the seed. + */ + do { + if (__os_clock(dbenv, &secs, &usecs) != 0) + return (0); /* 0 is the only invalid return */ + __db_chksum((u_int8_t *)&secs, sizeof(secs), NULL, mac); + s = 0; + for (i = 0; i < DB_MAC_KEY && s == 0; + i += sizeof(unsigned long)) + s = mac[i]; + } while (s == 0); + __db_sgenrand(s, dbenv->mt, &dbenv->mti); + } + + for (kk=0;kk<N-M;kk++) { + y = (dbenv->mt[kk]&UPPER_MASK)|(dbenv->mt[kk+1]&LOWER_MASK); + dbenv->mt[kk] = dbenv->mt[kk+M] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1]; + } + for (;kk<N-1;kk++) { + y = (dbenv->mt[kk]&UPPER_MASK)|(dbenv->mt[kk+1]&LOWER_MASK); + dbenv->mt[kk] = dbenv->mt[kk+(M-N)] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1]; + } + y = (dbenv->mt[N-1]&UPPER_MASK)|(dbenv->mt[0]&LOWER_MASK); + dbenv->mt[N-1] = dbenv->mt[M-1] ^ (y >> 1) ^ mag01[y & 0x1]; + + dbenv->mti = 0; + } + + y = dbenv->mt[dbenv->mti++]; + y ^= TEMPERING_SHIFT_U(y); + y ^= TEMPERING_SHIFT_S(y) & TEMPERING_MASK_B; + y ^= TEMPERING_SHIFT_T(y) & TEMPERING_MASK_C; + y ^= TEMPERING_SHIFT_L(y); + + return y; +} diff --git a/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.c b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89bf4621f --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.c @@ -0,0 +1,1466 @@ +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.c + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br> + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "db_config.h" + +#include "db_int.h" +#include "dbinc/crypto.h" + +#include "crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h" + +/* +Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; +Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; +Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; +Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; +Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; + +Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; +Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; +Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; +Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; +Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; +*/ + +static const u32 Te0[256] = { + 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, + 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, + 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, + 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, + 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, + 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, + 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, + 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, + 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, + 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, + 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, + 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, + 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, + 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, + 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, + 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, + 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, + 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, + 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, + 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, + 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, + 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, + 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, + 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, + 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, + 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, + 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, + 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, + 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, + 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, + 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, + 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, + 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, + 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, + 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, + 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, + 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, + 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, + 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, + 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, + 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, + 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, + 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, + 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, + 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, + 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, + 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, + 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, + 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, + 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, + 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, + 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, + 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, + 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, + 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, + 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, + 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, + 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, + 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, + 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, + 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, + 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, + 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, + 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, +}; +static const u32 Te1[256] = { + 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, + 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, + 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, + 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, + 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, + 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, + 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, + 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, + 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, + 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, + 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, + 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, + 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, + 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, + 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, + 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, + 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, + 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, + 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, + 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, + 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, + 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, + 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, + 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, + 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, + 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, + 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, + 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, + 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, + 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, + 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, + 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, + 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, + 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, + 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, + 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, + 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, + 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, + 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, + 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, + 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, + 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, + 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, + 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, + 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, + 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, + 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, + 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, + 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, + 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, + 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, + 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, + 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, + 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, + 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, + 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, + 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, + 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, + 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, + 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, + 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, + 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, + 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, + 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, +}; +static const u32 Te2[256] = { + 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, + 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, + 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, + 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, + 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, + 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, + 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, + 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, + 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, + 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, + 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, + 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, + 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, + 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, + 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, + 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, + 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, + 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, + 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, + 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, + 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, + 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, + 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, + 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, + 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, + 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, + 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, + 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, + 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, + 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, + 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, + 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, + 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, + 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, + 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, + 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, + 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, + 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, + 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, + 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, + 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, + 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, + 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, + 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, + 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, + 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, + 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, + 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, + 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, + 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, + 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, + 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, + 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, + 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, + 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, + 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, + 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, + 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, + 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, + 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, + 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, + 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, + 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, + 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, +}; +static const u32 Te3[256] = { + + 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, + 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, + 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, + 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, + 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, + 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, + 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, + 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, + 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, + 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, + 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, + 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, + 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, + 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, + 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, + 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, + 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, + 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, + 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, + 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, + 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, + 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, + 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, + 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, + 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, + 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, + 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, + 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, + 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, + 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, + 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, + 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, + 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, + 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, + 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, + 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, + 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, + 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, + 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, + 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, + 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, + 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, + 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, + 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, + 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, + 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, + 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, + 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, + 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, + 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, + 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, + 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, + 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, + 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, + 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, + 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, + 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, + 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, + 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, + 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, + 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, + 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, + 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, + 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, +}; +static const u32 Te4[256] = { + 0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, + 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U, + 0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, + 0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U, + 0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU, + 0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U, + 0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU, + 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U, + 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U, + 0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU, + 0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, + 0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U, + 0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U, + 0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU, + 0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U, + 0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U, + 0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU, + 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U, + 0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, + 0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U, + 0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU, + 0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, + 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U, + 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, + 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU, + 0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U, + 0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, + 0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, + 0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU, + 0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U, + 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U, + 0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, + 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU, + 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U, + 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU, + 0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U, + 0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU, + 0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U, + 0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U, + 0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, + 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU, + 0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, + 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U, + 0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U, + 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU, + 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, + 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU, + 0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U, + 0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, + 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U, + 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU, + 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU, + 0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U, + 0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, + 0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U, + 0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU, + 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U, + 0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U, + 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U, + 0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, + 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU, + 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U, + 0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, + 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U, +}; +static const u32 Td0[256] = { + 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, + 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, + 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, + 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, + 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, + 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, + 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, + 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, + 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, + 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, + 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, + 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, + 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, + 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, + 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, + 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, + 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, + 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, + 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, + 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, + 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, + 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, + 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, + 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, + 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, + 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, + 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, + 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, + 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, + 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, + 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, + 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, + 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, + 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, + 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, + 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, + 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, + 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, + 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, + 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, + 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, + 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, + 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, + 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, + 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, + 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, + 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, + 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, + 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, + 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, + 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, + 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, + 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, + 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, + 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, + 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, + 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, + 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, + 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, + 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, + 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, + 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, + 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, + 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, +}; +static const u32 Td1[256] = { + 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, + 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, + 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, + 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, + 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, + 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, + 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, + 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, + 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, + 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, + 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, + 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, + 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, + 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, + 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, + 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, + 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, + 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, + 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, + 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, + 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, + 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, + 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, + 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, + 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, + 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, + 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, + 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, + 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, + 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, + 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, + 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, + 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, + 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, + 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, + 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, + 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, + 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, + 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, + 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, + 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, + 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, + 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, + 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, + 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, + 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, + 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, + 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, + 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, + 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, + 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, + 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, + 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, + 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, + 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, + 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, + 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, + 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, + 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, + 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, + 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, + 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, + 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, + 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, +}; +static const u32 Td2[256] = { + 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, + 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, + 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, + 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, + 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, + 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, + 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, + 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, + 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, + 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, + 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, + 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, + 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, + 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, + 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, + 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, + 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, + 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, + 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, + 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, + + 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, + 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, + 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, + 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, + 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, + 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, + 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, + 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, + 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, + 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, + 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, + 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, + 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, + 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, + 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, + 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, + 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, + 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, + 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, + 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, + 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, + 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, + 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, + 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, + 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, + 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, + 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, + 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, + 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, + 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, + 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, + 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, + 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, + 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, + 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, + 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, + 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, + 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, + 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, + 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, + 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, + 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, + 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, + 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, +}; +static const u32 Td3[256] = { + 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, + 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, + 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, + 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, + 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, + 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, + 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, + 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, + 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, + 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, + 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, + 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, + 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, + 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, + 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, + 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, + 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, + 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, + 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, + 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, + 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, + 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, + 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, + 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, + 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, + 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, + 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, + 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, + 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, + 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, + 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, + 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, + 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, + 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, + 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, + 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, + 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, + 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, + 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, + 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, + 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, + 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, + 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, + 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, + 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, + 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, + 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, + 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, + 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, + 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, + 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, + 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, + 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, + 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, + 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, + 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, + 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, + 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, + 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, + 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, + 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, + 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, + 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, + 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, +}; +static const u32 Td4[256] = { + 0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, + 0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U, + 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU, + 0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU, + 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U, + 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U, + 0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U, + 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU, + 0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U, + 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU, + 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU, + 0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, + 0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U, + 0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, + 0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U, + 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U, + 0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U, + 0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U, + 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU, + 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U, + 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U, + 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU, + 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U, + 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U, + 0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U, + 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU, + 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U, + 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U, + 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU, + 0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U, + 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U, + 0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU, + 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U, + 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU, + 0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU, + 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U, + 0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U, + 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U, + 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U, + 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, + 0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U, + 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U, + 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, + 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU, + 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU, + 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U, + 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU, + 0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U, + 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U, + 0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U, + 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U, + 0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU, + 0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, + 0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU, + 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, + 0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU, + 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU, + 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U, + 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU, + 0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U, + 0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, + 0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U, + 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U, + 0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU, +}; +static const u32 rcon[] = { + 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, + 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, + 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ +}; + +#define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00) + +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#define GETU32(p) SWAP(*((u32 *)(p))) +#define PUTU32(ct, st) { *((u32 *)(ct)) = SWAP((st)); } +#else +#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) +#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } +#endif + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +/* + * __db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc __P((u32 *, const u8 *, int)); + */ +int +__db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits) + u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + const u8 *cipherKey; + int keyBits; +{ + int i = 0; + u32 temp; + + rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); + rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); + rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); + rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); + if (keyBits == 128) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[3]; + rk[4] = rk[0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; + rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; + rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; + if (++i == 10) { + return 10; + } + rk += 4; + } + } + rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); + rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); + if (keyBits == 192) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 5]; + rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; + if (++i == 8) { + return 12; + } + rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; + rk += 6; + } + } + rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); + rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); + if (keyBits == 256) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 7]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; + rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; + if (++i == 7) { + return 14; + } + temp = rk[11]; + rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; + rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; + rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; + + rk += 8; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +/* + * __db_rijndaelKeySetupDec -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_rijndaelKeySetupDec __P((u32 *, const u8 *, int)); + */ +int +__db_rijndaelKeySetupDec(rk, cipherKey, keyBits) + u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + const u8 *cipherKey; + int keyBits; +{ + int Nr, i, j; + u32 temp; + + /* expand the cipher key: */ + Nr = __db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); + /* invert the order of the round keys: */ + for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { + temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; + } + /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ + for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { + rk += 4; + rk[0] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[1] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[2] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[3] = + Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te4[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + } + return Nr; +} + +/* + * __db_rijndaelEncrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: void __db_rijndaelEncrypt __P((u32 *, int, const u8 *, u8 *)); + */ +void +__db_rijndaelEncrypt(rk, Nr, pt, ct) + u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + int Nr; + const u8 *pt; + u8 *ct; +{ + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Te4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(ct , s0); + s1 = + (Te4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Te4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Te4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); +} + +/* + * __db_rijndaelDecrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: void __db_rijndaelDecrypt __P((u32 *, int, const u8 *, u8 *)); + */ +void +__db_rijndaelDecrypt(rk, Nr, ct, pt) + u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + int Nr; + const u8 *ct; + u8 *pt; +{ + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(pt , s0); + s1 = + (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); +} + +#ifdef INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT + +/* + * __db_rijndaelEncryptRound -- + * + * PUBLIC: void __db_rijndaelEncryptRound __P((const u32 *, int, u8 *, int)); + */ +void +__db_rijndaelEncryptRound(rk, Nr, pt, ct) + const u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + int Nr; + u8 *block; + int rounds; +{ + int r; + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(block ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(block + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(block + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(block + 12) ^ rk[3]; + rk += 4; + + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + for (r = (rounds < Nr ? rounds : Nr - 1); r > 0; r--) { + t0 = + Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + t1 = + Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + t2 = + Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + t3 = + Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + + s0 = t0; + s1 = t1; + s2 = t2; + s3 = t3; + rk += 4; + + } + + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + if (rounds == Nr) { + t0 = + (Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + t1 = + (Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + t2 = + (Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + t3 = + (Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + + s0 = t0; + s1 = t1; + s2 = t2; + s3 = t3; + } + + PUTU32(block , s0); + PUTU32(block + 4, s1); + PUTU32(block + 8, s2); + PUTU32(block + 12, s3); +} + +/* + * __db_rijndaelDecryptRound -- + * + * PUBLIC: void __db_rijndaelDecryptRound __P((const u32 *, int, u8 *, int)); + */ +void +__db_rijndaelDecryptRound(rk, Nr, pt, ct) + const u32 *rk; /* rk[4*(Nr + 1)] */ + int Nr; + u8 *block; + int rounds; +{ + int r; + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(block ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(block + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(block + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(block + 12) ^ rk[3]; + rk += 4; + + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + for (r = (rounds < Nr ? rounds : Nr) - 1; r > 0; r--) { + t0 = + Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + t1 = + Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + t2 = + Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + t3 = + Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + + s0 = t0; + s1 = t1; + s2 = t2; + s3 = t3; + rk += 4; + + } + + /* + * complete the last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + t0 = + (Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + t1 = + (Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + t2 = + (Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + t3 = + (Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + + if (rounds == Nr) { + t0 ^= rk[0]; + t1 ^= rk[1]; + t2 ^= rk[2]; + t3 ^= rk[3]; + } + + PUTU32(block , t0); + PUTU32(block + 4, t1); + PUTU32(block + 8, t2); + PUTU32(block + 12, t3); +} + +#endif /* INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT */ diff --git a/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81751ed5c --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Id: rijndael-alg-fst.h,v 1.2 2002/01/08 18:53:37 sue Exp + */ +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.h + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br> + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H +#define __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H + +#define MAXKC (256/32) +#define MAXKB (256/8) +#define MAXNR 14 + +typedef u_int8_t u8; +typedef u_int16_t u16; +typedef u_int32_t u32; + +#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_ALG_FST_H */ diff --git a/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.c b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2f75e197c --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.c @@ -0,0 +1,496 @@ +/** + * rijndael-api-fst.c + * + * @version 2.9 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br> + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Acknowledgements: + * + * We are deeply indebted to the following people for their bug reports, + * fixes, and improvement suggestions to this implementation. Though we + * tried to list all contributions, we apologise in advance for any + * missing reference. + * + * Andrew Bales <Andrew.Bales@Honeywell.com> + * Markus Friedl <markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de> + * John Skodon <skodonj@webquill.com> + */ + +#include "db_config.h" + +#ifndef NO_SYSTEM_INCLUDES +#include <string.h> +#endif + +#include "db_int.h" +#include "dbinc/crypto.h" + +#include "crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h" +#include "crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h" + +/* + * __db_makeKey -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_makeKey __P((keyInstance *, int, int, char *)); + */ +int +__db_makeKey(key, direction, keyLen, keyMaterial) + keyInstance *key; + int direction; + int keyLen; + char *keyMaterial; +{ + u8 cipherKey[MAXKB]; + + if (key == NULL) { + return BAD_KEY_INSTANCE; + } + + if ((direction == DIR_ENCRYPT) || (direction == DIR_DECRYPT)) { + key->direction = direction; + } else { + return BAD_KEY_DIR; + } + + if ((keyLen == 128) || (keyLen == 192) || (keyLen == 256)) { + key->keyLen = keyLen; + } else { + return BAD_KEY_MAT; + } + + if (keyMaterial != NULL) { + memcpy(cipherKey, keyMaterial, key->keyLen/4); + } + + if (direction == DIR_ENCRYPT) { + key->Nr = __db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc(key->rk, cipherKey, keyLen); + } else { + key->Nr = __db_rijndaelKeySetupDec(key->rk, cipherKey, keyLen); + } + __db_rijndaelKeySetupEnc(key->ek, cipherKey, keyLen); + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * __db_cipherInit -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_cipherInit __P((cipherInstance *, int, char *)); + */ +int +__db_cipherInit(cipher, mode, IV) + cipherInstance *cipher; + int mode; + char *IV; +{ + if ((mode == MODE_ECB) || (mode == MODE_CBC) || (mode == MODE_CFB1)) { + cipher->mode = mode; + } else { + return BAD_CIPHER_MODE; + } + if (IV != NULL) { + memcpy(cipher->IV, IV, MAX_IV_SIZE); + } + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * __db_blockEncrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_blockEncrypt __P((cipherInstance *, keyInstance *, BYTE *, + * PUBLIC: size_t, BYTE *)); + */ +int +__db_blockEncrypt(cipher, key, input, inputLen, outBuffer) + cipherInstance *cipher; + keyInstance *key; + BYTE *input; + size_t inputLen; + BYTE *outBuffer; +{ + int i, k, t, numBlocks; + u8 block[16], *iv; + u32 tmpiv[4]; + + if (cipher == NULL || + key == NULL || + key->direction == DIR_DECRYPT) { + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + if (input == NULL || inputLen <= 0) { + return 0; /* nothing to do */ + } + + numBlocks = (int)(inputLen/128); + + switch (cipher->mode) { + case MODE_ECB: + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, outBuffer); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + break; + + case MODE_CBC: + iv = cipher->IV; + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(tmpiv, iv, MAX_IV_SIZE); + ((u32*)block)[0] = ((u32*)input)[0] ^ tmpiv[0]; + ((u32*)block)[1] = ((u32*)input)[1] ^ tmpiv[1]; + ((u32*)block)[2] = ((u32*)input)[2] ^ tmpiv[2]; + ((u32*)block)[3] = ((u32*)input)[3] ^ tmpiv[3]; + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, block, outBuffer); + iv = outBuffer; + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + break; + + case MODE_CFB1: + iv = cipher->IV; + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(outBuffer, input, 16); + for (k = 0; k < 128; k++) { + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->ek, key->Nr, iv, block); + outBuffer[k >> 3] ^= (block[0] & 0x80U) >> (k & 7); + for (t = 0; t < 15; t++) { + iv[t] = (iv[t] << 1) | (iv[t + 1] >> 7); + } + iv[15] = (iv[15] << 1) | ((outBuffer[k >> 3] >> (7 - (k & 7))) & 1); + } + outBuffer += 16; + input += 16; + } + break; + + default: + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + + return 128*numBlocks; +} + +/** + * Encrypt data partitioned in octets, using RFC 2040-like padding. + * + * @param input data to be encrypted (octet sequence) + * @param inputOctets input length in octets (not bits) + * @param outBuffer encrypted output data + * + * @return length in octets (not bits) of the encrypted output buffer. + */ +/* + * __db_padEncrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_padEncrypt __P((cipherInstance *, keyInstance *, BYTE *, + * PUBLIC: int, BYTE *)); + */ +int +__db_padEncrypt(cipher, key, input, inputOctets, outBuffer) + cipherInstance *cipher; + keyInstance *key; + BYTE *input; + int inputOctets; + BYTE *outBuffer; +{ + int i, numBlocks, padLen; + u8 block[16], *iv; + u32 tmpiv[4]; + + if (cipher == NULL || + key == NULL || + key->direction == DIR_DECRYPT) { + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + if (input == NULL || inputOctets <= 0) { + return 0; /* nothing to do */ + } + + numBlocks = inputOctets/16; + + switch (cipher->mode) { + case MODE_ECB: + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, outBuffer); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + padLen = 16 - (inputOctets - 16*numBlocks); + DB_ASSERT(padLen > 0 && padLen <= 16); + memcpy(block, input, 16 - padLen); + memset(block + 16 - padLen, padLen, padLen); + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, block, outBuffer); + break; + + case MODE_CBC: + iv = cipher->IV; + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(tmpiv, iv, MAX_IV_SIZE); + ((u32*)block)[0] = ((u32*)input)[0] ^ tmpiv[0]; + ((u32*)block)[1] = ((u32*)input)[1] ^ tmpiv[1]; + ((u32*)block)[2] = ((u32*)input)[2] ^ tmpiv[2]; + ((u32*)block)[3] = ((u32*)input)[3] ^ tmpiv[3]; + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, block, outBuffer); + iv = outBuffer; + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + padLen = 16 - (inputOctets - 16*numBlocks); + DB_ASSERT(padLen > 0 && padLen <= 16); + for (i = 0; i < 16 - padLen; i++) { + block[i] = input[i] ^ iv[i]; + } + for (i = 16 - padLen; i < 16; i++) { + block[i] = (BYTE)padLen ^ iv[i]; + } + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, block, outBuffer); + break; + + default: + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + + return 16*(numBlocks + 1); +} + +/* + * __db_blockDecrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_blockDecrypt __P((cipherInstance *, keyInstance *, BYTE *, + * PUBLIC: size_t, BYTE *)); + */ +int +__db_blockDecrypt(cipher, key, input, inputLen, outBuffer) + cipherInstance *cipher; + keyInstance *key; + BYTE *input; + size_t inputLen; + BYTE *outBuffer; +{ + int i, k, t, numBlocks; + u8 block[16], *iv; + u32 tmpiv[4]; + + if (cipher == NULL || + key == NULL || + (cipher->mode != MODE_CFB1 && key->direction == DIR_ENCRYPT)) { + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + if (input == NULL || inputLen <= 0) { + return 0; /* nothing to do */ + } + + numBlocks = (int)(inputLen/128); + + switch (cipher->mode) { + case MODE_ECB: + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, outBuffer); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + break; + + case MODE_CBC: + memcpy(tmpiv, cipher->IV, MAX_IV_SIZE); + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, block); + ((u32*)block)[0] ^= tmpiv[0]; + ((u32*)block)[1] ^= tmpiv[1]; + ((u32*)block)[2] ^= tmpiv[2]; + ((u32*)block)[3] ^= tmpiv[3]; + memcpy(tmpiv, input, 16); + memcpy(outBuffer, block, 16); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + break; + + case MODE_CFB1: + iv = cipher->IV; + for (i = numBlocks; i > 0; i--) { + memcpy(outBuffer, input, 16); + for (k = 0; k < 128; k++) { + __db_rijndaelEncrypt(key->ek, key->Nr, iv, block); + for (t = 0; t < 15; t++) { + iv[t] = (iv[t] << 1) | (iv[t + 1] >> 7); + } + iv[15] = (iv[15] << 1) | ((input[k >> 3] >> (7 - (k & 7))) & 1); + outBuffer[k >> 3] ^= (block[0] & 0x80U) >> (k & 7); + } + outBuffer += 16; + input += 16; + } + break; + + default: + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + + return 128*numBlocks; +} + +/* + * __db_padDecrypt -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_padDecrypt __P((cipherInstance *, keyInstance *, BYTE *, + * PUBLIC: int, BYTE *)); + */ +int +__db_padDecrypt(cipher, key, input, inputOctets, outBuffer) + cipherInstance *cipher; + keyInstance *key; + BYTE *input; + int inputOctets; + BYTE *outBuffer; +{ + int i, numBlocks, padLen; + u8 block[16]; + u32 tmpiv[4]; + + if (cipher == NULL || + key == NULL || + key->direction == DIR_ENCRYPT) { + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + if (input == NULL || inputOctets <= 0) { + return 0; /* nothing to do */ + } + if (inputOctets % 16 != 0) { + return BAD_DATA; + } + + numBlocks = inputOctets/16; + + switch (cipher->mode) { + case MODE_ECB: + /* all blocks but last */ + for (i = numBlocks - 1; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, outBuffer); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + /* last block */ + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, block); + padLen = block[15]; + if (padLen >= 16) { + return BAD_DATA; + } + for (i = 16 - padLen; i < 16; i++) { + if (block[i] != padLen) { + return BAD_DATA; + } + } + memcpy(outBuffer, block, 16 - padLen); + break; + + case MODE_CBC: + /* all blocks but last */ + memcpy(tmpiv, cipher->IV, MAX_IV_SIZE); + for (i = numBlocks - 1; i > 0; i--) { + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, block); + ((u32*)block)[0] ^= tmpiv[0]; + ((u32*)block)[1] ^= tmpiv[1]; + ((u32*)block)[2] ^= tmpiv[2]; + ((u32*)block)[3] ^= tmpiv[3]; + memcpy(tmpiv, input, 16); + memcpy(outBuffer, block, 16); + input += 16; + outBuffer += 16; + } + /* last block */ + __db_rijndaelDecrypt(key->rk, key->Nr, input, block); + ((u32*)block)[0] ^= tmpiv[0]; + ((u32*)block)[1] ^= tmpiv[1]; + ((u32*)block)[2] ^= tmpiv[2]; + ((u32*)block)[3] ^= tmpiv[3]; + padLen = block[15]; + if (padLen <= 0 || padLen > 16) { + return BAD_DATA; + } + for (i = 16 - padLen; i < 16; i++) { + if (block[i] != padLen) { + return BAD_DATA; + } + } + memcpy(outBuffer, block, 16 - padLen); + break; + + default: + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + + return 16*numBlocks - padLen; +} + +#ifdef INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT +/** + * cipherUpdateRounds: + * + * Encrypts/Decrypts exactly one full block a specified number of rounds. + * Only used in the Intermediate Value Known Answer Test. + * + * Returns: + * TRUE - on success + * BAD_CIPHER_STATE - cipher in bad state (e.g., not initialized) + */ +/* + * __db_cipherUpdateRounds -- + * + * PUBLIC: int __db_cipherUpdateRounds __P((cipherInstance *, keyInstance *, + * PUBLIC: BYTE *, int, BYTE *, int)); + */ +int +__db_cipherUpdateRounds(cipher, key, input, inputLen, outBuffer, rounds) + cipherInstance *cipher; + keyInstance *key; + BYTE *input; + size_t inputLen; + BYTE *outBuffer; + int rounds; +{ + u8 block[16]; + + if (cipher == NULL || key == NULL) { + return BAD_CIPHER_STATE; + } + + memcpy(block, input, 16); + + switch (key->direction) { + case DIR_ENCRYPT: + __db_rijndaelEncryptRound(key->rk, key->Nr, block, rounds); + break; + + case DIR_DECRYPT: + __db_rijndaelDecryptRound(key->rk, key->Nr, block, rounds); + break; + + default: + return BAD_KEY_DIR; + } + + memcpy(outBuffer, block, 16); + + return TRUE; +} +#endif /* INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT */ diff --git a/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5f948ef62 --- /dev/null +++ b/db/crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +/* + * Id: rijndael-api-fst.h,v 1.4 2002/03/27 04:31:12 bostic Exp + */ +/** + * rijndael-api-fst.h + * + * @version 2.9 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> + * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br> + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Acknowledgements: + * + * We are deeply indebted to the following people for their bug reports, + * fixes, and improvement suggestions to this implementation. Though we + * tried to list all contributions, we apologise in advance for any + * missing reference. + * + * Andrew Bales <Andrew.Bales@Honeywell.com> + * Markus Friedl <markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de> + * John Skodon <skodonj@webquill.com> + */ + +#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_API_FST_H +#define __RIJNDAEL_API_FST_H + +#include "crypto/rijndael/rijndael-alg-fst.h" + +/* Generic Defines */ +#define DIR_ENCRYPT 0 /* Are we encrpyting? */ +#define DIR_DECRYPT 1 /* Are we decrpyting? */ +#define MODE_ECB 1 /* Are we ciphering in ECB mode? */ +#define MODE_CBC 2 /* Are we ciphering in CBC mode? */ +#define MODE_CFB1 3 /* Are we ciphering in 1-bit CFB mode? */ +#undef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#undef FALSE +#define FALSE 0 +#define BITSPERBLOCK 128 /* Default number of bits in a cipher block */ + +/* Error Codes */ +#define BAD_KEY_DIR -1 /* Key direction is invalid, e.g., unknown value */ +#define BAD_KEY_MAT -2 /* Key material not of correct length */ +#define BAD_KEY_INSTANCE -3 /* Key passed is not valid */ +#define BAD_CIPHER_MODE -4 /* Params struct passed to cipherInit invalid */ +#define BAD_CIPHER_STATE -5 /* Cipher in wrong state (e.g., not initialized) */ +#define BAD_BLOCK_LENGTH -6 +#define BAD_CIPHER_INSTANCE -7 +#define BAD_DATA -8 /* Data contents are invalid, e.g., invalid padding */ +#define BAD_OTHER -9 /* Unknown error */ + +/* Algorithm-specific Defines */ +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 64 /* # of ASCII char's needed to represent a key */ +#define MAX_IV_SIZE 16 /* # bytes needed to represent an IV */ + +/* Typedefs */ + +typedef unsigned char BYTE; + +/* The structure for key information */ +typedef struct { + BYTE direction; /* Key used for encrypting or decrypting? */ + int keyLen; /* Length of the key */ + char keyMaterial[MAX_KEY_SIZE+1]; /* Raw key data in ASCII, e.g., user input or KAT values */ + int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ + u32 rk[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* key schedule */ + u32 ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* CFB1 key schedule (encryption only) */ +} keyInstance; + +/* The structure for cipher information */ +typedef struct { /* changed order of the components */ + BYTE mode; /* MODE_ECB, MODE_CBC, or MODE_CFB1 */ + BYTE IV[MAX_IV_SIZE]; /* A possible Initialization Vector for ciphering */ +} cipherInstance; + +#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_API_FST_H */ |