blockdev: Refuse to open encrypted image unless paused

Opening an encrypted image takes an additional step: setting the key.
Between open and the key set, the image must not be used.

We have some protection against accidental use in place: you can't
unpause a guest while we're missing keys.  You can, however, hot-plug
block devices lacking keys into a running guest just fine, or insert
media lacking keys.  In the latter case, notifying the guest of the
insert is delayed until the key is set, which may suffice to protect
at least some guests in common usage.

This patch makes the protection apply in more cases, in a rather
heavy-handed way: it doesn't let you open encrypted images unless
we're in a paused state.

It doesn't extend the protection to users other than the guest (block
jobs?).  Use of runstate_check() from block.c is disgusting.  Best I
can do right now.

Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/block.c b/block.c
index fae50c95b5..53f5b44fbb 100644
--- a/block.c
+++ b/block.c
@@ -1388,12 +1388,19 @@ done:
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto close_and_fail;
     }
-    QDECREF(options);
 
     if (!bdrv_key_required(bs)) {
         bdrv_dev_change_media_cb(bs, true);
+    } else if (!runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PRELAUNCH)
+               && !runstate_check(RUN_STATE_INMIGRATE)
+               && !runstate_check(RUN_STATE_PAUSED)) { /* HACK */
+        error_setg(errp,
+                   "Guest must be stopped for opening of encrypted image");
+        ret = -EBUSY;
+        goto close_and_fail;
     }
 
+    QDECREF(options);
     *pbs = bs;
     return 0;