Merge branch 'next-evm' of git://github.com/mzohar/linux-evm into next

14 files changed, 155 insertions, 84 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 22847a889081..51bd5a0b69ae 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
 
 config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
+	depends on KEYS
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index 884617d4aad0..afbb59dd262d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && TCG_TPM
+	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
-	select TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
index 0787d262b9e3..7393c415a066 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Makefile
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
 
 evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
+evm-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += evm_posix_acl.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index f0127e536f84..92d3d99a9f7b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
@@ -76,25 +76,18 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 			   xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		goto err_out;
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA)
+		    ? INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
 	rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (u8 *)&xattr_data,
 			   sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (rc < 0)
-		goto err_out;
-	evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-	goto out;
-
-err_out:
-	switch (rc) {
-	case -ENODATA:		/* file not labelled */
-		evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
-		break;
-	default:
-		evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-	}
+		evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA)
+		    ? INTEGRITY_NOLABEL : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 out:
 	if (iint)
 		iint->evm_status = evm_status;
@@ -159,21 +152,6 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
 
 /*
- * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
- *
- * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed.
- */
-static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
-{
-	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
  * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
  *
@@ -189,6 +167,39 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
+ *
+ * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
+ * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
+ *
+ * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
+ * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
+ * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
+ * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated.
+ */
+static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	enum integrity_status evm_status;
+
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
+		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
+			return 0;
+		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+			return 0;
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
 /**
  * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
@@ -202,16 +213,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
-
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				xattr_value_len);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -224,14 +227,7 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  */
 int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
-	enum integrity_status evm_status;
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -250,7 +246,8 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
-	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+	if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
+				 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
 		return;
 
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
@@ -286,10 +283,13 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
 
-	if (ia_valid & ~(ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
+	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
 		return 0;
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
-	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
+	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
+	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1753e98bf9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_posix_acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+
+int posix_xattr_acl(char *xattr)
+{
+	int xattr_len = strlen(xattr);
+
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	if ((strlen(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == xattr_len)
+	     && (strncmp(XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, xattr, xattr_len) == 0))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 0a23e075e1d2..399641c3e846 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index b34cc6ee6900..a56f1ffdc64d 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y := \
 	user_defined.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += ecryptfs_format.o encrypted.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6bc7a86d1027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# Makefile for encrypted keys
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted.o ecryptfs_format.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += masterkey_trusted.o
diff --git a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
index 6daa3b6ff9ed..6daa3b6ff9ed 100644
--- a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c
diff --git a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
index 40294de238bb..40294de238bb 100644
--- a/security/keys/ecryptfs_format.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.h
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index e7eca9ec4c65..3f577954b85a 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -299,31 +299,6 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
- *
- * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
- * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
- * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
- */
-static struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
-				       u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
-{
-	struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
-	struct key *tkey;
-
-	tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
-	if (IS_ERR(tkey))
-		goto error;
-
-	down_read(&tkey->sem);
-	tpayload = rcu_dereference(tkey->payload.data);
-	*master_key = tpayload->key;
-	*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
-error:
-	return tkey;
-}
-
-/*
  * request_user_key - request the user key
  *
  * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
@@ -469,8 +444,14 @@ static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (IS_ERR(mkey)) {
-		pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
-			epayload->master_desc);
+		int ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
+
+		if (ret == -ENOTSUPP)
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not supported",
+				epayload->master_desc);
+		else
+			pr_info("encrypted_key: key %s not found",
+				epayload->master_desc);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
index cef5e2f2b7d1..b6ade8945250 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
@@ -2,6 +2,17 @@
 #define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H
 
 #define ENCRYPTED_DEBUG 0
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS
+extern struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+				       u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen);
+#else
+static inline struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+					      u8 **master_key,
+					      size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+#endif
 
 #if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a5da5128891b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+
+/*
+ * request_trusted_key - request the trusted key
+ *
+ * Trusted keys are sealed to PCRs and other metadata. Although userspace
+ * manages both trusted/encrypted key-types, like the encrypted key type
+ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
+ */
+struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
+				u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
+	struct key *tkey;
+
+	tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(tkey))
+		goto error;
+
+	down_read(&tkey->sem);
+	tpayload = rcu_dereference(tkey->payload.data);
+	*master_key = tpayload->key;
+	*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
+error:
+	return tkey;
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9ebda054a333..c1d69875db6c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	int ret;
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return 0;
 
 	memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof new_xattrs);
 	if (!initxattrs)
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return 0;
 	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
 						 len);
 }