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authorChristoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>2008-05-19 16:34:34 +1000
committerNiv Sardi <xaiki@debian.org>2008-07-28 16:58:13 +1000
commit911ee3de3d1cb6620e2ac4e0678ff434867e2644 (patch)
tree3ecde1181f6e312073893feee10893fd5be7d9ce /fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c
parentd748c62367eb630cc30b91d561a5362f597a0892 (diff)
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[XFS] Kill attr_capable checks as already done in xattr_permission.
No need for addition permission checks in the xattr handler, fs/xattr.c:xattr_permission() already does them, and in fact slightly more strict then what was in the attr_capable handlers. SGI-PV: 981809 SGI-Modid: xfs-linux-melb:xfs-kern:31164a Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Tim Shimmin <tes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c41
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c
index df151a859186..86d8619f279c 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c
@@ -2622,43 +2622,6 @@ attr_lookup_namespace(
return NULL;
}
-/*
- * Some checks to prevent people abusing EAs to get over quota:
- * - Don't allow modifying user EAs on devices/symlinks;
- * - Don't allow modifying user EAs if sticky bit set;
- */
-STATIC int
-attr_user_capable(
- bhv_vnode_t *vp,
- cred_t *cred)
-{
- struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp);
-
- if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
- return -EPERM;
- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
- (current_fsuid(cred) != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
-STATIC int
-attr_trusted_capable(
- bhv_vnode_t *vp,
- cred_t *cred)
-{
- struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp);
-
- if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
- return -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
STATIC int
attr_system_set(
bhv_vnode_t *vp, char *name, void *data, size_t size, int xflags)
@@ -2709,7 +2672,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_system = {
.attr_get = attr_system_get,
.attr_set = attr_system_set,
.attr_remove = attr_system_remove,
- .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr,
};
struct attrnames attr_trusted = {
@@ -2719,7 +2681,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_trusted = {
.attr_get = attr_generic_get,
.attr_set = attr_generic_set,
.attr_remove = attr_generic_remove,
- .attr_capable = attr_trusted_capable,
};
struct attrnames attr_secure = {
@@ -2729,7 +2690,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_secure = {
.attr_get = attr_generic_get,
.attr_set = attr_generic_set,
.attr_remove = attr_generic_remove,
- .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr,
};
struct attrnames attr_user = {
@@ -2738,7 +2698,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_user = {
.attr_get = attr_generic_get,
.attr_set = attr_generic_set,
.attr_remove = attr_generic_remove,
- .attr_capable = attr_user_capable,
};
struct attrnames *attr_namespaces[] =