diff options
author | Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> | 2008-05-19 16:34:34 +1000 |
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committer | Niv Sardi <xaiki@debian.org> | 2008-07-28 16:58:13 +1000 |
commit | 911ee3de3d1cb6620e2ac4e0678ff434867e2644 (patch) | |
tree | 3ecde1181f6e312073893feee10893fd5be7d9ce /fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c | |
parent | d748c62367eb630cc30b91d561a5362f597a0892 (diff) | |
download | kernel-common-911ee3de3d1cb6620e2ac4e0678ff434867e2644.tar.gz kernel-common-911ee3de3d1cb6620e2ac4e0678ff434867e2644.tar.bz2 kernel-common-911ee3de3d1cb6620e2ac4e0678ff434867e2644.zip |
[XFS] Kill attr_capable checks as already done in xattr_permission.
No need for addition permission checks in the xattr handler,
fs/xattr.c:xattr_permission() already does them, and in fact slightly more
strict then what was in the attr_capable handlers.
SGI-PV: 981809
SGI-Modid: xfs-linux-melb:xfs-kern:31164a
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Tim Shimmin <tes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c | 41 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c index df151a859186..86d8619f279c 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c @@ -2622,43 +2622,6 @@ attr_lookup_namespace( return NULL; } -/* - * Some checks to prevent people abusing EAs to get over quota: - * - Don't allow modifying user EAs on devices/symlinks; - * - Don't allow modifying user EAs if sticky bit set; - */ -STATIC int -attr_user_capable( - bhv_vnode_t *vp, - cred_t *cred) -{ - struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp); - - if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) - return -EPERM; - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && - (current_fsuid(cred) != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -STATIC int -attr_trusted_capable( - bhv_vnode_t *vp, - cred_t *cred) -{ - struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp); - - if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) - return -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - STATIC int attr_system_set( bhv_vnode_t *vp, char *name, void *data, size_t size, int xflags) @@ -2709,7 +2672,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_system = { .attr_get = attr_system_get, .attr_set = attr_system_set, .attr_remove = attr_system_remove, - .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr, }; struct attrnames attr_trusted = { @@ -2719,7 +2681,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_trusted = { .attr_get = attr_generic_get, .attr_set = attr_generic_set, .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, - .attr_capable = attr_trusted_capable, }; struct attrnames attr_secure = { @@ -2729,7 +2690,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_secure = { .attr_get = attr_generic_get, .attr_set = attr_generic_set, .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, - .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr, }; struct attrnames attr_user = { @@ -2738,7 +2698,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_user = { .attr_get = attr_generic_get, .attr_set = attr_generic_set, .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, - .attr_capable = attr_user_capable, }; struct attrnames *attr_namespaces[] = |