diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 109 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index ab94948..4d34dba 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) int num, j, retry; int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; + int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; + int err; + if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); return -1; @@ -216,7 +219,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; + ok = -1; + goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); ctx->last_untrusted = 1; @@ -225,7 +229,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; + ok = -1; + goto err; } num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); @@ -249,7 +254,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) - goto end; + goto err; /* * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up * again later. @@ -266,7 +271,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (xtmp != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; + ok = -1; + goto err; } CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); @@ -314,7 +320,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; } else { /* * We have a match: replace certificate with store @@ -347,25 +353,26 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) - goto end; + goto err; if (ok == 0) break; x = xtmp; if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - ok = 0; - goto end; + ok = -1; + goto err; } num++; } /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ - i = check_trust(ctx); + if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { + /* Callback already issued */ + ok = 0; + goto err; + } - /* If explicitly rejected error */ - if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) - goto end; /* * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already @@ -373,14 +380,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) * chain checking */ retry = 0; - if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED + if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { while (j-- > 1) { xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); if (ok < 0) - goto end; + goto err; /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ if (ok > 0) { /* @@ -410,7 +417,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already * and set bad_chain == 1 */ - if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { + if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; @@ -431,26 +438,26 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) bad_chain = 1; ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; } /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; /* Check name constraints */ ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; ok = check_id(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); @@ -462,16 +469,16 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; - i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, - ctx->param->flags); - if (i != X509_V_OK) { - ctx->error = i; + err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, + ctx->param->flags); + if (err != X509_V_OK) { + ctx->error = err; ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); ok = cb(0, ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; } /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ @@ -480,25 +487,28 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) else ok = internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); if (!ok) - goto end; + goto err; if (0) { - end: + err: + /* Ensure we return an error */ + if (ok > 0) + ok = 0; X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); } if (sktmp != NULL) @@ -2283,9 +2293,10 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; + /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ + memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); - if (!ctx->param) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; @@ -2294,7 +2305,6 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ - if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else @@ -2302,6 +2312,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, if (store) { ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; + /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; } else ctx->cleanup = 0; @@ -2312,7 +2323,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; + goto err; } if (store && store->check_issued) @@ -2367,19 +2378,18 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, ctx->check_policy = check_policy; + if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, + &ctx->ex_data)) + return 1; + X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + + err: /* - * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As - * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a - * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. + * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not + * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ - /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ - if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, - &(ctx->ex_data))) { - OPENSSL_free(ctx); - X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - return 1; + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + return 0; } /* @@ -2395,8 +2405,17 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { - if (ctx->cleanup) + /* + * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls + * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() + * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the + * pointers below after they're freed! + */ + /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ + if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); + ctx->cleanup = NULL; + } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); |