Imported Upstream version 1.0.2dupstream/1.0.2d

Change-Id: I565a3e3ac5176f83139175faa2d2a11a334e8908
Signed-off-by: Yury Usishchev <y.usishchev@samsung.com>

1 files changed, 68 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 499835f..9c2a943 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -28,39 +28,53 @@
 # include <openssl/rand.h>
 # include <openssl/sha.h>
 
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
-                const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
-
 int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                const unsigned char *from, int flen,
                                const unsigned char *param, int plen)
 {
+    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen,
+                                           param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                    const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
     int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
     unsigned char *db, *seed;
-    unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
 
-    if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+    if (flen > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
                RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+    if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+               RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
         return 0;
     }
 
     to[0] = 0;
     seed = to + 1;
-    db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+    db = to + mdlen + 1;
 
-    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, md, NULL))
         return 0;
-    memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
-           emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
-    db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
-    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int)flen);
-    if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+    memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * mdlen - 1);
+    db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+    memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+    if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
         return 0;
 # ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
     memcpy(seed,
@@ -68,20 +82,20 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
            20);
 # endif
 
-    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
     if (dbmask == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
         return 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+    for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++)
         db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
 
-    if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md) < 0)
         return 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
         seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
 
     OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
@@ -92,6 +106,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                  const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
                                  const unsigned char *param, int plen)
 {
+    return RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(to, tlen, from, flen, num,
+                                             param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                      const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                      int num, const unsigned char *param,
+                                      int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                      const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
+{
     int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
     unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
     const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
@@ -101,26 +125,33 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      */
     unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE],
         phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int mdlen;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+        md = EVP_sha1();
+    if (mgf1md == NULL)
+        mgf1md = md;
+
+    mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
 
     if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
         return -1;
-
     /*
      * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
      * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
      * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus
-     * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
+     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
      * This does not leak any side-channel information.
      */
-    if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2)
+    if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
         goto decoding_err;
 
-    dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1;
+    dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
     db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
     em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
     if (db == NULL || em == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
@@ -143,26 +174,25 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
 
     maskedseed = em + 1;
-    maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
 
-    if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
-    for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+    for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++)
         seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
 
-    if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+    if (PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
     for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
         db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
 
-    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+    if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, md, NULL))
         goto cleanup;
 
-    good &=
-        constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
+    good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
 
     found_one_byte = 0;
-    for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) {
+    for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
         /*
          * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1.
          */
@@ -188,7 +218,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
 
     if (tlen < mlen) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
         mlen = -1;
     } else {
         memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
@@ -200,7 +230,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
      * reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
      */
-    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
+    RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
+           RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
  cleanup:
     if (db != NULL)
         OPENSSL_free(db);
@@ -249,9 +280,4 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
     return rv;
 }
 
-static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
-                long seedlen)
-{
-    return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
-}
 #endif