Merge branch 'upstream' into tizen_base

Change-Id: If901de6e8c9317a458af4fa72b754a2a5332cd5b

29 files changed, 284 insertions, 160 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 850e13f..8cfdec6 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,23 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
+
+  *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+     This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+     fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+     generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Add FIPS support for Android Arm 64-bit
+
+     Support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to the OpenSSL FIPS Object
+     Module in Version 2.0.10. For some reason, the corresponding target
+     'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it could not be
+     built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit. This omission has been
+     fixed.
+     [Matthias St. Pierre]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019]
 
   *) 0-byte record padding oracle
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index fec5a8b..54c3f44 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ my %table=(
 "android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"android64-aarch64","gcc:-mandroid -fPIC -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-pie%-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 
 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
 "BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 2ffb280..1f018f5 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2r
+VERSION=1.0.2s
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
 RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib
 RC= windres
 NM= nm
-PERL= /usr/bin/perl
+PERL= /usr/local/bin/perl
 TAR= tar
 TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
 MAKEDEPPROG= gcc
diff --git a/README b/README
index 8404d21..4288325 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2r 26 Feb 2019
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2s 28 May 2019
 
- Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
 
diff --git a/apps/CA.pl b/apps/CA.pl
index 43c20b2..3bf4c99 100644
--- a/apps/CA.pl
+++ b/apps/CA.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
 #
 # CA - wrapper around ca to make it easier to use ... basically ca requires
 #      some setup stuff to be done before you can use it and this makes
diff --git a/config b/config
index 6214c4b..c8a3b58 100755
--- a/config
+++ b/config
@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
   *-*-qnx6) OUT="QNX6" ;;
   x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;;
   armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armv7" ;;
+  aarch64-*-android) OUT="android64-aarch64" ;;
   *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;;
 esac
 
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
index 162753a..924a5ae 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!dctx)
         return 0;
-    dctx->prime_len = 1024;
+    dctx->prime_len = 2048;
     dctx->subprime_len = -1;
     dctx->generator = 2;
     dctx->use_dsa = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
index 7f00e97..cdf7320 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_pmeth.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@
 
 typedef struct {
     /* Parameter gen parameters */
-    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 1024) */
-    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 160) */
+    int nbits;                  /* size of p in bits (default: 2048) */
+    int qbits;                  /* size of q in bits (default: 224) */
     const EVP_MD *pmd;          /* MD for parameter generation */
     /* Keygen callback info */
     int gentmp[2];
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ static int pkey_dsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!dctx)
         return 0;
-    dctx->nbits = 1024;
-    dctx->qbits = 160;
+    dctx->nbits = 2048;
+    dctx->qbits = 224;
     dctx->pmd = NULL;
     dctx->md = NULL;
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
index 0d04cc6..5da3cd8 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_oct.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
                              BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
     point_conversion_form_t form;
-    int y_bit;
+    int y_bit, m;
     BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
     BIGNUM *x, *y, *yxi;
     size_t field_len, enc_len;
@@ -332,7 +332,8 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
         return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point);
     }
 
-    field_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+    field_len = (m + 7) / 8;
     enc_len =
         (form ==
          POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len;
@@ -357,7 +358,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
 
     if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x))
         goto err;
-    if (BN_ucmp(x, &group->field) >= 0) {
+    if (BN_num_bits(x) > m) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
     } else {
         if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y))
             goto err;
-        if (BN_ucmp(y, &group->field) >= 0) {
+        if (BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -382,16 +383,14 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
             }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, x, y, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
 
-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
     ret = 1;
 
  err:
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index df56484..cd2c420 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -872,7 +872,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
@@ -890,7 +898,15 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
-    return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
+    if (!group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
+        ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
+              EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
index da71526..a784a99 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
     ret = 1;
 
  err:
-    EC_POINT_free(s);
+    EC_POINT_clear_free(s);
     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
     BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index 90989c5..1a42068 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -356,10 +356,15 @@ static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in)
 static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in)
 {
     /*
-     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting.
+     * In order to prevent underflow, we add 64p mod p (which is equivalent
+     * to 0 mod p) before subtracting. p is 2^521 - 1, i.e. in binary a 521
+     * digit number with all bits set to 1. See "The representation of field
+     * elements" comment above for a description of how limbs are used to
+     * represent a number. 64p is represented with 8 limbs containing a number
+     * with 58 bits set and one limb with a number with 57 bits set.
      */
-    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
-    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 62) - (((limb) 1) << 4);
+    static const limb two63m6 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 6);
+    static const limb two63m5 = (((limb) 1) << 63) - (((limb) 1) << 5);
 
     out[0] += two63m6 - in[0];
     out[1] += two63m5 - in[1];
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
index 1bc3f39..6943cee 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -408,16 +408,14 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
             }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp is responsible for checking that
+         * the point is on the curve.
+         */
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx))
             goto err;
     }
 
-    /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
     ret = 1;
 
  err:
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ectest.c b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
index 5e1ef50..73f7374 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ectest.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ectest.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 =
         NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
     EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *yplusone;
     unsigned char buf[100];
     size_t i, len;
     int k;
@@ -405,7 +405,8 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     x = BN_new();
     y = BN_new();
     z = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D"))
@@ -542,6 +543,14 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, "23a628553168947d59dcc912042351377ac5fb32"))
         ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
     if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
@@ -613,6 +622,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 192)
         ABORT;
@@ -668,6 +686,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 224)
         ABORT;
@@ -728,6 +755,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 256)
         ABORT;
@@ -783,6 +819,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 384)
         ABORT;
@@ -844,6 +889,15 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     if (0 != BN_cmp(y, z))
         ABORT;
 
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     fprintf(stdout, "verify degree ...");
     if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) != 521)
         ABORT;
@@ -858,6 +912,10 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 
     /* more tests using the last curve */
 
+    /* Restore the point that got mangled in the (x, y + 1) test. */
+    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
+        ABORT;
+
     if (!EC_POINT_copy(Q, P))
         ABORT;
     if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q))
@@ -987,6 +1045,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
     BN_free(x);
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(z);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
 
     if (P_160)
         EC_GROUP_free(P_160);
@@ -1007,6 +1066,13 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1025,6 +1091,12 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
+        if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one())) ABORT;        \
+        /* \
+         * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not, \
+         * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail. \
+         */ \
+        if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, yplusone, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
         if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
@@ -1062,7 +1134,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     EC_GROUP *C2_B163 = NULL, *C2_B233 = NULL, *C2_B283 = NULL, *C2_B409 =
         NULL, *C2_B571 = NULL;
     EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
-    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof;
+    BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *cof, *yplusone;
     unsigned char buf[100];
     size_t i, len;
     int k;
@@ -1076,7 +1148,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     p = BN_new();
     a = BN_new();
     b = BN_new();
-    if (!p || !a || !b)
+    if (p == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "13"))
@@ -1142,7 +1214,8 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     y = BN_new();
     z = BN_new();
     cof = BN_new();
-    if (!x || !y || !z || !cof)
+    yplusone = BN_new();
+    if (x == NULL || y == NULL || z == NULL || cof == NULL || yplusone == NULL)
         ABORT;
 
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "6"))
@@ -1504,6 +1577,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(z);
     BN_free(cof);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
 
     if (C2_K163)
         EC_GROUP_free(C2_K163);
@@ -1672,7 +1746,7 @@ static const struct nistp_test_params nistp_tests_params[] = {
 static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
 {
     BN_CTX *ctx;
-    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order;
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *x, *y, *n, *m, *order, *yplusone;
     EC_GROUP *NISTP;
     EC_POINT *G, *P, *Q, *Q_CHECK;
 
@@ -1687,6 +1761,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
     m = BN_new();
     n = BN_new();
     order = BN_new();
+    yplusone = BN_new();
 
     NISTP = EC_GROUP_new(test->meth());
     if (!NISTP)
@@ -1709,6 +1784,14 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, test->Qy))
         ABORT;
+    if (!BN_add(yplusone, y, BN_value_one()))
+        ABORT;
+    /*
+     * When (x, y) is on the curve, (x, y + 1) is, as it happens, not,
+     * and therefore setting the coordinates should fail.
+     */
+    if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, yplusone, ctx))
+        ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(NISTP, Q_CHECK, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, test->Gx))
@@ -1811,6 +1894,7 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
     BN_free(x);
     BN_free(y);
     BN_free(order);
+    BN_free(yplusone);
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c
index d3b0524..2185c38 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh/ech_ossl.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
 
  err:
     if (tmp)
-        EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+        EC_POINT_clear_free(tmp);
     if (ctx)
         BN_CTX_end(ctx);
     if (ctx)
diff --git a/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/err/err.c
index 5ce774a..e6138aa 100644
--- a/crypto/err/err.c
+++ b/crypto/err/err.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -827,8 +827,24 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file,
         return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     }
 
+    while (es->bottom != es->top) {
+        if (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            err_clear(es, es->top);
+            es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+        if (es->err_flags[i] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+            es->bottom = i;
+            err_clear(es, es->bottom);
+            continue;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
     if (es->bottom == es->top)
         return 0;
+
     if (top)
         i = es->top;            /* last error */
     else
@@ -1158,23 +1174,6 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
     return 1;
 }
 
-#ifdef UINTPTR_T
-# undef UINTPTR_T
-#endif
-/*
- * uintptr_t is the answer, but unformtunately we can't assume that all
- * compilers supported by 1.0.2 have it :-(
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64
-/*
- * But we can't use size_t on VMS, because it adheres to sizeof(size_t)==4
- * even in 64-bit builds, which means that it won't work as mask.
- */
-# define UINTPTR_T unsigned long long
-#else
-# define UINTPTR_T size_t
-#endif
-
 void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
 {
     ERR_STATE *es;
@@ -1186,11 +1185,11 @@ void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
 
     top = es->top;
 
-    es->err_flags[top] &= ~(0 - clear);
-    es->err_buffer[top] &= ~(0UL - clear);
-    es->err_file[top] = (const char *)((UINTPTR_T)es->err_file[top] &
-                                       ~((UINTPTR_T)0 - clear));
-    es->err_line[top] |= 0 - clear;
-
-    es->top = (top + ERR_NUM_ERRORS - clear) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+    /*
+     * Flag error as cleared but remove it elsewhere to avoid two errors
+     * accessing the same error stack location, revealing timing information.
+     */
+    clear = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(clear, 0),
+                                     0, ERR_FLAG_CLEAR);
+    es->err_flags[top] |= clear;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/err/err.h b/crypto/err/err.h
index f423656..1862456 100644
--- a/crypto/err/err.h
+++ b/crypto/err/err.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define ERR_TXT_STRING          0x02
 
 # define ERR_FLAG_MARK           0x01
+# define ERR_FLAG_CLEAR          0x02
 
 # define ERR_NUM_ERRORS  16
 typedef struct err_state_st {
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index 6eaa0d2..8b47569 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000212fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000213fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2r-fips  26 Feb 2019"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s-fips  28 May 2019"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2r  26 Feb 2019"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2s  28 May 2019"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 7f20fd6..b7362ad 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
         goto err;
     }
     RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-    err_clear_last_constant_time(r >= 0);
+    err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & ~constant_time_msb(r));
 
  err:
     if (ctx != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 033ea5a..41e9c3b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
      * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
      * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
      * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
      * This does not leak any side-channel information.
      */
@@ -180,17 +180,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
     /*
      * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
      * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
      * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
      */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
 
-    maskedseed = from + 1;
-    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+    maskedseed = em + 1;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
 
     if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
@@ -231,29 +230,30 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
 
     /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
      */
     good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
 
     /*
-     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
-     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
-     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
-     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
-     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
-     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
-     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
-     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     * Move the result in-place by |dblen|-|mdlen|-1-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |db|+|mdlen|+1 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
-    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
-    mlen = dblen - msg_index;
-    for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
-
-        from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
+                                    dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < dblen - mdlen - 1; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (dblen - mdlen - 1 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = mdlen + 1; i < dblen - msg_index; i++)
+            db[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + msg_index], db[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[i + mdlen + 1], to[i]);
     }
 
     /*
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 074bc0a..86e0deb 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -241,15 +241,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
 
     /* scan over padding data */
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
 
         zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
                                               i, zero_index);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
@@ -276,24 +275,25 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
 
     /*
-     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
-     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
-     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
-     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
-     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
-     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
-     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
-     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
-    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
-    mlen = num - msg_index;
-    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
-
-        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
     }
 
     OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 00e730f..a798be5 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * 2006.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
     rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
     if (!rctx)
         return 0;
-    rctx->nbits = 1024;
+    rctx->nbits = 2048;
     rctx->pub_exp = NULL;
     rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
     rctx->md = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index e9a5fe2..6f25acd 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
 /*
  * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
- * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
  * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
  */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
@@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
     int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
 
-    if (flen < 10) {
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
@@ -138,10 +141,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
     err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
     mask = ~good;
 
@@ -149,18 +151,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     threes_in_row = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
 
         zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
                                               i, zero_index);
         found_zero_byte |= equals0;
 
         threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
-        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                    RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
     mask = ~good;
 
-    good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8);
     err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
                                    RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
     mask = ~good;
@@ -188,24 +190,25 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
 
     /*
-     * Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
-     * |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
-     * bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
-     * where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
-     * about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
-     * memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
-     * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
-     * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
+     * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+     * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+     * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+     * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+     * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+     * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+     * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+     * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
-    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
-    mlen = num - msg_index;
-    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
-
-        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
+    for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
+        mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
+        for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+            em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
     }
 
     OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
diff --git a/doc/apps/genpkey.pod b/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
index 2e24400..2a86c68 100644
--- a/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/genpkey.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ below.
 
 =item B<rsa_keygen_bits:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated key. If not specified 2048 is used.
 
 =item B<rsa_keygen_pubexp:value>
 
@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ below.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_bits:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 1024 is used.
+The number of bits in the generated prime. If not specified 2048 is used.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_q_bits:numbits>
 
 The number of bits in the q parameter. Must be one of 160, 224 or 256. If not
-specified 160 is used.
+specified 224 is used.
 
 =item B<dsa_paramgen_md:digest>
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ or B<sha256> if it is 256.
 
 =item B<dh_paramgen_prime_len:numbits>
 
-The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 1024.
+The number of bits in the prime parameter B<p>. The default is 2048.
 
 =item B<dh_paramgen_subprime_len:numbits>
 
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index b42b739..7e94a22 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2r
+Version: 1.0.2s
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/packaging/openssl.spec b/packaging/openssl.spec
index dc77159..2745172 100644
--- a/packaging/openssl.spec
+++ b/packaging/openssl.spec
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2r
+Version: 1.0.2s
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL and Apache-2.0 and BSD-3-Clause
 Group: Security/Crypto Libraries
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index c7fe977..00aa15f 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 830b723..f694767 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
diff --git a/tools/c_rehash b/tools/c_rehash
index 6a27c02..40f1277 100644
--- a/tools/c_rehash
+++ b/tools/c_rehash
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
 
 # Perl c_rehash script, scan all files in a directory
 # and add symbolic links to their hash values.