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authorMaciej Wereski <m.wereski@partner.samsung.com>2014-01-15 15:15:00 (GMT)
committerMaciej Wereski <m.wereski@partner.samsung.com>2014-01-15 15:15:00 (GMT)
commitbcca19a055cbdb0d67985ac08fef491f6d4bb42b (patch)
tree1d49ec65d242cf1dec494570622b3737aef06a03
parentb138da4a4b9d57b850ca4d0061969f5e3299861d (diff)
downloadlibcap-bcca19a055cbdb0d67985ac08fef491f6d4bb42b.zip
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Imported Upstream version 2.24upstream/2.24upstream
-rw-r--r--CHANGELOG10
-rw-r--r--Make.Rules11
-rw-r--r--Makefile7
-rw-r--r--README1
-rw-r--r--libcap/Makefile16
-rw-r--r--libcap/cap_alloc.c2
-rw-r--r--libcap/cap_extint.c10
-rw-r--r--libcap/cap_file.c4
-rw-r--r--libcap/include/sys/capability.h4
-rw-r--r--libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h (renamed from libcap/include/linux/capability.h)250
-rw-r--r--libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h (renamed from libcap/include/linux/prctl.h)47
-rw-r--r--libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h (renamed from libcap/include/linux/securebits.h)9
-rw-r--r--libcap/libcap.h13
-rw-r--r--libcap/libcap.pc.in11
-rw-r--r--pam_cap/capability.conf2
-rw-r--r--pgp.keys.asc138
-rw-r--r--progs/capsh.c3
-rwxr-xr-xprogs/quicktest.sh44
-rw-r--r--progs/setcap.c27
19 files changed, 316 insertions, 293 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
index a945be4..70e5faf 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG
+++ b/CHANGELOG
@@ -4,8 +4,14 @@ For release notes and other info pointers:
See GIT repository for detailed source history
- http://git.kernel.org/?p=libs/libcap/libcap.git;a=summary
+ https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/morgan/libcap.git/
Or simply download the source:
- git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
+ git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/morgan/libcap.git
+
+The license for this library is here:
+
+ https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/morgan/libcap.git/tree/License
+
+please submit patches compatible with this to morgan at kernel.org.
diff --git a/Make.Rules b/Make.Rules
index 8393738..ec1c474 100644
--- a/Make.Rules
+++ b/Make.Rules
@@ -7,13 +7,13 @@
FAKEROOT=$(DESTDIR)
# Autoconf-style prefixes are activated when $(prefix) is defined.
-# Otherwise binaries and libraraies are installed in /{lib,sbin}/,
+# Otherwise binaries and libraries are installed in /{lib,sbin}/,
# header files in /usr/include/ and documentation in /usr/man/man?/.
# These choices are motivated by the fact that getcap and setcap are
# administrative operations that could be needed to recover a system.
ifndef lib
-lib=$(shell ldd /usr/bin/ld|fgrep ld-linux|cut -d/ -f2)
+lib=$(shell ldd /usr/bin/ld|egrep "ld-linux|ld.so"|cut -d/ -f2)
endif
ifdef prefix
@@ -35,17 +35,18 @@ MANDIR=$(FAKEROOT)$(man_prefix)/man
SBINDIR=$(FAKEROOT)$(exec_prefix)/sbin
INCDIR=$(FAKEROOT)$(inc_prefix)/include
LIBDIR=$(FAKEROOT)$(lib_prefix)/$(lib)
+PKGCONFIGDIR=$(FAKEROOT)$(prefix)/$(lib)/pkgconfig
# common defines for libcap
LIBTITLE=libcap
VERSION=2
-MINOR=22
+MINOR=24
#
# Compilation specifics
-KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include
-IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS)
+KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi
+IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include
CC := gcc
CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index b0a8727..124d10d 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -27,8 +27,11 @@ distclean: clean
$(DISTCLEAN)
release: distclean
- cd .. && ln -s libcap libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR) && tar cvfz libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR).tar.gz libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)/* && rm libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)
+ cd .. && ln -s libcap libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR) && tar cvf libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR).tar libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)/* && rm libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)
+ cd .. && gpg -sba -u E2CCF3F4 libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR).tar
tagrelease: distclean
- git tag -s libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)
+ @echo "sign the tag twice: older DSA key; and newer RSA kernel.org key"
+ git tag -u D41A6DF2 -s libcap-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)
+ git tag -u E2CCF3F4 -s libcap-korg-$(VERSION).$(MINOR)
make release
diff --git a/README b/README
index b4740f0..7356eac 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ More information on capabilities in the Linux kernel can be found at
installs the library libcap.XX.Y in /lib[64]/
the binaries in /sbin/
the <sys/capability.h> file in /usr/include
+ the libcap.pc file in /usr/lib[64]/pkgconfig
* for some example programs look in progs.
diff --git a/libcap/Makefile b/libcap/Makefile
index 4762c60..20ab00f 100644
--- a/libcap/Makefile
+++ b/libcap/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ FILES=cap_alloc cap_proc cap_extint cap_flag cap_text
ifeq ($(LIBATTR),yes)
FILES += cap_file
LDFLAGS += -lattr
+DEPS = -lattr
endif
INCLS=libcap.h cap_names.h $(INCS)
@@ -25,13 +26,22 @@ MAJLIBNAME=$(LIBNAME).$(VERSION)
MINLIBNAME=$(MAJLIBNAME).$(MINOR)
GPERF_OUTPUT = _caps_output.gperf
-all: $(MINLIBNAME) $(STALIBNAME)
+all: $(MINLIBNAME) $(STALIBNAME) libcap.pc
ifeq ($(shell gperf --version > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo yes),yes)
USE_GPERF_OUTPUT = $(GPERF_OUTPUT)
INCLUDE_GPERF_OUTPUT = -include $(GPERF_OUTPUT)
endif
+libcap.pc: libcap.pc.in
+ sed -e 's,@prefix@,$(prefix),' \
+ -e 's,@exec_prefix@,$(exec_prefix),' \
+ -e 's,@libdir@,$(lib_prefix)/$(lib),' \
+ -e 's,@includedir@,$(inc_prefix)/include,' \
+ -e 's,@VERSION@,$(VERSION).$(MINOR),' \
+ -e 's,@deps@,$(DEPS),' \
+ $< >$@
+
_makenames: _makenames.c cap_names.list.h
$(BUILD_CC) $(BUILD_CFLAGS) $< -o $@
@@ -71,9 +81,11 @@ install: all
ifeq ($(FAKEROOT),)
-/sbin/ldconfig
endif
+ mkdir -p -m 0755 $(PKGCONFIGDIR)
+ install -m 0644 libcap.pc $(PKGCONFIGDIR)/libcap.pc
clean:
$(LOCALCLEAN)
- rm -f $(OBJS) $(LIBNAME)* $(STALIBNAME)
+ rm -f $(OBJS) $(LIBNAME)* $(STALIBNAME) libcap.pc
rm -f cap_names.h cap_names.list.h _makenames $(GPERF_OUTPUT)
cd include/sys && $(LOCALCLEAN)
diff --git a/libcap/cap_alloc.c b/libcap/cap_alloc.c
index 5fa5e93..525ea90 100644
--- a/libcap/cap_alloc.c
+++ b/libcap/cap_alloc.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int cap_free(void *data_p)
}
if ( good_cap_string(data_p) ) {
- int length = strlen(data_p) + sizeof(__u32);
+ size_t length = strlen(data_p) + sizeof(__u32);
data_p = -1 + (__u32 *) data_p;
memset(data_p, 0, length);
free(data_p);
diff --git a/libcap/cap_extint.c b/libcap/cap_extint.c
index 5a0cc8e..7d6e7ad 100644
--- a/libcap/cap_extint.c
+++ b/libcap/cap_extint.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ struct cap_ext_struct {
ssize_t cap_size(cap_t caps)
{
- return sizeof(struct cap_ext_struct);
+ return ssizeof(struct cap_ext_struct);
}
/*
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ssize_t cap_copy_ext(void *cap_ext, cap_t cap_d, ssize_t length)
int i;
/* valid arguments? */
- if (!good_cap_t(cap_d) || length < sizeof(struct cap_ext_struct)
+ if (!good_cap_t(cap_d) || length < ssizeof(struct cap_ext_struct)
|| cap_ext == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ ssize_t cap_copy_ext(void *cap_ext, cap_t cap_d, ssize_t length)
result->length_of_capset = CAP_SET_SIZE;
for (i=0; i<NUMBER_OF_CAP_SETS; ++i) {
- int j;
+ size_t j;
for (j=0; j<CAP_SET_SIZE; ) {
__u32 val;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ssize_t cap_copy_ext(void *cap_ext, cap_t cap_d, ssize_t length)
}
/* All done: return length of external representation */
- return (sizeof(struct cap_ext_struct));
+ return (ssizeof(struct cap_ext_struct));
}
/*
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ cap_t cap_copy_int(const void *cap_ext)
blen = export->length_of_capset;
for (set=0; set<NUMBER_OF_CAP_SETS; ++set) {
- int blk;
+ unsigned blk;
int bno = 0;
for (blk=0; blk<(CAP_SET_SIZE/sizeof(__u32)); ++blk) {
__u32 val = 0;
diff --git a/libcap/cap_file.c b/libcap/cap_file.c
index 634e601..d3dc1d0 100644
--- a/libcap/cap_file.c
+++ b/libcap/cap_file.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ cap_t cap_get_fd(int fildes)
/* fill the capability sets via a system call */
sizeofcaps = fgetxattr(fildes, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
&rawvfscap, sizeof(rawvfscap));
- if (sizeofcaps < sizeof(rawvfscap.magic_etc)) {
+ if (sizeofcaps < ssizeof(rawvfscap.magic_etc)) {
cap_free(result);
result = NULL;
} else {
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ cap_t cap_get_file(const char *filename)
/* fill the capability sets via a system call */
sizeofcaps = getxattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
&rawvfscap, sizeof(rawvfscap));
- if (sizeofcaps < sizeof(rawvfscap.magic_etc)) {
+ if (sizeofcaps < ssizeof(rawvfscap.magic_etc)) {
cap_free(result);
result = NULL;
} else {
diff --git a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
index 4b54acc..64ac50e 100644
--- a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
+++ b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
@@ -23,13 +23,11 @@ extern "C" {
#include <stdint.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-/*
- * Required to limit what gets defined in the kernel header file.
- */
#ifndef __user
#define __user
#endif
#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
/*
* POSIX capability types
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 4924f2a..a4b907f 100644
--- a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@
*
* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
*
- * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
+ * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
*/
-#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#include <linux/types.h>
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
} __user *cap_user_data_t;
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
-#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
@@ -87,27 +84,6 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
-#else
-
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
-
-extern int file_caps_enabled;
-
-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
- __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-} kernel_cap_t;
-
-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
-struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
- __u32 magic_etc;
- kernel_cap_t permitted;
- kernel_cap_t inheritable;
-};
-
-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
-#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
-
#endif
@@ -201,7 +177,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
sockets */
-/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
@@ -213,6 +189,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */
#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
@@ -249,7 +226,6 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
/* Allow administration of the random device */
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
-/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
/* Allow setting the domainname */
/* Allow setting the hostname */
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
@@ -355,222 +331,28 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
+/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
-/* Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYSLOG.
- CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not acceptable anymore. */
#define CAP_SYSLOG 34
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYSLOG
+/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
-#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
+#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
-/*
- * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
- */
-
-#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
-#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
+/* Allow preventing system suspends */
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
+#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
-/*
- * Internal kernel functions only
- */
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
-#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
- for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
-
-/*
- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
- *
- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
- *
- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
- *
- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
- * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
- * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
- */
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-
-#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
-# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
-#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
-
-# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
-# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
-# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
-# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
- CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
- CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-
-#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
-
-#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
-
-# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
-# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
-# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
-
-#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-
-#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
-do { \
- unsigned __capi; \
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
- c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
-do { \
- unsigned __capi; \
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
- c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
- const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
- return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
- const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
- return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
- const kernel_cap_t drop)
-{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
- return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
-{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
- return dest;
-}
-
-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
- unsigned __capi;
- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
- if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
+#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
/*
- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
- * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
- * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
- */
-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
-{
- kernel_cap_t dest;
- dest = cap_drop(a, set);
- return cap_isclear(dest);
-}
-
-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-
-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
-{
- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
- return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
- return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
- const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
- return cap_combine(a,
- cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
- return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
- const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
- const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
- return cap_combine(a,
- cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
-}
-
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
-
-/**
- * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
- */
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
-
-/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
- * @t: The task in question
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
- * check.
- *
- * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
*/
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
- (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
-
-extern int capable(int cap);
-/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
-struct dentry;
-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
+#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
-#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
-#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a3baeb2..289760f 100644
--- a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -102,4 +102,51 @@
#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
+/*
+ * Tune up process memory map specifics.
+ */
+#define PR_SET_MM 35
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1
+# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3
+# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6
+# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7
+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
+# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12
+# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13
+
+/*
+ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
+ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
+ */
+#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
+# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
+
+#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36
+#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37
+
+/*
+ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
+ * execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid,
+ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
+ *
+ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
+ * capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
+ *
+ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example,
+ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
+ * in execve returning -EPERM.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
+ */
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
+
+#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
index 3340617..985aac9 100644
--- a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
changed from user-level. */
#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
-#endif
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
@@ -51,4 +48,4 @@
issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
diff --git a/libcap/libcap.h b/libcap/libcap.h
index 1e66f98..2596c11 100644
--- a/libcap/libcap.h
+++ b/libcap/libcap.h
@@ -12,14 +12,15 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#ifndef __u8
-#define __u8 unsigned char
+#define __u8 uint8_t
#endif /* __8 */
#ifndef __u32
-#define __u32 unsigned int
+#define __u32 uint32_t
#endif /* __u32 */
/* include the names for the caps and a definition of __CAP_BITS */
@@ -197,4 +198,12 @@ extern int capsetp(pid_t pid, cap_t cap_d);
#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
+/*
+ * The library compares sizeof() with integer return values. To avoid
+ * signed/unsigned comparisons, leading to unfortunate
+ * misinterpretations of -1, we provide a convenient cast-to-signed-integer
+ * version of sizeof().
+ */
+#define ssizeof(x) ((ssize_t) sizeof(x))
+
#endif /* LIBCAP_H */
diff --git a/libcap/libcap.pc.in b/libcap/libcap.pc.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28e3e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcap/libcap.pc.in
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+libdir=@libdir@
+includedir=@includedir@
+
+Name: libcap
+Description: libcap
+Version: @VERSION@
+Libs: -L${libdir} -lcap
+Libs.private: @deps@
+Cflags: -I${includedir}
diff --git a/pam_cap/capability.conf b/pam_cap/capability.conf
index dd93ea7..09517f8 100644
--- a/pam_cap/capability.conf
+++ b/pam_cap/capability.conf
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
# and thus you'll know about Linux's capability support.
# [If you don't know about libcap, the sources for it are here:
#
-# http://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
+# http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
#
# .]
#
diff --git a/pgp.keys.asc b/pgp.keys.asc
index 583accd..b39f76a 100644
--- a/pgp.keys.asc
+++ b/pgp.keys.asc
@@ -1,8 +1,112 @@
+morgan@kernel.org upload/signature key.
+
+pub 4096R/E2CCF3F4 2011-10-07 Andrew G. Morgan (Work Address) <agm@google.com>
+uid Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (GNU/Linux)
+
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+9ifyrw==
+=Ibs8
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
pub 1024D/D41A6DF2 2002-09-23 Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
-Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
+Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (GNU/Linux)
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+T/i1WsxYMEaZtexvLuQe9LeaDqyY19DyBaJIIiN6EcGZ4sXRa7M6QUD1HKjEWt62
+U4shHkPGIMgQWLcRZDepovlpGVXLmXEf
+=oXom
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-
The following is my DSA key 'D41A6DF2' signed with my old '2A398175'
RSA key.
diff --git a/progs/capsh.c b/progs/capsh.c
index 52336d7..3ceadcd 100644
--- a/progs/capsh.c
+++ b/progs/capsh.c
@@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
if (set >= 0) {
const char *b;
b = binary(set); /* use verilog convention for binary string */
- printf("Securebits: 0%o/0x%x/%u'b%s\n", set, set, strlen(b), b);
+ printf("Securebits: 0%o/0x%x/%u'b%s\n", set, set,
+ (unsigned) strlen(b), b);
printf(" secure-noroot: %s (%s)\n",
(set & 1) ? "yes":"no",
(set & 2) ? "locked":"unlocked");
diff --git a/progs/quicktest.sh b/progs/quicktest.sh
index be3fa7d..ca6bf1e 100755
--- a/progs/quicktest.sh
+++ b/progs/quicktest.sh
@@ -44,18 +44,23 @@ pass_capsh () {
pass_capsh --print
-# Make a local non-setuid-0 version of ping
-cp /bin/ping . && chmod -s ./ping
-# Give it the forced capability it needs
-./setcap all=ep ./ping
+# Make a local non-setuid-0 version of capsh and call it privileged
+cp ./capsh ./privileged && chmod -s ./privileged
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo "Failed to copy capsh for capability manipulation"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+# Give it the forced capability it could need
+./setcap all=ep ./privileged
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "Failed to set all capabilities on file"
exit 1
fi
-./setcap cap_net_raw=ep ./ping
+./setcap cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ep ./privileged
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- echo "Failed to set single capability on ping file"
+ echo "Failed to set limited capabilities on privileged file"
exit 1
fi
@@ -75,37 +80,40 @@ pass_capsh --uid=500 -- -c "./tcapsh --keep=1 --caps=\"cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin
# This fails, on 2.6.24, but shouldn't
pass_capsh --uid=500 -- -c "./tcapsh --keep=1 --caps=\"cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin=ip\" --uid=500 --forkfor=10 --caps= --print --killit=9 --print"
-rm -f tcapsh
-
# only continue with these if --secbits is supported
./capsh --secbits=0x2f > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "unable to test securebits manipulation - assume not supported (PASS)"
- rm -f ./ping
+ rm -f tcapsh
+ rm -f privileged
exit 0
fi
pass_capsh --secbits=42 --print
fail_capsh --secbits=32 --keep=1 --keep=0 --print
pass_capsh --secbits=10 --keep=0 --keep=1 --print
-fail_capsh --secbits=47 -- -c "ping -c1 localhost"
+fail_capsh --secbits=47 -- -c "./tcapsh --user=nobody"
+
+rm -f tcapsh
# Suppress uid=0 privilege
-fail_capsh --secbits=47 --print -- -c "/bin/ping -c1 localhost"
+fail_capsh --secbits=47 --print -- -c "./capsh --user=nobody"
-# suppress uid=0 privilege and test this ping
-pass_capsh --secbits=0x2f --print -- -c "./ping -c1 localhost"
+# suppress uid=0 privilege and test this privileged
+pass_capsh --secbits=0x2f --print -- -c "./privileged --user=nobody"
# observe that the bounding set can be used to suppress this forced capability
-fail_capsh --drop=cap_net_raw,cap_chown --secbits=0x2f --print -- -c "./ping -c1 localhost"
+fail_capsh --drop=cap_setuid --secbits=0x2f --print -- -c "./privileged --user=nobody"
# change the way the capability is obtained (make it inheritable)
-./setcap cap_net_raw=ei ./ping
+./setcap cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ei ./privileged
-pass_capsh --secbits=47 --inh=cap_net_raw --drop=cap_net_raw \
- --uid=500 --print -- -c "./ping -c1 localhost"
+# Note, the bounding set (edited with --drop) only limits p
+# capabilities, not i's.
+pass_capsh --secbits=47 --inh=cap_setuid,cap_setgid --drop=cap_setuid \
+ --uid=500 --print -- -c "./privileged --user=nobody"
-rm -f ./ping
+rm -f ./privileged
# test that we do not support capabilities on setuid shell-scripts
cat > hack.sh <<EOF
diff --git a/progs/setcap.c b/progs/setcap.c
index 0215fc4..83090ae 100644
--- a/progs/setcap.c
+++ b/progs/setcap.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void usage(void)
static int read_caps(int quiet, const char *filename, char *buffer)
{
- int i=MAXCAP;
+ int i = MAXCAP;
if (!quiet) {
fprintf(stderr, "Please enter caps for file [empty line to end]:\n");
@@ -170,10 +170,33 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
}
retval = cap_set_file(*++argv, cap_d);
if (retval != 0) {
+ int explained = 0;
+#ifdef linux
+ cap_value_t cap;
+ cap_flag_value_t per_state;
+
+ for (cap = 0;
+ cap_get_flag(cap_d, cap, CAP_PERMITTED, &per_state) != -1;
+ cap++) {
+ cap_flag_value_t inh_state, eff_state;
+
+ cap_get_flag(cap_d, cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, &inh_state);
+ cap_get_flag(cap_d, cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, &eff_state);
+ if ((inh_state | per_state) != eff_state) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "NOTE: Under Linux, effective file capabilities must either be empty, or\n"
+ " exactly match the union of selected permitted and inheritable bits.\n");
+ explained = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* def linux */
+
fprintf(stderr,
"Failed to set capabilities on file `%s' (%s)\n",
argv[0], strerror(errno));
- usage();
+ if (!explained) {
+ usage();
+ }
}
}
if (cap_d) {