diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/export.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/export.c | 756 |
1 files changed, 756 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09faa03 --- /dev/null +++ b/g10/export.c @@ -0,0 +1,756 @@ +/* export.c + * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, + * 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <assert.h> + +#include "gpg.h" +#include "options.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "status.h" +#include "keydb.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "i18n.h" +#include "trustdb.h" + + +/* An object to keep track of subkeys. */ +struct subkey_list_s +{ + struct subkey_list_s *next; + u32 kid[2]; +}; +typedef struct subkey_list_s *subkey_list_t; + + +static int do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options ); +static int do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret, + KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, + int *any ); +static int build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent); + + +int +parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy) +{ + struct parse_options export_opts[]= + { + {"export-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL, + N_("export signatures that are marked as local-only")}, + {"export-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL, + N_("export attribute user IDs (generally photo IDs)")}, + {"export-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL, + N_("export revocation keys marked as \"sensitive\"")}, + {"export-reset-subkey-passwd",EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD,NULL, + N_("remove the passphrase from exported subkeys")}, + {"export-clean",EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL, + N_("remove unusable parts from key during export")}, + {"export-minimal",EXPORT_MINIMAL|EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL, + N_("remove as much as possible from key during export")}, + {"export-sexp-format",EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT, NULL, + N_("export keys in an S-expression based format")}, + /* Aliases for backward compatibility */ + {"include-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL}, + {"include-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,NULL}, + {"include-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,NULL}, + /* dummy */ + {"export-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL}, + {"export-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL}, + {"export-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL}, + {NULL,0,NULL,NULL} + /* add tags for include revoked and disabled? */ + }; + + return parse_options(str,options,export_opts,noisy); +} + + +/**************** + * Export the public keys (to standard out or --output). + * Depending on opt.armor the output is armored. + * options are defined in main.h. + * If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported. */ +int +export_pubkeys( strlist_t users, unsigned int options ) +{ + return do_export( users, 0, options ); +} + +/**************** + * Export to an already opened stream; return -1 if no keys have + * been exported + */ +int +export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, + KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options ) +{ + int any, rc; + + rc = do_export_stream( out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any ); + if( !rc && !any ) + rc = -1; + return rc; +} + +int +export_seckeys( strlist_t users ) +{ + /* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */ + unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT); + return do_export( users, 1, options ); +} + +int +export_secsubkeys( strlist_t users ) +{ + /* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */ + unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT); + return do_export( users, 2, options ); +} + +static int +do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options ) +{ + IOBUF out = NULL; + int any, rc; + armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL; + compress_filter_context_t zfx; + + memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx); + + rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out ); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!(options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT)) + { + if ( opt.armor ) + { + afx = new_armor_context (); + afx->what = secret? 5 : 1; + push_armor_filter (afx, out); + } + if ( opt.compress_keys ) + push_compress_filter (out,&zfx,default_compress_algo()); + } + + rc = do_export_stream ( out, users, secret, NULL, options, &any ); + + if ( rc || !any ) + iobuf_cancel (out); + else + iobuf_close (out); + release_armor_context (afx); + return rc; +} + + + +/* Release an entire subkey list. */ +static void +release_subkey_list (subkey_list_t list) +{ + while (list) + { + subkey_list_t tmp = list->next;; + xfree (list); + list = tmp; + } +} + + +/* Returns true if NODE is a subkey and contained in LIST. */ +static int +subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list_t list, KBNODE node) +{ + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) + { + u32 kid[2]; + + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid); + else + keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid); + + for (; list; list = list->next) + if (list->kid[0] == kid[0] && list->kid[1] == kid[1]) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Allocate a new subkey list item from NODE. */ +static subkey_list_t +new_subkey_list_item (KBNODE node) +{ + subkey_list_t list = xcalloc (1, sizeof *list); + + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, list->kid); + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) + keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, list->kid); + + return list; +} + + +/* Helper function to check whether the subkey at NODE actually + matches the description at DESC. The function returns true if the + key under question has been specified by an exact specification + (keyID or fingerprint) and does match the one at NODE. It is + assumed that the packet at NODE is either a public or secret + subkey. */ +static int +exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node) +{ + u32 kid[2]; + byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN]; + size_t fprlen; + int result = 0; + + switch(desc->mode) + { + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID: + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID: + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid); + else + keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid); + break; + + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16: + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20: + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR: + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr,&fprlen); + else + fingerprint_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, fpr,&fprlen); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + switch(desc->mode) + { + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID: + if (desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1]) + result = 1; + break; + + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID: + if (desc->u.kid[0] == kid[0] && desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1]) + result = 1; + break; + + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16: + if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 16)) + result = 1; + break; + + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20: + case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR: + if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 20)) + result = 1; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return result; +} + + +/* If keyblock_out is non-NULL, AND the exit code is zero, then it + contains a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported. No + other keyblocks are exported. The caller must free it. */ +static int +do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret, + KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, int *any ) +{ + int rc = 0; + PACKET pkt; + KBNODE keyblock = NULL; + KBNODE kbctx, node; + size_t ndesc, descindex; + KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL; + subkey_list_t subkey_list = NULL; /* Track alreay processed subkeys. */ + KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd; + strlist_t sl; + int indent = 0; + + *any = 0; + init_packet( &pkt ); + kdbhd = keydb_new (secret); + + if (!users) { + ndesc = 1; + desc = xcalloc ( ndesc, sizeof *desc ); + desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST; + } + else { + for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++) + ; + desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc); + + for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next) { + if (classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc)) + ndesc++; + else + log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), + sl->d, g10_errstr (G10ERR_INV_USER_ID)); + } + + /* It would be nice to see which of the given users did + actually match one in the keyring. To implement this we + need to have a found flag for each entry in desc and to set + this we must check all those entries after a match to mark + all matched one - currently we stop at the first match. To + do this we need an extra flag to enable this feature so */ + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS + if (secret) { + log_error (_("exporting secret keys not allowed\n")); + rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; + goto leave; + } +#endif + + while (!(rc = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex))) { + int sha1_warned=0,skip_until_subkey=0; + u32 sk_keyid[2]; + + if (!users) + desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; + + /* Read the keyblock. */ + rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock ); + if( rc ) { + log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) ); + goto leave; + } + + if((node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_SECRET_KEY))) + { + PKT_secret_key *sk=node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; + + keyid_from_sk(sk,sk_keyid); + + /* We can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key. */ + if( secret == 2 && !sk->is_protected ) + { + log_info(_("key %s: not protected - skipped\n"), + keystr(sk_keyid)); + continue; + } + + /* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */ + if( secret == 2 && sk->version == 3 ) + { + log_info(_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"), + keystr(sk_keyid)); + continue; + } + + /* It does not make sense to export a key with a primary + key on card using a non-key stub. We simply skip those + keys when used with --export-secret-subkeys. */ + if (secret == 2 && sk->is_protected + && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) + { + log_info(_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"), + keystr(sk_keyid)); + continue; + } + } + else + { + /* It's a public key export, so do the cleaning if + requested. Note that both export-clean and + export-minimal only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11, + 0x12, and 0x13). A designated revocation is never + stripped, even with export-minimal set. */ + + if(options&EXPORT_CLEAN) + clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&EXPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL); + } + + /* And write it. */ + for( kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0 )); ) { + if( skip_until_subkey ) + { + if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY + || node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) + skip_until_subkey=0; + else + continue; + } + + /* We used to use comment packets, but not any longer. In + case we still have comments on a key, strip them here + before we call build_packet(). */ + if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT ) + continue; + + /* Make sure that ring_trust packets never get exported. */ + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) + continue; + + /* If exact is set, then we only export what was requested + (plus the primary key, if the user didn't specifically + request it). */ + if(desc[descindex].exact + && (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY + || node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)) + { + if (!exact_subkey_match_p (desc+descindex, node)) + { + /* Before skipping this subkey, check whether any + other description wants an exact match on a + subkey and include that subkey into the output + too. Need to add this subkey to a list so that + it won't get processed a second time. + + So the first step here is to check that list and + skip in any case if the key is in that list. + + We need this whole mess because the import + function is not able to merge secret keys and + thus it is useless to output them as two + separate keys and have import merge them. */ + if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node)) + skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */ + else + { + size_t j; + + for (j=0; j < ndesc; j++) + if (j != descindex && desc[j].exact + && exact_subkey_match_p (desc+j, node)) + break; + if (!(j < ndesc)) + skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */ + } + } + + if(skip_until_subkey) + continue; + + /* Mark this one as processed. */ + { + subkey_list_t tmp = new_subkey_list_item (node); + tmp->next = subkey_list; + subkey_list = tmp; + } + } + + if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) + { + /* do not export packets which are marked as not + exportable */ + if(!(options&EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS) + && !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable) + continue; /* not exportable */ + + /* Do not export packets with a "sensitive" revocation + key unless the user wants us to. Note that we do + export these when issuing the actual revocation + (see revoke.c). */ + if(!(options&EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS) + && node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey) + { + int i; + + for(i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++) + if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40) + break; + + if(i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys) + continue; + } + } + + /* Don't export attribs? */ + if( !(options&EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES) && + node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && + node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) { + /* Skip until we get to something that is not an attrib + or a signature on an attrib */ + while(kbctx->next && kbctx->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) { + kbctx=kbctx->next; + } + + continue; + } + + if( secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) + { + /* We don't want to export the secret parts of the + * primary key, this is done by using GNU protection mode 1001 + */ + int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode; + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = 1001; + if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT)) + rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent); + else + rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt); + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = save_mode; + } + else if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY + && (opt.export_options&EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD)) + { + /* If the subkey is protected reset the passphrase to + export an unprotected subkey. This feature is + useful in cases of a subkey copied to an unattended + machine where a passphrase is not required. */ + PKT_secret_key *sk_save, *sk; + + sk_save = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; + sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk_save); + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk; + + log_info (_("about to export an unprotected subkey\n")); + switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk)) + { + case -1: + rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; + break; + case 0: + break; + default: + if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001) + ; /* No secret parts. */ + else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) + ; /* Card key stub. */ + else + { + rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 ); + } + break; + } + if (rc) + { + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save; + free_secret_key (sk); + log_error (_("failed to unprotect the subkey: %s\n"), + g10_errstr (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT)) + rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent); + else + rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt); + + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save; + free_secret_key (sk); + } + else + { + /* Warn the user if the secret key or any of the secret + subkeys are protected with SHA1 and we have + simple_sk_checksum set. */ + if(!sha1_warned && opt.simple_sk_checksum && + (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY || + node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) && + node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.sha1chk) + { + /* I hope this warning doesn't confuse people. */ + log_info(_("WARNING: secret key %s does not have a " + "simple SK checksum\n"),keystr(sk_keyid)); + + sha1_warned=1; + } + + if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT)) + rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent); + else + rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt); + } + + if( rc ) { + log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n", + node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) ); + goto leave; + } + } + + if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent) + { + for (; indent; indent--) + iobuf_put (out, ')'); + iobuf_put (out, '\n'); + } + + ++*any; + if(keyblock_out) + { + *keyblock_out=keyblock; + break; + } + } + if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent) + { + for (; indent; indent--) + iobuf_put (out, ')'); + iobuf_put (out, '\n'); + } + if( rc == -1 ) + rc = 0; + + leave: + release_subkey_list (subkey_list); + xfree(desc); + keydb_release (kdbhd); + if(rc || keyblock_out==NULL) + release_kbnode( keyblock ); + if( !*any ) + log_info(_("WARNING: nothing exported\n")); + return rc; +} + + + +static int +write_sexp_line (iobuf_t out, int *indent, const char *text) +{ + int i; + + for (i=0; i < *indent; i++) + iobuf_put (out, ' '); + iobuf_writestr (out, text); + return 0; +} + +static int +write_sexp_keyparm (iobuf_t out, int *indent, const char *name, gcry_mpi_t a) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *buffer; + + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "("); + iobuf_writestr (out, name); + iobuf_writestr (out, " #"); + + rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, &buffer, NULL, a); + assert (!rc); + iobuf_writestr (out, buffer); + iobuf_writestr (out, "#)"); + gcry_free (buffer); + return 0; +} + +static int +build_sexp_seckey (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent) +{ + PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key; + char tmpbuf[100]; + + if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) + { + iobuf_writestr (out, "(openpgp-key\n"); + (*indent)++; + } + else + { + iobuf_writestr (out, " (subkey\n"); + (*indent)++; + } + (*indent)++; + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(private-key\n"); + (*indent)++; + if (is_RSA (sk->pubkey_algo) && !sk->is_protected) + { + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(rsa\n"); + (*indent)++; + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "n", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "e", sk->skey[1]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "d", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "q", sk->skey[4]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "u", sk->skey[5]); + iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + (*indent)--; + } + else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && !sk->is_protected) + { + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(dsa\n"); + (*indent)++; + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "q", sk->skey[1]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "g", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "y", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "x", sk->skey[4]); + iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + (*indent)--; + } + else if (is_ELGAMAL (sk->pubkey_algo) && !sk->is_protected) + { + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(elg\n"); + (*indent)++; + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "g", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "y", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "x", sk->skey[4]); + iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + (*indent)--; + } + write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(attrib\n"); (*indent)++; + sprintf (tmpbuf, "(created \"%lu\"", (unsigned long)sk->timestamp); + write_sexp_line (out, indent, tmpbuf); + iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close created */ + iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close attrib */ + iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close private-key */ + if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY) + iobuf_put (out,')'), (*indent)--; /* close subkey */ + iobuf_put (out,'\n'); + + return 0; +} + + +/* For some packet types we write them in a S-expression format. This + is still EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change. */ +static int +build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent) +{ + int rc; + + switch (pkt->pkttype) + { + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: + rc = build_sexp_seckey (out, pkt, indent); + break; + default: + rc = 0; + break; + } + return rc; +} + |