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2020-04-16activation: fix indentationupgrade-to-1.12.16Adrian Szyndela1-1/+1
2020-04-16dbus-transport: stop using orig_len outside its contextAdrian Szyndela1-1/+1
2020-04-16packaging: update packaging for dbus-1.12.16Adrian Szyndela2-8/+10
- spec: drop deprecated option --with-init-scripts - spec: package new, installed files - spec: acknowledge removing of dbus.socket from dbus.target.wants - spec: add autoconf-archive build dependency - acknowledge renaming HACKING to CONTRIBUTING.md - spec: bump version to 1.12.16
2020-04-16Merge dbus-1.12.16 into tizenAdrian Szyndela275-7232/+17617
dbus 1.12.16
2020-03-30Revert "Add dependency to security-manager.socket"submit/tizen/20200402.112144accepted/tizen/unified/20200406.133221INSUN PYO1-2/+0
This reverts commit 8d7fa32af68f2ba1f5da3494ce6d50e8e7c2c034. Change-Id: Iaf3890e804b87b7c6751237e0ef93b3ad5db9ceb
2020-03-25Revert "Remove DefaultDependencies=no from dbus.socket"INSUN PYO1-0/+1
This reverts commit 873bad7e9515fbafb8682fa6cdadfee629762e0d. Change-Id: I642e8ca08d551320b56d97e682c969689640700f
2020-03-12policy: print policy denied complaint log for signal broadcastingsanghyeok.oh1-2/+4
Debugging is difficult due to lack of error information: When the broadcast signal is blocked by dbus policy, unlike other types of dbus messages, dbus-daemon does not print any error logs, it just passes an error message to the bus monitor. Change-Id: I9c6c55530d64451403664ea1eee4b703360691eb
2020-01-13auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server ownerSimon McVittie1-0/+30
The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie" into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting file owned by the server. Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's. Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing authentication bypass. This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this vulnerability only applies to: * system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration * third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default) * third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available. However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at ~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the identity of the process hosting the DBusServer. Change-Id: I04d70bf97d78d25551e9adc217a4dd7652d428b6 Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/269 Closes: CVE-2019-12749
2019-08-20Revert "tizen: Add additional unit for "unified" user session"tizen_5.5.m2_releasesubmit/tizen_5.5_mobile_hotfix/20201026.185106submit/tizen_5.5/20191031.000006submit/tizen/20190820.090809accepted/tizen/unified/20190822.045457accepted/tizen/5.5/unified/mobile/hotfix/20201027.063100accepted/tizen/5.5/unified/20191031.005930tizen_5.5_tvtizen_5.5_mobile_hotfixaccepted/tizen_5.5_unified_mobile_hotfixYunmi Ha5-43/+1
This reverts commit 662187a7597aaf9c9ad2a635944951e6174a36da. We've optimized systemd-user without unified system/session. So, we revert the patch for unified system/session. Change-Id: I70ee37ebeda65e549c5f544d37d511cb6d54b757
2019-07-30policy: modify complaint log to print out matched rulesubmit/tizen/20190812.022819accepted/tizen/unified/20190816.112439sanghyeok.oh4-16/+132
Reconstruct rule with xml format. Change-Id: I760f5c89f519672743a10fa15b66ac14b7e819a1 Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-07-23policy: change complaint log format of bus_client_policy_check_can_own() to ↵sanghyeok.oh1-5/+9
print out connection log Change-Id: Ib0fc3be8b07577da687a024f5c39178dad387644 Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-07-19kdbus: fix computing bloom filterssubmit/tizen/20190719.104741accepted/tizen/unified/20190722.074825Adrian Szyndela1-3/+3
The bloom filters computing had been implemented in the past, basing on systemd. However, the reimplementation introduced two bugs: - no clearing of 'p' variable; - clearing of hash_index variable in a wrong place. This fixes the bugs. The same applies to glib. Change-Id: Ie7c602c6bc881e38c62f41d482ab3785b03c5503
2019-07-17Revert "Fix for smack error when dbus-daemon(session) accesses proc/cmdline"submit/tizen/20190717.061730accepted/tizen/unified/20190717.220434Hyotaek Shim1-1/+1
This reverts commit c7fbfc743059b3e9988a359106ad459511b5ea78. Change-Id: I86742a428f372ff6988a13df12694c550e2a53c2
2019-07-01gvariant: fix UBSan related codesubmit/tizen/20190701.095512accepted/tizen/unified/20190702.114943sanghyeok.oh1-2/+2
fix Undefined Behavior Sanitizer error. Change-Id: If3b68e68d4de753d0e66c0eeb07f626431057cbf Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-06-26policy: add complaint log for bus_client_policy_check_can_own()sanghyeok.oh1-0/+5
Change-Id: I4e67ff2258b11bab764f51cfe7e2ae01f2a11d49 Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-06-24Merge "Remove unused DbusError to avoid memory leak." into tizensubmit/tizen/20190624.005319accepted/tizen/unified/20190624.115337sanghyeok oh1-3/+1
2019-06-17remove unused DBusError in kdbus_read_message()Himanshu Maithani1-6/+2
The function defines and initializes local DBusError. It is not used in kdbus_decode_msg() and function relies on assert for error. So, remove the DBusError variable in kdbus_decode_msg(). Change-Id: Ic726f2a161f06766b081f1a98e83ff4f3834f75b Signed-off-by: Himanshu Maithani <himanshu.m@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Gaurav Gupta <g.gupta@samsung.com>
2019-06-13Remove unused DbusError to avoid memory leak.Gaurav Gupta1-3/+1
Pass NULL as error argument to avoid setting error string in dbus_validate_bus_name(), thus avoid possible memory leak. We expect the name to be valid bus name (utf8) as it is fetched from the connection. It will also optimize stack usage as "local_error" variable & dbus_error_init() function are called in for loop. Other fix could be to check free "error" if it is set. Signed-off-by: Gaurav Gupta <g.gupta@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Himanshu Maithani <himanshu.m@samsung.com> Change-Id: I773211edd76b6591369bbaae5464971894481a28
2019-06-12fix: missing dbus_error_free in kdbus_write_msg_internalsubmit/tizen/20190624.001018himanshu.m@samsung.com1-0/+1
free message/name from the error in kdbus_write_msg_internal Change-Id: I7f03abc0fc3f7c81e3725b3325f9e15209906e35 Signed-off-by: Himanshu Maithani <himanshu.m@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Gaurav Gupta <g.gupta@samsung.com>
2019-06-09Prepare version 1.12.16dbus-1.12.16Simon McVittie2-4/+17
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2019-06-09test: Add basic test coverage for DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1Simon McVittie7-3/+184
We don't actually complete successful authentication, because that would require us to generate a cookie and compute the correct SHA1, which is difficult to do in a deterministic authentication script. However, we do assert that dbus#269 (CVE-2019-12749) has been fixed. Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2019-06-09auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server ownerSimon McVittie1-0/+32
The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie" into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting file owned by the server. Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's. Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing authentication bypass. This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this vulnerability only applies to: * system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration * third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default) * third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available. However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at ~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the identity of the process hosting the DBusServer. Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/269 Closes: CVE-2019-12749
2019-05-17Start 1.12.16 developmentSimon McVittie2-1/+6
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2019-05-17Release 1.12.14dbus-1.12.14Simon McVittie2-3/+5
2019-05-14apply default deny own policysubmit/tizen/20190530.011453accepted/tizen/unified/20190602.221846sanghyeok.oh1-1/+1
Change default own policy from allow to deny. Change-Id: Ifde07a31ea3e6b8c97a6b7aee093ff9bf67c301c Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-05-13Update NEWSSimon McVittie1-1/+36
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
2019-05-13bus: Try to raise soft fd limit to match hard limitSimon McVittie4-34/+44
Linux systems have traditionally set the soft limit to 1024 and the hard limit to 4096. Recent versions of systemd keep the soft fd limit at 1024 to avoid breaking programs that still use select(), but raise the hard limit to 512*1024, while in recent Debian versions a complicated interaction between components gives a soft limit of 1024 and a hard limit of 1024*1024. If we can, we might as well elevate our soft limit to match the hard limit, minimizing the chance that we will run out of file descriptor slots. Unlike the previous code to raise the hard and soft limits to at least 65536, we do this even if we don't have privileges: privileges are unnecessary to raise the soft limit up to the hard limit. If we *do* have privileges, we also continue to raise the hard and soft limits to at least 65536 if they weren't already that high, making it harder to carry out a denial of service attack on the system bus on systems that use the traditional limit (CVE-2014-7824). As was previously the case on the system bus, we'll drop the limits back to our initial limits before we execute a subprocess for traditional (non-systemd) activation, if enabled. systemd activation doesn't involve us starting subprocesses at all, so in both cases activated services will still inherit the same limits they did previously. This change also fixes a bug when the hard limit is very large but the soft limit is not, for example seen as a regression when upgrading to systemd >= 240 (Debian #928877). In such environments, dbus-daemon would previously have changed its fd limit to 64K soft/64K hard. Because this hard limit is less than its original hard limit, it was unable to restore its original hard limit as intended when carrying out traditional activation, leaving activated subprocesses with unintended limits (while logging a warning). Reviewed-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> [smcv: Correct a comment based on Lennart's review, reword commit message] Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> (cherry picked from commit 7eacbfece70f16bb54d0f3ac51f87ae398759ef5) [smcv: Mention that this also fixes Debian #928877]
2019-05-13cmake: Avoid overwriting PKG_CONFIG_PATH env varClemens Lang1-0/+27
The CMake config file installed by DBus will run in the context of other projects. Consequently, changing the value of the PKG_CONFIG_DIR, PKG_CONFIG_PATH or PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR environment variables will affect any further calls to pkg-config made by such projects, which can cause problems. A common case of this happening are pkg-config files installed in usr/share/pkgconfig for .pc files that are architecture-independent, as for example systemd does. Avoid clobbering the environment variables by saving and restoring their values. Note that for some of the variables, setting them to an empty string is different from not setting them at all. Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <clemens.lang@bmw-carit.de> (cherry picked from commit 3525cc045d4c683dfc6048f5be795cc372c323a3) Closes: dbus#267
2019-05-09coverity fixsanghyeok.oh3-13/+33
Change-Id: Iac35795aaa9a0640c83b59ddb6fb5dc18435746f Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-05-07tizen: Add additional unit for "unified" user sessionsubmit/tizen/20190509.015828accepted/tizen/unified/20190510.111111Mateusz Moscicki5-1/+43
The unified user session is about moving user session units, managed by systemd --user, to main systemd, where it's managed as part of newly created user@.target. user@.target will contain same units as previously available in user/, with same UID and environment setup. systemd instance is used for unit to be able to specify UID (inherited from user@.target). The rationale behind this work is following: * VD requirement to remove user session support * boot time optimization requirements, due to: + 'systemd --user' taking 1s its own startup that could be used for unit startup + ability to better rearrange units if these managed by one systemd instance Unit installed by this commit will not be used till user login mechanism will be changed in systemd package (via changing pam_systemd to start user@.target, rather than user@.service). Change-Id: I524768f116ca91d812ae0884adbb300e52817975
2019-04-29Remove DefaultDependencies=no from dbus.socketsubmit/tizen/20190502.044443accepted/tizen/unified/20190503.075041INSUN PYO1-1/+0
Change-Id: I1f1b72c237451aa04da92195c696a0387cad9e18
2019-04-29dbus-daemon: Don't create /tmp/dbus_launchsubmit/tizen/20190429.043102accepted/tizen/unified/20190430.113428INSUN PYO2-6/+1
VD only uses /tmp/dbus_launch - VD target: use /tmp/dbus_launch generated by systemd in kdbus - VD emulator: use /tmp/dbus_launch generated by dbus-daemon that uses VD plugin drop-in Change-Id: If2120a016015ee76c589416dab7cc6c96ee21b05
2019-04-25Add dependency to security-manager.socketsubmit/tizen/20190426.023004accepted/tizen/unified/20190429.103648INSUN PYO1-0/+2
dbus-daemon connect to security-manager.service to get getgrouplist. (gdb) bt 0 security_manager_groups_get_for_user (uid=0, groups=groups@entry=0xfffef754, groups_count=groups_count@entry=0xfffef758) at /usr/src/debug/security-manager-1.5.3/src/client/client-security-manager.cpp:1391 1 0xf71faa14 in _nss_securitymanager_initgroups_dyn (user=0x443f70 "root", group_gid=<optimized out>, start=0xfffef7cc, size=0xfffef800, groupsp=0xfffef804, limit=-1, errnop=0xf77ea11c) at /usr/src/debug/security-manager-1.5.3/src/nss/nss_securitymanager.cpp:109 2 0xf759f204 in internal_getgrouplist (user=0x1 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x1>, user@entry=0x443f70 "root", group=124, group@entry=0, size=0xfffef800, size@entry=0xfffef7f8, groupsp=0xfffef804, groupsp@entry=0xfffef7fc, limit=limit@entry=-1) at initgroups.c:112 3 0xf759f45c in getgrouplist (user=user@entry=0x443f70 "root", group=0, groups=groups@entry=0x443f90, ngroups=ngroups@entry=0xfffef834) at initgroups.c:170 4 0xf778d940 in fill_user_info (info=info@entry=0x442ce0, uid=uid@entry=0, username=username@entry=0x0, error=0x1c, error@entry=0xfffef8b0) at dbus-sysdeps-unix.c:2410 5 0xf778db24 in _dbus_user_info_fill_uid (info=info@entry=0x442ce0, uid=uid@entry=0, error=error@entry=0xfffef8b0) at dbus-sysdeps-unix.c:2534 6 0xf7790b24 in _dbus_user_database_lookup (db=db@entry=0x4424c0, uid=<optimized out>, username=username@entry=0x0, error=error@entry=0xfffef8b0) at dbus-userdb.c:176 7 0xf7790d64 in _dbus_user_database_get_uid (db=db@entry=0x4424c0, uid=<optimized out>, info=0xfffef8ac, info@entry=0xfffef8a4, error=error@entry=0xfffef8b0) at dbus-userdb.c:662 8 0xf7790dc8 in init_system_db () at dbus-userdb.c:247 9 0xf7790f4c in init_system_db () at dbus-userdb.c:238 10 _dbus_user_database_get_system () at dbus-userdb.c:340 11 0x00421e58 in _dbus_get_user_id_and_primary_group (username=0xfffef928, uid_p=0x442584, gid_p=0x0) at dbus-userdb-util.c:210 12 0x0040f344 in start_busconfig_child (error=0xfffef9b8, attribute_values=0x0, attribute_names=0x4404f8, element_name=0x4399e0 "\250\230\003", parser=0x440d08) at config-parser.c:1048 13 bus_config_parser_start_element (parser=0x440d08, element_name=element_name@entry=0x442478 "policy", attribute_names=attribute_names@entry=0x4404f8, attribute_values=attribute_values@entry=0x442568, error=0xfffefc08) at config-parser.c:1919 14 0x0041ecc8 in expat_StartElementHandler (userData=0xfffefb18, name=0x442478 "policy", atts=0x440710) at config-loader-expat.c:107 15 0xf76c84a0 in doContent (parser=parser@entry=0x440518, startTagLevel=startTagLevel@entry=0, enc=enc@entry=0xf76e8a50 <utf8_encoding>, s=s@entry=0x4414d0 "<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/usr/share/dbus-1/accessibility-services</servicedir>\n <auth>EXTERNAL</auth>\n\n <listen>unix:tmpdir=/tmp</listen>\n\n <policy user=\"owner\">\n <"..., end=end@entry=0x441957 "", nextPtr=nextPtr@entry=0x440530, haveMore=haveMore@entry=0 '\000') at xmlparse.c:2890 16 0xf76c8ca0 in contentProcessor (parser=parser@entry=0x440518, start=start@entry=0x4414d0 "<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/usr/share/dbus-1/accessibility-services</servicedir>\n <auth>EXTERNAL</auth>\n\n <listen>unix:tmpdir=/tmp</listen>\n\n <policy user=\"owner\">\n <"..., end=end@entry=0x441957 "", endPtr=endPtr@entry=0x440530) at xmlparse.c:2552 17 0xf76c9d9e in doProlog (parser=parser@entry=0x440518, enc=0xf76e8a50 <utf8_encoding>, s=0x4414d0 "<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/usr/share/dbus-1/accessibility-services</servicedir>\n <auth>EXTERNAL</auth>\n\n <listen>unix:tmpdir=/tmp</listen>\n\n <policy user=\"owner\">\n <"..., s@entry=0x441440 "<!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC \"-//freedesktop//DTD D-Bus Bus Configuration 1.0//EN\" \"http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd\">\n<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/"..., end=0x441957 "", tok=<optimized out>, next=<optimized out>, next@entry=0x441449 " busconfig PUBLIC \"-//freedesktop//DTD D-Bus Bus Configuration 1.0//EN\" \"http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd\">\n<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/usr/share"..., nextPtr=nextPtr@entry=0x440530, haveMore=haveMore@entry=0 '\000') at xmlparse.c:4579 18 0xf76ca2da in prologProcessor (parser=0x440518, s=0x441440 "<!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC \"-//freedesktop//DTD D-Bus Bus Configuration 1.0//EN\" \"http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd\">\n<busconfig>\n\n <type>accessibility</type>\n\n<servicedir>/"..., end=<optimized out>, nextPtr=0x440530) at xmlparse.c:4293 19 0xf76cb678 in XML_ParseBuffer (parser=0x440518, len=<optimized out>, isFinal=1) at xmlparse.c:1988 20 0x0041eebc in bus_config_load (file=file@entry=0xfffefc18, is_toplevel=is_toplevel@entry=1, parent=parent@entry=0x0, error=0xfffefc08, error@entry=0x406824 <main+960>) at config-loader-expat.c:245 21 0x0040a890 in bus_context_new (config_file=0xfffefc18, flags=(BUS_CONTEXT_FLAG_FORK_NEVER | BUS_CONTEXT_FLAG_WRITE_PID_FILE), print_addr_pipe=0xfffefc00, print_pid_pipe=0xfffefc04, address=0x0, error=0xfffefc08) at bus.c:797 22 0x00406824 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at main.c:634 Change-Id: Ic1ee03c3e760506e72032247da36b2567d903ba3
2019-04-18Merge branch 'cherry-pick-14f46d14' into 'dbus-1.12'Simon McVittie1-1/+4
build: Don't assume we can set permissions on a directory See merge request dbus/dbus!112
2019-04-18build: Don't assume we can set permissions on a directorySimon McVittie1-1/+4
MSYS2 has enough of a Unixish environment to run Autotools, but apparently not enough of a Unixish environment to have functional permissions. Closes: dbus#216 (cherry picked from commit 14f46d14a0526f137f81a3fff5d32f26733323cd)
2019-04-17Merge branch '1-12-logical-op' into 'dbus-1.12'Simon McVittie3-7/+22
Backport -Wlogical-op fixes to 1.12.x See merge request dbus/dbus!109
2019-04-17Merge branch '1-12-code-coverage' into 'dbus-1.12'Simon McVittie11-7/+443
Adapt to API change in AX_CODE_COVERAGE version 28 See merge request dbus/dbus!108
2019-04-17_dbus_get_is_errno_eagain_or_ewouldblock: Avoid warningDavid King1-0/+8
EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK are documented to possibly be numerically equal, for instance in errno(3), and a simple logical OR check will trigger the -Wlogical-op warning of GCC. The GCC developers consider the warning to work as-designed in this case: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69602 Avoid such a warning by explicitly checking if the values are identical. Fixes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/225 Signed-off-by: David King <dking@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> (cherry picked from commit a65319134209d39f5eb6e5425ec6a35fad05bcd7)
2019-04-17dbus-send: Avoid duplicated-branches warningDavid King1-4/+7
Switch the order of the argument checks to avoid the -Wduplicated-branches warning. Signed-off-by: David King <dking@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> (cherry picked from commit c0bf0d185d72e20e70da9a98e13f69e19f2a87d5)
2019-04-17desktop-file: Justify implementation of is_valid_section_name()Simon McVittie1-1/+6
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> (cherry picked from commit 99580298f305e1e2426f0c016d797a1ff9ea0b79)
2019-04-17is_valid_section_name: Fix logical expressionDavid King1-2/+1
Group names in desktop files may contain all ASCII characters, except control characters and '[' and ']'. Rather than accepting all values, thanks to a logical operator confusion found by GCC warning -Wlogical-op, instead explicitly reject the invalid values. Signed-off-by: David King <dking@redhat.com> Fixes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/208 (cherry picked from commit 3ef9e789c1b99f420078f4debabd4f5c4fa0a748)
2019-04-17Adapt to API change in AX_CODE_COVERAGE version 28Simon McVittie11-7/+443
AX_CODE_COVERAGE recently changed the way it embedded its Makefile rules in the output file: instead of using @CODE_COVERAGE_RULES@, users are now meant to include aminclude_static.am. The new AX_CODE_COVERAGE is only in the latest autoconf-archive release, version 2019.01.06, which is inconveniently new, so bundle everything we need for the moment. This requires us to stop using the deprecated CODE_COVERAGE_LDFLAGS (which we still used to support older versions of autoconf-archive) and replace them with CODE_COVERAGE_LIBS. Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> (cherry picked from commit 2938c2125ebcd001e470aeac1ffac45b6b1ebe89) Closes: dbus#265
2019-03-19kdbus: share fd and pool with libdbuspolicysubmit/tizen/20190321.094448accepted/tizen/unified/20190322.075523Adrian Szyndela3-2/+14
This uses new functionality of libdbuspolicy: using client's pool and fd. This way libdbuspolicy doesn't have to create its own connection, and what is more important it doesn't have to create its own 1MB pool. This is at the cost of using client's pool for receiving responses to ioctl(KDBUS_CMD_GET_CONN_INFO), which are small. Change-Id: I183a91196fead179a9fba22fa6418680305d3558
2019-03-18kdbus: add assert for non-NULL memberAdrian Szyndela1-0/+2
Trying to call an unnammed method on org.freedesktop.DBus is considered a programming error. This detects such errors. Change-Id: Ic341df0eef0e7ef5ab8234aacc2c256c295327c3
2019-03-14kdbus: move dbuspolicy init to bus_register_kdbusAdrian Szyndela3-31/+49
This changes the moment of checking if user is allowed to connect to the bus. Now, it reflects standard process a bit more. The standard process is: - open fd (e.g. socket); - check authentication, if needed and possible; - connect to the bus (say hello). In kdbus, we have only: - open kdbus fd; - connect to the bus (ioctl KDBUS_CMD_HELLO). Calling libdbuspolicy for authentication fits between the two. Additionally, and most importantly, this is required to share the connection between libdbus and libdbuspolicy in the future. Change-Id: Id6fe1dbc1cdc6ec774316e13fe5d60d862949476
2019-02-14kdbus: Fix memory leakage in capture_org_freedesktop_DBus_StartServiceByName()submit/tizen/20190215.045528accepted/tizen/unified/20190219.154258sanghyeok.oh1-2/+6
Change-Id: If4b04d0f287e199e809cdf183ce4ce779c0f4dd4 Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-02-13DBusMessage: bugfix for wrong type specifiersubmit/tizen/20190213.080620accepted/tizen/unified/20190214.154123sanghyeok.oh1-1/+1
Change-Id: I0743a3d67e3d6d58acc605ded013eedb6b0af9c5 Signed-off-by: sanghyeok.oh <sanghyeok.oh@samsung.com>
2019-02-01dbus_message_iter_open_container: Don't leak signature on failuresubmit/tizen/20190211.015911Simon McVittie1-2/+9
If we run out of memory while calling _dbus_type_writer_recurse() (which is impossible for most contained types, but can happen for structs and dict-entries), then the memory we allocated in the call to _dbus_message_iter_open_signature() will still be allocated, and we have to free it in order to return to the state of the world prior to calling open_container(). One might reasonably worry that this change can break callers that use this (incorrect) pattern: if (!dbus_message_iter_open_container (outer, ..., inner)) { dbus_message_iter_abandon_container (outer, inner); goto fail; } /* now we know inner is open, and we must close it later */ However, testing that pattern with _dbus_test_oom_handling() demonstrates that it already dies with a DBusString assertion failure even before this commit. This is all concerningly fragile, and I think the next step should be to zero out DBusMessageIter instances when they are invalidated, so that a "double-free" is always detected. Change-Id: I2ccd4b516c7714f64c4543dd8d2e5c99633733a5 Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com> Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101568
2019-02-01dbus_message_append_args_valist: Don't leak memory on inappropriate typeSimon McVittie1-0/+1
Found by source code inspection while trying to debug an unrelated leak. Change-Id: I0726c57bb4b0ccdadee2263b14f9fe3fe4ebc99a Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com> Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101568
2019-02-01DBusMessage: Fix UB (misaligned access) in call to ↵Marc Mutz1-60/+62
_dbus_header_set_field_basic() The const void* 'value' pointer that is passed the address of a uint32_t here eventually ends up in _dbus_marshal_write_basic(), which casts it to a DBusBasicValue, a union type that has an alignment of eight on 64-bit platforms and is therefore more-aligned than the uint32. The read of a value of a more-aligned type through a pointer to a less -aligned type is undefined behaviour. Fix by storing the uint32 in a DBusBasicValue and passing that instead. Found by UBSan: dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-basic.c:832:14: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x7fdb8dac3a04 for type 'const union DBusBasicValue', which requires 8 byte alignment 0x7fdb8dac3a04: note: pointer points here 4a 87 b5 71 01 00 00 00 40 7d 01 00 00 61 00 00 10 3b ac 8d db 7f 00 00 2c 2a 3e 94 db 7f 00 00 ^ #0 0x7fdb9444a2c3 in _dbus_marshal_write_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-basic.c:832 #1 0x7fdb943d22fb in _dbus_type_writer_write_basic_no_typecode dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-recursive.c:1605 #2 0x7fdb943d64e9 in _dbus_type_writer_write_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-recursive.c:2327 #3 0x7fdb943c52a6 in write_basic_field dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-header.c:318 #4 0x7fdb943c919e in _dbus_header_set_field_basic dbus/dbus/dbus-marshal-header.c:1321 #5 0x7fdb943e1349 in dbus_message_set_reply_serial dbus/dbus/dbus-message.c:1173 Change-Id: I0149da4ebbead9b4b38c8c62af1ea892e24ec95e Signed-off-by: Marc Mutz <marc@kdab.net> Reviewed-by: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk> Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98035
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