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authorSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>2020-04-16 14:45:11 +0100
committerSimon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>2020-06-02 10:43:16 +0100
commit272d484283883fa9ff95b69d924fff6cd34842f5 (patch)
tree6f4e5ddd0656b1a6c19f4cbaf2d2a2fd642c86e3
parent31297172f1ea6114072793ab24b338c7c251c47c (diff)
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sysdeps-unix: On MSG_CTRUNC, close the fds we did receive
MSG_CTRUNC indicates that we have received fewer fds that we should have done because the buffer was too small, but we were treating it as though it indicated that we received *no* fds. If we received any, we still have to make sure we close them, otherwise they will be leaked. On the system bus, if an attacker can induce us to leak fds in this way, that's a local denial of service via resource exhaustion. Reported-by: Kevin Backhouse, GitHub Security Lab Fixes: dbus#294 Fixes: CVE-2020-12049 Fixes: GHSL-2020-057
-rw-r--r--dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c32
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
index e8cd5b33..f9dc2a6e 100644
--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
+++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
@@ -435,18 +435,6 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd,
struct cmsghdr *cm;
dbus_bool_t found = FALSE;
- if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
- {
- /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
- thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
- without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
- serious error. */
-
- errno = ENOSPC;
- _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
- return -1;
- }
-
for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m); cm; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&m, cm))
if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cm->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS)
{
@@ -501,6 +489,26 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd,
if (!found)
*n_fds = 0;
+ if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
+ thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
+ without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
+ serious error. */
+
+ /* We still need to close whatever fds we *did* receive,
+ * otherwise they'll never get closed. (CVE-2020-12049) */
+ for (i = 0; i < *n_fds; i++)
+ close (fds[i]);
+
+ *n_fds = 0;
+ errno = ENOSPC;
+ _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* put length back (doesn't actually realloc) */
_dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start + bytes_read);