diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/nss.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/nss.c | 1481 |
1 files changed, 1481 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/nss.c b/lib/nss.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6d3f12c03 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/nss.c @@ -0,0 +1,1481 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2010, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +/* + * Source file for all NSS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code + * but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions. + */ + +#include "setup.h" + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <ctype.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include <sys/socket.h> +#endif + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */ +#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */ +#include "connect.h" +#include "strequal.h" +#include "select.h" +#include "sslgen.h" + +#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */ +#include <curl/mprintf.h> + +#ifdef USE_NSS + +#include "nssg.h" +#include <nspr.h> +#include <nss.h> +#include <ssl.h> +#include <sslerr.h> +#include <secerr.h> +#include <secmod.h> +#include <sslproto.h> +#include <prtypes.h> +#include <pk11pub.h> +#include <prio.h> +#include <secitem.h> +#include <secport.h> +#include <certdb.h> +#include <base64.h> +#include <cert.h> + +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "rawstr.h" +#include "easyif.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */ + +/* The last #include file should be: */ +#include "memdebug.h" + +#define SSL_DIR "/etc/pki/nssdb" + +/* enough to fit the string "PEM Token #[0|1]" */ +#define SLOTSIZE 13 + +PRFileDesc *PR_ImportTCPSocket(PRInt32 osfd); + +PRLock * nss_initlock = NULL; +PRLock * nss_crllock = NULL; + +volatile int initialized = 0; + +typedef struct { + const char *name; + int num; + PRInt32 version; /* protocol version valid for this cipher */ +} cipher_s; + +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l) + +#define CERT_NewTempCertificate __CERT_NewTempCertificate + +enum sslversion { SSL2 = 1, SSL3 = 2, TLS = 4 }; + +#define NUM_OF_CIPHERS sizeof(cipherlist)/sizeof(cipherlist[0]) +static const cipher_s cipherlist[] = { + /* SSL2 cipher suites */ + {"rc4", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"rc4-md5", SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"rc4export", SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"rc2", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"rc2export", SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"des", SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + {"desede3", SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5, SSL2}, + /* SSL3/TLS cipher suites */ + {"rsa_rc4_128_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_rc4_128_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_des_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_rc4_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_rc2_40_md5", SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_null_md5", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_null_sha", SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"fips_3des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"fips_des_sha", SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"fortezza", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"fortezza_rc4_128_sha", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"fortezza_null", SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + /* TLS 1.0: Exportable 56-bit Cipher Suites. */ + {"rsa_des_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_rc4_56_sha", TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + /* AES ciphers. */ + {"rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, + {"rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL3 | TLS}, +#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC + /* ECC ciphers. */ + {"ecdh_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_rsa_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_rsa_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"echde_rsa_null", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_rc4_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_3des_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdhe_rsa_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_anon_null_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_anon_rc4_128sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_anon_3des_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_anon_aes_128_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS}, + {"ecdh_anon_aes_256_sha", TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS}, +#endif +}; + +/* following ciphers are new in NSS 3.4 and not enabled by default, therefore + they are enabled explicitly */ +static const int enable_ciphers_by_default[] = { + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL +}; + +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT +static const char* pem_library = "libnsspem.so"; +#endif +SECMODModule* mod = NULL; + +static SECStatus set_ciphers(struct SessionHandle *data, PRFileDesc * model, + char *cipher_list) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRBool cipher_state[NUM_OF_CIPHERS]; + PRBool found; + char *cipher; + SECStatus rv; + + /* First disable all ciphers. This uses a different max value in case + * NSS adds more ciphers later we don't want them available by + * accident + */ + for(i=0; i<SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; i++) { + SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i], SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + } + + /* Set every entry in our list to false */ + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + cipher_state[i] = PR_FALSE; + } + + cipher = cipher_list; + + while(cipher_list && (cipher_list[0])) { + while((*cipher) && (ISSPACE(*cipher))) + ++cipher; + + if((cipher_list = strchr(cipher, ','))) { + *cipher_list++ = '\0'; + } + + found = PR_FALSE; + + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + if(Curl_raw_equal(cipher, cipherlist[i].name)) { + cipher_state[i] = PR_TRUE; + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + + if(found == PR_FALSE) { + failf(data, "Unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher); + return SECFailure; + } + + if(cipher_list) { + cipher = cipher_list; + } + } + + /* Finally actually enable the selected ciphers */ + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + rv = SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, cipherlist[i].num, cipher_state[i]); + if(rv != SECSuccess) { + failf(data, "Unknown cipher in cipher list"); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Get the number of ciphers that are enabled. We use this to determine + * if we need to call NSS_SetDomesticPolicy() to enable the default ciphers. + */ +static int num_enabled_ciphers(void) +{ + PRInt32 policy = 0; + int count = 0; + unsigned int i; + + for(i=0; i<NUM_OF_CIPHERS; i++) { + SSL_CipherPolicyGet(cipherlist[i].num, &policy); + if(policy) + count++; + } + return count; +} + +/* + * Determine whether the nickname passed in is a filename that needs to + * be loaded as a PEM or a regular NSS nickname. + * + * returns 1 for a file + * returns 0 for not a file (NSS nickname) + */ +static int is_file(const char *filename) +{ + struct_stat st; + + if(filename == NULL) + return 0; + + if(stat(filename, &st) == 0) + if(S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static char *fmt_nickname(char *str, bool *nickname_alloc) +{ + char *nickname = NULL; + *nickname_alloc = FALSE; + + if(is_file(str)) { + char *n = strrchr(str, '/'); + if(n) { + *nickname_alloc = TRUE; + n++; /* skip last slash */ + nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #%d:%s", 1, n); + } + return nickname; + } + + return str; +} + +static int nss_load_cert(struct ssl_connect_data *ssl, + const char *filename, PRBool cacert) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + CK_SLOT_ID slotID; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; + CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[20]; + CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS objClass = CKO_CERTIFICATE; + char slotname[SLOTSIZE]; +#endif + CERTCertificate *cert; + char *nickname = NULL; + char *n = NULL; + + /* If there is no slash in the filename it is assumed to be a regular + * NSS nickname. + */ + if(is_file(filename)) { + n = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(n) + n++; + if(!mod) + return 1; + } + else { + /* A nickname from the NSS internal database */ + if(cacert) + return 0; /* You can't specify an NSS CA nickname this way */ + nickname = strdup(filename); + if(!nickname) + return 0; + goto done; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + attrs = theTemplate; + + /* All CA and trust objects go into slot 0. Other slots are used + * for storing certificates. With each new user certificate we increment + * the slot count. We only support 1 user certificate right now. + */ + if(cacert) + slotID = 0; + else + slotID = 1; + + snprintf(slotname, SLOTSIZE, "PEM Token #%ld", slotID); + + nickname = aprintf("PEM Token #%ld:%s", slotID, n); + if(!nickname) + return 0; + + slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slotname); + + if(!slot) { + free(nickname); + return 0; + } + + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &objClass, sizeof(objClass) ); + attrs++; + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); + attrs++; + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)filename, + strlen(filename)+1); + attrs++; + if(cacert) { + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TRUST, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); + } + else { + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TRUST, &ckfalse, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); + } + attrs++; + + /* This load the certificate in our PEM module into the appropriate + * slot. + */ + ssl->cacert[slotID] = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, theTemplate, 4, + PR_FALSE /* isPerm */); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + if(ssl->cacert[slotID] == NULL) { + free(nickname); + return 0; + } +#else + /* We don't have PK11_CreateGenericObject but a file-based cert was passed + * in. We need to fail. + */ + return 0; +#endif + + done: + /* Double-check that the certificate or nickname requested exists in + * either the token or the NSS certificate database. + */ + if(!cacert) { + cert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname((char *)nickname, NULL); + + /* An invalid nickname was passed in */ + if(cert == NULL) { + free(nickname); + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0); + return 0; + } + + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + } + + free(nickname); + + return 1; +} + +/* add given CRL to cache if it is not already there */ +static SECStatus nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crlDER) +{ + CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); + CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crlDER, 0); + if(crl) { + /* CRL already cached */ + SEC_DestroyCrl(crl); + SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() */ + PR_Lock(nss_crllock); + if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crlDER)) { + /* unable to cache CRL */ + PR_Unlock(nss_crllock); + SECITEM_FreeItem(crlDER, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */ + SSL_ClearSessionCache(); + PR_Unlock(nss_crllock); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus nss_load_crl(const char* crlfilename) +{ + PRFileDesc *infile; + PRFileInfo info; + SECItem filedata = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem crlDER = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + char *body; + + infile = PR_Open(crlfilename, PR_RDONLY, 0); + if(!infile) + return SECFailure; + + if(PR_SUCCESS != PR_GetOpenFileInfo(infile, &info)) + goto fail; + + if(!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &filedata, info.size + /* zero ended */ 1)) + goto fail; + + if(info.size != PR_Read(infile, filedata.data, info.size)) + goto fail; + + /* place a trailing zero right after the visible data */ + body = (char*)filedata.data; + body[--filedata.len] = '\0'; + + body = strstr(body, "-----BEGIN"); + if(body) { + /* assume ASCII */ + char *trailer; + char *begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\n'); + if(!begin) + begin = PORT_Strchr(body, '\r'); + if(!begin) + goto fail; + + trailer = strstr(++begin, "-----END"); + if(!trailer) + goto fail; + + /* retrieve DER from ASCII */ + *trailer = '\0'; + if(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&crlDER, begin)) + goto fail; + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE); + } + else + /* assume DER */ + crlDER = filedata; + + PR_Close(infile); + return nss_cache_crl(&crlDER); + +fail: + PR_Close(infile); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&filedata, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static int nss_load_key(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex, + char *key_file) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; + CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs; + CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[20]; + CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS objClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_SLOT_ID slotID; + char slotname[SLOTSIZE]; + struct ssl_connect_data *sslconn = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + attrs = theTemplate; + + /* FIXME: grok the various file types */ + + slotID = 1; /* hardcoded for now */ + + snprintf(slotname, sizeof(slotname), "PEM Token #%ld", slotID); + slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(slotname); + + if(!slot) + return 0; + + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &objClass, sizeof(objClass) ); attrs++; + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++; + PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, (unsigned char *)key_file, + strlen(key_file)+1); attrs++; + + /* When adding an encrypted key the PKCS#11 will be set as removed */ + sslconn->key = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, theTemplate, 3, + PR_FALSE /* isPerm */); + if(sslconn->key == NULL) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY, 0); + return 0; + } + + /* This will force the token to be seen as re-inserted */ + SECMOD_WaitForAnyTokenEvent(mod, 0, 0); + PK11_IsPresent(slot); + + /* parg is initialized in nss_Init_Tokens() */ + if(PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, + conn->data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) != SECSuccess) { + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return 0; + } + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + return 1; +#else + /* If we don't have PK11_CreateGenericObject then we can't load a file-based + * key. + */ + (void)conn; /* unused */ + (void)key_file; /* unused */ + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int display_error(struct connectdata *conn, PRInt32 err, + const char *filename) +{ + switch(err) { + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD: + failf(conn->data, "Unable to load client key: Incorrect password"); + return 1; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CERT: + failf(conn->data, "Unable to load certificate %s", filename); + return 1; + default: + break; + } + return 0; /* The caller will print a generic error */ +} + +static int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, char *cert_file, char *key_file) +{ + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + int rv = 0; + + if(cert_file) { + rv = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], cert_file, PR_FALSE); + if(!rv) { + if(!display_error(conn, PR_GetError(), cert_file)) + failf(data, "Unable to load client cert %d.", PR_GetError()); + return 0; + } + } + if(key_file || (is_file(cert_file))) { + if(key_file) + rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, key_file); + else + /* In case the cert file also has the key */ + rv = nss_load_key(conn, sockindex, cert_file); + if(!rv) { + if(!display_error(conn, PR_GetError(), key_file)) + failf(data, "Unable to load client key %d.", PR_GetError()); + + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +static char * nss_get_password(PK11SlotInfo * slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) +{ + (void)slot; /* unused */ + if(retry || NULL == arg) + return NULL; + else + return (char *)PORT_Strdup((char *)arg); +} + +static SECStatus BadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock) +{ + SECStatus success = SECSuccess; + struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)arg; + PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + char *subject, *subject_cn, *issuer; + + if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0) + return success; + + conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=err; + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject); + subject_cn = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject); + issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + + switch(err) { + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + infof(conn->data, "Issuer certificate is invalid: '%s'\n", issuer); + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + success = SECFailure; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + success = SECFailure; + infof(conn->data, "Certificate is signed by an untrusted issuer: '%s'\n", + issuer); + break; + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifyhost) { + failf(conn->data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match " + "target host name '%s'", subject_cn, conn->host.dispname); + success = SECFailure; + } else { + infof(conn->data, "warning: SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not " + "match target host name '%s'\n", subject_cn, conn->host.dispname); + } + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + success = SECFailure; + infof(conn->data, "Remote Certificate has expired.\n"); + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + success = SECFailure; + infof(conn->data, "Peer's certificate issuer is not recognized: '%s'\n", + issuer); + break; + default: + if(conn->data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + success = SECFailure; + infof(conn->data, "Bad certificate received. Subject = '%s', " + "Issuer = '%s'\n", subject, issuer); + break; + } + if(success == SECSuccess) + infof(conn->data, "SSL certificate verify ok.\n"); + PR_Free(subject); + PR_Free(subject_cn); + PR_Free(issuer); + + return success; +} + +/** + * Inform the application that the handshake is complete. + */ +static SECStatus HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *sock, void *arg) +{ + (void)sock; + (void)arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void display_cert_info(struct SessionHandle *data, + CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + char *subject, *issuer, *common_name; + PRExplodedTime printableTime; + char timeString[256]; + PRTime notBefore, notAfter; + + subject = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject); + issuer = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer); + common_name = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject); + infof(data, "\tsubject: %s\n", subject); + + CERT_GetCertTimes(cert, ¬Before, ¬After); + PR_ExplodeTime(notBefore, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime); + PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime); + infof(data, "\tstart date: %s\n", timeString); + PR_ExplodeTime(notAfter, PR_GMTParameters, &printableTime); + PR_FormatTime(timeString, 256, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", &printableTime); + infof(data, "\texpire date: %s\n", timeString); + infof(data, "\tcommon name: %s\n", common_name); + infof(data, "\tissuer: %s\n", issuer); + + PR_Free(subject); + PR_Free(issuer); + PR_Free(common_name); +} + +static void display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock) +{ + SSLChannelInfo channel; + SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite; + CERTCertificate *cert; + + if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof channel) == + SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof channel && + channel.cipherSuite) { + if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite, + &suite, sizeof suite) == SECSuccess) { + infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName); + } + } + + infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n"); + + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + display_cert_info(conn->data, cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + + return; +} + +/** + * + * Check that the Peer certificate's issuer certificate matches the one found + * by issuer_nickname. This is not exactly the way OpenSSL and GNU TLS do the + * issuer check, so we provide comments that mimic the OpenSSL + * X509_check_issued function (in x509v3/v3_purp.c) + */ +static SECStatus check_issuer_cert(PRFileDesc *sock, + char *issuer_nickname) +{ + CERTCertificate *cert,*cert_issuer,*issuer; + SECStatus res=SECSuccess; + void *proto_win = NULL; + + /* + PRArenaPool *tmpArena = NULL; + CERTAuthKeyID *authorityKeyID = NULL; + SECITEM *caname = NULL; + */ + + cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock); + cert_issuer = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert,PR_Now(),certUsageObjectSigner); + + proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock); + issuer = NULL; + issuer = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(issuer_nickname, proto_win); + + if ((!cert_issuer) || (!issuer)) + res = SECFailure; + else if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&cert_issuer->derCert, + &issuer->derCert)!=SECEqual) + res = SECFailure; + + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuer); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert_issuer); + return res; +} + +/** + * + * Callback to pick the SSL client certificate. + */ +static SECStatus SelectClientCert(void *arg, PRFileDesc *sock, + struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, + struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert, + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey) +{ + static const char pem_nickname[] = "PEM Token #1"; + const char *pem_slotname = pem_nickname; + + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)arg; + struct SessionHandle *data = connssl->data; + const char *nickname = connssl->client_nickname; + + if (mod && nickname && + 0 == strncmp(nickname, pem_nickname, /* length of "PEM Token" */ 9)) { + + /* use the cert/key provided by PEM reader */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + void *proto_win = SSL_RevealPinArg(sock); + *pRetKey = NULL; + + *pRetCert = PK11_FindCertFromNickname(nickname, proto_win); + if (NULL == *pRetCert) { + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname); + return SECFailure; + } + + slot = PK11_FindSlotByName(pem_slotname); + if (NULL == slot) { + failf(data, "NSS: PK11 slot not found: %s", pem_slotname); + return SECFailure; + } + + *pRetKey = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(slot, *pRetCert, NULL); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (NULL == *pRetKey) { + failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname); + return SECFailure; + } + + infof(data, "NSS: client certificate: %s\n", nickname); + display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* use the default NSS hook */ + if (SECSuccess != NSS_GetClientAuthData((void *)nickname, sock, caNames, + pRetCert, pRetKey) + || NULL == *pRetCert) { + + if (NULL == nickname) + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found (nickname not " + "specified)"); + else + failf(data, "NSS: client certificate not found: %s", nickname); + + return SECFailure; + } + + /* get certificate nickname if any */ + nickname = (*pRetCert)->nickname; + if (NULL == nickname) + nickname = "[unknown]"; + + if (NULL == *pRetKey) { + failf(data, "NSS: private key not found for certificate: %s", nickname); + return SECFailure; + } + + infof(data, "NSS: using client certificate: %s\n", nickname); + display_cert_info(data, *pRetCert); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function is supposed to decide, which error codes should be used + * to conclude server is TLS intolerant. + * + * taken from xulrunner - nsNSSIOLayer.cpp + */ +static PRBool +isTLSIntoleranceError(PRInt32 err) +{ + switch (err) { + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE: + case SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING: + case SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION: + case SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE: + case SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT: + case SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT: + return PR_TRUE; + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } +} + +static CURLcode init_nss(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + char *cert_dir; + struct_stat st; + if(initialized) + return CURLE_OK; + + /* First we check if $SSL_DIR points to a valid dir */ + cert_dir = getenv("SSL_DIR"); + if(cert_dir) { + if((stat(cert_dir, &st) != 0) || + (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) { + cert_dir = NULL; + } + } + + /* Now we check if the default location is a valid dir */ + if(!cert_dir) { + if((stat(SSL_DIR, &st) == 0) && + (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))) { + cert_dir = (char *)SSL_DIR; + } + } + + if(!NSS_IsInitialized()) { + SECStatus rv; + initialized = 1; + infof(data, "Initializing NSS with certpath: %s\n", + cert_dir ? cert_dir : "none"); + if(!cert_dir) { + rv = NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL); + } + else { + char *certpath = + PR_smprintf("%s%s", NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.0") ? "sql:" : "", cert_dir); + rv = NSS_Initialize(certpath, "", "", "", NSS_INIT_READONLY); + PR_smprintf_free(certpath); + } + if(rv != SECSuccess) { + infof(data, "Unable to initialize NSS database\n"); + initialized = 0; + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + } + + if(num_enabled_ciphers() == 0) + NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/** + * Global SSL init + * + * @retval 0 error initializing SSL + * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully + */ +int Curl_nss_init(void) +{ + /* curl_global_init() is not thread-safe so this test is ok */ + if (nss_initlock == NULL) { + PR_Init(PR_USER_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 256); + nss_initlock = PR_NewLock(); + nss_crllock = PR_NewLock(); + } + + /* We will actually initialize NSS later */ + + return 1; +} + +CURLcode Curl_nss_force_init(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + CURLcode rv; + if(!nss_initlock) { + failf(data, "unable to initialize NSS, curl_global_init() should have been " + "called with CURL_GLOBAL_SSL or CURL_GLOBAL_ALL"); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + rv = init_nss(data); + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + return rv; +} + +/* Global cleanup */ +void Curl_nss_cleanup(void) +{ + /* This function isn't required to be threadsafe and this is only done + * as a safety feature. + */ + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + if (initialized) { + /* Free references to client certificates held in the SSL session cache. + * Omitting this hampers destruction of the security module owning + * the certificates. */ + SSL_ClearSessionCache(); + + if(mod && SECSuccess == SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(mod)) { + SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod); + mod = NULL; + } + NSS_Shutdown(); + } + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + + PR_DestroyLock(nss_initlock); + PR_DestroyLock(nss_crllock); + nss_initlock = NULL; + + initialized = 0; +} + +/* + * This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status. + * + * Return codes: + * 1 means the connection is still in place + * 0 means the connection has been closed + * -1 means the connection status is unknown + */ +int +Curl_nss_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn) +{ + int rc; + char buf; + + rc = + PR_Recv(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void *)&buf, 1, PR_MSG_PEEK, + PR_SecondsToInterval(1)); + if(rc > 0) + return 1; /* connection still in place */ + + if(rc == 0) + return 0; /* connection has been closed */ + + return -1; /* connection status unknown */ +} + +/* + * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed. + */ +void Curl_nss_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + if(connssl->handle) { + PR_Close(connssl->handle); + + /* NSS closes the socket we previously handed to it, so we must mark it + as closed to avoid double close */ + fake_sclose(conn->sock[sockindex]); + conn->sock[sockindex] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + if(connssl->client_nickname != NULL) { + free(connssl->client_nickname); + connssl->client_nickname = NULL; + } +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + if(connssl->key) + (void)PK11_DestroyGenericObject(connssl->key); + if(connssl->cacert[1]) + (void)PK11_DestroyGenericObject(connssl->cacert[1]); + if(connssl->cacert[0]) + (void)PK11_DestroyGenericObject(connssl->cacert[0]); +#endif + connssl->handle = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close + * down everything and free all resources! + */ +int Curl_nss_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + (void)data; + return 0; +} + +/* handle client certificate related errors if any; return false otherwise */ +static bool handle_cc_error(PRInt32 err, struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT: + failf(data, "SSL error: SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT"); + return true; + + case SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT: + failf(data, "SSL error: SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT"); + return true; + + case SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT: + failf(data, "SSL error: SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT"); + return true; + + default: + return false; + } +} + +static Curl_recv nss_recv; +static Curl_send nss_send; + +CURLcode Curl_nss_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + PRInt32 err; + PRFileDesc *model = NULL; + PRBool ssl2 = PR_FALSE; + PRBool ssl3 = PR_FALSE; + PRBool tlsv1 = PR_FALSE; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + int curlerr; + const int *cipher_to_enable; + PRSocketOptionData sock_opt; + long time_left; + PRUint32 timeout; + + if (connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) + return CURLE_OK; + + connssl->data = data; + +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + connssl->cacert[0] = NULL; + connssl->cacert[1] = NULL; + connssl->key = NULL; +#endif + + /* FIXME. NSS doesn't support multiple databases open at the same time. */ + PR_Lock(nss_initlock); + curlerr = init_nss(conn->data); + if(CURLE_OK != curlerr) { + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + goto error; + } + + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + +#ifdef HAVE_PK11_CREATEGENERICOBJECT + if(!mod) { + char *configstring = aprintf("library=%s name=PEM", pem_library); + if(!configstring) { + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + goto error; + } + mod = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(configstring, NULL, PR_FALSE); + free(configstring); + + if(!mod || !mod->loaded) { + if(mod) { + SECMOD_DestroyModule(mod); + mod = NULL; + } + infof(data, "WARNING: failed to load NSS PEM library %s. Using " + "OpenSSL PEM certificates will not work.\n", pem_library); + } + } +#endif + + PK11_SetPasswordFunc(nss_get_password); + PR_Unlock(nss_initlock); + + model = PR_NewTCPSocket(); + if(!model) + goto error; + model = SSL_ImportFD(NULL, model); + + /* make the socket nonblocking */ + sock_opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking; + sock_opt.value.non_blocking = PR_TRUE; + if(PR_SetSocketOption(model, &sock_opt) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_SECURITY, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + switch (data->set.ssl.version) { + default: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + ssl3 = PR_TRUE; + if (data->state.ssl_connect_retry) + infof(data, "TLS disabled due to previous handshake failure\n"); + else + tlsv1 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + tlsv1 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: + ssl2 = PR_TRUE; + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: + ssl3 = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL2, ssl2) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, ssl3) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_ENABLE_TLS, tlsv1) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO, ssl2) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE; + + /* enable all ciphers from enable_ciphers_by_default */ + cipher_to_enable = enable_ciphers_by_default; + while (SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL != *cipher_to_enable) { + if (SSL_CipherPrefSet(model, *cipher_to_enable, PR_TRUE) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + goto error; + } + cipher_to_enable++; + } + + if(data->set.ssl.cipher_list) { + if(set_ciphers(data, model, data->set.ssl.cipher_list) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + goto error; + } + } + + if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost == 1) + infof(data, "warning: ignoring unsupported value (1) of ssl.verifyhost\n"); + + data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=0; /* not checked yet */ + if(SSL_BadCertHook(model, (SSLBadCertHandler) BadCertHandler, conn) + != SECSuccess) { + goto error; + } + if(SSL_HandshakeCallback(model, (SSLHandshakeCallback) HandshakeCallback, + NULL) != SECSuccess) + goto error; + + if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer) + /* skip the verifying of the peer */ + ; + else if(data->set.ssl.CAfile) { + int rc = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], data->set.ssl.CAfile, + PR_TRUE); + if(!rc) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + goto error; + } + } + else if(data->set.ssl.CApath) { + struct_stat st; + PRDir *dir; + PRDirEntry *entry; + + if(stat(data->set.ssl.CApath, &st) == -1) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + goto error; + } + + if(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + int rc; + + dir = PR_OpenDir(data->set.ssl.CApath); + do { + entry = PR_ReadDir(dir, PR_SKIP_BOTH | PR_SKIP_HIDDEN); + + if(entry) { + char fullpath[PATH_MAX]; + + snprintf(fullpath, sizeof(fullpath), "%s/%s", data->set.ssl.CApath, + entry->name); + rc = nss_load_cert(&conn->ssl[sockindex], fullpath, PR_TRUE); + /* FIXME: check this return value! */ + } + /* This is purposefully tolerant of errors so non-PEM files + * can be in the same directory */ + } while(entry != NULL); + PR_CloseDir(dir); + } + } + infof(data, + " CAfile: %s\n" + " CApath: %s\n", + data->set.ssl.CAfile ? data->set.ssl.CAfile : "none", + data->set.ssl.CApath ? data->set.ssl.CApath : "none"); + + if (data->set.ssl.CRLfile) { + if(SECSuccess != nss_load_crl(data->set.ssl.CRLfile)) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE; + goto error; + } + infof(data, + " CRLfile: %s\n", + data->set.ssl.CRLfile ? data->set.ssl.CRLfile : "none"); + } + + if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) { + bool nickname_alloc = FALSE; + char *nickname = fmt_nickname(data->set.str[STRING_CERT], &nickname_alloc); + if(!nickname) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + if(!cert_stuff(conn, sockindex, data->set.str[STRING_CERT], + data->set.str[STRING_KEY])) { + /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */ + if(nickname_alloc) + free(nickname); + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + } + + /* this "takes over" the pointer to the allocated name or makes a + dup of it */ + connssl->client_nickname = nickname_alloc?nickname:strdup(nickname); + if(!connssl->client_nickname) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + } + else + connssl->client_nickname = NULL; + + if(SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(model, SelectClientCert, + (void *)connssl) != SECSuccess) { + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + goto error; + } + + /* Import our model socket onto the existing file descriptor */ + connssl->handle = PR_ImportTCPSocket(sockfd); + connssl->handle = SSL_ImportFD(model, connssl->handle); + if(!connssl->handle) + goto error; + + PR_Close(model); /* We don't need this any more */ + model = NULL; + + /* This is the password associated with the cert that we're using */ + if (data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) { + SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(connssl->handle, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]); + } + + /* Force handshake on next I/O */ + SSL_ResetHandshake(connssl->handle, /* asServer */ PR_FALSE); + + SSL_SetURL(connssl->handle, conn->host.name); + + /* check timeout situation */ + time_left = Curl_timeleft(conn, NULL, TRUE); + if(time_left < 0L) { + failf(data, "timed out before SSL handshake"); + goto error; + } + timeout = PR_MillisecondsToInterval((PRUint32) time_left); + + /* Force the handshake now */ + if(SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(connssl->handle, timeout) != SECSuccess) { + if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult == SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN) + curlerr = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + else if(conn->data->set.ssl.certverifyresult!=0) + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CACERT; + goto error; + } + + connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; + conn->recv[sockindex] = nss_recv; + conn->send[sockindex] = nss_send; + + display_conn_info(conn, connssl->handle); + + if (data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) { + SECStatus ret; + bool nickname_alloc = FALSE; + char *nickname = fmt_nickname(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT], + &nickname_alloc); + + if(!nickname) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + ret = check_issuer_cert(connssl->handle, nickname); + + if(nickname_alloc) + free(nickname); + + if(SECFailure == ret) { + infof(data,"SSL certificate issuer check failed\n"); + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + goto error; + } + else { + infof(data, "SSL certificate issuer check ok\n"); + } + } + + return CURLE_OK; + + error: + /* reset the flag to avoid an infinite loop */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = FALSE; + + err = PR_GetError(); + if(handle_cc_error(err, data)) + curlerr = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + else + infof(data, "NSS error %d\n", err); + + if(model) + PR_Close(model); + + if (ssl3 && tlsv1 && isTLSIntoleranceError(err)) { + /* schedule reconnect through Curl_retry_request() */ + data->state.ssl_connect_retry = TRUE; + infof(data, "Error in TLS handshake, trying SSLv3...\n"); + return CURLE_OK; + } + + return curlerr; +} + +static ssize_t nss_send(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ + int sockindex, /* socketindex */ + const void *mem, /* send this data */ + size_t len, /* amount to write */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + int rc; + + rc = PR_Send(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, (int)len, 0, -1); + + if(rc < 0) { + PRInt32 err = PR_GetError(); + if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + else if(handle_cc_error(err, conn->data)) + *curlcode = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + else { + failf(conn->data, "SSL write: error %d", err); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + } + return -1; + } + return rc; /* number of bytes */ +} + +static ssize_t nss_recv(struct connectdata * conn, /* connection data */ + int num, /* socketindex */ + char *buf, /* store read data here */ + size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + ssize_t nread; + + nread = PR_Recv(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, (int)buffersize, 0, -1); + if(nread < 0) { + /* failed SSL read */ + PRInt32 err = PR_GetError(); + + if(err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + else if(handle_cc_error(err, conn->data)) + *curlcode = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + else { + failf(conn->data, "SSL read: errno %d", err); + *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + return -1; + } + return nread; +} + +size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION); +} + +int Curl_nss_seed(struct SessionHandle *data) +{ + /* TODO: implement? */ + (void) data; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* USE_NSS */ |