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| author | wagner <wagner@tansi.org> | 2013-07-02 03:00:02 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | wagner <wagner@tansi.org> | 2013-07-02 03:00:02 +0200 |
| commit | d8fbf4302218f93eb0a918949611ee43db1a94c5 (patch) | |
| tree | ea3e8fba1ffac7c0ad9f6a4c7d9a570370a7d646 | |
| parent | 3be96efe0b6f37ad5ce93398ebf768dd614b89bd (diff) | |
| download | cryptsetup-d8fbf4302218f93eb0a918949611ee43db1a94c5.tar.gz cryptsetup-d8fbf4302218f93eb0a918949611ee43db1a94c5.tar.bz2 cryptsetup-d8fbf4302218f93eb0a918949611ee43db1a94c5.zip | |
Added comment that a hidden volume is unprotected against changes
in its outer volume and hence the outer volume should not be mounted.
| -rw-r--r-- | man/cryptsetup.8 | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/man/cryptsetup.8 b/man/cryptsetup.8 index 0779093..688d169 100644 --- a/man/cryptsetup.8 +++ b/man/cryptsetup.8 @@ -417,6 +417,19 @@ device not the system partition as the device parameter. To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use \fB\-\-tcrypt-hidden\fR option. + +\fBNote:\fR There is no protection for a hidden volume if +the outer volume is mounted. The reason is that if there +were any protection, it would require some metadata describing +what to protect in the outer volume and the hidden volume would +become detectable. This is not a cryptsetup limitation, it is +a limitation of how hidden volumes are implemented in TrueCrypt. +The way to deal with this is not to mount the outer volume after +a hidden volume has been created in it. +This, in turn, causes the problem that after a while all time-stamps +in the outer volume become old and it becomes obvious that +it is unused. This may cause suspicion in itself. + .PP \fIopen\fR \-\-type tcrypt <device> <name> .br |