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authorwagner <wagner@tansi.org>2013-04-05 11:24:44 +0200
committerwagner <wagner@tansi.org>2013-04-05 11:24:44 +0200
commita9441043bc0b3e02fc7d5f7ffd70010371f3218f (patch)
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@@ -393,6 +393,22 @@ A. Contributors
not work anymore. Therefore it is better to encrypt the RAID
device, e.g. /dev/dm0 .
+ This means that the typical layering looks like this:
+
+ Filesystem <- top
+ |
+ Encryption
+ |
+ RAID
+ |
+ Raw partitions
+ |
+ Raw disks <- bottom
+
+ The big advantage is that you can manage the RAID container just
+ like any RAID container, it does not care that what is in it is
+ encrypted.
+
* 2.7 How do I read a dm-crypt key from file?
@@ -488,6 +504,10 @@ A. Contributors
own tool that in turn gets the key from the more secure key
storage.
+ For TPM support, you may want to have a look at tpm-luks at
+ https://github.com/shpedoikal/tpm-luks. Note that tpm-luks is not
+ related to the cryptsetup project.
+
* 2.13 Can I resize a dm-crypt or LUKS partition?
@@ -633,7 +653,38 @@ A. Contributors
diagnosing and (if still possible) repairing this.
- * 4.2 Can a bad RAM module cause problems?
+ * 4.2 I cannot unlock my LUKS container! What could be the problem?
+
+ First, make sure you have a correct passphrase. Then make sure you
+ have the correct key-map and correct keyboard. And then make sure
+ you have the correct character set and encoding, see also
+ "PASSPHRASE CHARACTER SET" under Section 1.2.
+
+ If you are sure you are entering the passphrase right, there is the
+ possibility that the respective key-slot has been damaged. There
+ is no way to recover a damaged key-slot, except from a header
+ backup (see Section 6). For security reasons, there is also no
+ checksum in the key-slots that could tell you whether a key-slot has
+ been damaged. The only checksum present allows recognition of a
+ correct passphrase, but that only works if the passphrase is
+ correct and the respective key-slot is intact.
+
+ In order to find out whether a key-slot is damaged one has to look
+ for "non-random looking" data in it. There is a tool that
+ automatizes this in the cryptsetup distribution from version 1.6.0
+ onwards. It is located in misc/keyslot_checker/. Instructions how
+ to use and how to interpret results are in the README file. Note
+ that this tool requires a libcryptsetup from cryptsetup 1.6.0 or
+ later (which means libcryptsetup.so.4.5.0 or later). If the tool
+ complains about missing functions in libcryptsetup, you likely
+ have an earlier version from your distribution still installed. You
+ can either point the symbolic link(s) from libcryptsetup.so.4 to
+ the new version manually, or you can uninstall the distribution
+ version of cryptsetup and re-install that from cryptsetup >= 1.6.0
+ again to fix this.
+
+
+ * 4.3 Can a bad RAM module cause problems?
LUKS and dm-crypt can give the RAM quite a workout, especially when
combined with software RAID. In particular the combination RAID5 +
@@ -675,7 +726,7 @@ A. Contributors
did a verify.
- * 4.3 How do I test RAM?
+ * 4.4 How do I test RAM?
First you should know that overclocking often makes memory
problems worse. So if you overclock (which I strongly recommend
@@ -1288,7 +1339,7 @@ A. Contributors
foot, you can figure out how to do it yourself.
- * 5.19 What about SSDs or Flash Drives?
+ * 5.19 What about SSDs, Flash and Hybrid Drives?
The problem is that you cannot reliably erase parts of these
devices, mainly due to wear-leveling and possibly defect
@@ -1302,7 +1353,7 @@ A. Contributors
done in some fashion so that larger writes do not cause a lot of
small internal updates.
- The thing is that the mappings between outside-adressable sectors
+ The thing is that the mappings between outside-addressable sectors
and inside sectors is arbitrary (and the vendors are not talking).
Also the discarded sectors are not necessarily erased immediately.
They may linger a long time.
@@ -1331,11 +1382,15 @@ A. Contributors
If you trust the device vendor (you probably should not...) you can
try an ATA "secure erase" command for SSDs. That does not work for
- USB keys though. And if it finishes after a few seconds, it was
- possibly faked by the SSD.
+ USB keys though and may or may not be secure for a hybrid drive. If
+ it finishes on an SSD after a few seconds, it was possibly faked.
+ UNfortunately, for hybrid drives that indicator does not work, as
+ the drive may well take the time to dully erase the magnetic part,
+ but only mark the SSD/Flash part as erased while data is still in
+ there.
If you can do without password management and are fine with doing
- physical destruction for permenently deleting data (allways after
+ physical destruction for permanently deleting data (always after
one or several full overwrites!), you can use plain dm-crypt or
LUKS.
@@ -1346,13 +1401,13 @@ A. Contributors
security as on a magnetic disk.
If you are concerned about your laptop being stolen, you are likely
- fine using LUKS on an SSD. An attacker would need to have access
- to an old passphrase (and the key-slot for this old passphrase
- would actually need to still be somewhere in the SSD) for your
- data to be at risk. So unless you pasted your old passphrase all
- over the Internet or the attacker has knowledge of it from some
- other source and does a targetted laptop theft to get at your
- data, you should be fine.
+ fine using LUKS on an SSD or hybrid drive. An attacker would need
+ to have access to an old passphrase (and the key-slot for this old
+ passphrase would actually need to still be somewhere in the SSD)
+ for your data to be at risk. So unless you pasted your old
+ passphrase all over the Internet or the attacker has knowledge of
+ it from some other source and does a targeted laptop theft to get
+ at your data, you should be fine.
6. Backup and Data Recovery