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author | danmosemsft <danmose@microsoft.com> | 2017-02-10 21:08:47 -0800 |
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committer | danmosemsft <danmose@microsoft.com> | 2017-02-10 21:36:09 -0800 |
commit | 1f75aecd267e4d2d322ce6a812a34d6a34cae1f9 (patch) | |
tree | f0b162c6ab8b4bf5fee43ae6191c6d4b47165e8a /src/vm/pefile.inl | |
parent | 6517da4563a47fb370f35c082ae709215f5d0b28 (diff) | |
download | coreclr-1f75aecd267e4d2d322ce6a812a34d6a34cae1f9.tar.gz coreclr-1f75aecd267e4d2d322ce6a812a34d6a34cae1f9.tar.bz2 coreclr-1f75aecd267e4d2d322ce6a812a34d6a34cae1f9.zip |
Remove always undefined FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
Diffstat (limited to 'src/vm/pefile.inl')
-rw-r--r-- | src/vm/pefile.inl | 70 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/src/vm/pefile.inl b/src/vm/pefile.inl index 76040e3551..da70cc2a74 100644 --- a/src/vm/pefile.inl +++ b/src/vm/pefile.inl @@ -1808,25 +1808,6 @@ inline HRESULT PEFile::GetFlagsNoTrigger(DWORD * pdwFlags) return GetPersistentMDImport()->GetAssemblyProps(TokenFromRid(1, mdtAssembly), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, pdwFlags); } -#ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY -inline COR_TRUST *PEFile::GetAuthenticodeSignature() -{ - CONTRACTL - { - THROWS; - GC_TRIGGERS; - MODE_PREEMPTIVE; - } - CONTRACTL_END; - - if (!m_fCheckedCertificate && HasSecurityDirectory()) - { - CheckAuthenticodeSignature(); - } - - return m_certificate; -} -#endif // ------------------------------------------------------------ // Hash support @@ -1887,57 +1868,6 @@ inline BOOL PEAssembly::IsFullySigned() } -#ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY -//--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// -// Verify the Authenticode and strong name signatures of an assembly during the assembly -// load code path. To verify the strong name signature outside of assembly load, use the -// VefifyStrongName method instead. -// -// If the applicaiton is using strong name bypass, then this method may not cause a real -// strong name verification, delaying the assembly's strong name load until we know that -// the verification is required. If the assembly must be forced to have its strong name -// verified, then the VerifyStrongName method should also be chosen. -// -// See code:AssemblySecurityDescriptor::ResolveWorker#StrongNameBypass -// - -inline void PEAssembly::DoLoadSignatureChecks() -{ - CONTRACTL - { - THROWS; - GC_TRIGGERS; // Fusion uses crsts on AddRef/Release - MODE_ANY; - } - CONTRACTL_END; - - ETWOnStartup(SecurityCatchCall_V1, SecurityCatchCallEnd_V1); - - // If this isn't mscorlib or a dynamic assembly, verify the Authenticode signature. - if (IsSystem() || IsDynamic()) - { - // If it was a dynamic module (or mscorlib), then we don't want to be doing module hash checks on it - m_flags |= PEFILE_SKIP_MODULE_HASH_CHECKS; - } - - // Check strong name signature. We only want to do this now if the application is not using the strong - // name bypass feature. Otherwise we'll delay strong name verification until we figure out how trusted - // the assembly is. - // - // For more information see code:AssemblySecurityDescriptor::ResolveWorker#StrongNameBypass - - // Make sure m_pMDImport is initialized as we need to call VerifyStrongName which calls GetFlags - // BypassTrustedAppStrongNames = false is a relatively uncommon scenario so we need to make sure - // the initialization order is always correct and we don't miss this uncommon case - _ASSERTE(GetMDImport()); - - if (!g_pConfig->BypassTrustedAppStrongNames()) - { - VerifyStrongName(); - } -} -#endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY // ------------------------------------------------------------ // Metadata access |