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authordanmosemsft <danmose@microsoft.com>2017-02-10 21:08:47 -0800
committerdanmosemsft <danmose@microsoft.com>2017-02-10 21:36:09 -0800
commit1f75aecd267e4d2d322ce6a812a34d6a34cae1f9 (patch)
treef0b162c6ab8b4bf5fee43ae6191c6d4b47165e8a /src/vm/pefile.inl
parent6517da4563a47fb370f35c082ae709215f5d0b28 (diff)
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Remove always undefined FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
Diffstat (limited to 'src/vm/pefile.inl')
-rw-r--r--src/vm/pefile.inl70
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions
diff --git a/src/vm/pefile.inl b/src/vm/pefile.inl
index 76040e3551..da70cc2a74 100644
--- a/src/vm/pefile.inl
+++ b/src/vm/pefile.inl
@@ -1808,25 +1808,6 @@ inline HRESULT PEFile::GetFlagsNoTrigger(DWORD * pdwFlags)
return GetPersistentMDImport()->GetAssemblyProps(TokenFromRid(1, mdtAssembly), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, pdwFlags);
}
-#ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
-inline COR_TRUST *PEFile::GetAuthenticodeSignature()
-{
- CONTRACTL
- {
- THROWS;
- GC_TRIGGERS;
- MODE_PREEMPTIVE;
- }
- CONTRACTL_END;
-
- if (!m_fCheckedCertificate && HasSecurityDirectory())
- {
- CheckAuthenticodeSignature();
- }
-
- return m_certificate;
-}
-#endif
// ------------------------------------------------------------
// Hash support
@@ -1887,57 +1868,6 @@ inline BOOL PEAssembly::IsFullySigned()
}
-#ifdef FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
-//---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-//
-// Verify the Authenticode and strong name signatures of an assembly during the assembly
-// load code path. To verify the strong name signature outside of assembly load, use the
-// VefifyStrongName method instead.
-//
-// If the applicaiton is using strong name bypass, then this method may not cause a real
-// strong name verification, delaying the assembly's strong name load until we know that
-// the verification is required. If the assembly must be forced to have its strong name
-// verified, then the VerifyStrongName method should also be chosen.
-//
-// See code:AssemblySecurityDescriptor::ResolveWorker#StrongNameBypass
-//
-
-inline void PEAssembly::DoLoadSignatureChecks()
-{
- CONTRACTL
- {
- THROWS;
- GC_TRIGGERS; // Fusion uses crsts on AddRef/Release
- MODE_ANY;
- }
- CONTRACTL_END;
-
- ETWOnStartup(SecurityCatchCall_V1, SecurityCatchCallEnd_V1);
-
- // If this isn't mscorlib or a dynamic assembly, verify the Authenticode signature.
- if (IsSystem() || IsDynamic())
- {
- // If it was a dynamic module (or mscorlib), then we don't want to be doing module hash checks on it
- m_flags |= PEFILE_SKIP_MODULE_HASH_CHECKS;
- }
-
- // Check strong name signature. We only want to do this now if the application is not using the strong
- // name bypass feature. Otherwise we'll delay strong name verification until we figure out how trusted
- // the assembly is.
- //
- // For more information see code:AssemblySecurityDescriptor::ResolveWorker#StrongNameBypass
-
- // Make sure m_pMDImport is initialized as we need to call VerifyStrongName which calls GetFlags
- // BypassTrustedAppStrongNames = false is a relatively uncommon scenario so we need to make sure
- // the initialization order is always correct and we don't miss this uncommon case
- _ASSERTE(GetMDImport());
-
- if (!g_pConfig->BypassTrustedAppStrongNames())
- {
- VerifyStrongName();
- }
-}
-#endif // FEATURE_CAS_POLICY
// ------------------------------------------------------------
// Metadata access