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authorWootak Jung <wootak.jung@samsung.com>2023-11-28 14:51:49 +0900
committerWootak Jung <wootak.jung@samsung.com>2023-11-29 10:18:22 +0900
commita1e210e40256d9994b854b536cef5a6633a4af9e (patch)
tree94a134f4ac46a633ce5ddb77d45cc754ca770abb
parent06b14835a973b759205e92f19fa9f66596e066a7 (diff)
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Fix the security vulnerability issue
A variant of this attack works when bluetoothctl shows that bluetooth is discoverable, pariable, and discovering (only a subset may be necessary). On Ubuntu 22.04 Desktop this becomes true when the GNOME panel for bluetooth settings is opened. BlueZ's setting ClassicBondedOnly=true prevents this attack. This parameter is not enabled in CVE-2020-0556 patches and all distros I checked have not opted into this setting. Most members of the distros list are likely affected. Change-Id: Ib4883d1766d314bcd415308a9e4805e196462f3a Signed-off-by: Wootak Jung <wootak.jung@samsung.com>
-rwxr-xr-xprofiles/input/input.conf2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/profiles/input/input.conf b/profiles/input/input.conf
index 2c18fa1c..227b00af 100755
--- a/profiles/input/input.conf
+++ b/profiles/input/input.conf
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
# device connections. Several older mice have been known for not supporting
# pairing/encryption.
# Defaults to false to maximize device compatibility.
-#ClassicBondedOnly=true
+ClassicBondedOnly=true
#ifndef TIZEN_FEATURE_BLUEZ_MODIFY
# LE upgrade security