From 8023976cf4627d9f1d82ad468ec40e32eb87d211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 13:51:56 +0800
Subject: SELinux: Add class support to the role_trans structure

If kernel policy version is >= 26, then the binary representation of
the role_trans structure supports specifying the class for the current
subject or the newly created object.

If kernel policy version is < 26, then the class field would be default
to the process class.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  3 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 14 ++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 348eb00cb668..bfc5218d5840 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -30,13 +30,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS	26
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index e7b850ad57ee..fd62c50d6e7d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -2302,8 +2307,17 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 		tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 		tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+			tr->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		} else
+			tr->tclass = p->process_class;
+
 		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
 		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
 		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role))
 			goto bad;
 		ltr = tr;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 732ea4a68682..801175f79cf9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ struct role_datum {
 
 struct role_trans {
 	u32 role;		/* current role */
-	u32 type;		/* program executable type */
+	u32 type;		/* program executable type, or new object type */
+	u32 tclass;		/* process class, or new object class */
 	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
 	struct role_trans *next;
 };
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 63a312ca55d09a3f6526919df495fff1073c88f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <harrytaurus200@hotmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 13:51:58 +0800
Subject: SELinux: Compute role in newcontext for all classes

Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3e7544d2a07b..03f7a4748ee8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1484,17 +1484,15 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				      tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
-	if  (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
-		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
-			/* Look for a role transition rule. */
-			for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
-			     roletr = roletr->next) {
-				if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
-				    roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
-					/* Use the role transition rule. */
-					newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
-					break;
-				}
+	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
+			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
+			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
+				/* Use the role transition rule. */
+				newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c900ff323d761753a56d8d6a67b034ceee277b6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 13:52:00 +0800
Subject: SELinux: Write class field in role_trans_write.

If kernel policy version is >= 26, then write the class field of the
role_trans structure into the binary reprensentation.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index fd62c50d6e7d..a493eae24e0a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -2535,8 +2535,9 @@ static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
+	struct role_trans *r = p->role_tr;
 	struct role_trans *tr;
 	u32 buf[3];
 	size_t nel;
@@ -2556,6 +2557,12 @@ static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
 		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->tclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -3267,7 +3274,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = role_trans_write(p->role_tr, fp);
+	rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f50a3ec961f90e38c0311411179d5dfee1412192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kohei Kaigai <Kohei.Kaigai@eu.nec.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2011 15:39:26 +0100
Subject: selinux: add type_transition with name extension support for
 selinuxfs

The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument
to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object
managers.
If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel.
In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched
kernel.

Thanks,

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com>
[manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 17 +++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index bfc5218d5840..2cf670864147 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				 u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ea39cb742ae5..973f5a4a6fce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -753,11 +753,13 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
 	ssize_t length;
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
+	int nargs;
 
 	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
 	if (length)
@@ -773,9 +775,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!namebuf)
+		goto out;
+
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+	nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+	if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
 		goto out;
+	if (nargs == 4)
+		objname = namebuf;
 
 	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length)
@@ -785,7 +795,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+					      objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -804,6 +815,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	length = len;
 out:
 	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(namebuf);
 	kfree(tcon);
 	kfree(scon);
 	return length;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 03f7a4748ee8..39d732145abe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1360,14 +1360,14 @@ out:
 
 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
 				  u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
-				  const struct qstr *qstr)
+				  const char *objname)
 {
 	struct filename_trans *ft;
 	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
 		if (ft->stype == scon &&
 		    ft->ttype == tcon &&
 		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
-		    !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) {
+		    !strcmp(ft->name, objname)) {
 			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
-				const struct qstr *qstr,
+				const char *objname,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
@@ -1479,9 +1479,9 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
-	if (qstr)
+	if (objname)
 		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
-				      tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
@@ -1539,13 +1539,14 @@ int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    qstr, out_sid, true);
+				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    NULL, out_sid, false);
+				    objname, out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From eba71de2cb7c02c5ae4f2ad3656343da71bc4661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2011 10:13:43 -0400
Subject: selinux: Fix regression for Xorg

Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled.  Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.

Reported-by:  "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 39d732145abe..f3f5dca81006 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
 			return i;
 	}
 
-	return pol_value;
+	return SECCLASS_NULL;
 }
 
 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1214eac73f798bccabc6adb55e7b2d787527c13c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2011 14:12:57 +0800
Subject: Initialize policydb.process_class eariler.

Initialize policydb.process_class once all symtabs read from policy image,
so that it could be used to setup the role_trans.tclass field when a lower
version policy.X is loaded.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index a493eae24e0a..82373eb2dc97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -2275,6 +2275,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
 	}
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+	if (!p->process_class)
+		goto bad;
+
 	rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -2358,11 +2363,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
-	rc = -EINVAL;
-	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
-	if (!p->process_class)
-		goto bad;
-
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
 	p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 425b473de5372cad6fffc6b98a758ed8e3fc70ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2011 14:46:59 -0400
Subject: SELinux: delete debugging printks from filename_trans rule processing

The filename_trans rule processing has some printk(KERN_ERR ) messages
which were intended as debug aids in creating the code but weren't removed
before it was submitted.  Remove them.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 82373eb2dc97..5591e422256a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1824,8 +1824,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto out;
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
-	printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel);
-
 	last = p->filename_trans;
 	while (last && last->next)
 		last = last->next;
@@ -1862,8 +1860,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 			goto out;
 		name[len] = 0;
 
-		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name);
-
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a35c6c8368d88deae6890205e73ed330b6df1db7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 10:21:28 -0400
Subject: SELinux: silence build warning when !CONFIG_BUG

If one builds a kernel without CONFIG_BUG there are a number of 'may be
used uninitialized' warnings.  Silence these by returning after the BUG().

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 2 ++
 security/selinux/netnode.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d52a92507412..7a630a8a5cef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -989,6 +989,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 			continue;
 		default:
 			BUG();
+			return;
 		};
 		/* we need a comma before each option */
 		seq_putc(m, ',');
@@ -1442,6 +1443,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index 65ebfe954f85..3618251d0fdb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6b697323a78bed254ee372f71b1a6a2901bb4b7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 10:21:28 -0400
Subject: SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_t

The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t.  Easy enough fix to silence
build warnings.  We have no need for signed-ness.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 2cf670864147..3ba4feba048a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 int security_mls_enabled(void);
 
 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
-int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
 size_t security_policydb_len(void);
 
 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f3f5dca81006..211c0ada594c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3189,7 +3189,7 @@ out:
  * @len: length of data in bytes
  *
  */
-int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len)
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct policy_file fp;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1c9904297451f558191e211a48d8838b4bf792b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 17:23:19 -0700
Subject: SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules

Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/capability.c      | 2 +-
 security/security.c        | 6 ++----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 6 +++++-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++++-
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index ab3d807accc3..56bb1605fd79 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 47b8a447118f..7e34f98bf433 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -514,16 +514,14 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, 0);
 }
 
 int security_inode_exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	if (flags)
-		return -ECHILD;
-	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags);
 }
 
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7a630a8a5cef..9a220be17a3f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2635,7 +2635,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2649,6 +2649,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* May be droppable after audit */
+	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
+		return -ECHILD;
+
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 23c7a6d0c80c..42fcb47747a3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
  */
-static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
@@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	 */
 	if (mask == 0)
 		return 0;
+
+	/* May be droppable after audit */
+	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
+		return -ECHILD;
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0dc1ba24f7fff659725eecbba2c9ad679a0954cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 17:23:20 -0700
Subject: SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe

Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly.  The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe.  A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.

This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code.  It will normally just work under RCU.  This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.

Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 security/selinux/include/avc.h | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 9da6420e2056..1d027e29ce8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
  * @avd: access vector decisions
  * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
  * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
  *
  * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
  * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
@@ -481,9 +482,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
  * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
  * before calling the auditing code.
  */
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
+	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
+	       unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
@@ -515,11 +517,24 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	else
 		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
 	if (!audited)
-		return;
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry.  This is because
+	 * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
+	 * safe.  Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
+	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
+	 * happened a little later.
+	 */
+	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+	    (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
+		return -ECHILD;
+
 	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
 	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
 	a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
@@ -529,6 +544,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
 	a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
 	common_lsm_audit(a);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -793,6 +809,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
  * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
  *
  * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
  * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -802,14 +819,19 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		       u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
-	int rc;
+	int rc, rc2;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
-	avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
+			flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9a220be17a3f..ed5f29aa0a38 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1447,8 +1447,11 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
-	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
-		avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		if (rc2)
+			return rc2;
+	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1468,7 +1471,8 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct inode *inode,
 			  u32 perms,
-			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp,
+			  unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1488,7 +1492,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 	}
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1505,7 +1509,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1541,7 +1545,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
 	rc = 0;
 	if (av)
-		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -2103,7 +2107,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 			file = file_priv->file;
 			inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 			if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
-					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
 				drop_tty = 1;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2649,10 +2653,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* May be droppable after audit */
-	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
-		return -ECHILD;
-
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 
@@ -2661,7 +2661,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
 
 	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
 
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 5615081b73ec..e77b2ac2908b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
 
 void __init avc_init(void);
 
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 	       struct av_decision *avd,
 	       int result,
-	       struct common_audit_data *a);
+	      struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 unsigned flags,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       unsigned);
+
+static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
+}
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f48b7399840b453e7282b523f535561fe9638a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2011 12:54:27 -0400
Subject: LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE

The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.  Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/lsm_audit.c       | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 security/selinux/avc.c     |  2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 security/smack/smack.h     |  8 ++++----
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 32 ++++++++++++++---------------
 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 908aa712816a..2e846052cbf4 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
 static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 				   struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
 	if (a->tsk)
@@ -229,33 +228,40 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
 		audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
 		break;
-	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-		if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-			struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-			if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-				audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.fs.path);
-			} else {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
-						 dentry->d_name.name);
-			}
-			inode = dentry->d_inode;
-		} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-			struct dentry *dentry;
-			inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-			if (dentry) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
-						 dentry->d_name.name);
-				dput(dentry);
-			}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: {
+		struct dentry *dentry = a->u.path.dentry;
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		if (a->u.path.mnt) {
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.path);
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+					 dentry->d_name.name);
 		}
+		inode = dentry->d_inode;
 		if (inode)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
 					inode->i_sb->s_id,
 					inode->i_ino);
 		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE: {
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = a->u.inode;
+		dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+		if (dentry) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+					 dentry->d_name.name);
+			dput(dentry);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu", inode->i_sb->s_id,
+				 inode->i_ino);
+		break;
+	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
 		tsk = a->u.tsk;
 		if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1d027e29ce8d..ce742f1778e1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
 	 * happened a little later.
 	 */
-	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
 	    (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
 		return -ECHILD;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ed5f29aa0a38..ad664d3056eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1488,8 +1488,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (!adp) {
 		adp = &ad;
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+		ad.u.inode = inode;
 	}
 
 	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
@@ -1506,9 +1506,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.mnt = mnt;
+	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1530,8 +1530,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1569,8 +1569,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1621,8 +1621,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1667,9 +1667,9 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
 
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
+	ad.u.path.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
+	ad.u.path.dentry = new_dentry;
 	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
 	if (new_dentry->d_inode)
 		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
@@ -1991,8 +1991,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
@@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
 
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -2468,8 +2468,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2478,8 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2653,8 +2653,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
 	if (from_access)
 		ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
@@ -2732,8 +2732,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b449cfdad21c..a16925c0e91a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -316,22 +316,22 @@ static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 						    struct dentry *d)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.path.dentry = d;
+	a->a.u.path.dentry = d;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 						 struct vfsmount *m)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.path.mnt = m;
+	a->a.u.path.mnt = m;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					      struct inode *i)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.inode = i;
+	a->a.u.inode = i;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					     struct path p)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.path = p;
+	a->a.u.path = p;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					    struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 42fcb47747a3..eeb393fbf925 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
 
 	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_root);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
 
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 	char *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
 	/* May be droppable after audit */
 	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
 		return -ECHILD;
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
 }
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	 */
 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
 	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
 	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
 	switch (cmd) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a269434d2fb48a4d66c1d7bf821b7874b59c5b41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2011 13:10:27 -0400
Subject: LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH

This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path.  This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/lsm_audit.c       | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 security/smack/smack.h     |  7 +------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 2e846052cbf4..893af8a2fa1e 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -229,17 +229,24 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
 		break;
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: {
-		struct dentry *dentry = a->u.path.dentry;
 		struct inode *inode;
 
-		if (a->u.path.mnt) {
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.path);
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
-					 dentry->d_name.name);
-		}
-		inode = dentry->d_inode;
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.path);
+
+		inode = a->u.path.dentry->d_inode;
+		if (inode)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+					inode->i_sb->s_id,
+					inode->i_ino);
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.dentry->d_name.name);
+
+		inode = a->u.dentry->d_inode;
 		if (inode)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
 					inode->i_sb->s_id,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ad664d3056eb..9e8078a42a94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1569,8 +1569,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1621,8 +1621,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1667,9 +1667,9 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
 
-	ad.u.path.dentry = old_dentry;
+	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	ad.u.path.dentry = new_dentry;
+	ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
 	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
 	if (new_dentry->d_inode)
 		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
@@ -2468,8 +2468,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2478,8 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2732,8 +2732,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index a16925c0e91a..2b6c6a516123 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -316,12 +316,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 						    struct dentry *d)
 {
-	a->a.u.path.dentry = d;
-}
-static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
-						 struct vfsmount *m)
-{
-	a->a.u.path.mnt = m;
+	a->a.u.dentry = d;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					      struct inode *i)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index eeb393fbf925..a3bdd1383928 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -425,10 +425,13 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_root);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
 
 	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
 	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -563,7 +566,7 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -592,7 +595,7 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -623,7 +626,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -663,7 +666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 	char *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -720,7 +723,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	 */
 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -736,10 +739,13 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -784,7 +790,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -845,7 +851,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -1070,7 +1076,7 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
 	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 92f4250901476fcadc4f52ace36e453c61f5591d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2011 13:15:55 -0400
Subject: SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct path

smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the
dentry.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a3bdd1383928..410825a44392 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1076,8 +1076,8 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4742600cf536c0c115b6f769eda82ee377d199c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:20 -0400
Subject: SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname
 not a qstr

filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name.
Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 211c0ada594c..3e1ae85c0130 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
 	}
 
-	/* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
 	if (objname)
 		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
 				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2667991f60e67d28c495b8967aaabf84b4ccd560 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:20 -0400
Subject: SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of
 *con

filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of
the subject and target.  It does not take a context.  Thus the names are
misleading.  Fix the argument names.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3e1ae85c0130..78bb8100b02e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1359,13 +1359,13 @@ out:
 }
 
 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
-				  u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
+				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
 				  const char *objname)
 {
 	struct filename_trans *ft;
 	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
-		if (ft->stype == scon &&
-		    ft->ttype == tcon &&
+		if (ft->stype == stype &&
+		    ft->ttype == ttype &&
 		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
 		    !strcmp(ft->name, objname)) {
 			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 03a4c0182a156547edd5f2717c1702590fe36bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dir

Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is
created.  First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000
filename trans rules.  Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad
idea.  This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each
ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule.  Thus when an inode is
created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent
directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no
relevant entry.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 ++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 2 ++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 5591e422256a..4c1811972b8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 	if (!p->range_tr)
 		goto out;
 
+	ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
 	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -801,6 +802,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 		ft = nft;
 	}
 
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1868,6 +1870,10 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 		ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 801175f79cf9..f054a9d4d114 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ struct policydb {
 	/* role transitions */
 	struct role_trans *role_tr;
 
+	/* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+	struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
 	/* file transitions with the last path component */
 	struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 78bb8100b02e..6a22eaebf3b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,15 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 				  const char *objname)
 {
 	struct filename_trans *ft;
+
+	/*
+	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+	 */
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+		return;
+
 	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
 		if (ft->stype == stype &&
 		    ft->ttype == ttype &&
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From be30b16d43f4781406de0c08c96501dae4cc5a77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic function

We have custom debug functions like rangetr_hash_eval and symtab_hash_eval
which do the same thing.  Just create a generic function that takes the name
of the hash table as an argument instead of having custom functions.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 4c1811972b8b..70c863bf715e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -423,32 +423,26 @@ static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 };
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
-static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
-		struct hashtab *h = s[i].table;
-		struct hashtab_info info;
+	struct hashtab_info info;
 
-		hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-		       "longest chain length %d\n", symtab_name[i], h->nel,
-		       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
-	}
+	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+	       "longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
+	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
 }
 
-static void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 {
-	struct hashtab_info info;
+	int i;
 
-	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: rangetr:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-	       "longest chain length %d\n", h->nel,
-	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hash_eval(s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
 }
+
 #else
-static inline void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
 {
 }
 #endif
@@ -1802,7 +1796,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		rt = NULL;
 		r = NULL;
 	}
-	rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
+	hash_eval(p->range_tr, "rangetr");
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	kfree(rt);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3f058ef7787e1b48720622346de9a5317aeb749a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: generic hashtab entry counter

Instead of a hashtab entry counter function only useful for range
transition rules make a function generic for any hashtable to use.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 70c863bf715e..ca7a7231b5a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int range_count(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 {
 	int *cnt = ptr;
 	*cnt = *cnt + 1;
@@ -3114,7 +3114,7 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
 	nel = 0;
-	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_count, &nel);
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2463c26d50adc282d19317013ba0ff473823ca47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable

To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type
of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable.  Given the policy we
are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about
5,000 entries to 17.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h |   9 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |  20 ++---
 3 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index ca7a7231b5a2..549120c56edd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -184,6 +184,43 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft = k;
+	unsigned long hash;
+	unsigned int byte_num;
+	unsigned char focus;
+
+	hash = ft->stype ^ ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+	byte_num = 0;
+	while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
+		hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
+	return hash & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft1 = k1;
+	const struct filename_trans *ft2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = ft1->stype - ft2->stype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+
+}
+
 static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
 {
 	const struct range_trans *key = k;
@@ -236,6 +273,10 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
+	p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
+	if (!p->filename_trans)
+		goto out;
+
 	p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
 	if (!p->range_tr)
 		goto out;
@@ -246,6 +287,8 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 
 	return 0;
 out:
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
 		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
 	return rc;
@@ -675,6 +718,16 @@ static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 	cat_destroy,
 };
 
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	kfree(ft->name);
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 {
 	struct mls_range *rt = datum;
@@ -709,7 +762,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	int i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
-	struct filename_trans *ft, *nft;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		cond_resched();
@@ -773,6 +825,9 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	}
 	kfree(lra);
 
+	hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+
 	hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
 	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 
@@ -788,14 +843,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
 	}
 
-	ft = p->filename_trans;
-	while (ft) {
-		nft = ft->next;
-		kfree(ft->name);
-		kfree(ft);
-		ft = nft;
-	}
-
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
@@ -1806,9 +1853,10 @@ out:
 
 static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	struct filename_trans *ft, *last;
-	u32 nel, len;
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
 	char *name;
+	u32 nel, len;
 	__le32 buf[4];
 	int rc, i;
 
@@ -1817,25 +1865,23 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 	if (rc)
-		goto out;
+		return rc;
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
-	last = p->filename_trans;
-	while (last && last->next)
-		last = last->next;
-
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		ft = NULL;
+		otype = NULL;
+		name = NULL;
+
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!ft)
 			goto out;
 
-		/* add it to the tail of the list */
-		if (!last)
-			p->filename_trans = ft;
-		else
-			last->next = ft;
-		last = ft;
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		otype = kmalloc(sizeof(*otype), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!otype)
+			goto out;
 
 		/* length of the path component string */
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
@@ -1863,14 +1909,22 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-		ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+		otype->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
 
 		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
+
+		hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
 	}
-	rc = 0;
+	hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+	return 0;
 out:
+	kfree(ft);
+	kfree(name);
+	kfree(otype);
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3131,43 +3185,60 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 {
-	struct filename_trans *ft;
-	u32 len, nel = 0;
 	__le32 buf[4];
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype = data;
+	void *fp = ptr;
 	int rc;
+	u32 len;
 
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next)
-		nel++;
-
-	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	len = strlen(ft->name);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
 	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
-		len = strlen(ft->name);
-		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
-		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-		rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
+	buf[0] = ft->stype;
+	buf[1] = ft->ttype;
+	buf[2] = ft->tclass;
+	buf[3] = otype->otype;
 
-		buf[0] = ft->stype;
-		buf[1] = ft->ttype;
-		buf[2] = ft->tclass;
-		buf[3] = ft->otype;
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 nel;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Write the configuration data in a policy database
  * structure to a policy database binary representation
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index f054a9d4d114..b846c0387180 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -79,11 +79,13 @@ struct role_trans {
 };
 
 struct filename_trans {
-	struct filename_trans *next;
 	u32 stype;		/* current process */
 	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
 	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
 	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
 	u32 otype;		/* expected of new object */
 };
 
@@ -227,10 +229,11 @@ struct policydb {
 	/* role transitions */
 	struct role_trans *role_tr;
 
+	/* file transitions with the last path component */
 	/* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
 	struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
-	/* file transitions with the last path component */
-	struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
+	/* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+	struct hashtab *filename_trans;
 
 	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
 	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 6a22eaebf3b7..e11b4b038f4a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1362,7 +1362,8 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
 				  const char *objname)
 {
-	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	struct filename_trans ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
 
 	/*
 	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
@@ -1372,15 +1373,14 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
 		return;
 
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
-		if (ft->stype == stype &&
-		    ft->ttype == ttype &&
-		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
-		    !strcmp(ft->name, objname)) {
-			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
-			return;
-		}
-	}
+	ft.stype = stype;
+	ft.ttype = ttype;
+	ft.tclass = tclass;
+	ft.name = objname;
+
+	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	if (otype)
+		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
 }
 
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 562abf624175e3f8487b7f064e516805e437e597 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:11:21 -0400
Subject: SELinux: pass last path component in may_create

New inodes are created in a two stage process.  We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed.  We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security().  The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook.  Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create.  Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created.  Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.

Reported-by: Dominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9e8078a42a94..a6dd2bed8d7b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1579,7 +1579,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 		return rc;
 
 	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+					     &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5a3ea8782c63d3501cb764c176f153c0d9a400e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:55:52 -0400
Subject: flex_array: flex_array_prealloc takes a number of elements, not an
 end

Change flex_array_prealloc to take the number of elements for which space
should be allocated instead of the last (inclusive) element. Users
and documentation are updated accordingly.  flex_arrays got introduced before
they had users.  When folks started using it, they ended up needing a
different API than was coded up originally.  This swaps over to the API that
folks apparently need.

Based-on-patch-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chris Richards <gizmo@giz-works.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.38+]
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 549120c56edd..102e9ec1b77a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
-				 p->p_types.nprim - 1, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+				 p->p_types.nprim, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 			goto out;
 
 		rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
-					 0, p->symtab[i].nprim - 1,
+					 0, p->symtab[i].nprim,
 					 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
@@ -2439,7 +2439,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto bad;
 
 	/* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
-	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim - 1,
+	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim,
 				 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2875fa00830be62431f5ac22d8f85d57f9fa3033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2011 16:04:24 -0400
Subject: SELinux: introduce path_has_perm

We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm.  dentry_has_perm just
calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data.  But dentry_has_perm can
take either a dentry or a path.  Split those to make the code obvious and
to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a
valid dentry and mnt.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a6dd2bed8d7b..9f426b8a12b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1499,16 +1499,29 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
-				  struct vfsmount *mnt,
 				  struct dentry *dentry,
 				  u32 av)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				struct path *path,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
-	ad.u.path.mnt = mnt;
-	ad.u.path.dentry = dentry;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1896,7 +1909,7 @@ static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
 }
 
 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
@@ -2496,8 +2509,7 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
 					   FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
 	else
-		return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
-				       FILE__MOUNTON);
+		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
 }
 
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
@@ -2630,14 +2642,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
@@ -2680,16 +2692,20 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 
 	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
-		return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
@@ -2710,7 +2726,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
 	   ordinary setattr permission. */
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -2797,14 +2813,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7a627e3b9a2bd0f06945bbe64bcf403e788ecf6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2011 15:34:16 -0700
Subject: SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfs

In the interest of keeping userspace from having to create new root
filesystems all the time, let's follow the lead of the other in-kernel
filesystems and provide a proper mount point for it in sysfs.

For selinuxfs, this mount point should be in /sys/fs/selinux/

Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzerqung@0pointer.de>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[include kobject.h - Eric Paris]
[use selinuxfs_obj throughout - Eric Paris]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 973f5a4a6fce..fde4e9d64bfd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
 
 /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
    Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
@@ -1909,6 +1910,7 @@ static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
 };
 
 struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+static struct kobject *selinuxfs_kobj;
 
 static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 {
@@ -1916,9 +1918,16 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
 		return 0;
+
+	selinuxfs_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("selinux", fs_kobj);
+	if (!selinuxfs_kobj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
 		return err;
+	}
 
 	selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
 	if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
@@ -1935,6 +1944,7 @@ __initcall(init_sel_fs);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 void exit_sel_fs(void)
 {
+	kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
 	unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
 }
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3