From 2a8ac745e3171889d364235b8203342e28526d2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Delvare Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2012 16:08:25 +0200 Subject: x86: CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y is no longer experimental This feature has been around for over 5 years now, and has no CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL dependency anymore, so remove the '(EXPERIMENTAL)' tag from the help text as well. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1341583705.4655.18.camel@amber.site Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index c70684f859e1..b03fe17042e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. config CC_STACKPROTECTOR - bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" + bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection" ---help--- This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on -- cgit v1.2.3 From d6250a3f12edb3a86db9598ffeca3de8b4a219e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Cox Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2012 16:28:19 +0100 Subject: x86, nops: Missing break resulting in incorrect selection on Intel The Intel case falls through into the generic case which then changes the values. For cases like the P6 it doesn't do the right thing so this seems to be a screwup. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-lww2uirad4skzjlmrm0vru8o@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Cc: --- arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 1f84794f0759..73ef56c5a8b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ void __init arch_init_ideal_nops(void) ideal_nops = intel_nops; #endif } - + break; default: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 ideal_nops = k8_nops; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1d44b30f35a9873a65b320dd5300088fa995fd94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tomoki Sekiyama Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 19:47:32 +0900 Subject: x86/ioapic: Fix NULL pointer dereference on CPU hotplug after disabling irqs In the current kernel, percpu variable `vector_irq' is not always cleared when a CPU is offlined. If the CPU that has the disabled irqs in vector_irq is hotplugged again, __setup_vector_irq() hits invalid irq vector and may crash. This bug can be reproduced as following; # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu7/online # modprobe -r some_driver_using_interrupts # vector_irq@cpu7 uncleared # echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu7/online # kernel may crash To fix this problem, this patch clears vector_irq in __fixup_irqs() when the CPU is offlined. This also reverts commit f6175f5bfb4c, which partially fixes this bug by clearing vector in __clear_irq_vector(). But in environments with IOMMU IRQ remapper, it could fail because cfg->domain doesn't contain offlined CPUs. With this patch, the fix in __clear_irq_vector() can be reverted because every vector_irq is already cleared in __fixup_irqs() on offlined CPUs. Signed-off-by: Tomoki Sekiyama Acked-by: Suresh Siddha Cc: yrl.pp-manager.tt@hitachi.com Cc: Yinghai Lu Cc: Alexander Gordeev Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120726104732.2889.19144.stgit@kvmdev Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c index 406eee784684..a6c64aaddf9a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c @@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ static void __clear_irq_vector(int irq, struct irq_cfg *cfg) BUG_ON(!cfg->vector); vector = cfg->vector; - for_each_cpu(cpu, cfg->domain) + for_each_cpu_and(cpu, cfg->domain, cpu_online_mask) per_cpu(vector_irq, cpu)[vector] = -1; cfg->vector = 0; @@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static void __clear_irq_vector(int irq, struct irq_cfg *cfg) if (likely(!cfg->move_in_progress)) return; - for_each_cpu(cpu, cfg->old_domain) { + for_each_cpu_and(cpu, cfg->old_domain, cpu_online_mask) { for (vector = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR; vector < NR_VECTORS; vector++) { if (per_cpu(vector_irq, cpu)[vector] != irq) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c index 1f5f1d5d2a02..7ad683d78645 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq.c @@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ void fixup_irqs(void) chip->irq_retrigger(data); raw_spin_unlock(&desc->lock); } + __this_cpu_write(vector_irq[vector], -1); } } #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 736edce5f395b8309a61aa62c36c4356abc83219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 11:21:53 -0700 Subject: x86/mce: Move MCACOD defines from mce-severity.c to We will need some of these values in mce.c. Move them to the appropriate header file so they are available. Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Cc: Chen Gong Cc: Huang Ying Cc: Hidetoshi Seto Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0ccfb1af5fe35e537b7cd8e4d448bf7d851dbfb9.1343078495.git.tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h index 441520e4174f..a3ac52b29cbf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mce.h @@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ #define MCI_STATUS_PCC (1ULL<<57) /* processor context corrupt */ #define MCI_STATUS_S (1ULL<<56) /* Signaled machine check */ #define MCI_STATUS_AR (1ULL<<55) /* Action required */ +#define MCACOD 0xffff /* MCA Error Code */ + +/* Architecturally defined codes from SDM Vol. 3B Chapter 15 */ +#define MCACOD_SCRUB 0x00C0 /* 0xC0-0xCF Memory Scrubbing */ +#define MCACOD_SCRUBMSK 0xfff0 +#define MCACOD_L3WB 0x017A /* L3 Explicit Writeback */ +#define MCACOD_DATA 0x0134 /* Data Load */ +#define MCACOD_INSTR 0x0150 /* Instruction Fetch */ /* MCi_MISC register defines */ #define MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m) ((m) & 0x3f) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c index 413c2ced887c..13017626f9a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c @@ -55,13 +55,6 @@ static struct severity { #define MCI_UC_S (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S) #define MCI_UC_SAR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR) #define MCI_ADDR (MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_MISCV) -#define MCACOD 0xffff -/* Architecturally defined codes from SDM Vol. 3B Chapter 15 */ -#define MCACOD_SCRUB 0x00C0 /* 0xC0-0xCF Memory Scrubbing */ -#define MCACOD_SCRUBMSK 0xfff0 -#define MCACOD_L3WB 0x017A /* L3 Explicit Writeback */ -#define MCACOD_DATA 0x0134 /* Data Load */ -#define MCACOD_INSTR 0x0150 /* Instruction Fetch */ MCESEV( NO, "Invalid", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 61b0fccd7f114573f973dfe25d864608822dc09e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Luck Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 11:28:46 -0700 Subject: x86/mce: Add quirk for instruction recovery on Sandy Bridge processors Sandy Bridge processors follow the SDM (Vol 3B, Table 15-20) and set both the RIPV and EIPV bits in the MCG_STATUS register to zero for machine checks during instruction fetch. This is more than a little counter-intuitive and means that Linux cannot recover from these errors. Rather than insert special case code at several places in mce.c and mce-severity.c, we pretend the EIPV bit was set for just this case early in processing the machine check. Acked-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Cc: Chen Gong Cc: Huang Ying Cc: Hidetoshi Seto Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/180a06f3f357cf9f78259ae443a082b14a29535b.1343078495.git.tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 5a5a5dc1ff15..8cf60e29790a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(mce_banks_t, mce_poll_banks) = { static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct work_struct, mce_work); +static void (*quirk_no_way_out)(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs); + /* * CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a notifier call here to print * MCE errors in a human-readable form. @@ -652,14 +654,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(machine_check_poll); * Do a quick check if any of the events requires a panic. * This decides if we keep the events around or clear them. */ -static int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg, unsigned long *validp) +static int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg, unsigned long *validp, + struct pt_regs *regs) { int i, ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) { m->status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i)); - if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) + if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) { __set_bit(i, validp); + if (quirk_no_way_out) + quirk_no_way_out(i, m, regs); + } if (mce_severity(m, tolerant, msg) >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY) ret = 1; } @@ -1042,7 +1048,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) *final = m; memset(valid_banks, 0, sizeof(valid_banks)); - no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg, valid_banks); + no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg, valid_banks, regs); barrier(); @@ -1418,6 +1424,34 @@ static void __mcheck_cpu_init_generic(void) } } +/* + * During IFU recovery Sandy Bridge -EP4S processors set the RIPV and + * EIPV bits in MCG_STATUS to zero on the affected logical processor (SDM + * Vol 3B Table 15-20). But this confuses both the code that determines + * whether the machine check occurred in kernel or user mode, and also + * the severity assessment code. Pretend that EIPV was set, and take the + * ip/cs values from the pt_regs that mce_gather_info() ignored earlier. + */ +static void quirk_sandybridge_ifu(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (bank != 0) + return; + if ((m->mcgstatus & (MCG_STATUS_EIPV|MCG_STATUS_RIPV)) != 0) + return; + if ((m->status & (MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_STATUS_UC| + MCI_STATUS_EN|MCI_STATUS_MISCV|MCI_STATUS_ADDRV| + MCI_STATUS_PCC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR| + MCACOD)) != + (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_EN| + MCI_STATUS_MISCV|MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_S| + MCI_STATUS_AR|MCACOD_INSTR)) + return; + + m->mcgstatus |= MCG_STATUS_EIPV; + m->ip = regs->ip; + m->cs = regs->cs; +} + /* Add per CPU specific workarounds here */ static int __cpuinit __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { @@ -1515,6 +1549,9 @@ static int __cpuinit __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model <= 13 && mce_bootlog < 0) mce_bootlog = 0; + + if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 45) + quirk_no_way_out = quirk_sandybridge_ifu; } if (monarch_timeout < 0) monarch_timeout = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 41fb433b63cc4745f4918fdaf295763da5ca826c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2012 18:43:08 +0200 Subject: arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c: Ensure a consistent return value in error case Typically, the return value desired for the failure of a function with an integer return value is a negative integer. In these cases, the return value is sometimes a negative integer and sometimes 0, due to a subsequent initialization of the return variable within the loop. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // @r exists@ identifier ret; position p; constant C; expression e1,e3,e4; statement S; @@ ret = -C ... when != ret = e3 when any if@p (...) S ... when any if (\(ret != 0\|ret < 0\|ret > 0\) || ...) { ... return ...; } ... when != ret = e3 when any *if@p (...) { ... when != ret = e4 return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1342284188-19176-7-git-send-email-Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c index 1d5d31ea686b..dc1404bf8e4b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent) { struct setup_data_node *node; struct setup_data *data; - int error = -ENOMEM; + int error; struct dentry *d; struct page *pg; u64 pa_data; @@ -121,8 +121,10 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent) while (pa_data) { node = kmalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!node) + if (!node) { + error = -ENOMEM; goto err_dir; + } pg = pfn_to_page((pa_data+sizeof(*data)-1) >> PAGE_SHIFT); if (PageHighMem(pg)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From eaf4ce6c5fed6b4c55f7efcd5fc3477435cab5e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2012 15:59:58 -0700 Subject: x86-64, kcmp: The kcmp system call can be common We already use the same system call handler for i386 and x86-64, there is absolutely no reason x32 can't use the same system call, too. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Cc: H.J. Lu Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: v3.5 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-vwzk3qbcr3yjyxjg2j38vgy9@git.kernel.org --- arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index 51171aeff0dc..29aed7ac2c02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ 309 common getcpu sys_getcpu 310 64 process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv 311 64 process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev -312 64 kcmp sys_kcmp +312 common kcmp sys_kcmp # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact -- cgit v1.2.3