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| author | Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> | 2011-03-15 13:36:05 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> | 2011-04-28 08:20:56 -0700 |
| commit | 754e601978068dab6d6ed3f25fd3fbb7ec9d28c2 (patch) | |
| tree | c6b9d92255ede4c77fa690289a6189ff7ea183fd /net | |
| parent | 8f6e8f4068274710a9d6aaad0089a13494daf753 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-754e601978068dab6d6ed3f25fd3fbb7ec9d28c2.tar.gz linux-stable-754e601978068dab6d6ed3f25fd3fbb7ec9d28c2.tar.bz2 linux-stable-754e601978068dab6d6ed3f25fd3fbb7ec9d28c2.zip | |
netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 402ce75432e4..e8c4ddf055b0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1273,6 +1273,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1817,6 +1818,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2046,6 +2048,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1; |