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2020-03-28fs/buffer: Make BH_Uptodate_Lock bit_spin_lock a regular spinlock_tThomas Gleixner3-23/+13
Bit spinlocks are problematic if PREEMPT_RT is enabled, because they disable preemption, which is undesired for latency reasons and breaks when regular spinlocks are taken within the bit_spinlock locked region because regular spinlocks are converted to 'sleeping spinlocks' on RT. PREEMPT_RT replaced the bit spinlocks with regular spinlocks to avoid this problem. The replacement was done conditionaly at compile time, but Christoph requested to do an unconditional conversion. Jan suggested to move the spinlock into a existing padding hole which avoids a size increase of struct buffer_head on production kernels. As a benefit the lock gains lockdep coverage. [ bigeasy: Remove the wrapper and use always spinlock_t and move it into the padding hole ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191118132824.rclhrbujqh4b4g4d@linutronix.de
2020-03-06futex: Fix inode life-time issuePeter Zijlstra1-0/+1
As reported by Jann, ihold() does not in fact guarantee inode persistence. And instead of making it so, replace the usage of inode pointers with a per boot, machine wide, unique inode identifier. This sequence number is global, but shared (file backed) futexes are rare enough that this should not become a performance issue. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2020-03-01Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-7/+7
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Two more bug fixes (including a regression) for 5.6" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: potential crash on allocation error in ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array() jbd2: fix data races at struct journal_head
2020-02-29ext4: potential crash on allocation error in ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array()Dan Carpenter1-3/+3
If sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated is zero and the first allocation fails then this code will crash. The problem is that "i--" will set "i" to -1 but when we compare "i >= sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated" then the -1 is type promoted to unsigned and becomes UINT_MAX. Since UINT_MAX is more than zero, the condition is true so we call kvfree(new_groups[-1]). The loop will carry on freeing invalid memory until it crashes. Fixes: 7c990728b99e ("ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and access") Reviewed-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228092142.7irbc44yaz3by7nb@kili.mountain Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2020-02-29jbd2: fix data races at struct journal_headQian Cai1-4/+4
journal_head::b_transaction and journal_head::b_next_transaction could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, LTP: starting fsync04 /dev/zero: Can't open blockdev EXT4-fs (loop0): mounting ext3 file system using the ext4 subsystem EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null) ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer [jbd2] / jbd2_write_access_granted [jbd2] write to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25721 on cpu 70: __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer+0xdd/0x210 [jbd2] __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:2569 jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x2d15/0x3f20 [jbd2] (inlined by) jbd2_journal_commit_transaction at fs/jbd2/commit.c:1034 kjournald2+0x13b/0x450 [jbd2] kthread+0x1cd/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 read to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25724 on cpu 68: jbd2_write_access_granted+0x1b2/0x250 [jbd2] jbd2_write_access_granted at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1155 jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x60 [jbd2] __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x50/0x90 [ext4] ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used+0x158/0x620 [ext4] ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x54f/0xca0 [ext4] ext4_ind_map_blocks+0xc79/0x1b40 [ext4] ext4_map_blocks+0x3b4/0x950 [ext4] _ext4_get_block+0xfc/0x270 [ext4] ext4_get_block+0x3b/0x50 [ext4] __block_write_begin_int+0x22e/0xae0 __block_write_begin+0x39/0x50 ext4_write_begin+0x388/0xb50 [ext4] generic_perform_write+0x15d/0x290 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe 5 locks held by fsync04/25724: #0: ffff99f9911093f8 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x21c/0x260 #1: ffff99f9db4c0348 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}, at: ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x65/0x210 [ext4] #2: ffff99f5e7dfcf58 (jbd2_handle){++++}, at: start_this_handle+0x1c1/0x9d0 [jbd2] #3: ffff99f9db4c0168 (&ei->i_data_sem){++++}, at: ext4_map_blocks+0x176/0x950 [ext4] #4: ffffffff99086b40 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: jbd2_write_access_granted+0x4e/0x250 [jbd2] irq event stamp: 1407125 hardirqs last enabled at (1407125): [<ffffffff980da9b7>] __find_get_block+0x107/0x790 hardirqs last disabled at (1407124): [<ffffffff980da8f9>] __find_get_block+0x49/0x790 softirqs last enabled at (1405528): [<ffffffff98a0034c>] __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c softirqs last disabled at (1405521): [<ffffffff97cc67a2>] irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 68 PID: 25724 Comm: fsync04 Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200221+ #7 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 The plain reads are outside of jh->b_state_lock critical section which result in data races. Fix them by adding pairs of READ|WRITE_ONCE(). Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222043111.2227-1-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2020-02-28Merge tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-28' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds3-91/+74
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe: - Fix for a race with IOPOLL used with SQPOLL (Xiaoguang) - Only show ->fdinfo if procfs is enabled (Tobias) - Fix for a chain with multiple personalities in the SQEs - Fix for a missing free of personality idr on exit - Removal of the spin-for-work optimization - Fix for next work lookup on request completion - Fix for non-vec read/write result progation in case of links - Fix for a fileset references on switch - Fix for a recvmsg/sendmsg 32-bit compatability mode * tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-28' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: io_uring: fix 32-bit compatability with sendmsg/recvmsg io_uring: define and set show_fdinfo only if procfs is enabled io_uring: drop file set ref put/get on switch io_uring: import_single_range() returns 0/-ERROR io_uring: pick up link work on submit reference drop io-wq: ensure work->task_pid is cleared on init io-wq: remove spin-for-work optimization io_uring: fix poll_list race for SETUP_IOPOLL|SETUP_SQPOLL io_uring: fix personality idr leak io_uring: handle multiple personalities in link chains
2020-02-28Merge tag 'zonefs-5.6-rc4' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-4/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dlemoal/zonefs Pull zonefs fixes from Damien Le Moal: "Two fixes in here: - Revert the initial decision to silently ignore IOCB_NOWAIT for asynchronous direct IOs to sequential zone files. Instead, return an error to the user to signal that the feature is not supported (from Christoph) - A fix to zonefs Kconfig to select FS_IOMAP to avoid build failures if no other file system already selected this option (from Johannes)" * tag 'zonefs-5.6-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dlemoal/zonefs: zonefs: select FS_IOMAP zonefs: fix IOCB_NOWAIT handling
2020-02-27io_uring: fix 32-bit compatability with sendmsg/recvmsgJens Axboe1-0/+10
We must set MSG_CMSG_COMPAT if we're in compatability mode, otherwise the iovec import for these commands will not do the right thing and fail the command with -EINVAL. Found by running the test suite compiled as 32-bit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: aa1fa28fc73e ("io_uring: add support for recvmsg()") Fixes: 0fa03c624d8f ("io_uring: add support for sendmsg()") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-27io_uring: define and set show_fdinfo only if procfs is enabledTobias Klauser1-0/+4
Follow the pattern used with other *_show_fdinfo functions and only define and use io_uring_show_fdinfo and its helper functions if CONFIG_PROC_FS is set. Fixes: 87ce955b24c9 ("io_uring: add ->show_fdinfo() for the io_uring file descriptor") Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-26io_uring: drop file set ref put/get on switchJens Axboe1-15/+8
Dan reports that he triggered a warning on ring exit doing some testing: percpu ref (io_file_data_ref_zero) <= 0 (0) after switching to atomic WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at lib/percpu-refcount.c:160 percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0xe8/0xf0 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3+ #5648 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0xe8/0xf0 Code: e7 ff 55 e8 eb d2 80 3d bd 02 d2 00 00 75 8b 48 8b 55 d8 48 c7 c7 e8 70 e6 81 c6 05 a9 02 d2 00 01 48 8b 75 e8 e8 3a d0 c5 ff <0f> 0b e9 69 ff ff ff 90 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 28 48 83 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000110ef8 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 7fffffffffffffff RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: ffffffff825be7a5 RDI: ffffffff825bc32c RBP: ffff8881b75eac38 R08: 000000042364b941 R09: 0000000000000045 R10: ffffffff825beb40 R11: ffffffff825be78a R12: 0000607e46005aa0 R13: ffff888107dcdd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000009 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881b9d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f49e6a5ea20 CR3: 00000001b747c004 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> rcu_core+0x1e4/0x4d0 __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2f1 irq_exit+0xa0/0xb0 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x60/0x140 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x23/0x170 Code: ff eb ab cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 65 8b 2d 10 96 92 7e 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 21 d0 51 00 fb f4 <65> 8b 2d f6 95 92 7e 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c c3 65 8b 05 e5 95 Turns out that this is due to percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic() only grabbing a reference to the percpu refcount if it's not already in atomic mode. io_uring drops a ref and re-gets it when switching back to percpu mode. We attempt to protect against this with the FFD_F_ATOMIC bit, but that isn't reliable. We don't actually need to juggle these refcounts between atomic and percpu switch, we can just do them when we've switched to atomic mode. This removes the need for FFD_F_ATOMIC, which wasn't reliable. Fixes: 05f3fb3c5397 ("io_uring: avoid ring quiesce for fixed file set unregister and update") Reported-by: Dan Melnic <dmm@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-26io_uring: import_single_range() returns 0/-ERRORJens Axboe1-1/+1
Unlike the other core import helpers, import_single_range() returns 0 on success, not the length imported. This means that links that depend on the result of non-vec based IORING_OP_{READ,WRITE} that were added for 5.5 get errored when they should not be. Fixes: 3a6820f2bb8a ("io_uring: add non-vectored read/write commands") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-26io_uring: pick up link work on submit reference dropJens Axboe1-4/+4
If work completes inline, then we should pick up a dependent link item in __io_queue_sqe() as well. If we don't do so, we're forced to go async with that item, which is suboptimal. This also fixes an issue with io_put_req_find_next(), which always looks up the next work item. That should only be done if we're dropping the last reference to the request, to prevent multiple lookups of the same work item. Outside of being a fix, this also enables a good cleanup series for 5.7, where we never have to pass 'nxt' around or into the work handlers. Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-26zonefs: select FS_IOMAPJohannes Thumshirn1-0/+1
Zonefs makes use of iomap internally, so it should also select iomap in Kconfig. Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
2020-02-26zonefs: fix IOCB_NOWAIT handlingChristoph Hellwig1-4/+4
IOCB_NOWAIT can't just be ignored as it breaks applications expecting it not to block. Just refuse the operation as applications must handle that (e.g. by falling back to a thread pool). Fixes: 8dcc1a9d90c1 ("fs: New zonefs file system") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
2020-02-25io-wq: ensure work->task_pid is cleared on initJens Axboe1-10/+4
We use ->task_pid for exit cancellation, but we need to ensure it's cleared to zero for io_req_work_grab_env() to do the right thing. Take a suggestion from Bart and clear the whole thing, just setting the function passed in. This makes it more future proof as well. Fixes: 36282881a795 ("io-wq: add io_wq_cancel_pid() to cancel based on a specific pid") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-25io-wq: remove spin-for-work optimizationJens Axboe1-19/+0
Andres reports that buffered IO seems to suck up more cycles than we would like, and he narrowed it down to the fact that the io-wq workers will briefly spin for more work on completion of a work item. This was a win on the networking side, but apparently some other cases take a hit because of it. Remove the optimization to avoid burning more CPU than we have to for disk IO. Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-25io_uring: fix poll_list race for SETUP_IOPOLL|SETUP_SQPOLLXiaoguang Wang1-32/+27
After making ext4 support iopoll method: let ext4_file_operations's iopoll method be iomap_dio_iopoll(), we found fio can easily hang in fio_ioring_getevents() with below fio job: rm -f testfile; sync; sudo fio -name=fiotest -filename=testfile -iodepth=128 -thread -rw=write -ioengine=io_uring -hipri=1 -sqthread_poll=1 -direct=1 -bs=4k -size=10G -numjobs=8 -runtime=2000 -group_reporting with IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL and IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL enabled. There are two issues that results in this hang, one reason is that when IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL and IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL are enabled, fio does not use io_uring_enter to get completed events, it relies on kernel io_sq_thread to poll for completed events. Another reason is that there is a race: when io_submit_sqes() in io_sq_thread() submits a batch of sqes, variable 'inflight' will record the number of submitted reqs, then io_sq_thread will poll for reqs which have been added to poll_list. But note, if some previous reqs have been punted to io worker, these reqs will won't be in poll_list timely. io_sq_thread() will only poll for a part of previous submitted reqs, and then find poll_list is empty, reset variable 'inflight' to be zero. If app just waits these deferred reqs and does not wake up io_sq_thread again, then hang happens. For app that entirely relies on io_sq_thread to poll completed requests, let io_iopoll_req_issued() wake up io_sq_thread properly when adding new element to poll_list, and when io_sq_thread prepares to sleep, check whether poll_list is empty again, if not empty, continue to poll. Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-24io_uring: fix personality idr leakJens Axboe1-0/+1
We somehow never free the idr, even though we init it for every ctx. Free it when the rest of the ring data is freed. Fixes: 071698e13ac6 ("io_uring: allow registering credentials") Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-23io_uring: handle multiple personalities in link chainsJens Axboe1-10/+15
If we have a chain of requests and they don't all use the same credentials, then the head of the chain will be issued with the credentails of the tail of the chain. Ensure __io_queue_sqe() overrides the credentials, if they are different. Once we do that, we can clean up the creds handling as well, by only having io_submit_sqe() do the lookup of a personality. It doesn't need to assign it, since __io_queue_sqe() now always does the right thing. Fixes: 75c6a03904e0 ("io_uring: support using a registered personality for commands") Reported-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-23Merge tag 'for-5.6-rc2-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds7-10/+44
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "These are fixes that were found during testing with help of error injection, plus some other stable material. There's a fixup to patch added to rc1 causing locking in wrong context warnings, tests found one more deadlock scenario. The patches are tagged for stable, two of them now in the queue but we'd like all three released at the same time. I'm not happy about fixes to fixes in such a fast succession during rcs, but I hope we found all the fallouts of commit 28553fa992cb ('Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap')" * tag 'for-5.6-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: Btrfs: fix deadlock during fast fsync when logging prealloc extents beyond eof Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents btrfs: fix bytes_may_use underflow in prealloc error condtition btrfs: handle logged extent failure properly btrfs: do not check delayed items are empty for single transaction cleanup btrfs: reset fs_root to NULL on error in open_ctree btrfs: destroy qgroup extent records on transaction abort
2020-02-23Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of ↵Linus Torvalds10-108/+256
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o: "More miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes (all stable fodder)" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: fix mount failure with quota configured as module jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when clearing block group bits ext4: fix race between writepages and enabling EXT4_EXTENTS_FL ext4: rename s_journal_flag_rwsem to s_writepages_rwsem ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and access ext4: fix potential race between s_group_info online resizing and access ext4: fix potential race between online resizing and write operations ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry() ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize
2020-02-22Merge tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds1-35/+30
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe: "Here's a small collection of fixes that were queued up: - Remove unnecessary NULL check (Dan) - Missing io_req_cancelled() call in fallocate (Pavel) - Put the cleanup check for aux data in the right spot (Pavel) - Two fixes for SQPOLL (Stefano, Xiaoguang)" * tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: io_uring: fix __io_iopoll_check deadlock in io_sq_thread io_uring: prevent sq_thread from spinning when it should stop io_uring: fix use-after-free by io_cleanup_req() io_uring: remove unnecessary NULL checks io_uring: add missing io_req_cancelled()
2020-02-22io_uring: fix __io_iopoll_check deadlock in io_sq_threadXiaoguang Wang1-18/+9
Since commit a3a0e43fd770 ("io_uring: don't enter poll loop if we have CQEs pending"), if we already events pending, we won't enter poll loop. In case SETUP_IOPOLL and SETUP_SQPOLL are both enabled, if app has been terminated and don't reap pending events which are already in cq ring, and there are some reqs in poll_list, io_sq_thread will enter __io_iopoll_check(), and find pending events, then return, this loop will never have a chance to exit. I have seen this issue in fio stress tests, to fix this issue, let io_sq_thread call io_iopoll_getevents() with argument 'min' being zero, and remove __io_iopoll_check(). Fixes: a3a0e43fd770 ("io_uring: don't enter poll loop if we have CQEs pending") Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-21ext4: fix mount failure with quota configured as moduleJan Kara1-1/+1
When CONFIG_QFMT_V2 is configured as a module, the test in ext4_feature_set_ok() fails and so mount of filesystems with quota or project features fails. Fix the test to use IS_ENABLED macro which works properly even for modules. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221100835.9332-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: d65d87a07476 ("ext4: improve explanation of a mount failure caused by a misconfigured kernel") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when clearing block group bitswangyan1-2/+6
I found a NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits(). The running environment: kernel version: 4.19 A cluster with two nodes, 5 luns mounted on two nodes, and do some file operations like dd/fallocate/truncate/rm on every lun with storage network disconnection. The fallocate operation on dm-23-45 caused an null pointer dereference. The information of NULL pointer dereference as follows: [577992.878282] JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-23-45. [577992.878290] Aborting journal on device dm-23-45. ... [577992.890778] JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-24-46. [577992.890908] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890916] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_extend_trans:474 ERROR: status = -30 [577992.890918] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890920] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_rotate_tree_right:2500 ERROR: status = -30 [577992.890922] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890924] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_do_insert_extent:4382 ERROR: status = -30 [577992.890928] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_insert_extent:4842 ERROR: status = -30 [577992.890928] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890930] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree:4947 ERROR: status = -30 [577992.890933] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890939] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data [577992.890949] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 [577992.890950] Mem abort info: [577992.890951] ESR = 0x96000004 [577992.890952] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [577992.890952] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [577992.890953] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [577992.890954] Data abort info: [577992.890955] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [577992.890956] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [577992.890958] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000f8da07a9 [577992.890960] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000 [577992.890964] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [577992.890965] Process fallocate (pid: 88392, stack limit = 0x00000000013db2fd) [577992.890968] CPU: 52 PID: 88392 Comm: fallocate Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE 4.19.36 #1 [577992.890969] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDD, BIOS 0.98 08/25/2019 [577992.890971] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [577992.891054] pc : _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x63c/0x968 [ocfs2] [577992.891082] lr : _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x618/0x968 [ocfs2] [577992.891084] sp : ffff0000c8e2b810 [577992.891085] x29: ffff0000c8e2b820 x28: 0000000000000000 [577992.891087] x27: 00000000000006f3 x26: ffffa07957b02e70 [577992.891089] x25: ffff807c59d50000 x24: 00000000000006f2 [577992.891091] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff807bd39abc30 [577992.891093] x21: ffff0000811d9000 x20: ffffa07535d6a000 [577992.891097] x19: ffff000001681638 x18: ffffffffffffffff [577992.891098] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff000080a03df0 [577992.891100] x15: ffff0000811d9708 x14: 203d207375746174 [577992.891101] x13: 73203a524f525245 x12: 20373439343a6565 [577992.891103] x11: 0000000000000038 x10: 0101010101010101 [577992.891106] x9 : ffffa07c68a85d70 x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f [577992.891109] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000080 [577992.891110] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000002 [577992.891112] x3 : ffff000001713390 x2 : 2ff90f88b1c22f00 [577992.891114] x1 : ffff807bd39abc30 x0 : 0000000000000000 [577992.891116] Call trace: [577992.891139] _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x63c/0x968 [ocfs2] [577992.891162] _ocfs2_free_clusters+0x100/0x290 [ocfs2] [577992.891185] ocfs2_free_clusters+0x50/0x68 [ocfs2] [577992.891206] ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x198/0x5e0 [ocfs2] [577992.891227] ocfs2_add_inode_data+0x94/0xc8 [ocfs2] [577992.891248] ocfs2_extend_allocation+0x1bc/0x7a8 [ocfs2] [577992.891269] ocfs2_allocate_extents+0x14c/0x338 [ocfs2] [577992.891290] __ocfs2_change_file_space+0x3f8/0x610 [ocfs2] [577992.891309] ocfs2_fallocate+0xe4/0x128 [ocfs2] [577992.891316] vfs_fallocate+0x11c/0x250 [577992.891317] ksys_fallocate+0x54/0x88 [577992.891319] __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x28/0x38 [577992.891323] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130 [577992.891325] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [577992.891327] el0_svc+0x8/0xc My analysis process as follows: ocfs2_fallocate __ocfs2_change_file_space ocfs2_allocate_extents ocfs2_extend_allocation ocfs2_add_inode_data ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree ocfs2_insert_extent ocfs2_do_insert_extent ocfs2_rotate_tree_right ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction ocfs2_extend_trans jbd2_journal_restart jbd2__journal_restart /* handle->h_transaction is NULL, * is_handle_aborted(handle) is true */ handle->h_transaction = NULL; start_this_handle return -EROFS; ocfs2_free_clusters _ocfs2_free_clusters _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits ocfs2_journal_access_gd __ocfs2_journal_access jbd2_journal_get_undo_access /* I think jbd2_write_access_granted() will * return true, because do_get_write_access() * will return -EROFS. */ if (jbd2_write_access_granted(...)) return 0; do_get_write_access /* handle->h_transaction is NULL, it will * return -EROFS here, so do_get_write_access() * was not called. */ if (is_handle_aborted(handle)) return -EROFS; /* bh2jh(group_bh) is NULL, caused NULL pointer dereference */ undo_bg = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *) bh2jh(group_bh)->b_committed_data; If handle->h_transaction == NULL, then jbd2_write_access_granted() does not really guarantee that journal_head will stay around, not even speaking of its b_committed_data. The bh2jh(group_bh) can be removed after ocfs2_journal_access_gd() and before call "bh2jh(group_bh)->b_committed_data". So, we should move is_handle_aborted() check from do_get_write_access() into jbd2_journal_get_undo_access() and jbd2_journal_get_write_access() before the call to jbd2_write_access_granted(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f72a623f-b3f1-381a-d91d-d22a1c83a336@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yan Wang <wangyan122@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21ext4: fix race between writepages and enabling EXT4_EXTENTS_FLEric Biggers2-9/+23
If EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is set on an inode while ext4_writepages() is running on it, the following warning in ext4_add_complete_io() can be hit: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at fs/ext4/page-io.c:234 ext4_put_io_end_defer+0xf0/0x120 Here's a minimal reproducer (not 100% reliable) (root isn't required): while true; do sync done & while true; do rm -f file touch file chattr -e file echo X >> file chattr +e file done The problem is that in ext4_writepages(), ext4_should_dioread_nolock() (which only returns true on extent-based files) is checked once to set the number of reserved journal credits, and also again later to select the flags for ext4_map_blocks() and copy the reserved journal handle to ext4_io_end::handle. But if EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is being concurrently set, the first check can see dioread_nolock disabled while the later one can see it enabled, causing the reserved handle to unexpectedly be NULL. Since changing EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is uncommon, and there may be other races related to doing so as well, fix this by synchronizing changing EXT4_EXTENTS_FL with ext4_writepages() via the existing s_writepages_rwsem (previously called s_journal_flag_rwsem). This was originally reported by syzbot without a reproducer at https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2202a584a00fffd19fbf, but now that dioread_nolock is the default I also started seeing this when running syzkaller locally. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+2202a584a00fffd19fbf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6b523df4fb5a ("ext4: use transaction reservation for extent conversion in ext4_end_io") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21ext4: rename s_journal_flag_rwsem to s_writepages_rwsemEric Biggers3-11/+11
In preparation for making s_journal_flag_rwsem synchronize ext4_writepages() with changes to both the EXTENTS and JOURNAL_DATA flags (rather than just JOURNAL_DATA as it does currently), rename it to s_writepages_rwsem. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and accessSuraj Jitindar Singh5-37/+76
During an online resize an array of s_flex_groups structures gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array and this memory has been reused then this can lead to an invalid memory access. The s_flex_group array has been converted into an array of pointers rather than an array of structures. This is to ensure that the information contained in the structures cannot get out of sync during a resize due to an accessor updating the value in the old structure after it has been copied but before the array pointer is updated. Since the structures them- selves are no longer copied but only the pointers to them this case is mitigated. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-4-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21io_uring: prevent sq_thread from spinning when it should stopStefano Garzarella1-12/+12
This patch drops 'cur_mm' before calling cond_resched(), to prevent the sq_thread from spinning even when the user process is finished. Before this patch, if the user process ended without closing the io_uring fd, the sq_thread continues to spin until the 'sq_thread_idle' timeout ends. In the worst case where the 'sq_thread_idle' parameter is bigger than INT_MAX, the sq_thread will spin forever. Fixes: 6c271ce2f1d5 ("io_uring: add submission polling") Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-21Btrfs: fix deadlock during fast fsync when logging prealloc extents beyond eofFilipe Manana1-5/+5
While logging the prealloc extents of an inode during a fast fsync we call btrfs_truncate_inode_items(), through btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(), while holding a read lock on a leaf of the inode's root (not the log root, the fs/subvol root), and then that function locks the file range in the inode's iotree. This can lead to a deadlock when: * the fsync is ranged * the file has prealloc extents beyond eof * writeback for a range different from the fsync range starts during the fsync * the size of the file is not sector size aligned Because when finishing an ordered extent we lock first a file range and then try to COW the fs/subvol tree to insert an extent item. The following diagram shows how the deadlock can happen. CPU 1 CPU 2 btrfs_sync_file() --> for range [0, 1MiB) --> inode has a size of 1MiB and has 1 prealloc extent beyond the i_size, starting at offset 4MiB flushes all delalloc for the range [0MiB, 1MiB) and waits for the respective ordered extents to complete --> before task at CPU 1 locks the inode, a write into file range [1MiB, 2MiB + 1KiB) is made --> i_size is updated to 2MiB + 1KiB --> writeback is started for that range, [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) --> end offset rounded up to be sector size aligned btrfs_log_dentry_safe() btrfs_log_inode_parent() btrfs_log_inode() btrfs_log_changed_extents() btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() --> does a search on the inode's root --> holds a read lock on leaf X btrfs_finish_ordered_io() --> locks range [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) --> end offset rounded up to be sector size aligned --> tries to cow leaf X, through insert_reserved_file_extent() --> already locked by the task at CPU 1 btrfs_truncate_inode_items() --> gets an i_size of 2MiB + 1KiB, which is not sector size aligned --> tries to lock file range [2MiB, (u64)-1) --> the start range is rounded down from 2MiB + 1K to 2MiB to be sector size aligned --> but the subrange [2MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) is already locked by task at CPU 2 which is waiting to get a write lock on leaf X for which we are holding a read lock *** deadlock *** This results in a stack trace like the following, triggered by test case generic/561 from fstests: [ 2779.973608] INFO: task kworker/u8:6:247 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 2779.979536] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1 [ 2779.984503] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 2779.990136] kworker/u8:6 D 0 247 2 0x80004000 [ 2779.990457] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [ 2779.990466] Call Trace: [ 2779.990491] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30 [ 2779.990521] schedule+0x33/0xe0 [ 2779.990616] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x19e/0x2e0 [btrfs] [ 2779.990632] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60 [ 2779.990730] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x2f/0x40 [btrfs] [ 2779.990782] btrfs_search_slot+0x510/0x1000 [btrfs] [ 2779.990869] btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs] [ 2779.990944] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x161/0x1060 [btrfs] [ 2779.990987] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xc0 [ 2779.990994] ? __slab_alloc.isra.49+0x99/0x100 [ 2779.991060] ? insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x64/0x300 [btrfs] [ 2779.991145] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x97/0x300 [btrfs] [ 2779.991222] ? start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs] [ 2779.991291] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4f4/0x840 [btrfs] [ 2779.991405] btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs] [ 2779.991432] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0 [ 2779.991460] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0 [ 2779.991481] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 2779.991489] kthread+0x103/0x140 [ 2779.991499] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 2779.991515] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 (...) [ 2780.026211] INFO: task fsstress:17375 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 2780.027480] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1 [ 2780.028482] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 2780.030035] fsstress D 0 17375 17373 0x00004000 [ 2780.030038] Call Trace: [ 2780.030044] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30 [ 2780.030052] schedule+0x33/0xe0 [ 2780.030075] lock_extent_bits+0x20c/0x320 [btrfs] [ 2780.030094] ? btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0xf4/0x1150 [btrfs] [ 2780.030098] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x59/0xa0 [ 2780.030102] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60 [ 2780.030122] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x133/0x1150 [btrfs] [ 2780.030151] ? btrfs_set_path_blocking+0xb2/0x160 [btrfs] [ 2780.030165] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x379/0x1000 [btrfs] [ 2780.030195] btrfs_log_changed_extents.isra.8+0x841/0x93e [btrfs] [ 2780.030202] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0 [ 2780.030215] ? btrfs_get_num_csums+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] [ 2780.030239] btrfs_log_inode+0xf83/0x1124 [btrfs] [ 2780.030251] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 [ 2780.030275] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x2a0/0xe40 [btrfs] [ 2780.030282] ? dget_parent+0xa1/0x370 [ 2780.030309] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs] [ 2780.030329] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x490 [btrfs] [ 2780.030339] do_fsync+0x38/0x60 [ 2780.030343] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 [ 2780.030345] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280 [ 2780.030348] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 2780.030356] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f6d5f0 [ 2780.030361] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 2780.030362] RSP: 002b:00007ffdba3c8548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b [ 2780.030364] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2d80f6d5f0 [ 2780.030365] RDX: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RSI: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2780.030367] RBP: 000000000000004a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdba3c855c [ 2780.030368] R10: 0000000000000078 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4 [ 2780.030369] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007ffdba3c85f0 R15: 0000557a49220d90 So fix this by making btrfs_truncate_inode_items() not lock the range in the inode's iotree when the target root is a log root, since it's not needed to lock the range for log roots as the protection from the inode's lock and log_mutex are all that's needed. Fixes: 28553fa992cb28 ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-21ext4: fix potential race between s_group_info online resizing and accessSuraj Jitindar Singh2-21/+39
During an online resize an array of pointers to s_group_info gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array in ext4_get_group_info() and this memory has been reused then this can lead to an invalid memory access. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-3-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-21ext4: fix potential race between online resizing and write operationsTheodore Ts'o4-25/+97
During an online resize an array of pointers to buffer heads gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a racing block allocation or deallocation which uses the old array, and the old array has gotten reused this can lead to a GPF or some other random kernel memory getting modified. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-2-tytso@mit.edu Reported-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-19ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry()Shijie Luo1-0/+1
We tested a soft lockup problem in linux 4.19 which could also be found in linux 5.x. When dir inode takes up a large number of blocks, and if the directory is growing when we are searching, it's possible the restart branch could be called many times, and the do while loop could hold cpu a long time. Here is the call trace in linux 4.19. [ 473.756186] Call trace: [ 473.756196] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198 [ 473.756199] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 473.756205] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc [ 473.756210] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8 [ 473.756215] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358 [ 473.756217] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8 [ 473.756222] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58 [ 473.756226] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248 [ 473.756231] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50 [ 473.756234] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0 [ 473.756236] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150 [ 473.756238] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 [ 473.756286] ext4_es_lookup_extent+0xdc/0x258 [ext4] [ 473.756310] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4] [ 473.756333] ext4_getblk+0x6c/0x1d0 [ext4] [ 473.756356] ext4_bread_batch+0x7c/0x1f8 [ext4] [ 473.756379] ext4_find_entry+0x124/0x3f8 [ext4] [ 473.756402] ext4_lookup+0x8c/0x258 [ext4] [ 473.756407] __lookup_hash+0x8c/0xe8 [ 473.756411] filename_create+0xa0/0x170 [ 473.756413] do_mkdirat+0x6c/0x140 [ 473.756415] __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x28/0x38 [ 473.756419] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130 [ 473.756421] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 473.756423] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 485.755156] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 22s! [tmp:5149] Add cond_resched() to avoid soft lockup and to provide a better system responding. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200215080206.13293-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-19ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksizeQian Cai2-2/+2
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_write_end [ext4] / ext4_writepages [ext4] write to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 49268 on cpu 127: ext4_write_end+0x4e3/0x750 [ext4] ext4_update_i_disksize at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3032 (inlined by) ext4_update_inode_size at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3046 (inlined by) ext4_write_end at fs/ext4/inode.c:1287 generic_perform_write+0x208/0x2a0 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe read to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 24872 on cpu 37: ext4_writepages+0x10ac/0x1d00 [ext4] mpage_map_and_submit_extent at fs/ext4/inode.c:2468 (inlined by) ext4_writepages at fs/ext4/inode.c:2772 do_writepages+0x5e/0x130 __writeback_single_inode+0xeb/0xb20 writeback_sb_inodes+0x429/0x900 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150 wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x870 wb_workfn+0x6b4/0x960 process_one_work+0x54c/0xbe0 worker_thread+0x80/0x650 kthread+0x1e0/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 37 PID: 24872 Comm: kworker/u261:2 Tainted: G W O L 5.5.0-next-20200204+ #5 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Since only the read is operating as lockless (outside of the "i_data_sem"), load tearing could introduce a logic bug. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE() for the read and WRITE_ONCE() for the write. Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581085751-31793-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org
2020-02-18io_uring: fix use-after-free by io_cleanup_req()Pavel Begunkov1-3/+3
io_cleanup_req() should be called before req->io is freed, and so shouldn't be after __io_free_req() -> __io_req_aux_free(). Also, it will be ignored for in io_free_req_many(), which use __io_req_aux_free(). Place cleanup_req() into __io_req_aux_free(). Fixes: 99bc4c38537d774 ("io_uring: fix iovec leaks") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-19Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extentsFilipe Manana1-1/+6
In btrfs_wait_ordered_range() once we find an ordered extent that has finished with an error we exit the loop and don't wait for any other ordered extents that might be still in progress. All the users of btrfs_wait_ordered_range() expect that there are no more ordered extents in progress after that function returns. So past fixes such like the ones from the two following commits: ff612ba7849964 ("btrfs: fix panic during relocation after ENOSPC before writeback happens") 28aeeac1dd3080 ("Btrfs: fix panic when starting bg cache writeout after IO error") don't work when there are multiple ordered extents in the range. Fix that by making btrfs_wait_ordered_range() wait for all ordered extents even after it finds one that had an error. Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/228#issuecomment-569777554 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-19btrfs: fix bytes_may_use underflow in prealloc error condtitionJosef Bacik1-3/+13
I hit the following warning while running my error injection stress testing: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1453 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:108 btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs] Call Trace: btrfs_free_reserved_data_space+0x4f/0x70 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x378/0x470 [btrfs] elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40 ? elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40 ? btrfs_commit_transaction+0xca/0xa50 [btrfs] ? dput+0xb4/0x2a0 ? btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x55/0x70 [btrfs] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x30e/0x420 [btrfs] ? do_fsync+0x38/0x70 ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This happens if we fail to insert our reserved file extent. At this point we've already converted our reservation from ->bytes_may_use to ->bytes_reserved. However once we break we will attempt to free everything from [cur_offset, end] from ->bytes_may_use, but our extent reservation will overlap part of this. Fix this problem by adding ins.offset (our extent allocation size) to cur_offset so we remove the actual remaining part from ->bytes_may_use. I validated this fix using my inject-error.py script python inject-error.py -o should_fail_bio -t cache_save_setup -t \ __btrfs_prealloc_file_range \ -t insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.0 \ -r "-5" ./run-fsstress.sh where run-fsstress.sh simply mounts and runs fsstress on a disk. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-19btrfs: handle logged extent failure properlyJosef Bacik1-0/+2
If we're allocating a logged extent we attempt to insert an extent record for the file extent directly. We increase space_info->bytes_reserved, because the extent entry addition will call btrfs_update_block_group(), which will convert the ->bytes_reserved to ->bytes_used. However if we fail at any point while inserting the extent entry we will bail and leave space on ->bytes_reserved, which will trigger a WARN_ON() on umount. Fix this by pinning the space if we fail to insert, which is what happens in every other failure case that involves adding the extent entry. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-19btrfs: do not check delayed items are empty for single transaction cleanupJosef Bacik1-1/+0
btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty() will check if the delayed root is completely empty, but this is a filesystem-wide check. On cleanup we may have allowed other transactions to begin, for whatever reason, and thus the delayed root is not empty. So remove this check from cleanup_one_transation(). This however can stay in btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), because it checks only after all of the transactions have been properly cleaned up, and thus is valid. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-19btrfs: reset fs_root to NULL on error in open_ctreeJosef Bacik1-0/+1
While running my error injection script I hit a panic when we tried to clean up the fs_root when freeing the fs_root. This is because fs_info->fs_root == PTR_ERR(-EIO), which isn't great. Fix this by setting fs_info->fs_root = NULL; if we fail to read the root. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-19btrfs: destroy qgroup extent records on transaction abortJeff Mahoney4-0/+17
We clean up the delayed references when we abort a transaction but we leave the pending qgroup extent records behind, leaking memory. This patch destroys the extent records when we destroy the delayed refs and makes sure ensure they're gone before releasing the transaction. Fixes: 3368d001ba5d ("btrfs: qgroup: Record possible quota-related extent for qgroup.") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> [ Rebased to latest upstream, remove to_qgroup() helper, use rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe() wrapper ] Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-18pipe: make sure to wake up everybody when the last reader/writer closesLinus Torvalds1-8/+10
Andrei Vagin reported that commit 0ddad21d3e99 ("pipe: use exclusive waits when reading or writing") broke one of the CRIU tests. He even has a trivial reproducer: #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main() { int p[2]; pid_t p1, p2; int status; if (pipe(p) == -1) return 1; p1 = fork(); if (p1 == 0) { close(p[1]); read(p[0], &status, sizeof(status)); return 0; } p2 = fork(); if (p2 == 0) { close(p[1]); read(p[0], &status, sizeof(status)); return 0; } sleep(1); close(p[1]); wait(&status); wait(&status); return 0; } and the problem - once he points it out - is obvious. We use these nice exclusive waits, but when the last writer goes away, it then needs to wake up _every_ reader (and conversely, the last reader disappearing needs to wake every writer, of course). In fact, when going through this, we had several small oddities around how to wake things. We did in fact wake every reader when we changed the size of the pipe buffers. But that's entirely pointless, since that just acts as a possible source of new space - no new data to read. And when we change the size of the buffer, we don't need to wake all writers even when we add space - that case acts just as if somebody made space by reading, and any writer that finds itself not filling it up entirely will wake the next one. On the other hand, on the exit path, we tried to limit the wakeups with the proper poll keys etc, which is entirely pointless, because at that point we obviously need to wake up everybody. So don't do that: just wake up everybody - but only do that if the counts changed to zero. So fix those non-IO wakeups to be more proper: space change doesn't add any new data, but it might make room for writers, so it wakes up a writer. And the actual changes to reader/writer counts should wake up everybody, since everybody is affected (ie readers will all see EOF if the writers have gone away, and writers will all get EPIPE if all readers have gone away). Fixes: 0ddad21d3e99 ("pipe: use exclusive waits when reading or writing") Reported-and-tested-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-02-18io_uring: remove unnecessary NULL checksDan Carpenter1-2/+2
The "kmsg" pointer can't be NULL and we have already dereferenced it so a check here would be useless. Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-02-17Merge tag 'ecryptfs-5.6-rc3-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds5-6/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs Pull eCryptfs fixes from Tyler Hicks: - downgrade the eCryptfs maintenance status to "Odd Fixes" - change my email address - fix a couple memory leaks in error paths - stability improvement to avoid a needless BUG_ON() * tag 'ecryptfs-5.6-rc3-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs: ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code eCryptfs: Replace deactivated email address MAINTAINERS: eCryptfs: Update maintainer address and downgrade status ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging() ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
2020-02-17Merge tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: "This is the fix for sleeping in a locked section bug reported by Dave Jones, caused by a patch dependence in development and pulled branches. I picked the existing patch over the fixup that Filipe sent, as it's a bit more generic fix. I've verified it with a specific test case, some rsync stress and one round of fstests" * tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: don't set path->leave_spinning for truncate
2020-02-17btrfs: don't set path->leave_spinning for truncateJosef Bacik1-2/+0
The only time we actually leave the path spinning is if we're truncating a small amount and don't actually free an extent, which is not a common occurrence. We have to set the path blocking in order to add the delayed ref anyway, so the first extent we find we set the path to blocking and stay blocking for the duration of the operation. With the upcoming file extent map stuff there will be another case that we have to have the path blocking, so just swap to blocking always. Note: this patch also fixes a warning after 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") got merged that inserts extent locks around truncation so the path must not leave spinning locks after btrfs_search_slot. [70.794783] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:565 [70.794834] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1141, name: rsync [70.794863] 5 locks held by rsync/1141: [70.794876] #0: ffff888417b9c408 (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [70.795030] #1: ffff888428de28e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#13/1){+.+.}, at: lock_rename+0xf1/0x100 [70.795051] #2: ffff888417b9c608 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x394/0x560 [70.795124] #3: ffff888403081768 (btrfs-fs-01){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795203] #4: ffff888403086568 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795222] CPU: 5 PID: 1141 Comm: rsync Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-backup+ #2 [70.795362] Call Trace: [70.795374] dump_stack+0x71/0xa0 [70.795445] ___might_sleep.part.96.cold.106+0xa6/0xb6 [70.795459] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d3/0x290 [70.795471] alloc_extent_state+0x22/0x1c0 [70.795544] __clear_extent_bit+0x3ba/0x580 [70.795557] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 [70.795569] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x339/0xe50 [70.795647] btrfs_evict_inode+0x269/0x540 [70.795659] ? dput.part.38+0x29/0x460 [70.795671] evict+0xcd/0x190 [70.795682] __dentry_kill+0xd6/0x180 [70.795754] dput.part.38+0x2ad/0x460 [70.795765] do_renameat2+0x3cb/0x540 [70.795777] __x64_sys_rename+0x1c/0x20 Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Fixes: 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
2020-02-16Merge tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of ↵Linus Torvalds7-1/+44
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "Two races fixed, memory leak fix, sysfs directory fixup and two new log messages: - two fixed race conditions: extent map merging and truncate vs fiemap - create the right sysfs directory with device information and move the individual device dirs under it - print messages when the tree-log is replayed at mount time or cannot be replayed on remount" * tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: sysfs, move device id directories to UUID/devinfo btrfs: sysfs, add UUID/devinfo kobject Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leaks
2020-02-16Merge tag '5.6-rc1-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6Linus Torvalds5-6/+44
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French: "Four small CIFS/SMB3 fixes. One (the EA overflow fix) for stable" * tag '5.6-rc1-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: cifs: make sure we do not overflow the max EA buffer size cifs: enable change notification for SMB2.1 dialect cifs: Fix mode output in debugging statements cifs: fix mount option display for sec=krb5i
2020-02-16Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of ↵Linus Torvalds9-63/+86
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes (all stable fodder)" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: improve explanation of a mount failure caused by a misconfigured kernel jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer() ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inode ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs ext4: fix support for inode sizes > 1024 bytes ext4: simplify checking quota limits in ext4_statfs() ext4: don't assume that mmp_nodename/bdevname have NUL
2020-02-16io_uring: add missing io_req_cancelled()Pavel Begunkov1-0/+4
fallocate_finish() is missing cancellation check. Add it. It's safe to do that, as only flags setup and sqe fields copy are done before it gets into __io_fallocate(). Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-01 19:40:18 +0000