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author | Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk> | 2015-10-26 09:10:41 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2015-11-23 17:54:39 +0100 |
commit | 7f495ad946a6be7bd78df752fad3a084d2710ee2 (patch) | |
tree | 0bc344233e02bff6e215942f6db420d73bdda901 /net | |
parent | 052a4bc49de9f959682140a200e7bcff98ca2cdf (diff) | |
download | linux-rpi-7f495ad946a6be7bd78df752fad3a084d2710ee2.tar.gz linux-rpi-7f495ad946a6be7bd78df752fad3a084d2710ee2.tar.bz2 linux-rpi-7f495ad946a6be7bd78df752fad3a084d2710ee2.zip |
netfilter-bridge: use netdev style comments
Changes comments to use netdev style.
No changes detected by objdiff.
Signed-off-by: Ian Morris <ipm@chirality.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_vlan.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 84 |
3 files changed, 56 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c index 0ad639a96142..f22284d8a454 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c @@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ ebt_log_packet(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf, unsigned int hooknum, ntohs(ah->ar_op)); /* If it's for Ethernet and the lengths are OK, - * then log the ARP payload */ + * then log the ARP payload + */ if (ah->ar_hrd == htons(1) && ah->ar_hln == ETH_ALEN && ah->ar_pln == sizeof(__be32)) { diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_vlan.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_vlan.c index 618568888128..98c221dbf059 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_vlan.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_vlan.c @@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ ebt_vlan_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) * - Canonical Format Indicator (CFI). The Canonical Format Indicator * (CFI) is a single bit flag value. Currently ignored. * - VLAN Identifier (VID). The VID is encoded as - * an unsigned binary number. */ + * an unsigned binary number. + */ id = TCI & VLAN_VID_MASK; prio = (TCI >> 13) & 0x7; @@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ static int ebt_vlan_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) } /* Check for bitmask range - * True if even one bit is out of mask */ + * True if even one bit is out of mask + */ if (info->bitmask & ~EBT_VLAN_MASK) { pr_debug("bitmask %2X is out of mask (%2X)\n", info->bitmask, EBT_VLAN_MASK); @@ -117,7 +119,8 @@ static int ebt_vlan_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) * 0 - The null VLAN ID. * 1 - The default Port VID (PVID) * 0x0FFF - Reserved for implementation use. - * if_vlan.h: VLAN_N_VID 4096. */ + * if_vlan.h: VLAN_N_VID 4096. + */ if (GET_BITMASK(EBT_VLAN_ID)) { if (!!info->id) { /* if id!=0 => check vid range */ if (info->id > VLAN_N_VID) { @@ -128,7 +131,8 @@ static int ebt_vlan_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) /* Note: This is valid VLAN-tagged frame point. * Any value of user_priority are acceptable, * but should be ignored according to 802.1Q Std. - * So we just drop the prio flag. */ + * So we just drop the prio flag. + */ info->bitmask &= ~EBT_VLAN_PRIO; } /* Else, id=0 (null VLAN ID) => user_priority range (any?) */ @@ -143,7 +147,8 @@ static int ebt_vlan_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) } /* Check for encapsulated proto range - it is possible to be * any value for u_short range. - * if_ether.h: ETH_ZLEN 60 - Min. octets in frame sans FCS */ + * if_ether.h: ETH_ZLEN 60 - Min. octets in frame sans FCS + */ if (GET_BITMASK(EBT_VLAN_ENCAP)) { if ((unsigned short) ntohs(info->encap) < ETH_ZLEN) { pr_debug("encap frame length %d is less than " diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 2a0b2f67dad6..62090e273aed 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ "report to author: "format, ## args) /* #define BUGPRINT(format, args...) */ -/* - * Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in +/* Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in * the softirq * For reading or updating the counters, the user context needs to * get a write_lock @@ -237,7 +236,8 @@ unsigned int ebt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, (*(counter_base + i)).bcnt += skb->len; /* these should only watch: not modify, nor tell us - what to do with the packet */ + * what to do with the packet + */ EBT_WATCHER_ITERATE(point, ebt_do_watcher, skb, &acpar); t = (struct ebt_entry_target *) @@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const struct ebt_replace *repl, if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS || !(e->bitmask & EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES)) { if (e->bitmask != 0) { /* we make userspace set this right, - so there is no misunderstanding */ + * so there is no misunderstanding + */ BUGPRINT("EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES shouldn't be set " "in distinguisher\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -487,8 +488,7 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const struct ebt_replace *repl, return 0; } -/* - * this one is very careful, as it is the first function +/* this one is very careful, as it is the first function * to parse the userspace data */ static inline int @@ -504,10 +504,12 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const struct ebt_entry *e, break; } /* beginning of a new chain - if i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS it must be a user defined chain */ + * if i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS it must be a user defined chain + */ if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS || !e->bitmask) { /* this checks if the previous chain has as many entries - as it said it has */ + * as it said it has + */ if (*n != *cnt) { BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries " "in the chain\n"); @@ -556,8 +558,7 @@ struct ebt_cl_stack unsigned int hookmask; }; -/* - * we need these positions to check that the jumps to a different part of the +/* We need these positions to check that the jumps to a different part of the * entries is a jump to the beginning of a new chain. */ static inline int @@ -687,7 +688,8 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, struct net *net, break; } /* (1 << NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) tells the check functions the rule is on - a base chain */ + * a base chain + */ if (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) hookmask = (1 << hook) | (1 << NF_BR_NUMHOOKS); else { @@ -758,8 +760,7 @@ cleanup_matches: return ret; } -/* - * checks for loops and sets the hook mask for udc +/* checks for loops and sets the hook mask for udc * the hook mask for udc tells us from which base chains the udc can be * accessed. This mask is a parameter to the check() functions of the extensions */ @@ -853,7 +854,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, return -EINVAL; } /* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order - as their corresponding hooks */ + * as their corresponding hooks + */ for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) { if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j]) continue; @@ -868,7 +870,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, i = 0; /* holds the expected nr. of entries for the chain */ j = 0; /* holds the up to now counted entries for the chain */ k = 0; /* holds the total nr. of entries, should equal - newinfo->nentries afterwards */ + * newinfo->nentries afterwards + */ udc_cnt = 0; /* will hold the nr. of user defined chains (udc) */ ret = EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(newinfo->entries, newinfo->entries_size, ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks, newinfo, @@ -888,10 +891,12 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, } /* get the location of the udc, put them in an array - while we're at it, allocate the chainstack */ + * while we're at it, allocate the chainstack + */ if (udc_cnt) { /* this will get free'd in do_replace()/ebt_register_table() - if an error occurs */ + * if an error occurs + */ newinfo->chainstack = vmalloc(nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack))); if (!newinfo->chainstack) @@ -932,14 +937,15 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, } /* we now know the following (along with E=mc²): - - the nr of entries in each chain is right - - the size of the allocated space is right - - all valid hooks have a corresponding chain - - there are no loops - - wrong data can still be on the level of a single entry - - could be there are jumps to places that are not the - beginning of a chain. This can only occur in chains that - are not accessible from any base chains, so we don't care. */ + * - the nr of entries in each chain is right + * - the size of the allocated space is right + * - all valid hooks have a corresponding chain + * - there are no loops + * - wrong data can still be on the level of a single entry + * - could be there are jumps to places that are not the + * beginning of a chain. This can only occur in chains that + * are not accessible from any base chains, so we don't care. + */ /* used to know what we need to clean up if something goes wrong */ i = 0; @@ -986,7 +992,8 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl, struct ebt_table *t; /* the user wants counters back - the check on the size is done later, when we have the lock */ + * the check on the size is done later, when we have the lock + */ if (repl->num_counters) { unsigned long size = repl->num_counters * sizeof(*counterstmp); counterstmp = vmalloc(size); @@ -1038,9 +1045,10 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl, write_unlock_bh(&t->lock); mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex); /* so, a user can change the chains while having messed up her counter - allocation. Only reason why this is done is because this way the lock - is held only once, while this doesn't bring the kernel into a - dangerous state. */ + * allocation. Only reason why this is done is because this way the lock + * is held only once, while this doesn't bring the kernel into a + * dangerous state. + */ if (repl->num_counters && copy_to_user(repl->counters, counterstmp, repl->num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter))) { @@ -1348,7 +1356,8 @@ static inline int ebt_make_matchname(const struct ebt_entry_match *m, char name[EBT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN] = {}; /* ebtables expects 32 bytes long names but xt_match names are 29 bytes - long. Copy 29 bytes and fill remaining bytes with zeroes. */ + * long. Copy 29 bytes and fill remaining bytes with zeroes. + */ strlcpy(name, m->u.match->name, sizeof(name)); if (copy_to_user(hlp, name, EBT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN)) return -EFAULT; @@ -1595,8 +1604,7 @@ static int ebt_compat_entry_padsize(void) static int ebt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match, unsigned int userlen) { - /* - * ebt_among needs special handling. The kernel .matchsize is + /* ebt_among needs special handling. The kernel .matchsize is * set to -1 at registration time; at runtime an EBT_ALIGN()ed * value is expected. * Example: userspace sends 4500, ebt_among.c wants 4504. @@ -1966,8 +1974,7 @@ static int compat_mtw_from_user(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *mwt, return off + match_size; } -/* - * return size of all matches, watchers or target, including necessary +/* return size of all matches, watchers or target, including necessary * alignment and padding. */ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32, @@ -2070,8 +2077,7 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base, if (ret < 0) return ret; buf_start = (char *) entry; - /* - * 0: matches offset, always follows ebt_entry. + /* 0: matches offset, always follows ebt_entry. * 1: watchers offset, from ebt_entry structure * 2: target offset, from ebt_entry structure * 3: next ebt_entry offset, from ebt_entry structure @@ -2115,8 +2121,7 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base, return 0; } -/* - * repl->entries_size is the size of the ebt_entry blob in userspace. +/* repl->entries_size is the size of the ebt_entry blob in userspace. * It might need more memory when copied to a 64 bit kernel in case * userspace is 32-bit. So, first task: find out how much memory is needed. * @@ -2360,8 +2365,7 @@ static int compat_do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, break; case EBT_SO_GET_ENTRIES: case EBT_SO_GET_INIT_ENTRIES: - /* - * try real handler first in case of userland-side padding. + /* try real handler first in case of userland-side padding. * in case we are dealing with an 'ordinary' 32 bit binary * without 64bit compatibility padding, this will fail right * after copy_from_user when the *len argument is validated. |