diff options
| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2022-01-31 18:23:58 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2022-02-01 20:21:10 -0800 |
| commit | e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9 (patch) | |
| tree | 6de2e6b00a83cddc31fe8089aa93fa9b5df593cf /net/packet | |
| parent | c6f6f2444bdbe0079e41914a35081530d0409963 (diff) | |
| download | linux-riscv-e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9.tar.gz linux-riscv-e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9.tar.bz2 linux-riscv-e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9.zip | |
af_packet: fix data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt
When packet_setsockopt( PACKET_FANOUT_DATA ) reads po->fanout,
no lock is held, meaning that another thread can change po->fanout.
Given that po->fanout can only be set once during the socket lifetime
(it is only cleared from fanout_release()), we can use
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt
write to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14653 on cpu 0:
fanout_add net/packet/af_packet.c:1791 [inline]
packet_setsockopt+0x22fe/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3931
__sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14654 on cpu 1:
packet_setsockopt+0x691/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3935
__sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff888106f8c000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14654 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 47dceb8ecdc1 ("packet: add classic BPF fanout mode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201022358.330621-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/packet')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/packet/af_packet.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 85ea7ddb48db..ab87f22cc7ec 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1789,7 +1789,10 @@ static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, struct fanout_args *args) err = -ENOSPC; if (refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) < match->max_num_members) { __dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook); - po->fanout = match; + + /* Paired with packet_setsockopt(PACKET_FANOUT_DATA) */ + WRITE_ONCE(po->fanout, match); + po->rollover = rollover; rollover = NULL; refcount_set(&match->sk_ref, refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) + 1); @@ -3934,7 +3937,8 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sockptr_t optval, } case PACKET_FANOUT_DATA: { - if (!po->fanout) + /* Paired with the WRITE_ONCE() in fanout_add() */ + if (!READ_ONCE(po->fanout)) return -EINVAL; return fanout_set_data(po, optval, optlen); |