From 4610d240d691768203fdd210a5da0a2e02eddb76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Durrant Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 17:03:24 +0000 Subject: xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT The purpose if this ioctl is to allow a user of privcmd to restrict its operation such that it will no longer service arbitrary hypercalls via IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL, and will check for a matching domid when servicing IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP or IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP*. The aim of this is to limit the attack surface for a compromised device model. Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky --- drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c index 1a6f1860e008..2077a3ac7c0c 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c @@ -56,16 +56,25 @@ module_param_named(dm_op_buf_max_size, privcmd_dm_op_buf_max_size, uint, MODULE_PARM_DESC(dm_op_buf_max_size, "Maximum size of a dm_op hypercall buffer"); +struct privcmd_data { + domid_t domid; +}; + static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped( struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, unsigned long nr_pages); -static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(void __user *udata) +static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(struct file *file, void __user *udata) { + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; struct privcmd_hypercall hypercall; long ret; + /* Disallow arbitrary hypercalls if restricted */ + if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID) + return -EPERM; + if (copy_from_user(&hypercall, udata, sizeof(hypercall))) return -EFAULT; @@ -242,8 +251,9 @@ static int mmap_gfn_range(void *data, void *state) return 0; } -static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata) +static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(struct file *file, void __user *udata) { + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; struct privcmd_mmap mmapcmd; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct *vma; @@ -258,6 +268,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata) if (copy_from_user(&mmapcmd, udata, sizeof(mmapcmd))) return -EFAULT; + /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */ + if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != mmapcmd.dom) + return -EPERM; + rc = gather_array(&pagelist, mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry), mmapcmd.entry); @@ -429,8 +443,10 @@ static int alloc_empty_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int numpgs) static const struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops; -static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version) +static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch( + struct file *file, void __user *udata, int version) { + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; int ret; struct privcmd_mmapbatch_v2 m; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; @@ -459,6 +475,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata, int version) return -EINVAL; } + /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */ + if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != m.dom) + return -EPERM; + nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(m.num, XEN_PFN_PER_PAGE); if ((m.num <= 0) || (nr_pages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT))) return -EINVAL; @@ -603,8 +623,9 @@ static void unlock_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned int nr_pages) } } -static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata) +static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(struct file *file, void __user *udata) { + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; struct privcmd_dm_op kdata; struct privcmd_dm_op_buf *kbufs; unsigned int nr_pages = 0; @@ -616,6 +637,10 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(void __user *udata) if (copy_from_user(&kdata, udata, sizeof(kdata))) return -EFAULT; + /* If restriction is in place, check the domid matches */ + if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != kdata.dom) + return -EPERM; + if (kdata.num == 0) return 0; @@ -683,6 +708,23 @@ out: return rc; } +static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata) +{ + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; + domid_t dom; + + if (copy_from_user(&dom, udata, sizeof(dom))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Set restriction to the specified domain, or check it matches */ + if (data->domid == DOMID_INVALID) + data->domid = dom; + else if (data->domid != dom) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data) { @@ -691,23 +733,27 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, switch (cmd) { case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(udata); + ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(file, udata); break; case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(udata); + ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(file, udata); break; case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 1); + ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 1); break; case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH_V2: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata, 2); + ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(file, udata, 2); break; case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_DM_OP: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(udata); + ret = privcmd_ioctl_dm_op(file, udata); + break; + + case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_RESTRICT: + ret = privcmd_ioctl_restrict(file, udata); break; default: @@ -717,6 +763,28 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, return ret; } +static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file) +{ + struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */ + data->domid = DOMID_INVALID; + + file->private_data = data; + return 0; +} + +static int privcmd_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file) +{ + struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data; + + kfree(data); + return 0; +} + static void privcmd_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct page **pages = vma->vm_private_data; @@ -785,6 +853,8 @@ static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped( const struct file_operations xen_privcmd_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .unlocked_ioctl = privcmd_ioctl, + .open = privcmd_open, + .release = privcmd_release, .mmap = privcmd_mmap, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_privcmd_fops); -- cgit v1.2.3