From d4f65b5d2497b2fd9c45f06b71deb4ab084a5b66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 13:06:29 +0100 Subject: KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: David Howells --- Documentation/security/keys.txt | 50 +++++++++++++- fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 6 +- fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 8 +-- include/keys/user-type.h | 6 +- include/linux/key-type.h | 35 +++++++++- net/ceph/crypto.c | 9 +-- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 6 +- net/rxrpc/ar-key.c | 40 +++++------ security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 16 +++-- security/keys/key.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++-- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 8 +-- security/keys/trusted.c | 16 +++-- security/keys/user_defined.c | 14 ++-- 15 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index aa0dbd74b71..7d9ca92022d 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ The main syscalls are: to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process does not have permission to write to the keyring. + If the key type supports it, if the description is NULL or an empty + string, the key type will try and generate a description from the content + of the payload. + The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty payload. @@ -1114,12 +1118,53 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: it should return 0. - (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); + (*) int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + This optional method permits the key type to attempt to parse payload + before a key is created (add key) or the key semaphore is taken (update or + instantiate key). The structure pointed to by prep looks like: + + struct key_preparsed_payload { + char *description; + void *type_data[2]; + void *payload; + const void *data; + size_t datalen; + size_t quotalen; + }; + + Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with + the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default + quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared. + + If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be + attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the + key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". + + The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These + are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. + + The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code + otherwise. + + + (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, + otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the + description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload + struct as filled in by the preparse() method. + + + (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction. The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this function. + The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload + blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. + If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called. @@ -1135,6 +1180,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided. It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided. + The prep->data and prep->datalen fields will define the original payload + blob. If preparse() was supplied then other fields may be filled in also. + key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c index e622863b292..086f381d648 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c @@ -31,18 +31,18 @@ /* create a new cifs key */ static int -cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { char *payload; int ret; ret = -ENOMEM; - payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) goto error; /* attach the data */ - memcpy(payload, data, datalen); + memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); key->payload.data = payload; ret = 0; diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index 05f4dc263a2..f3c60e264ca 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -167,17 +167,17 @@ static struct shrinker cifs_shrinker = { }; static int -cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { char *payload; - payload = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + payload = kmalloc(prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(payload, data, datalen); + memcpy(payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); key->payload.data = payload; - key->datalen = datalen; + key->datalen = prep->datalen; return 0; } diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index bc9ec1d7698..5e452c84f1e 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ struct user_key_payload { extern struct key_type key_type_user; extern struct key_type key_type_logon; -extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); -extern int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); +struct key_preparsed_payload; + +extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion); extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index f0c651cda7b..518a53afb9e 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_construction { struct key *authkey;/* authorisation for key being constructed */ }; +/* + * Pre-parsed payload, used by key add, update and instantiate. + * + * This struct will be cleared and data and datalen will be set with the data + * and length parameters from the caller and quotalen will be set from + * def_datalen from the key type. Then if the preparse() op is provided by the + * key type, that will be called. Then the struct will be passed to the + * instantiate() or the update() op. + * + * If the preparse() op is given, the free_preparse() op will be called to + * clear the contents. + */ +struct key_preparsed_payload { + char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */ + void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */ + void *payload; /* Proposed payload */ + const void *data; /* Raw data */ + size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ + size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ +}; + typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, const char *op, void *aux); @@ -45,18 +66,28 @@ struct key_type { /* vet a description */ int (*vet_description)(const char *description); + /* Preparse the data blob from userspace that is to be the payload, + * generating a proposed description and payload that will be handed to + * the instantiate() and update() ops. + */ + int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + + /* Free a preparse data structure. + */ + void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + /* instantiate a key of this type * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to determine if the * user's quota will hold the payload */ - int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); + int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); /* update a key of this type (optional) * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to recalculate the * quota consumption * - the key must be locked against read when modifying */ - int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); + int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); /* match a key against a description */ int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc); diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c index 9da7fdd3cd8..af14cb42516 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c @@ -423,14 +423,15 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, } } -int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; void *p; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto err; ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); @@ -443,8 +444,8 @@ int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) goto err; /* TODO ceph_crypto_key_decode should really take const input */ - p = (void *)data; - ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)data+datalen); + p = (void *)prep->data; + ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)prep->data+datalen); if (ret < 0) goto err_ckey; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index d9507dd0581..859ab8b6ec3 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; * "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar" */ static int -dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *_data, size_t datalen) +dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload; unsigned long derrno; int ret; - size_t result_len = 0; - const char *data = _data, *end, *opt; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0; + const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt; kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu", key->serial, key->description, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c index 8b1f9f49960..106c5a6b1ab 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ #include "ar-internal.h" static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *); -static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); -static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, const void *, size_t); +static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ error: * * if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1; struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp; @@ -686,26 +686,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) u32 kver; int ret; - _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); + _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); /* handle a no-security key */ - if (!data && datalen == 0) + if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0) return 0; /* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */ - if (datalen > 7 * 4) { - ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, data, datalen); + if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) { + ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen); if (ret != -EPROTO) return ret; } /* get the key interface version number */ ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 4 || !data) + if (prep->datalen <= 4 || !prep->data) goto error; - memcpy(&kver, data, sizeof(kver)); - data += sizeof(kver); - datalen -= sizeof(kver); + memcpy(&kver, prep->data, sizeof(kver)); + prep->data += sizeof(kver); + prep->datalen -= sizeof(kver); _debug("KEY I/F VERSION: %u", kver); @@ -715,11 +715,11 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) /* deal with a version 1 key */ ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen < sizeof(*v1)) + if (prep->datalen < sizeof(*v1)) goto error; - v1 = data; - if (datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) + v1 = prep->data; + if (prep->datalen != sizeof(*v1) + v1->ticket_length) goto error; _debug("SCIX: %u", v1->security_index); @@ -784,17 +784,17 @@ error: * instantiate a server secret key * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, - size_t datalen) +static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct crypto_blkcipher *ci; - _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), datalen); + _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); - if (datalen != 8) + if (prep->datalen != 8) return -EINVAL; - memcpy(&key->type_data, data, 8); + memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8); ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(ci)) { @@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, const void *data, return PTR_ERR(ci); } - if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, data, 8) < 0) + if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0) BUG(); key->payload.data = ci; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 2d1bb8af769..9e1e005c759 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - size_t datalen) +static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; char *datablob = NULL; @@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, char *master_desc = NULL; char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!datablob) return -ENOMEM; datablob[datalen] = 0; - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv); if (ret < 0) @@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; char *buf; char *new_master_desc = NULL; const char *format = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) return -ENOMEM; buf[datalen] = 0; - memcpy(buf, data, datalen); + memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen); ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 50d96d4e06f..1d039af99f5 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -412,8 +412,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); * key_construction_mutex. */ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, - const void *data, - size_t datalen, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey, unsigned long *_prealloc) @@ -431,7 +430,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, /* can't instantiate twice */ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { /* instantiate the key */ - ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen); + ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ @@ -482,22 +481,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey) { + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; unsigned long prealloc; int ret; + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = data; + prep.datalen = datalen; + prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + if (key->type->preparse) { + ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + } + if (keyring) { ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto error_free_preparse; } - ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey, + ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &prealloc); if (keyring) __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); +error_free_preparse: + if (key->type->preparse) + key->type->free_preparse(&prep); +error: return ret; } @@ -706,7 +720,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype) * if we get an error. */ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, - const void *payload, size_t plen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret; @@ -722,7 +736,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, down_write(&key->sem); - ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); + ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); @@ -774,6 +788,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long prealloc; + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key_type *ktype; struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; @@ -789,8 +804,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate) - goto error_2; + if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate || + (!description && !ktype->preparse)) + goto error_put_type; keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); @@ -798,18 +814,37 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) - goto error_2; + goto error_put_type; + + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = payload; + prep.datalen = plen; + prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; + if (ktype->preparse) { + ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_put_type; + } + if (!description) + description = prep.description; + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if (!description) + goto error_free_prep; + } ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_2; + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have * to modify the keyring */ ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE); if (ret < 0) { key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing @@ -840,25 +875,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, perm, flags); if (IS_ERR(key)) { key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ - ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL, - &prealloc); + ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc); if (ret < 0) { key_put(key); key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); - error_3: +error_link_end: __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); - error_2: +error_free_prep: + if (ktype->preparse) + ktype->free_preparse(&prep); +error_put_type: key_type_put(ktype); - error: +error: return key_ref; found_matching_key: @@ -866,10 +903,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned */ __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); - key_type_put(ktype); - key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); - goto error; + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); + goto error_free_prep; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); @@ -888,6 +924,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); */ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) { + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret; @@ -900,18 +937,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) /* attempt to update it if supported */ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (key->type->update) { - down_write(&key->sem); - - ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); - if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + if (!key->type->update) + goto error; - up_write(&key->sem); + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = payload; + prep.datalen = plen; + prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + if (key->type->preparse) { + ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; } - error: + down_write(&key->sem); + + ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); + if (ret == 0) + /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ + clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + + up_write(&key->sem); + + if (key->type->preparse) + key->type->free_preparse(&prep); +error: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 3364fbf4680..505d40be196 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. * + * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to + * generate one from the payload. + * * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. * * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error @@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, if (ret < 0) goto error; - description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); - if (IS_ERR(description)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(description); - goto error; + description = NULL; + if (_description) { + description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(description)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(description); + goto error; + } + if (!*description) { + kfree(description); + description = NULL; + } } /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 81e7852d281..f04d8cf81f3 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) * operations. */ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, - const void *data, size_t datalen); + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); @@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. */ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, - const void *data, size_t datalen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen == 0) { + if (prep->datalen == 0) { /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ keyring_publish_name(keyring); ret = 0; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 60d4e3f5e4b..85730d5a5a5 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ #include #include "internal.h" -static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); +static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, + struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); @@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. */ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, - const void *data, - size_t datalen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data; + key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; return 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 2d5d041f204..42036c7a085 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -927,22 +927,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - size_t datalen) +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!datablob) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); datablob[datalen] = '\0'; options = trusted_options_alloc(); @@ -1011,17 +1012,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) /* * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; struct trusted_key_options *new_o; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; char *datablob; int ret = 0; if (!p->migratable) return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1038,7 +1040,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) goto out; } - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); datablob[datalen] = '\0'; ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); if (ret != Opt_update) { diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index c7660a25a3e..55dc8893918 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); /* * instantiate a user defined key */ -int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto error; ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) /* attach the data */ upayload->datalen = datalen; - memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); + memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); ret = 0; @@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); * update a user defined key * - the key's semaphore is write-locked */ -int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto error; /* construct a replacement payload */ @@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) goto error; upayload->datalen = datalen; - memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); + memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); /* check the quota and attach the new data */ zap = upayload; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 631527703d1aa2f0c5dc2af0d998f4da95c83f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Cox Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2012 12:20:02 +0100 Subject: keys: Fix unreachable code We set ret to NULL then test it. Remove the bogus test Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Signed-off-by: David Howells --- security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 54339cfd673..178b8c3b130 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -357,8 +357,6 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) { case -EAGAIN: /* no key */ - if (ret) - break; case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */ ret = key_ref; break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a84a921978b7d56e0e4b87ffaca6367429b4d8ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Cox Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2012 12:20:02 +0100 Subject: key: Fix resource leak On an error iov may still have been reallocated and need freeing Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Signed-off-by: David Howells --- security/keys/keyctl.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 3364fbf4680..a0d373f7681 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1112,12 +1112,12 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto err; if (ret == 0) goto no_payload_free; ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid); - +err: if (iov != iovstack) kfree(iov); return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 87b526d349b04c31d7b3a40b434eb3f825d22305 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2012 11:40:45 -0700 Subject: seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent This fixes two issues that could cause incompatibility between kernel versions: - If a tracer uses SECCOMP_RET_TRACE to select a syscall number higher than the largest known syscall, emulate the unknown vsyscall by returning -ENOSYS. (This is unlikely to make a noticeable difference on x86-64 due to the way the system call entry works.) - On x86-64 with vsyscall=emulate, skipped vsyscalls were buggy. This updates the documentation accordingly. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Acked-by: Will Drewry Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++--------------- kernel/seccomp.c | 13 +++- 3 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt index 597c3c58137..1e469ef7577 100644 --- a/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt +++ b/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt @@ -95,12 +95,15 @@ SECCOMP_RET_KILL: SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: Results in the kernel sending a SIGSYS signal to the triggering - task without executing the system call. The kernel will - rollback the register state to just before the system call - entry such that a signal handler in the task will be able to - inspect the ucontext_t->uc_mcontext registers and emulate - system call success or failure upon return from the signal - handler. + task without executing the system call. siginfo->si_call_addr + will show the address of the system call instruction, and + siginfo->si_syscall and siginfo->si_arch will indicate which + syscall was attempted. The program counter will be as though + the syscall happened (i.e. it will not point to the syscall + instruction). The return value register will contain an arch- + dependent value -- if resuming execution, set it to something + sensible. (The architecture dependency is because replacing + it with -ENOSYS could overwrite some useful information.) The SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the return value will be passed as si_errno. @@ -123,6 +126,18 @@ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: the BPF program return value will be available to the tracer via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. + The tracer can skip the system call by changing the syscall number + to -1. Alternatively, the tracer can change the system call + requested by changing the system call to a valid syscall number. If + the tracer asks to skip the system call, then the system call will + appear to return the value that the tracer puts in the return value + register. + + The seccomp check will not be run again after the tracer is + notified. (This means that seccomp-based sandboxes MUST NOT + allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without + extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.) + SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: Results in the system call being executed. @@ -161,3 +176,50 @@ architecture supports both ptrace_event and seccomp, it will be able to support seccomp filter with minor fixup: SIGSYS support and seccomp return value checking. Then it must just add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER to its arch-specific Kconfig. + + + +Caveats +------- + +The vDSO can cause some system calls to run entirely in userspace, +leading to surprises when you run programs on different machines that +fall back to real syscalls. To minimize these surprises on x86, make +sure you test with +/sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource set to +something like acpi_pm. + +On x86-64, vsyscall emulation is enabled by default. (vsyscalls are +legacy variants on vDSO calls.) Currently, emulated vsyscalls will honor seccomp, with a few oddities: + +- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRAP will set a si_call_addr pointing to + the vsyscall entry for the given call and not the address after the + 'syscall' instruction. Any code which wants to restart the call + should be aware that (a) a ret instruction has been emulated and (b) + trying to resume the syscall will again trigger the standard vsyscall + emulation security checks, making resuming the syscall mostly + pointless. + +- A return value of SECCOMP_RET_TRACE will signal the tracer as usual, + but the syscall may not be changed to another system call using the + orig_rax register. It may only be changed to -1 order to skip the + currently emulated call. Any other change MAY terminate the process. + The rip value seen by the tracer will be the syscall entry address; + this is different from normal behavior. The tracer MUST NOT modify + rip or rsp. (Do not rely on other changes terminating the process. + They might work. For example, on some kernels, choosing a syscall + that only exists in future kernels will be correctly emulated (by + returning -ENOSYS). + +To detect this quirky behavior, check for addr & ~0x0C00 == +0xFFFFFFFFFF600000. (For SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, use rip. For +SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, use siginfo->si_call_addr.) Do not check any other +condition: future kernels may improve vsyscall emulation and current +kernels in vsyscall=native mode will behave differently, but the +instructions at 0xF...F600{0,4,8,C}00 will not be system calls in these +cases. + +Note that modern systems are unlikely to use vsyscalls at all -- they +are a legacy feature and they are considerably slower than standard +syscalls. New code will use the vDSO, and vDSO-issued system calls +are indistinguishable from normal system calls. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c index 8d141b30904..b2e58a248b3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c @@ -136,19 +136,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr) return nr; } -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP -static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr) -{ - if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp)) - return 0; - task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr; - task_pt_regs(tsk)->ax = syscall_nr; - return __secure_computing(syscall_nr); -} -#else -#define vsyscall_seccomp(_tsk, _nr) 0 -#endif - static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size) { /* @@ -181,10 +168,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { struct task_struct *tsk; unsigned long caller; - int vsyscall_nr; + int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp; int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error; long ret; - int skip; /* * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode @@ -216,56 +202,84 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) } tsk = current; - /* - * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to - * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder. - */ - prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error; - current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1; /* + * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr. + * * NULL is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and * 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here. For all the * vsyscalls, NULL means "don't write anything" not "write it at * address 0". */ - ret = -EFAULT; - skip = 0; switch (vsyscall_nr) { case 0: - skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_gettimeofday); - if (skip) - break; - if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) || - !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) - break; + !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto check_fault; + } + + syscall_nr = __NR_gettimeofday; + break; + + case 1: + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto check_fault; + } + + syscall_nr = __NR_time; + break; + + case 2: + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) || + !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto check_fault; + } + + syscall_nr = __NR_getcpu; + break; + } + + /* + * Handle seccomp. regs->ip must be the original value. + * See seccomp_send_sigsys and Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt. + * + * We could optimize the seccomp disabled case, but performance + * here doesn't matter. + */ + regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr; + regs->ax = -ENOSYS; + tmp = secure_computing(syscall_nr); + if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) { + warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs, + "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip"); + do_exit(SIGSYS); + } + if (tmp) + goto do_ret; /* skip requested */ + /* + * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to + * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder. + */ + prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error; + current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1; + + ret = -EFAULT; + switch (vsyscall_nr) { + case 0: ret = sys_gettimeofday( (struct timeval __user *)regs->di, (struct timezone __user *)regs->si); break; case 1: - skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_time); - if (skip) - break; - - if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) - break; - ret = sys_time((time_t __user *)regs->di); break; case 2: - skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_getcpu); - if (skip) - break; - - if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) || - !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) - break; - ret = sys_getcpu((unsigned __user *)regs->di, (unsigned __user *)regs->si, NULL); @@ -274,12 +288,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error; - if (skip) { - if ((long)regs->ax <= 0L) /* seccomp errno emulation */ - goto do_ret; - goto done; /* seccomp trace/trap */ - } - +check_fault: if (ret == -EFAULT) { /* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */ warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs, @@ -302,7 +311,6 @@ do_ret: /* Emulate a ret instruction. */ regs->ip = caller; regs->sp += 8; -done: return true; sigsegv: diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index ee376beedaf..5af44b59377 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -396,25 +396,29 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: { int data; + struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall); data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; switch (ret) { case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: /* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */ - syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), + syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -data, 0); goto skip; case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: /* Show the handler the original registers. */ - syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current)); + syscall_rollback(current, regs); /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */ seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data); goto skip; case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */ - if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) + if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) { + syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, + -ENOSYS, 0); goto skip; + } /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data); /* @@ -425,6 +429,9 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) */ if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) break; + if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0) + goto skip; /* Explicit request to skip. */ + return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3a50597de8635cd05133bd12c95681c82fe7b878 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2012 19:24:29 +0100 Subject: KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Ray Strode --- include/linux/cred.h | 17 +----- kernel/cred.c | 127 +++++-------------------------------------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 11 ++-- security/keys/process_keys.c | 66 ++++++++-------------- security/keys/request_key.c | 10 ++-- 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 181 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index ebbed2ce663..0142aacb70b 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -76,21 +76,6 @@ extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t); extern int in_group_p(kgid_t); extern int in_egroup_p(kgid_t); -/* - * The common credentials for a thread group - * - shared by CLONE_THREAD - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS -struct thread_group_cred { - atomic_t usage; - pid_t tgid; /* thread group process ID */ - spinlock_t lock; - struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */ - struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */ - struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU deletion hook */ -}; -#endif - /* * The security context of a task * @@ -139,6 +124,8 @@ struct cred { #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested * keys to */ + struct key __rcu *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */ + struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */ struct key *thread_keyring; /* keyring private to this thread */ struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred; /* thread-group shared credentials */ diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index de728ac50d8..3f7ad1ec2ae 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -29,17 +29,6 @@ static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar; -/* - * The common credentials for the initial task's thread group - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS -static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = { - .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2), - .tgid = 0, - .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock), -}; -#endif - /* * The initial credentials for the initial task */ @@ -65,9 +54,6 @@ struct cred init_cred = { .user = INIT_USER, .user_ns = &init_user_ns, .group_info = &init_groups, -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - .tgcred = &init_tgcred, -#endif }; static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n) @@ -95,36 +81,6 @@ static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n) #endif } -/* - * Dispose of the shared task group credentials - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS -static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{ - struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = - container_of(rcu, struct thread_group_cred, rcu); - - BUG_ON(atomic_read(&tgcred->usage) != 0); - - key_put(tgcred->session_keyring); - key_put(tgcred->process_keyring); - kfree(tgcred); -} -#endif - -/* - * Release a set of thread group credentials. - */ -static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred; - - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tgcred->usage)) - call_rcu(&tgcred->rcu, release_tgcred_rcu); -#endif -} - /* * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials */ @@ -150,9 +106,10 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) #endif security_cred_free(cred); + key_put(cred->session_keyring); + key_put(cred->process_keyring); key_put(cred->thread_keyring); key_put(cred->request_key_auth); - release_tgcred(cred); if (cred->group_info) put_group_info(cred->group_info); free_uid(cred->user); @@ -246,15 +203,6 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) if (!new) return NULL; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - new->tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!new->tgcred) { - kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new); - return NULL; - } - atomic_set(&new->tgcred->usage, 1); -#endif - atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS new->magic = CRED_MAGIC; @@ -308,9 +256,10 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void) get_user_ns(new->user_ns); #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + key_get(new->session_keyring); + key_get(new->process_keyring); key_get(new->thread_keyring); key_get(new->request_key_auth); - atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY @@ -334,39 +283,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); */ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) { - struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL; struct cred *new; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tgcred) - return NULL; -#endif - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) { - kfree(tgcred); + if (!new) return new; - } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */ key_put(new->thread_keyring); new->thread_keyring = NULL; - /* create a new per-thread-group creds for all this set of threads to - * share */ - memcpy(tgcred, new->tgcred, sizeof(struct thread_group_cred)); - - atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); - spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); - /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */ - key_get(tgcred->session_keyring); - tgcred->process_keyring = NULL; - - release_tgcred(new); - new->tgcred = tgcred; + key_put(new->process_keyring); + new->process_keyring = NULL; #endif return new; @@ -383,9 +313,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) */ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) { -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct thread_group_cred *tgcred; -#endif struct cred *new; int ret; @@ -425,22 +352,12 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new); } - /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in - * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a - * bit */ + /* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process; + * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit. + */ if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { - tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tgcred) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error_put; - } - atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); - spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); - tgcred->process_keyring = NULL; - tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring); - - release_tgcred(new); - new->tgcred = tgcred; + key_put(new->process_keyring); + new->process_keyring = NULL; } #endif @@ -643,9 +560,6 @@ void __init cred_init(void) */ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) { -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct thread_group_cred *tgcred; -#endif const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; @@ -653,14 +567,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) if (!new) return NULL; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tgcred) { - kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, new); - return NULL; - } -#endif - kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new); if (daemon) @@ -678,13 +584,10 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) get_group_info(new->group_info); #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1); - spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock); - tgcred->process_keyring = NULL; - tgcred->session_keyring = NULL; - new->tgcred = tgcred; - new->request_key_auth = NULL; + new->session_keyring = NULL; + new->process_keyring = NULL; new->thread_keyring = NULL; + new->request_key_auth = NULL; new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; #endif diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index a0d373f7681..65b38417c21 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1475,7 +1475,8 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) goto error_keyring; newwork = &cred->rcu; - cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); + cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); + keyring_r = NULL; init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring); me = current; @@ -1500,7 +1501,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) mycred = current_cred(); pcred = __task_cred(parent); if (mycred == pcred || - mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) { + mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) { ret = 0; goto unlock; } @@ -1516,9 +1517,9 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) goto unlock; /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ - if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring && - pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) || - mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) + if ((pcred->session_keyring && + pcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) || + mycred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) goto unlock; /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 178b8c3b130..9de5dc59827 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -169,9 +169,8 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void) int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) { struct key *keyring; - int ret; - if (new->tgcred->process_keyring) + if (new->process_keyring) return -EEXIST; keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, @@ -179,17 +178,8 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); - spin_lock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock); - if (!new->tgcred->process_keyring) { - new->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring; - keyring = NULL; - ret = 0; - } else { - ret = -EEXIST; - } - spin_unlock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock); - key_put(keyring); - return ret; + new->process_keyring = keyring; + return 0; } /* @@ -230,7 +220,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) /* create an empty session keyring */ if (!keyring) { flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN; - if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring) + if (cred->session_keyring) flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA; keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, @@ -242,17 +232,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) } /* install the keyring */ - spin_lock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock); - old = cred->tgcred->session_keyring; - rcu_assign_pointer(cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring); - spin_unlock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock); - - /* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising - * on it if it didn't previously point to anything */ - if (old) { - synchronize_rcu(); + old = cred->session_keyring; + rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring); + + if (old) key_put(old); - } return 0; } @@ -367,9 +351,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, } /* search the process keyring second */ - if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) { + if (cred->process_keyring) { key_ref = keyring_search_aux( - make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1), + make_key_ref(cred->process_keyring, 1), cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; @@ -388,12 +372,10 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, } /* search the session keyring */ - if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring) { + if (cred->session_keyring) { rcu_read_lock(); key_ref = keyring_search_aux( - make_key_ref(rcu_dereference( - cred->tgcred->session_keyring), - 1), + make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring), 1), cred, type, description, match, no_state_check); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -563,7 +545,7 @@ try_again: break; case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING: - if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) { + if (!cred->process_keyring) { if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)) goto error; @@ -575,13 +557,13 @@ try_again: goto reget_creds; } - key = cred->tgcred->process_keyring; + key = cred->process_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break; case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING: - if (!cred->tgcred->session_keyring) { + if (!cred->session_keyring) { /* always install a session keyring upon access if one * doesn't exist yet */ ret = install_user_keyrings(); @@ -596,7 +578,7 @@ try_again: if (ret < 0) goto error; goto reget_creds; - } else if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring == + } else if (cred->session_keyring == cred->user->session_keyring && lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) { ret = join_session_keyring(NULL); @@ -606,7 +588,7 @@ try_again: } rcu_read_lock(); - key = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring); + key = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring); atomic_inc(&key->usage); rcu_read_unlock(); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); @@ -766,12 +748,6 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) struct key *keyring; long ret, serial; - /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group - - * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking - * ENOMEM */ - if (!current_is_single_threaded()) - return -EMLINK; - new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; @@ -783,7 +759,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) if (ret < 0) goto error; - serial = new->tgcred->session_keyring->serial; + serial = new->session_keyring->serial; ret = commit_creds(new); if (ret == 0) ret = serial; @@ -806,6 +782,9 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) } else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto error2; + } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) { + ret = 0; + goto error2; } /* we've got a keyring - now to install it */ @@ -862,8 +841,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring); - new->tgcred->tgid = old->tgcred->tgid; - new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring); + new->process_keyring = key_get(old->process_keyring); security_transfer_creds(new, old); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 000e7501752..275c4f9e4b8 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -150,12 +150,12 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, cred->thread_keyring ? cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0); prkey = 0; - if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) - prkey = cred->tgcred->process_keyring->serial; + if (cred->process_keyring) + prkey = cred->process_keyring->serial; sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey); rcu_read_lock(); - session = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring); + session = rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring); if (!session) session = cred->user->session_keyring; sskey = session->serial; @@ -297,14 +297,14 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) break; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING: - dest_keyring = key_get(cred->tgcred->process_keyring); + dest_keyring = key_get(cred->process_keyring); if (dest_keyring) break; case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING: rcu_read_lock(); dest_keyring = key_get( - rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring)); + rcu_dereference(cred->session_keyring)); rcu_read_unlock(); if (dest_keyring) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2012 19:24:56 +0100 Subject: KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys Reduce the initial permissions on new keys to grant the possessor everything, view permission only to the user (so the keys can be seen in /proc/keys) and nothing else. This gives the creator a chance to adjust the permissions mask before other processes can access the new key or create a link to it. To aid with this, keyring_alloc() now takes a permission argument rather than setting the permissions itself. The following permissions are now set: (1) The user and user-session keyrings grant the user that owns them full permissions and grant a possessor everything bar SETATTR. (2) The process and thread keyrings grant the possessor full permissions but only grant the user VIEW. This permits the user to see them in /proc/keys, but not to do anything with them. (3) Anonymous session keyrings grant the possessor full permissions, but only grant the user VIEW and READ. This means that the user can see them in /proc/keys and can list them, but nothing else. Possibly READ shouldn't be provided either. (4) Named session keyrings grant everything an anonymous session keyring does, plus they grant the user LINK permission. The whole point of named session keyrings is that others can also subscribe to them. Possibly this should be a separate permission to LINK. (5) The temporary session keyring created by call_sbin_request_key() gets the same permissions as an anonymous session keyring. (6) Keys created by add_key() get VIEW, SEARCH, LINK and SETATTR for the possessor, plus READ and/or WRITE if the key type supports them. The used only gets VIEW now. (7) Keys created by request_key() now get the same as those created by add_key(). Reported-by: Lennart Poettering Reported-by: Stef Walter Signed-off-by: David Howells --- include/linux/key.h | 1 + security/keys/key.c | 6 +++--- security/keys/keyring.c | 9 +++------ security/keys/process_keys.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/request_key.c | 11 ++++++++++- 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index cef3b315ba7..89069981521 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern int key_unlink(struct key *keyring, extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, + key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags, struct key *dest); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 50d96d4e06f..bebeca3a78e 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -826,13 +826,13 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, /* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */ if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) { perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; - perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_LINK | KEY_USR_SETATTR; + perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; if (ktype->read) - perm |= KEY_POS_READ | KEY_USR_READ; + perm |= KEY_POS_READ; if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update) - perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE; + perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; } /* allocate a new key */ diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 81e7852d281..cf704a92083 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -257,17 +257,14 @@ error: * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring. */ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, - const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags, - struct key *dest) + const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, + unsigned long flags, struct key *dest) { struct key *keyring; int ret; keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description, - uid, gid, cred, - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL, - flags); - + uid, gid, cred, perm, flags); if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL); if (ret < 0) { diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 9de5dc59827..b58d9389274 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) struct user_struct *user; const struct cred *cred; struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; + key_perm_t user_keyring_perm; char buf[20]; int ret; + user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL; cred = current_cred(); user = cred->user; @@ -72,8 +74,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, - cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, - NULL); + cred, user_keyring_perm, + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring); goto error; @@ -88,7 +90,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, - cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + cred, user_keyring_perm, + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); goto error_release; @@ -129,6 +132,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) struct key *keyring; keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new, + KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -173,8 +177,9 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) if (new->process_keyring) return -EEXIST; - keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, - new, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); + keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new, + KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW, + KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -223,8 +228,9 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) if (cred->session_keyring) flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA; - keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, - cred, flags, NULL); + keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred, + KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, + flags, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); } else { @@ -773,8 +779,10 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false); if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) { /* not found - try and create a new one */ - keyring = keyring_alloc(name, old->uid, old->gid, old, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + keyring = keyring_alloc( + name, old->uid, old->gid, old, + KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK, + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto error2; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 275c4f9e4b8..0ae3a220277 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, cred = get_current_cred(); keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, + KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); put_cred(cred); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { @@ -347,6 +348,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned long prealloc; struct key *key; + key_perm_t perm; key_ref_t key_ref; int ret; @@ -355,8 +357,15 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type, *_key = NULL; mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock); + perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR; + perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW; + if (type->read) + perm |= KEY_POS_READ; + if (type == &key_type_keyring || type->update) + perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; + key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, - KEY_POS_ALL, flags); + perm, flags); if (IS_ERR(key)) goto alloc_failed; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8aa23a55f813c9bddec2a6176e0e67274e6e7c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2012 19:24:56 +0100 Subject: KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings now that it has a permissions parameter rather than using key_alloc() + key_instantiate_and_link(). Also document and export keyring_alloc() so that modules can use it too. Signed-off-by: David Howells --- Documentation/security/keys.txt | 17 +++++++++++++++++ fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 12 ++++-------- fs/nfs/idmap.c | 12 ++++-------- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 13 +++++-------- security/keys/keyring.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index aa0dbd74b71..a4f9125c033 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -990,6 +990,23 @@ payload contents" for more information. reference pointer if successful. +(*) A keyring can be created by: + + struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, + const struct cred *cred, + key_perm_t perm, + unsigned long flags, + struct key *dest); + + This creates a keyring with the given attributes and returns it. If dest + is not NULL, the new keyring will be linked into the keyring to which it + points. No permission checks are made upon the destination keyring. + + Error EDQUOT can be returned if the keyring would overload the quota (pass + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted + towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned. + + (*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called: int validate_key(struct key *key); diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index 05f4dc263a2..a8a753c8fcd 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -537,19 +537,15 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void) if (!cred) return -ENOMEM; - keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".cifs_idmap", 0, 0, cred, - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_idmap", 0, 0, cred, + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; } - ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); - if (ret < 0) - goto failed_put_key; - ret = register_key_type(&cifs_idmap_key_type); if (ret < 0) goto failed_put_key; diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c index a850079467d..957134b4c0f 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c @@ -192,19 +192,15 @@ static int nfs_idmap_init_keyring(void) if (!cred) return -ENOMEM; - keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".id_resolver", 0, 0, cred, - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + keyring = keyring_alloc(".id_resolver", 0, 0, cred, + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; } - ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); - if (ret < 0) - goto failed_put_key; - ret = register_key_type(&key_type_id_resolver); if (ret < 0) goto failed_put_key; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index d9507dd0581..f2c379d835e 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -259,19 +259,15 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void) if (!cred) return -ENOMEM; - keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".dns_resolver", 0, 0, cred, - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver", 0, 0, cred, + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; } - ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); - if (ret < 0) - goto failed_put_key; - ret = register_key_type(&key_type_dns_resolver); if (ret < 0) goto failed_put_key; @@ -303,3 +299,4 @@ static void __exit exit_dns_resolver(void) module_init(init_dns_resolver) module_exit(exit_dns_resolver) MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index cf704a92083..8c25558da14 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, return keyring; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc); /** * keyring_search_aux - Search a keyring tree for a key matching some criteria -- cgit v1.2.3 From b5666502700855a1eb1a15482005b22478b9460e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashley Lai Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 12:49:50 -0500 Subject: drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup This patch removed the tasklet and moved the wait queue into the private structure. It also cleaned up the response CRQ path. Signed-off-by: Ashley Lai Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h | 5 ++- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c index efc4ab36a9d..88a95ea2ba0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c @@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ static struct vio_device_id tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table[] __devinitdata = { }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(vio, tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table); -DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(wq); - /** * ibmvtpm_send_crq - Send a CRQ request * @vdev: vio device struct @@ -83,6 +81,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) { struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm; u16 len; + int sig; ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)chip->vendor.data; @@ -91,22 +90,23 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) return 0; } - wait_event_interruptible(wq, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len != 0); + sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, ibmvtpm->res_len != 0); + if (sig) + return -EINTR; + + len = ibmvtpm->res_len; - if (count < ibmvtpm->crq_res.len) { + if (count < len) { dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Invalid size in recv: count=%ld, crq_size=%d\n", - count, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len); + count, len); return -EIO; } spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock); - memcpy((void *)buf, (void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len); - memset(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, 0, ibmvtpm->crq_res.len); - ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = 0; - ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = 0; - len = ibmvtpm->crq_res.len; - ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = 0; + memcpy((void *)buf, (void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, len); + memset(ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, 0, len); + ibmvtpm->res_len = 0; spin_unlock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock); return len; } @@ -273,7 +273,6 @@ static int __devexit tpm_ibmvtpm_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev) int rc = 0; free_irq(vdev->irq, ibmvtpm); - tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet); do { if (rc) @@ -372,7 +371,6 @@ static int ibmvtpm_reset_crq(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm) static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev) { struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = ibmvtpm_get_data(dev); - unsigned long flags; int rc = 0; do { @@ -387,10 +385,11 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev) return rc; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); - vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev); - tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); + rc = vio_enable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev); + if (rc) { + dev_err(dev, "Error vio_enable_interrupts rc=%d\n", rc); + return rc; + } rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm); if (rc) @@ -467,7 +466,7 @@ static struct ibmvtpm_crq *ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm) if (crq->valid & VTPM_MSG_RES) { if (++crq_q->index == crq_q->num_entry) crq_q->index = 0; - rmb(); + smp_rmb(); } else crq = NULL; return crq; @@ -535,11 +534,9 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq, ibmvtpm->vtpm_version = crq->data; return; case VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES: - ibmvtpm->crq_res.valid = crq->valid; - ibmvtpm->crq_res.msg = crq->msg; - ibmvtpm->crq_res.len = crq->len; - ibmvtpm->crq_res.data = crq->data; - wake_up_interruptible(&wq); + /* len of the data in rtce buffer */ + ibmvtpm->res_len = crq->len; + wake_up_interruptible(&ibmvtpm->wq); return; default: return; @@ -559,38 +556,19 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq, static irqreturn_t ibmvtpm_interrupt(int irq, void *vtpm_instance) { struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *) vtpm_instance; - unsigned long flags; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); - vio_disable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev); - tasklet_schedule(&ibmvtpm->tasklet); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); - - return IRQ_HANDLED; -} - -/** - * ibmvtpm_tasklet - Interrupt handler tasklet - * @data: ibm vtpm device struct - * - * Returns: - * Nothing - **/ -static void ibmvtpm_tasklet(void *data) -{ - struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = data; struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq; - unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); + /* while loop is needed for initial setup (get version and + * get rtce_size). There should be only one tpm request at any + * given time. + */ while ((crq = ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(ibmvtpm)) != NULL) { ibmvtpm_crq_process(crq, ibmvtpm); crq->valid = 0; - wmb(); + smp_wmb(); } - vio_enable_interrupts(ibmvtpm->vdev); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ibmvtpm->lock, flags); + return IRQ_HANDLED; } /** @@ -650,9 +628,6 @@ static int __devinit tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev, goto reg_crq_cleanup; } - tasklet_init(&ibmvtpm->tasklet, (void *)ibmvtpm_tasklet, - (unsigned long)ibmvtpm); - rc = request_irq(vio_dev->irq, ibmvtpm_interrupt, 0, tpm_ibmvtpm_driver_name, ibmvtpm); if (rc) { @@ -666,13 +641,14 @@ static int __devinit tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev, goto init_irq_cleanup; } + init_waitqueue_head(&ibmvtpm->wq); + crq_q->index = 0; ibmvtpm->dev = dev; ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev; chip->vendor.data = (void *)ibmvtpm; - spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->lock); spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock); rc = ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(ibmvtpm); @@ -689,7 +665,6 @@ static int __devinit tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev, return rc; init_irq_cleanup: - tasklet_kill(&ibmvtpm->tasklet); do { rc1 = plpar_hcall_norets(H_FREE_CRQ, vio_dev->unit_address); } while (rc1 == H_BUSY || H_IS_LONG_BUSY(rc1)); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h index 4296eb4b4d8..bd82a791f99 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h @@ -38,13 +38,12 @@ struct ibmvtpm_dev { struct vio_dev *vdev; struct ibmvtpm_crq_queue crq_queue; dma_addr_t crq_dma_handle; - spinlock_t lock; - struct tasklet_struct tasklet; u32 rtce_size; void __iomem *rtce_buf; dma_addr_t rtce_dma_handle; spinlock_t rtce_lock; - struct ibmvtpm_crq crq_res; + wait_queue_head_t wq; + u16 res_len; u32 vtpm_version; }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 93b69d437effff11b1c37f330d3265c37ec2f84b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2012 14:53:58 -0700 Subject: Yama: add RCU to drop read locking Stop using spinlocks in the read path. Add RCU list to handle the readers. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Serge E. Hallyn Acked-by: John Johansen --- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index b4c29848b49..70cd85e3ba3 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct ptrace_relation { struct task_struct *tracer; struct task_struct *tracee; struct list_head node; + struct rcu_head rcu; }; static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations); @@ -48,32 +49,31 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock); static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) { - int rc = 0; - struct ptrace_relation *added; - struct ptrace_relation *entry, *relation = NULL; + struct ptrace_relation *relation, *added; added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL); if (!added) return -ENOMEM; + added->tracee = tracee; + added->tracer = tracer; + spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); - list_for_each_entry(entry, &ptracer_relations, node) - if (entry->tracee == tracee) { - relation = entry; - break; + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { + if (relation->tracee == tracee) { + list_replace_rcu(&relation->node, &added->node); + kfree_rcu(relation, rcu); + goto out; } - if (!relation) { - relation = added; - relation->tracee = tracee; - list_add(&relation->node, &ptracer_relations); } - relation->tracer = tracer; - spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); - if (added != relation) - kfree(added); + list_add_rcu(&added->node, &ptracer_relations); - return rc; +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + return 0; } /** @@ -84,15 +84,18 @@ static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer, static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) { - struct ptrace_relation *relation, *safe; + struct ptrace_relation *relation; spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); - list_for_each_entry_safe(relation, safe, &ptracer_relations, node) + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { if (relation->tracee == tracee || (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) { - list_del(&relation->node); - kfree(relation); + list_del_rcu(&relation->node); + kfree_rcu(relation, rcu); } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); } @@ -217,11 +220,10 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *parent = NULL; bool found = false; - spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); rcu_read_lock(); if (!thread_group_leader(tracee)) tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader); - list_for_each_entry(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) if (relation->tracee == tracee) { parent = relation->tracer; found = true; @@ -231,7 +233,6 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer))) rc = 1; rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); return rc; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 235e752789eb65a81477bb82845323dfcbf93012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 15:21:26 -0800 Subject: Yama: remove locking from delete path Instead of locking the list during a delete, mark entries as invalid and trigger a workqueue to clean them up. This lets us easily handle task_free from interrupt context. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 70cd85e3ba3..2663145d119 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0 #define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1 @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ static int ptrace_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL; struct ptrace_relation { struct task_struct *tracer; struct task_struct *tracee; + bool invalid; struct list_head node; struct rcu_head rcu; }; @@ -36,6 +38,29 @@ struct ptrace_relation { static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock); +static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work); +static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup); + +/** + * yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list + * + */ +static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct ptrace_relation *relation; + + spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock); + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { + if (relation->invalid) { + list_del_rcu(&relation->node); + kfree_rcu(relation, rcu); + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock); +} + /** * yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair * @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace @@ -57,10 +82,13 @@ static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer, added->tracee = tracee; added->tracer = tracer; + added->invalid = false; - spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock); rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { + if (relation->invalid) + continue; if (relation->tracee == tracee) { list_replace_rcu(&relation->node, &added->node); kfree_rcu(relation, rcu); @@ -72,7 +100,7 @@ static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer, out: rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock); return 0; } @@ -85,18 +113,22 @@ static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) { struct ptrace_relation *relation; + bool marked = false; - spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { + if (relation->invalid) + continue; if (relation->tracee == tracee || (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) { - list_del_rcu(&relation->node); - kfree_rcu(relation, rcu); + relation->invalid = true; + marked = true; } } rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock); + + if (marked) + schedule_work(&yama_relation_work); } /** @@ -223,12 +255,15 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, rcu_read_lock(); if (!thread_group_leader(tracee)) tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { + if (relation->invalid) + continue; if (relation->tracee == tracee) { parent = relation->tracer; found = true; break; } + } if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer))) rc = 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 111fe8bd65e473d5fc6a0478cf1e2c8c6a77489a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 11:28:11 -0700 Subject: Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig The components NETLABEL and SECURITY_NETWORK are required by Smack. Using "depends" in Kconfig hides the Smack option if the user hasn't figured out that they need to be enabled while using make menuconfig. Using select is a better choice. Because select is not recursive depends on NET and SECURITY are added. The reflects similar usage in TOMOYO and AppArmor. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/Kconfig | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig index 603b0878434..e69de9c642b 100644 --- a/security/smack/Kconfig +++ b/security/smack/Kconfig @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support" - depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK + depends on NET + depends on INET + depends on SECURITY + select NETLABEL + select SECURITY_NETWORK default n help This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. -- cgit v1.2.3 From e93072374112db9dc86635934ee761249be28370 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 18:14:32 -0700 Subject: Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs There are a number of "conventions" for where to put LSM filesystems. Smack adheres to none of them. Create a mount point at /sys/fs/smackfs for mounting smackfs so that Smack can be conventional. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smackfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 99929a50093..76a5dca4640 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2063,6 +2063,19 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +static struct kset *smackfs_kset; +/** + * smk_init_sysfs - initialize /sys/fs/smackfs + * + */ +static int smk_init_sysfs(void) +{ + smackfs_kset = kset_create_and_add("smackfs", NULL, fs_kobj); + if (!smackfs_kset) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + /** * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock * @sb: the empty superblock @@ -2183,6 +2196,10 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) return 0; + err = smk_init_sysfs(); + if (err) + printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs: sysfs mountpoint problem.\n"); + err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type); if (!err) { smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type); -- cgit v1.2.3