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2010-01-29Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functionsLinus Torvalds1-0/+1
'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and it is pretty badly misnamed. It doesn't just flush the old executable environment, it also starts up the new one. Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails. As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit (TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do the actual personality magic. This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the 'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail (still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()). All callers are changed to trivially comply with the new world order. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-12-17mm: introduce coredump parameter structureMasami Hiramatsu1-1/+1
Introduce coredump parameter data structure (struct coredump_params) to simplify binfmt->core_dump() arguments. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-31Don't crap into descriptor table in binfmt_somAl Viro1-7/+0
Same story as in binfmt_elf, except that in binfmt_som we actually forget to close the sucker. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-11-14CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells1-1/+1
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-16binfmt_som.c: add MODULE_LICENSEAdrian Bunk1-0/+2
Add the missing MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"). Reported-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx> Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@parisc-linux.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-26tracehook: execRoland McGrath1-2/+0
This moves all the ptrace hooks related to exec into tracehook.h inlines. This also lifts the calls for tracing out of the binfmt load_binary hooks into search_binary_handler() after it calls into the binfmt module. This change has no effect, since all the binfmt modules' load_binary functions did the call at the end on success, and now search_binary_handler() does it immediately after return if successful. We consolidate the repeated code, and binfmt modules no longer need to import ptrace_notify(). Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-25[PATCH] sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()Al Viro1-10/+0
* unshare_files() can fail; doing it after irreversible actions is wrong and de_thread() is certainly irreversible. * since we do it unconditionally anyway, we might as well do it in do_execve() and save ourselves the PITA in binfmt handlers, etc. * while we are at it, binfmt_som actually leaked files_struct on failure. As a side benefit, unshare_files(), put_files_struct() and reset_files_struct() become unexported. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-02-08aout: remove unnecessary inclusions of {asm, linux}/a.out.hDavid Howells1-1/+0
Remove now unnecessary inclusions of {asm,linux}/a.out.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix alpha build] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17core_pattern: ignore RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipeNeil Horman1-1/+1
For some time /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern has been able to set its output destination as a pipe, allowing a user space helper to receive and intellegently process a core. This infrastructure however has some shortcommings which can be enhanced. Specifically: 1) The coredump code in the kernel should ignore RLIMIT_CORE limitation when core_pattern is a pipe, since file system resources are not being consumed in this case, unless the user application wishes to save the core, at which point the app is restricted by usual file system limits and restrictions. 2) The core_pattern code should be able to parse and pass options to the user space helper as an argv array. The real core limit of the uid of the crashing proces should also be passable to the user space helper (since it is overridden to zero when called). 3) Some miscellaneous bugs need to be cleaned up (specifically the recognition of a recursive core dump, should the user mode helper itself crash. Also, the core dump code in the kernel should not wait for the user mode helper to exit, since the same context is responsible for writing to the pipe, and a read of the pipe by the user mode helper will result in a deadlock. This patch: Remove the check of RLIMIT_CORE if core_pattern is a pipe. In the event that core_pattern is a pipe, the entire core will be fed to the user mode helper. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com> Cc: <wwoods@redhat.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2006-10-04[PARISC] Fix fs/binfmt_som.cMatthew Wilcox1-2/+16
Fix compilation (missing include of a.out.h) Fix security hole (need to call unshare_files) Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx> Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@parisc-linux.org>
2006-06-30Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel1-1/+0
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2005-10-29[PATCH] mm: mm_init set_mm_countersHugh Dickins1-1/+0
How is anon_rss initialized? In dup_mmap, and by mm_alloc's memset; but that's not so good if an mm_counter_t is a special type. And how is rss initialized? By set_mm_counter, all over the place. Come on, we just need to initialize them both at once by set_mm_counter in mm_init (which follows the memcpy when forking). Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-04-16Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds1-0/+309
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!