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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-02-26 20:16:07 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-02-26 20:16:07 -0800 |
commit | d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b (patch) | |
tree | 895dc9157e28f603d937a58be664e4e440d5530c /security/selinux | |
parent | 9626357371b519f2b955fef399647181034a77fe (diff) | |
parent | d3d009cb965eae7e002ea5badf603ea8f4c34915 (diff) | |
download | linux-3.10-d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b.tar.gz linux-3.10-d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b.tar.bz2 linux-3.10-d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing ->d_name/->d_parent
locking violations, etc.
The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with
"has ->d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file
to inode. Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes.
Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from
several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then.
PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits)
saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions
proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()
fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM
fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static
ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock
ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path
get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both ->f_pos and ->f_version zero
target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless
export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances
fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type
kill f_vfsmnt
vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op
nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol
switch vfs_getattr() to struct path
default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h
ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted
d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances
9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate()
9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl()
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 20 |
2 files changed, 13 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ef26e9611ff..84b591711ee 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; @@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); @@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) @@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { - struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = file->f_security; - isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security; + isec = file_inode(file)->i_security; /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 3a6e8731646..ff427733c29 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, { char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino; int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ? security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown(); @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = { static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos) { - ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; char *data; ssize_t rv; @@ -1042,8 +1042,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ssize_t length; ssize_t ret; int cur_enforcing; - struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; + unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex); @@ -1077,8 +1076,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, char *page = NULL; ssize_t length; int new_value; - struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; + unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; mutex_lock(&sel_mutex); @@ -1486,13 +1484,11 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct inode *inode; char *con; u32 sid, len; ssize_t ret; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK; + sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK; ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1553,7 +1549,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino) static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; char res[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); @@ -1567,7 +1563,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; char res[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len); @@ -1584,7 +1580,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, int value; char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK); length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value); |