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| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2010-11-15 18:36:29 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-11-15 15:40:01 -0800 |
| commit | 12b3052c3ee8f508b2c7ee4ddd63ed03423409d8 (patch) | |
| tree | b97d0f209f363cfad94ce9d075312274e349da89 /security/commoncap.c | |
| parent | 6800e4c0ea3e96cf78953b8b5743381cb1bb9e37 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3.10-12b3052c3ee8f508b2c7ee4ddd63ed03423409d8.tar.gz linux-3.10-12b3052c3ee8f508b2c7ee4ddd63ed03423409d8.tar.bz2 linux-3.10-12b3052c3ee8f508b2c7ee4ddd63ed03423409d8.zip | |
capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failure
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 04b80f9912b..64c2ed9c901 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> -#include <linux/syslog.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in @@ -884,26 +883,6 @@ error: } /** - * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted - * @type: Function requested - * @from_file: Whether this request came from an open file (i.e. /proc) - * - * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular - * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not. - */ -int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file) -{ - if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file) - return 0; - if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && - type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -/** * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made * @pages: The size of the mapping |