KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]

Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 06400cf0775..93a2ffe6590 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -836,6 +845,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+				     struct key *key)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -961,9 +977,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
@@ -1063,6 +1081,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);