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authorJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>2007-06-04 19:05:57 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2007-06-07 13:42:46 -0700
commit4aa2e62c45b5ca08be2d0d3c0744d7585b56e860 (patch)
tree16649593d55f3df4dac54227fcda28bb4fb49f17 /net/8021q
parentb00b4bf94edb42852d55619af453588b2de2dc5e (diff)
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xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD
Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete()) However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks patch. This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and SPD. It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial. If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error without removing anything. This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the entire database. Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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