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| author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2009-01-05 17:19:37 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2009-01-07 15:40:44 -0500 |
| commit | f05ef8db1abe68e3f6fc272efee51bc54ce528c5 (patch) | |
| tree | 8e74dfecce221e51ec3631c66c0e4f8ce589b566 /fs | |
| parent | 0dba7c2a9ed3d4a1e58f5d94fffa9f44dbe012e6 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3.10-f05ef8db1abe68e3f6fc272efee51bc54ce528c5.tar.gz linux-3.10-f05ef8db1abe68e3f6fc272efee51bc54ce528c5.tar.bz2 linux-3.10-f05ef8db1abe68e3f6fc272efee51bc54ce528c5.zip | |
CRED: Fix NFSD regression
Fix a regression in NFSD's permission checking introduced by the credentials
patches. There are two parts to the problem, both in nfsd_setuser():
(1) The return value of set_groups() is -ve if in error, not 0, and should be
checked appropriately. 0 indicates success.
(2) The UID to use for fs accesses is in new->fsuid, not new->uid (which is
0). This causes CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to always be set, rather than being
cleared if the UID is anything other than 0 after squashing.
Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/auth.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c index 0184fe9b514..c903e04aa21 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c @@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) ret = set_groups(new, gi); put_group_info(gi); - if (!ret) + if (ret < 0) goto error; - if (new->uid) + if (new->fsuid) new->cap_effective = cap_drop_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective); else new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective, |