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author | Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> | 2009-03-28 23:20:19 +0000 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-03-28 17:30:00 -0700 |
commit | e426b64c412aaa3e9eb3e4b261dc5be0d5a83e78 (patch) | |
tree | c1528139b34fef3e4595576266c64068098fe211 /fs/compat.c | |
parent | 53e9309e01277ec99c38e84e0ca16921287cf470 (diff) | |
download | linux-3.10-e426b64c412aaa3e9eb3e4b261dc5be0d5a83e78.tar.gz linux-3.10-e426b64c412aaa3e9eb3e4b261dc5be0d5a83e78.tar.bz2 linux-3.10-e426b64c412aaa3e9eb3e4b261dc5be0d5a83e78.zip |
fix setuid sometimes doesn't
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.
Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.
[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]
Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/compat.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/compat.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c index b543363dd62..55efdfebdf5 100644 --- a/fs/compat.c +++ b/fs/compat.c @@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); if (!bprm->cred) goto out_unlock; - check_unsafe_exec(bprm, current->files); + check_unsafe_exec(bprm); file = open_exec(filename); retval = PTR_ERR(file); |