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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-04-23 21:29:27 (GMT)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2014-06-26 19:12:37 (GMT)
commit1141a455802884d3bcbcf6b30e1d65d09cf286e1 (patch)
treecf3e9a2df48351395ea657c35fd0736090ae3845 /crypto
parent738f378d77b04f685f2cd01aa4240d1bce5c9668 (diff)
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net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/crypto_user.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 1512e41..43665d0 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&